42 U.S.C. § 1983

A sheriff’s office is not a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Marshall-Hardy v. Iredell County · filed 2020-08-28

Such a claim is a claim against the office of Sheriff itself, which is not a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a court because a court is not a person within the statute’s meaning.

Johnson v. Court of Appeals · filed 2020-09-02

A court is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a sheriff’s office or its medical department because neither is a person under the statute.

Crockett v. DCSO Medical Dept. · filed 2020-09-08

As an initial matter, neither the DCSO nor its Medical Department is a proper defendant under Section 1983, which creates a cause of action against “[e]very person” who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits against persons, but a county jail is not a person that can be sued under it.

Fitzpatrick v. Marshall County Jail · filed 2020-09-15

As an initial matter, the Marshall County Jail is not a proper defendant under Section 1983, which creates a cause of action against “[e]very person” who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor and does not permit claims against defendants entitled to immunity.

Harmon v. 18th Judicial District Court · filed 2020-09-23

Plaintiff also names improper defendants, including defendants that are entitled to immunity and defendants who are not state actors as required under § 1983.

A county jail is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action.

FREEMAN v. MCDONNELL · filed 2020-09-29

Although a county may be a proper defendant in a § 1983 action, a county jail is not. ... Consequently, all of Petitioner’s claims against MCCI are dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek injunctive relief against medical defendants responsible for his care; the warden is not the only proper defendant.

COLLINS v. NWANNUNU · filed 2020-10-09

But the Medical Defendants do not argue that they are not responsible for Mr. Collins's medical care and it is clear from the record that they are. Moreover, the case the Medical Defendants cite for the proposition that the Warden is the only proper defendant against whom injunctive relief can issue, does not so state, but rather holds only that "the warden … is a proper defendant." Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011).

A jail building is not a person capable of being sued under § 1983.

Taylor v. Vermilion County Jail · filed 2020-10-19

Finally, the Vermillion County Jail is not a proper Defendant since it is a building and not a person capable of being sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.

A detention center that is not a legal entity separate from the sheriff who operates it is not a proper defendant under Section 1983.

Griffith v. Monroe County Detention Center · filed 2020-10-30

And, the Court agrees that MCDC is not a proper defendant in federal court.

Section 1983 requires an identifiable party as a defendant; “Medical” is not an identifiable party subject to suit.

Rogers v. Lee County · filed 2020-11-02

“Medical” is not an identifiable party subject to suit; as such, this defendant must be dismissed with prejudice from this case.

A prison mail room is not a person or entity amenable to suit under Section 1983.

Anderson v. M.D.O.C. Mail Room · filed 2020-11-13

In this case, Mr. Anderson has named only the “MDOC Mail Room” as a defendant; however, this is not a person or entity amenable to suit in a § 1983 case.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against the Wisconsin Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund.

Earl v. Kinziger · filed 2020-11-17

But this fund is not a proper defendant in a lawsuit under §1983. The court will dismiss the fund as a defendant.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county jail because a jail is not a person.

Torrens v. Humphreys County Jail · filed 2020-11-17

As an initial matter, the Humphreys County Jail is not a proper defendant under Section 1983, which creates a cause of action against “[e]very person” who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state department of corrections.

Kelly v. Department of Corrections · filed 2020-11-18

As the Court explained in the prior screening orders, the DOC is not a proper defendant under 42 U.S.C. §1983, and Kelly is required to allege facts showing that specific individuals knew that they were giving him the wrong medication and deliberately disregarded the risk of harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit a local police department to be sued as a separate municipal defendant.

Espinoza v. Garcia · filed 2020-12-07

To the extent Plaintiff names the West Covina Police Department as a defendant, it is not a proper defendant. Local departments within municipal governmental entities are not proper defendants under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county jail because the jail is a building, not a person capable of being sued.

Clevenger v. Flannery · filed 2020-12-08

For instance, the Macon County Jail is not a proper Defendant since it is a building and not a person capable of being sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.

A county adult detention center is not amenable to suit under § 1983.

Outlaw v. Lowndes County Adult Detention Center · filed 2020-12-08

LCADC, however, is not amenable to civil suit.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a county jail because a jail is not a person subject to liability under the statute.

SANABRIA v. ST. LUKES HOSPITAL (SACRED HEART CAMPUS) · filed 2020-12-21

However, the Lehigh County Jail is not a “person” subject to liability under § 1983.

A public defender’s office is not a proper defendant in a section 1983 action.

(PC) Taylor v. Solano County Public Defenders Office · filed 2020-12-28

Plaintiff is advised that a public defender’s office is not a proper defendant in a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against federal agencies.

Moore v. Federal Bureau of Prison · filed 2021-01-12

Because Plaintiff cannot pursue his claim for money damages against the Federal Bureau of Prisons and U.S. Marshals Service under the FTCA, Bivens, or Section 1983, both agencies shall be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against the State of Illinois.

Brown v. State of Illinois · filed 2021-01-13

Plaintiff cannot bring a claim for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of Illinois.

A municipal police department is not a separate legal entity that can be sued under § 1983.

Burton v. Sanders · filed 2021-01-19

It is well settled that “city departments [such as the Detroit Police Department] are not separate legal entities against which a suit can be directed.” ... The Court therefore grants Defendants’ motion and dismisses the Detroit Police Department as a defendant in this case.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against the United States or a state.

Brown v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 2021-01-26

Further, neither the United States nor the Commonwealth of Virginia is a proper defendant to a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 allows a claim for injunctive relief against an individual official, but the official must have authority to provide the requested relief.

LOZANO v. YORK COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT · filed 2021-01-26

Because Plaintiff also presses his claim against an individual defendant, Nancy Hammond, who is potentially subject to a claim seeking injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and/or Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the entire case is not subject to dismissal solely on the basis of the Superior Court’s motion.2 ... An answer in this case is not required from Ms. Hammond because she does not have the authority to expunge from the records maintained by the Registry a state court order of attachment unless and until the attachment order is lifted or expires by its own terms.

Section 1983 does not provide a constitutional claim based solely on negligent or mistaken medical diagnoses absent abuse, mistreatment, or denial of medical attention.

Bishop v. Cox · filed 1970-11-25

Even if the institutional physicians are negligent or mistaken in their diagnoses, such error does not raise a Constitutional issue in the absence of any evidence of abuse, mistreatment, or denial of medical attention.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for negligence or medical malpractice alone.

Jones v. Galveston · filed 2007-09-21

At most, Jones has alleged claims against Firestone and Brownlee for negligence or medical malpractice, which are insufficient to give rise to a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of welfare rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Ojeda v. Hackney · filed 1970-11-30

Based on Goldberg, King, Solman, and Russo, I hold that Plaintiffs have alleged a cause of action covered by 42 U.S.C. *153 Sec. 1983 and that there is jurisdiction founded on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343(3) (4).

Allegations that state food-stamp administration violated due process support a claim under section 1983.

Griffin v. Coler · filed 1986-06-03

The allegations of a due process violation support a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits election invalidation only when the violation reaches an extraordinary level of severity, culpability, or influence on the electoral process.

Putter v. Montpelier Public School System · filed 1997-06-06

In sum, plaintiff’s § 1983 claims do not — and cannot — even remotely approach the level of extremity, culpability or undue influence on the electoral process necessary to warrant the extraordinary remedy of election invalidation.

Section 1983 reaches election-administration errors only when wilful conduct undermines the electoral process, and compensatory damages require proof of actual injury rather than the presumed value of voting rights.

Santana v. Registrars of Voters of Worcester · filed 1986-12-31

Section 1983 is implicated only when there is “wilful conduct which undermines the organic processes by which candidates are elected.” ... Since the defendants’ conduct stemmed from a “misapprehension” of their duties under the statutes, the plaintiffs do not have a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). ... It is clear that a plaintiff must prove actual injury as a prerequisite to recovery of damages in a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit defeated candidates to recover post-election damages for alleged election irregularities.

Hutchinson v. Miller · filed 1986-08-07

We accordingly hold that federal courts do not sit to award post-election damages to defeated candidates.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for relief when election officials’ practices deprive voters of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and federal voting-rights laws.

Torres v. Sachs · filed 1974-07-25

Ordered that the practices and procedures of the defendants discussed herein are declared to have deprived the plaintiffs and the class they represent, of their rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Voting Rights Amendment of 1970 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and it is further ... Ordered that all parties submit within 30 days of the filing of this Order, affidavits and/or briefs as to the granting of costs, disbursements and reasonable attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for election irregularities absent a constitutional violation, and a challenge based on irregular votes requires showing a probability that the election result would have differed, not merely a mathematical possibility.

Powell v. Power · filed 1970-12-01

In simple terms plaintiffs’ claim under § 1983 is that the substantial number of irregularities in the primary, without more, denies them Due Process and Equal Protection. No authority has been furnished which supports this proposition, and in our view a question of constitutional dimensions is not presented. ... On this record, even assuming arguendo that our jurisdiction might be invoked under § 1983, we find that plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of showing that the irregularities were of such a nature as to establish the probability that the result of the election would have differed if the irregular votes had not been cast. A mere mathematical possibility is not enough.

Section 1983 reaches uneven administration by state officials that infringes federal rights, but occasional election-law violations are insufficient; the alleged departures must be serious and widespread.

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF UNITED STATES v. Fields · filed 1972-12-11

The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was intended to reach the uneven administration by state officials of their duties when such administration infringes on a federal right. ... To rise to the level of a federal civil rights cause of action, the alleged departures from propriety by local officials must be serious and widespread. ... Mere occasional election law violations are not actionable under § 1983, Bacon v. Holzman, 264 F.Supp. 120 (N.D.Ill., 1967).

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for election irregularities caused by mechanical or human error absent discriminatory, fraudulent, or other willful conduct rising to a constitutional violation.

Hennings v. Harry Grafton, in Capacity as County Clerk · filed 1975-11-11

In contrast, the record here shows at most irregularities caused by mechanical or human error and lacking in invidious or fraudulent intent; it does not show conduct which is discriminatory by reason of its effect or inherent nature. Voting device malfunction, the failure of election officials to take statutorily prescribed steps to diminish what was at most a theoretical possibility that the devices might be tampered with, and the refusal of those officials after the election to conduct a retabulation, assuming these events to have occurred, fall far short of constitutional infractions, absent aggravating circumstances of fraud or other wilful conduct found not to exist by the District Court and not shown by any evidence offered. Similarly, allowing voters to vote a second time in precincts where the voting devices broke down without establishing procedures to assure that their previous votes had not in fact been registered, assuming this occurred, was of course not an adequate discharge by election officials of their responsibilities, but it did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits federal relief for a state-election process that is fundamentally unfair in violation of due process, beyond ordinary ballot-counting irregularities.

Griffin v. Robert F. Burns, Etc., Thomas A. McCormick · filed 1978-01-19

The present situation, judged in light of the standards we have discussed, presented a due process violation for which relief under § 1983 was appropriate. The district court was not asked to examine the validity of individual ballots or to supervise the administrative details of a local election. It was asked to remedy a broad-gauged unfairness that infected the results of a local election.

Section 1983 does not provide equal-protection relief for an inadvertent error in administering otherwise fair voting procedures absent discriminatory intent.

Gamza v. Aguirre · filed 1980-06-19

The question before us is whether either the innocent initial errors or the subsequent attempts to conceal that error justify the relief granted under section 1983. ... In the absence of evidence that the alleged maladministration of the local election procedures was attended by the intention to discriminate against the affected voters or motivated by a desire to subvert the right of the voters to choose their school board representative, we cannot conclude that the error constituted a denial of equal protection of the laws.

Election-administration misconduct supports a Section 1983 voting-rights claim only when the process reaches patent and fundamental unfairness; ordinary election irregularities are insufficient.

Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign Committee · filed 1985-03-18

Under existing federal case law, for allegations of misconduct in the administration of a state election to constitute a claim for the deprivation of the right to vote or to constitute a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the election process itself must reach the point of “patent and fundamental unfairness.” ... Therefore, the mere existence of irregularities in a state election is not sufficient to constitute a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An election board's arbitrary ballot-invalidating decision does not support a § 1983 claim without intentional discrimination or serious impairment of the election's fundamental fairness.

Goodloe v. Madison County Board of Election Commissioners · filed 1985-06-06

The reason as outlined in that opinion was the lack of any intentional discrimination. The Plaintiffs by their Motion to Amend filed August 30, 1984, point out that the analysis of this Court was under the equal protection rather than due process clause of the Constitution of the United States. The result is the same in this case under either analysis.

Section 1983 does not make an ordinary dispute over counting and marking ballots actionable when no racially discriminatory purpose or effect is present.

Welch v. Lillie v. McKenzie · filed 1985-07-22

Because we have upheld the district court’s findings that no racially discriminatory purpose or effect was present here, we are left with an “ordinary dispute over the counting and marking of ballots,” involving complaints about missing signatures, ballots that should have been mailed rather than hand-delivered, and six fraudulent votes. ... such claims of infringement of voting rights are not actionable in federal court because of our federal system’s recognition that states are primarily responsible for regulating their own elections.

Garden-variety election irregularities do not support a § 1983 claim without fraud or other willful conduct undermining the electoral process.

Bodine v. Elkhart County Election Board · filed 1986-04-21

This case is virtually indistinguishable from the facts of Hennings, where the malfunctioning of electronic voting devices which were alleged to not comply with state requirements did not establish a section 1983 claim in the absence of fraud or other willful conduct.

Election-system errors amounting to incompetence rather than election fraud do not present a cognizable § 1983 claim.

Bodine v. Elkhart County Election Board · filed 1986-04-21

Thus, the election officials’ actions sound more like incompetence than election fraud. ... This court finds that there were no issues of material fact which precluded summary judgment on the grounds that appellant has not presented a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Election irregularities implicate § 1983 only when willful conduct undermines the organic processes by which candidates are elected.

Kasper v. Hayes · filed 1987-01-23

Only “willful conduct which undermines the organic processes by which candidates are elected” implicates the Constitution and § 1983.

A constitutional election-fraud claim under § 1983 requires willful conduct undermining the electoral process; negligent or ineffective administration alone is insufficient.

Kasper v. Board of Election Commissioners · filed 1987-01-27

We have said that intent is an essential ingredient of a constitutional election fraud case under § 1983. ... “[SJection 1983 is implicated only when there is ... ‘willful ... conduct which undermines the organic processes by which candidates are elected’.”

A constitutional election-fraud claim under § 1983 requires willful conduct that undermines the electoral process.

Kasper v. Board Of Election Commissioners Of The City Of Chicago · filed 1987-04-27

"[S]ection 1983 is implicated only when there is 'willful conduct which undermines the organic processes by which candidates are elected'."

Section 1983 plaintiffs who had an opportunity to seek relief before an election must do so diligently to preserve a request to void the election afterward.

Premier Games, Inc. ex rel. Goudeau v. State ex rel. Ieyoub · filed 1999-06-07

We are faced with the lack of any attempt to seek judicial relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prior to the election. ... We agree with the State’s interpretation and its cited authorities that it was incumbent upon plaintiffs to diligently seek pre-election judicial relief as a prerequisite to voiding an election due to constitutional violations, especially when they had the opportunity to seek relief. The plaintiffs now have no remedy available to them because of their failure to seek pre-election relief; therefore, the plaintiffs do not have a cause of action.

Section 1983 does not provide a tort action for state officials’ election irregularities or authorize federal courts to monitor state elections.

Montecino v. Louisiana · filed 1999-06-28

Section 1983 did not create a delictual action for the torts of state officials, and it did not authorize federal courts to be state election monitors.

Section 1983 reaches state or local election irregularities only when officials willfully act to subvert the electoral process or impair a citizen’s right to vote.

Parra v. Neal · filed 2010-06-23

Accordingly, we have held that election irregularities implicate § 1983 only when defendants have engaged in “ ‘willful conduct which undermines the organic processes by which candi- dates are elected.’ ” Kozuszek v. Brewer, 546 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bodine, 788 F.2d at 1272); see also Dieckhoff, 915 F.2d at 1148; Kasper v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 814 F.2d 332, 343 (7th Cir. 1987).

Section 1983 permits an action for an illegal arrest, meaning an arrest without probable cause to believe the accused violated a criminal statute.

Droysen v. Hansen · filed 1973-08-16

An action for an illegal arrest, i. e., an arrest without probable cause to believe the accused has violated a criminal statute, may be brought under 42 U. S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a wrongful-arrest damages action when a state actor, acting under color of state law, deprives the plaintiff of a constitutional right; good faith and probable cause provide a defense, and a genuine factual dispute about probable cause goes to the jury.

Giordano v. Lee · filed 1970-12-04

In order to recover it must be shown that the arresting officer was acting under color of state law and that he deprived plaintiff of a constitutional right. ... In Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U.S. at 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288, the Supreme Court held that “good faith and probable cause” is a defense to the action. ... Our research also leads us to conclude that in civil rights actions of this nature, where a genuine issue of fact on the existence of probable cause for arrest is presented, the question should be submitted to the jury.

Section 1983 does not make a lawful arrest actionable merely because the plaintiff alleges a conspiracy.

Lawrence v. Schaefer · filed 1973-12-31

The addition of allegations of conspiracy does not convert a lawful arrest into a chargeable act under § 1983.

An arrest under a facially valid warrant left outstanding by clerical error does not establish a Section 1983 due-process deprivation, even if tort remedies may exist.

Thibodeaux v. Arceneaux · filed 1984-10-18

When the charges against Tammy Thibodeaux were dismissed, the facially valid certified copy of the fugitive arrest warrant was not recalled due to clerical error in the Clerk of Court’s office. ... This Court finds that the plaintiff's arrest and seven hour detainment conformed to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hence, plaintiff never had a § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 recognizes a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest and imprisonment when the probable-cause determination rested on information the state supplied knowing it was false.

D.C. Wheeler and John Thedford Sims v. Cosden Oil and Chemical Co. · filed 1984-10-25

In addition to stating a claim for malicious prosecution actionable under § 1983, we conclude that the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint state a claim for arrest and imprisonment without probable cause in violation of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. ... We read the complaint here to state a claim that both Wheeler and Sims were deprived of their right to a determination of probable cause before arrest or detention in that the information which formed the basis of their arrest and detention was supplied by the state (Farr) with the knowledge that it was false. We hold that this states a claim for false arrest and imprisonment.

A false-arrest claim under § 1983 fails when the arresting officer had probable cause.

Claiborne v. Cahalen · filed 1986-05-28

A finding of probable cause eliminates this claim, because “there is no cause of action for ‘false arrest’ under Section 1983 unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause.”

Probable cause to make an arrest is an absolute bar to a § 1983 claim based on that arrest.

Michael Bergren, Individually and by His Guardians, Kenneth Bergren and Adriane Bergren v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1987-02-11

The existence of probable cause to arrest Michael bars appellants’ section 1983 claim.

An officer reasonably executing a facially valid warrant does not violate § 1983 by arresting the wrong person.

Brown v. Officer L. Patterson · filed 1987-06-12

If, as here, an arrest warrant, regular on its face, is duly issued, the officer executing the warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment by arresting the wrong person, unless the officer acts unreasonably, which Patterson did not do.

Section 1983 permits a false arrest claim against a defendant who caused the arrest even if the defendant was not physically present when it occurred.

Frye v. O'NEILL · filed 1988-03-09

O’Neill not being physically present when Frye was arrested is not a defense to a section 1983 false arrest claim by Frye. ... Here the facts clearly demonstrate Frye would not have been arrested but for O’Neill’s actions. There is thus a sufficient causal connection between O’Neill’s actions and Frye’s arrest to permit Frye to maintain a section 1983 action against O’Neill on the basis of an alleged false arrest.

A § 1983 false arrest claim requires causation; an independent intermediary breaks the causal chain unless the defendant tainted its deliberations by withholding or misrepresenting relevant facts.

Hand v. Stuart Gary, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Deputy Sheriff · filed 1988-03-10

An independent intermediary breaks the chain of causation unless it can be shown that the deliberations of that intermediary were in some way tainted by the actions of the defendant. Here there is no such evidence. As we stated above, Gary withheld no information from the federal agents, from the federal prosecutors or from the federal grand jury. On this theory as well, it is necessary to reverse the jury’s finding of causation.

Section 1983 permits damages for wrongful arrest when the plaintiff shows that the arrest lacked probable cause.

Cottrell v. Kaysville City · filed 1993-05-18

A plaintiff may recover damages under § 1983 for wrongful arrest if she shows she was arrested without probable cause.

A § 1983 wrongful arrest claim accrues at the time of the arrest.

Haag v. Village of Camden · filed 2001-10-30

First, it is well-established that a § 1983 claim for wrongful arrest accrues at the time of the arrest.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for medical malpractice alone.

Hall v. Tennessee Department of Corrections Main Hospital Dave Seahorne (Pa's) Fred Takacs and Dr. Nesbitt · filed 1987-10-09

His claim of medical malpractice cannot support a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits actions against individual county commissioners even when defendants argue that the complaint is effectively against the board.

Martens v. Hall · filed 1977-09-30

However, in a line of cases confronting this question the Fifth Circuit has consistently held that actions against individuals are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for an official who carries out an unconstitutional policy; the policy does not itself shield that official.

Dugas v. Jefferson County · filed 1996-06-21

There can be no logical extension from this premise to the issue of whether the acts of a nonpolicymaking official which are pursuant to an unconstitutional policy may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability against the individual. The Praprotnik case is simply not on point.

Section 1983 claims against individuals fail when the complaint alleges no conduct by those individuals that deprived the plaintiff of federally protected rights.

Bozner v. Sweetwater County School District Number One · filed 1996-07-23

As to each of the individual defendants, there are no allegations that any of them acted to deprive plaintiffs of federally protected rights. ... To the extent that the complaint purports to state claims against the individual defendants personally, the Section 1983 claim fails.

Section 1983 provides for individual liability in an action to enforce rights under the IDEA.

Doe v. Town of Framingham · filed 1997-06-04

Although this action is to enforce rights under the IDEA, the plaintiff has brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides for individual liability. Therefore, the defendants’ argument that the IDEA does not provide for individual liability is not applicable under the circumstances of this case.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for a supervisor’s own actions even if the supervisor is not a final policymaker for the municipality.

Springdale Education Ass'n v. Springdale School District · filed 1998-01-09

In other words, Rollins need not be a final policymaker for the district in order to be subject to individual liability for actions that he himself performed.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for a supervisor who directly participates in a constitutional violation, whether or not the supervisor is an authorized municipal policymaker.

Springdale Education Association v. Springdale School District · filed 1998-01-09

In fact, a supervisor may be subject to individual liability under section 1983 "if he directly participates in a constitutional violation." Andrews, 98 F.3d at 1078. This is true regardless of whether the supervisor is an authorized policymaker for purposes of municipal liability.

Section 1983 liability for a council vote requires causation for each defendant; if a majority would have voted the same way without the protected conduct, no member is liable for the resulting decision.

Coogan v. Smyers · filed 1998-01-15

This rule of causation allows an individual defendant to escape personal liability by proving a legitimate alternative motive for his vote. Furthermore, if a majority of defendants prove that their individual votes against the plaintiff would have been the same irrespective of the plaintiffs protected conduct, then the defendants as a group cannot be held liable, and no individual defendant, even one whose proof falls short, can be so held because causation is absent.

A Section 1983 claim against an individual defendant does not require proof of respondeat superior liability.

Klemencic v. Ohio State University · filed 1998-07-14

The fifth element of respondeat superior liability is not applicable here since this is an action against an individual under § 1983.

Section 1983 liability for detention beyond a sentence requires proof that the official knew of the problem, responded with deliberate indifference, and causally contributed to the unjustified detention.

Douglas v. Murphy · filed 1998-07-17

In order to establish § 1983 .liability in such a case, a plaintiff must demonstrate three elements: First, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner’s problem and thus of the risk that unwarranted punishment was being, or would be, inflicted. Second, the plaintiff must show that the official either failed to act or took only ineffectual action under the circumstances, indicating that his/her response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s plight. Finally, the plaintiff must show a causal connection between the official’s response to the problem and the unjustified detention.

Section 1983 permits individual liability when a state actor’s conduct proximately causes a free speech violation, even if a higher authority could review or correct that conduct.

Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham · filed 1998-07-29

Second, notwithstanding a possibility of administrative review and corrective action by higher authority, an individual who acts under color of state law to interfere with free speech is liable under § 1983 to the extent that his action or non-action is the proximate cause of that interference.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity suit against a local government official even when the government entity can also be sued.

Edward Nekolny, Patrick Dumas, and Maria L. Dahms v. Ann B. Painter, Individually and as Supervisor of Lyons Township, D · filed 1981-08-14

Defendant incorrectly leaps to the conclusion, however, that therefore only an official capacity and not an individual suit is appropriate here. We see no reason to assume on the basis of Monell that the law of individual liability has changed. We are unpersuaded that the district court should have immunized Painter from individual liability in this action.

Section 1983 requires specific factual allegations showing how each individual defendant was responsible for the alleged constitutional violation to impose personal liability.

Beattie v. Farnsworth Middle School · filed 1998-12-09

Here, Plaintiffs section 1983 claim seeking to hold the individual Defendants personally liable, like her HRL § 296(6) claim discussed above and section 1985 claim discussed below, is simply too conclusory to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for individual liability; a sheriff’s access to a jail roster, detention policy, and inaction do not alone establish it.

Luck v. Rovenstine · filed 1999-02-16

Even assuming all those facts were true — that is, that the sheriff had access to the roster, that he had the policy we have just finished discussing in connection with the official capacity claim, and that he was guilty of inaction in Luck’s case or generally — the district court correctly concluded that this does not add up to the kind of personal involvement we require for individual liability in sec.1983 cases.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity claims against school district officials for acts that deprive a person of rights secured by Title IX.

Morlock v. West Central Education District · filed 1999-03-29

In light of Crawford’s failure to make the distinction defendants advocate, and defendants’ failure to offer a theoretical justification for such a distinction, the Court holds that school district officials individually are subject to liability under section 1983 for acts that deprive a claimant of his or her rights secured under Title IX.

An individual-capacity § 1983 claim requires facts connecting the defendant to the alleged constitutional violation.

Madison v. Houston Independent School District · filed 1999-04-22

As Plaintiff has sued Paige in his individual capacity for the District’s termination of Madison, the Court shall address the application of qualified immunity for individual defendants in § 1983 actions. ... As Plaintiff has provided no factual basis to support his claim against Dr. Paige as an individual, the Court finds that this claim should be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for an official's own conduct even when the official acted in an official capacity.

Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist. · filed 1984-01-24

On the other hand, an official may be liable under § 1983 individually even though he was acting in his official capacity at the time he personally committed the conduct complained of.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for a government official or supervisor who is deliberately indifferent to known sexual harassment.

Murrell Ex Rel. Jones v. School District No. 1 · filed 1999-08-04

By way of contrast to the institution itself, a governmental official or supervisory employee may be held liable under section 1983 upon a showing of deliberate indifference to known sexual harassment.

Section 1983 requires an individual defendant to encourage or participate in the alleged misconduct to be liable.

Gratsch v. Hamilton County Sheriff's Department · filed 2000-03-24

In order to be liable for a violation of § 1983, an individual must encourage or somehow participate in the alleged misconduct.

Section 1983 permits officers to be sued personally for actions taken in their official duties.

Wilkerson v. Thrift · filed 2000-08-04

And, contrary to Defendants’ position, they may be sued personally for actions taken in their official capacities.

Section 1983 permits an individual supervisor to be sued even when the supervisor cannot be sued under Title VII.

Molnar, Lisetta v. Booth, Lloyd · filed 2000-10-02

As far as Booth is concerned, we have already noted his error in assuming that because he is not a proper defendant for Title VII, he cannot be held individually liable under sec. 1983.

Section 1983 allows claims against individual employees and supervisors.

Weberg v. Franks · filed 2000-10-10

Individual liability is allowed under § 1983, however.

Section 1983 requires proof that an individually named official was directly responsible for the alleged deprivation through action or failure to act.

Rice v. Indiana State Police · filed 2001-04-12

Second, section 1983 requires individualized proof that that the named official was directly responsible for the improper conduct, Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir.1983), and "knowingly, willfully, or at least recklessly caused the alleged deprivation by his action or failure to act.” Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir.1986).

For a § 1983 claim premised on Title VII liability, the plaintiff must be able to state a Title VII claim against the individual defendant.

Akers v. Alvey · filed 2001-09-19

Consequently, Plaintiff must be able to make out a Title VII case generally as well as against the specific Defendant against whom she asserts the § 1983 claim. In this instance, while Plaintiff may be able to make out a Title VII claim generally, Wathen prevents her from asserting one against Alvey individually. Consequently, Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against Alvey in his individual capacity must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a superintendent for an adverse employment action he did not cause.

Mullinax v. Sch · filed 2002-09-12

Dr. Sullivan cannot be held liable because he did not cause the adverse employment action.

Section 1983 claims against officials in their individual capacities cannot proceed when the complaint alleges no cognizable civil-rights cause of action against them.

Donovan v. City of Haverhill · filed 2002-11-15

Plaintiffs have alleged no cognizable causes of action against Flaherty or Mayor Rurak in their individual capacity for violations of plaintiffs' civil rights. Therefore, we only consider the claims asserted against Flaherty, and Mayor Rurak in their official capacities.

A § 1983 claim against municipal officials individually requires sufficient evidence that their actions support a colorable claim.

Dubuc v. Green Oak Township · filed 2002-12-02

Thus, strict claim preclusion does not apply to Vallie or Clevenger in their individual capacity only. However, Appellant has not presented sufficient evidence that actions in their non-official capacity by either party would raise a colorable § 1983 claim.

Monell's municipal policy or custom requirement does not apply to § 1983 suits against individual government officials.

Kroll v. Steere, No. 545009, (Dec. 4, 2002) · filed 2002-12-04

The court cannot accept the argument that Monell standards apply to § 1983 suits against individual officials carried to its logical conclusion it would render § 1983 and other civil rights laws, in large measure, inoperable.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity suits against officials but requires individualized proof that each official was directly responsible for the alleged deprivation.

Curry v. Pulliam · filed 2002-12-12

As to Mr. Curry’s individual capacity claims under section 1983, while that statute authorizes actions against individuals, it also requires individualized proof that the named official was directly responsible for the improper conduct, ... Even assuming that Mr. Curry has presented evidence that his rights have been violated, he has made no allegation that any of the named individuals meet the criteria for individual liability pursuant to section 1983.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a municipal official’s actions outside an official role support a colorable claim against that individual.

Dubuc v. Green Oak Township · filed 2003-01-28

Thus, strict claim preclusion does not apply to Vallie or Clevenger in their individual capacity only. However, Appellant has not presented sufficient evidence that actions in their non-official capacity by either party would raise a colorable § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for a supervisor who directly participates in a constitutional violation.

Shepard v. Wapello County, Iowa · filed 2003-03-04

Based on the evidence cited with regard to parts 11(D)(1) — (2) above, the Court finds plaintiff has created a material issue of fact as to whether defendant Kirkendall directly participated in the violation of plaintiffs First Amendment rights by allegedly terminating plaintiff for engaging in protected conduct.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for individual liability; a supervisor can be liable without direct participation if the supervisor acquiesced in the constitutional violation.

Palmer, Ronald v. Marion County · filed 2003-05-01

Although direct participation is not necessary, there must at least be a showing that the Sheriff acquiesced in some demonstrable way in the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 claims against officials in their individual capacities require factual allegations supporting personal liability.

Tibbs v. Williams · filed 2003-05-13

The Second Amended Complaint contains no basis to make a personal claim against either official. Therefore, in accord with the reasons stated by Judge Sullivan, Mayor Williams and Chief Few will be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 permits damages against individual state officials for actions taken in their official capacities.

Horne v. Russell County Commission · filed 2003-12-09

It is clear, however, that individual state defendants may be held personally liable under § 1983 for damages based upon actions taken in their official capacities.

Section 1983 permits a public employee to sue an alleged harasser individually without proving employer liability.

Owens v. Ragland · filed 2004-04-12

One exception is that a public employee alleging harassment under § 1983 may the sue the alleged harasser individually, as plaintiff did in this case; she need not show that her employer is liable.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a private individual liable for conduct committed by a state actor to establish that the private individual was the proximate cause of the violations.

Perez v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2004-05-28

“In order for a private individual to be liable for a § 1983 violation when a state actor commits the challenged conduct, the plaintiff must establish that the private individual was the proximate cause of the violations.”

Section 1983 permits liability for officers who integrally participate in a constitutional violation even if each officer’s actions do not independently violate the Constitution.

Boyd v. Benton County · filed 2004-06-28

Specifically, "integral participation" does not require that each officer's actions themselves rise to the level of a constitutional violation. ... Therefore, under the integral participation analysis adopted in Chuman, each defendant may be held liable for the Fourth Amendment violation outlined above.

Section 1983 can impose individual liability for discrimination even when the individuals are not the plaintiff’s employers.

Aucoin v. Kennedy · filed 2004-07-26

Defendants cite no support for their argument that individuals may not be liable as a matter of law under § 1983 for acts of discrimination, and several eases have recognized individual liability in similar circumstances. ... The individual defendants’ motion to dismiss Aucoin’s § 1983 claims on this basis is denied.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who follows other officers into an unlawful search when the officer knew or should have known that his conduct might violate the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.

O'Rourke v. Trujillo · filed 2004-07-27

In Hartsfield, 50 F.3d at 956, we held that all officers, including those following someone else’s lead, could be held liable under § 1983 if “they knew or should have known that their conduct might result in a violation of the [plaintiff’s] Fourth Amendment rights.” ... Whether or not the police officers accompanying Hayes decided to enter O’Rourke’s office, their unconstitutional behavior did not relieve Hayes of his responsibility to decide for himself whether to violate clearly established constitutional rights by intruding into the office without a warrant or exigent circumstances.

Section 1983 permits individual liability when an official acting under color of law deprives someone of constitutional rights, unless qualified immunity shields the official.

Hayes v. Faulkner Cty., AR · filed 2004-10-29

To hold Kelley liable as an individual under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hayes must prove: (1) the official's conduct deprived him of constitutional rights, and (2) the official's actions were taken under color of law. See Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1973). As discussed, Kelley's conduct deprived Hayes of substantive due process. And as jail administrator, Kelley was acting under color of law. Thus, unless shielded by qualified immunity, Kelley is individually liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits individual liability when an official acting under color of law deprives a person of constitutional rights.

Hayes v. Faulkner County · filed 2004-10-29

To hold Kelley liable as an individual under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hayes must prove: (1) the official's conduct deprived him of constitutional rights, and (2) the official's actions were taken under color of law.

Section 1983 damages require proof that the defendant acted under color of state law and caused or contributed to the alleged constitutional violation.

Panaderia La Diana, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp. · filed 2004-11-03

“To prevail on a claim for damages for a constitutional violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish the defendant acted under color of state law and caused or contributed to the alleged violation.”

Section 1983 permits claims against individual officials for their actions when plaintiffs adequately allege a federal due process violation.

K.J. ex rel. Lowry v. Division of Youth & Family Services · filed 2005-04-06

Defendants also argue that the named officials cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for their actions. ... The court disagrees.

A § 1983 action cannot be dismissed solely on the insufficiency of an official-capacity claim without addressing potential individual-capacity liability.

Caise v. Van Spencer · filed 1988-02-11

Upon review, we conclude that dismissal on this basis was improper because the district court did not address defendant's liability in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 permits employment discrimination claims against individuals who act under color of state law.

Demoret v. Zegarelli · filed 2006-06-08

Once action under color of state law is established, the analysis for such claims is similar to that used for employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII, the difference being that a § 1983 claim, unlike a Title VII claim, can be brought against individuals.

Section 1983 allows a claim against a school employee who allegedly used his state authority to sexually abuse a student; Title IX does not foreclose that claim.

Doe, John v. Smith, Brady · filed 2006-11-28

Because Title IX does not preempt the Does’ section 1983 claims against Smith and because there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Smith was acting under color of law when he allegedly abused Doe, judgment as a matter of law was improper.

Section 1983 permits liability against public employees for their own misconduct; being a coworker at the same level does not itself bar liability.

Roger Fairley and Richard Gackowski v. Evan Fermaint, Noberto Bercasio, and Fred Coffey · filed 2007-03-19

Things are otherwise under § 1983. ... Liability falls on the misbehaving employees — which of course is why they are keen to assert immunities from suit.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for individual liability and does not allow a claim based solely on allegedly false statements in a grievance response.

Dockery v. Bob Houston · filed 2007-05-03

We also find no basis for individual liability: Dockery cannot sue for allegedly false statements in a grievance response, see Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (prison grievance procedure does not confer substantive rights actionable under § 1983), and there is no evidence suggesting that any named defendant was personally involved in knowingly disregarding Dockery’s serious medical needs, see Hughes v. Stottlemyre, 454 F.3d 791, 798 (8th Cir. 2006) (no respondeat superior liability under § 1983); Vaughn v. Greene County, 438 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2006) (to show defendants were deliberately indifferent to pretrial detainee’s serious medical needs, it must be shown that they disregarded known risk to his health).

Section 1983 permits a claim against an individual even if no claim lies against the individual’s employer.

Taylor v. Altoona Area School District · filed 2007-08-23

Hence, the Defendants’ argument that Adams, Myers and Ritchey cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless an action lies against the District is wholly without merit.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between an individual defendant’s acts and the deprivation of a federal right; allegations that an official knew of and approved unconstitutional acts can suffice at the pleading stage.

COMMISSIONED II LOVE v. Yarbrough · filed 2007-08-24

In order to sufficiently state a claim against a defendant in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection between a defendant’s acts and a deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... Read liberally, the Complaint alleges that Defendant Oliver knew of the allegedly unconstitutional acts against Plaintiffs and gave his official approval of those acts. Plaintiffs assert that, as Director of Student Programs and Organizations, Director Oliver is responsible for implementing Savannah State’s policies and procedures. At present, this is sufficient to establish a causal connection.

Section 1983 does not allow individuals to be held liable for claims based on IDEA violations when the IDEA limits liability to school districts or public agencies.

LMP v. School Bd. of Broward County · filed 2007-09-27

Accordingly, the Court holds, consistent with the Eleventh Circuit's rationale in Williams, that individuals cannot be held liable for § 1983 claims based on IDEA violations because they are not proper parties under the IDEA.

Section 1983 does not allow liability against individual defendants for IDEA violations when the IDEA makes only school boards and public agencies proper parties.

L.M.P. ex rel. E.P. v. School Board · filed 2007-09-27

Accordingly, the Court holds, consistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s rationale in Williams, that individuals cannot be held liable for § 1983 claims based on IDEA violations because they are not proper parties under the IDEA.

Section 1983 permits claims against state officials in their individual capacities for deprivations of federal rights under color of state law.

Harley v. Carman · filed 1984-05-24

Their “state action” is not necessarily “action of the State”; the claims against them in their individual capacity are actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on individual officers for continued retention of seized property without evidence that they had authority to return it.

Snider v. Lincoln County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2008-06-05

Plaintiffs brought their § 1983 claims only against Neal and Evans, yet they presented no evidence that either of these individuals had authority to return their property once it was seized. In fact, Neal testified that he has no such authority.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative causal link between an official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation for individual-capacity liability.

Christopher Yon Brannon v. Thomas Co. Jail · filed 2008-06-09

For a defendant to be liable in his individual capacity, § 1983 requires proof of an affirmative causal link between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity suit against a government official for actions taken under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity.

Davis v. McCarter · filed 2008-08-05

In an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a suit against a government official may be made to impose individual liability for actions taken under color of state law.

A Section 1983 claimant seeking individual liability must allege specific acts by the defendants, not merely conclusory allegations.

Darlak v. Bobear · filed 1987-05-18

Dr. Darlak's complaint fails to allege any acts on the part of these defendants which would impose individual liability. "In the now familiar cases involving 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 we consistently require the claimant to state specific facts, not merely conclusory allegations."

Section 1983 permits individual board members to be sued when the complaint adequately alleges conduct constituting state action.

Blevins v. Kreutzman · filed 1978-03-14

The defendant board members, as individuals, are subject to suit in this civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity suits against state officials for acts performed in their official roles.

York v. Ferris State University · filed 1998-12-21

The Court also notes that Defendants themselves continued to assert a baseless argument for dismissal, namely that the individual defendants could not be sued in their individual capacities for violations of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires allegations of specific actions by an official that caused the plaintiff’s injury to support personal liability.

Suever v. Connell · filed 2009-08-26

Although we disagree with the court’s additional determination that the § 1983 allegations in the first amended complaint actually indicate that the State is the “real, substantial party in interest,” thereby triggering Eleventh Amendment immunity, we nonetheless affirm the court’s conclusion that the allegations are insufficient to put Westly on notice of specific, individual actions for which he is personally liable to Plaintiffs.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing multiple defendants to establish each defendant’s direct liability separately.

Phillips v. NORTHWEST REGIONAL COMMUNICATIONS · filed 2009-10-27

Where an allegation of such a violation is made against multiple defendants, the plaintiff must establish direct liability on the part of each defendant separately.

Section 1983 does not support an individual-capacity claim against public officials based solely on a Title VII violation that cannot support individual liability.

Fraker v. MARYSVILLE EXEMPTED VILLAGE SCHOOLS · filed 2010-03-08

Because Title VII claims cannot be asserted against public officials in their individual capacities, any Section 1983 claim against the individual Defendants in their individual capacities based on a Title VII violation also fails.

Section 1983 imposes individual liability, so a nurse’s responsibility for delayed treatment depends on his own actions and the reasonableness of his reliance on a doctor.

Berry v. Peterman · filed 2010-05-05

The extent to which Nurse Reich relied on Dr. Butler’s medical judgment and the reasonableness of any such reliance require further exploration at trial, particularly given the regime of individual liability under section 1983, under which the defendants might try to blame each other for Berry’s suffering.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on an official solely because the official has policymaking authority.

Bethany v. Reescano · filed 2011-03-22

Additionally, Bethany cannot prevail on a claim against Reescano based solely on an allegation that Reescano had “policymaking authority.” The question whether an official has final policymaking authority pertains to a determination of municipal liability, not individual liability.

Section 1983 claims against an official in her individual capacity require specific facts supporting her liability; speculative allegations do not suffice.

Galada v. George Payne, Jr. · filed 2011-04-11

In addition, Galada does not plead any specific facts tending to establish Gatson-Riley’s liability in her individual capacity; therefore, he has not demonstrated that his right to relief rises above the speculative level.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for state officials who cause the deprivation of a federal right.

I.P. Ex Rel. Cardenas v. Henneberry · filed 2011-04-26

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state officials may be held individually liable if they cause the deprivation of a federal right. ... The Court’s conclusion that the lien is valid undercuts this theory. Accordingly, Plaintiff has no basis for attempting to hold Defendants individually liable. Thus, Plaintiff cannot maintain her action against these Defendants in their individual capacity.

Section 1983 requires each officer’s liability to be assessed individually based on that officer’s own actions.

Marmelshtein v. City of Southfield · filed 2011-05-03

As was the case with Leonid’s excessive-force claim, the district court failed to assess the liability of each defendant officer individually. Here, the record only supports a claim against Jagielski, who says he knocked, announced, and rammed the door open. We therefore accept jurisdiction and reverse the denial of qualified immunity as to all of the officers except Jagielski on the failure-to-knock claim.

Section 1983 requires assessing each defendant’s liability based on his own actions; an individual who took no adverse action is entitled to qualified immunity from the retaliation claim.

Sigler v. City of Englewood · filed 2011-05-20

“Each defendant’s liability must be assessed individually based on his own actions.” Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 650 (6th Cir. 2010). The legal conclusion is therefore required that Brownfield did not violate Sigler’s constitutional rights and that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose direct liability for a termination on a defendant who was not the plaintiff’s employer, but that defendant may be liable for conspiring to violate the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.

Sexton v. City of Hannibal · filed 2011-05-27

Hicks is correct, however, that because he was not Sexton’s employer, he cannot be liable under § 1983, for her termination. Thus, Hicks is entitled to summary judgment on Count I of Sexton’s complaint. Hicks can, however, be liable, for conspiracy to violate Sexton’s First Amendment rights.

Section 1983 requires each defendant's liability to be assessed individually based on the defendant's own actions and permits liability for active participation, supervision, or a duty of protection.

Pershell v. Martin · filed 2011-07-13

For the purposes of § 1983, “[e]ach defendant's liability must be assessed individually based on his own actions.” Binay, 601 F.3d at 650; see also Dorsey v. Barber, 517 F.3d 389, 399 (6th Cir. 2008) (remarking that district court should have “distinguish[ed] between the actions of [defendant police officers]” instead ... of “lump[ing] them together” for purposes of the qualified-immunity analysis in excessive-force case). “To hold an officer liable for the use of excessive force, a plaintiff must prove that the officer ‘(1) actively participated in the use of excessive force, (2) supervised the officer who used excessive force, or (3) owed the victim a duty of protection against the use of excessive force.’” Binay, 601 F.3d at 650 (quoting Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1997)). “As a general rule, mere presence at the scene of [the alleged constitutional violation], without a showing of direct responsibility for the action, will not subject an officer to liability.” Id. (quoting Ghandi v. Police Dep't of Detroit, 747 F.2d 338, 352 (6th Cir. 1984)).

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s action or inaction to cause the alleged deprivation; a person without authority or control over the challenged conduct is not individually liable.

Mansourian v. Board of Regents · filed 2011-08-03

Based upon the evidence submitted, the court concludes that defendant Gill-Fisher is not liable for alleged Equal Protection violations arising out of the alleged systemic policy of providing unequal athletic opportunities because she had no authority or control over the provision or elimination of athletic opportunities. Accordingly, she cannot be found to have caused any deprivation to plaintiffs as a result of her action or inaction.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for actions taken as part of official duties under color of state law when those actions violate federal law.

Kohn v. SCHOOL DIST. OF CITY OF HARRISBURG · filed 2011-09-22

Further, individual defendants cannot avoid liability on a section 1983 claim by asserting that their actions were taken as part of their official duties. That is what a federal civil-rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is for, to expose a person to personal liability for actions taken under color of state law, when those actions violate the federal Constitution or federal law.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for a final decision maker’s retaliatory employment decision even when the decision is made without a formal vote.

Juarez v. Aguilar · filed 2011-09-30

For these reasons, we will not extend our precedent to exempt decisions made through informal procedures from the category of “adverse employment decisions” that can result in liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against individuals acting under color of state law who violate federal constitutional or statutory rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Maraj v. Massachusetts · filed 2011-12-13

42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against individuals acting under color of state law who violate rights of another secured under the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... The availability of relief for a plaintiff under § 1983 is limited by the operation of the doctrine of qualified immunity, which “protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights....” The relevant inquiry here, then, is whether the conduct of the individual corrections officers amounted to a violation of Decedent’s clearly established constitutional right. ... The Motion to Dismiss, therefore, must be denied as to the civil rights claims brought against these defendants in their individual capacities because Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts as against each individual defendant to state a plausible claim for relief.

Section 1983 requires specific facts plausibly showing an official’s individual liability; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Hydrick v. Hunter · filed 2012-01-12

In short, Plaintiffs’ “bald” and “conclusory” allega- tions are insufficient to establish individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against individuals based on an ADA claim that provides no individual liability.

Torres v. House of Representatives · filed 2012-04-16

Plaintiff is suing individual defendants under the ADA and as explained above, this legislation does not provide for individual liability. Thus, Plaintiff has no valid claim under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold officers individually liable to establish each officer’s own responsibility for the challenged conduct.

Gordon v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government · filed 2012-06-28

However, the rule that a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing individual officer liability in § 1983 claims is well established in our Circuit.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity claims against territorial officers.

Olive ex rel. People v. Dejongh · filed 2012-08-03

Since the Complaint specifies that each of the Defendants is being sued in his or her individual capacity only, the Defendants are subject to Section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits liability when an officer proximately causes a deprivation of rights or meaningfully participates in the violation, even without personally committing every act.

Keane v. McMullen · filed 2012-08-13

As a general matter, liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under § 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. ... Alternatively, even if the officer did not personally engage in the unconstitutional conduct, the officer may be liable if he or she was an “integral participant” in the constitutional violation. ... Under well settled Ninth Circuit authority, Plaintiffs’ evidence is more than sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether Silva was an integral participant with respect to the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 requires an individual defendant to be personally involved in a constitutional violation or to have caused the deprivation of a federal right.

J.E. ex rel. Edwards v. Center Moriches Union Free School District · filed 2012-09-22

With respect to the individual school defendants, plaintiffs have failed to establish that such defendants were personally involved in a constitutional violation or caused plaintiffs to be deprived of a federal right.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for an official whose decisions deprive someone of a federal right, even if the official lacks final policymaking authority.

Jackson v. City of Centreville · filed 2012-09-24

Murphy’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that he can be liable in his individual capacity as a decisionmaker, despite the fact that he was not the final policymaker, are OVERRULED.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an official who orders an allegedly unconstitutional transfer when the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence of retaliation.

Petrie v. City of Grapevine · filed 2012-10-21

As the Court has already determined that Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to support his free speech retaliation claim, it determines that Salame, who ordered the allegedly unconstitutional transfer, (see Def. MSJ App. at 29), may be held liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make individuals liable for an employee’s termination when they lacked authority to terminate or supervise that employee.

Hein v. Kimbrough · filed 2013-04-30

It is undisputed that Kimbrough’s co-defendants lacked the power to terminate plaintiff. Without supervisory authority over plaintiff, they cannot be held liable for his termination.

Section 1983 excessive force claims require an individualized assessment of each officer’s conduct; officers whose own conduct could not support the claim are entitled to qualified immunity.

Roberts v. City of Omaha · filed 2013-07-31

Officers Jones and Raders are entitled to qualified immunity insofar as their own conduct is concerned. Roberts admits Officer Martinec was the only officer to fire on Roberts. Roberts does not allege Officers Jones or Raders made physical contact with or otherwise applied any force against Roberts. Simply put, Officers Jones and Raders did nothing that could arguably support a claim of excessive force.

Section 1983 permits equal protection claims against individuals.

Murray v. Town of Stratford · filed 2014-02-11

The difference in the two is that a § 1983 claim, unlike a Title VII claim, can be brought against individuals.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity claim against an official who knew a policy was causing constitutional violations but failed to correct it.

Blossom v. Dart · filed 2014-08-14

Blossom’s allegations that Dart knew the policy for assigning housing to disabled detainees was faulty but failed to correct it are sufficient to state a section 1983 claim against Dart in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 requires facts plausibly connecting a supervisor personally to the alleged constitutional violation.

Stark v. University of Southern Mississippi · filed 2014-08-21

As to certain claims, such as the Plaintiffs unequal pay allegation, the Complaint was found to be devoid of factual content leading to the reasonable inference that Dr. Saunders was personally involved in the alleged violation. As to the Equal Protection and Due Process claims still before the Court, the Plaintiff was found to have pled sufficient facts to support § 1983 individual liability.

Section 1983 requires an individual defendant to have caused the constitutional deprivation; an official who could not provide the required hearing is not liable for its denial.

McDonald v. Wise · filed 2014-10-28

As we emphasized in Tonkovich v. Kansas Board of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 518 (10th Cir. 1998), “[t]he plain wording of [§ 1983] contains an element of causation,” and thus “a defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 unless he or she subjected a citizen to the deprivation, or caused a citizen to be subjected to the deprivation.” ... Here, as the Mayor’s press secretary, Ms. Miller similarly was in no position to provide Mr. McDonald the process he was due, a name-clearing hearing. She is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

In an individual-capacity § 1983 suit, an officer’s liability depends on what the officer knew or should have known and what information from other officers the officer could reasonably rely on.

Kishna Brown v. Lewis · filed 2015-02-26

For § 1983 individual-capacity cases such as this one, we have recognized a limitation on the collective-knowledge doctrine: ... Because this is an individual-liability suit, however, we must apply the limitation articulated in Humphrey, which leads to a different conclusion.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a named defendant intentionally or recklessly caused a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Thornton v. State of Indiana · filed 2015-08-14

The fact that Thornton’s probation revocation was later vacated does not lead to the conclusion that the named probation officers committed a tort or intentionally or recklessly deprived him of his constitutional rights. As a matter of law, the complaint does not allege any facts with respect to the named probation officers upon which the trial court could have granted relief.