42 U.S.C. § 1983

Judicial immunity bars § 1983 liability for a judge-appointed hearing officer whose actions are quasi-judicial.

Jefferson v. City of Hazlehurst · filed 1995-12-29

Defendant Stuart, who was appointed by Judge Shannon as the hearing officer, is also immune from liability pursuant to the doctrine of judicial immunity. ... Hence, this court finds that his actions were quasi-judicial in nature and also protected by judicial immunity.

A social worker acting within the scope of a valid court order has absolute quasi-judicial immunity from a Section 1983 claim.

Mary Smith and William Morrison Smith v. City of Bad Axe David Miller, Officer County of Huron and Carol Henny, Four Sea · filed 1996-01-22

As this court has noted, "Quasi-judicial immunity extends to those persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune." ... Because Henny acted within the scope of this order, she is cloaked with absolute immunity and we therefore affirm the district court's entry of judgment in her favor.

Section 1983 does not subject a judge to damages liability for judicial acts, including contempt and sentencing, performed within the judge’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

Sleeman v. Brazoria County · filed 1996-02-02

We conclude that Judge Blackstock is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for citing Sleeman with contempt and sentencing him to ninety days in jail and a $300 fine.

A constable who allegedly alters a court order of execution to thwart the issuing judge’s intent is not entitled to judicial immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Miniscalco v. Gordon · filed 1996-02-26

The question in this case is whether judicial immunity attaches to a constable who, acting as the arm of the court in carrying out an order of execution, allegedly altered that order so as to thwart the intention of the district justice and pervert the judicial process. Defendant has cited no authority holding or even suggesting that a constable acting in this manner is immune from suit under section 1983, and I know of none.

University grievance officials lack quasi-judicial absolute immunity from § 1983 liability when the grievance process lacks sufficient independence and procedural safeguards.

Purisch v. Tennessee Technological University · filed 1996-03-01

In short, the Tennessee Tech grievance proceedings do not meet the Watts test, and therefore neither Quattlebaum nor Volpe is entitled to quasi-judicial absolute immunity.

Absolute and quasi-judicial immunity can support dismissal of a § 1983 action against judges and court personnel.

Leathem v. U.S. Dist. Court, Eastern Dist. of California · filed 1996-03-05

Appellants contend the district court erred when it dismissed their action on the grounds of absolute and quasi-judicial immunity as well as mootness. Appellants insist that their allegations state federal claims. We disagree for the reasons stated by the district court.

Judges have absolute judicial immunity from § 1983 claims for actions within the scope of their jurisdiction.

Isom v. Young · filed 1996-03-07

Judge Young's actions were within the scope of his jurisdiction, thus affording him absolute judicial immunity.

Section 1983 claims against a municipal judge may be dismissed on judicial immunity grounds.

Brown v. Bost · filed 1996-03-12

Keith and Jamie Brown brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, raising various federal and state claims against Chris Williams, in his individual and official capacities as a municipal court judge for the City of Malvern, Arkansas, and also against the City of Malvern (City). ... In a full and extensive opinion, the district court1 granted Williams' motion to dismiss because Williams was entitled to judicial immunity and because the complaint failed to state a claim against the City. ... We affirm on the basis of Judge Hendren's well-reasoned opinion.

State judges are immune from damages under Section 1983 when they did not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction.

Kelly v. Franklin Freeman Ernest B. Fullwood Robert L. Farmer · filed 1996-04-23

The district court properly found that the two state judges were immune from damages because they were not acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction.

A state district judge has absolute immunity from a § 1983 action seeking to compel the judge to conduct a hearing.

Wolfe v. Gabbard · filed 1996-04-22

The court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding defendant was entitled to absolute immunity as a state district court judge, Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1435 (10th Cir. 1986), and that federal courts have no authority to direct state courts in the performance of their duties, id. at 1436 n. 5. We have reviewed the briefs on appeal, the pleadings, and the district court's order, and have carefully examined the entire record on appeal. Based upon our review of the record, we find no reversible error and affirm the dismissal of plaintiff's action for substantially the same reasons set forth in the district court's order.

A court-appointed receiver is judicially immune from a Section 1983 claim for executing a court order within the authority the order grants.

Plassman v. City of Wauseon · filed 1996-05-14

Thus, the receiver's actions did not exceed the scope of the authority granted him by court order, and he is entitled to judicial immunity for executing the court's order.

Section 1983 damages claims against individual parole board members are barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Holmes v. Bob Crosby · filed 2005-06-27

We repeatedly have held that individual members of the Parole Board are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from a suit for damages. ... Thus, we hold that the district court erred in permitting the claims for monetary damages to proceed against the individual Board members.

Parole board officials have immunity from Section 1983 claims for decisions to grant, deny, or revoke parole.

Hopkins v. Indeterminate Sentence Review Board · filed 2005-11-15

We have held that parole board officials’ decisions to grant, deny, or revoke parole are entitled to immunity, and we therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

Section 1983 claims against municipal board members in their individual capacities are barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity when the challenged functions are judicial in nature.

Dotzel v. Ashbridge · filed 2006-02-14

The Board members here were acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, and are absolutely immune from suit in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 claims against municipal board members in their individual capacities are barred by absolute immunity when the members act in a quasi-judicial capacity.

Norbert J. Dotzel, Jr., D/B/A Dotzel Trucking Joanne Dotzel, D/B/A Dotzel Trucking v. Ernest Ashbridge John R. Bower Dar · filed 2006-02-14

The Board members here were acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, and are absolutely immune from suit in their individual capacities. Any actions against them in their individual capacities must therefore be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims are barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity for court clerks performing tasks integral to the judicial process.

Brown v. Ponzoha · filed 2006-03-17

The district court properly dismissed Brown’s action because court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.

Section 1983 claims against officials who act within their authority to carry out a facially valid court order can be barred by quasi-judicial immunity.

Moss v. Kopp · filed 2007-02-16

Defendants qualify for quasi-judicial immunity because they did not exceed their authority and acted pursuant to a facially valid court order. When properly invoked, quasi-judicial immunity serves as an absolute bar to recovery.

Probation officers have quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 claims for actions taken in the judicial process of monitoring compliance with probation.

Loggins v. Oh · filed 2007-03-01

Accepting all of Loggins’ allegations against Brooks as true, he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Brooks is entitled to immunity. All of Brooks’ actions were related to ensuring Loggins was complying with the terms of his probation. At all relevant times Brooks was working for Judge Froehlich in the context of a judicial proceeding, unlike, for example, an independent complaining witness or investigating officer.

An official who simply executes a valid court order has absolute quasi-judicial immunity from a Section 1983 claim.

J.P. Silverton Industries L.P. v. Sohm · filed 2007-06-26

Thus, because in conducting the sale Sohm was simply following an order of the court, he is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

A court clerk performing an act integral to the judicial process has absolute quasi-judicial immunity from a § 1983 claim, even if the act allegedly violated constitutional rights.

Wymore v. Green · filed 2007-08-17

Thus, even assuming M s. Collins violated M r. W ymore’s constitutional rights, M s. Collins is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity because her actions w ere “judicial act[s] . . . having an integral relationship with the judicial process.”

Section 1983 does not give a corrections commissioner quasi-judicial immunity from suits seeking injunctive relief.

Simmons v. Fabian · filed 2007-12-31

In light of the plain language, legislative history, and purpose of section 1983, including the FCIA, we conclude that section 1983 does not protect the commissioner from lawsuits seeking injunctive relief.

A governor has absolute quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 damages for reviewing parole decisions, even when the review exceeds his authority, unless he acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Miller v. Davis · filed 2008-04-01

Accordingly, Governor Davis is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for his reversal of the Board’s decisions granting Miller parole.

Section 1983 affords a governor absolute quasi-judicial immunity for reviewing parole grants when he exceeds his authority but does not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Miller v. Davis · filed 2008-04-02

Accordingly, Governor Davis is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for his reversal of the Board’s decisions granting Miller parole.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for damages against a person acting under color of state law who deprives another of federal rights, subject to applicable immunities.

Jarnig v. Wade · filed 2009-04-06

The district court properly granted summary judgment because quasi-judicial immunity bars civil actions for damages against the defendant, who is the Deputy Court Clerk for Alaska’s Appellate Courts, arising from the performance of duties that are functionally comparable to those of judges.

Section 1983 affords absolute quasi-judicial immunity for acts executing a facially valid court order, but the immunity does not cover acts beyond the order’s scope.

Thompson v. Safety Council of Southwest Louisiana · filed 1995-06-12

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the Magistrate, but will briefly respond to the arguments raised by the objection. ... The Magistrate concluded that the Safety Council served as executor of a facially valid court order and, as such, enjoyed absolute quasi-judicial immunity for those acts prescribed by Judge Quirk’s sentence. ... IT IS ORDERED that all claims against the Safety Council are dismissed except the claims that the Safety Council went beyond the scope of Judge Quirk’s sentence in requiring that plaintiff attend a Christian church and in requiring that plaintiff attend church for the period of time that it did.

A state probation officer who prepares a presentence report has quasi-judicial immunity from damages under § 1983.

Poe v. Massey · filed 1998-03-30

Wholly apart from the statute of limitations problem, plaintiffs claim for damages against defendant is barred because she is protected against claims for money damages by quasi-judicial immunity. ... The function performed by Connecticut probation officers in connection with presentence reports is essentially the same. ... Accordingly, they are entitled to the same immunity.

Absolute judicial or quasi-judicial immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim even if the complaint otherwise states a claim.

Steele v. McGregor · filed 1998-04-14

Since absolute immunity is a complete bar to Steele’s action, this issue is dispositive without regard to the technical sufficiency of Steele’s allegations to state a § 1983 claim.

Judicial and quasi-judicial immunity can bar § 1983 claims against a judge and court clerk concerning a request for a free trial transcript.

Nichols v. Presley · filed 1999-01-21

The magistrate judge recommended that the complaint, barred by judicial immunity and quasi-judicial immunity, be dismissed for failure to state a claim. ... After fully considering Mr. Nichols’ arguments on appeal and the entire file, we conclude that the magistrate judge and the district court correctly analyzed this case in their respective “Findings and Recommendation” filed August 21, 1998, and “Order of Dismissal” filed September 25, 1998, both of which we incorporate by this reference.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a court clerk for actions taken as a conservator under a court order because the clerk has quasi-judicial immunity.

Vinson v. Benson · filed 2000-10-19

The district court did not err in dismissing Vinson’s § 1983 action on the basis of Benson’s entitlement to quasi-judicial immunity, and Vinson’s appeal is frivolous.

Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 damages claims for filing court orders as part of the judicial process.

Teng v. Urie · filed 2009-07-28

The district court properly dismissed the action based on absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Section 1983 does not give deputies absolute quasi-judicial immunity for unlawful conduct in carrying out a judge’s order when the judge did not specifically direct that conduct.

Richman, Marcella v. Sheahan, Michael · filed 2001-10-16

It is not necessary to the judicial function, in our judgment, to also deny a remedy to plaintiffs who were harmed not by the judge’s order, but by unlawful conduct by those who enforce it. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of the deputies’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

Law-enforcement personnel seeking quasi-judicial immunity from a § 1983 claim must show that a judge directed their challenged conduct.

Schneider v. Will County, Illinois · filed 2010-03-05

Just as most claims for qualified immunity are too fact-intensive to be decided on a motion to dismiss, Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1090 (7th Cir. 2008); Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001); Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 775 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring), so too is the defense raised in this case, and the district court erred by extending quasi-judicial immunity to law-enforcement personnel without any competent evidence that they were acting at the direction of a judge.

A zoning appeals board’s legal advisor has quasi-judicial immunity from a Section 1983 claim arising from advice on a variance petition.

Alfano v. VILLAGE OF FARMINGDALE · filed 2010-03-12

Therefore, the Court finds that DeBellis is immune from suit for his role in advising the Farming-dale Zoning Appeals Board with respect to their denial of the plaintiffs’ petition.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against state licensing board members for acts they perform as adjudicators in disciplinary proceedings because they have quasi-judicial immunity.

Coggeshall v. Massachusetts Board of Registration of Psychologists · filed 2010-05-17

Accordingly, we hold that the members of the Board, individually, are shielded from the damages claims by reason of quasi-judicial immunity.

Section 1983 claims against Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board members for their licensing decisions are barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Keystone Redevelopment Partners, LLC v. Decker · filed 2011-01-07

In sum, we hold that the Butz factors, on balance, clearly support quasi-judicial immunity for members of the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board.

Section 1983 claims against Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board members for their licensing decisions are barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Keystone Redevelpment Partners v. Coy · filed 2011-01-07

In sum, we hold that the Butz factors, on balance, clearly support quasi-judicial immunity for members of the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board.

Section 1983 individual-capacity claims against a sheriff and jail administrator are barred by quasi-judicial absolute immunity when they exercise delegated judicial authority in a bond decision.

John Chism Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Pennington · filed 2011-03-02

Reviewing the dismissal of the individual capacity claims de novo, see Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720, 721 (8th Cir. 1997), we hold quasi-judicial absolute immunity protects the sheriff and jail administrator in their joint decision to require a sheriff’s bond before releasing Williams.

Officers acting within the scope of a facially valid court order have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages under § 1983.

Henshaw v. Wayne County · filed 2011-04-29

In arresting Henshaw, the deputies were acting within the scope of a facially valid court order. They are therefore entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Section 1983 allows defendants to assert immunity doctrines such as quasi-judicial immunity against civil rights claims.

Tomlins v. Village of Wappinger Falls Zoning Board of Appeals · filed 2011-07-08

The applicability of quasi-judicial immunity is determined by considering not the identity of the actor but rather the nature of the functions the actor performs. ... As to the ZBA, Defendants have not satisfied their burden that quasi-judicial immunity applies.

Section 1983 claims arising from a housing authority hearing officer’s performance of her hearing duties are barred by quasi-judicial immunity.

McCall v. MONTGOMERY HOUSING AUTHORITY · filed 2011-09-12

Courts have long recognized immunity from suit which protects judicial officers from suit pursuant to § 1983. ... The Court is persuaded that the allegations against Ellis clearly implicate only conduct for which she is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Accordingly, she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to McCall’s claims against her.

Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 damages claims for tasks integral to the judicial process.

Essell v. Carter · filed 2011-09-29

We agree with the district court that the alleged actions fall within the scope of the Clerk of the Court’s duties that are an integral part of the judicial process. Accordingly, the district court did not err by dismissing the complaint. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process).

Judicial and quasi-judicial immunity bar § 1983 claims against a judge and an arraignment magistrate.

Smith v. Rebstock · filed 2012-03-08

In April 2010, Smith filed a pro se complaint in the District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Judge Eugene Maier, Arraignment Court Magistrate Francis Rebstock, Assistant District Attorney Damien Sammons, and Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) social workers Katherine Lewis and Felina Gustoson as defendants. ... In doing so, the court concluded that the claims against them were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrines of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity, and that amendment of those claims would be futile. ... With respect to the District Court’s decision to grant Judge Maier’s and Magistrate Rebstock’s motion to dismiss, we hold that, for the reasons provided by the District Court, that decision was proper.

Liquor control commissioners serving a judicial function when deciding license applications have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims.

Flying Dog Brewery, LLLP v. Michigan Liquor Control Commission · filed 2012-06-28

Because they are serving a judicial function, they are entitled to absolute immunity from legal action challenging their decision in this case. Plaintiff was free to file suit against the Commission itself to challenge the Constitutionality of its ruling, but the claims for damages are barred by absolute immunity.

A conservator has quasi-judicial immunity from a Section 1983 suit only for acts authorized or approved by the probate court.

Gross v. Rell · filed 2012-09-25

We therefore hold that Donovan is immune from suit only to the extent that she acted with the authorization or approval of the Probate Court.

Medical board members have quasi-judicial immunity from Section 1983 claims for actions taken during license revocation proceedings.

Roy v. TN · filed 2012-10-26

The claims asserted against the Board members in their individual capacities were also properly dismissed on the basis that the Board members were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for actions taken during Roy’s revocation proceedings.

Section 1983 damages claims against medical licensing board members are barred by quasi-judicial immunity when their challenged acts are prosecutorial or adjudicatory.

Quatkemeyer v. KY Board of Medical Licensure · filed 2012-11-21

The members of the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure exercise the requisite adjudicatory functioning for quasi-judicial immunity.

A bankruptcy trustee may be immune from a Section 1983 claim for conduct within the scope of his official duties.

Lunan v. Jones (In re Lunan) · filed 2012-11-21

In this action removed from state court, the husband of the chapter 7 debtor seeks damages from the debtor’s chapter 7 trustee and her court-appointed auctioneer for conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and violation of due process rights under the Tennessee Constitution. ... Assuming as true each of the allegations in the amended complaint as this court must do in the context of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 the court nonetheless concludes that all of the alleged conduct by the Defendants is protected by immunity.

Section 1983 does not confer absolute quasi-judicial immunity on a jail warden who prolongs detention based on indirect court instructions and an ambiguous custody order.

Schneider v. County of Will · filed 2013-06-19

Warden O’Leary never spoke with Judge Garrison, and we have never held that indirect instructions like those “the court” purportedly relayed to O’Leary though Niemann can confer absolute immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state official for acts performed in a quasi-judicial capacity.

LeFer v. Murry · filed 2013-10-15

The acts surrounding the Commissioner’s adjudication of complaints are quasi-judicial and entitle him to absolute immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against officials in their individual capacities are barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity when the officials act in an adjudicative capacity and the proceedings have sufficient adversarial safeguards.

Gilliam v. Norman Hodges, Jr. · filed 2015-09-17

This court concludes that defendants had absolute, quasi-judicial immunity as to the individual-capacity claims, because ACC hearings contain sufficient adversarial procedures to qualify as quasi-judicial proceedings.

Quasi-judicial immunity from Section 1983 liability does not protect an official who applies a warrant to the wrong person and fails to use procedures to prevent misidentification.

Garcia v. County of Riverside · filed 2016-02-03

Here, according to Plaintiff’s allegations, Baca did not strictly comply with the order, as it was applied to the wrong person, and Plaintiff challenged not just the fact of his incarceration, but also the lack of procedures to prevent the misidentification. Because the facts Plaintiff has alleged go beyond the limits of quasi-judicial immunity, this immunity does not apply to Baca.

Quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 liability requires strict compliance with a facially valid court order and does not cover applying a warrant to the wrong person without procedures to prevent misidentification.

Garcia v. County of Riverside · filed 2016-04-08

Here, according to Plaintiff’s allegations, Baca did not strictly comply with the order, as it was applied to the wrong person, and Plaintiff challenged not just the fact of his incarceration, but also the lack of procedures to prevent the misidentification. Because the facts Plaintiff has alleged go beyond the limits of quasi-judicial immunity, this immunity does not apply to Baca.

Absolute quasi-judicial immunity protects the D.C. Bar and its arbitration manager from Section 1983 claims arising from their handling of an arbitration request.

Hussain v. Lewis · filed 2016-04-19

Because Hussain has raised no other argument in response to the Bar’s claim of absolute immunity, the Court holds that the Bar (i.e., both the Bar itself and Lewis) is entitled to immunity.

Courtroom officials sued under Section 1983 lack absolute immunity when they allegedly use force beyond what the judge ordered and the Constitution allows.

Brooks v. Clark County · filed 2016-07-07

We are satisfied that neither precedent nor first principles justify giving courtroom officials absolute immunity when they allegedly use force in excess of what their judge commanded and the Constitution allows.

A state court-appointed receiver has absolute quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 claims for actions undertaken pursuant to, and approved by, court orders.

Marn v. McCully Associates · filed 2016-08-05

To the extent that appellants sought injunctive relief or money damages against Hayes, the district court properly dismissed their § 1983 claim because as a state court-appointed receiver, Hayes was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for actions undertaken pursuant to, and approved by, court orders.

Section 1983 does not give officers quasi-judicial immunity for enforcing an already executed eviction order, even if they reasonably believe it remains valid.

Zoretic v. Darge · filed 2016-08-08

It is possible the deputies at the scene on June 5 believed they were enforcing a judge’s eviction order. But they were not, and their mistake — even if reasonable— does not entitle them to quasi-judicial immunity.

Officers executing a facially valid arrest warrant are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims.

Gennie v. Byrd v. Investigator D.A. Jones · filed 2016-12-22

As for executing the arrest warrants, because Jones and Cousette were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for the actions, if any, that they took in that regard, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ false arrest and false imprisonment claims.

An official who presides over a parole revocation hearing has quasi-judicial immunity from damages claims under Section 1983.

Jackson v. Ramirez · filed 2017-05-31

Consequently, an official who presides over a parole revocation hearing is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.

A guardian ad litem is immune from damages under § 1983 for acts within the scope of that role.

Sturdza v. Lewin · filed 2017-06-20

As such, a guardian ad litem enjoys immunity from suit for any damages that flow from acts takes within the scope of that role.

Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 damages claims for tasks integral to the judicial process.

Victory v. Board of Parole Hearings · filed 2018-06-20

The district court properly dismissed Victory’s claim against the state-court clerk defendants because these defendants are protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Section 1983 defendants who follow a facially valid court order are protected by quasi-judicial absolute immunity, even if the order is later held unlawful.

Sandknop v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2018-07-16

Defendants cannot be liable for following such an order.

Section 1983 does not provide quasi-judicial immunity for the manner in which an officer executes a court order.

Russell v. Superior Court of the Virgin I · filed 2018-09-25

Today, we join our Sister Circuits and make explicit what was implicit in our decisions in Lockhart and Waits: Quasi-judicial immunity extends only to the acts authorized by court order, i.e., to the execution of a court order, and not to the manner in which it is executed.

Court clerks have quasi-judicial immunity from Section 1983 claims arising from administrative acts integral to the judicial process.

Ibeabuchi v. Penzone · filed 2018-10-31

The district court properly dismissed Ibeabuchi’s claims against defendant Jeanes on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity because they arise out of Jeanes’s administrative acts as a court clerk.

Section 1983 damages claims against a court clerk are barred by quasi-judicial immunity when they arise from the clerk’s administrative acts.

Ibeabuchi v. Johnson · filed 2018-12-03

The district court properly dismissed on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity Ibeabuchi’s claims seeking damages because they arise out of Johnson’s administrative acts as a court clerk.

Bar examiners who adjudicate accommodation requests with procedural safeguards have quasi-judicial immunity from individual-capacity damages claims under § 1983.

Sinapi v. RI Board of Bar Examiners · filed 2018-12-11

As to this claim, it is manifest that the Board members enjoy quasi-judicial immunity.

Judicial and quasi-judicial immunity can bar § 1983 damages claims against judges and court clerks for protected acts.

Moore v. Rosenblatt · filed 2019-01-23

The district court properly dismissed Moore’s federal claims for damages against the judicial and clerk defendants on the basis of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity.

Probation officers have quasi-judicial immunity from Section 1983 claims when filing a probation violation notice is integral to the judicial process.

Thornton v. Matthew Pietrzak, Stephanie Buttz, Eric Lee, and Dianna Johnson · filed 2019-03-19

Appellees are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, and the trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment in their favor.

State Bar employees have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 claims for acts performed in their official capacities.

In re: Lenore L. Albert-Sheridan · filed 2019-04-11

State Bar employees are entitled to absolute quasi- judicial immunity under the Civil Rights Act for acts performed in their official capacities.

Section 1983 damages claims against judicial discipline commission members are barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity when the members perform adjudicatory functions.

Moore v. Yardely · filed 2019-04-19

A judge is immune from suit, including suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to recover for alleged deprivation of civil rights, in all but two narrow sets of circumstances. ... Based on the nature of the Commission's activities and the allegations of the Complaint, the court concludes that Judge Yardley is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff's individual-capacity claims against Judge Yardley for money damages are barred on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity.

A state-appointed divorce master has quasi-judicial immunity from Section 1983 monetary damages claims for judicial acts taken within her jurisdiction.

KE v. SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, WESTERN DISTRICT · filed 2019-09-12

As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Defendant Richmond are barred by quasi-judicial immunity, to the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against her.

Section 1983 permits damages against a bailiff for an arrest outside the scope of a court order, even when quasi-judicial immunity covers actions the order authorized.

Martin v. Charles · filed 2019-09-18

So while quasi-judicial immunity covers the property seizure actions that were directed by a judge, Charles is not immune from damages stemming from the unauthorized arrest of Martin.

A probation officer who applies for an arrest warrant is not entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from a Section 1983 claim for that conduct.

Washington v. Rivera · filed 2019-09-25

We thus hold that, because the Supreme Court in Malley concluded that a police officer’s application for a warrant was not sufficiently judicial to receive quasi-judicial immunity, Rivera’s action here cannot receive it either.

Section 1983 does not provide absolute quasi-judicial immunity to probation officials for ministerial decisions about where to hold revocation hearings.

Harris v. Powers · filed 1981-08-10

The conclusion that Nuter and Schneider are not entitled to absolute or quasi-judicial immunity for the complained of acts is consistent with the policy underlying the grant of absolute immunity to certain executive officials.

Section 1983 claims against a court-appointed foreclosure commissioner are barred by quasi-judicial immunity when the commissioner acts under the authority of the state court’s order.

Aquino v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas · filed 2019-11-06

To the extent Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against Commissioner Minatodani is based on her acting pursuant to her authority under the state court’s order, any such claim would be barred under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity as explained above.

Section 1983 damages claims against court clerks are barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity when the clerks perform tasks integral to the judicial process.

Godwin v. Fleming · filed 2015-02-27

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Godwin’s complaint after concluding that further amendment would be futile. ... see also Curry v. Castillo (In re Castillo), 297 F.3d 940, 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2002) (absolute judicial immunity “extends to nonjudicial officers for all claims relating to the exercise of judicial functions,” including some administrative acts “which taken out of context would appear ministerial, but when viewed in context are actually a part of the judicial function” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages . . . when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.”).

Section 1983 damages claims against domestic relations employees for their roles in child support proceedings are barred by quasi-judicial immunity.

Nellom v. Delaware County Domestic Relations Section · filed 2015-11-18

The named defendants, all officers of the Domestic Relations Section of Delaware County, are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for their acts.

Section 1983 damages claims against a clerk magistrate are barred by quasi-judicial immunity when the clerk issues a criminal complaint and arrest warrant as an adjudicatory function.

Clapp v. Tobin · filed 2019-11-08

Here, Flanagan’s issuance of the criminal complaint and warrant for Clapp’s arrest is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because, in issuing a complaint and warrant, he was performing a judicial function.

Quasi-judicial immunity from an individual-capacity § 1983 claim is an affirmative defense that must be raised by a motion for summary judgment, not a plea to the jurisdiction.

Maxine Adams and Cecil Adams v. Prine · filed 2017-01-11

Because immunity from liability does not affect a trial court’s jurisdiction, it must be asserted in a motion for summary judgment, not in a plea to the jurisdiction.

A court clerk acting on behalf of the court in handling a filing has quasi-judicial immunity from monetary damages under § 1983.

Elledge 174292 v. Minton · filed 2019-12-04

Because Defendant Weaver is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, Plaintiff may not maintain an action against him for monetary damages.

Court clerks are not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 liability for ministerial tasks such as mailing notices of court orders.

WARREN v. LEHIGH COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS · filed 2019-12-06

Accordingly, Naugle cannot be characterized as a “quasi-judicial” official and, therefore, she is not entitled to absolute “quasi-judicial” immunity from liability under §1983 for the allegedly improper performance of her ministerial duties.

The defendant officers were not entitled to dismissal of the § 1983 claims on quasi-judicial or qualified immunity grounds at this stage.

Caldwell v. Malave · filed 2020-02-21

At this time, the court cannot find that defendants are entitled to immunity from plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity and qualified immunity will be denied.

Section 1983 damages claims against state attorney disciplinary officials are barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity when the challenged conduct falls within their delegated disciplinary duties.

Manookian v. Flippin · filed 2020-02-28

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from Plaintiff’s claims for damages against them personally.

An officer carrying out a judge’s verbal order can receive quasi-judicial immunity from a Section 1983 claim; the order need not be in writing.

Turner v. Watson · filed 2020-03-13

A judicial order need not be in writing to confer quasi-judicial immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against officers are barred by quasi-judicial immunity when the officers carry out a facially valid court order and the claim challenges their enforcement of the order rather than how they carried it out.

Caldwell v. Blythe · filed 2020-03-27

Caldwell’s allegations in this case present precisely the type of strictly administrative implementation of a court order that is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Dismissal of Caldwell’s § 1983 claims is therefore warranted on this basis.

Town officials who obtain and act on a court order to enforce an ordinance do not qualify for quasi-judicial immunity from a Section 1983 claim.

McLaughlin v. Tiverton Town Council · filed 2020-03-27

They thus do not qualify for the same immunity enjoyed by judges, court clerks, or wardens.

Section 1983 damages claims against a drug court administrator are barred by quasi-judicial immunity when the challenged duties involve discretionary judgment and are integral to the judicial process.

Grindling v. State of Hawaii · filed 2020-04-13

In sum, the court finds that the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity applies to shield Ishihara from Plaintiff’s damages claim against him in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 damages claims against dental board members are barred by absolute immunity when the members perform quasi-judicial functions in suspending a license.

Beck v. Austin, D.D.S. · filed 2020-04-17

For the reasons set forth above and found in Beck v. Tex. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 204 F.3d 629 (5th Cir. 2000), the TSBDE Board Member Defendants performed a quasi-judicial function when they suspended Beck’s license and are immune from suit on that basis.

Section 1983 does not give parole board psychologists absolute immunity at the pleading stage when the complaint alleges that they gathered facts for the parole board rather than participated in its hearing.

Gay v. Parsons · filed 2020-06-22

The district court thus properly found absolute immunity unavailable to the psychologists at the pleading stage, noting that Gay had alleged that they “did not participate in the parole hearing—the most judge-like component of the parole process . . . but rather a fact-gathering process similar to that of a police officer.”

Probation officers have absolute immunity from § 1983 claims arising from their recommendations to revoke probation.

Weso v. Thomson · filed 2020-06-29

In recommending that Weso’s probation be revoked, Thomson and Krause were engaged in a quasi- judicial function for which they are protected by absolute immunity.

Quasi-judicial immunity can bar a § 1983 claim when state licensing officials perform prosecutorial or adjudicatory functions with safeguards protecting constitutional rights.

Poursaied v. State of California · filed 2020-06-29

Because the State Defendants satisfy the three factors of the quasi-judicial immunity analysis, they are entitled to immunity.

Disciplinary counsel have quasi-judicial immunity from individual-capacity damages claims under § 1983 for conduct in their disciplinary functions.

Murphy v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel · filed 2020-07-07

As a result, any alleged misconduct occurred in the exercise of the ODC defendants’ quasi-judicial functions, so quasi-judicial immunity applies.

Court-appointed special masters have quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 claims for actions taken pursuant to court orders when the court has subject matter jurisdiction.

DECKARD v. EMORY · filed 2020-07-13

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Salaman and Grunfeld are immune from suit for plaintiff’s claims in Count II of the 1st Amended Complaint that arise out of defendants’ actions taken pursuant to the Orphans’ Court’s orders.

Court employees cannot invoke quasi-judicial immunity from a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage for allegedly failing to perform ministerial duties, such as providing access to court records.

Lindsey v. Jewett · filed 2020-07-17

Thus, the defendants may not invoke quasi-judicial immunity at the pleading stage for allegedly failing to provide access to court records or other documents.

Section 1983 damages claims against court clerks are barred by quasi-judicial immunity when the clerks perform tasks integral to the judicial process.

Morales v. Kuhn · filed 2020-08-05

Because Mr. Anderson has absolute quasi-judicial immunity in this instance, and amendment would be futile, the claims against him are dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 claims against a court clerk are barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity when the challenged acts perform judicial functions.

Leppla v. Julie Kagel, formerly Marion County Clerk of Court · filed 2020-08-31

Defendant is thus entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for all actions alleged by Plaintiff.

Section 1983 damages claims against a divorce master for adjudicative acts are barred by quasi-judicial immunity.

Ke v. Dipasquale · filed 2020-09-22

We agree with the District Court that Richmond is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because her adjudicative tasks as a divorce master are functionally comparable to those performed by a judge.

Section 1983 claims against court clerks are barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity for acts within their judicial duties.

Bloom v. New York State Unified Court System · filed 2020-10-16

Agostino’s conduct falls within the scope of her judicial duties as Clerk of the Court; she therefore receives absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Section 1983 does not shield appeal committee members with quasi-judicial immunity when their neutrality is in doubt and their procedures lack adequate safeguards.

Webb v. Washington State University · filed 2020-11-17

We, thus, deny absolute immunity here to Committee members whose neutrality could be questioned and whose procedures lacked even more safeguards.

Probation officers and their supervisors have quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 claims based on preparing and approving presentence reports.

Miller v. Clapp · filed 2020-11-23

Third, Plaintiff’s claims against probation officer Clapp and his supervisor, Vanlake, are barred under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.

Quasi-judicial immunity from a § 1983 claim applies to enforcing a valid court order, but not to a challenge to the manner in which the order was carried out.

Caldwell v. Malave · filed 2020-12-17

Application of quasi-judicial immunity is only appropriate where the plaintiff challenges enforcement of a valid court order, not the manner in which it was enforced.

Section 1983 damages claims against parole officers are barred by quasi-judicial immunity for actions within their duties preparing for and participating in a probable cause hearing.

Miles v. McDonald (INMATE 1)(CONSENT) · filed 2021-01-20

However, the Court need not specifically address the merits of these claims because “absolute” quasi-immunity protects Defendants from payment of monetary damages for their roles that were in the scope of their duties in preparing for and participating in Miles’ probable cause hearing.

A court clerk has quasi-judicial immunity from a Section 1983 claim for judicially related acts performed for the state court.

Jones v. McBride · filed 2021-01-21

Finally, the magistrate judge concluded that Defendant is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because the alleged acts at issue are “judicially-related acts performed for the state court.” Id. ... Accordingly, the court ADOPTS the Report (ECF No. 9), which is incorporated herein.

Section 1983 does not provide judicial immunity for a judge’s nonjudicial acts when the judge uses judicial office for personal objectives without any party invoking judicial machinery.

Harper v. Merckle · filed 1981-03-05

Succinctly stated, we hold only that when it is beyond reasonable dispute that a judge has acted out of personal motivation and has used his judicial office as an offensive weapon to vindicate personal objectives, and it further appears certain that no party has invoked the judicial machinery for any purpose at all, then the judge’s actions do not amount to “judicial acts.” These nonjudicial acts, to state the obvious, are not cloaked with judicial immunity from suit under § 1983.

Judicial immunity in Section 1983 cases protects judicial acts within the judge’s jurisdiction from damages, but not prospective relief or ministerial and administrative acts.

Andrew F. Glick and Susanne M. Glick, His Wife and Andrew F. Glick, a Trustee of the River City Family Trust v. John S. · filed 1986-01-30

The doctrine applies to damage claims, but not to suits seeking prospective relief, ... to judicial acts, but not to ministerial or administrative acts, ... and only to acts taken over subject matter which lies within a judge’s jurisdiction.

A judge lacks absolute judicial immunity from § 1983 damages claims for administrative acts performed as head of the courts.

Amato v. Wilentz · filed 1990-12-18

As such the court finds that the Chief Justice does not have absolute judicial immunity for acts taken in his administrative capacity as head of the courts.

Village council members who affirm an employee’s discharge perform an administrative act and lack absolute judicial immunity from a Section 1983 suit.

Hadad v. Croucher · filed 1995-10-11

We agree with the magistrate that the Village Council members performed an administrative--not a judicial--act in approving Hadad's discharge, and therefore do not enjoy absolute immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against prosecutors and public defenders for actions that are part of the judicial process.

Ross v. Meagan · filed 1981-01-16

Because their actions were part of the judicial process, they cannot be held liable for damages under the Civil Rights Acts.

A warden who has no custody of the evidence and no role in granting or denying DNA testing is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 claim seeking that testing.

Emerson v. Rick Thaler · filed 2013-03-20

Because Thaler does not have custody of the evidence and had no role in granting or denying Emerson the DNA testing he sought, Thaler is not the proper defendant.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a basis for holding the named defendant liable.

Braud v. Burl Cain, Warden · filed 2009-11-13

In this court, Braud repeats his § 1983 claims without identifying any basis for the defendant’s liability. We deny Braud leave to appeal IFP, and we dismiss this appeal as frivolous because it is without any arguable merit.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify the individuals who allegedly violated a constitutional right.

Pinkston, James E. v. Madry, Anthony · filed 2006-03-14

In addition, an unidentified guard would not helped Pinkston’s case, for in order to prevail on a § 1983 claim a plaintiff must identify those individuals who have allegedly violated a constitutional right.

Section 1983 damages claims against a school district must name the district rather than its board of education as the defendant.

Nichiporuk v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF PALMYRA-MACEDON · filed 2006-02-23

To the extent Nichiporuk seeks damages the proper defendant is the Palmyra-Macdeon Central School District, not the Board of Education ("Board").

Section 1983 supplies a cognizable federal cause of action for a non-frivolous constitutional claim and permits suit against officials in both their official and individual capacities.

Karr v. Schmidt · filed 1970-11-19

The Court finds that the Complaint alleges a non-frivolous cause of action raising substantial federal questions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 over which this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Defendants are proper parties, both in their official and individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a governor absent the governor’s own wrongful act, and a State is not a proper defendant because it is not a statutory “person.”

Harty v. Rockefeller · filed 1972-01-18

Unless the Governor himself did some specific act that was wrong, there is no personal liability for State acts on the theory of respondeat superior for which relief can be had under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Nor can the complaint be sustained if it is construed to be against the State of New York. For a State is not a proper defendant under the Civil Rights Act, since it is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1988.

State judges acting as disinterested adjudicators are not proper Section 1983 defendants in a prospective constitutional challenge when complete relief is available against enforcement officials.

R.W.T. ex rel Cohn v. Dalton · filed 1983-07-11

In the typical prospective assault on the constitutionality of a state statute, the state judge is not a proper party defendant under § 1983 because he has no stake in upholding the statute: he is not the plaintiff’s adversary, and the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ... Thus, the judges were not proper defendants in this suit.

A § 1983 complaint that fails to state a claim against the named warden, and whose constitutional theories would be frivolous even against proper defendants, may be dismissed as frivolous.

Arnold v. Lake County Regional Prison and Billy McWherter Warden · filed 1987-12-15

This pro se Tennessee prisoner appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). We conclude that the district court acted properly; the plaintiff failed to state a claim against the defendant warden. Moreover, even if the proper parties-defendants had been named, the plaintiff's claim that his due process and equal protection rights were violated is frivolous.

A pro se Section 1983 plaintiff with a potentially meritorious claim must have a reasonable opportunity to identify and add the proper defendants before dismissal for naming the wrong defendants.

Curtis Nowlin, Jr. v. Officer McCoy L.W. Simpson, Officer · filed 1990-09-04

The district court's failure to inform Nowlin that he should have amended his complaint to name the proper defendants in light of the potentially meritorious claims renders the dismissal improper.

In a § 1983 suit seeking to block an election referendum, the election board responsible for submitting the proposition to voters is a proper defendant, while officials who merely administer the challenged statute are not.

87 South Rothschild Liquor Mart v. Kozubowski · filed 1990-11-02

We also find persuasive the argument that defendants Kozubowski, Daley, and Chicago Liquor Control Commission are "not the real parties in interest [because] they only administer the statute.” Defendants' Memorandum at 2. We therefore dismiss the complaint as to those three defendants as well. The remaining defendant, Election Board, is the proper party in interest in this case, and we deny its motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 injunctive relief requires defendants responsible for the alleged deprivation who can prevent its recurrence.

Act-Up v. Walp · filed 1991-02-06

The court does not feel that it can enjoin parties — here, the defendant police commissioners and officers — from doing an act which they never apparently performed in the first place. Moreover, even if the court did order an injunction against the police, it would not help plaintiff because the Speaker could still order the Sergeant at Arms to lock the door to the gallery, police protection or not.

Section 1983 permits a suit against a state officer only if the officer is in some manner responsible for the alleged deprivation of rights.

El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon · filed 1991-07-18

In order for a state officer to be properly brought in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 such officer must be in some manner responsible for the alleged deprivation of rights.

A § 1983 complaint should not be dismissed for naming the wrong defendant when the record makes the correct defendant apparent.

Garland v. Mason County Fiscal Court Roger Case, Mason County Jailer · filed 1992-02-21

The district court should not have dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the wrong party had been sued where it was apparent from the record who the correct defendant was, see Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 882-83 (6th Cir.1986).

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state retirement trustees in their official capacities even when the complaint names the board rather than each trustee.

Kestler v. North Carolina Local Governmental Employees' Retirement System · filed 1992-12-16

The Board of Trustees, can also be properly sued under § 1983. The Board is composed of persons who, in their official capacities, administer the System. As explained above, injunctive relief should not be barred against a plaintiff who has, for whatever reason, chosen not to name each member of the Board of Trustees individually in the complaint.

A person who was not employed when the alleged misconduct occurred is not a proper defendant in a Section 1983 claim based on that conduct.

Jirovec v. James Blodgett, Superintendent · filed 1994-01-07

First, defendant Roop was previously dismissed from this action because she was not employed at the time of the alleged incidents; she is not a proper defendant in this action.

Section 1983 permits a suit for injunctive relief against state officials who play a role in enforcing the challenged law, even when other officials administer it directly.

Schulz v. Williams · filed 1994-12-27

While the individual county board members might have been proper parties to this action, the state Board's members also were proper parties. ... The state Board's members therefore have the requisite "special relation" to the contested provision to render them proper defendants.

State correctional institutions are not proper defendants under Section 1983.

McCaslin v. Clarke · filed 1995-04-04

The magistrate judge recommended dismissing as frivolous those claims against the Department of Corrections and the Nebraska Center for Women because they were not proper defendants under section 1983; ... We see no such abuse in the dismissal of the institutional defendants and the Eighth Amendment claim, and we affirm the dismissal of those claims.

Section 1983 permits a suit against a state judicial conduct commission empowered to enforce the challenged rule, even if the commission has not yet tried to enforce it.

Zeller v. the Florida Bar · filed 1995-06-16

The Eleventh Circuit specifically addressed this issue in an earlier challenge to Canon 7B(1), concluding that the JQC is a proper party defendant — even if it has made no attempt to enforce the Judicial Code provision in question — because it is duly empowered to regulate the conduct of the state’s judges through enforcement of the Judicial Code. ... Accordingly, JQC’s motion to dismiss (doc. 10) is DENIED.

Section 1983 does not allow a public school to be sued separately when it has no legal existence independent of its school district.

Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. West High School · filed 1995-09-13

Since West High School has no status independent of the school district, it cannot be separately liable under § 1983, and any claim against it would simply be redundant.

An official whose signature appears on a challenged disciplinary decision may be sued under § 1983 despite a claim that a designee signed for him.

Knecht v. Collins · filed 1995-09-22

If Ms. Jorgenson was acting on her own behalf or as his designee, she should have signed in her own name. Since Mr. Wilkinson's signature appears on the documents, the Plaintiffs properly filed suit against him.

A pro se § 1983 plaintiff who names improper defendants may be allowed to amend the complaint to name proper defendants.

Jackson v. Arizona Department of Corrections Arizona's Forty-First Legislature · filed 1995-10-20

Although Jackson's complaint failed to name proper defendants or allege any harm associated with the enactment of the legislation, these defects could be cured by amendment.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging conduct outside an institutional custom or policy to sue the responsible individual officers rather than the institution.

Soto v. Brooklyn Correctional Facility · filed 1996-02-12

To maintain a section 1983 action arising from conduct that was not alleged to have been part of any institutional custom or policy, Soto should have named as defendants, not BCF, but the corrections officers responsible for returning him to housing with his tormenters and leaving him in their company unsupervised.

Section 1983 permits a suit for an injunction against state agency directors even when they are far removed from the actions of agency employees.

Futernick v. Sumpter Township · filed 1996-03-18

The directors of a state agency, no matter how far removed from the actions of agency employees, are proper parties to a suit for an injunction under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against a county but not against an agency of the county, such as its department of corrections.

Vance v. County of Santa Clara · filed 1996-06-11

The County is a proper defendant in a § 1983 claim, an agency of the County is not.

A § 1983 retaliation claim cannot impose liability on people who are not named as defendants in the action.

Hause v. Witkowski · filed 1996-10-16

In addi- tion, regarding Appellant's claim of retaliation, we note that the per- sons allegedly responsible are not named defendants in this action.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity suit against judges where they have no individual liability, but a descriptive name for the judges as a group is not a suable entity.

Scham v. District Courts Trying Criminal Cases · filed 1997-01-31

On instruction from the Court, the DCTCC judges have been named as defendants in their official capacities because they have no individual liability and the acronym for the individual judges, DCTCC, is not a suable entity.

Section 1983 permits suit against the persons whose wrongful acts harmed the plaintiff; a warden is not vicariously liable for subordinates’ acts.

Moore v. Pemberton · filed 1997-03-24

The right respondent in a § 2254 action is the warden of the prison; the right defendants in a § 1983 suit are the persons whose wrongful acts harmed the plaintiff (and the warden is rarely a proper defendant, because he is not vicariously liable for subordinates’ acts).

A former prison warden remains a proper § 1983 defendant after leaving office when the plaintiff sued him in his personal as well as official capacity.

Dixon v. Salvador A. Godinez, Theopolis Smith, Thomas P. Roth & Dennis Jennings · filed 1997-05-20

Because Dixon sued Godinez in his personal as well as official capacity, Godinez remains a proper party to the suit.

The Oregon Department of Corrections is an improper defendant in a Section 1983 action.

Newman v. Oregon Department of Corrections · filed 1997-10-24

Here, Newman's complaint alleged that defendant Oregon Department of Corrections improperly failed to provide him with Jewish literature in the prison Library. While the district court correctly informed Newman that his complaint named an improper defendant, Newman was not given any opportunity to amend his complaint prior to dismissal of the action.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county probation department with no legal identity separate from the county.

Duffy v. County of Bucks · filed 1998-04-28

The Probation Dept. is not a proper defendant under § 1983 because it has no legal identity separate from Bucks County; it is not a "person" under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against the United States.

Dynamic Image Technologies, Inc. v. United States · filed 1998-07-17

The United States is not a proper party to a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits suits against local police and sheriff departments when their employees allegedly acted pursuant to official policies or customs.

Reese v. Milwaukee County Sheriff Department · filed 1980-12-31

I find that the defendants are proper parties to this action. The complaint charges that the defendants’ employees committed the acts complained of, not in their individual capacities, but pursuant to officially adopted policies and customs.

Section 1983 permits claims against state officials in their personal capacities, but officials acting in their official capacities are not proper defendants.

Gordon v. Scott · filed 2000-01-05

Therefore, West and Vela are not proper parties to Gordon’s § 1983 claim in their official capacities. However, a § 1983 action will he against West and Vela in their personal or individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against judges who act solely as neutral adjudicators rather than enforcers or administrators of a challenged statute.

Brandon E. v. Reynolds · filed 2000-01-14

Thus, although in Georgevitch we held the judges amenable to suit under S 1983, our decision nevertheless recognized the impropriety of such suits where the judge acted as an adjudicator rather than an enforcer or administrator of a statute. ... Because the judges presiding over Act 53 proceedings are acting in their capacity as neutral adjudicators, the district court committed no error in dismissing the suit for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 permits a detention superintendent to remain a defendant when he is responsible for the detention alleged to violate constitutional rights.

Carter Ex Rel. M.C. v. Doyle · filed 2000-03-27

As superintendent, he is responsible for the detention of individuals, arguably, without probable cause. For the time being we deny the motion to dismiss him from the lawsuit.

Section 1983 damages claims about state prison conditions must name individual officers in their individual capacities rather than the correctional facility or department of corrections.

Farrell v. J.E. Hamilton Correctional Center · filed 2001-04-27

Mr. Farrell obviously did not understand then, or on appeal, that in order to state a claim for monetary damages under § 1983 regarding allegedly unconstitutional state prison conditions , he can not sue the correctional facility or department of corrections but must name the specific individual officers (or “John or Jane Doe,” if he does not know the officers’ names) in their individual ... capacities as defendants in the style of the case instead of identifying them only in the body of the complaint and using the words “et al.” in the style of the complaint.

Section 1983 permits suits against persons, but a dog is not a proper defendant.

Dye, Anthony v. Wargo, William B. · filed 2001-06-11

All things considered, it is best to follow the Dictionary Act and hold that a dog is not a proper defendant in litigation under sec.1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against the state official who has authority to change the policy allegedly causing a voting-rights deprivation.

Common Cause Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Greater Los Angeles v. Jones · filed 2001-08-24

Plaintiffs choice of the secretary of state as a defendant is appropriate. Plaintiff claims that the denial of the right to vote arises from the collective choices of voting system by various counties. No choice by any single county is the source of the problem. Hence the only way to address the issue is to change the provision which allows counties to choose voting systems of widely disparate quality. The Secretary of State is the individual with the authority to make this change.

A county jail or sheriff’s department that is not a suable entity cannot be named as a § 1983 defendant; dismissal may be without prejudice to naming a suable entity or individual.

De La Garza v. Kandiyohi Cty. Jail · filed 2001-08-30

While we agree with the district court’s conclusion, see Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[s]heriff’s departments and police departments are not usually considered legal entities subject to suit”); Marsden v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 856 F. Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“jail is not an entity that is amenable to suit”); In re Scott County Master Docket, 672 F. Supp. 1152, 1163 n.1 (D. Minn. 1987) (sheriff’s department is not legal entity subject to suit), aff’d, Myers v. Scott County, 868 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1989), we modify the dismissal to be without prejudice so that Mr. De La Garza may refile his complaint to name a suable entity or individual, cf. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 707-08 (1978) (local government liable under § 1983 if injury stems from official policy or custom); Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (prison warden individually liable if directly involved in unconstitutional decision).

In a § 1983 facial challenge to state election law, a county board is not a proper defendant when it only carries out state-delegated election duties and plaintiffs do not challenge its local application of the law.

Arizona Libertarian Party, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of Pima County · filed 2002-08-06

While counties are responsible for many election related functions, the authority to carry out those functions is delegated by the state. In this case, Plaintiffs raise a facial challenge to the open primary election law in Arizona and are not challenging how that law is applied specifically to the Libertarian Party in Pima County. For this reason, the Pima County Board of Supervisors is not a properly named defendant in this suit.

A corrections commissioner ordinarily is not the proper defendant in a Section 1983 claim alleging that an inmate was denied medical care.

Kosilek v. Maloney · filed 2002-08-28

Ordinarily, the Commissioner of the DOC would not be the appropriate defendant in a case involving an inmate’s claim alleging a denial of medical care.