42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not shield a judge with judicial immunity when the judge acts in the clear absence of jurisdiction.

Linda Kay Sparkman and Leo Sparkman v. McFarlin · filed 1977-03-23

Thus, Judge Stump’s action had no basis either in law or in equity and was therefore taken without jurisdiction. In the absence of jurisdiction, a judge is not entitled to judicial immunity in a suit for damages that resulted from his action.

Section 1983 actions are subject to judicial immunity, so judges are immune from damages and suit for acts performed in their judicial duties.

Hofferber v. First National Bank · filed 1977-05-05

The judicial immunity doctrine applies in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 preserves quasi-judicial immunity for damages actions arising from judicial functions, but that immunity does not bar suits for injunctive relief.

Shipp v. Hardin E. Todd, Clerk of the 13th Judicial District Court in and for Yellowstone County, Montana · filed 1978-01-10

Appellee argues and we agree that the Civil Rights Act does not abrogate the quasi-judicial immunity accorded him in the exercise of his judicial functions. ... That immunity, however, is limited to actions for damages and does not extend to suits for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 claims for damages against state officials performing prosecutorial functions in attorney-discipline proceedings are subject to quasi-judicial absolute immunity.

Robert N. Kissell and Beverly J. Kissell v. Breskow · filed 1978-07-18

The action complained of here was Breskow’s presentation of the grievance to the Disciplinary Commission. Whether there may be circumstances under which a grant of quasi-judicial immunity may be withheld from state officials charged with the duty of disciplining attorneys, no such circumstances are present here. Breskow’s actions in determining to file a grievance, in filing the grievance, in notifying Terry, and in seeking a Commission determination on what disciplinary actions should be taken, fall within the normal role of a prosecutor. Those actions are thus entitled to a grant of quasi-judicial immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a judge for judicial acts taken in error, maliciously, or in excess of authority unless the judge acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Dunlap v. Sanderson · filed 1978-09-07

“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’ ”

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a judge for judicial acts taken within the judge's jurisdiction.

McClain v. Brown · filed 1978-11-17

A judge of a court of superior or general jurisdiction is not liable in civil actions for his judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of his jurisdiction and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly, so long as he has not acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. ... A judge of limited or inferior authority is also protected from liability when his judicial actions are taken within his jurisdiction. ... Thus Magistrate Brown, presiding over trial of misdemeanor charges, had authority to adjudge McClain in contempt of court for his refusal to testify. Magistrate Brown is therefore immune from liability.

Section 1983 does not abrogate judicial immunity: judges are immune from civil actions for judicial acts, even when those acts are alleged to be malicious, corrupt, or influenced by collusion or bribery.

Strawbridge v. Bednarik · filed 1978-11-22

Later we held that this doctrine of judicial immunity was applicable in suits under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the legislative record gave no indication that Congress intended to abolish this long-established principle. ... In view of the allegations set forth by the plaintiff in his Complaint that Judge Bednarek’s alleged violation of plaintiff’s civil rights took place at a hearing in Philadelphia Municipal Court and that the alleged violation consisted of Judge Bednarek’s making an evidentiary ruling in the trial of a civil matter, the doctrine of judicial immunity is applicable. This is so even where, as here, there is an allegation that the judicial ruling came about as the result of collusion and/or bribery.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a court-appointed receiver for acts taken while following the appointing court's orders, because the receiver shares the judge's immunity.

T & W Investment Company, Inc., an Oklahoma Corporation v. Kurtz · filed 1978-12-18

It is well established that judges and court officials are immune from suit under § 1983 for acts performed in their official capacities, even if they are accused of acting maliciously and corruptly. ... The courts that have considered the matter have held that a receiver is a court officer who shares the judge’s immunity, at least if he is carrying out the orders of his appointing judge. ... We hold that the receiver was in fact following the orders of the court and complying therewith. In these circumstances, at least, the receiver is entitled to share the judge’s immunity. The suit, therefore, was properly dismissed as not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against a judicial officer are barred by absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts performed pursuant to valid subject-matter jurisdiction, even when the acts are procedurally improper.

Gary v. Spires · filed 1979-03-14

Since he was acting as Magistrate at all times, he has immunity, the immunity of the judiciary. ... Any acts done pursuant to valid subject matter jurisdiction over the case, are protected, even though the acts might be procedurally improper. ... Thus, the motion to dismiss the § 1983 action must be granted as to Spires.

Section 1983 does not abrogate common-law judicial immunity for judges sued over constitutional-rights deprivations.

Clark v. Taylor · filed 1980-03-05

The common law immunity of judges is fully applicable in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deprivations of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a judge for acts carried out in the judge’s judicial capacity.

Cleveland v. Noland · filed 1981-01-15

The Court finds that all acts attributed to Defendant Noland were carried out by him in his judicial capacity and therefore he is absolutely immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides absolute immunity to judicial officers sued for actions performed in their official duties pursuant to court instructions.

Zarrilli v. Snell · filed 1981-03-09

The state defendants have moved to dismiss on the ground, Inter alia, that judicial officers are absolutely immune from suit under the civil rights laws for actions done in performance of their official duties pursuant to instructions from the court. See Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 F.2d 163, 166 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing other authorities). We agree and, based upon the facts as alleged by the plaintiff, dismiss all claims against the state defendants, including the Massachusetts Appeals Court.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a judge for acts taken in the judge's judicial capacity, even when the acts are erroneous, malicious, or beyond the judge's authority, unless the judge acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Wilson v. Tillman · filed 1981-05-20

A judge will not be deprived of .immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.”

Section 1983 suits are barred by absolute judicial immunity for judges and courts, and by related immunity for court officials acting under judicial authority.

Mourat v. Common Pleas Court of Lehigh County · filed 1981-05-22

Defendant, Judge Backenstoe, who placed the plaintiff in the ARD program, is absolutely immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The clerk, Joseph Joseph, is also immune from suit. ... Similarly, the court reporter’s qualified immunity shields her from suit when she acts pursuant to lawful authority or follows a judge’s instruction or a rule of court. ... Finally, the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County as a court and acting as a court derives immunity from the doctrine of judicial immunity. ... As noted above, the defendants Backenstoe, Joseph and the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas enjoy immunity from suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983's judicial-immunity doctrine does not shield a county judge from liability for administrative hiring or firing; judicial immunity protects judicial acts and is not strictly applied to injunctive or protective relief.

Clark v. Campbell · filed 1981-05-28

While the concept of judicial immunity is applicable to actions under Section 1983, the doctrine seems to be restricted to damage actions and is not applied strictly where injunctive, or protective relief is sought. ... The Court is persuaded, and accordingly, finds that the defendant in discharging the plaintiff was exercising administrative functions which have been statutorily defined as “executive powers.”

Section 1983 claims against a judge for acts performed in a judicial capacity are barred by absolute judicial immunity.

Nickels v. Meden · filed 1981-05-18

This immunity applies to plaintiff’s federal claim under § 1983, both as to allegations of constitutional deprivation and tortious conduct. Accordingly, plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, and all counts thereunder, is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for deprivation of civil rights by persons acting under color of state law, but judicial immunity bars damages claims against judges for their judicial acts.

Williams v. Silverlight · filed 1982-01-12

The question must still be answered, however, as io whether a judge’s immunity extends to claims under the broadened interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute which provides a civil remedy for deprivation of civil rights by persons acting under color of state law. While Mr. Williams did not allege an action under § 1983 specifically, his complaint should be read in its broadest form, and on such a reading, the possibility of a § 1983 allegation does exist. Even in that respect, however, Mr. Williams is not able to pierce the judicial immunity accorded Judge Silverlight. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). See also Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966) and cases cited therein. Accord, Guedry v. Ford, 431 F.2d 660, 663 (5th Cir. 1970).

Section 1983 does not allow damages against officials performing jury-selection duties that are related to the judicial process when those officials are protected by quasi-judicial immunity.

Pomerantz v. County Of Los Angeles · filed 1982-04-19

We hold, therefore, that the remaining individual defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from damages, both as to the § 1983 and the § 794 causes of action.

Section 1983 gives judges absolute immunity from money damages for acts performed in their judicial capacities, but does not immunize them from equitable or declaratory relief.

Dostert v. Neely · filed 1982-04-22

Judges, as § 1983 defendants, are absolutely immune from money damages for acts performed in their judicial capacities. ... While the question has not been decided by the United States Supreme Court, the law of this circuit clearly holds that judges are not immune from equitable and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not abolish common-law judicial immunity; judges remain immune from suit for judicial acts.

Martinez v. Winner · filed 1982-07-30

We do not believe that this settled principle of law was abolished by § 1983, which makes liable “every person” who under color of law deprives another person of his civil rights. The legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities. ... State judges are thus immune from suit under § 1983 for their “judicial” acts.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state agency when the agency acts in a judicial capacity and is functionally comparable to a judge.

Stanislaus Food Products Co. v. Public Utilities Commission · filed 1982-08-11

Accordingly, this court finds the PUC to be a state agency which is functionally comparable to a judge. It is, therefore, protected from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 shields a judge from liability for judicial acts, and whether an act is judicial depends on whether it is normally performed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in a judicial capacity.

Arsenaux v. Henry J. Roberts, Jr. · filed 1982-10-04

this immunity from § 1983 suits protects the judge against liability for all but nonjudicial acts. In determining whether a particular act is judicial, two factors must be considered, “(1) ‘whether it is a function normally performed by a judge,’ and (2) ‘whether [the' parties] dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.’ ”

Section 1983 does not permit damages against state licensing-board members for acts performed in quasi-judicial functions protected by absolute immunity.

Hicks v. Georgia State Board of Pharmacy · filed 1982-12-21

Finally, the Court finds that the Board members in their individual capacities are absolutely immune from damages liability due to the judicial nature of their activities in this case.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a judicial officer for acts taken in that judicial capacity.

Corby v. Warden · filed 1983-04-29

Insofar as the plaintiff purports to allege a claim against defendant based on Mullen’s acts as a judicial officer, that doctrine applies.

Section 1983 preserves a state judge’s absolute immunity from monetary damages for judicial acts, although it does not immunize the judge from declaratory or injunctive relief.

Blackwell v. Cook · filed 1983-09-08

Although not immunizing him from injunctive and declaratory relief, the Civil Rights Act did leave intact a state court judge’s absolute immunity from monetary damages for the performance of a judicial act.

Judicial immunity does not bar § 1983 declaratory relief against state judges.

Guerin v. Riley · filed 1983-10-31

For the reasons stated below, the court finds that such immunity is not available to state judges.

Judicial immunity is not defeated by procedural error or malice.

Rothschild v. Ferris · filed 1983-11-10

The doctrine of judicial immunity cannot be defeated by procedural errors, maliciousness or acts done-in excess of judicial authority.

Judicial immunity applies regardless of whether a suit is brought under § 1983 or as a common-law tort claim.

Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Department · filed 1983-11-16

Clearly, the nature of the suit, whether brought under § 1983 or as a common law tort claim, is irrelevant to the application of the doctrine of judicial immunity.

Entities and officials that perform functions normally performed by a judge, such as a state bar and its bar examiners investigating attorney admission applicants, are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages liability under Section 1983.

Greene v. Zank · filed 1984-07-23

We hold that the State Bar and the Committee of Bar Examiners, as arms of the Supreme Court, and their officials, as officers of the Supreme Court, are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for their acts while conducting a preadmission investigation.

Absolute witness immunity from damages suits under this statute extends to testimony given in administrative proceedings, like a civil service commission hearing, that are functionally comparable to judicial proceedings.

Lentsch v. Dean Marshall, Mayor of the City of Sheridan, Wyoming and Roger Krout, Chief of Police, City of Sherid · filed 1984-08-13

We conclude that the civil service commission hearing in the instant case possesses enough of the characteristics of the judicial process that witnesses in such hearings should be absolutely immune from suits for damages arising out of their testimony.

Judicial immunity bars damages against a judicial officer in a § 1983 action but does not bar declaratory relief.

Burkhart v. Thomas · filed 1985-01-17

This Ohio State pro se litigant appeals from a district court judgment dismissing his civil rights complaint construed to be filed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... The district court apparently overlooked the fact that this plaintiff was seeking declaratory and monetary relief; and, while judicial immunity bars an award of damages against a judicial officer, declaratory relief is not barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.

A judge is absolutely immune from § 1983 damages liability for judicial acts unless the judge acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Stafford v. Goff · filed 1985-05-25

It is clear that a judge is absolutely immune from liability for damages under § 1983 for actions arising out of the performance of his judicial functions unless he acted "in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”

Court-appointed mediators performing a quasi-judicial function are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages unless they act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Mills v. Killebrew · filed 1985-06-11

Thus, for the appellants' argument to be correct, the mediators must not only have acted without jurisdiction, they must have acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

A judge of a court of limited jurisdiction is absolutely immune from section 1983 damages for judicial acts unless the judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Johnny King v. Love · filed 1985-07-03

Defendant Robert Love, a City Court judge in Memphis, Tennessee, appeals from a jury verdict awarding $10,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages to plaintiff Johnny King in this action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We hold only that where a judge of a court of limited jurisdiction engages in judicial acts in deciding a case over which the court has subject matter jurisdiction, he is absolutely immune from suits for damages even if he exceeds his authority or his jurisdiction.

A state attorney general performing quasi-judicial review of proposed state contracts is absolutely immune from § 1983 damages liability.

Mother Goose Nursery Schools, Inc. v. Sendak · filed 1985-08-14

The review procedures provide adequate checks upon abuse by the Attorney General to confirm our conclusion that when reviewing proposed contracts for the state, the Indiana Attorney General is performing a quasi-judicial function and his conduct thereunder is entitled to absolute immunity from prosecution for damages under Section 1983.

Judicial immunity under Section 1983 applies to damages claims for judicial acts within the judge's subject-matter jurisdiction, but not prospective relief or ministerial acts.

Lowe v. Letsinger · filed 1985-08-29

The doctrine applies to ... damage claims, but not to suits seeking prospective relief, ... to judicial acts, but not to ministerial or administrative acts, ... and only to acts taken over subject matter which lies within a judge’s jurisdiction, ... Lowe seeks damages. We are therefore left to determine whether Judge Letsinger’s alleged violative acts were jurisdictional and judicial.

A judge is absolutely immune from Section 1983 damages for judicial acts within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, even if the act exceeded the judge's legal authority.

Chu v. Griffith · filed 1985-08-30

It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions. ... There is no such immunity, of course, if the judge undertakes to act in an area where he has no subject matter jurisdiction, but it is immaterial that his challenged judicial act may have been unauthorized by the laws which govern his conduct.

Judicial immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against a judge who did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Cavallary v. Lakewood Sky Diving Center · filed 1985-10-11

Even if this Court could assert ... jurisdiction over Judge Doherty, the complaint against him would have to be dismissed as barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity, ... since this is a suit only for money damages and not injunctive relief, ... and Cavallary does not assert that Judge Doherty acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction,” ... .

Judicial immunity is a defense to a § 1983 action for acts performed in a judge's judicial capacity, even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously or corruptly.

SHEAN BY AND THROUGH SHEAN v. White · filed 1985-10-25

The doctrine of judicial immunity extends to all acts performed by judges in their judicial capacity and is a valid defense to a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Judicial immunity is a valid shield from liability even when the judge is accused of malicious and corrupt exercise of his or her judicial powers.

Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits for actions taken in their judicial capacity.

Hagerty v. Keller, Executor of the Succession of Clement, Et Al. · filed 1985-11-04

Judges are clearly entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 suits involving actions taken in their judicial capacity.

Judges are absolutely immune from Section 1983 liability for judicial acts unless they act in the clear absence of all subject-matter jurisdiction.

Liles v. Reagan · filed 1986-01-13

The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity will protect a judge against liability for a given act if two conditions are satisfied. First, the act must not have been taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” ... Second, the act must be a “judicial act.”

Parole officials have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 damages for adjudicatory evidentiary decisions made during preliminary parole-revocation hearings.

Wright v. McClain · filed 1986-01-17

Consistent with this authority, this Court now holds that the evidentiary decisions complained of in this action fall squarely within the scope of parole board officials’ absolute “quasi-judicial” immunity. The fact that these decisions were made during a preliminary hearing to determine if probable cause for revocation of parole existed is of no consequence, because the tasks performed by the hearing officials are still “quasi-judicial” in nature.

Probation officers preparing presentence reports for state judges are absolutely immune from personal-damages actions under Section 1983.

Demoran v. F.A. Witt and John Does 1-4. · filed 1986-01-24

We have held that probation officers preparing reports for the use of state courts possess an absolute judicial immunity from damage suits under section 1983 arising from acts performed within the scope of their official duties.

Judges are immune from Section 1983 damages suits for acts performed in their judicial capacities.

Mathis v. Clerk of the First Department Appellate Division · filed 1986-03-19

It is clear, however, that judges are immune from suits under section 1983 which seek to recover money damages for acts performed in their judicial capacities as Mathis has claimed in the instant action.

State courts are not persons subject to Section 1983 suit, and judges acting within their judicial capacity are immune.

Harris v. Missouri Court of Appeals · filed 1986-03-28

Individual judges are immune from civil suit when acting within their judicial capacity, even in § 1983 Civil Rights actions. ... Likewise, courts as entities are not vulnerable to § 1983 suits, because they are protected by state immunity under the eleventh amendment. ... A court is not a “person” within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act.

A judge is absolutely immune from Section 1983 damages for judicial acts unless performed in the complete absence of subject-matter jurisdiction; merely exceeding authority is not enough.

Teeple v. Patton · filed 1986-04-07

A judge defending against a section 1983 action is entitled to absolute immunity from damages and liability for acts performed in his judicial capacity. ... However, there is a distinction between acts done in the excess of jurisdiction, in which case judicial immunity still applies, and acts done in the complete absence of subject matter jurisdiction, in which case a judge may be deprived of judicial immunity.

Judicial immunity bars a § 1983 claim against a judicial officer for actions taken under the authority of the judicial office.

Paisey v. VITALE, IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLA. · filed 1986-04-22

If the plaintiff is seeking redress against the Judge herself, the cases say that no civil rights cause of action can be maintained against a judicial officer for actions taken under authority of his or her office.

Judicial officers have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims for acts normally performed in their official judicial capacity.

Kondrat v. Hon. Frank D. Celebrezze, Chief Justice, Ohio Supreme Court · filed 1986-05-01

Judicial officers are entitled to absolute immunity for their judicial acts. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ---- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 351 (1985); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1984). A judicial act is one normally performed by a judicial officer in his official capacity.

Judges are immune from section 1983 suits for acts within their judicial capacity.

Harris v. Missouri Court Of Appeals, Western District · filed 1986-05-08

Individual judges are immune from civil suit when acting within their judicial capacity, even in Sec. 1983 Civil Rights actions.

Agency officials who initiate administrative enforcement proceedings and provide investigative information used in those proceedings have absolute immunity from civil-rights damages liability.

Norton Coal Corp. v. Gellhaus · filed 1986-06-23

Based on the descriptions of defendants’ job functions, this court finds that defendants are entitled to absolute immunity....

Judicial immunity bars Section 1983 money damages against a person acting judicially unless the judge acted in clear absence of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Walker v. Comay · filed 1986-07-29

However, the doctrine of judicial immunity protects those acting in a judicial capacity from the § 1983 claim for money damages unless they act in a clear absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

A judge acting within judicial duties is immune from § 1983 damages even if the judge acted maliciously.

Thompson v. Heckemeyer · filed 1986-09-25

Plaintiff’s claim concerns actions taken by Judge Heckemeyer within the scope of his duties as a judge. Consequently, defendant can claim the benefit of immunity from plaintiff’s claim for damages. ... Defendant has immunity from a suit for damages even if he acted maliciously.

A judge has absolute immunity from Section 1983 damages when the challenged conduct was a judicial act and was not taken in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Ralph Liles, Herman Bachanan, David Carlson, Ken Stastny, James Glenn, Larry Nolte and Ray Robinson v. Reagan · filed 1986-11-04

According to the Court, a judge is entitled to absolute immunity if the acts complained of were “judicial acts” and were not taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.”

Judicial immunity protects judges from Section 1983 suits seeking money damages for actions taken in their judicial capacity within their subject-matter jurisdiction.

Callahan v. Rendlen · filed 1986-12-04

Judicial immunity protects a judicial officer from civil suits seeking money damages, including those suits initiated under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Judicial immunity bars Section 1983 liability when a judge acts beyond jurisdiction but not in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Elzey v. Archer · filed 1986-12-08

Even though there was no indication that the cireumstances were applicable, Judge Pierre sitting in a court with authority to grant writs of habeas corpus, was acting beyond his jurisdiction but not without jurisdiction. ... As such, Judge Pierre is entitled to judicial immunity, and this Court need not determine whether the writ could have been granted based upon the continuing jurisdiction of the Allen Circuit Court over custody matters arising from the dissolution proceeding.

Judicial and quasi-judicial immunity in § 1983 actions bars monetary damages but not declaratory or injunctive relief.

Anderson v. Thomas J. Middleton Henry C. MacKall · filed 1987-02-02

However, both judicial and quasi-judicial immunity are limited to monetary damages. Declaratory and injunctive relief are still possible remedies.

Nonjudicial persons performing quasi-judicial functions intimately related to the judicial process have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages, and pleading a conspiracy does not defeat that immunity.

Moses v. Sadashiv D. Parwatikar, M.D. · filed 1987-03-09

We hold that absolute immunity is not affected by a conspiracy and consequently no matter how well pleaded Moses’ complaint was or could have become, Dr. Parwatikar is still absolutely immune from suit.

Section 1983 did not abolish common-law judicial immunity for judges acting within their judicial role and jurisdiction.

Ohse v. Hughes · filed 1987-05-14

We do not believe that this settled principle of law was abolished by § 1983, which makes liable “every person” who under color of law deprives another person of his civil rights. ... The immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role is equally well established, and we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine. ... Therefore, we rule the three defendant judges are to be dismissed from the lawsuit.

In a § 1983 damages action, a parole officer has absolute immunity for initiating and prosecuting a parole-revocation proceeding, and a witness has absolute immunity for testimony at the revocation hearing.

Johnson v. Kelsh · filed 1987-07-14

In the present action, the function performed by defendant Kelsh was comparable to that of a prosecutor in a criminal trial. Kelsh initiated the action against the plaintiff by executing a warrant, and presented evidence to the hearing officer. There was substantially no difference between his function and the protected function of a prosecutor who initiates a suit and brings evidence before a court. ... James Martin's conduct during the final hearing is also covered by absolute immunity.

Section 1983 does not create damages liability for every injury to a constitutional interest.

Johnson v. Kelsh · filed 1987-07-14

Section 1983, under which plaintiff brings this action, does not create a damage remedy for all conduct which may result in an injury to a constitutionally protected interest.

A Michigan prison hearing officer functioning as an independent professional adjudicator enjoys absolute immunity from § 1983 damages for acts performed in that role.

Shelly v. Johnson · filed 1987-08-14

... require the conclusion that a Michigan prison hearing officer enjoys absolute immunity in the performance of the functions described in the present complaint.

Judges of courts of general jurisdiction are immune from Section 1983 damages liability for their judicial acts.

Silverburg v. Charles Tackett, Officially and Individually · filed 1987-10-15

Plaintiff is not entitled to damages because judges of courts of general jurisdiction are immune from liability for their judicial acts.

A court must examine whether parole officials acted judicially, prosecutorially, or administratively before deciding whether § 1983 affords them absolute or only qualified immunity.

Stewart v. P.O. Gary Lattanzi, Donna M. Mills, Hearing Officer, and William J. Brianwell, Commissioner · filed 1987-10-26

Some factual inquiry must be made to determine whether the duties of the defendants were judicial or prosecutorial in nature entitling them, or any of them, to absolute immunity. Alternatively, this factual inquiry may show their duties to be administrative in nature, entitling the defendants to qualified immunity.

State utility regulators receive no absolute prosecutorial immunity under § 1983 when their challenged conduct is regulatory and investigative rather than quasi-judicial.

Diana G. Schlegel and Central Pacific Freight Lines, an Oregon Corporation v. William Bebout and Bob Russell · filed 1987-11-03

We, therefore, find that even though they were acting within the scope of their authority, these PUC officers were not acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, and are not entitled to the absolute immunity afforded to judges, persons performing judge-like roles within federal agencies, or prosecutors.

Judges are absolutely immune from Section 1983 damages liability for actions taken in the performance of their judicial duties.

Baker v. Schrader · filed 1988-01-26

More specifically, Judge Dowd correctly concluded that the three judicial defendants--i.e., Judges Bayer, Murphy and McMahon--were absolutely immune from damages liability under Section 1983 because the actions of which the Bakers complain were all taken pursuant to their duties as judges with the court of common pleas.

Section 1983 damages are unavailable against a judge for acts taken in a judicial capacity because the judge has absolute immunity.

Midthun v. Pasternak · filed 1988-03-16

The latter ruling was premised on'the court’s conclusion, which we share, that the judge enjoyed absolute immunity while acting in a judicial capacity.

Judges are absolutely immune from damages under Section 1983 for judicial acts taken without a clear absence of jurisdiction.

Williams v. North · filed 1988-03-30

Even if all the facts Williams alleges are true, he has in no way indicated that any defendant judge acted in a nonjudicial role or in the clear absence of jurisdiction. Accordingly, each of the defendant judges is entitled to assert, as a matter of law, the bar of absolute immunity. Summary judgment therefore will be granted in favor of those defendants as to Williams’ quest for an award of damages.

Judges are immune from suits for monetary damages under § 1983 for judicial acts taken within their authority and jurisdiction.

Morrison v. Judge Willie Lipscomb, Judge Harold Ryan, Judge Adam Shakoor, Does I Thru V · filed 1988-05-23

Upon review, we conclude that the defendant judges, Ryan and Lipscomb, of the 36th District Court of Detroit, Michigan are immune for suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 because the actions taken by them were clearly judicial acts taken within their limited authority and jurisdiction.

Section 1983 permits damages against a judge who fires assistant public defenders for political reasons while acting in an administrative capacity, when the constitutional prohibition was clearly established.

Steven A. Kurowski and David H. Nicholls v. James J. Krajewski, Individually and in His Capacity as Judge of the Lake Co · filed 1988-06-02

The assistants responded with this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that the use of political criteria in selecting public defenders violates the first amendment, applied to the states through the fourteenth. ... Forrester holds that the extent of immunity depends on the capacity in which the judge acts; judicial decisions are immune absolutely, while administrative decisions must be evaluated under principles of qualified immunity. Judge Krajewski played an administrative role when firing Kurowski and Nicholls. ... A reasonable person in Judge Krajewski’s position would have understood in December 1985 that the Constitution forbids firing an assistant public defender on the basis of politics.

In a Section 1983 action against a judge, the court must consider whether the challenged act was judicial and within the judge’s jurisdiction before deciding absolute immunity, and consider qualified immunity if absolute immunity is unavailable.

Donna Crooks and Brenda Holmes v. Honorable John H. Maynard · filed 1988-07-26

The plaintiffs, Donna Crooks and Brenda Holmes, brought 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions against Idaho District Judge John H. Maynard. ... On remand the district court should undertake two inquiries. First, whether Judge Maynard’s contempt order, otherwise an inherently judicial act, loses its judicial character in this case under the analysis set forth in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1107, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). Second, whether Judge Maynard had the power under Idaho law to find the plaintiffs in contempt for violating his April 23, 1985 administrative order and to confine them in jail until they promised to abide by that order. ... Should the district court find that Judge Maynard’s act was not a judicial one or was taken in “the clear absence of all jurisdiction,” it should then determine whether he is entitled to qualified immunity under the teachings of Forrester v. White, supra, and Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). Should the holding be that Judge Maynard lacks immunity, both absolute and qualified, the plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed with their action.

A state court judge is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit seeking monetary damages for alleged constitutional violations arising from his exercise of judicial authority.

Quimby v. Charles A. Pike, Judge · filed 1988-08-10

Plaintiff appeals the district court's judgment dismissing his civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... Seeking only monetary damages, plaintiff filed suit against a state court judge alleging that he had exceeded his jurisdiction, abused his authority and violated plaintiff's constitutional rights under color of state law. The district court dismissed the action, holding that the defendant was absolutely immune from suit for monetary damages. ... Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's suit.

Section 1983 affords absolute immunity to prison disciplinary appeals board members whose regular appellate duties are independent of facility staff and inmates.

Shaddy v. Gunter · filed 1988-08-08

Unlike the Cleavinger defendants who the Court found were “temporarily diverted from their usual duties,” the members of the appeals board serve on the board as part of their regular duties. The appeals board members are not placed in the uncomfortable position of making credibility determinations between co-workers and inmates since they do not have regular contact with either the facilities’ workers or the inmates. Further, the board’s decisions are not reviewable by the chief executive officer of any of the correctional facilities, but rather, are reviewable by the Nebraska courts. These differences lead me to conclude that the appeals board members should be afforded the protection of absolute immunity.

Judicial immunity leaves prospective injunctive relief as the available § 1983 remedy against a judicial officer, subject to the plaintiff having standing to seek it.

Sterling v. Calvin · filed 1988-08-15

The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs do not have standing to bring this action against Judge Calvin for injunctive relief. As that is their only remedy against a judicial officer under Pulliam, the Court must enter judgment in favor of defendant.

A judge is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit for judicial acts involving enforcement of a child support order.

Agg v. Flanagan · filed 1988-08-25

Judge Flanagan, of course, is absolutely immune from suit for these acts.

Judges and bar admissions committee members have absolute judicial immunity from Section 1983 damages claims for deciding an applicant’s eligibility for admission to the bar.

Sparks v. Character and Fitness Committee of Kentucky · filed 1988-10-18

For the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in Sparks, supra, we hold that the actions taken by the Kentucky Supreme Court and the Committee on Character and Fitness, and its members, were “judicial acts” to which absolute immunity attached.

Judicial immunity bars § 1983 claims against a magistrate for remanding a person into custody and declining to dismiss charges.

Pressley v. Randy Grayson R.D. Cantley, Jr., Magistrate · filed 1988-10-26

Initially, we note that magistrate Cantley is judicially immune from both claims in this suit.

A judge has absolute immunity from a Section 1983 claim for actions within the bounds of the judge’s jurisdiction.

Peste v. Clunk · filed 1988-10-31

Plaintiffs' present Sec. 1983 action is meritless. First, Judge Clunk is entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken by him within the bounds of his jurisdiction.

Judicial immunity bars damages under Section 1983 against a judge for judicial actions.

Blazel v. Bradley · filed 1988-11-07

Plaintiff has not sought money damages from defendant, and she is immune from them.

Judicial immunity bars damages against judges in a § 1983 action but does not bar injunctive relief.

Barry v. Chancellor Leon Jordan · filed 1988-11-15

To the extent that Barry sues Chancellor Jordan and Judge Weaver for damages, therefore, the District Court was correct in dismissing her action on those grounds. Judicial immunity does not apply, however, to the injunctive relief sought by Barry.

Private citizens and state officials do not acquire a judge’s immunity from § 1983 damages merely by believing they are helping carry out a judicial ruling.

Thomas L. Davis, James J. Condit, Attorneys-Appellants v. Hon. Thomas C. Crush, Planned Parenthood Association of Cincin · filed 1988-11-23

We know of no principle which allows private citizens or state officials to cloak themselves with the immunity that attaches to a judge even if they subjectively believe they are attempting to assist in carrying out a judicial ruling.

Judicial immunity does not bar a § 1983 suit seeking injunctive relief against a judge.

Kondrat v. H.F. Inderlied, Jr., Geauga Court of Common Pleas · filed 1988-12-08

Judicial immunity is not a bar to suits seeking injunctive relief.

State court judges have absolute immunity from Section 1983 damages for their judicial acts.

BEALE v. CAIN · filed 1989-02-21

The named defendant judges are entitled to absolute immunity from Sec. 1983 damages for the judicial acts complained of in Beale's civil rights suit.

A judge is absolutely immune from damages under Section 1983 for a sentencing decision within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction unless the judge acts in the absence of all jurisdiction.

Cross v. Richard Winningham John Taylor, Judge, City of Chattanooga, Defendants · filed 1989-02-22

Since disposition of the misdemeanor charges was within the subject matter jurisdiction of the City Court, and there is no allegation that Winningham acted in the absence of all jurisdiction, Winningham is absolutely immune from a suit for money damages.

A judge acting in a judicial capacity has absolute immunity from a § 1983 damages claim even if the judge acted corruptly, erroneously, or in excess of jurisdiction.

Duane K. Brown v. George M. Glasser, Judge Carol A. Pietrykowski, Clerk of Courts, Defendants · filed 1989-02-28

A judge acting in a judicial capacity is absolutely immune from a damage suit even if he acted corruptly, erroneously or in excess of jurisdiction.

A court-appointed receiver has absolute quasi-judicial immunity from Section 1983 claims for acts performed in administering assets under the appointing court’s jurisdiction.

NEW ALASKA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. GUETSCHOW · filed 1989-03-09

While our cases have not directly addressed the immunity due a receiver appointed by a state court to manage the business assets of a marital estate during a dissolution proceeding, their rationale teaches that absolute derivative judicial immunity is appropriate.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on judges for judicial acts within their subject matter jurisdiction, even if those acts are malicious.

Moore v. Taylor · filed 1989-03-29

Judges are absolutely immune from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability for all acts performed within their subject matter jurisdiction, even if the acts are malicious.

Section 1983 damages claims against court officers are barred by absolute immunity when they arise from judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Fletcher v. Clint Crabtree John 1 and 2 Does · filed 1989-04-20

Moreover, the damages claim against all the defendants was subject to dismissal because court officers are absolutely immune from suit on claims arising out of the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Judges are immune from damages under Section 1983 for judicial acts unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction; error, malice, or excess of authority does not remove that immunity.

Malcolm v. Bob Jones, Mark Hayes, Russell Talerico, Joe Merendino, Anthony Julian, Rodney B. Merrifield · filed 1989-04-27

We first hold that Malcolm's allegations concerning actions by the hearing judges were properly dismissed by the district court. Judges are immune from damages for judicial acts unless done in clear absence of all jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). Immunity is not lost because judicial action was taken in error, done maliciously, or exceeded authority.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against judges for acts relating to their official duties.

Downing v. Rumer · filed 1989-05-22

Downing's attempt to sue Judge Rumer for monetary damages for violating his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 must fail. Judges may not be sued for monetary damages for acts relating to their official duties.

Section 1983 permits declaratory and prospective injunctive relief against a judge acting in a judicial capacity despite judicial immunity from damages.

Facio v. Jones · filed 1989-05-25

The principle of judicial immunity does not apply, however, when the plaintiff simply seeks declaratory and prospective injunctive relief rather than monetary damages. That narrow exception to the doctrine of judicial immunity applies here.

Judges are immune from damages under § 1983 for decisions made in their judicial capacity.

Myers v. Regnal W. Garff, Jr., David L. Wilkinson, and Michael F. Skolnick · filed 1989-05-30

We agree with the district court that Judge Garff is immune from liability for damages in this case. ... Here, plaintiff complains of decisions that Judge Garff made while he was acting in his judicial capacity.

A judge lacks absolute judicial immunity from a Section 1983 claim for a general administrative order directing court personnel how to process petitions.

Morrison v. Judge Willie Lipscomb and Judge Harold Ryan, Judge Adam Shakoor and Does I Thru V · filed 1989-06-08

We hold, then, that the Shakoor order was an administrative, not judicial, act and that absolute immunity does not apply.

Michigan prison hearing officers have absolute judicial immunity from section 1983 suits for judicial acts performed during misconduct hearings.

Banks v. Klapish · filed 1989-06-09

Defendant Howell is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from suit for all judicial acts performed in the course of conducting misconduct hearings.

Judicial officers acting in their judicial or quasi-judicial capacities are absolutely immune from damages under Section 1983.

Kirkpatrick v. Michael A. Rumer, Judge Robert M. Light, Judge Richard E. Cheney, Referee Daniel S. Cade, Asst · filed 1989-06-12

The defendants were acting in their judicial or quasi-judicial capacities performing their official functions when they allegedly violated Kirkpatrick's rights. As such, they are absolutely immune from liability from damages under Sec. 1983.

Judges are immune from § 1983 damages for acts within their judicial capacity and jurisdiction, and clerks are immune from damages for judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Hardin v. Boyd Circuit Court Kelley Asbury, Judge Russell Compton, Clerk · filed 1989-06-26

The state court judge is absolutely immune from damages as Hardin failed to demonstrate that the judge acted outside his judicial capacity and jurisdiction; the clerk is also immune from liability for damages for claims arising out of the performance of his judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

A judge is absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for judicial acts unless the judge acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction.

Polur v. Raffe · filed 1989-07-14

A judge is absolutely immune from liability under section 1983 except in the clear absence of jurisdiction, even if an action was taken “in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.”

Section 1983 defendants who act in reliance on a facially valid court order are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.

Henry v. Farmer City State Bank · filed 1989-07-27

Second, with respect to the individual section 1983 defendants, the claims against them also flew in the face of established judicial precedent. It is black letter law that those who act in reliance on a facially valid court order are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.

Michigan prison hearing officers have absolute judicial immunity from damages under § 1983 for judicial acts performed within their jurisdiction while conducting misconduct hearings.

Branham v. Spurgis · filed 1989-08-04

Defendant is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for all judicial acts performed in the course of conducting misconduct hearings.

Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits for judicial acts, including issuing an arrest warrant.

Richard Lee Helzer, v City of Alpena County of Alpena, a Municipal Corporation Theodore O. Johnson, Magistrate of the Ci · filed 1989-08-24

Judges enjoy absolute immunity for their judicial acts. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978). The issuance of an arrest warrant is such a judicial act.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against a judge for conduct performed in the judge’s judicial capacity.

Merton Bond v. Edward Johnstone U.S. Government · filed 1989-10-04

Judge Johnstone has absolute immunity from monetary liability in this case as the conduct forming the basis of this suit was clearly conducted in the judge's judicial capacity.

Court agents enforcing a judge’s order may share the judge’s absolute judicial immunity from Section 1983 liability.

Scarso v. Cuyahoga County Department of Human Services · filed 1989-10-31

The § 1983 liability of CCDHS, CCDHS employees, and the Juvenile Court employees is premised upon their efforts at enforcing Judge Ruben’s order. Clearly, those defendants are entitled to the protection afforded Judge Ruben under the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against court personnel are barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity when the personnel request and receive transcript payment under a judge’s instructions as part of the judicial process.

Dellenbach v. James Letsinger, Paul Buchanan, Janet Roberts Blue, Marianna Novak and Debra Banach · filed 1989-11-14

Thus, we conclude on the facts before us that the court personnel are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for their alleged acts of requesting and receiving payment for the transcript pursuant to the judge’s instructions.

Judicial immunity does not bar actions under § 1983 seeking injunctive or declaratory relief against judges.

Brown v. Diane McQ Strickland, Judge General District Court for the Twenty-Third Judicial Circuit · filed 1989-11-16

While we agree with Brown that judges are not immune from actions for injunctive or declaratory relief, Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984), we affirm on other grounds.

Judges are immune from damages under Section 1983 for actions taken in their judicial capacity.

Polyak v. Jim T. Hamilton, Individually and in His Judicial Capacity as Circuit Judge Circuit Court of Lawrence · filed 1989-11-29

However, judges are immune for damages based on their judicial actions under Sec. 1983.

Judges are absolutely immune from damages under § 1983 for truly judicial acts.

Addleman v. Dolliver · filed 1989-11-30

As judicial officers, defendants Dolliver and Revelle are absolutely immune from liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for "truly judicial" acts.

Judges are immune from damages suits under Section 1983 for judicial acts, even if those acts exceed their jurisdiction or are alleged to be malicious or corrupt.

Bush v. Frank L. Sullivan, Eddie Joe Bush v. Kenneth O. Eikenberry · filed 1989-12-05

Judges are immune from suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (quotation omitted); accord Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.1986) (en banc).

Judges may be immune from liability under Section 1983 through judicial immunity.

Rorie v. O'Neal · filed 1989-12-08

Defendants O'Neal and Gardner were both entitled to judicial immunity.

Section 1983 damages against a judge are barred by absolute judicial immunity for acts within the judge’s jurisdiction and judicial capacity.

Filip v. Flanagan · filed 1989-12-18

Thus, absolute immunity bars all damage relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Sheriffs and other court officers executing facially valid court orders have quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 damages claims for conduct within the scope of that immunity.

Roach v. Madden · filed 1989-12-20

Defendant’s statement of the law is correct. “Police officers, sheriffs, and other court officers who act in reliance on a facially valid court order are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from suit under § 1983 for damages.”

Section 1983 does not give a state court judge absolute judicial immunity for an employment decision.

Bridges v. Senger · filed 1990-01-29

I must reject, however, the contention that defendant Senger is, in his personal capacity, entitled to absolute immunity. The Supreme Court has recently addressed this issue, holding that a state court judge making an employment decision is not acting in his official capacity and is thus not entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

Judges are immune from damages under Section 1983 for judicial acts resolving disputes between parties who invoked the court’s jurisdiction.

Merton Bond v. Judge Clayton Judge McDonald Judge Miller · filed 1990-01-30

Judges are entitled to immunity from damages where their judicial acts involve the resolving of disputes between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction of the court.

State judges are absolutely immune from damages under Section 1983 for judicial acts.

Brown v. Minnix · filed 1990-02-13

Moreover, the state court judge is absolutely immune from damages liability for the judicial acts complained of in this case.

Section 1983 does not give a judicial officer absolute judicial immunity for a ministerial duty performed outside the judicial function.

Anderson v. Slater · filed 1990-02-16

As the official responsible for reporting the conviction to the state, Mayor Slater is not entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

Judicial immunity bars damages under § 1983 for judicial acts performed within a judge’s jurisdiction, but does not bar injunctive relief against a judge.

Holeman v. Elliott · filed 1990-03-08

A judicial officer is absolutely immune from civil suits for damages resulting from any “judicial acts which are not performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” ... The doctrine of judicial immunity does not, however, shield a judge from injunctive relief in a suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides no claim against a judge for judicial acts because the judge has absolute immunity.

McMahon v. Donald Kent John H. Johnston Donald L. Bowman · filed 1990-03-19

The district court correctly found that Judge Kent is absolutely immune from suit under Sec. 1983 for the judicial acts which are the basis of Ms. McMahon's claim.

Section 1983 gives officials absolute immunity for acts prescribed by a facially valid court order, but only qualified immunity for conduct beyond the order’s scope.

Turney v. O'Toole · filed 1990-03-26

The district court failed to take into account, however, that this absolute immunity extended only to acts prescribed by Judge Wolking's order, see Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962, 100 S.Ct. 1648, 64 L.Ed.2d 237 (1980), and that all the order decreed was Turney's confinement at Central State. It did not dictate any specific placement or treatment within the facility. Therefore, the defendants are not absolutely immune from liability arising from Turney's placement in the maximum security ward. Instead, they are only qualifiedly immune.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges are barred by judicial immunity when the challenged acts were performed in a judicial capacity.

Merton Bond v. Raikes · filed 1990-03-26

Here the state court judge was clearly acting in his judicial capacity when he decided Bond's malpractice case. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988). Therefore, he is entitled to judicial immunity from damages, and the district court properly dismissed the case.

Officials executing a facially valid judicial detention order have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages for acts the order prescribes, but only qualified immunity for decisions about confinement conditions the order does not prescribe.

Turney v. O'Toole · filed 1990-03-26

We hold that O’Toole and Featherston were absolutely immune from liability arising from the fact of Turney’s confinement, but that they were only qualifiedly immune from liability arising from the conditions in which he was held.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges are barred by absolute judicial immunity for acts that are judicial functions performed while presiding over a criminal trial.

See v. Martin E. Johnstone, Judge · filed 1990-04-12

Even if this allegation were proven true, defendant would still be immune from suit because the alleged act occurred while the defendant was presiding over a criminal trial. Thus, it was a judicial function to which absolute immunity attached.

Section 1983 damages claims against state medical board members and staff in their individual capacities are barred by quasi-judicial immunity for their adjudicatory acts.

Paul E. Bettencourt, M.D. v. Board of Registration in Medicine of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts · filed 1990-06-01

In the present case, however, we do not order a stay of plaintiff’s damages claims, because other grounds exist for upholding the district court’s dismissal of them, namely, (1) the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the recovery of damages from the Board, and the Board members and their staff in their official capacities; and (2) the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity bars the recovery of damages from the Board members and their staff in their individual capacities.

Judges are immune from § 1983 claims arising from decisions they make in a judicial capacity, including deciding a litigant’s disability retirement benefits.

Dostert v. Harshbarger · filed 1990-07-18

Even if this suit was not barred by res judicata, the district court correctly held that the appellees' judicial immunity defeats Dostert's claims. ... Even assuming that the supreme court is the "administrative head" or even the "employer" of state circuit court judges, there is no doubt that the supreme court acted in its judicial capacity in denying Dostert his disability retirement benefits.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a judge for judicial acts within the judge’s authority, including evidentiary rulings and orders for restitution or fines.

Bennett v. Batchik · filed 1990-07-27

This Court finds that defendant, Judge Batchik, is absolutely immune from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions. The acts complained of by plaintiff were performed in Judge Batchik’s official duty as a judge. Evidentiary rulings and orders granting restitution and/or fines are clearly within the exclusive authority or discretion of a judge. These actions may serve as the basis of an appeal, but do not create any liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A judge is immune from suit under Section 1983 for judicial acts in excess of the judge’s jurisdiction.

Rosenthal v. Justices Of The Supreme Court Of California · filed 1990-08-01

A judge is immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for acts in excess of his jurisdiction, so long as the acts themselves were judicial.

Section 1983 claims against a judge are barred by absolute judicial immunity when the judge holds parties in contempt as a judicial act within colorable jurisdiction.

Donna Crooks Brenda Holmes v. John H. Maynard, District Judge · filed 1990-08-31

When he held Crooks and Holmes in contempt of court, Judge Maynard was clearly performing a judicial act. ... Therefore, since Judge Maynard had colorable authority to hold Crooks and Holmes in contempt, he did not act in clear absence of all jurisdiction. ... Since we affirm that Judge Maynard is cloaked by absolute judicial immunity, we do not reach the question of qualified immunity.

A judge is immune from § 1983 damages for holding hearings and signing orders because those acts are judicial functions.

Hunziker v. German-American State Bank · filed 1990-09-04

Holding a hearing and signing orders are judicial functions and Judge Mahoney is immune from damages resulting from these actions.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges are barred by absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts performed within their jurisdiction.

Lara v. Judge Thomas Fay · filed 1990-09-19

We need not reach that issue since we find that Judge Fay has absolute immunity for the judicial functions performed in issuing the December 1985 order.

A judge acting in a judicial capacity within the court’s jurisdiction has absolute judicial immunity from liability under § 1983.

Harley v. Perkinson · filed 1990-09-28

The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity is firmly entrenched at common law and bars any imposition of liability against a Judge under 42 USC § 1983 for acts performed in a judicial capacity (Bradley v Fisher, 13 Wall [80 US] 335; Pierson v Ray, 386 US 547). ... Defendant acted within his jurisdiction as a Family Court Judge and is entitled to the protection of the defense of absolute judicial immunity.

Section 1983 does not abrogate absolute judicial immunity for judges performing judicial acts within their jurisdiction.

Minniecheske v. Vocke · filed 1990-10-19

Therefore, we affirm the decision of the district court for the reasons stated in the attached memorandum opinions. ... The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity was first announced by the United States Supreme Court in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 U.S. (1 Wall.) 335 (1871), which held that a judge was not to be held liable in civil damages for judicial acts committed while exercising his jurisdiction, even if accused of acting maliciously and corruptly. ... Moreover, the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity is not limited by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits for monetary damages arising from their judicial acts.

Myers v. Nevius · filed 1990-11-15

Seeking monetary relief, Myers sued Eugene Nevius, a judge of the Springfield (Ohio) Municipal Court. ... The defendant is absolutely immune from suit for monetary damages.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against judges for acts performed in their adjudicatory functions.

Kothe v. City Of Elyria · filed 1990-11-27

Judges engaged in adjudicatory functions are absolutely immune from suit for liability in damages.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against judges or other court officials for actions or failures to act related to their official duties.

Linticum v. Unknown Judicial Officers, Wartburg County Criminal Court at Wartburg, Tennessee · filed 1990-12-06

Judges and other court officials may not be sued for monetary damages for actions or failures to act relating to their official duties.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against Illinois Court of Claims judges for decisions made in their quasi-judicial capacity.

Williams v. Rath · filed 1991-02-12

In light of the adjudicatory nature of the Court of Claims proceedings and the ample safeguards afforded by that tribunal to protect the fairness of those proceedings, this Court concludes that Illinois Court of Claims judges are indeed entitled to absolute immunity when acting in their quasi-judicial capacity. Here Williams challenges the decision rendered by the Judges in 89-2203. Because they were unquestionably acting in their judicial capacity when they dismissed Williams’ claim, they are immune from damages in this Section 1983 suit.

A judge is absolutely immune from a Section 1983 action for judicial acts unless they were done in clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Powell v. Erwin · filed 1991-02-25

In addition, the district court judge enjoys absolute immunity in a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action since Powell has not alleged any judicial acts done "in clear absence of all jurisdiction."

Judges are absolutely immune from damages under Section 1983 for acts performed in their judicial capacities.

Sipka v. Soet · filed 1991-03-15

Judges defending against section 1983 actions are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their judicial capacities.

Judges and court clerks have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages suits for judicial or quasi-judicial acts.

Robinson v. Cawthorne · filed 1991-05-14

Generally, judges and court clerks enjoy absolute immunity from suit for damages for judicial or quasi-judicial acts.

Judges have absolute immunity from § 1983 claims for judicial acts unless they act in a complete absence of jurisdiction.

Depineda v. Tursi · filed 1991-06-27

Judges have absolute immunity from Sec. 1983 claims unless they act in a complete absence of jurisdiction.

Judicial immunity bars a § 1983 action against a judge.

Clayton v. Mary Brisendine, Commercial Bank and Trust, Bobby Travilliam, William Cherry, Richard Dunlap, Iii, Wil · filed 1991-08-05

After a review, the district court dismissed the suit, finding: (1) that diversity jurisdiction did not exist because Clayton and all but one of the defendants were citizens of Tennessee; (2) that Clayton's Sec. 1983 action against West, a Tennessee judge, was barred by judicial immunity; (3) that Clayton's Sec. 1983 action against Brisendine was barred by res judicata, because Clayton had sued Brisendine to recover the monies in her unsuccessful state court action; and (4) that Clayton had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the remaining defendants in the Sec. 1983 action, because her allegations against them were vague and conclusory. Following the district court's denial of her motion for reconsideration, Clayton filed a timely appeal. 4 Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Clayton's action for the reasons stated in the district court's order of dismissal entered March 20, 1991.

Section 1983 bars damages claims against judges and officials performing judge-like functions for their judicial acts.

Demille v. Shearing · filed 1991-09-10

"Judges and those performing judge-like functions" are absolutely immune from section 1983 liability for damages for their judicial acts.

Judges are absolutely immune from Section 1983 damages liability for acts within their judicial authority.

John Robert Demos, Jr. v. James R. Browning, Honorable, Robert J. McNichols Honorable · filed 1991-09-10

Because the judges' actions were within their judicial authority, the district court properly determined that they were absolutely immune from section 1983 liability and dismissed Demo's action as frivolous.

Judicial immunity protects a judge from § 1983 damages for directing officers to bring counsel before the court, even if the judge authorized excessive force, when the act was judicial and within the court’s jurisdiction.

Mireles v. Waco · filed 1991-10-21

A judge’s direction to court officers to bring a person who is in the courthouse before him is a function normally performed by a judge. ... If Judge Míreles authorized and ratified the police officers’ use of excessive force, he acted in excess of his authority. But such an action — taken in the very aid of the judge’s jurisdiction over a matter before him — cannot be said to have been taken in the absence of jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against state judges for hearing a case despite having recused themselves from a prior case involving the same litigant, because the judges are immune from suit.

Kukes v. Roger Gilbert Reginald M. Watt · filed 1991-11-01

Kukes's federal claims lack an arguable basis in law. We have recently held that state court judges in virtually the identical situation are immune from suit.

Administrative officials exercising quasi-judicial functions are entitled to judicial immunity from § 1983 claims.

Stratford Nursing & Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Kilstein · filed 1991-11-15

With respect to Russo, who issued the Final Agency Decision which was overturned by the Appellate Division, it is clear as a matter of law that, he was exercising a quasi-judicial function, see N.J.A. C 1:1-18.6, and is thus entitled to judicial immunity.

Section 1983 claims against a judge for acts in small claims proceedings are barred by judicial immunity.

Celani v. Bekins Van Lines · filed 1991-11-26

He appeals that dismissal, and we AFFIRM the court's decision for the reasons stated in Judge Curran's attached district court order. ... Notwithstanding the plaintiff's argument that Judge Bruner acted without jurisdiction, he is clearly entitled to judicial immunity. The only acts alleged involving Judge Bruner concerned his involvement in the small claims proceedings.

Section 1983 claims against judges are barred by absolute judicial immunity, and court clerks have derivative immunity when acting under the court's direction.

Loftis v. County of Horry, Sc State Officials in Office Capacity · filed 1991-11-27

Loftis's § 1983 claim against the sentencing judge, however, fails because judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). The clerk of court is entitled to derivative immunity if he was acting under the court's direction. Plaintiff has not alleged or shown otherwise.

Judges acting within the course and scope of their judicial duties are immune from damages liability under § 1983.

Ledbetter v. U.S. Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of California, Sacramento · filed 1991-12-17

Judges acting within the course and scope of their judicial duties are immune from liability for damages under § 1983.

Judges have absolute immunity from § 1983 claims for acts committed within their judicial discretion.

Miller v. Bobbitt · filed 1991-12-17

Judges enjoy absolute immunity for actions arising out of acts committed within their judicial discretion.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on judges for acts within their judicial capacity because they have absolute judicial immunity.

Andrisani v. Miriam A. Vogel First Western Development Corporation Paul Maeting Lancer Walker · filed 1991-12-26

The district court properly determined that Andrisani failed to state a claim against Judge Vogel, who was acting within her judicial capacity and thus has absolute judicial immunity from section 1983 liability. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1986) (en banc).

Section 1983 damages claims against judges are barred by absolute judicial immunity for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless the judge acted clearly without any colorable claim of jurisdiction.

Depineda v. Warren O. Martin, Trial Court Judge · filed 1992-02-03

The Magistrate Judge correctly cited Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) for the rule that this lawsuit is prohibited because a judge, acting in his judicial capacity, is absolutely immune from civil rights suits, unless the judge acts clearly without any colorable claim of jurisdiction.

Section 1983 authorizes actions for injunctive relief against state circuit judges.

Murphy v. Gregory A. Weeks, Judge, Cumberland County · filed 1992-02-25

Actions for injunctive relief against state circuit judges are authorized under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against state court judges are barred when the judge is absolutely immune.

Moody v. Richard D. Robb, Judge Scott Epstein Patrick Delaney · filed 1992-02-25

Rather, he filed a civil rights action in federal court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the state court judge and two attorneys from the prosecutor's office. ... To the extent Moody's complaint can be construed as anything other than an attempt to secure impermissible appellate review, then we agree with the magistrate judge that the state court judge is absolutely immune.