42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits individual defendants to be liable when their conduct foreseeably causes another person to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Martin v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2015-11-17

Individual, non-supervisory defendants may be liable if they knew or reasonably should have known that their conduct would lead to the deprivation of a plaintiffs constitutional rights 'by others, and an unforeseeable intervening act has not terminated their liability.

Section 1983 permits liability for a state actor who sets in motion events that the actor knew or reasonably should have known would cause another to inflict a constitutional injury, absent an unforeseeable intervening and superseding act.

A.M. ex rel. Youngers v. New Mexico Department of Health · filed 2015-12-07

That M. Evans was not a state actor does not shield the Individual DOH Defendants from proximate causation liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability against an influential recommender in an individual capacity when the recommender's retaliatory conduct has a causal nexus to the final termination decision.

Williams v. CITY OF FRANKLIN, TENN. · filed 2008-11-18

Additionally, defendant Randolph argues that only a final decision-maker may be liable for a First Amendment retaliation claim. ... However, the Sixth Circuit has expressly held that an “influential reeommender” sued in his or her individual capacity may be liable for a First Amendment retaliation claim, despite the fact that the individual may not be a final decision-maker.

Section 1983 claims against individual school administrators for discriminatory bullying require plausible allegations that they knew the bullying targeted a student because of protected status and were deliberately indifferent to it.

Estate of D.B. ex rel. Briggs v. Thousand Islands Cent. Sch. Dist. · filed 2016-03-14

In order to state a claim against individual school administrators under the Equal Protection Clause through a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege facts plausibly suggesting (a) that those particular defendants had actual knowledge that the misconduct in question (here, bullying) was directed at an individual because of his or her protected status, and (b) that the administrators were deliberately indifferent to the misconduct.

Section 1983 does not allow personal liability based on vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Mederos v. St. Tammany Parish Government · filed 2016-07-11

Theories of vicarious liability and respondeat superior |indo not apply to an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A successful individual-capacity claim under § 1983 imposes liability on the official personally, regardless of which entity employed him.

Hulett v. City of Syracuse · filed 2017-05-30

To the extent plaintiff believes this dispute to be relevant for purposes of his § 1983-based false arrest or malicious prosecution claims against Officer Coleman in his individual capacity, plaintiff is simply incorrect: a successful § 1983 individual-capacity claim against an official can result only in a finding of liability against the official himself.

Section 1983 does not require proof of an official policy or custom for a claim against a defendant in an individual capacity.

L. L. v. Evesham Township Board of Education · filed 2017-09-27

As for the claims against the individual defendants, sued in their individual capacities, plaintiffs need not establish that an individual acted pursuant to a custom or policy.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking individual liability to link the officer’s own conduct to the alleged constitutional violation.

Przybysz v. City of Toledo · filed 2017-10-17

Section 1983 is an individual-liability statute. ... Przybysz does not "specifically link" Sgt. Williams to the alleged disclosure.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on government officials based solely on their supervisory positions; each official must have personally acted in an unconstitutional manner.

Kollaritsch v. Mich. State Univ. Bd. of Trs. · filed 2017-11-02

An individual defendant who is a government official may not be held liable under § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior. Each individual must have acted in an unconstitutional manner.

Section 1983 claims against an official require sufficient facts to support individual or supervisory liability.

Warren v. Doe · filed 2018-03-05

But Warren fails to show that the district court erred in dismissing his claims against Dr. Julye, because he has not alleged sufficient facts to support a theory of individual or supervisory liability.

Section 1983 individual-capacity claims against deputies require allegations of their own unconstitutional conduct; deputies who are not policymakers cannot be held liable merely for failing to implement agency policies.

Thornton v. Chronister · filed 2018-04-10

The allegations that the Defendant Deputies, who are not alleged to be policymakers for the Sheriff's Office, violated C.T.'s constitutional rights by failing to implement certain practices and policies for Student Day does not state a claim. Nor does the Complaint contain other non-conclusory allegations that the Defendant Deputies personally violated C.T.'s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not make a single board member individually liable for official actions taken by the full board following a vote of all members.

Sullivan v. Town of Southampton · filed 2018-07-19

In the absence of authority to the contrary, the court is persuaded that just as an elected board is not liable for the malice of a single member, a single member cannot be liable for the official actions taken by the board following a vote of all members.

Section 1983 imposes individual liability only when a defendant directly participates in a constitutional violation or causes one by failing to supervise or train an employee.

Toney v. Dickson · filed 2018-12-20

Individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 attaches only if a defendant directly participated in a constitutional violation or if failure to supervise and train an offending employee caused a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires liability to rest on each defendant’s own conduct; it does not permit respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Hubbard v. OK Dept of Human Services · filed 2018-12-28

Under § 1983, there is no respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity claim against a supervisor when the plaintiff adequately alleges the supervisor's actual knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct.

Simpson v. Phila. Sheriff's Office · filed 2019-01-07

Plaintiff therefore has alleged at least actual knowledge and acquiescence on the part of this Defendant, and therefore personal involvement. Thus, to the extent that Sheriff Williams is being sued under § 1983 in his individual capacity, his motion as to Count IV is denied.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between an individual officer’s acts and the constitutional violation for that officer to be liable.

Soler v. County of San Diego · filed 2019-02-26

However, an individual officer may only be liable if there is a “causal connection” between the officer’s acts and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 individual-capacity claims may proceed when the complaint plausibly connects the defendants’ own conduct to the alleged deprivation of rights.

Murphy v. Baker · filed 2019-03-29

Having concluded Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges sufficient facts for Plaintiff’s individual capacity § 1983 claims to survive, the Court denies as moot Plaintiff’s motion to file a further amended complaint to the extent it seeks to add additional factual allegations regarding the individual defendants named in the Amended Complaint.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an individual who acts under color of law and bears personal responsibility for the violation, without proof of employer liability.

Wazny v. The City of Chicago · filed 2019-04-19

Because section 1983 permits liability against an individual defendant, Wazny need not show a basis for employer liability to survive summary judgment on his section 1983 claim against Egan so long as he can demonstrate that Egan acted "under color of law," 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2019), and with "sufficient personal responsibility," Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 1983 requires each officer’s liability to be assessed individually based on the officer’s own actions.

Williams v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn. · filed 2019-05-15

As this action arises under § 1983, “[e]ach defendant’s liability must be assessed individually based on his own actions.” ... Here, we cannot conclude, as the district court did, that all Officers were operating in the same universe of facts because they arrived on scene in waves at various times: (1) Cobb; (2) Churchwell; (3) Weary, Moss, and Johnston; (4) Griffith; and (5) Palmer, Trumbo, McFarland, and Lancaster.

Section 1983 employment discrimination claims against individual defendants require facts supporting an inference that they were personally involved in intentional discrimination.

Hampton v. Judicial Branch · filed 2019-07-24

Here, while Ms. Hampton appears to have adequately alleged Mr. Grant, Ms. Fuller, and Mr. Fitzgerald were personally involved in her suspension and termination, she has not pleaded any facts demonstrating that they were involved in the alleged discipline of Ms. Laudano. She therefore has not pleaded any facts suggesting that the circumstances in which she was suspended and then terminated give rise to an inference that Mr. Grant, Ms. Fuller, and Mr. Fitzgerald intentionally discriminated against her. She therefore has not stated a prima facie case of discrimination under § 1983 against these individuals.

A § 1983 plaintiff can plead individual liability by alleging, with particularity, that the defendant participated in the misconduct or knew of and acquiesced in it.

CORCORAN v. CAUWELS · filed 2019-08-09

Ina § 1983 claim, a plaintiff can successfully plead a defendant’s individual liability by alleging “participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence” in the retaliatory action.

Section 1983 requires facts showing an official’s personal involvement to plead an individual-capacity claim.

Pendleton v. Oklahoma County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2019-09-30

To state an individual-capacity claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts to establish the defendant’s personal involvement in the asserted violation of federal rights. ... Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has satisfied her pleading burden for the imposition of individual liability against Defendant Taylor and the Commissioners.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the claimed violation for individual liability.

Villar v. City of New York · filed 2015-09-29

Similarly, a plaintiff must establish an individual defendant’s personal involvement in the claimed violation to find him liable in his individual capacity under § 1983.

A § 1983 damages claim against these state employees requires suing them in their individual capacities, where each is responsible only for his own wrongdoing.

Jackson v. Angus · filed 2017-05-12

Each defendant in the federal case is sued in his individual capacity (as is necessary for a damages claim under § 1983). Their legal interests and defenses may very well differ; when a defendant is sued in his individual capacity, he is held responsible only for his individual wrongdoing.

Section 1983 permits individual liability under a cat’s paw theory when an employee’s intentional conduct causes a decision maker to take adverse action.

Hernandez v. School District 201 · filed 2019-11-13

Considering all the above, the Court finds that the cat’s paw theory can support individual liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits individual liability when a defendant proximately causes the deprivation of a federally protected right.

Solorio v. Ducart · filed 2020-01-13

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under section 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right.

Section 1983 requires each defendant’s own conduct to support individual liability; association with another defendant is insufficient.

Neill v. Saez · filed 2020-02-04

Section 1983 does not sanction tort by association.” ... In this case, Neill has not pointed to any specific actions taken by Nurses Stephens, Prince, or Infante that deprived him of his federal constitutional rights.

An individual is liable under § 1983 only if the individual proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right.

Rodriguez v. Kelly · filed 2020-02-07

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under § 1983 only if Plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right.

An individual-capacity § 1983 claim against an official cannot rest on the agency’s lack of oversight or policies.

Munn v. City of Aurora · filed 2020-03-06

First, the lack of such institutional precautions bears only on the City of Aurora’s actions, not on Osberg’s, as she is being sued in her individual capacity, not ... her official capacity as the APD’s FOIA Officer.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold an individual defendant liable to show that the defendant’s actions actually and proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right.

Ontiveros v. Dominguez · filed 2020-03-18

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant’s actions both actually and proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing individual officials to plead and prove which actions of each defendant caused the constitutional harm.

Jones v. Mississippi Secretary of State, e · filed 2020-03-27

Thus, while the prima facie elements of a Title VII claim may establish an employer’s liability for intentional discrimination, a § 1983 plaintiff must additionally plead and prove which actions of the individual defendant caused the harm.

Section 1983 permits individual liability only for a defendant’s own unconstitutional conduct.

Kelly v. Haslam · filed 2020-05-08

he has not stated any facts that would support individual liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes individual liability only when the defendant’s conduct proximately causes the deprivation of a federally protected right.

Baldwin v. Atchley · filed 2020-06-03

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under § 1983 only if Plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing individual officials to plead and prove which actions of each defendant caused the constitutional harm.

Jones v. Mississippi Secretary of State, e · filed 2020-06-15

Thus, while the prima facie elements of a Title VII claim may establish an employer’s liability for intentional discrimination, a § 1983 plaintiff must additionally plead and prove which actions of the individual defendant caused the harm.

Section 1983 imposes individual liability only when the defendant caused the alleged deprivation.

Norris v. Downs · filed 2020-06-29

There remains an issue as to which Defendants are accountable for the allegedly inhumane conditions. Plaintiff claims, generically, that “staff” were aware of the conditions. He does not, however, identify any particular Defendant to whom he made complaints. See Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003) (individual liability under §1983 can only be based upon a finding that the defendant caused the deprivation alleged).

Section 1983 requires a discrimination plaintiff to allege how each individual defendant’s actions caused the unconstitutional harm.

Muslow v. Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College · filed 2020-08-04

To determine that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a § 1983 prima facie case of discrimination based on circumstantial evidence, the Court must examine whether Plaintiffs have alleged actions on the part of each individual defendant causing them unconstitutional harm, in accordance with Jones.

Section 1983 permits individual liability when a defendant’s actions actually and proximately cause the deprivation of a federally protected right.

Smith v. Tamayo · filed 2020-08-10

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant’s actions both actually and proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. ... In other words, it cannot be said that Defendant Friedman deprived Plaintiff of his religious freedom in the absence of evidence showing that Defendant Friedman did an affirmative act, participated in another’s affirmative act or omitted to perform an act which he was legally required to do, that caused the constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 permits individual liability only when the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right.

Causey v. Alameda County Santa Rita Jail · filed 2020-09-04

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under § 1983 only if Plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right.

Section 1983 permits individual liability only when the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right.

Khan v. Payton · filed 2020-09-09

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under § 1983 only if Plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right.

A § 1983 individual-capacity claim against a supervisory official requires facts connecting that official to the alleged constitutional violation.

Barras v. Garber · filed 2020-09-25

Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that the defendants were personally involved in the events leading up to Barras’ attempted suicide. Nor do Plaintiffs allegations show that the defendants had knowledge of any facts from which they could have drawn the inference of a substantial risk of serious harm. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against Sheriff Garber and Paula Smith in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 requires evidence of personal participation or a basis for supervisory liability to hold an individual defendant liable.

Rich v. Moore · filed 2020-10-29

As previously stated, to impose personal liability against any individual defendant, Rich must provide evidence showing that the defendant personally participated in the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violation or that the defendant can be held liable in his supervisory capacity.

Section 1983 claims against individual defendants require facts identifying each defendant’s acts and showing how those acts caused the constitutional harm.

Guerra v. City of Pleasanton · filed 2020-11-24

But for Plaintiff to succeed on her claims against the individual Defendants, she must identify the specific acts of each individual because she must demonstrate individual causation.

Section 1983 individual-capacity claims require allegations of wrongdoing by the named officials themselves.

Mengesha v. Rice · filed 2020-11-30

Since plaintiff failed to allege any wrongdoing by the named defendants in their individual capacities, he has failed to state a claim for relief against them under section 1983.

Section 1983 allows state officials sued in their individual capacities to be held personally liable for damages based on actions taken in their official capacities.

Long v. Sugai · filed 2020-12-18

State officials sued in their individual capacities, like the Defendants here, are persons for the purposes of § 1983 and may be held personally liable for damages based upon actions taken in their official capacities.

Section 1983 money damages can compensate injuries from withheld prison wages and termination of a prison work assignment, defeating the irreparable-harm showing for preliminary injunctive relief.

Hale v. Wood · filed 1996-06-21

Hale failed to establish a threat of irreparable harm because the injuries he alleged as the basis for his claim for relief--wrongfully withheld wages, statutorily inadequate wages, and termination of his work assignment--were compensable through his section 1983 claim for money damages.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on investigators for a prosecutor’s failure to disclose evidence the investigators gave to the prosecution.

Goudy v. Cummings · filed 2019-05-01

Police officers generally discharge their Brady obligations by turning over such evidence to the prosecutors, who in turn have a duty to disclose the evidence to the defense. ... Cummings and Napier thus cannot be held liable in their capacity as investigators for the failure of the trial prosecutors to turn over the specific police reports at issue in Goudy I .

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a law enforcement officer whose merely negligent failure to give Brady material to prosecutors results in an unfair conviction.

Porter v. Bob White · filed 2007-04-12

On the authority of Daniels and Cannon, we hold that mere negligence or inadvertence on the part of a law enforcement official in failing to turn over Brady material to the prosecution, which in turn causes a defendant to be convicted at a trial that does not meet the fairness requirements imposed by the Due Process Clause, does not amount to a “deprivation” in the constitutional sense. Thus, a negligent act or omission cannot provide a basis for liability in a § 1983 action seeking compensation for loss of liberty occasioned by a Brady violation.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a violation of the Brady due process right to a fair trial.

McMillian v. Johnson · filed 1996-07-09

We agree that § 1983 provides a cause of action for a violation of the due process right to a fair trial that is protected by Brady.

Section 1983 liability for a law enforcement officer’s Brady violation requires intentional suppression of evidence or bad faith.

Helmig v. Fowler · filed 2016-07-11

Unlike in the criminal context where a prosecutor is responsible for failing to produce materially favorable evidence regardless of fault, § 1983 civil liability for a Brady violation by a law enforcement officer requires intentional suppression or bad faith. ... Without any evidence of intent or bad faith, Helmig’s claim must fail.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal right to indemnification.

Allen v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1996-08-07

There is no federal right to indemnification provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Federal equitable principles govern indemnification for § 1983 judgments; state indemnity provisions cannot alone determine whether indemnity exists or cap recovery.

Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham · filed 1999-04-22

This-court’s understanding of the principles established for considering § 1983 and Rule 69 in juxtaposition means that neither § 2-4-11 of the Birmingham Code, nor § 11-47-24, nor § 11-93-2, nor § 11-47-190 of the Alabama Code, can without more, determine whether an indemnity exists in this case. This question must be decided pursuant to principles of equity in federal practice. Neither can these code provisions limit the amount of recovery under federal law.

Section 1983 gives a defendant no express, implied, or federal common law right to contribution or indemnification from another defendant.

Frantz v. City of Pontiac · filed 2006-05-18

The City simply has not demonstrated that there is an express, implied or common law right to contribution it may seek from the Union as it relates to the claims asserted under §§ 1981 or 1983. Accordingly, defendant Union’s motion to dismiss the cross-complaint as to the claims for contribution and indemnification under federal law will be granted.

Section 1983 gives defendants no right to contribution or indemnification, including through federal common law or § 1988.

Woodson v. City of Richmond · filed 2014-01-17

Therefore, this Court will follow the leading district court decision within the circuit and rule that there is no implied right to contribution in § 1983 actions. ... Therefore, § 1988 cannot be used to import state statutes on contribution into a § 1983 action. ... The Court therefore concludes that there is no express or implied right to indemnification in § 1983, no federal common law right to indemnification under § 1983, and no means of importing a right to indemnification through § 1988.

Section 1983 provides no right to contribution or indemnification and preempts state law claims seeking those remedies for Section 1983 liability.

Hoa v. Riley · filed 2015-01-26

The Cross-Claimants may not seek contribution or indemnity based on Section 1983. State law cross-claims for contribution or indemnity are not precluded by the exclusivity rule of the Workers Compensation Act, but are precluded where, as here, federal law supplies the rule of decision as to the Cross-Claimants and preempts such state claims.

Section 1983 does not permit contribution for a civil rights violation, and a defendant cannot shift liability for such a violation to a third party through indemnification that would undermine the statute’s deterrent purpose.

Simonson v. Borough of Taylor · filed 2019-12-10

The court again agrees with the majority of courts that do not allow contribution for §1983 actions. ... As such, in the instant case, as in the Bank case, id., “Pennsylvania law would be inconsistent with §1983’s purpose of deterring civil rights violations” and, thus [defendants] cannot maintain an indemnity claim [against Loretta] for the underlying §1983 action in Count[s] [I, II, III, IV, VII and VIII] of Plaintiff[’s] [amended] Complaint.”

Section 1983 permits an additional remedy alongside Title VII, but a right created solely by Title VII cannot independently support a § 1983 claim.

McCue v. State of Kansas, Dept. of Human Resources · filed 1996-08-08

While the applicability of Title VII to a plaintiffs claim does not preclude an additional remedy under § 1983, a right created solely under Title VII cannot serve as the basis for an independent remedy under § 1983.

A § 1983 claim premised on Title VII rights cannot succeed when the underlying Title VII claim fails.

Duncan v. Manager, Department of Safety · filed 2005-02-15

Ms. Duncan’s inability to survive summary judgment on her Title VII claims necessarily means that her § 1983 claims against Chief Michaud cannot succeed.

Section 1983 requires a distinct federal right; a Title VII violation alone cannot support a Section 1983 claim.

Alexander v. Westbury Union Free School District · filed 2011-11-04

But that language describes a Title VII claim, and a violation of Title VII cannot serve as the predicate constitutional or federal right for a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims against state employees in their official capacities are treated as claims against the state and are barred by sovereign immunity.

LUTHER v. RUST · filed 2020-03-04

All official capacity claims are dismissed because claims against the defendants as employees of the Indiana Department of Correction are in essence against the State of Indiana.

A state employee sued for damages in an official capacity is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Gennoe v. Washburn · filed 2019-11-04

Additionally, a state employee sued in his official capacity is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages against state agencies or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Spencer v. NH State Police · filed 2019-07-22

In addition, the state defendants are correct that, as the court previously ruled, Spencer cannot bring claims for money damages in this court against the New Hampshire State Police and the Attorney General’s Office. Therefore, any claims against those entities are dismissed for that additional reason.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

University of Southern Miss. v. Williams · filed 2004-11-10

However, based upon established principles of statutory construction and common law immunities, the United States Supreme Court has held that neither states nor state officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. ... Accordingly, any § 1983 claims by Williams should have been dismissed as a matter of law, and the circuit court erred when it denied USM's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict regarding Williams's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against a state official sued in an official capacity; a suit that does not specify capacity is treated as an official-capacity suit.

Besser v. Wilkinson · filed 1996-09-06

Absent a specification of capacity, a state official will be construed to be sued in his official capacity. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.1989). A state official is not subject to suit for monetary damages in his official capacity. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). Therefore, the defendants are not subject to suit for monetary damages in this case.

An official-capacity § 1983 claim against a county official is treated as a claim against the county.

Pompey v. Broward County · filed 1996-09-26

In addition, to the extent that the plaintiffs brought a § 1983 claim against Jack Osterholt, in his official capacity as administrator of Broward County, and against Judy Fink, in her official capacity as director of the Support Division, we treat those claims as claims against the County.

Section 1983 official-capacity suits against government officials impose liability on the governmental entity they represent, and resulting judgments are collectible from that entity.

Harris County v. Walsweer · filed 1996-10-03

A suit against a government official in his official capacity seeks to impose liability only upon the governmental entity the official represents, and any judgment in such a suit is collectible only against the governmental entity, not against the official’s personal assets.

Section 1983 bars monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Ben-Yahudah v. Dan Bolden, Sherry L. Burt, and Elizabeth McNamara · filed 1996-10-03

Insofar as Mr. Ben-Yahudah seeks an award of monetary damages against the defendants in their official capacities, it is well established that his claim is barred.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against a police chief sued in his official capacity.

Moore v. Evans · filed 1996-10-15

As Mr. Moore herein seeks monetary damages for alleged violations of his constitutional rights, he cannot recover against defendant Paul in his official capacity under § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity when the state has not consented to suit in federal court.

Watts v. Ramos · filed 1996-11-01

Watts’ claim for damages based on Ramos’ actions in his official capacity is dismissed because such a claim is barred by the immunity granted state officials pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities; a complaint that does not specify capacity is construed as an official-capacity suit.

Na'im v. Christine Bradley Ricky Bell Lannie Dedrick Barbara Wisherd Bruce Hester · filed 1996-12-12

Na'im sued the defendants for monetary and equitable relief without specifying the capacity in which he sued them. Absent a specification of capacity, a state official will be construed to be sued in his official capacity. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.1989). A state official is not subject to suit for monetary damages in his official capacity. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). Therefore, the defendants are not subject to suit for monetary damages.

A § 1983 claim against a sheriff in his official capacity must connect the alleged constitutional violation to a department regulation, policy, or practice.

1996-12-17 · filed 1996-12-17

The complaints fail to allege a violation of a Sheriff's Department regulation, policy, or practice that authorized any constitutionally proscribed action taken against Jackson and Penland, and therefore the complaints fail to impute liability to the Sheriff in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against state officials in their official capacities when the state has not waived its immunity.

Blue v. Jabe · filed 1996-12-23

Neither the State of Virginia nor Congress has waived Virginia’s immunity. Therefore, Blue cannot sue Jabe, Lawhon, and Trent in their official capacities for civil damages.

Monetary relief under § 1983 against state officials in their official capacities is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

McClure v. Howard A. Peters, III · filed 1997-02-05

We further note that McClure's claims for monetary relief against the defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against a state or a state actor acting in an official capacity because neither is a person subject to liability under the statute.

Migneault v. Peck · filed 1997-03-14

Furthermore, neither a state nor a state actor acting in his official capacity is a “person” subject to liability for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary claims against state officials in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Blackcloud v. Cunningham · filed 1997-04-22

...capacity are not subject to monetary liability under § 1983 because they are not "persons" within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against Alabama jailers are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity because the jailers are state officials.

Lancaster v. Monroe County · filed 1997-07-11

Applying the same factors in this case, we agree with the district court that Alabama jailers are state officials entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity when sued in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a territory or its law enforcement officers sued in their official capacities.

International Islamic Community of Masjid Baytulkhaliq, Inc. v. United States · filed 1997-08-29

Damages may not be obtained against the territory or its law enforcement officers in their official capacities, and the plaintiffs are not seeking injunctive relief.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Williams v. Coalter · filed 1997-10-09

Notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs civil rights claims lack merit, they must also be dismissed in part because defendants, in their official capacities, are immune from liability for damages.

Section 1983 requires a custom or policy favoring the alleged constitutional violations to maintain an official-capacity action against a sheriff.

Hammonds v. McQueen · filed 1997-11-19

Appellant has also failed to allege proof of a custom or policy favoring the commission of the alleged constitutional violations necessary to maintain an action against McQueen in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not allow money damages against state officials sued in their official capacities when Eleventh Amendment immunity applies.

Robinson v. Ridge · filed 1997-12-16

Defendants Ridge, Horn, and Vaughn are all immune from suit for money damages under § 1983 in their official capacities pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against school officials fail when the officials lack final policymaking authority for the challenged action.

Duda v. Board of Education of Franklin Park Public School District No. 84, John Barry, Dan Pietrini · filed 1998-01-16

To the extent that these allegations are brought against the defendants in their official capacities, they must fail. The defendants are not officials “who speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.”

Section 1983 treats an official-capacity claim against police officers as a claim against the governmental entity, which requires a municipal policy, custom or practice that caused the constitutional violation.

Frane v. Kijowski · filed 1998-01-27

A suit against the police officers in their official capacities operates as a suit against the governmental entity and a constitutional tort against a municipal entity will not lie unless the tort is caused by a municipal policy, custom or practice.

A plaintiff suing under § 1983 cannot avoid a state official’s Eleventh Amendment immunity by seeking payment from the county rather than the state.

Wall v. Sloan · filed 1998-02-11

While the extent of the state treasury's liability is the main consideration in determining immunity, a party cannot file suit under § 1983 and specifically seek money from the county and not the state in an effort to circumvent an official's entitlement to Eleventh Amendment protection.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims require a direct causal link between an unconstitutional government policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Glass v. Fairman · filed 1998-02-12

In order to state a cognizable § 1983 claim against Fairman in his official capacity, Glass must demonstrate a direct causal link between an unconstitutional governmental policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the section.

Hawaiians v. Cayetano · filed 1998-03-05

Moreover, it is well-settled that neither a state nor state actors sued in their official capacities are “persons” for purposes of Section 1983.

An official-capacity suit under § 1983 is treated as a suit against the officer’s employing entity.

Sanders v. Howze · filed 1998-03-19

A suit against officers in then-official capacities is actually a suit against the entity that employs them.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against officers are redundant when the government entity is also sued for the same claim.

Gibson v. Hickman · filed 1998-04-27

This court agrees, and finds that the § 1983 claims against Hickman and Dumas in their official capacities are indistinguishable from the § 1983 claim against the Monroe County School District. Accordingly, plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Hickman, Dumas, and members of the school board in their official capacities are also DISMISSED.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims for prospective injunctive relief lie against the current officeholder, not a former officeholder.

Williams v. Goldsmith · filed 1998-04-29

An official capacity claim may not, however, lie against a former Sheriff or former Deputy.

Section 1983 permits recovery of actual damages caused by a denial of procedural due process from local school board members sued in their official capacities regardless of good faith, unless the Eleventh Amendment protects them.

McGhee v. Daniel D. Draper, Superintendent Daniel D. Draper Floyd E. Mott Montie Jones Jerry Stafford Don Larmon a · filed 1981-01-16

Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S.Ct. 1398 (1980), holds local governmental officials in their official capacities liable for compensatory damages regardless of good faith. ... Defendant school board members in their official capacity therefore may not escape liability for any actual damages traceable to the denial of procedural due process unless protected by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 treats claims against government employees in their official capacities as claims against the governmental entity itself.

Keim v. City of El Paso · filed 1998-11-05

Any claims against these defendants for actions taken in their respective official capacities as employees of the city and the school district are treated as claims against the governmental entity itself.

An official-capacity claim under § 1983 against a local official duplicates a claim against the local government when both are named as defendants.

Atkinson v. City of Dayton · filed 1998-11-10

Defendant Ronald Lowe, the City’s Chief of Police, contends that the doctrine of qualified immunity shields him from liability on the Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. The Court finds this issue immaterial, however, because the Plaintiffs have sued Lowe only in his official capacity. ... Consequently, the suit against Lowe merely duplicates the Plaintiffs’ suit against the City. As a result, the Court sustains the Defendants’ Motion as it relates to the dismissal of Lowe from this litigation.

An official-capacity claim under § 1983 against a school official is treated as a claim against the school district and requires proof that a district policy or custom violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Konop v. Northwestern School District · filed 1998-11-10

Such claims dealing with their official capacities are equivalent to claims against Northwestern as their employer. Such claims require proof that a Northwestern policy or custom violated plaintiffs’ rights.

An official-capacity § 1983 claim against a government officer is a claim against the employing entity, which is liable only if a policy, custom or practice caused the constitutional violation.

Stricker v. Kuehl · filed 1998-11-16

When a claim is brought against a government officer in his or her official capacity, it is in essence a claim against the entity for which he is employed. ... The Defendant’s motion correctly states that the governmental entity cannot be held liable unless there was a policy, custom or practice, which caused the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 bars claims for monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Stroud v. Harrison · filed 1998-12-01

Under § 1983, plaintiff is barred from suing defendant Harrison in her official capacity for monetary damages.

Section 1983 requires a constitutional injury caused by an official policy, custom, or practice to support an official-capacity claim against a government officer.

Lewis v. Cook County Department of Corrections · filed 1998-12-15

Since § 1983 does not recognize the theory of respondent superior as a basis for liability, a plaintiff must allege that he or she suffered injuries of a constitutional magnitude as a result of an official policy, custom, or practice in order to prevail on an official capacity claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against a state corrections commissioner in his official capacity.

Carillo v. DuBois · filed 1999-02-12

In Carillo I, the court granted the motion insofar as the motion was directed to the plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages against the Commissioner in his official capacity. ... The orders in Carillo I will stand, however, insofar as they granted the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claims for damages.

Section 1983 does not permit official capacity liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Samarco v. Neumann · filed 1999-03-04

As a matter of law, § 1983 official capacity liability solely on the basis of respondeat superior is prohibited.

In an official-capacity § 1983 suit, the plaintiff must show that a government entity’s policy or custom caused the injury.

Murphy v. Bray · filed 1999-03-12

As this is an official-capacity suit, Plaintiff must also show that a policy or custom attributable to a government entity caused his injury. ... After reviewing the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, this Court finds that Plaintiff raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant Leis knew of and disregarded an excessive risk of harm presented to Plaintiff by the custom at the HCJC. Accordingly, we hereby DENY Defendant Simon L. Leis’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

In an official-capacity § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s deliberate conduct was the moving force behind the injury.

Moore v. Sheahan · filed 1999-03-23

In a § 1983 official capacity claim, like the instant case, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the deliberate conduct of the defendant was the “moving force” behind the injury.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing officials in their official capacities to show that an official policy or custom caused the deprivation of rights.

Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E. · filed 1999-03-30

In order to prevail on a S 1983 suit brought against defendants in their official capacity, the plaintiff must establish that the deprivation of his rights was the result of an official policy or custom.

A § 1983 official-capacity claim requires an unconstitutional governmental custom or policy.

Rowe v. Merrimack House of Correction · filed 1999-04-13

Perhaps more importantly, he has submitted nothing which might even imply that he was the victim of an unconstitutional custom or policy at the MCHC which unlawfully restricted his First Amendment rights.

Section 1983 provides no monetary recovery against a North Carolina sheriff sued in his official capacity as a state official.

Buchanan v. Hight · filed 1999-05-18

Here, plaintiffs seek monetary damages for the alleged violations of section 1983; however, under Messick and Slade we conclude no recovery is available.

Official-capacity claims under § 1983 may be dismissed as redundant when the governmental entity faces the same claims.

Sheriff's Silver Star Ass'n of Oswego County, Inc. v. County of Oswego · filed 1999-07-02

As claims have been asserted which may subject the County to municipal liability, the court dismisses plaintiffs’ official-capacity claims against Nellis and Todd.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a local official in an official capacity to show that a governmental custom or policy caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Hourihan v. Lafferty · filed 1999-07-09

In this case, since plaintiff has sued Lafferty in his official capacity, the onus is upon the plaintiff to show a custom or policy which has violated his constitutional rights. He has only made conclusory allegations regarding violations of his rights, and has set forth no affidavits or evidence to make out a genuine issue of fact concerning any unconstitutional custom or policy for which the Sheriffs Department may be held liable. Accordingly, his claims against Lafferty, in his official capacity, must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities.

Zigmund v. Young, No. Cv 99 0088324 (Nov. 23, 1999) · filed 1999-11-23

Accordingly, with respect to counts five and six, to the extent that the plaintiff seeks to sue the defendants for damages in their official capacities under § 1983, the motion to dismiss is granted.

A § 1983 claim against a sheriff in his official capacity is a claim against the county.

Wayne v. Jarvis · filed 1999-12-08

Although Wayne did not sue DeKalb County itself, his claim against Sheriff Jarvis in his official capacity is a claim against DeKalb County (“the County”).

An official-capacity § 1983 claim against an officer is redundant when the plaintiff also sues the government entity the officer represents.

Blalock v. Dale County Board of Education · filed 1999-12-15

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that summary judgment is due to be granted on Plaintiffs § 1983 claim against Monday in his official capacity, as Plaintiff has effectively brought a claim against the Board.

An official-capacity claim under § 1983 is treated as a claim against the entity the officer represents.

Picard v. Charron · filed 2000-01-04

Claims against individuals in their “official capacity” in § 1983 suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”

Section 1983 requires deliberate indifference to hold a sheriff liable in his official capacity when a facially lawful action leads an employee to violate federal rights.

Calvert v. Collins · filed 2000-01-19

In order to establish a cause of action against a sheriff in his/her official capacity on the theory that a facially lawful action led an employee to violate another’s federal rights the plaintiff would be required to show that the sheriffs action was taken with deliberate indifference as to its known or obvious consequences.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims require a municipal policy, custom, or practice; an isolated incident alone is insufficient.

Love v. Cook County, Illinois · filed 2000-01-28

Plaintiff has alleged what amounts to a random, isolated incident directed solely against him, and he has not plead the essential elements of any recognized official capacity claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to plead a cognizable claim against the Defendants in their official capacity, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is granted as to Plaintiffs official capacity claims.

Section 1983 does not treat state officials sued in their official capacities as proper defendants.

Johnson v. Commonwealth · filed 2000-02-09

In that capacity, they are not proper party defendants to a § 1983 action. Thus, the demurrer to Count HI is sustained on the first ground raised.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages claims against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Tigrett v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia · filed 2000-05-12

All claims against individually-named defendants sued in their official capacities are dismissed to the extent they seek monetary damages.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Dickinson v. Goodman, No. Cv 99 0090101 (May 26, 2000) · filed 2000-05-26

Accordingly, the plaintiff may not seek money damages from the defendants in their official capacities under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity liability for a city officer when the officer is a final municipal policymaker whose decisions constitute official policy.

Smith v. City of Holland Board of Public Works · filed 2000-06-08

To establish official liability for a city officer under Section 1983 a plaintiff must show that a particular defendant is a final policymaker of the municipality such that the defendant’s decisions can be considered “official policy.”

Section 1983 does not permit money damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Harris v. Scott, No. Cv 99 0090121 (Jul. 10, 2000) · filed 2000-07-10

Accordingly, the plaintiff may not seek money damages from the defendants in their official capacities under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against prosecutors in their official capacities are claims against their office.

Comardelle v. Hernandez · filed 2000-07-26

The claims brought by Plaintiff- Appellee against Morel and Sins in their official prosecutorial capacities are thus claims against the DA’s office.

In a § 1983 official-capacity action, a defendant has only the immunities available to the governmental entity.

Herrera v. Russo · filed 2000-08-03

The only immunities available to a defendant in an official capacity § 1983 action are those possessed by the governmental entity.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state or a state official acting in an official capacity because they are not persons under the section.

Hurlbut v. State, 90-8363 (2000) · filed 2000-08-25

However, "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are `persons' under § 1983." ... Accordingly, because Hurlbut sued both Picano in his official capacity and the State, those portions of Hurlbut's complaint based on § 1983 fail as a matter of law.

An official-capacity claim under § 1983 against a sheriff is a claim against the county and may be dismissed as duplicative when the county is also sued.

Garza v. Spence · filed 2000-12-13

Her official-capacity claim against Spence is really a claim against the County of Willacy and was therefore properly dismissed as duplicative.

Section 1983 requires an official-capacity plaintiff to link the alleged constitutional deprivation to a government policy or custom; respondeat superior is insufficient.

Johnson v. Herman · filed 2001-01-31

Because respondeat superior is not a recognized theory under § 1983, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 689, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), in order to prevail in an official capacity claim the Plaintiff must show that the alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is affirmatively linked to a governmental policy or custom.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims require a link between the alleged constitutional deprivation and a governmental policy or custom.

Castellano v. Chicago P.D. · filed 2001-02-12

Specifically, to state a § 1983 claim against individuals in their official capacities, plaintiff must allege: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest and (2) that the action alleged to be under color of law can be definitely linked to a governmental policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not treat a State or state officials acting in their official capacities as persons who can be sued under it.

Burnette v. Brooks · filed 2001-02-16

... neither a State nor state officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats official-capacity claims as claims against the governmental entity and requires the constitutional injury to result from an entity policy or custom.

Bogosian v. Board of Education of Community Unit School District 200 · filed 2001-02-22

Mr. Bogosian does not respond to this argument, so I construe the § 1983 claims as “official capacity” claims. That means that they are claims against the governmental entity (in this case, the Board) rather than against the individual defendants, and that the constitutional injury must have been caused by some policy or custom of the entity.

Section 1983 claims against municipal employees in their official capacities duplicate claims brought directly against the municipality.

Ratts v. Board of County Com'rs, Harvey County, KS · filed 2001-03-28

To the extent that they are sued in their official capacities, those claims merely duplicate the claims brought directly against the City.

Officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Young v. Vinson · filed 2001-05-22

Officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against states or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Kinzer v. Harris · filed 2001-05-31

Neither states, nor slate officials acting in their official capacity, are considered ‘persons” under Section 1983; therefore, they cannot be sued under this statute.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages suit against a state officer in his official capacity.

White v. Maryland Transportation Authority · filed 2001-06-01

In his official capacity, Justice is immune from a damages suit.

State officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages in state court are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

Vest v. Easley · filed 2001-07-17

However, our Supreme Court in Corum v. University of North Carolina, held that when an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is brought seeking monetary damages against “the State, its agencies, and/or its officials acting in their official capacities” in state court, neither the state nor its officials are considered “persons” within the meaning of the statute. ... Because plaintiff sued defendants in their official capacities, a claim under section 1983 cannot be made against defendants.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not subject to monetary relief under § 1983.

Becker v. Oregon · filed 2001-07-26

To the extent the complaint seeks monetary relief under section 1983 against the individual defendants in their official capacities, this claim is dismissed because suing the individual defendants in their official capacities for money damages is “no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); see Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) (state officials sued for monetary relief in their official capacities are not “persons” under section 1983).

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Destek v. Verizon, et al. · filed 2001-07-31

Accordingly, a state official acting in her official capacity is not a "person" for purposes of Section 1983 and, therefore, may not be sued for damages under that statute.

Section 1983 treats an official-capacity claim against a government officer as a claim against the government entity, making the officer claim duplicative when the entity is also sued.

Brunson v. City of Dayton · filed 2001-08-21

Thus, the Plaintiffs claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities merely restate her claims against Dayton.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against school officials are redundant when the school board is also sued on the same issues.

Jabr v. Rapides Parish School Board Ex Rel. Metoyer · filed 2001-09-27

Plaintiffs’ official capacity claims against Jenkins and Cotton are redundant of their action against the School Board.

Section 1983 allows money damages against state officials in their individual capacities, but not their official capacities.

Stack v. City of Hartford · filed 2001-10-25

Nonetheless, money damages under this theory are only available against state officials in their individual capacities — not their official capacities, as Stack claims.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against state officers sued in their official capacities.

Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Board Gregory Spendlove State of Nevada · filed 2002-02-04

To the extent Carey is suing Spendlove in his official capacity, Carey’s claim fails because Carey’s complaint requests only damages, which are not available against state officers sued in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit official-capacity liability based on respondeat superior or another theory of vicarious liability.

Gantt v. Whitaker · filed 2002-02-26

Official liability under § 1983 may not be premised on a respondeat superior or other vicarious liability theory.

Under § 1983, an official capacity claim against a public employee is treated as a claim against the governmental employer.

United Food & Commercial Workers, Local Union 1099 v. City of Sidney · filed 2002-03-11

An official capacity claim against a public employee is nothing more than a claim against the governmental entity which employs him.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state officials in their individual capacities but bars damages claims against the state and officials in their official capacities.

Doen Ex Rel. Doe v. Barger · filed 2002-03-25

Thus, plaintiff can proceed with his § 1983 claim for damages against defendants in their individual capacities. His claim for damages against defendants in their official capacity and against the State of Arkansas is dismissed.

An official-capacity claim under § 1983 requires proof that a government policy or custom caused the alleged deprivation.

Denoyer v. Duane Rogers · filed 2002-03-29

Because DeNoyer offered no proof that his allegedly deficient medical treatment resulted from a County policy or custom, the district court properly granted summary judgment dismissing DeNoyer’s claim against Rogers acting in his official capacity.

Section 1983 official-capacity liability requires an official policy that was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional injury.

Runge v. Waitz · filed 2002-04-23

Runge has therefore failed to demonstrate the existence of an official policy of the Sheriff’s Office that was the moving force behind his alleged constitutional injury.

Section 1983 does not provide compensatory damages against territorial officials sued only in their official capacities.

Lockhart v. Matthew · filed 2002-05-30

Lockhart is not entitled to receive compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he sued Defendants only in their official capacities, and monetary damages are therefore not an available remedy.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on the county officials sued in their official capacities here.

Melendrez v. Loza · filed 2002-06-05

Melendrez’s claims are against officials of Zapata County, Texas, in their official capacities. Therefore, the officials are not subject to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity liability only when the governmental entity itself is a moving force behind the deprivation of a federal right.

Fewless Ex Rel. Fewless v. Board of Education of Wayland Union Schools · filed 2002-07-11

More is required in an official-capacity action, however, because a governmental entity is hable under § 1983 only when the entity itself is a moving force behind the deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose official-capacity liability on a county deputy sheriff for state courthouse security actions when he acts for the state rather than the county.

Huminski v. Rutland County Sheriff's Department · filed 2002-07-11

Because Elrick acts, for the State in the area of state courthouse security, Elrick cannot be held liable in his official capacity for Huminski’s Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against a sheriff may be dismissed as redundant when the county board is also a defendant.

Smith v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Lyon · filed 2002-07-16

Regarding plaintiffs claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this defendant has been sued only in his official capacity. ... This court has previously applied this rationale to dismiss official capacity claims against individuals in suits in which a Board of County Commissioners is a party, ... and shall do the same here. Accordingly, plaintiffs redundant claim against Sheriff Eichorn shall be dismissed.

Section 1983 treats an official-capacity claim against a city official as a claim against the city, so a judgment in the city's favor leaves no separate official-capacity judgment against the official.

Hensley v. Horne · filed 2002-07-16

There has been no appeal of the judgment in favor of the City, thus no judgment would lie against Horne in his official capacity, the City being liable for any judgment. This leaves as the sole issue on appeal and on remand the question of liability of Horne in his individual capacity.

In a § 1983 suit, an unappealed judgment for a city forecloses judgment against its officer in his official capacity because the city would be liable for that judgment.

Hensley v. Fred R. Horne, and City of Danville, Virginia · filed 2002-07-16

There has been no appeal of the judgment in favor of the City, thus no judgment would lie against Home in his official. capacity, the City being liable for any judgment.

An official capacity § 1983 claim requires evidence that a government policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Armes v. Noble County Sheriff Department · filed 2002-08-06

Simply stated, the Plaintiff must show that the Sheriffs Department followed or instituted an unconstitutional practice, policy, or custom that resulted in the Plaintiff’s alleged deprivations. ... However, the Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence suggesting the existence of an unconstitutional practice, policy or custom of denying medical care, let alone that such a policy or practice caused him a constitutional injury.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; an official-capacity claim against a sheriff requires an official policy or custom that caused the injury.

Perkins, William G. v. Lawson, John L. · filed 2002-12-05

Under § 1983, there is no respondeat superior liability. In order to prevail on an official capacity suit against the sheriff, the plaintiffs must show that an official policy or custom caused the injury.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Peterson v. NORTH DAKOTA EX REL. ND UNIVERSITY · filed 2003-01-03

Section 1983 damage claims against state officials acting in their official capacities are likewise barred, either by the Eleventh Amendment or, because in their official capacities, state officials are not "persons" for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 claims against a government officer in his official capacity for nonprospective relief are treated as claims against the government entity.

Anderson v. Strickland · filed 2003-01-07

Furthermore, whether a Board member or not, Marshall was clearly a governmental officer serving as an agent of the Board and, thus, Anderson’s claims against Marshall in his official capacity for nonprospective relief constituted claims against the Board itself.

An official-capacity § 1983 claim against a public officer is treated as a claim against the governmental entity the officer serves.

Homo v. Merrimack Cty. DOC · filed 2003-01-10

Because his claims against Anderson and Doucet are brought in both their individual and official capacities, he has also alleged claims against the jail.