42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 ordinarily requires an allegation that the defendant personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.

Massey v. Wilson · filed 1980-02-29

Personal participation by the defendant in the alleged deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights ordinarily “is an essential allegation in a Section 1983 claim.”

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for individual liability and does not impose supervisory liability through respondeat superior.

Armstrong v. Borie · filed 1980-07-29

Personal involvement is essential to find an individual defendant liable under § 1983. ... As to Officer Borie, the Court denied plaintiff’s requested charge as to supervisory liability because it was based on a respondeat superior theory, which is not applicable.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s direct personal responsibility for the deprivation of a constitutional right before liability can arise.

Lea Duncan v. Jack Duckworth, Warden, and Ronald Freake, Hospital Administrator · filed 1981-03-13

It is true that a defendant’s direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right must be established in order for liability to arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires personal participation or an affirmative link between the defendants and the constitutional deprivation, and it does not permit a school district or board to be held liable under respondeat superior for employees' discriminatory acts.

Rivas v. STATE BD. FOR COMMUNITY COLLEGES, ETC. · filed 1981-06-26

Personal participation is a prerequisite to a § 1983 action. ... A school district or board may not be held liable under a respondeat superior theory for the discriminatory acts of its employees. ... There must be an affirmative link between the incidents of misconduct and the defendants; defendants must expressly or otherwise acquiesce in the constitutional deprivations of which complaint is made. ... This affirmative link requirement encompasses nonfeasance as well as malfeasance.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a false-arrest claim when probable cause exists and does not permit liability against an individual who was not directly involved in the arrest.

Van Howell v. Joe D. Tanner, Individually and as Commissioner of Department of Natural Resources · filed 1981-07-13

The defense of probable cause negates a § 1983 claim based on an alleged false arrest. ... Once probable cause has been established, the legality of the arrest is not affected by collateral bad faith of the arresting officer or a subsequent dismissal or acquittal of the charges. ... Since there is no showing of direct involvement by Tanner in the arrest, he cannot be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes liability on an individual officer who participates in an unlawful arrest that deprives a person of constitutional rights.

Gagnon v. Ball · filed 1982-12-08

Mrs. Gagnon then brought this suit against defendants, alleging that her constitutional rights had been denied by an unlawful arrest in violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... We note, however, that Officer Laplaca not only declined to intercede on Mrs. Gagnon's behalf but also assisted Officer Ball in detaining her. This participation in an unlawful arrest suffices to support the jury's verdict against Officer Laplaca.

A supervisory official’s lack of personal participation in the alleged constitutional deprivation is a defense to a § 1983 claim.

Cotner v. Sharp · filed 1983-06-20

Further, the Defendant Sharp, Sheriff of Oklahoma County, is not shown to have participated in the arrest or to otherwise have deprived the Plaintiff of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the U.S. Constitution and his lack of personal participation is an additional ground of defense in his behalf to the Plaintiffs § 1983 action.

A state official is not liable in a civil rights action under § 1983 unless he or she directly and personally participated in the conduct that deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Lee v. McManus · filed 1984-06-28

A state official will not be held liable in a civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless he or she directly and personally participates in the conduct said to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s direct personal responsibility; supervisory responsibility and notice of subordinates’ alleged misconduct do not by themselves create personal liability.

Johnson v. Lane · filed 1984-10-29

In order for liability to arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish a defendant’s direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right. ... That Lane may have been apprised of the claimed misconduct of subordinates does not, however, subject him to personal liability.

Section 1983 imposes individual-capacity liability only for each defendant's own wrongdoing and does not recognize supervisory or respondeat-superior liability.

Junior Ray Duckworth, Cross-Appellants v. Gayle Franzen, Cross-Appellees · filed 1986-02-05

But being sued in their individual capacities the defendants could be held liable only for their individual wrongdoing. Section 1983 does not recognize a doctrine of superiors’ liability.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a warden who did not actively participate in the medical staff's alleged wrongdoing.

Branton v. Department of Corrections for Tennessee D.W. Harris, Warden and Medical Staff, East Tennessee Recepti · filed 1986-07-21

The warden was not an active participant in any of the alleged wrongdoing. Hence, he cannot be held vicariously liable under the theory of respondeat superior for the alleged acts of the medical staff.

Personal involvement is an essential prerequisite to a § 1983 claim against an individual defendant.

Richardson v. Penfold · filed 1986-12-30

There is a long line of authority in this court and elsewhere requiring personal involvement as an essential prerequisite to a claim against an individual defendant under § 1983.

A tenuous causal connection between state corrections officials’ regulatory oversight and unconstitutional county-jail conditions is insufficient to impose § 1983 liability on the state officials.

Ortiz v. Turner · filed 1987-01-08

To find that the tenuous causation suggested by the evidence at trial is sufficient to impose liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would indeed result in the type of intrusion into state sovereignty which the Eleventh Amendment was designed to forbid.

A § 1983 damages claim against an individual defendant requires allegations of that defendant's personal involvement in the challenged conduct.

Drake v. T.D. Taylor, Warden the Staff of the Mail Room R. Turjanica, Superintendent of Custody T. Stickrath, · filed 1987-02-11

Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for damages because he has not alleged any personal involvement by defendants in the improper actions.

A police officer may be liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene to stop other officers’ unlawful use of force occurring in the officer’s presence or knowledge.

Skorupski v. County of Suffolk · filed 1987-02-04

The law is clear that a police officer has an affirmative duty to intervene and prevent the unlawful use of force by other officers in his presence. ... the defendant officers were liable under § 1983 since “a police officer may not ignore the duty imposed by his office and fail to stop other officers who summarily punish a third person in his presence or otherwise within his knowledge.”

Officials who conspire to cause a public employee’s retaliatory firing may be liable under § 1983 even though only the legislative body possessed formal authority to terminate the employee.

Blair v. City of Winchester · filed 1987-09-04

That it took formal board action to fire Blair does not insulate these individuals from being accountable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their roles in Blair’s claims of constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 liability requires personal participation; a governing board's neutral adoption of an academic bulletin does not establish individual action against a particular student or a constitutional violation.

Hammond v. Auburn University · filed 1987-09-24

Absent a showing of some facts by the plaintiff demonstrating some action on the part of the individual members of the Board of Trustees, this Court is obliged to grant summary judgment for the defendant trustees because the plaintiff's complaint against them is without a factual basis. It is this Court's opinion that the act of approving the 1985-1986 Bulletin by the defendant trustees does not state a cause of action under § 1983.

A state officer cannot be held personally liable under § 1983 for a search when uncontroverted evidence shows the officer merely served and inventoried a warrant and did not participate in the seizure.

Fusion Energy Foundation, Inc. v. Terry · filed 1988-01-07

Because appellants have offered no evidence to challenge Spivey's affidavit, the district court properly granted summary judgment in his favor.

Section 1983 liability for an unlawful search may extend to officers who participated actively or passively with knowledge, but not to officers who arrived afterward and merely observed evidence in plain view.

Crooker v. Van Higgins · filed 1988-04-04

It is for a jury to decide whether Borrero and Correira somehow participated in the unlawful search of the cabinet — actively, or passively but with knowledge — or whether they innocently came into the kitchen after Higgins opened the cabinet and observed the explosives in plain view which, if the jury believes, would absolve them of fourth amendment liability.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have personally participated in the alleged deprivation to be liable.

Durre v. Dempsey · filed 1989-02-28

In order to be liable pursuant to Sec. 1983, a defendant must have personally participated in the alleged deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have personally participated in the alleged deprivation of protected rights.

Haston v. Tatham · filed 1994-01-19

In order to prevail on a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant personally participated in the alleged deprivation of protected rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a superintendent personally participated in or directed the conduct giving rise to the claim.

Downs v. Eldon Vail, Superintendent, Wccw Charlotte Blackwell, Superintendent, Emcf Robert Schieldler, S · filed 1994-08-09

Downs' allegations are insufficient to indicate any deliberate indifference by responsible officials, see Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303, and Downs does not allege that any superintendent personally participated in or directed the conduct giving rise to Downs' claim, see Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (section 1983 liability arises only upon showing of personal participation).

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have personally participated in the alleged violation of constitutional rights.

Graham v. Gunter · filed 1995-07-25

The affidavits demonstrate that none of the named Defendants knowingly exposed Plaintiff to harmful fumes and, therefore, were not personally involved in the alleged violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Personal participation is essential in a Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 liability requires each defendant to have personally participated in the alleged violation.

Kimble v. Bunnell · filed 1995-09-20

"Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant." Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (citation omitted). ... Because Kimble failed to establish that Curtis participated in the alleged violation, the district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Curtis on Kimble's claim of deliberate indifference. See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege each defendant’s personal participation in the challenged conduct.

Henrichsen v. Romer · filed 1996-06-20

In an action alleging a violation of § 1983, personal participation by a defendant is necessary to stating a cause of action.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.

Talley v. Burnell · filed 1996-09-20

Also, Talley fails adequately to allege any personal participation by defendant Warren Diesslin in any purported deprivation of his constitutional rights. So, the suit against defendant Diesslin must be dismissed on that ground as well.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant personally participated in the alleged rights violation.

Hannum v. Friedt · filed 1997-12-05

Personal participation in the alleged violation is an essential allegation in a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant's personal participation in the alleged rights violation.

Jesusdaughter v. McDonnell · filed 1999-12-10

We conclude that the district court properly dismissed defendants McDonnell, Kawamura, Carmel, Hawkins, Singleton, Bennett, Vigil, and Olin for lack of personal participation. See Mitchell v. Maynard , 80 F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[P]ersonal participation is an essential allegation to a § 1983 claim.”) (quotation omitted).

A § 1983 claim requires personal participation by each defendant in the alleged deprivation of a federal right.

Simmons v. Suthers · filed 2001-05-10

The district court dismissed Mr. Simmons’ amended complaint against defendants Suthers, Neal, and Lynn because he failed to allege any personal participation or conduct by these individuals that allegedly deprived him of a federal right. ... Mr. Simmons has failed to offer on appeal any legally justified basis for reversing the district court’s judgment of dismissal, and it is clear the district court did not err in its disposition.

Section 1983 requires a damages claimant to show that each defendant personally caused or contributed to the alleged constitutional violation.

Fugate v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City · filed 2001-08-08

To prevail on a claim for damages for a constitutional violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must establish that defendant acted under color of state law and caused or contributed to the alleged violation. ... Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff has not alleged the personal participation required to set forth a constitutional claim against him.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Brown v. Suthers · filed 2002-02-04

Mr. Brown failed to allege the essential element of personal participation of any of the Defendants as is required in a § 1983 civil rights action.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged rights violation; merely responding to a grievance does not establish liability.

Giba v. Cook · filed 2002-03-31

It is difficult to perceive how Stevens personally participated in any alleged conduct simply by notifying Giba that she had no documentation of any improper opening of his legal mail by other SRCI officials. Thus, the claims against Stevens are dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged violation.

Ramirez v. Kroonen · filed 2002-08-12

The district court dismissed all of the defendants except for Creson based on lack of personal participation in the alleged § 1983 violation. ... These conclusions, except as to Director of Personnel, Jackie Weiss, are supported by the record.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a defendant when evidence supports a finding that the defendant personally participated in the alleged deprivation.

Ind v. Wright · filed 2002-11-25

Further, DOC employee Shuh must be reinstated as a defendant with regard to the due process claim only , as there is evidence to support a finding that he participated in the reading materials screening process.

A § 1983 claim against a warden requires an allegation of the warden’s personal participation.

Hogan v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections · filed 2003-03-18

The court also correctly held that defendant Warden Boone should be dismissed from the case because Hogan failed to allege any personal participation by the Warden and “[p]ersonal participation is an essential allegation in a § 1983 claim.” Mitchell v. Maynard , 80 F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996).

Section 1983 liability requires the defendant’s personal participation.

Walker v. Gomez · filed 2004-06-07

The district court did not err in dismissing Walker’s claims against defendant Gomez under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as “[liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989).

Section 1983’s personal participation pleading requirement is satisfied by specific allegations permitting an inference that a prison director was responsible for or aware of an alleged constitutional deprivation and failed to prevent it.

Abney v. Alameida · filed 2004-08-20

Plaintiff has satisfied the requirement that he set forth specific factual allegations regarding personal participation by Defendant Alameida in the alleged constitutional violations. ... These allegations are sufficient to satisfy the personal participation pleading requirement of a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between each defendant’s conduct and the alleged constitutional violation.

Allen Oil & Gas, LLC v. Klish · filed 2004-10-26

In order to state a claim for relief under § 1983, plaintiff must show an affirmative link between defendants’ conduct and the alleged constitutional violation. Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards & Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1156- 57 (10th Cir. 2001). Here, the complaint makes no link between these individual defendants and the acts complained of.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in a constitutional deprivation for individual liability.

Tatum v. Simpson · filed 2005-11-14

As the Magistrate Judge correctly stated at page 18 of the Recommendation, personal participation in a constitutional deprivation must be shown in order for a defendant to have liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant's personal participation in the alleged constitutional deprivation for supervisory liability.

Wade v. California Department of Corrections · filed 2006-03-17

The district court also properly dismissed the claims as to the remaining defendants because Wade’s amended complaint failed to allege that the defendants personally participated in the alleged constitutional deprivations. See Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir.2001) (section 1983 supervisory liability arises only upon a showing of personal participation by defendant).

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Brush v. Burgess · filed 2006-05-01

In response, Sheriff Burgess and Undersheriff Perry assert that these claims must be dismissed for lack of personal participation. See Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Personal participation is an essential allegation to a § 1983 claim.”) (quotation omitted). We agree. Brush has not alleged that Sheriff Burgess and Undersheriff Perry operated or maintained the Clinton City Jail, let alone that either officer made the decision to place him in segregation at the Clinton City Jail.

Section 1983 claims against individual defendants require their personal participation in the alleged violation.

Ind v. Wright · filed 2002-08-14

Because plaintiffs have not shown the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the district court committed legal error regarding: (1) the Eleventh Amendment dismissal of claims against defendants in their official capacities; (2) the dismissal of claims against certain defendants for lack of personal participation; (3) the constitutionality of Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC) administrative regulation 300-26, on its face and as applied, as a restriction on plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights; and (4) the failure to provide separate taped religious programming, we affirm those portions of the district court’s judgment.

Section 1983 does not make dispatchers liable for negligent alerts or failure to gather more details before issuing them under the circumstances addressed by the court.

Smoak v. Eric Hall, David Bush Jeff Phann Tim McHood Brian Brock Jerry Andrews, Lieutenant · filed 2006-08-25

We therefore hold, based on the facts before us, that the dispatchers are not hable for their negligent transmissions or their failure to ascertain more details before sending out BOLOs mentioning a possible robbery.

Section 1983 liability requires the defendant’s personal participation in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Garner v. Ashcraft · filed 2007-03-19

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants Ashcraft and Neven because Garner failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether either Ashcraft or Neven personally participated in the mishandling of Garner’s legal mail.

Section 1983 requires personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation; denying a grievance alone does not establish it.

Larson v. Meek · filed 2007-06-14

M r. Gillespie’s denial of the grievances alone is insufficient to establish personal participation in the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a defendant’s conduct and the alleged constitutional violation.

Rouse v. Colorado State · filed 2007-07-09

Accordingly, the plaintiff is required to show an affirmative link between the defendant’s conduct and any constitutional violation.

Section 1983 liability requires an affirmative link between the defendant’s conduct and the constitutional violation.

Rouse v. Colorado State Board of Parole · filed 2007-07-09

Accordingly, the plaintiff is required to show an affirmative link between the defendant’s conduct and any constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the claimed deprivation of rights.

B.T. ex rel. G.T. v. Davis · filed 2007-07-31

The Court also recognizes that “personal participation is an essential allegation in a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claim.”

Section 1983 claims require personal participation by each named defendant and do not permit respondeat superior liability.

Sheridan v. Andrus · filed 1979-02-21

Courts in this circuit have consistently recognized that “personal participation is an essential allegation in a § 1983 claim.” ... Since plaintiff has failed to allege personal participation on the part of any named defendants, defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims predicated on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is granted.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish the defendant’s direct personal responsibility for the claimed constitutional deprivation.

Smith v. Bruce · filed 2008-07-31

For liability to attach under Section 1983, plaintiff must establish defendant’s direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant personally participated in the alleged violation.

Reed v. Hadden · filed 1979-07-06

In addition, there is a noted absence of allegations regarding the participation of defendant Hadden in this case. Courts in this circuit have consistently recognized that “personal participation is an essential allegation in a § 1983 claim.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show each defendant’s personal participation in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Romero v. Vargo · filed 2009-09-08

The Findings and Recommendation is adopted in its entirety. ... Plaintiff fails to create an issue of fact regarding the personal participation by any of the other defendants in denying him the treatment prescribed by Dr. Becker. ... Being a conduit for information is not enough.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of a right.

Manning v. Schriro · filed 2009-12-14

The district court properly dismissed the access to the courts claim because Manning failed sufficiently to allege how any individual defendant personally participated in depriving him of any rights.

Section 1983 requires personal participation by a defendant; merely denying grievances does not satisfy that requirement.

Snyder v. Harris · filed 2011-01-04

Merely denying grievances is not “personal participation” that will support a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 liability requires the defendant to have proximately caused the alleged violation.

Prien v. Johanna Smith · filed 2011-01-24

Moreover, defendant Johnston cannot be held liable because she was not the proximate cause of the alleged violations.

Section 1983 requires personal participation; merely denying a grievance does not satisfy that requirement.

Driggers v. Clark · filed 2011-05-05

The mere denial of a grievance does not constitute “personal participation” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability for a person who causes a constitutional deprivation through affirmative conduct, participation, or a legally required omission.

MONTEILH v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2011-07-12

Officers who are “integral participants” in a constitutional violation are potentially liable under § 1983, even if they did not directly engage in the unconstitutional conduct themselves.

Section 1983 requires personal participation, which a jury may infer when an officer initiates force against one person and participates in subsequent force against another, even without touching the latter.

Newman v. San Joaquin Delta Community College District · filed 2011-08-31

Section 1983 requires “personal participation.” ... While Wood did not touch Newman, Wood initiated the use of force against Butler and a jury could reasonably infer that he participated in the subsequent use of force against Newman.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation.

Grissom v. Werholtz · filed 2013-05-01

The district court explained that § 1983 actions require “personal participation in the specific constitutional violation,” and “that the denial of . . . grievances alone is insufficient to establish personal participation.” ... We agree with the district court’s decision to dismiss Defendant Werholtz for lack of personal participation.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the claimed deprivation; an official’s refusal to remedy an alleged ongoing violation can establish that involvement.

Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Kansas Department of Transportation · filed 2013-05-21

“[F]or liability to arise under § 1983, a defendant’s direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right must be established.” ... Thus, the plaintiffs have alleged King’s personal involvement in the ongoing constitutional violation concerning the Ottawa quarry.

Section 1983 requires allegations of each defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional violation; merely denying a grievance is insufficient.

Lowery v. Edmondson · filed 2013-06-17

However, he insufficiently pleads personal involvement. First, he identifies no ... actions on the part of Edmondson or Jones that infringed upon his rights. Second, we have previously held that the mere denial of a grievance, which Morton allegedly did, is inadequate for personal participation.

Section 1983 liability for a constitutional violation requires a defendant’s personal participation in the violation.

Phillips v. Ayers · filed 2013-06-20

To the extent that Phillips alleges the use of excessive force against him after order was restored to the prison yard, the district court properly granted summary judgment in light of Phillips’s acknowledgment that the two escorting prison officials who allegedly injured him were not named defendants in this action. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (liability for violation of a constitutional right requires defendants’ personal participation in the violation).

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Green v. Hininger · filed 2014-02-24

“[p]ersonal participation is an essential allegation in a § 1983 claim.” ... “[S]upervisor status by itself is insufficient to support liability.” ... Mr. Green failed to demonstrate any personal participation by these DOC Defendants. ... We agree fully with the district court’s analysis and dismissal of the claims against Defendants McCoy and Sutmiller.

Section 1983 requires personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation; a grievance denial alone does not establish it, but related conduct may.

Tennyson v. Carpenter · filed 2014-03-18

The district court therefore erred by dismissing all of Mr. Tennyson’s claims against Officer Carpenter on the ground that they related solely to Officer Carpenter’s denial of Mr. Tennyson’s grievances. See Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that “denial of a grievance, by itself without any connection to the violation of constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff, does not establish personal participation under § 1983”). But as our previous discussion shows, Mr. Tennyson’s allegations involving Officer Carpenter cannot be so narrowly construed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have caused or personally participated in the alleged violation of a plaintiff’s rights.

Pettigrew v. Zavaras · filed 2014-07-30

Having reviewed the district court’s order, we find that the district court correctly concluded that these individuals were improper defendants in a § 1983 action because Mr. Pettigrew failed to establish that either caused or personally participated in the alleged violations of Mr. Pettigrew’s rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Bertolo v. Benezee · filed 2015-02-04

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that each defendant personally participated in the alleged deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that each defendant personally participated in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Templeton v. Anderson · filed 2015-04-15

To prevail on a claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must show that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires personal participation by a defendant and permits survivors to assert the decedent’s constitutional claim when state law authorizes a survival action.

Estate of Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Torres · filed 2015-04-29

Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal participation by a defendant.

Section 1983 does not make mere negligence, malpractice, or an incorrect diagnosis actionable and requires personal participation by the defendant.

McNeill v. Allen · filed 2015-05-26

Mere negligence, malpractice, or incorrect diagnosis is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that each named defendant personally participated in the constitutional deprivation.

Brewer v. Gilroy · filed 2015-09-01

The district court correctly dismissed Mr. Brewer’s claims, despite his detailed factual allegations, because he failed to allege that any named defendant personally participated in the alleged deprivations.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege the defendant’s personal participation in a constitutional violation to establish causation.

Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Powell · filed 2015-09-29

To prove the final requirement of causation, plaintiff need only allege Lyrene’s “personal participation in the constitutional violation.” Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327. Because plaintiff alleged that Lyrene personally saw multiple medical forms and received verbal.requests for Hobbs’s medical treatment, and thereafter failed to examine or treat Hobbs, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged causation and has stated a claim for deliberate indifference under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant's personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation for liability.

Luong v. City & County of San Francisco Police Department · filed 2015-11-16

To the extent that Plaintiffs sufficiently raised this issue on appeal, the district court did not err in granting Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of evidence because Plaintiffs either failed to show personal participation, or actionable conduct on the part of Officers Ciudad, Moriyama and Chea as to certain excessive force claims brought by Plaintiffs.

Section 1983 requires personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation, and denying a grievance alone is insufficient.

Duncan v. Hickenlooper · filed 2015-11-25

But the “denial of a grievance, by itself without any connection to the violation of constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff, does not establish personal participation under § 1983.”

Section 1983 requires personal participation to hold an individual school board member liable for school employees’ actions.

Miller v. Monroe School District · filed 2016-02-03

Section 1983 liability arises only upon a showing of a defendant’s personal participation. ... Plaintiff has failed to show that the individual Board members can be held liable under § 1983 for the actions taken by Hart in September 2013 and by Kinney in November 2013.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege facts showing that each defendant personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation.

Brown v. Whitten · filed 2016-04-21

The district court properly dismissed Brown’s due process claims against the remaining defendants because Brown failed to allege facts sufficient to show that those defendants personally participated in the offense, or that Brown has a constitutional right to have his grievances processed or decided in a particular manner.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that each defendant personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation.

Daniels v. Mar · filed 2016-11-02

Dismissal of Daniels’s deliberate indifference claim against defendants Jones, Garner, and Bannister was proper because Daniels failed to allege facts sufficient to show that these defendants personally participated in the alleged violations at issue.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged deprivation of rights for individual liability.

Keiper v. Venta · filed 2016-11-03

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Keiper failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants Brown and Venta personally participated in the alleged rights deprivation.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation.

Coit v. Zavaras · filed 2017-01-11

With respect to the other defendants, she points to no specific acts which would support their personal participation in failing to protect her.

Section 1983 requires actionable allegations of a defendant’s personal participation in the claimed violation.

Williams v. Trammell · filed 2017-02-02

In its opinion and order disposing of the case, the district court dismissed Warden Anita Trammell and Dr. John Marlar from the suit for lack of actionable allegations of personal participation with respect to any of Mr. Williams’ claims. Nothing Mr. Williams argues on appeal demonstrates any error in this ruling.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that each defendant personally participated in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Shehee v. Ahlin · filed 2017-02-27

The district court properly dismissed Shehee’s claims of constitutionally inadequate medical care against defendants Ahlin, King, Sanduh, and Waggoner because he failed to allege facts sufficient to show these defendants personally participated in the alleged rights deprivation.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation.

Carr v. Higgens · filed 2017-06-23

Defendants are correct that Carr’s claims against Hartnett and Davidson cannot be sustained; Carr failed to submit evidence demonstrating their personal participation in the alleged constitutional violations.

A § 1983 claim requires facts showing that the defendant personally participated in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Tran v. Davey · filed 2017-10-26

The district court properly dismissed Tran’s action because Tran failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendant personally participated in the alleged rights deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Harden v. Monninghoff · filed 2017-11-20

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Moninghoff (erroneously sued as Monninghoff) because Harden failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Moninghoff personally participated in the alleged rights deprivation.

A prisoner sufficiently alleges personal participation under § 1983 when a warden directly responds to requests about harmful conditions and does more than deny a grievance.

Womble v. Harvanek · filed 2017-12-12

Because Womble alleged that Harvanek participated in the alleged constitutional violation by doing more than just denying a grievance, the reasoning in Stewart is inapplicable, and the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss on that basis.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged violation; merely responding to and denying a medical grievance does not establish it.

Gray v. Sorrels · filed 2018-08-01

As for Mr. Gray’s remaining claims that the denial of the grievances resulted in unconstitutional delays in providing him medical care, a prison official’s “mere response and denial of [a] grievance [pertaining to medical treatment] are insufficient to establish the requisite personal participation under § 1983.” Requena, 893 F.3d at 1216. Thus, these claims were properly dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show how each defendant personally caused the alleged deprivation of a federal right.

Richardson v. Werner · filed 2019-03-29

Instead, Richardson’s brief on appeal attempts to hold the defendant guards responsible for each other’s conduct and the conduct of a non-defendant nurse, an approach Richardson was specifically informed was at odds with governing law.

Section 1983 requires personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation; denying a grievance alone does not establish it.

Whitehead v. Marcantel · filed 2019-04-02

In this circuit, the mere denial of a grievance without any factual basis supporting an affirmative link between the denial and the alleged constitutional violation is fatal to a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged violation; supervisory authority alone does not create liability.

Robertson (ID 76205) v. Lee · filed 2019-07-08

It is settled that “§ 1983 does not recognize a concept of strict supervisory liability; the defendant’s role must be more than one of abstract authority over individuals who actually committed a constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 requires facts showing that each defendant personally or integrally participated in the conduct causing the alleged constitutional injury.

Bentley v. Arizona Department of Child Safety · filed 2019-07-16

The integral participant rule explains a theory for imposing § 1983 liability – it does not lower Plaintiffs’ burden of pleading facts that state a viable claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged violation; denying a grievance alone, without a connection to that violation, does not suffice.

Hines v. Allbaugh · filed 2019-08-02

“[D]enial of a grievance, by itself without any connection to the violation of constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff, does not establish personal participation under § 1983.” Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009). ... Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Allbaugh and Knutson’s roles were more than “one of abstract authority over individuals who actually committed a constitutional violation.” Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008).

Section 1983 liability requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

Brightwell v. Warden · filed 2019-08-21

Liability under §1983 attaches only upon personal participation by a defendant in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged violation.

Noble v. Dzurenda · filed 2019-09-09

A defendant is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.” ... However, Plaintiff again fails to state a claim against the Jane Doe nurse as Plaintiff continues to fail to allege she had any knowledge of his 18 month wait for eye glasses or his injuries arising from his long wait.

Section 1983 requires personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation; denial of a grievance alone does not establish it.

Paulsen v. Christner · filed 2019-09-16

As Judge Babcock correctly noted, however, the denial of grievances alone does not establish personal participation in a constitutional violation for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts linking each defendant’s own acts or omissions to the alleged deprivation of federal rights.

(PC) Serna v. Sullivan · filed 2019-09-27

Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing personal actions by any of the Defendants that demonstrate a violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable § 1983 claim against any of the Defendants.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in a constitutional violation; a supervisor’s response to grievances does not establish liability when he could not remedy the conduct.

Mitchell v. State of Nevada · filed 2019-10-23

A defendant is liable under § 1983 “only upon a showing of personal participation by a defendant.” ... Unlike in Snow, the record does not show that Filson was in a position to remedy Alvarado and Knight’s retaliatory conduct, which occurred on the same day of the verbal altercation. Filson was not present when the retaliatory conduct occurred and did not directly oversee Alvarado or Knight. Because Filson did not personally participate in the constitutional violation, I grant the motion for summary judgment in his favor.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the unlawful acts for liability.

Kee v. Raemisch · filed 2019-10-28

The court properly found Kee failed to allege sufficient facts to show personal participation by many of the named defendants. See Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1072 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Liability under § 1983 requires personal participation in the unlawful acts.”).

Section 1983 requires facts showing how each defendant personally participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights.

Bosse v. Blades · filed 2019-10-30

A plaintiff must allege facts showing how each defendant personally violated his constitutional rights. ... Plaintiff’s allegations state a colorable failure-to-protect claim, other than the fact that he has not sufficiently alleged the personal participation of any of the defendants.

Section 1983 requires allegations that an individual defendant personally participated in the alleged rights deprivation.

Nesbit v. Tuck · filed 2019-11-15

There are no allegations that either Tuck or Campbell, the only named Defendants, personally participated in mailing the notice or in providing the incorrect address in the notice. Thus, without such allegations, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any named Defendant.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged deprivation of a federal right.

Riddick v. Barber PLEASE FILE IN THIS CASE ONLY! DO NOT FILE IN MEMBER CASE! · filed 2019-11-18

Because Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate any personal participation in the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations on the part of the DBDHS Defendants, Parikh and Ermmouf, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state Fourteenth Amendment claims upon which relief can be granted pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct.

Wangerow v. Agent Cohen 6837 · filed 2019-11-22

Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) attaches only upon personal participation by a defendant in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to participate personally in the deprivation; denying a grievance alone is insufficient when the defendant lacks authority to resolve the underlying issue.

Jackson v. State of Nevada · filed 2019-12-03

Without that authority, his mere denial of the grievance, alone, is insufficient to establish personal participation.

Section 1983 imposes individual liability only when the defendant personally participates in the constitutional violation.

Harvey v. Maryland Parole & Probation · filed 2019-12-11

Liability under §1983 attaches only upon personal participation by a defendant in the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a defendant’s personal participation in an alleged constitutional violation.

Jannisch v. D. Bates · filed 2019-12-17

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Jannisch’s procedural due process claim because Jannisch failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to defendants’ personal participation in the alleged due process violation.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged deprivation of a federal right.

McReynolds v. State of Washington · filed 2019-12-19

Plaintiff’s constitutional claims asserted against Dr. Longwell should be dismissed for lack of personal participation.

Section 1983 requires a showing that a defendant personally participated in the alleged violation.

Reberger v. Vern · filed 2019-12-20

Further, a defendant is liable for a claim brought under § 1983 “only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).

Section 1983 requires personal participation; denying or failing to respond to a grievance alone does not establish it.

Guyle (ID 103204) v. Voigts · filed 2020-02-04

The allegation that an official denied a grievance or failed to respond to a grievance is not sufficient to show personal participation.

A § 1983 complaint must link each defendant to specific alleged civil-rights violations.

Jones v. Albrecht · filed 2020-02-07

Does not properly affirmatively link Defendants to specific civil-rights violations.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege each defendant’s personal participation in the challenged conduct.

Davis v. State of Utah, The · filed 2020-03-09

As explained in the Court’s previous Order, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a complaint must allege personal participation by the defendant.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged deliberate indifference before that defendant can be held liable.

Bonham v. Aranas · filed 2020-05-05

A defendant may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference claims “only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). ... Plaintiff has not identified any specific behavior by Defendants that constitutes deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 requires allegations that each defendant personally participated in the claimed constitutional violation.

Knox v. Sharp · filed 2020-07-01

Plaintiff, however, has failed to present facts alleging Governor Stitt or President Trump have personally participated in a constitutional violation against him. “Personal participation is an essential allegation in a § 1983 claim.”

Section 1983 requires a showing that each defendant personally participated in the alleged violation.

Partridge v. Dzurenda · filed 2020-07-20

The Court finds that Plaintiff simply lumps all defendants together and does not allege what each specific defendant did to violate his rights. The Court notes that a defendant is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Section 1983 liability requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation.

Blakely v. Jones · filed 2020-08-11

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Blakely’s deliberate indifference claim because Blakely failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether defendants personally participated in the alleged rights deprivation.

Section 1983 requires personal fault based on a defendant’s own conduct; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Drummond v. Wolfe · filed 2020-09-28

Instead, § 1983 requires a showing of personal fault based upon a defendant’s personal conduct.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation; unsupported assertions do not establish that participation.

Livermore v. Tonhofer · filed 2020-10-22

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown any dispute of material fact regarding the personal participation of Mr. Hammond, Rusty Smith, Correctional Officer Perry, and Correctional Officer Bouchard. Those Defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on lack of personal participation.

Section 1983 liability requires a showing that the defendant personally participated in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Nasby v. State of Nevada, ex rel. NDOC · filed 2020-11-30

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, whose decision binds this Court, has held that § 1983 liability arises “only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.”

Section 1983 liability requires a showing that the defendant personally participated in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Harborview Fellowship v. Inslee · filed 2020-12-09

“Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.” ... No such showing is made on the facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint.

Section 1983 liability requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged deprivation of rights.

Harborview Fellowship v. Inslee · filed 2020-12-21

“Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.” ... No such showing is made on the facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint.

A judge's personnel decision receives judicial immunity in a Section 1983 action only when the employment relationship implicates judicial independence and makes the decision a judicial act.

Laskowski v. Mears · filed 1985-01-25

Unless the judge's relationship with his or her probation officer is something more unusual as a factual matter, a relationship which implicates the judge’s independence, then there is no argument that the “nature of the act” of discharge was “a judicial act.”

Parole board members acting in quasi-judicial functions are immune from suit under § 1983.

Bricker v. Michigan Parole Board · filed 1975-12-18

In the instant case, the decision to impose certain conditions of parole fell within the quasi-judicial functions vested in the Parole Board members by Michigan law. Under the allegations of this case as developed from the affidavits, the defendant Parole Board members are immune from suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide judicial or quasi-judicial immunity to court reporters performing ministerial duties, although a reporter may defend a damages suit by showing good-faith compliance with lawful court authority and instructions.

McLallen v. Jack Henderson, Official Court Stenographer, 30th Judicial Circuit of Missouri · filed 1974-03-05

On motion of the appellee, the trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that the appellee was immune from suit under § 1983 because of the doctrine of judicial immunity. We reverse. ... Reporters are like clerks, in that their duties are ministerial in nature and thus are not protected by quasi-judicial immunity. ... However, this is not to say that clerks and court reporters may not have an absolute defense, sometimes referred to as a qualified immunity, to a suit for damages. Such is the case where the clerk, or reporter can show that he was acting pursuant to his lawful authority and following in good faith the instructions or rules of the Court and was not in derogation of those instructions or rules.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on court-appointed psychiatrists for acts performed as an integral part of the judicial process.

Norman Burkes, Jr. v. Luther Callion, Deputy Central Adult Investigations, Etc. · filed 1970-11-04

We hold that the court-appointed psychiatrists who prepared' and submitted medical reports to the state court are also immune from liability for damages under the Act. The function of the examining psychiatrists in this case falls within the scope of “quasi-judicial immunity,” defined by this court in Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1965), to extend to acts committed “in the performance of an integral part of the judicial process.”

Section 1983 provides a damages action for civil-rights violations, but officials acting in a quasi-judicial capacity are immune from liability for damages under the statute.

Elizabeth Mills v. L. K. Small, M.D. · filed 1971-08-30

Although the complaint, filed in October 1970, does not state its basis for federal jurisdiction, we assume it charges a violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute contains no limitation period but resort may be had to the California law. A liability “created by statute” must be brought within three years. Cal.Code Civ.P. § 338(1). As such her action is barred. Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1970); Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962). In addition, Dr. Small was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity and was immune from liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on judicial and quasi-judicial officials who are acting in those roles and are protected by judicial immunity.

Frank J. Marcedes, Jr. v. Thomas E. Barrett, Clerk of Courts · filed 1971-12-16

After careful consideration of the complaint, we have determined that “its failure to state facts in support of its conclusions,” see Gaito v. Ellenbogen, 425 F.2d 845, 849 (3d Cir. 1970); Negrich v. Hohn, 379 F.2d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 1967), and the judicial immunity of the defendants, acting as judicial and quasi-judicial officials, require the conclusion that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state judges for judicial action or inaction when they act in their judicial capacity.

Carter v. Duggan · filed 1972-02-29

We agree with the trial court that the two state judges are cloaked with judicial immunity and may not be subjected to a demand for damages for judicial action or inaction whether the right to damages is asserted to arise under Title 42, U.S.C., Section 1983 or under any other theory of liability.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil-rights suit against a court clerk protected by judicial immunity for performing a ministerial act mandated by statute.

Smith v. Rosenbaum · filed 1972-06-08

As a court clerk, Grobman performed a ministerial act mandated by statute; he has judicial immunity and cannot be sued under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq., Marcedes v. Barrett, 3 Cir., 453 F.2d 391 (1971), Robinson v. McCorkle, et al., 3 Cir., 462 F.2d 111 (Argued March 14, 1972), and cases cited therein.

Section 1983 does not abolish judicial immunity from damages for acts performed within a judge’s judicial jurisdiction.

James Oliver McAlester Et Ux. v. Brown · filed 1972-12-05

In essence, appellants attempt to characterize the judge’s behavior in their own case as falling without the broad borders of the immune area — acts committed within a judge’s judicial jurisdiction. We are unable to accept that distinction and we hold that Judge Brown’s action here fell squarely within the sheltered zone. We recognize that at the time of the altercation Judge Brown was not in his judge’s robes, he was not in the courtroom itself, and he may well have violated state and/or federal procedural requirements regarding contempt citations. Nevertheless, we discern in this case four factors that, when taken together, compel the conclusion that Judge Brown was acting “in his judicial jurisdiction”: (1) the precise act complained of, use of the contempt power, is a normal judicial function; (2) the events involved occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose directly and immediately out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against an official whose challenged act was performed within the scope of official quasi-judicial duties.

Denman v. Leedy · filed 1973-06-08

Second, the complaint fails to allege a valid cause of action under § 1983. ... As the plaintiffs’ charge relates to an act performed by the Clerk within the scope of his official quasi-judicial duties, this defendant is entitled to immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose civil liability on judges for acts performed in their judicial capacity.

Rudnicki v. McCormack · filed 1962-10-01

Insofar as the judicial defendants are concerned, it has long been settled that judges, both state and federal, are immune from civil liability for their judicial acts. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871); Francis v. Crafts, 203 F.2d 809 (1st Cir., 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 835, 74 S.Ct. 43, 98 L.Ed. 357 (1953). This immunity extends to suits, such as the present ones, for alleged deprivation of civil rights under the Civil Rights Act, Francis v. Crafts, supra.

Section 1983 does not abrogate judicial immunity, so a judge is immune from damages liability for acts within his jurisdiction even when those acts are merely in excess of jurisdiction.

Paddleford v. Biscay · filed 1969-11-25

The “clear-absenee-versus-mere-excess of jurisdiction” distinction is still the law today, Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 591 (3rd Cir. 1966), and judicial immunity was not abrogated by the Civil Rights Act, supra. Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213; Dieu v. Norton, 411 F.2d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 1969); Bauers v. Heisel, supra, 361 F.2d at 591.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil-rights suit against judicial or quasi-judicial officers for acts performed in their official duties.

Evans v. Prothonotary of Supreme Court · filed 1971-03-30

Furthermore, acts done by judicial and quasi-judicial officers in the performance of their duties are immune from suit under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges are barred by judicial immunity for acts taken within their jurisdiction, but the immunity does not bar suits for purely equitable relief.

Jacobson v. Nick F. Schaefer · filed 1971-04-13

The United States Supreme Court has held that the passage of the 1871 Civil Rights Statutes did not abrogate the doctrine and that thus even though a judge may be accused of malicious or corrupt conduct, he still will be immune from a damage suit for acts committed “within his jurisdiction.” ... It is only when he has acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter” that he may be sued for damages. ... We point out again that we are applying the judicial immunity doctrine only to damage suits against judges. The doctrine does not reach suits for purely equitable relief. ... But under the pertinent caselaw and where there is the presence of some jurisdiction to protect the defendant judge’s action, the immunity doctrine must be applied.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on judicial officials, including court clerks acting pursuant to court direction, for acts performed in their official capacity.

Smith v. Rosenbaum · filed 1971-07-01

A clerk of a county court is immune under the judicial immunity doctrine from liability in a civil rights action for acts performed in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not eliminate judicial immunity for judges acting in their judicial role within their jurisdiction.

Larsen v. Gallogly · filed 1973-07-16

This well established legal principle has not been changed by the passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize damages claims against judges acting in their judicial capacities.

Smyl, Inc. v. Gerstein · filed 1973-09-14

As judges, they enjoy the cloak of official immunity and are not actionable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 creates no claim against judges acting within their judicial capacities to destroy a final state-court judgment.

Adkins v. Underwood · filed 1974-01-16

The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates no claim that may be asserted against judges acting within their judicial capacities in order to destroy a final judgment of a state court.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against judges for acts taken within their jurisdiction and authority because judicial immunity bars them.

Atchley v. Greenhill · filed 1974-04-15

Secondly, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), because of judicial immunity. The Civil Rights Act does not abrogate that bar. ... The Court held “Judges acting within their jurisdiction and authority are immune from suit under §§ 1983 and 1985.”

Section 1983 preserves judicial immunity for conduct within a judge’s general powers, even when the conduct exceeds jurisdiction.

Duba v. McIntyre · filed 1974-07-18

We think that Judge Robinson was correct in holding that appellees’ conduct, even though in excess of their jurisdiction, was within their general powers under Nebraska law and therefore cloaked with immunity for the purpose of a civil rights action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a judge for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless the judge acted in a clear absence of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Meyer v. Lavelle · filed 1974-11-12

Judge Lavelle’s motion to dismiss in C.A. 74-1442 is based on the doctrine of judicial immunity. ... Judicial immunity protects those acting in a judicial capacity unless they do so in a clear absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter. ... In the instant case, decisions made by Judge Lavelle in the pretrial and trial proceedings are of the very essence of the judicial process. ... Judge Lavelle’s motion to dismiss the action against him in C.A. 74-1442 on the ground of judicial immunity will be granted.

Section 1983 does not abolish judicial immunity for judges sued for damages based on acts within their judicial jurisdiction, including a justice of the peace acting in the discharge of judicial duties.

Pitt v. Coxe · filed 1975-01-15

In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-555, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), the Court held that the common-law doctrine of immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction was not abolished by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Thus, a Justice of the Peace is immune from suit for actions connected with the discharge of his judicial duties. ... Recognition of this doctrine, however, does not automatically require dismissal of the complaint. ... Since it does not appear beyond doubt that the complained of actions of the defendant were committed beyond the authority of his office as Justice of the Peace, the motion to dismiss the complaint as to the § 1983 claim must be denied at this juncture.

Section 1983 does not provide state-court judges, including appellate justices, with a broad judicial-immunity bar against claims seeking injunctive relief.

Medved v. Hallows · filed 1975-05-09

The defendants have argued, however, that they should be granted immunity from federal injunctive relief under § 1983 because they are appellate justices and not trial court judges. This argument, however, is unpersuasive. While appellate justices may be subject to fewer instances of liability under § 1983 than trial court judges, this fact does not necessitate the creation of a broad judicial immunity from injunctive relief.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against parole-board members performing a quasi-judicial function.

Franklin v. Shields · filed 1975-08-05

Defendants were therefore performing a quasi-judicial function and as a matter of law are immune from suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 bars damages claims against judges and other court officers for acts taken in their official capacity because judicial immunity applies.

Glucksman v. Birns · filed 1975-08-05

It is well settled that judicial immunity protects not only judges but other officers of the court from claims for damages under § 1983 for acts committed in their official capacity.

Section 1983 claims are barred by judicial immunity when the defendant judge acts within the scope of judicial functions.

Davis v. Fugitive Officer · filed 1975-09-15

The plaintiff is attempting to initiate an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against an unnamed and unknown fugitive officer of Madison County, Illinois, and the Honorable Judge Lu-ten, of the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri. ... An examination of plaintiff’s complaint clearly indicates that defendant Luten was acting within the scope of his judicial immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against judges for judicial acts protected by judicial immunity.

Vail v. Quinlan · filed 1976-01-07

With regard to plaintiffs’ claim for money damages, the doctrine of judicial immunity bars recovery against defendants Juidice and Aldrich, both judges of the Dutchess County Court.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against judges and court referees for acts taken in their judicial capacities.

Littleton v. Honorable Arthur O. Fisher and Honorable Harry E. Groves · filed 1976-02-13

A disappointed litigant in a domestic relations case in the State court filed this suit against the judge and referee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, seeking $5,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. ... Judge Rubin correctly held that this action is barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity and that both the Judge of the Court of Common Pleas and the referee are immune from suit under the facts averred in the complaint.

Section 1983 permits damages claims for constitutional deprivations under color of state law, but absolute or quasi-judicial immunity shields court officers and persons acting as their deputies for ministerial acts carrying out court orders.

Hevelone v. Thomas · filed 1976-04-08

The Court therefore concludes that the Sheriff enjoys absolute immunity from plaintiffs’ damage claims. ... This analysis is applicable to the facts of this case and it follows that defendant Okeson was also cloaked with judicial immunity in executing the court order. ... Implicit in the Court’s holding is that the defendants performed ministerial acts and did nothing other than perform the court’s directive. ... The Court holds that in any event defendants acted at all times in good faith.

Section 1983 preserves judicial immunity only for a judge’s acts taken within jurisdiction; acts beyond the judge’s jurisdiction are not protected.

Smithson v. Ray · filed 1976-05-03

It is only when a Tennessee judge has jurisdiction over both the parties and the subject matter that he is immune from a suit for money damages for deprivation of civil rights.

Section 1983 does not permit an action against a judge for acts done in a judicial function while the judge had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter.

Christian v. Garrett · filed 1976-07-20

A judge is immune from an action under the Civil Rights Act, where his acts complained of were done in the exercise of his judicial function at a time when he had jurisdiction over both the parties and the subject matter of the litigation.

A suit under § 1983 against a judge must be dismissed when judicial immunity applies.

Lowery v. Hauk · filed 1976-11-11

Thus, a suit initiated under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, or 1986 against a judge must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on judges for acts performed within their judicial role.

Keeton v. Julius P. Guedry and T. J. Gautreau · filed 1976-12-16

Judges are immune from section 1983 liability for their acts within the judicial role.