42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 reaches a challenge to the constitutional adequacy of municipal employment procedures, but not a claim alleging only that a city failed to follow its own personnel rules.

Joslyn v. Kinch · filed 1985-07-25

Here Plaintiff does not argue that the procedures provided him by the City of Pawtucket’s Charter and its Personnel Rules and Regulations are inadequate, so as to violate the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. ... If he did, his claims clearly would fall within both the purview of a § 1983 action, and the jurisdiction of this Court. Instead, Plaintiff contends that the Director of Accounts position was abolished by a branch of the City government which was not so empowered, and that the City terminated his employment without complying with the procedures set out in the City’s Personnel Rules. ... This undecided issue is one more properly addressed by a Rhode Island state court.

An allegation that local officials improperly applied state zoning law does not by itself state a Section 1983 claim.

Carter v. Rollins Cablevision of Massachusetts, Inc. · filed 1985-10-01

... the Town defendants improperly applied state law, and does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state custodian may be liable under § 1983 for placing a child in a home known to be unsafe when that placement proximately causes abuse and deprives the child of liberty without due process.

Doe v. Bobbitt · filed 1987-07-29

On the face of the complaint, Morgan’s actions were a proximate cause of Michelle’s injuries, and therefore Count I states a claim against Morgan under § 1983 for deprivation of Michelle’s liberty without due process of law.

A § 1983 claim based on a constitutional violation fails when no constitutional right was denied.

Marquart v. Perales · filed 1988-07-18

In light of finding no denial of a constitutional right, the ... petitioner has no cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 which would allow for the award of attorney’s fees under 42 USC § 1988.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for violations of a state constitution.

Rial v. Burmila · filed 1992-01-27

To the extent that his Complaint also cites to provisions of the Illinois Constitution, of course Section 1983 provides no remedy — and any possible application of the supplemental jurisdiction doctrine under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to encompass those state-law claims vanishes with the failure of the federal claims under Section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for alleged deprivations of constitutional due process and equal protection rights.

Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Community School District · filed 1997-04-25

The amended complaint expressly alleges a violation of specific constitutional rights. Lockhart now asserts that he has been deprived of due process and equal protection in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Consequently, a remedy for violation of those rights is available pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal law and does not cover violations of state constitutional rights.

Binette v. Sabo · filed 1998-03-10

First, because § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal law; ... state constitutional violations fall outside its remedial purview.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of a state constitution.

Roderick v. City of Gulfport, Miss. · filed 2000-08-09

However, redress for the alleged violations of the Mississippi State Constitution may not be had under § 1983, but only under Mississippi state law.

Section 1983 does not authorize claims for violations of a state constitution.

Cuvo v. De Bias · filed 2004-09-30

Section 1983 does not authorize plaintiffs to assert state constitutional violations. Accordingly, we dismiss this inapposite claim.

Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of constitutional rights, not for breaches of duties arising solely under tort law.

Michenfelder v. Sumner · filed 1985-12-26

The Civil Rights Act, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983, imposes liability for violation of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violation of duties arising out of tort law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of a state constitution.

Hood v. Prisoner Health Services, Inc. · filed 2006-05-09

As for Mr. Hood’s allegations of violations under the Kansas constitution, the district court correctly noted that they are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for claims that do not implicate constitutional matters or allege violations of internal prison regulations.

Moorman v. Jowers · filed 2009-03-11

Moorman’s remaining claims against the defendants do not give rise to § 1983 causes of action because they do not implicate constitutional matters or allege violations of internal prison regulations.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights; violations of a state constitution alone cannot support a claim.

Kuhns v. City of Allentown · filed 2009-03-31

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim for deprivation of rights to religious freedom and freedom of expression under the Pennsylvania Constitution must be dismissed, however. Section 1983 only provides a remedy for deprivation of rights established or secured under the constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal claim based solely on a state agency’s violation of state regulations or an allegedly arbitrary and capricious decision.

Harris v. Mills · filed 2009-07-09

Insofar as this is intended to be a stand-alone legal claim based solely on violations of state regulations, it is not actionable in federal court. ... “Section 1983 is not a means for litigating in a federal forum whether a state or local administrative decision was arbitrary and capricious.”

Section 1983 permits claims against state officials for violations of the U.S. Constitution, but not state constitutions.

State, Department of Corrections v. Heisey · filed 2012-03-02

With regard to Heisey's first argument, it is true that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows claims against state officials for violation of the U.S. Constitution, not state constitutions.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under a state constitution.

One Three Five, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 2013-06-17

Plaintiffs state constitutional claim is not cognizable under § 1983 because it is a statute designed to protect federal rights and may not be used by litigants as a vehicle to enforce provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federally protected rights, but not for violations of a state constitution alone.

Johnston v. Swing · filed 2013-07-26

While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 expressly provides a remedy for the violation of federally protected rights, numerous courts have held that a claimed violation of a state constitution is not cognizable under § 1983. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979); see also Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 314 (6th Cir. 2005). Therefore, Mr. Johnston’s § 1983 claim for the alleged deprivation of his rights under Article I, section 8 of the Tennessee constitution is without merit.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law.

Melanie M. v. Winterer · filed 2015-04-23

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for the violation of state law.

Section 1983 provides a claim for an alleged deprivation of federal constitutional rights.

Turner v. Boyle · filed 2015-07-15

Although Turner organizes his claims as separate .theories of liability for a claim of malicious prosecution and conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution, his causes of action primarily turn on whether each defendant’s alleged behavior deprived him of, or contributed to a conspiracy to deprive him of, the "rights privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States]." 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985. Accordingly, I construe his claims regarding his federal constitutional rights under those provisions of the U.S.Code.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state constitutional rights.

Doe v. Ohio State University · filed 2016-01-22

But “a claimed violation .of-a state constitutional right is not cognizable under § 1983.”

Section 1983 covers claims alleging violations of a person's rights by government officials.

Porter v. Governor of the State of Florida · filed 2016-07-28

The facts in Porter’s complaint could be characterized as stating a claim under § 1983 because, if taken as true, they allege violations of Porter’s rights by government officials.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on a failure to follow state law when that failure deprives a person of a federally protected right under color of state law.

Modacure v. B&B Vehicle Processing, Inc. · filed 2018-12-21

We also reject the trial court’s conclusion that a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 cannot be based on a violation of section 22851.1, subdivision (b). ... A claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 may be based on a showing that the defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a federally protected right.

Section 1983 does not authorize suits for violations of a state constitution.

Moore v. City of Cleveland · filed 2019-05-21

However, section 1983 does not authorize suits for violation of state constitutional law, ... and Ohio law does not authorize private suits for violations of the Ohio Constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state constitutional rights.

WEBER v. PNC INVESTMENTS LLC · filed 2020-02-05

Accordingly, our Court of Appeals has held that plaintiffs cannot remedy state constitutional harms using § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of state constitutional rights.

Abdulkadir v. Peterson · filed 2020-07-16

Because a plaintiff may not bring a state claim under the aegis of § 1983, this court’s ability to entertain Abdulkadir’s due process and separation of powers challenges to the Nebraska statute based on provisions of the Nebraska Constitution cannot be predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (original jurisdiction),2 but instead must depend on 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (supplemental jurisdiction).

Section 1983 does not provide prospective injunctive or declaratory relief against state judges when the requested remedy would direct a state court’s actions.

Melvin Johnson, III v. Estlinbaum · filed 2016-07-19

Johnson’s argument that his claims for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief are cognizable under § 1983 fails. ... Moreover, a review of his pleadings demonstrates that the only remedy he sought against the Texas judges was in the nature of mandamus relief. Federal courts, however, do not have the authority to direct a state court’s actions under the circumstances alleged by Johnson.

Section 1983 does not authorize a federal court to order a state court to hold a habeas hearing.

Burks v. Collins · filed 2013-07-04

Specifically, Burks sought two types of relief under § 1983. First, he asked the district court to order the state courts to conduct a habeas hearing before an impartial judge. ... As to his first request for relief, “federal courts have no authority to order state courts to hold hearings in habeas matters.” O’Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F.2d 365, 408 (5th Cir. 1983).

Section 1983 does not authorize federal courts to issue writs in the nature of mandamus directing state courts or state judicial officers in the performance of their duties.

Lamar v. 118th Judicial District Court · filed 1970-10-16

In any event, federal courts have no authority, even under the Civil Rights Act, to issue writs in the nature of mandamus to direct state courts and their judicial officers in the performance of their duties.

Injunctive relief against a judicial officer under § 1983 is inappropriate when an adequate remedy under state law exists.

Steven H. Sterling, Darlene Williams, and Terrie Purl v. Calvin · filed 1989-05-11

Judicial officers are not absolutely immune from suits for injunction under § 1983, Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984), but such relief is not appropriate where an adequate remedy under state law exists.

Section 1983 does not authorize a writ of mandamus against a state official.

Everitt v. Young · filed 1996-04-25

Appellant’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief amounts to a request for a writ of mandamus against a state official which is not authorized by § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an injunction against a judicial officer for an act in the officer’s judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Tesmer v. Granholm · filed 2000-03-31

Following the decision in Pulliam, § 1983 was amended to provide that, “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Since no declaratory decree has been violated and declaratory relief is available, the Court cannot enter an injunction against the Judges.

Section 1983 permits an injunction against a judicial officer who violates a declaratory decree even if that officer was not a party to the decree.

Tesmer v. Kowalski · filed 2000-06-30

Further, the Court concludes that it may validly issue a § 1983 injunction against Judge Kolenda even though he was not a party to the original action. The 1996 amendments to § 1983 indicate that an injunction may issue against a judicial officer when “a declaratory decree was violated....” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Salem v. Paroli (In Re Salem) · filed 2001-03-26

However, “[t]he 1996 amendments to § 1983 provide that ‘in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.’ ” ... No declaratory decree was violated in plaintiffs state case. Moreover, because plaintiff appealed Justice Pagones’s decision not to recuse himself and both the Appellate Division, Second Department and the New York Court of Appeals denied the appeal, declaratory relief was not “unavailable” to him.

Section 1983’s amendment concerning relief against judicial officers forecloses declaratory relief based on Pulliam v. Allen.

Guerin v. Higgins · filed 2001-04-11

We also reject plaintiffs contention that he is entitled to declaratory relief based on Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 536-37, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984), given that the Pulliam holding with respect to such relief has been effectively overruled by Congress.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Sanchez v. Doyle · filed 2003-03-31

Although prior to 1996, absolute immunity did not shield a judge in a § 1983 suit from responsibility for attorney fees sought by a prevailing party or from appropriate injunctive relief, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984), amendments to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 now preclude such relief against a judicial officer acting in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in an enforcement capacity; the restriction on injunctive relief applies to acts taken in a judicial capacity.

LeClerc v. Webb · filed 2003-07-02

The Court is persuaded that the FCIA does not bar injunctive relief where a judicial officer acts in other capacities such as the enforcement capacity.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Shelton v. Seay · filed 1999-12-06

Injunctive relief is not available against a judicial officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Here, nothing in Shelton’s complaint or the record suggests that Judge Seay violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Shelton’s claim for injunctive relief is frivolous and must fail as a matter of law.

Section 1983’s limit on injunctive relief against judicial officers does not apply to officials who are not judicial officers and do not act in a judicial capacity.

Mitchell v. Fishbein · filed 2004-08-03

By the same token, the provision in § 1983 conditionally prohibiting the granting of injunctive relief against "a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity," 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is inapplicable to the State Defendants, who plainly are not judicial officers and do not act in a judicial capacity.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Haas v. Wisconsin · filed 2004-08-05

Mr. Haas’ claims for injunctive relief against Judge Michelson are also foreclosed. In 1996, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to state that “injunctive relief shall not be granted” in an action brought against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity ... unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 permits preliminary injunctive relief against judicial officers when declaratory relief is unavailable at that stage.

Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky, Inc. v. Wolnitzek · filed 2004-10-19

Section 1983 does not preclude injunctive relief because declaratory relief is unavailable for the Plaintiffs at this time.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Conway v. Garvey · filed 2004-12-06

We note, moreover, that although the district court did not specifically address Conway’s request for injunctive relief against one of the defendants, a state court judge, this claim, absent any showing that the defendants violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable, is unavailing.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Massey v. Stosberg · filed 2005-02-08

These claims are unavailing as “injunctive relief shall not be granted” in an action brought against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity ... unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003); accord Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir.1999).

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Dibbs v. Roldan · filed 2005-02-14

To the extent Dibbs requests injunctive relief against the Justices, such claims must also be dismissed because he has failed to allege the violation of a declaratory decree or the unavailability of declaratory relief.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Sibley v. U.S. Supreme Court · filed 2005-06-10

Section 1983 provides, however, that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute thus limits Sibley’s injunctive remedy to declaratory relief.

Section 1983 limits injunctive relief against judicial officers only for acts taken in a judicial capacity.

LeClerc v. Webb · filed 2005-07-29

Moreover, the FCIA of 1996 only precludes injunctive relief for suits against a judicial defendant acting in his "judicial capacity."

Section 1983 restricts injunctive relief against judicial officers only for acts taken in their judicial capacity.

Leclerc v. Webb · filed 2005-08-18

Moreover, the FCIA of 1996 only precludes injunctive relief for suits against a judicial defendant acting in his “judicial capacity.”

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Azubuko v. Saris · filed 2006-02-16

Because Azubuko has not alleged that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable, and because the injunctive relief sought by Azubuko does not address the actions of Judge Saris other than in her judicial capacity, his claim for injunctive relief is barred under § 1983.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Carney v. Christiansen · filed 2006-03-28

In addition, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “injunctive relief shall not be granted” in an action brought against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity ... unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” ... Here, plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief are precluded by § 1983.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Smith v. City of Hammond · filed 2006-05-30

Smith, however, fails to recognize that Section 1983 was amended in 1996 to prohibit the grant of injunctive relief in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Section 1983 permits a suit against a state judicial body, but a federal district court may decline to review a state supreme court decision under comity and abstention.

Reed v. Thomas · filed 1974-09-20

As a matter of comity, abstention and equity, I must refuse to review the State Supreme Court decision on the basis of a civil rights complaint. ... I recognize the plaintiff’s right to bring a state judicial body before this court under the Civil Rights Act. It is, however, imperative to the efficient and successful operation of both systems that in such cases the federal district court have the option to refuse consideration.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Wallace v. Abell · filed 2007-02-01

These...two judicial actors also are shielded from a suit for prospective relief under the Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub.L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide that "injunctive relief shall not be granted" in an action brought against "a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity," "unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable").

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Catanzaro v. Cottone · filed 2007-04-05

Under the 1996 amendments to § 1983, injunctive relief against judicial officers for acts or omissions taken in the officer’s judicial capacity “shall not be granted” unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Williams v. Wettick · filed 2007-06-08

Because Williams has not alleged that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable, and because the injunctive relief sought pertains only to actions taken in Judge Wettick’s official capacity, his claim for injunctive relief was barred.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for a judicial act unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Bowen v. Cheuvront · filed 2007-09-25

This is because Congress, in the statute upon which the plaintiff relies, has precluded injunctive relief in the absence of an earlier declaratory judgment or a showing that declaratory relief was unavailable. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable”).

Section 1983 does not allow money damages against state officers acting in their official capacities.

Pentlarge v. Murphy · filed 2008-03-31

Additionally, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, money damages are unavailable against State officers acting in their official capacities.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable; declaratory relief remains available.

Muhammad v. Paruk · filed 2008-05-12

Because Paruk was acting in his judicial capacity when he chose not to allow Muhammad to testify while wearing her veil, he is not subject to injunctive relief under § 1983. Under the statute, Muhammad may, however, maintain her claims for declaratory relief.

A complaint alleging that a state officer violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights may be construed as a Section 1983 claim seeking injunctive or declaratory relief against that officer.

State Ex Rel. Skaggs v. Brunner · filed 2008-11-20

Moreover, because the Complaint contains allegations that the Secretary, a state officer, has violated a federal court order and the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, the Court can properly interpret the Complaint as stating a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The Secretary is therefore subject to suit, and the Court has the authority grant injunctive or declaratory relief.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Robinson v. Graves · filed 2007-05-31

In 1996, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide that “injunctive relief shall not be granted” in an action brought against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

White v. Rabner · filed 2009-09-18

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” In requesting Chief Justice Rabner’s recusal and “judicial review,” White did not establish that he violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for judicial acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

MacPherson v. Town of Southampton · filed 2009-09-30

The question of whether Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief are barred by the amended version of § 1983 is more complicated. As noted above, such claims are barred unless Plaintiffs allege that “a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs cannot allege that declaratory relief is unavailable because Plaintiffs can, and indeed have, pursued a claim seeking a declaration that the Town rental law is unconstitutional.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Muka v. Murphy · filed 2009-12-21

Plaintiff’s claim also fails on the merits because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 expressly provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable,” and plaintiff has made no such allegation here.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Winkler v. Grant · filed 2010-03-18

To the extent that Winkler sought injunctive relief in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Defendant Doran, we note that § 1983, as amended in 1996, provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because Winkler did not allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable, his complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Section 1983 generally bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act taken in the officer’s judicial capacity, subject to exceptions.

Berry v. Weimer · filed 2010-04-19

To the extent Berry seeks injunctive relief in his complaint, subject to certain exceptions not alleged here, such relief is unavailable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in an action against a judicial officer for an act taken in the officer’s judicial capacity.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for judicial acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Williamson County v. Heckman · filed 2010-04-23

Section 1983 requires that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for judicial acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

SKS & Associates, Inc. v. Dart · filed 2010-08-27

Although SKS later told Judge Shadur that it wanted injunc- tive relief, it cannot get around the terms of section 1983 prohibiting such relief against the state court judge.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for actions taken in an official capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Marciano v. White · filed 2011-05-09

We begin by noting that Marciano has failed to state a claim for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which precludes injunctive relief against a judicial officer for actions taken in her official capacity “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Marciano does not claim that a declaratory decree was violated nor is there any indication that declaratory relief is unavailable.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Parent v. New York · filed 2011-05-24

Since a declaratory decree was not violated and declaratory relief is available, plaintiff cannot seek injunctive relief from the judicial defendants.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judicial officers for acts taken in their judicial capacity.

Moten v. Hatch · filed 2011-08-30

Although "judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity," Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984), by statute injunctive relief cannot be granted as to defendants Collins and Ishii. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("[I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted.").

Section 1983’s restriction on injunctive relief against judicial officers does not bar prospective relief against an official who oversees an allegedly unlawful policy outside a judicial capacity.

McBride v. Cahoone · filed 2011-10-17

However, even if it does, and even if Raith can be properly considered a “judicial officer,” § 1983 bars only those actions taken in a “judicial capacity.” Therefore, the question becomes whether Raith acts in a “judicial capacity” simply by virtue of enforcing APPS’ allegedly unconstitutional EM violation policy. We find that he does not.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judicial officers unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Chavez v. Schwartz · filed 2012-01-18

Generally speaking, the only type of relief available to a plaintiff who sues a judicial officer is declaratory relief. See Schepp v. Fremont County, 900 F.2d 1448, 1452 (10th Cir. 1990); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (prohibiting injunctive relief against judicial officers “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable”).

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Peters v. Noonan · filed 2012-05-18

Injunctive relief cannot be granted pursuant to § 1983 “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” ... Judge Noonan is named in this action in his official capacity and there are no allegations in the complaint, or in any of plaintiff Joan Peters’ filings, that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable to the plaintiff.

Section 1983’s exception permitting injunctive relief against a judicial officer does not treat an order granting visitation rights as a declaratory decree.

Puiia v. Cross et al. · filed 2012-08-08

Second, the order granting Puiia visitation rights clearly is not a “declaratory decree” within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judicial officers for acts in their judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Landrith v. Gariglietti · filed 2012-12-07

Federal courts are not authorized to grant injunctive relief against judicial officers taking actions in their judicial capacity, absent limited circumstances not present here.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against judicial officers only when a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Swain v. Seaman · filed 2012-12-14

But Mr. Swain forgets that Congress expressly disallowed injunctive relief against judicial officers “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. And Mr. Swain doesn’t suggest either of these exceptions applies.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

James v. Tobolowski · filed 2013-03-26

In addition, to the extent James sought injunctive relief against the defendants, § 1983 expressly provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This is an additional basis for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in an official capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Howell v. Young · filed 2013-07-03

Pursuant to § 1983, when an action is brought against a judicial officer acting in their official capacity, injunc-tive relief is prohibited “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 limits injunctive relief against a judicial officer for judicial acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Frederick Levin Waterfield, Jr. v. William Gary Law, Jr. · filed 2013-10-25

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Irma I. Donato Malave v. Abrams · filed 2013-12-06

which amended § 1983 and provided that “injunctive relief [against a judicial officer] shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was ... unavailable.” Id. § 309. Malave has not shown that either condition was satisfied here.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Glaser v. City and County of Denver · filed 2014-01-29

Glaser’s contention, however, ignores the text of § 1983. “Although we have previously said that a plaintiff may obtain an injunction against a state judge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, those statements were abrogated by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, which provides that ‘injunctive relief [against a judicial officer] shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.’” Knox v. Bland, 632 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting § 1983) (citations omitted). Because Glaser does not allege that either of these statutory conditions is satisfied, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Claim 18.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judicial officers on the allegations presented here.

Day v. State of Florida · filed 2014-02-12

Additionally, as noted by the District Court, Day cannot sustain his requests for injunctive relief against the judicial officers, because such claims are barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a federal court to order a state judge to vacate orders entered in the performance of judicial duties.

LaBranche v. Becnel · filed 2014-03-10

Although judicial immunity does not bar claims for injunctive or declaratory relief in civil rights actions, see Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 525 (5th Cir. 1985), LaBranche cannot obtain his requested relief because federal courts have no authority to direct state courts or their judicial officers in the performance of their duties.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

McKenzie v. Nixon · filed 2014-04-10

To the extent that he seeks injunctive relief against Judge Nixon, the claim is barred by § 1983, which provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judicial officers for acts in their judicial capacity when declaratory relief remains available.

William Penn Apartments, L.P. v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals · filed 2014-04-14

Because declaratory relief was not unavailable, and the challenged actions were official acts by the judges in their judicial capacity, the judicial defendants are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 barred injunctive relief against a judge for acts involving adjudication of a pistol permit application.

Aron v. Becker · filed 2014-09-22

Insofar as Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against Judge Becker, such relief is statutorily barred.

Section 1983’s restriction on injunctive relief against judicial officers does not apply when clerks perform the ministerial task of issuing marriage licenses.

Marie v. Moser · filed 2014-11-04

Judged by these criteria, the issuance of marriage licenses under Kansas law is a ministerial act, not a judicial act. ... Judicial immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, therefore, does not apply.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Smith v. The Marion County Prosecutor’s Office · filed 2015-03-30

Since 1996, Section 1983 has prohibited the grant of injunctive relief in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in the officer’s judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. ... There has been neither an allegation nor a showing that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable in this cause of action.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable; this protection can extend to bar counsel performing judicial functions.

Deters v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n · filed 2015-09-14

The text of Section 1983 now provides that “injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a; declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable” in “any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. As discussed supra, this protection extends to Bar Counsel notwithstanding the fact that they are sued in their individual capacities as they were acting in their judicial capacities. ... For this reason, injunctive relief is unavailable to Deters.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judicial officers acting in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Li v. Rabner · filed 2016-03-17

However, Section 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Li does not allege that the defendants violated a declaratory decree or that this relief was unavailable. Thus, his claims for injunctive relief were properly dismissed.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judicial officers for official acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.

Davis v. Johnson · filed 2016-11-04

By virtue of a 1996 amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute prohibits the granting of injunctive relief against judicial officers for acts taken in their official capacities, except in situations where a declaratory decree has been violated or is unavailable. ... But none of that means the relief is unavailable. Thus, based on the language of § 1983, this Court has no authority to grant any relief to Davis regarding claims asserted in Counts VI and VII.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Unger v. Sogluizzo · filed 2016-12-21

As explained by the District Court, the injunctive relief that he seeks is foreclosed by the text of § 1983 itself. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (explaining that “injunctive relief shall not be granted” in a § 1983 action against a state or federal judicial officer “for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity. . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable”).

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Whelan v. Dawson · filed 2017-04-19

Furthermore, to the extent that Whelan’s complaint can be construed as invoking the jurisdiction of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to obtain injunctive relief against Judge Dawson, the statute itself explicitly bars such relief.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judicial officers acting in a judicial capacity when declaratory relief is available and no declaratory decree has been violated.

ODonnell v. Harris County · filed 2017-04-28

Section .1983 does not permit injunctive relief against judicial officers acting in a judicial capacity unless either: (1) they violate a declaratory decree; or (2) declaratory relief is unavailable. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Declaratory relief is available in this case; preliminary injunctive relief is not.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Chapdelaine v. Town of Eastford · filed 2017-09-05

And Chapdelaine could not seek injunctive relief from the judicial defendants because she did not allege that they violated a previous declaratory judgment or that declaratory relief was unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Cinotti v. Adelman · filed 2017-09-15

To the extent Cinotti seeks injunctive relief against the state judge, her claims are barred by the text of § 1983, which provides that, “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Cinotti’s complaint does not suggest that the state judge violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Williams v. Riley · filed 2017-10-04

As to injunctive relief: “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The individual defendants here were judicial officers because they were either judges or entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 759-61 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Williams did not allege that the defendants violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable. The district court properly dismissed the claims for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.

Johnson v. Rose Duncan · filed 2017-10-04

As to Counts III and IV, injunctive relief is not available against a judicial officer unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 197-98 (3d Cir. 2000), which Johnson does not allege.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Catanach v. Thomson · filed 2017-11-20

Section 1983 expressly disallows injunctive relief against a judicial officer “for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 generally bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity.

Powell v. Washington · filed 2017-12-18

The district court also correctly determined that § 1983 bars Powell’s claim for injunctive relief against Theut. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (prohibiting injunctive relief “against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity”).

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Jenner v. Fackler · filed 2018-02-09

Section 1983 precludes injunctive relief against a judicial officer “for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was ... violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff does not allege that either of these prerequisites for injunctive relief are met. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, his claims are subject to dismissal.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Machetta v. The Honorable Conrad Moren · filed 2018-06-04

So section 1983 does not provide a basis for Machetta to seek injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits declaratory relief against a state judicial officer for acts or omissions taken in a judicial capacity.

Caliste v. Cantrell · filed 2018-08-06

Because here the alleged acts were omissions taken in Judge Cantrell's judicial capacity, this Court has authority under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act in the officer’s judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Vodicka v. Ermatinger · filed 2019-06-20

However injunctive relief is unavailable under § 1983 unless “a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”4 Because Plaintiffs do not allege, and the record does not show, that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable, the claim for injunctive relief against Judge Moyé must be dismissed.

Section 1983 allows injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Roger of the Family Forrest Party Aggrieved v. 45 C.F.R. 75.2 IV-D Contractor Steve Banks · filed 2019-08-30

The amendment to § 1983, allowing for injunctive relief against a judge only if a state- court declaratory decree was violated or state-court declaratory relief is unavailable, precludes Plaintiff from seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against Evans and Cafasso.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Rose v. Elliott · filed 2019-10-04

This Court has recognized that “[s]ection 1983 expressly disallows injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” ... Plaintiff has not alleged that Judge Elliot violated a declaratory judgment or that declaratory relief was unavailable. ... Plaintiff’s claim is therefore barred by § 1983.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Scott 225249 v. O'Brien · filed 2019-11-08

Moreover, injunctive relief is not available under § 1983, because, under the 1996 amendments to that statute, injunctive relief “shall not be granted” in an action against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488, 496 (6th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff does not allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Consequently, his claim for injunctive relief is barred.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Calhoun 379175 v. Tyler · filed 2019-11-12

Moreover, injunctive relief is also not available under § 1983, because, under the 1996 amendments to that statute, injunctive relief “shall not be granted” in an action against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488, 496 (6th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff does not allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Consequently, his claim for injunctive relief is barred.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Feenstra v. Sigler · filed 2019-11-13

The Judicial Defendants first argue that plaintiffs’ request for relief with respect to the federal § 1983 claims is barred by the Federal Courts Improvement Act, pursuant to which “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847, 3853 (1996), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs do not allege that the Judicial Defendants violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief is unavailable. In fact, plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment in this case. Thus, plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief with respect to the federal claims fails.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Hatton v. Combs · filed 2019-12-10

But even if the AIA does not bar his claims for injunctive relief, § 1983 does: it expressly disallows injunctive relief against a judicial officer “for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” § 1983; see also Knox v. Bland, 632 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Although we have previously said that a plaintiff may obtain an injunction against a state judge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, those statements were abrogated by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, which provides that injunctive relief against a judicial officer shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”) (alterations and internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Holtz v. Frostman · filed 2019-12-18

Holtz is not entitled to injunctive relief against Rakowski because she does not allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Acavino v. Wilson · filed 2020-01-07

We further note that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “‘injunctive relief shall not be granted’ in an action brought against ‘a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.’” Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting § 1983). Here, Acavino’s pleading does not allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable, and because the injunctive relief sought by Acavino does not address the actions of Master O’Connell other than in his judicial capacity, her claim for injunctive relief is barred. See id.

Section 1983 generally bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity, subject to statutory exceptions.

Carter v. Watkins · filed 2020-01-07

Although official-capacity claims for injunctive relief against state officials are not precluded by the Eleventh Amendment, Section 1983 itself states that “injunctive relief shall not be granted,” except in circumstances not present here, against a judicial officer such as Judge Watkins “for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Hill 699324 v. Matthews · filed 2020-01-31

Moreover, injunctive relief is not available under § 1983, because, under the 1996 amendments to that statute, injunctive relief “shall not be granted” in an action against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488, 496 (6th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff does not allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Consequently, his claim for injunctive relief is barred.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Willis v. O'Toole · filed 2020-03-02

“in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Willis has not shown that this exception applies.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Peters v. Noonan · filed 2020-03-20

Here, Plaintiff makes no allegation that Defendant has violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Therefore, § 1983 bars this action.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Perry v. Treseler · filed 2020-04-15

Because Defendant is a “‘judicial officer[]’” within the meaning of that statute and the exceptions do not apply, injunctive relief is not available under § 1983.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief for acts taken in a judge’s judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable; the restriction applies to state and federal judges.

CRAWFORD v. LINARES · filed 2020-04-29

In 1996, Congress amended § 1983 to state that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 2006). This provision of § 1983 applies to both state and federal judges. Azubuko, 443 F.3d at 304 (citing Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000)).

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Lott 593524 v. Huss · filed 2020-05-12

Moreover, injunctive relief is not available under § 1983, because, under the 1996 amendments to that statute, injunctive relief “shall not be granted” in an action against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Hakeem v. Lamar · filed 2020-06-30

Hakeem does not allege that Judge Lamar violated any declaratory decree or that declaratory relief is unavailable. Consequently, Hakeem has not stated claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 is the vehicle for civil rights claims against state officers rather than federal agents.

Plair v. New York City Department of Correction · filed 2020-07-02

Plair’s complaint states that he is bringing a Bivens action; however, as the defendants named in the complaint are not federal agents, but rather state employees, the Court construes his complaint to be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

SMITH v. SMITH · filed 2020-07-22

Further, Plaintiff is unable to seek any injunction relief from Judge Ferrelli. Section 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” As Plaintiff “has not alleged that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable . . . [her] claim for injunctive relief is barred.” Azubuko, 443 F.3d at 304.

Section 1983 generally bars injunctive relief against judicial officers for acts in their judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Quinn v. Kibodeaux · filed 2020-07-29

As explained above, § 1983 does not provide for injunctive relief against judicial officers except in very limited circumstances; none of which have been alleged here.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Adams 823706 v. Mohrman · filed 2020-08-10

Moreover, injunctive relief is not available under § 1983, because, under the 1996 amendments to that statute, injunctive relief “shall not be granted” in an action against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judicial officers for official acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Argen v. Katz · filed 2020-09-15

As the District Court correctly noted, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 precludes injunctive relief against judicial officers for official acts “unless a ... declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Neither exception exists here—no declaratory decree has been violated, and declaratory relief is not unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Lewis v. Karas · filed 2020-10-05

In addition, as amended in 1996, § 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated, or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Karas arise of out of his rulings and actions while presiding over Lewis I and Lewis II; such rulings and actions were within the scope of his judicial capacity and jurisdiction. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Kenneth M. Karas under the doctrine of judicial immunity and as frivolous.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Fulcher v. Bennett · filed 2020-11-30

Additionally, the text of § 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” ... No such circumstances were alleged here.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Phillips-Addis 420015 v. Ward · filed 2020-12-03

Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Parks or Economopoulos violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was not available; therefore, Plaintiff may not obtain injunctive relief against those judicial officers under the statute.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Matrai v. Hiramoto · filed 2020-12-14

“[I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,” however, Section 1983 expressly provides that “injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” ... Here, Matrai neither alleges nor argues that Judge Hiramoto issued the bond requirement in violation of a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Accordingly, the Court finds Count II is subject to dismissal for the additional reason that Matrai fails to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify the particular state official or officials who violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Bello-Reyes v. Gaynor · filed 2021-01-14

In § 1983 suits, it is necessary to identify the particular state official or officials who violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires an individual defendant to be personally involved in the challenged conduct.

Dooley v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2001-06-06

Defendants are correct in arguing that § 1983 requires personal involvement in the challenged conduct.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a municipality for patrol officers’ conduct absent evidence that higher-ranking officers condoned the conduct or were aware of similar activities.

Blake v. Cich · filed 1978-07-18

The only employees of the city alleged to have been involved in the incident were defendant patrolmen. No evidence indicated that higher-ranking officers condoned defendants’ alleged conduct or were aware of similar activities occurring in the past. In this circumstance, the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an official through respondeat superior; the official must directly and personally participate under color of state law in conduct depriving a plaintiff of federal rights.

Brown v. Clements · filed 1978-07-14

Courts have consistently held that the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in actions brought under § 1983. ... Therefore, an official is not liable under § 1983 unless he directly and personally participated in conduct under color of state law which deprived plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 imposes liability on a person who, acting under color of state law, personally causes a deprivation of federal rights, and it does not allow respondeat superior liability.

Beard v. Boren · filed 1976-01-07

It is fundamental that in order for a defendant to be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 it is essential that he must have acted under color of State law to cause the denial of a federally protected right. ... It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... It is a general rule that an official will not be held liable in a Civil Rights action unless he directly and personally participates in conduct under color of state law which deprives the plaintiff of rights, privileges and immunities secured him by the federal Constitution.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisory official based solely on authority to promulgate correctional rules; the complaint must allege the official’s participation in the challenged acts or approval of a violating policy.

Davis v. Lindsay · filed 1970-11-04

One further matter remains for disposition. Defendant Paul McGinnis opposes the motion and claims that the action should be dismissed as to him on the ground that the complaint fails to allege any acts which constitute a violation by him of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The only allegation made in the complaint against defendant McGinnis is that he “has the authority to promulgate rules and regulations establishing minimum care, custody, correctional treatment, supervision, and discipline for all persons confined in local correctional institutions.” Since the complaint does not allege nor do the papers on this motion establish that defendant McGinnis participated in any way in actions relating to plaintiff, nor that he approved any policies of the City Department of Correction which may have violated the plaintiff’s civil rights, no cause of action has been stated against defendant McGinnis, and accordingly the complaint is dismissed as to him.

Section 1983 imposes liability only on persons who personally directed or participated in depriving someone of federal rights, and does not apply respondeat superior.

Campbell v. Anderson · filed 1971-12-28

But even if this liberal and broad construction is given to the complaint, it still fails to state a good cause of action against the Warden, the Director and the Secretary because the doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under § 1983. That statute contemplates only the liability of persons who have personally directed or participated in the deprivation of federal rights.

Section 1983 requires a defendant's personal participation, under color of state law, in conduct that deprives the plaintiff of a federally protected right.

Fowler v. Anderson · filed 1974-02-13

It is the general rule that an official will not be liable in a Civil Rights action unless he directly and personally participates in conduct under color of state law which deprives the plaintiff of rights, privileges, and immunities secured him by the Federal Constitution. Richardson v. Snow, 340 F.Supp. 1261 (D.Md.1972). It is an essential element of a Civil Rights claim that the particular defendant be personally involved in the alleged denial of the Constitutional right. Battle v. Lawson, 352 F.Supp. 156 (W.D.Okl.1972).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an official absent direct and personal participation, under color of state law, in conduct depriving a plaintiff of federal rights.

Clark v. Anderson · filed 1974-02-13

It is the general rule that an official will not be liable in a Civil Rights action unless he directly and personally participates in conduct under color of state law which deprives the plaintiff of rights, privileges, and immunities secured him by the Federal Constitution.

Section 1983 requires an official's direct and personal participation in conduct under color of state law that deprives a plaintiff of federal constitutional rights.

Seibert v. McCracken · filed 1974-03-07

It is the general rule that an official will not be liable in a Civil Rights action unless he directly and personally participates in conduct under color of state law which deprives the plaintiff of rights, privileges, and immunities secured him by the Federal Constitution.

A § 1983 claim requires allegations that each defendant directly and personally participated in the discrimination.

Harbert v. Rapp · filed 1976-03-30

Plaintiff has failed to state that any of the Defendants have directly and personally participated in discrimination against her, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 damages require the defendant’s personal responsibility for the rights violation and cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Robinson v. Commissioner of Jurors, New York Cty. · filed 1976-09-14

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has consistently held that damage awards under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be predicated on personal responsibility of the defendant for the acts constituting a violation of the plaintiff’s rights.

A § 1983 claim against a supervisory prison official fails when the complaint alleges no personal participation in the deprivation.

Hines v. Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation, State of Florida · filed 1976-09-23

The complaint contained no allegations against the defendant, charging other prison officials and doctors with the deprivation of medical care.

Personal participation by the defendant is an essential allegation in a § 1983 claim.

Bennett v. Albert Passic, Sheriff, Etc. · filed 1976-09-29

Further, Bennett does not allege any injury or damage resulting from the delay; he does not allege that any of the defendants personally participated in or caused the delay.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages to show an affirmative link between each defendant and the conduct causing the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Taliaferro v. Dykstra · filed 1977-01-10

In order to recover damages in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish an affirmative link between the defendants and the conduct complained of. ... It is the conduct of the named defendants to which the Court must look in determining whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have personally participated in, or knowingly acquiesced in, an intentional deprivation of civil rights.

Cavey v. Levine · filed 1977-05-24

Defendants Levine and Moore have moved for summary judgment on the grounds that, the plaintiff has failed to ascribe to them any active role or knowing acquiescence in an intentional deprivation of the plaintiff’s civil rights. ... For these reason, as to both Moore and Levine, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and their motions for summary judgment will be granted.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an official absent direct and personal participation under color of state law in conduct depriving constitutional rights.

Linebarger v. Williams · filed 1977-08-12

It is well settled that an official will not be liable in an action brought under § 1983 unless he directly and personally participates in conduct under color of state law which deprives plaintiffs of rights, privileges and immunities secured them by the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove some form of actual participation by each individual defendant to prevail.

Riley v. City of Minneapolis · filed 1977-09-19

It is true that plaintiff must prove some form of actual participation by all individual defendants in order to prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).

Section 1983 generally requires an official to have directly and personally participated, under color of state law, in conduct that deprived the plaintiff of federally secured rights.

Brown v. Benton · filed 1978-03-30

As a general rule, an official will not be liable in an action brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless he directly and personally participates in conduct under color of state law which deprives the plaintiff of rights, privileges and immunities secured him by the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 requires personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation before an individual may be held liable.

Hutton v. Heggie · filed 1978-08-01

It has long been the rule that personal participation is a prerequisite to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for mere negligent supervision; liability requires an affirmative link between the supervisor's own acts or omissions and the actions directly causing the constitutional violation.

Meyer v. NILES TP., ILL. · filed 1979-07-24

Mere negligent supervision is insufficient to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... “[i]n order to establish the liability under § 1983 of supervisory officials for deprivation of constitutional rights through the acts of their subordinates, an affirmative link must be proven between their own acts or omissions and the actions directly causing the alleged violation.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials for a subordinate’s recordkeeping error when they lacked personal participation or deliberate indifference and reasonably relied on the subordinate’s assurances.

Gene Howard Williams, and Cross-Appellant v. Park Anderson, Sam Johnston and Dale Gossett, and Cross-Appellees · filed 1979-07-20

Under such circumstances these three defendants should not be held liable under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Choate’s error.

A § 1983 claim requires an allegation that the defendant personally participated in the deprivation, so a claim against an official who did not personally cause the alleged deprivation does not state a cause of action.

Adargo v. Barr · filed 1980-01-04

Courts in this circuit have consistently recognized that “[personal participation is an essential allegation in a § 1983 claim.” ... Since Barr did not personally deprive Adar-go of his right to attend the hearing, Adar-go’s claim of denial of due process based upon his absence from the proceedings does not state a cause of action under § 1983 and must be dismissed.