42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation for damages liability, including direct participation or failure to intervene when there was a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm.

Gonzalez v. Waterbury Police Dept. · filed 2016-07-29

Even if the evidence is insufficient to establish that a particular defendant directly participated in the use of excessive force, a plaintiff may still prove personal liability under section 1983 by showing that the defendants “permitted fellow officers to violate a suspect’s clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” Zainc v. City of Waterbury, 603 F.Supp.2d 368, 384 (D.Conn.2009) (quoting Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 129). “A law enforcement officer has an affirmative duty to intercede on the behalf of a citizen whose constitutional rights are being violated in his presence by other officers.” O’Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir.1988); Braswell v. Corley, 2015 WL 575145, at *13 (D.Conn. Feb. 11, 2015). “In order for liability to attach, there must have been a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.” Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir.1994). ... Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Lanoie and Torres were liable for failing to intervene to prevent rocks from being thrown at Gonzalez.

Section 1983 did not impose a duty on the prosecutors to intervene under these circumstances, where they lacked a reasonable means or opportunity to do so.

Patrick v. City of Chicago · filed 2016-10-04

Given the present state of the law in this Circuit, the nuanced considerations both pro and con, and the particular facts of this case, the Court cannot say that the ASA Defendants were under a duty to intervene, nor does the evidence show that they had any reasonable means or opportunity to do so. The ASA defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the failure to intervene cause of action is, therefore, granted.

Section 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation for a failure-to-intervene claim.

Simcoe v. Gray · filed 2016-11-23

But, irrespective of the merits of that determination, the jury’s conclusion that excessive force was not applied in Simcoe’s arrest obviates Simcoe’s failure-to-intervene claim because, absent a constitutional violation on the part of any of the officers, Simcoe’s failure-to-intervene claim necessarily fails.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for failure to supervise or intervene when the underlying conduct was constitutional.

Estate of Brackens v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro Government · filed 2017-02-21

Similarly, no LMPD officer can be held liable for failure to supervise or intervene because the underlying conduct was not unconstitutional.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer who fails to prevent another officer’s use of excessive force when the officer is present and has a reasonable opportunity to intervene.

Raffaele v. City of New York · filed 2017-03-16

An officer who does not personally inflict the injury at the core of an excessive use of force claim may still be liable under § 1983 if the officer was present at the assault, and fails to intervene to prevent the harm when he or she had a reasonable opportunity to do so.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in a constitutional violation; an officer’s presence at the scene alone does not establish liability for failing to intervene.

Conroy v. Caron · filed 2017-08-08

Plaintiffs have presented no evidence, however, to suggest that any of these officers was in a position to have prevented the alleged constitutional violations: An officer’s mere presence at the scene is not enough to establish liability for a failure'to intervene.

Section 1983 bystander liability requires an officer to know of another officer’s constitutional violation and have a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm.

Adams v. City of Shreveport · filed 2017-08-28

Adams’ § 1983 failure to intervene claim against Officer Neville must also be dismissed because there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to at least two necessary elements of such a claim. Specifically, Adams has not demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Officer Neville (1) knew that Officer Coleman was violating Adams’ constitutional rights or (2) had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm that Adams suffered.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who fails to intervene despite a reasonable opportunity to prevent known cruel or unusual force.

Wilborn v. Ealey · filed 2018-02-07

An officer who fails to intervene to try to prevent known cruel or unusual force, despite a reasonable opportunity to do so, may be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim only when an officer had a realistic opportunity and was in a position to stop another officer’s excessive force.

Johnson v. Shaun M. White · filed 2018-02-27

Johnson has simply not presented evidence that any deputy, and specifically Sergeants Nix or Young, had an opportunity or was in a position to intervene but failed to do so.

An officer has no failure-to-intervene liability under § 1983 when there was insufficient time to perceive the incident and intervene.

Barton v. City of Lincoln Park · filed 2018-03-01

On these facts, there was not enough time for Officer Behrik to both perceive the incident and intervene to assist Barton.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for failing to intervene in a false arrest when an officer lacked reason to know the arrest was unsupported by probable cause.

Jackson v. Tellado · filed 2018-03-22

Based on the evidence adduced at trial, no reasonable jury could have concluded that Tellado knew or had reason to believe that Plaintiff's arrest lacked probable cause and that he (Tellado), therefore, should have intervened to prevent the arrest.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who fails to intervene to prevent another officer’s excessive force, even without evidence that the officer personally used force.

McCoy v. Meyers · filed 2018-04-10

Even without record evidence of each officer’s specific involvement, a reasonable jury could conclude that the Appellees each failed to intervene to prevent the allegedly excessive force.

An officer is not liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene when the officer had no realistic opportunity to prevent the alleged harm.

Littrell v. Gulbrandson · filed 2018-06-12

The court finds that even if plaintiff is able to show that excessive force was being used against him or that any constitutional violation had been committed by the police, officer Nicosia did not have a “realistic opportunity” to intervene to prevent the alleged harm from happening to plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits a failure to intervene claim only when an officer was in a position to prevent another officer’s excessive force and failed to take reasonable steps to do so.

Grimes v. Felder · filed 2018-08-27

As a result, Rogers was not in a position to intervene, meaning that he did not fail to take reasonable steps to prevent the alleged excessive use of force by Felder.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against an officer who also allegedly used excessive force.

Campbell v. City Of Chicago · filed 2018-09-12

For the same reason, the fact that Carter, Linwood, and Jackson allege that Defendants Gade, Lavorata, Ortiz, and Villanueva used excessive force does not doom their failure-to-intervene claims against those officers.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for failing to intervene when an officer had no real opportunity to prevent the alleged assault.

Heyliger v. Krygier · filed 2018-09-28

Based on the suddenness and brief duration of the claimed assault, a reasonable trier of fact could not conclude Beall had any real opportunity to prevent it. Therefore, Beall cannot be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who has reason to know of an assault and a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Craig v. Hardy · filed 2018-09-30

As bystanders, Defendants may be held liable under § 1983 if Craig can show that they “(1) had reason to know that [Craig was being assaulted], and (2) had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the act from occurring.” Lewis, 581 F.3d at 472.

A § 1983 failure-to-intervene claim cannot succeed without a showing of excessive force.

Zubrod v. Hoch · filed 2018-10-22

In addition, because a failure-to-intervene claim may not prevail in the absence of a showing of excessive force, we also hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Deputies Short and Smith on the Zubrods’ failure-to-intervene claim (“Count III”).

A Section 1983 failure to intervene claim can survive dismissal when the alleged facts suggest that an officer could have intervened, even if the complaint does not specify how.

Lietzow v. Village of Huntley · filed 2018-11-29

Lietzow need not allege specifically and explicitly how the Officers failed to intervene, so long as the narrative suggests that they could have acted to intervene but failed to do so.

Section 1983 can hold an officer liable for failing to take reasonable steps to stop another officer’s excessive force, even if the officer did not personally use force.

Cortes v. Bradley · filed 2018-12-18

Small insists that he was, at most, a bystander to the incident, but “[i]t is not necessary that a police officer actually participate in the use of excessive force in order to be held liable under section 1983.” ... “[A]n officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force, can be held liable for his nonfeasance.”

Section 1983 does not impose failure-to-intervene liability on an official who was not in a position to stop the alleged excessive force.

Williams v. Rickman · filed 2019-01-02

The undisputed relevant facts indicate that Warden Barfield was not present at Mr. Williams’ cell when the use of force occurred. Because he was not in a position to intervene in the excessive use of force against Mr. Williams, Warden Barfield cannot be held liable for failure to intervene.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against an officer who had reason to know another officer was violating the Constitution and a reasonable opportunity to prevent it.

Whitney v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (METRA) · filed 2019-01-16

An officer can only be liable for failure to prevent a constitutional violation under § 1983 if the officer had reason to know that another officer was violating the Constitution and had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the violation.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who has a realistic opportunity to prevent another officer's excessive force but fails to take reasonable steps to do so.

Sheffield v. Pieroway · filed 2019-02-22

Moreover, an officer who is present at the scene of an arrest and fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer's use of excessive force can be held liable under § 1983 for his nonfeasance, provided that he had a "realistic opportunity" to prevent the other officer's actions. ... Because a reasonable jury could conclude that Resil had a realistic opportunity to prevent the use of excessive force, his motion for summary judgment with respect to the use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment will be denied.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against an officer who could prevent another officer’s excessive force, but the claim fails when the alleged force was not excessive.

Routt v. Howard · filed 2019-03-01

“[A] law enforcement official who fails to intervene to prevent another law enforcement official’s use of excessive force may be liable under § 1983.” ... Therefore, because the complaint failed to state a claim that the officers used excessive force during the second incident, it also did not state a claim that Sergeant Howard failed to intervene to prevent another law enforcement official’s use of excessive force.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim when an official has a reasonable opportunity to prevent known unconstitutional force, but the claim fails without an underlying constitutional violation.

Johnson v. Clayton · filed 2019-07-02

An official who fails to intervene to try to prevent a known, unconstitutional use of force, despite a reasonable opportunity to do so, may be held liable under § 1983. ... Because there was no underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiff’s failure-to-intervene claim against Defendants Mayes, Rose, Wear, and Winters also fails.

Section 1983 permits a failure to intervene claim against an officer who observes another officer’s excessive force and has a realistic opportunity and sufficient time to prevent it.

Burns v. Croteau · filed 2019-07-02

Accordingly, the court finds the “failure to intervene” allegations sufficiently plausible to survive a motion to dismiss.

An officer is liable under § 1983 for failing to stop another officer’s excessive force only if the officer had a realistic and reasonable opportunity to intervene.

HARTFELDER v. NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE · filed 2019-07-15

However, “an officer is only liable if [he had] a realistic and reasonable opportunity to intervene” in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. ... Accordingly, because Defendant Cox did not have a realistic and reasonable opportunity to intervene or prevent Defendant Clark’s allegedly violative conduct, summary judgment is entered in favor of Defendant Cox.

Section 1983 permits an excessive force claim against an officer whose failure to intervene supports liability, even if another officer applied the force.

Hayward v. Doe · filed 2019-08-29

This failure to act is sufficient for John Doe 1 to potentially be liable for his non-feasance.

An officer can be liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene only if the officer had a realistic opportunity to prevent another officer’s violation of the plaintiff’s rights.

Rosado v. Mora · filed 2019-09-17

Rosado must show that Apacible had a “realistic opportunity to step forward and prevent a fellow officer from violating a plaintiff’s rights . . . .” Miller v. Smith, 220 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2000). He does not present any such evidence.

Section 1983 permits liability for officers who had an opportunity to stop another officer’s excessive force but failed to do so, or who integrally participated in the violation.

Roberts v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2019-09-25

Thus, Jackson and LeBlanc may be liable if Devore used excessive force and they had the opportunity to intercede but failed to do so or otherwise integrally participated in the violation.

An officer may be liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene when the officer knows another officer is violating a person’s constitutional rights, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Rouse v. Florio · filed 2019-09-30

An officer may be liable under § 1983 on a theory of bystander liability, if he “(1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.” Randall v. Prince George’s Cty., 302 F.3d 188, 204 (2002); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (“Every person who . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .”).

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim when an officer has the opportunity and means to prevent another officer’s excessive force.

Christenson v. Cook · filed 2019-09-30

The facts, therefore, do not suggest that Officer Plumb had sufficient time to act to prevent the shove.

Section 1983 permits an excessive force claim against an officer who had an opportunity to intervene, even if another officer inflicted all the force.

Batson v. Genesee Cty. Sheriff's Deputy Hoover · filed 2019-10-11

Even if Leonowicz had committed every act of excessive force against Batson, a jury could still find Kennamer liable for failure to intervene. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Batson, there is a genuine question for the jury of whether there was sufficient opportunity for the officer to realize that excessive force was being used and to intervene.

Section 1983 imposes liability on an officer for failing to intervene only if the officer has reason to know of a constitutional violation and a realistic opportunity to prevent it.

Garrit v. City of Chicago · filed 2019-10-24

In the instant case, the whole incident took place in a matter of seconds and there was no way for either Burg or Sturm to prevent the other officers from firing their weapons, even if they wanted to.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a correctional officer who fails to intervene in another officer’s constitutional violation.

Pearson v. Gittemeier · filed 2019-10-24

As such, under § 1983, a correctional officer can be held liable for failing to intervene in another officer’s constitutional violation.

An officer cannot be held liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene if he could not know at the time that another officer’s use of force was unlawful.

Ronald Hunter, Jr. v. Leeds, City of · filed 2019-11-01

Jackson thus cannot be held liable for failing to intervene where he could not have known at the time that what he was observing amounted to a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer who knows another officer is violating a prisoner’s constitutional rights and fails to intervene.

(PC) Howell v. Gallagher · filed 2019-11-26

A prison official may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if he is aware that a fellow officer is violating a prisoner's constitutional rights but fails to intervene. ... At this stage, the Court finds that plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim against these defendants.

Section 1983 failure-to-intervene liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Porter, Brandon v. Dittman, M. · filed 2019-12-04

Naturally, a prerequisite for such a claim is the existence of a constitutional violation. Because the court has concluded that plaintiff has not stated a claim for any constitutional violation, plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim necessarily fails.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-protect claim against officers who witness another officer’s excessive force and fail to intervene.

Duncan v. Wilcher · filed 2020-01-06

Likewise, the officers who watched the assault but did not intervene may be liable for that failure. ... In summary, plaintiff’s claims for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, failure to protect, and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need survive preliminary review.

An officer’s liability under § 1983 for failing to intervene in excessive force depends on whether the officer was in a position to intervene; a factual dispute on that issue precludes summary judgment.

Bochner v. Martin County · filed 2020-01-31

The Court concludes that there is a genuine issue for trial as to whether Officers Edens and Cernuto were in positions to intervene.

Section 1983 permits liability against a correctional officer who fails to intervene in another officer’s constitutional violation.

Pearson v. Gittemeier · filed 2020-02-05

As such, under § 1983, a correctional officer can be held liable for failing to intervene in another officer’s constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer who fails to take reasonable steps to stop fellow officers’ excessive force.

BRAZIER v. WABASH VALLEY CORR. FAC. · filed 2020-02-06

An officer may be liable under § 1983 for failing to take reasonable steps to stop the use of excessive force by fellow officers.

Section 1983 permits a failure to intervene claim against officers who knew excessive force was being used and had a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm.

Bradley v. Tritt · filed 2020-02-11

At this stage, these allegations are sufficient to state a failure to intervene claim against Tritt, Leopold, and Beahm.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against an officer who was in a position to stop another officer’s excessive force but failed to do so.

Dyal v. Gardner · filed 2020-02-20

“But it must also be true that the non-intervening officer was in a position to intervene yet failed to do so.” Id. at 1331. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Santiago was in any position to intervene in the interaction between Defendant Harper and Plaintiff. As a result, Count Twelve must be dismissed for failure to adequately state a claim for failure to intervene.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a corrections officer for failing to intervene in an alleged constitutional violation when the allegations support an opportunity to intervene.

Sinkler v. Clark · filed 2020-02-25

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court concludes that they are sufficient to state a claim at this time that Defendant McManara violated his rights by failing to intervene in the alleged First Amendment violation.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against an officer who had reason to know another officer was using excessive force and had a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm.

Bradley v. Tritt · filed 2020-02-28

Under certain circumstances, “a state actor’s failure to intervene renders him or her culpable under § 1983.” Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994). An inmate asserting a failure to intervene claim against officers who were present when the inmate’s constitutional rights were violated by a different officer must show that the officers had reason to know that excessive force was being used and the officers “had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.” ... At this stage, these allegations are sufficient to state a failure to intervene claim against Tritt, Leopold, and Beahm.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against officers who had reason to know excessive force was being used and a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm.

Bradley v. Beahm · filed 2020-02-28

Plaintiff has also stated a failure to intervene claim against CO Barkhurst, Lt. Sanchez, and CO Ridley. Under certain circumstances, “a state actor’s failure to intervene renders him or her culpable under § 1983.” Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994). An inmate asserting a failure to intervene claim against officers who were present when the inmate’s constitutional rights were violated by a different officer must show that the officers had reason to know that excessive force was being used and the officers “had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.”

An officer alleged to have directly violated a person’s constitutional rights cannot also be liable under Section 1983 for failing to intervene in that violation.

Earle v. Rivelli · filed 2020-03-10

However, because Rivelli is the officer alleged to have directly violated Earle’s constitutional rights, the failure to intervene claim against him is dismissed.

Section 1983 permits liability against prison officials who fail to intervene when another officer violates an inmate's constitutional rights in their presence.

Lurch, Jr. v. Bui · filed 2020-03-11

Law enforcement officials, including prison officials, can be held liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene in a situation where another official is violating an inmate's constitutional rights, including the use of excessive force, in their presence.

Section 1983 failure-to-intervene and conspiracy claims require an underlying constitutional violation.

Gonzalez v. City of Chicago · filed 2020-03-13

Finally, Gonzalez attempts to state claims under § 1983 for failure to intervene and conspiracy. For both failure to intervene and conspiracy claims, a plaintiff must establish an underlying constitutional violation. Rivera v. Guevara, 319 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1049 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (holding that § 1983 failure to intervene and conspiracy claims “rise and fall with the underlying constitutional violations”). Given the Court’s dismissal of Gonzalez’s substantive constitutional claims, his failure to intervene and conspiracy claims must be dismissed as well.

Section 1983 permits liability for a state actor who has a realistic opportunity to prevent another state actor’s excessive force but fails to intervene.

Walton v. Gordon · filed 2020-03-23

State actors “who have a realistic opportunity to step forward and prevent a fellow [state actor] from violating a plaintiff’s rights through the use of excessive force but fail to do so” may be held liable. Miller, 220 F.3d at 495. Here, it can be plausibly inferred that Sgt. Gordon and Officer Hufford’s alleged actions lasted sufficiently long for the officers that were watching and laughing to intervene. Therefore, Walton will be permitted to proceed against Officer Moore, Ryan Tinsley, Officer Tatum, and Officer West.

Section 1983 can make a state actor liable for failing to intervene in another actor’s constitutional violation.

Doe v. Board of Education District 299 · filed 2020-03-24

“The Seventh Circuit has consistently recognized that a state actor’s failure to intervene in the violation of another’s constitutional rights may render him liable” under § 1983. ... But because the Plaintiffs have adequately alleged constitutional violations by Velarde under the Equal Protection Clause (Count 4) and the Due Process Clause (Count 6), see supra Sections III(C)(1) and (C)(3), Reynolds’ motion to dismiss must fail.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against an officer who had reason to know of another officer’s constitutional violation and a realistic opportunity to prevent it.

Harrison v. City of Fort Wayne · filed 2020-03-31

In general, a law enforcement officer can be held liable under § 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the officer: “(1) had reason to know that a fellow officer was using excessive force or committing a constitutional violation, and (2) had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the act from occurring.”

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against an officer only when the officer had a realistic opportunity to stop another officer’s excessive force.

Deptula v. City of Worcester · filed 2020-04-06

There is not a scintilla of evidence that would support a finding that either of them was in position to stop Officer Carlson’s alleged attack. Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted on Counts I and II.

A § 1983 failure-to-intervene claim requires allegations that the officer knew of the impending violation and had a realistic opportunity to intercede.

(PC) Williams v. Thompson · filed 2020-04-15

There is also no indication that CO Madrigal knew CO Scalley would push plaintiff or that CO Madrigal had a “realistic opportunity” to intercede in that moment.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer who fails to intervene in another officer’s use of excessive force.

Pinto v. Collier County · filed 2020-05-07

To the extent that Pinto alleges that Kinney and the Deputy Defendants failed to intervene to protect him from the use of excessive force, he has stated a claim for relief.

An officer may be liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene to stop another officer’s violation of a person’s rights.

Green v. Frederickson · filed 2020-05-08

Thus, a reasonable jury could also find that Deputy Frederickson had a duty to intervene to stop Deputy Trabosh’s violation of plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for failing to intervene when an officer had no opportunity to stop another officer’s excessive force.

Jean-Baptiste Noel v. Arias · filed 2020-05-13

Plaintiff’s admission confirms Porterfield, Arias, and Pacheco had no opportunity to intervene. Porterfield, Arias, and Pacheco are therefore not liable for failing to intervene in Reyes’s and Santiago’s alleged use of excessive force.

An officer’s liability under Section 1983 for failing to intervene requires an opportunity to prevent the harm; supervisory rank alone does not establish that opportunity.

Pierce v. City of New York · filed 2020-05-20

The record before us, however, does not demonstrate that Mercado knew or anticipated that Belardo’s vehicle would strike Pierce, much less had any opportunity—regardless of his position as Belardo’s superior officer—to intercede to prevent the collision during the course of events here, all of which unfolded over a matter of seconds.

Section 1983 permits liability against a prison official who fails to intervene when another official uses excessive force against an inmate in the official's presence.

Randolph v. Griffin · filed 2020-06-02

Prison officials can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to intervene in a situation where another official is violating an inmate's constitutional rights, including the use of excessive force, in their presence.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim when an officer had reason to know of another officer’s excessive force or constitutional violation and a realistic opportunity to prevent it.

Mitchell v. Village Of Matteson · filed 2020-06-05

To state a claim for failure to intervene under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead that the law enforcement officer had reason to know that a fellow officer was using excessive force or committing a constitutional violation, and had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the act.

Section 1983 permits individual liability for an officer who fails to intervene in a constitutional violation when the officer has a realistic and reasonable opportunity to do so.

JOHNSON v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2020-06-12

A police officer can be held individually liable under Section 1983 even if he or she does not directly participate in the constitutional violation if he or she fails to intervene when given a “realistic and reasonable opportunity to [do so].” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650–51 (3d Cir. 2002).

Section 1983 permits a claim against a correctional officer who fails to intervene in another officer’s constitutional violation.

Vaughn v. Gullett · filed 2020-06-22

To that end, a correctional officer can be held liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene in another officer’s constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer who knew another officer was using excessive force and had a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Baldwin v. Isaac · filed 2020-06-30

A prison staff member “can be held liable under § 1983 if [he] (1) had reason to know that a fellow officer was using excessive force or committing a constitutional violation, and (2) had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the act from occurring.” ... Giving Baldwin the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, he has alleged a plausible claim that Officer Hatfield had a realistic opportunity to intervene to stop Sergeant Isaac’s use of excessive force, as these events appear to have unfolded over the course of several minutes in different areas of the prison.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer who had reason to know another officer was using excessive force and a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Henson v. Haight · filed 2020-07-02

As for Sergeant Will and Officer Thieme, a prison staff member “can be held liable under § 1983 if [he] (1) had reason to know that a fellow officer was using excessive force or committing a constitutional violation, and (2) had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the act from occurring.” Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 472 (7th Cir. 2009). Giving Henson the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, he has alleged a plausible claim that these two officers had a realistic opportunity to intervene to stop Officer Haight’s use of excessive force.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a prison official who fails to intervene when another official uses excessive force in the official’s presence.

Ismael v. Comacho · filed 2020-07-15

There is also an issue of fact about whether Sampson failed to intervene as Caruso and Charles beat Ismael. As explained further below, “[p]rison officials can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to intervene in a situation where another official is violating an inmate’s constitutional rights, including the use of excessive force, in their presence.” Randolph, 2020 WL 2846649, at *2 (citing Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001)).

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against an officer who knew or had reason to know excessive force was being used and had the opportunity and means to prevent it.

McGranahan v. Kentucky Department of Corrections · filed 2020-08-07

“An officer who fails to act to prevent the use of excessive force may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when 1) the officer observed or had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used; and 2) the officer had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring.” ... Even if excessive force was used, Rodriguez had no reason to know force would be used and did not have the opportunity to prevent the harm from occurring.

Section 1983 failure-to-intervene liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Zivko v. Shaw · filed 2020-08-10

Given that Zivko cannot establish an underlying retaliation claim against Shaw, he cannot establish a failure to intervene claim against Oppeneer.

An officer cannot be liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene in the officer’s own single, indivisible use of force.

DIXON v. SCHWEIZER · filed 2020-08-11

Accordingly, the Court grants defendants’ Motion with respect to plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim against Schweizer and Pross under § 1983. The Motion is granted with respect to plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim against Szelagowski because a single defendant cannot be liable for both excessive force and failure to intervene where the “alleged use of excessive force is a single, indivisible assault,” as in this case.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer for failing to protect a detainee from other officers’ alleged excessive force when he had no reasonable opportunity or authority to intervene.

Wesley v. Winchester City Police Officer Connor Malloy · filed 2020-08-12

Moreover, the second clip (wesley 2.ave) does not support Wesley’s contentions that Molloy interrupted a search of Wesley’s person, that Molloy planted drugs on him during that search, or that Molloy had any reasonable opportunity or authority to protect Wesley from excessive force by NRADC officers who then had custody of the detainee.

Section 1983 permits failure-to-intervene liability when an official has reason to know of another official’s constitutional violation and a realistic opportunity to prevent it.

Curtis v. Schwartz · filed 2020-08-19

An official may be liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene and prevent another official’s unconstitutional conduct if an official (1) has reason to know that a fellow official was committing a constitutional violation; and the official “had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the act from occurring.” Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 472 (7th Cir. 2009). ... Because Schwartz and Adams did not unconstitutionally retaliate against Curtis, it necessarily follows that Arndt, Yeates, Wiersma, and Jess cannot be liable for having not intervened.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against an officer who observes another officer using excessive force and has a realistic opportunity and sufficient time to stop it.

Richard Simone, Jr., Plaintiff v. Andrew Monaco, et al., Defendants · filed 2020-08-27

An officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force can be held liable under section 1983 for his nonfeasance. ... The court concludes that the allegations in the Amended Complaint are sufficient to withstand dismissal.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a bystander officer who had reason to know another officer was using excessive force and a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Johnson v. Rightnowar · filed 2020-09-08

A bystander to the use of excessive force can be held liable under section 1983 for failure to intervene if a Plaintiff can show that the officer: (1) had reason to know that a fellow officer was using excessive force or committing a constitutional violation; and (2) had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the act from occurring.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against an officer who had a realistic opportunity to prevent another officer’s excessive force.

Campbell v. City of Yonkers · filed 2020-09-16

This allegation, combined with plaintiffs’ other allegations regarding the nature of the incident, as discussed above, are sufficient to state a Section 1983 claim against Det. Malone for failure to intervene.

Section 1983 permits an excessive force claim against an officer who had sufficient time and opportunity to intervene before another officer released a police dog but failed to do so.

Erickson v. City of Lakewood, Colorado · filed 2020-09-24

“Liability under § 1983 requires personal participation in the unlawful acts.” ... Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has sufficiently stated an excessive force claim as to defendant Baggs under a failure-to-intervene theory.

Section 1983 permits bystander liability when an officer knows another officer is violating someone’s constitutional rights, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Rew v. Vincent · filed 2020-09-24

An officer may be liable under § 1983 on the basis of bystander liability where the officer “(1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.”

A prison officer may be liable under § 1983 for failing to stop another officer’s constitutional violation if the officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Barrett v. Berry · filed 2020-09-30

A prison official may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if he is aware that a fellow officer is violating a prisoner’s constitutional rights but fails to intervene. ... The failure to intervene can support an excessive force claim where the bystander-officers had a realistic opportunity to intervene but failed to do so. ... There was no time or reasonable opportunity for the other defendants to have intervened, and there are no allegations that they could have foreseen the second pepper-spraying.

A Section 1983 false arrest claim against an officer who failed to intervene must allege that the officer had an opportunity to intervene.

Allen v. Pacheco · filed 2020-10-19

Nevertheless, although a claim against a present, non-arresting officer for failing to intervene may be viable in certain circumstances, the amended complaint here fails to allege that Officer Suttle had the opportunity to intervene in Allen’s arrest.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer who witnesses excessive force, has an opportunity to prevent it, and fails to intervene.

Reeves v. Parker · filed 2020-10-28

An officer present who “had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used” and “had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring” owes a duty of care to the plaintiff. ... In his proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Sergeants Hicks and Cras both witnessed Plaintiff’s beating and failed to intervene despite opportunity to do so. Given these additional factual allegations and the leniency afforded pro se plaintiffs, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion only as to his failure-to-protect claim against Sergeants Hicks and Cras.

Section 1983 does not impose failure-to-intervene liability on an officer who takes reasonable steps to stop another officer’s excessive force, including telling a police dog handler to release the dog.

Temple v. McIntosh County, Georgia · filed 2020-11-09

An officer is only liable if he did not take any reasonable steps to intervene. By demanding that Defendant Howard give Axel the command to release Plaintiff, Defendant Cox took the reasonable action that the defendant in Priester did not.

Section 1983 permits a false arrest failure to intervene claim against an officer who encourages an arrest, could intervene, and knows it lacks even arguable probable cause.

Allen v. Pacheco · filed 2020-12-11

The allegations of the second amended complaint on the failure to intervene theory plausibly state a claim. ... This allegation raises the inference that Officer Suttle could have intervened in the arrest but chose instead to encourage it.

Section 1983 permits liability for failing to intervene in another officer’s use of excessive force when the officer had a reasonable and realistic opportunity to intervene.

Howard v. Hollenbaugh · filed 2021-02-16

The allegations of the FAC simply lack specific facts from which a reasonable factfinder could infer anything more than the possibility that Defendant Fitting had a “reasonable and realistic” opportunity to intervene prior to each tasing incident.

An officer who fails to intervene in another officer’s use of excessive force can be liable under § 1983 only if the officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Penny v. Alameda County · filed 2021-02-17

However, officers can be held liable for failing to intercede only if they had a realistic opportunity to intercede. ... Liberally construed, the allegations that deputy Wong stood by and failed to intervene to stop deputy Pereira from attacking Mr. Penny state a cognizable due process claim against deputy Wong.

Section 1983 requires a failure-to-intervene claim to allege that the defendant knew of the alleged violation and had a realistic opportunity to prevent it.

McCloud v. Eutsey · filed 2021-02-26

As a result, he fails to plead that they were aware of the alleged actions of Defendants Harmon and Trusty and had a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer who can intervene to stop another officer’s excessive force but fails to do so.

Helm v. Carroll · filed 2021-03-10

Moreover, “[i]f a police officer, whether supervisory or not, fails or refuses to intervene when a constitutional violation . . . takes place in his presence, the officer is directly liable under Section 1983.”

Section 1983 permits a failure to intervene claim against an officer who had reason to know excessive force was being used and a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm.

Williams v. Dennison · filed 2021-03-12

An inmate asserting a failure to intervene claim under Section 1983 against officers who were present when the inmate’s constitutional rights were violated by a different officer must show that the officers had reason to know that excessive force was being used, and the officers had a “realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.”

Section 1983 does not impose a general duty on prison officials to intervene whenever they witness a violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights.

Glover v. Rivas · filed 2021-03-15

But that rule does not create a general duty for prison officials to intervene whenever they may witness violation of any of a prisoner’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against a correctional officer who had reason to know another officer was using excessive force and a realistic opportunity to prevent it.

Davis v. Lake County Jail · filed 2021-03-29

Even where a correctional officer is “a bystander” to an incident of excessive use of force, he may be held liable for failure to intervene if he “(1) had reason to know that a fellow officer was using excessive force or committing a constitutional violation, and (2) had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the act from occurring.” ... Given the jury questions concerning whether Abdeljaber used excessive force, the Court believes whether Corbin failed to intervene to prevent that use of force must also be decided by the jury.

An officer is liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene in another officer’s excessive use of force only if the officer had a realistic opportunity to prevent it.

Cherrone v. City of Morris · filed 2021-03-29

So even assuming Officer Borzick’s actions amounted to a violation of his rights, Cherrone has failed to establish that Sgt. Allbert had a realistic opportunity to prevent those actions.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against an officer who allegedly stood by during another officer’s use of excessive force.

Walker v. Doe · filed 2021-03-29

And although Defendant Sparling was not ... directly responsible for the beating, he was allegedly standing idly by during it and therefore remains potentially liable for failing to intervene.

Section 1983 permits a claim against officers who were present during an alleged constitutional deprivation and had a reasonable opportunity to intervene but failed to do so.

LASSITER-COVINGTON v. TOWNSHIP OF HILLSIDE · filed 2021-03-29

The Court finds Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts that the Individual Sheriff Officers were present during the alleged apprehension and arrest of Decedent and failed to intervene despite a reasonable opportunity to do so.

Section 1983 permits liability for a state actor who has a realistic opportunity to prevent another state actor’s excessive force but fails to intervene.

Scroggin v. Davis · filed 2021-03-30

State actors “who have a realistic opportunity to step forward and prevent a fellow [state actor] from violating a plaintiff’s rights through the use of excessive force but fail to do so” may be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a correctional officer who fails to intervene in another officer’s constitutional violation.

Adams v. Hillis · filed 2021-03-30

As such, under § 1983, a correctional officer can be held liable for failing to intervene in another officer’s constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against an officer who had reason to know another officer was using excessive force and a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm.

Mrdjenovich v. Menard Correctional Center · filed 2021-03-31

A failure to intervene claim may be asserted against officers who were present when the inmate's constitutional rights were violated by a different officer if the officers had reason to know that excessive force was being used, and the officers had a “realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.” Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 774 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Yang, 37 F.3d at 284 (7th Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint includes sufficient allegations to proceed on an excessive force claim against J. Smith, A. Estes, J. Golliher, and Doeding and a failure to intervene claim against Doeding and Bebout.

A § 1983 failure-to-intervene claim requires allegations that the official knew of a constitutional violation, was present, had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chose not to act.

Rathmann v. Mississippi Department of Corrections · filed 2021-04-12

The only claim that remains pending against King and Epps in their individual capacities is a failure to intervene claim under § 1983. ... Rathmann also does not allege that King and Epps knew Ms. Rathmann was being assaulted the night of White’s attack, were present during the assault and had a reasonable opportunity to prevent it, or chose not to act.

Section 1983 permits liability for a prison official who fails to intervene when another official violates an inmate’s constitutional rights in the official’s presence.

Roberts v. Blowers · filed 2021-04-22

Prison officials can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to intervene in a situation where another official is violating an inmate’s constitutional rights, including the use of excessive force, in their presence.

Section 1983 permits failure-to-intervene liability when an officer knows another officer is using excessive force, has a realistic opportunity to prevent harm, and intentionally fails to take reasonable measures to stop it.

Medina v. Angrignon · filed 2021-05-06

To establish liability under a failure to intervene theory, a plaintiff must prove the use of excessive force by someone other than the individual and that the defendant under consideration: 1) possessed actual knowledge of the use by another corrections officer of excessive force; 2) had a realistic opportunity to intervene and prevent the harm from occurring; and 3) nonetheless disregarded that risk by intentionally refusing or failing to take reasonable measures to end the use of excessive force.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against an officer only if the officer had a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm.

Doxtator v. O'Brien · filed 2021-05-19

The undisputed evidence in this case establishes that the deputies could not reasonably be expected to have acted to stop Officer O’Brien from shooting because they did not have a reasonable opportunity to prevent the shooting.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a correctional officer who is present during an alleged constitutional violation and fails to intervene.

Woodard v. Adams · filed 2021-05-24

The Court concludes these allegations are sufficient to allege that defendants Cheeseboro and McDaniel failed to intervene to prevent the allegedly excessive use of force by defendants Johnson and Bennett.

Section 1983 failure-to-intervene liability requires knowledge of an underlying constitutional violation and a realistic opportunity to prevent it.

BYRD v. SMITH · filed 2021-04-29

In order to plead a failure to intervene claim, Mr. Byrd would have to show that these defendants (1) knew of the underlying constitutional violation and (2) had a realistic opportunity to prevent it.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for an officer who is present and able to intervene in another officer’s excessive use of force but fails to do so.

Rice v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2021-06-15

When an officer uses excessive force against a prisoner, officers who are present and in a position to intervene can be held personally liable if they do not.

Section 1983 permits a failure to intervene claim when an official knows or has reason to know of constitutional harm and has a realistic opportunity and means to prevent it.

Johnson v. Dobbins · filed 2021-06-17

To establish a failure to intervene claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must show that Youker and Vandenbosch “(1) observed or had reason to know that [constitutional harm] would be or was [taking place], and (2) ha[d] both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring.” ... Accordingly, the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count V will be denied.

A failure-to-intervene claim under Section 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Jackson v. Gantner · filed 2021-06-21

Finally, because Jackson fails to state a federal claim based on the destruction of her property, she also fails to state a claim against McDermott, who she alleges failed to intervene to stop the destruction of the property.

An officer may be liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene in another officer’s use of excessive force only if the officer had an opportunity to prevent it.

Swenson v. Palacek · filed 2021-07-12

Under some circumstances, an officer who is present during a use of force but does not himself use force may be held liable under § 1983 as if he had. ... However, under a failure-to-intervene theory, the bystander officer must have had an opportunity to intervene, which depends on the circumstances, including whether the officer was present, witnessed the use of force, and had time to stop or prevent it.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who has a reasonable opportunity to stop another officer’s excessive force but fails to intervene.

CISLO v. MARTZ · filed 2021-07-21

Captain Gilley cannot escape liability on the basis that he was not personally involved in the use of OC spray. Liability under the Eighth Amendment extends not only to individuals who use excessive force, but also to those who fail to intervene in an ongoing instance of excessive force.

Section 1983 permits a bystander liability claim when an officer has a reasonable opportunity to prevent another officer’s constitutional violation but fails to intervene.

Tserkis v. Baltimore County, Maryland · filed 2021-07-23

With respect to the § 1983 bystander liability claim in Count VIII, the facts preclude summary judgment for defendants. Contrary to the Officers’ unsubstantiated assertion, the evidence plainly presents genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Officers who did not use a taser nonetheless failed to intervene, despite having had a reasonable opportunity to do so.

Section 1983 permits a failure to intervene claim to reach a jury when officers had reason to anticipate excessive force and a realistic opportunity to prevent it.

Ross v. Willis · filed 2021-08-09

On the contrary, the video, showing the close proximity of these two officers to Willis, would give a jury a solid factual basis on which to find a realistic opportunity—on recognizing that Ross, if still in bed, would imminently be pepper-sprayed—to intervene.

A § 1983 failure-to-intervene claim fails when the fellow officer used no excessive force.

Settlemyer v. Hampton · filed 2021-08-11

Without any use of excessive force, the Plaintiff’s claim against Officer Smith for failure to intervene during the incident necessarily fails.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer for failing to intervene when no excessive force occurred.

Judd v. Langford · filed 2021-08-11

Further, as no excessive force was used, the Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Thicklin failed to intervene necessarily fails.

Section 1983 requires a failure-to-intervene claim to identify each defendant’s opportunity to prevent the alleged constitutional harm; conclusory allegations against defendants as a group are insufficient.

Robertson v. University of Akron School of Law · filed 2021-08-20

The Court agrees that Robertson’s grouped and conclusory allegations involving the failure of “Defendants” to intervene are insufficient to meet the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard. ... Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Robertson has failed to state a claim for failure to intervene under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats an officer’s failure to intervene in another officer’s alleged misconduct as personal involvement in the claim.

Lindell v. Pollard · filed 2021-09-03

Because the record indicates that Ault, Weycker, and Van Lanen were present at the time of the search and did not intervene to stop Gomm from continuing to harass the plaintiff, they along with Gomm are the defendants who must proceed to trial on this claim. See Sanchez v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 919, 928 (7th Cir. 2012) (failure to intervene is a form of personal involvement for purposes of § 1983).

A failure-to-intervene claim under Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant witnessed excessive force and had a realistic opportunity to stop it.

Conwell v. Marvin · filed 2021-09-10

To succeed on his failure to intervene claim, Plaintiff must show that Nurse Cooper witnessed Sgt. Marvin using excessive force against him and that she had a realistic opportunity to stop it but failed to do so.

Section 1983 permits an officer who uses excessive force to be liable for failing to intervene in another officer’s excessive force when the officer has a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Conforti v. City of Franklin · filed 2021-09-13

Moreover, I can see no reason why an officer who uses excessive force cannot also be liable for failing to intervene to prevent another officer from using excessive force.

A § 1983 conspiracy or failure-to-intervene claim that depends on a false-arrest claim fails when the false-arrest claim fails.

Stanley v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc. · filed 2021-09-17

And because Stanley’s § 1983 failure to intervene and conspiracy claims are derivative of his § 1983 false arrest claim, those claims are also dismissed.

A Section 1983 failure-to-intervene claim fails without an underlying constitutional violation.

Smith v. City of New York · filed 2021-09-20

Plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim fails as a matter of law because there was no underlying constitutional violation for excessive force and there was probable cause to arrest and prosecute Plaintiff.

Section 1983 failure-to-intervene and conspiracy claims require proof of an underlying constitutional violation.

HUMPHREY v. CITY OF ANDERSON · filed 2021-09-30

Count IV alleges the failure to intervene to prevent the violation of Humphrey's constitutional rights and Count V alleges a § 1983 conspiracy claim. Defendants seek summary judgment on these claims, too. Each of these claims requires proof of an underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose failure-to-intervene liability on an officer who had no opportunity to prevent the alleged violation.

Brooker v. Abate · filed 2021-10-07

And, regardless, the record shows that Abate—the only other named defendant—was outside the apartment at the time of the shooting, and nothing in the record presents any reason to believe that he could (or should) have intervened.

Section 1983 permits liability for failing to intervene in another officer’s constitutional violation only when the defendant had a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm.

Saracina v. Dubrey · filed 2021-10-13

The Court finds that Plaintiff has offered no evidence from which a jury could find that Defendant Youngs was “present” or “in the vicinity” of either the breezeway or the SHU during the alleged assaults, such that he a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a psychiatric technician for failing to intercede to prevent a law enforcement officer’s constitutional violation.

(PC) Kindred v. Allenby · filed 2021-10-26

Because the undisputed evidence on summary judgment establishes that defendant Lopez was a psychiatric technician and not a law enforcement officer of any kind at the time of the incident in question he, as a matter of law, cannot be held liable for failing to intercede to prevent a law enforcement officer from violating plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer for failing to intervene when no underlying constitutional violation is alleged.

Reyes v. The City of Jacksonville Beach · filed 2021-10-26

Because Reyes has failed to allege that a constitutional violation occurred, Officers Wallace and Blalock cannot be liable for failing to intervene and Count III of the Amended Complaint is also due to be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a correctional officer who fails to intervene to prevent another officer’s unconstitutional conduct.

Phillips v. Gordon · filed 2021-10-26

A correctional officer may be held liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene to prevent another officer’s unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 treats failure to intervene as a theory of liability for a constitutional violation, not an independent claim.

Arbuckle v. Lt. Brown · filed 2021-11-16

Failure to intervene is not a stand-alone claim. It is, instead, a form of liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against an officer who had a realistic opportunity to prevent another officer’s excessive force.

Jellyman v. City of Worcester · filed 2022-01-10

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the victim of an officer’s use of excessive force may hold another officer liable for failing to intervene. ... Here, no reasonable jury could find that either Officer LaFleche or Officer Bullock had a realistic opportunity, with sufficient time, to prevent the attack.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against a defendant who knows of an ongoing constitutional violation and has authority to stop it but fails to act.

DUVALL v. BURKETT · filed 2022-01-13

Personal liability under § 1983 requires personal involvement in the constitutional violation. Colbert v. City of Chi., 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017). However, even where the defendant did not personally commit the underlying violation, she may nevertheless be held liable for that violation under the theory that she was aware of the ongoing constitutional violation and failed to act within her authority to stop that violation. ... Accordingly, Ms. Duvall has not established that Ms. Burkett failed to act within her authority to protect her from unlawful retaliation, and the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Section 1983 permits an excessive force claim against an officer who had a realistic opportunity to stop fellow officers' use of force but failed to intervene.

WILLIAMS v. LAYTON · filed 2022-02-08

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Williams as the Court must on summary judgment, a jury could conclude that Officer Knapp had a realistic opportunity to intervene and stop the other officers' actions but did not. Therefore, Officer Knapp is not entitled to summary judgment as to the claim of failure to intervene.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who is present during another officer’s excessive force and fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim.

PRICE v. LAMAR · filed 2021-10-14

The Eleventh Circuit has held that “‘[i]t is not necessary that a police officer actually participate in the use of excessive force in order to be held liable under section 1983. Rather, an officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force, can be held liable for his nonfeasance.’” ... Plaintiff’s failure-to-intervene claims against Defendant Washington shall therefore also proceed for further factual development.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to pursue excessive force and failure to intervene claims in the alternative when the officers’ roles remain disputed.

Hernandez v. County of Nassau · filed 2022-02-20

Because Plaintiff can proceed with alternative theories, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim arising from events that took place at the precinct.

An officer may be liable under § 1983 for another officer's excessive force if he had a realistic opportunity to intervene and stop it.

MOORE v. KNIGHT · filed 2022-03-07

Thus, Officer Andrews can be liable for that use of force if he had a realistic opportunity to intervene and warn Sergeant Pierce to stop. ... Accordingly, Officer Andrews's motion for summary judgment is denied.

A Section 1983 failure to intervene claim fails when the underlying constitutional claims have been dismissed.

McMillan v. Capital One Bank, N.A. · filed 2022-03-16

Since all of plaintiff’s constitutional claims against the City Defendants are hereby dismissed, plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim fails as well.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim when an officer observes misconduct and has an opportunity to prevent further harm.

Newkirk v. County of Suffolk · filed 2022-03-18

These conflicting accounts raise genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Officer Pav was aware of Officer McCoy’s conduct and failed to intervene during the stop or prevent the subsequent assaults from occurring by reporting Officer McCoy’s behavior to his superiors or by ensuring that Officer McCoy was not left alone with Plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a police officer who fails to intervene in an arrest allegedly made without probable cause.

Brown v. Harris 6034 · filed 2022-03-18

The Court will likewise recognize that a police officer may be directly liable under § 1983 if he “fails or refuses to intervene” in an arrest that is alleged to have taken place without probable cause.

Section 1983 permits a failure to intervene claim against an officer whose alleged involvement includes an opportunity to stop another officer’s constitutional violation.

Johnson v. Annucci · filed 2022-03-24

Under these circumstances, and given that Plaintiff alleges that Lee placed handcuffs, shackles, and a chain belt restraint on Plaintiff causing Plaintiff’s inability to brace himself from impact while inside the vehicle due to the restraints and the lack of seatbelts, Judge Stewart correctly concluded that Plaintiff plausibly alleges a failure to intervene claim against Lee.

Section 1983 requires a realistic opportunity to intervene before an officer can be liable for failing to stop another officer’s abuse.

Dinkins v. Gustave · filed 2022-03-25

Without Captain Mitchell being present inside the pen or even being able to see the alleged sexual abuse, he cannot be faulted for failing to intervene at the moment any assault occurred.

Section 1983 failure-to-intervene liability requires knowledge of an imminent or ongoing constitutional violation; awareness of a risk of future abuse is insufficient.

Medina v. Izquierdo · filed 2022-03-28

But a failure to intervene theory does not impose liability for “failing to prevent (or predict)” a future constitutional violation, even if the state actor knows of and ignores risk of this future violation.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who had reason to know of a constitutional violation and a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Robinson v. Sweeney · filed 2022-03-29

Liability is established if the bystander officer had reason to know of the violations and a realistic opportunity to intervene.

An officer can be liable under § 1983 for failing to stop another officer’s excessive force only if the officer knew of the force and could have stopped it.

SHIRLEY v. RABERSTEIN · filed 2022-03-31

And Sergeant Perkins can’t be liable under a failure-to-intervene theory because, being outside the house, he wouldn’t have had knowledge of what force was being used to effect Mr. Shirley’s arrest.

Section 1983 failure-to-intervene liability requires a state actor to know of and acquiesce in a constitutional violation and have a realistic and reasonable opportunity to intervene.

CALLAWAY v. SMALL · filed 2022-03-31

As stated in the Court’s FAC opinion, to state a claim for one state actor’s failure to intervene or arrest where another state actor deprives an individual of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must allege that the bystander state actor “(1) knows of and acquiesces to (2) the unconstitutional treatment of another in his presence, and (3) fails or refuses to intervene despite having a realistic and reasonable opportunity to intervene.”

Section 1983 failure-to-intervene liability requires an underlying constitutional violation and an opportunity for the officer to intervene.

Brackbill v. Ruff · filed 2022-03-31

In this case, the court having concluded that there was no constitutional violation that would give rise to a Section 1983 false arrest claim, Brackbill cannot show that there was a reasonable opportunity to intervene, let alone a duty to intervene.

Section 1983 does not support a failure-to-intervene claim when there was no underlying constitutional violation.

Williams v. Haure · filed 2022-04-08

Because no reasonable jury could find that Haure subjected Williams to excessive force, “there can be no failure to intervene.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against a correctional officer who is in a position to intervene in a constitutional violation but fails to do so.

Connell v. Dunn · filed 2022-04-25

“Prison correctional officers may be held directly liable under § 1983 if they fail or refuse to intervene when a constitutional violation occurs in their presence. However, . . . for liability to attach, the officers must have been in a position to intervene.” ... Taking Connell’s factual allegations as true, the amended complaint states a claim for failure to intervene against Binder, Speaks, McLemore, and Aaron.

Section 1983 permits a claim against officers who had a realistic opportunity to stop another officer’s excessive force but failed to intervene.

Alcantara v. Donaghue · filed 2022-05-06

Without evidence to establish these critical facts, defendants cannot show as a matter of law they could not have intervened either before the first punch or between the first and second punch, especially given their close physical proximity to plaintiff, having just stood him up.

Section 1983 can hold a correctional officer liable for failing to intervene in another officer’s constitutional violation; a nurse’s presence alone does not establish a duty to intervene in a use-of-force incident.

Lindsey v. John Doe 1 · filed 2022-05-09

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a correctional officer can be held liable for failing to intervene in another officer’s constitutional violation. ... Plaintiff states that Doe #2 was a Corizon nurse, not a correctional officer. As such, he has not shown that Doe #2 had an obligation to intervene in a use-of-force incident involving correctional staff, or that Doe #2 even had any training to recognize the difference between proper and improper force.

A Section 1983 failure-to-intervene claim requires an underlying constitutional violation that the defendant could have prevented.

Cannon: Bey v. City Of Chicago · filed 2022-05-10

The Court construes this as a claim for failure to intervene under Section 1983. ... However, this claim necessarily fails as Plaintiff has not alleged an underlying constitutional violation in which Defendants failed to intervene.

An officer may be liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene in excessive force when the officer has enough time and opportunity to prevent it.

Grinnell v. City of Taylor, Mich. · filed 2022-05-18

One-and-a-half minutes is surely enough time to perceive the use of excessive force and intervene. Thus, accepting Grinnell’s theory of events, and even accounting for the undisputed audio recording, Defendants may be liable for failing to intervene.

Section 1983 permits an excessive force claim against an officer who had reason to know another officer was using excessive force and had a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Williams v. Birdyshaw · filed 2022-05-26

The officers who did not themselves use excessive force still may be liable for the other officers’ actions if the plaintiff can show they “(1) had reason to know that a fellow officer was using excessive force or committing a constitutional violation, and (2) had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the act from occurring.”

Section 1983 allows separate claims against an officer and a municipality for the same constitutional injury, but permits only one recovery for that injury.

Tinch v. City of Dayton · filed 1996-02-20

While Plaintiff may assert separate and distinct § 1983 actions against the municipal defendants and the defendant officers, she may recover only once for the injury suffered by Scott Tinch.

A Section 1983 plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same constitutional injury, including from both officers and a municipality.

Swanigan v. City of Chicago · filed 2018-02-02

Federal common law prevents § 1983 plaintiffs from recovering twice for the same injury. ... That means Swanigan cannot recover from the City for the prolonged detention because he was compensated for that constitutional violation in his suit against the officers.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officers whose pre-seizure conduct was, at most, negligent in causing an allegedly excessive-force seizure.

Diaz v. Salazar · filed 1996-03-21

Because I have concluded Defendants Lujan, Lopez and Webb cannot be liable under Section 1983 for their, at worst, negligent conduct in creating an allegedly “dangerous situation” prior to Plaintiff’s seizure in this case, I need not consider their qualified immunity defense.

A § 1983 damages claim against a private party for invoking an unconstitutional prejudgment attachment procedure follows malicious prosecution principles, requiring the plaintiff to prove favorable termination, lack of probable cause, malice, and damages.

Roland Pinsky Jennie Pinsky and Eileen Fedowitz, Brian K. Doehr v. Robert K. Duncan and Joseph Golden Insurance Agency, · filed 1996-03-22

We think that malicious prosecution is the most closely analogous tort and look to it for the elements that must be established in order for Doehr to prevail on his § 1983 damages claim. Accordingly, having established that Di Giovanni’s attachment proceeding ended in failure, it remains for Doehr to demonstrate want of probable cause, malice and damages. The burden of proof is, of course, upon the plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a private creditor for misuse of a prejudgment attachment procedure when the plaintiff does not challenge the procedure’s constitutionality.

Long v. CITIZEN'S BANK & TRUST CO. OF MANHATTAN · filed 1983-05-10

Because the plaintiff in this case has expressly disavowed any constitutional attack on any Kansas statute, and because he alleges that the prejudgment attachment of his Jeep was not performed in accords anee with the requirements of Kansas law, he fails to present a valid cause of action under § 1983, Lugar, 102 S.Ct. at 2757.