42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not ordinarily impose malicious prosecution liability on a private citizen who merely reports a crime to police.

Hogan v. Lewis County, New York · filed 2020-10-16

Normally, a citizen who reports a crime to law enforcement authorities cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages for harm that would render a conviction or sentence invalid unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Ellawendy v. Monterey County Superior Court · filed 2021-09-23

A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to obtain damages for a conviction only after it has been overturned or expunged.

Gore v. Newsom · filed 2021-02-22

Plaintiff may only obtain money damages once his conviction has been overturned or expunged.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has first been invalidated.

Hines v. Kaemingk · filed 2020-01-30

Because Hines is seeking damages for his alleged § 1983 violations and he is essentially asking the Court to invalidate the state court’s conviction and sentence, his claims are barred by Heck.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred by Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated; an excessive-force claim that does not imply invalidity is not barred on that ground.

Guerrero v. Gates · filed 2006-03-27

We therefore hold that, with the exception of his excessive force claim, Heck bars Guerrero’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims implying that a conviction is invalid cannot proceed unless the conviction has been overturned, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question.

Gunnell v. Taft · filed 2002-12-05

No § 1983 action may be pursued which implies the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been overturned, expunged, invalidated or called into question by other means.

Section 1983 claims must be dismissed when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Darick v. Johnson · filed 2003-02-13

The district court was required to dismiss Darick’s action against all the defendants because a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions for speeding, and' Darick did not demonstrate that the convictions had been invalidated.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been reversed.

McKinney v. Lockyer · filed 2003-05-16

McKinney’s action fails because it alleged that he was prosecuted without probable cause, and a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a malicious prosecution claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Lawson v. Engleman · filed 2003-06-06

Although Lawson insists that he is not challenging his conviction or sentence, we agree with the district court that Lawson’s claim for malicious prosecution is not cognizable under § 1983 because success on his § 1983 cause of action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and because Lawson has presented no evidence to suggest that his conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Section 1983 bars damages claims that would imply a conviction or sentence is invalid unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated.

Bloom v. Social Security Administration · filed 2003-07-03

Other than his complaint about his Social Security benefits, all of Mr. Bloom’s allegations identify “harms caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render his conviction and sentence invalid.” The district court properly dismissed these claims without prejudice.

Section 1983 damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence are not cognizable unless the conviction and sentence are invalidated.

Colon v. Special Agent James Connolly · filed 2003-10-27

Finally, Colon's argument that he stated viable damages claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), has no merit. The lower court correctly held that Colon's damages claims were not cognizable under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) because the present suit would necessarily imply the invalidity of Colon's underlying sentence. We add that Colon may pursue his damages claims if his conviction and sentence are ever invalidated.

A § 1983 damages claim cannot proceed if a judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply that an outstanding criminal conviction is invalid.

Ballenger v. Owens · filed 2003-12-17

Because a judgment for Ballenger in this case would necessarily imply invalidity of his conviction, the case at this stage amounts to no more than an unexhausted habeas corpus claim that collaterally attacks his conviction.

A § 1983 claim challenging a search must be dismissed if success would require suppressing evidence and necessarily invalidate an outstanding conviction.

Ballenger v. John Dale Owens, Lance Corporal and South Carolina State Trooper State of South Carolina · filed 2003-12-17

When evidence derived from an illegal search would have to be suppressed in a criminal case if the judgment in the § 1983 claim were to be applied to the criminal case and the suppression would necessarily invalidate the criminal conviction, the stated principle of Heck would apply, and the § 1983 claim would have to be dismissed; there would be no cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 bars a malicious prosecution damages claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction.

Wheeler v. Scarafiotti · filed 2004-01-08

Because success on a malicious prosecution claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction for driving off-road, therefore, Heck v. Humphrey requires that the claim be dismissed.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been reversed through direct appeal or habeas corpus.

Ng v. Miki · filed 2004-05-19

We agree with the district court that Ng’s action is barred under Heck, because the gravamen of Ng’s action is that he was detained without probable cause and prosecuted on “trumped up charges.” A favorable judgment in Ng’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. ... Ng therefore may not bring his action unless and until his conviction is reversed through a direct appeal or writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction.

Morris v. Cason · filed 2004-06-10

Morris’s claim therefore is not cognizable under § 1983 because a ruling on the claim would, if established, necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to pursue a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction, sentence, or disciplinary punishment unless it has been invalidated.

Jeffries v. Guilfoyle · filed 2004-07-02

It is also clear that since 1997 an inmate may not bring a challenge to the validity of procedures used to deprive him of good-time credits unless the prisoner can demonstrate the sanction has previously been invalidated.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would imply a conviction’s invalidity unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Robinson v. Ashcroft · filed 2004-07-26

Such a claim, defendant correctly maintains, cannot be sustained unless and until the relevant conviction is overturned.

Section 1983 bars a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a state conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been set aside.

Williams v. Maroney · filed 2004-10-14

It is well established that a § 1983 plaintiff may not raise claims that, if correct, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a state conviction or sentence unless and until that conviction or sentence has been set aside.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for an ineffective assistance claim that attacks the validity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Portillo v. Fisher · filed 2004-12-13

This contention lacks merit because Portillo’s ineffective assistance claim attacks the validity of his conviction.

A § 1983 claim is not cognizable when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Farabee v. Feix · filed 2005-01-06

Success on Farabee’s claim requires a finding that the drugs administered by Dr. Feix caused Farabee to enter an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. Such a finding necessarily implies the invalidity of Farabee’s conviction, and the district court properly ruled that Farabee’s claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims that necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction are barred unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Archilta v. State of Oklahoma · filed 2005-01-24

Therefore, whether we construe the applicable cause of action under § 1983 or § 1331, the rationale of Heck applies to bar the claims.

A § 1983 claim cannot proceed when success on it would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that remains valid.

Lynn v. Desiderio · filed 2005-12-15

Dismissing the defiant trespass charge does not alter the fact that success on Lynn’s constitutional claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of the disorderly conduct conviction, a conviction that has not been reversed on appeal, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Guerrero v. Gates · filed 2006-03-27

Heck bars almost all of Guerrero's § 1983 claims because: a judgment in favor of Guerrero on those claims "would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction;" he cannot show that his conviction has already been invalidated; and no exception to Heck's bar applies.

Section 1983 does not permit a due process claim that implies the invalidity of the decision in the plaintiff’s direct criminal appeal.

Simmonds v. United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit · filed 2006-04-28

We construe the complaint as asserting a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Moreover, because Simmonds’s due process claim implies the invalidity of this court’s decision in the direct appeal from his criminal conviction, it is not cognizable in a civil rights action under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction or sentence.

Jacob v. Township of West Bloomfield · filed 2006-07-10

In any event, Heck again precludes Jacob’s § 1983 claim. If Jacob were to succeed on the merits (i.e., prove that he was incarcerated without due process), the judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence.

A § 1983 claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence must be dismissed unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Gradle v. State of Oklahoma · filed 2006-08-01

W hen a state prisoner seeks damages or declaratory or injunctive relief in a § 1983 suit, “the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”

Section 1983 does not permit claims that necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been set aside.

Fennell v. Sistrunk · filed 2006-08-28

Additionally, because Fennell’s claims necessarily imply the invalidity of his assault conviction, which has not been set aside, they are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and are frivolous.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Harrison v. Moketa/Motycka · filed 2007-02-15

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable under § 1983 if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” unless the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated. 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364. In this case, Plaintiffs conviction has not been invalidated; accordingly, this court may not find that Plaintiff has been injured by a “wrongful” conviction.

A § 1983 claim cannot proceed when judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.

Stafford v. Josephine County Board of Commissioners · filed 2007-02-28

The district court also properly concluded Stafford failed to state a claim against remaining defendant Milligan for failing to recognize Stafford had been convicted for activity that did not amount to a crime, because a judgment in Stafford’s favor on this claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would necessarily undermine a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Ray v. Tsunoda · filed 2007-04-24

The district court properly determined that Ray’s claim that she was subjected to an unreasonable search was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), because a judgment in Ray’s favor on this claim would necessarily impugn the validity of her guilty plea to violating a municipal code ordinance, and Ray failed to allege that this conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not already been invalidated.

Wiggins v. Donio · filed 2007-08-17

A party may not bring a § 1983 claim if success “would necessarily imply the invalidity” of a conviction or sentence that has not already been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence.

Paige v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections · filed 2007-09-07

Finally, M r. Paige’s third claim for relief is not cognizable under Section 1983 because judgment in his favor w ould “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been set aside.

Brown v. TOWN OF DEKALB, MISS. · filed 2007-09-11

Defendants correctly argue that Brown’s claims based on allegations pertaining to the seizure of his person and the seizure of his property from the safety deposit box, which led to his confession, indisputably question the validity of his subsequent conviction for embezzlement and are consequently barred by Heck.

A prisoner cannot pursue a § 1983 damages claim alleging bias at a disciplinary hearing when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction that has not been invalidated.

Mariani v. Stommel · filed 2007-10-16

Heck held that a state prisoner’s claim for damages under § 1983 is not cognizable if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence” unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been previously invalidated. ... Because M r. M ariani’s allegations of bias of the hearing officer necessarily imply the invalidity of his prison disciplinary conviction, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying him leave to amend.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for constitutional-rights deprivations under color of state law, subject to Heck’s bar when success would necessarily invalidate a criminal conviction.

Connors v. Graves · filed 2008-08-04

It is well settled under Heck that when an individual like Connors brings a section 1983 claim against the arresting officers and their supervisors, “the district court must first ‘consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.’” ... Accordingly, we hold that Connors’s section 1983 claims are barred under Heck.

Section 1983 bars a suit when granting relief would imply that an uninvalidated conviction is invalid.

Branon v. Debus · filed 2008-08-07

The district court properly dismissed Branon’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Branon’s claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-88,114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), because his underlying conviction has not been reversed or otherwise declared invalid.

Section 1983 claims whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an unoverturned conviction must be dismissed without prejudice.

Oberg v. Asotin County · filed 2009-01-23

The district court properly dismissed Oberg’s claims alleging a racketeering conspiracy and challenging the tristate investigation, because success on those claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of Oberg’s Oregon convictions, and Oberg failed to demonstrate that the convictions have been overturned. ... However, those claims should have been dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the claimant’s criminal conviction.

Krause v. Leonard · filed 2009-11-06

Subject to certain exceptions, Heck v. Humphrey directs lower federal courts to dismiss any § 1983 action that – if successful – would necessarily imply the invalidity of the claimant’s criminal conviction.

Section 1983 bars an excessive force claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Wesbecher v. Landaker · filed 2010-03-25

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wesbecher’s excessive force claim because a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions, and Wesbecher offered no evidence that his convictions have been invalidated.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred when success would necessarily imply that an outstanding conviction is invalid, unless the conviction has been set aside.

Esquibel v. Williamson · filed 2010-12-03

Turning to Mr. Esquibel’s claims against Smith and Todis, we hold that they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). That decision disallows § 1983 claims that, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a previous conviction, unless the conviction has been set aside.

A Section 1983 claim is barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding criminal conviction.

Szajer v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2011-02-11

Just as in Whitaker, if the Szajers prevailed on their Section 1983 claim, it would necessarily imply the invalidity of their state court convictions.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been called into question.

Thomas v. Darnell Jones, II · filed 2011-05-19

Thus, as the District Court concluded, a ... judgment in Thomas’s favor on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. ... And, because Thomas’s only previous challenges to his conviction have been unsuccessful, his claim is not cognizable under § 1983 at this time.

A § 1983 claim is barred if a judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply that an existing conviction is invalid, unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Jackson v. Holton · filed 2011-08-17

But Jackson has a bigger problem: his lawsuit is foreclosed by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), which bars any suit under § 1983 where “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction” unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Corelleone v. Covina Police Department · filed 2012-01-09

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears from the face of the complaint that Corelleone’s allegations imply the invalidity of his conviction, and he has not shown that his conviction was overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Section 1983 does not provide relief that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has already been invalidated.

Long v. Atlantic City Police Department · filed 2012-02-13

Here, Long’s complaint seeks the sort of ... relief that is plainly barred by Heck because he seeks § 1983 relief on the ground that the defendants conspired to obtain a capital murder conviction against him, but he has not demonstrated that his conviction has already been invalidated.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been set aside.

Bolick v. Commonwealth of PA · filed 2012-03-29

We also agree with the District Court that Bolick’s § 1983 claims are barred at least in part under Heck to the extent that a judgment in Bolick’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of the 1981 conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction until the conviction is invalidated through an authorized avenue.

Whatley v. Coffin · filed 2012-11-07

Therefore, accepting the version of events alleged by Whatley, his § 1983 claims were necessarily inconsistent with his assault of a public servant convictions and thus are barred by Heck.

Section 1983 bars a state prisoner’s damages claim if success would necessarily imply that a conviction or sentence is invalid, unless it has already been invalidated.

Moore v. Wheeler · filed 2013-06-04

A state prisoner cannot bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit for damages if a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated already.

A § 1983 claim is barred when success would necessarily undermine an outstanding conviction.

Gordon v. Van Hollen · filed 2013-08-29

Because prevailing on his assertion that he never drove the pickup would undermine his outstanding conviction on the charge that he drove it while intoxicated, the case is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 bars damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Mouton v. State of Louisiana · filed 2013-11-14

Mouton’s arguments regarding ineffective assistance, prosecutorial misconduct, trial court error, judicial misconduct, juror misconduct, and wrongful incarceration are all barred by Heck because these claims are directly related to the validity of his conviction.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Bludworth v. City of Stockton · filed 2014-12-04

The district court properly dismissed Bludworth’s action as Heck-barred because success on Bludworth’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.

Section 1983 claims by state prisoners are barred when success would necessarily imply an invalid conviction unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Edward Miller, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 2014-12-11

Miller is a state prisoner seeking damages in a § 1983 suit. He contends that the Appellees failed to preserve exculpatory evidence that could have proven his innocence. In addition to damages, he wants a new trial. Because a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, he must demonstrate that his conviction has been invalidated to proceed with his suit. See id. He has not done so. His complaint was thus rightly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would imply a prison disciplinary conviction is invalid unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Charles Lee, Jr. v. Wade · filed 2015-02-19

Lee has not shown that his disciplinary conviction has been invalidated by official action. Therefore, his claims are barred by Heck and are not at this point cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would imply a conviction is invalid until that conviction has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Collins v. Valley Metro · filed 2015-02-24

Under Heck, a § 1983 plaintiff is barred from seeking damages “for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” until the conviction for which he complains “has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by an [authorized] state tribunal . . . , or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 permits a due process claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction only after the conviction has been set aside.

Hill v. Murphy · filed 2015-05-04

As we put it in Dominguez v. Hendley, 545 F.3d 585, 588 (7th Cir.2008), “a § 1983 claim for a due process violation based on the denial of a fair criminal trial may be brought only after the conviction is set aside. Otherwise, that civil claim would imply the invalidity of the outstanding conviction and would thus constitute.a collateral attack on the conviction through an impermissible route.”

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prior criminal conviction are barred unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Terry v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 2008-10-28

The Supreme Court has held that, if judgment in favor of a plaintiff in a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prior criminal conviction, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim when success would necessarily imply an invalid conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Roberts v. Attorney General, State of Florida · filed 2016-04-28

Although Roberts’s section 1983 complaint seeks only monetary damages, a judgment in Roberts’s favor would imply necessarily that his underlying conviction and sentence were invalid. Because Roberts has failed to demonstrate that his conviction and sentence have already been invalidated, the district court dismissed properly Roberts’s claim as not cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 bars a claim when a judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction that has not been invalidated.

Muhammad v. City of Bakersfield · filed 2016-12-22

The district court properly concluded that Muhammad’s action was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because a judgment in Muhammad’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction under California Penal Code § 148(a)(1).

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s claim if success would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated, regardless of the relief sought.

L.H. Wagner v. Allegheny County ADA C.H. Connors · filed 2017-01-13

As such, a state prisoner’s Section 1983 action is barred, no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim when success would necessarily imply that a criminal conviction is invalid unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or otherwise called into question.

Bowman v. J.T. Mann · filed 2017-04-03

Bowen’s claims are not cognizable under § 1983 because a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply that his subsequent criminal conviction was invalid and Bowen has not shown that his conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or otherwise called into question.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would necessarily imply that a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Hill v. Moreno · filed 2017-06-30

The district court properly dismissed Hill’s claims concerning a conspiracy to deny him a fair criminal trial because success on those claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486- 87 (1994) (barring § 1983 claim which would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction, unless the plaintiff can show that the conviction has been invalidated).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction.

Moschref v. Stratton · filed 2017-09-14

To succeed in a § 1983 action, Moschref would have to show that Officer Corona’s statements—including the statement that Moschref was the driver of the car during the August 7, 2012, incident leading to his arrest—were false, which would necessarily, and impermissibly, imply the invalidity of Moschref’s DUI conviction.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction are premature unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Eikenberry v. Seward County, Kansas · filed 2018-05-14

Therefore, a judgment for Mr. Eikenberry on these claims would necessarily imply that his conviction was invalid. Under Heck, this implication required the district court to dismiss the claims for creating false evidence, concealing exculpatory evidence, and conspiring to frame Mr. Eikenberry.

Section 1983 does not permit a false arrest claim whose success would necessarily imply that an outstanding conviction is invalid.

Davis v. Officer Lee · filed 2018-06-08

Plaintiff’s conviction has not been invalidated, he is still serving a sentence for that conviction, and he cannot bring a § 1983 claim if success on the claim would necessarily imply that his conviction is invalid.

A § 1983 claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction cannot proceed until the conviction is invalidated.

Rice v. Murphy · filed 2018-09-26

Plaintiff cannot proceed with his § 1983 claim until his conviction is invalidated through a proceeding designed to address the validity of convictions (a direct appeal, state petition for post-conviction relief, federal petition for habeas corpus relief, or a pardon by an official with such authority).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Kornse v. Howell · filed 2019-06-05

As these § 1983 claims are clearly barred by Heck, the Court concludes that these claims must be dismissed as frivolous.

Section 1983 bars a claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Bradley (ID 61833) v. Thompson · filed 2019-08-16

Second, the Heck doctrine requires the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint. Because a ruling that KORA is unconstitutional would demonstrate the invalidity of Plaintiff’s conviction for violating KORA and because Plaintiff has not shown that his conviction has already been invalidated, his claims appear to be barred by Heck.

Section 1983 bars a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Pressley v. Pacheco · filed 2020-01-09

Moreover, in Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that if a favorable judgment on a claim in a civil rights action would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence, the claim must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated. 512 U.S. at 486-87. Here, Plaintiff does not allege that his underlying conviction or sentence has been invalidated. And a finding that Plaintiff was convicted in violation of his right to self-representation would necessarily imply the invalidity of that conviction. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim is subject to dismissal.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction until the conviction has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by habeas corpus.

Robinson v. Knauss · filed 2020-01-16

Plaintiff cannot bring a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), “unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994); Figueroa v. U.S., 596 F. App’x 513, 514-15 (7th Cir. 2015) (Heck applies to actions brought by federal prisoners under Bivens). Accordingly, as Plaintiff has not successfully challenged his underlying convictions via a habeas corpus proceeding, his claims are barred pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to recover damages when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Snider v. Indiana State of · filed 2020-03-11

“[A] state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997). Because a favorable ruling on these claims would necessarily imply that Mr. Snider’s conviction and sentence were invalid, this claim for monetary damages must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would necessarily imply that a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

COOPER v. COMMONWEALTH · filed 2020-08-12

Here, Cooper seeks to recover compensatory damages based on his claim that the underlying court proceedings were manipulated and his imprisonment falsely obtained. A judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. Because his conviction has not been invalidated, Cooper cannot pursue this claim at this time, and his Complaint must be dismissed without prejudice to his raising it at a later time, if his conviction is invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.

Birch v. Atchison, Kansas, City of · filed 2020-08-17

To recover damages for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” a plaintiff seeking damages under § 1983 must prove that the conviction or sentence was previously ... invalidated.

A Section 1983 plaintiff cannot recover damages on claims that would invalidate a conviction unless the conviction has already been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Larive v. Viken · filed 2020-08-18

Larive has not claimed that his conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid or impugned by the granting of a writ. Thus, Larive’s claims are barred by Heck and dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim based on an invalid conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has been overturned, reversed, or otherwise called into question.

Mudd v. Henry · filed 2020-08-19

Likewise, before Plaintiff may proceed in a federal civil action for monetary damages based upon an invalid conviction or sentence, he must show that his conviction or sentence has been overturned, reversed, or otherwise called into question.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been set aside.

Bush v. Struthers Ohio Police Department · filed 2020-08-21

Under Heck, a plaintiff cannot succeed in a § 1983 action when the basis for the claim necessarily implies the invalidity of a previous state criminal conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to recover damages on a claim whose success would necessarily imply that a conviction or sentence is invalid, unless it has already been invalidated.

Snider v. Indiana State of · filed 2020-10-26

“[A] state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.” ... Because a favorable ruling on these claims would necessarily imply that Mr. Snider’s conviction and sentence were invalid, this claim for monetary damages must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Potter v. Port Jervis Police Department · filed 2020-12-14

The Supreme Court held in Heck v. Humphrey that a plaintiff is prohibited from asserting a claim under § 1983 that, if successful, would imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction, unless the conviction has been overturned or otherwise invalidated. 512 U.S. at 486-87. ... Plaintiff now reasserts those claims, and yet he alleges no facts showing that the conviction has been overturned or otherwise invalidated. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against Haniuk and Mehedin for the same reasons that those claims were dismissed in Potter I, without prejudice to Plaintiff’s reasserting them only if his conviction is overturned or otherwise invalidated.

A § 1983 claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction is not cognizable unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

REYNOLDS v. GEORGIA · filed 2021-01-15

If the conviction has not already been invalidated, then a § 1983 claim implying its invalidity is not cognizable.

Section 1983 does not permit a Brady claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been set aside.

Ramey v. Lawrie · filed 2021-02-05

As such, Ramey’s success in this action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions, which have not been set aside. Accordingly, Ramey’s claims are not cognizable in a section 1983 action and the court must dismiss the complaint.

A plaintiff cannot recover damages under § 1983 for a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Stills v. Simpson · filed 2021-03-19

This claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). ... Accordingly, the Court will not permit him to amend his complaint to add a claim of false arrest against Defendant Simpson.

A § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim cannot proceed when success would imply that an outstanding conviction is invalid, unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Gerling v. Waite · filed 2021-06-23

Therefore, insofar as his claim alleging unlawful arrest is based on the lack of probable cause, it is barred by the rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). A conclusion that Waite lacked probable cause to arrest Gerling for illegal parking would necessarily imply the invalidity of Gerling’s conviction for illegal parking. In that situation, the § 1983 claim may not proceed unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction, including one based on a no-contest plea.

Cook v. Torres · filed 2021-08-13

Similar to Szajer, plaintiff’s claim is barred by Heck and summary judgment is granted to Antioch Defendants Downie and Scott for this claim.

Section 1983 does not permit claims whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an intact conviction.

LOPEZ v. CITY OF LEHIGH COUNTY · filed 2022-01-11

Success on these claims, accordingly, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his currently intact convictions. Accordingly, Lopez’s claims are not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction or sentence unless it has been invalidated.

NELLOM v. EXELON CORPORATION · filed 2022-02-14

Unless and until a court invalidates his conviction or sentence, Heck bars his claim, so the Court must dismiss his Amended Complaint without prejudice.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an existing conviction or sentence.

Lucero v. 9th Judicial District Court · filed 2022-04-29

Heck mandates dismissal of any § 1983 damages claim that, if resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, would necessarily imply the invalidity of an existing conviction or sentence.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a challenge that would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction unless that conviction has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Rives v. Ward · filed 2003-04-30

Rives’ challenges to his disciplinary proceeding would imply the invalidity of his conviction. As he has not shown that his disciplinary conviction has been overturned or otherwise invalidated, he may not maintain his claim for damages in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims challenging the validity of criminal convictions when those claims are barred by Heck.

Whitehead v. Bush · filed 2003-05-01

The court further found that his claims for damages challenging the validity of his criminal convictions were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). ... We AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of Whitehead's § 1983 complaint for substantially the same reasons as stated in the court's order filed December 27, 2002.

Section 1983 damages claims arising from prison discipline do not require prior invalidation of the disciplinary charges when the discipline did not affect the fact or duration of the prisoner’s sentence.

Russell v. Washington · filed 2002-12-10

But as we noted in DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir.2000), Heck and Edwards apply only if the discipline affected the fact or duration of the prisoner’s sentence. The demotion to C grade status (the only discipline not set aside by warden Barnett) did not affect the fact or duration of Mr. Russell’s sentence, and so Heck and Edwards do not apply.

Section 1983 limits damages claims that would undermine an unoverturned disciplinary conviction.

Branum v. Johnson · filed 2008-02-14

Branum did not allege that the disciplinary-infraction conviction he challenged had been overruled or reversed. He did allege that he lost previously earned good-time credits as a result of the disciplinary infraction conviction. Despite his protestation to the contrary, his second amended complaint clearly sought monetary damages for the disciplinary-infraction conviction. The district court did not err in dismissing the claims challenging the disciplinary proceeding.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain review of a parole authority’s determination of a prisoner’s parole eligibility category.

Buhrman v. Wilkinson · filed 2003-03-31

Finally, to the extent the due process claim is premised on the allegation that the Parole Authority wrongly classified him, it must fail, because § 1983 cannot be invoked to obtain review of that determination.

Section 1983 permits a pretrial detainee to challenge disciplinary segregation; Balisok does not bar the claim.

Cardenas v. Lewis · filed 2003-03-07

Because Cardenas was a pretrial detainee, however, his claim is controlled by Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517 (9th Cir.1996), not Balisok.

Section 1983 claims challenging prison disciplinary sanctions or a parole decision must be dismissed if success would necessarily imply those decisions’ invalidity.

Thompson v. Booke · filed 2002-12-12

Thompson’s first amended complaint alleged, in part, that the defendants retaliated against him by charging him with false prison violations, depriving him of due process during prison disciplinary hearings, and facilitating denial of his parole. These claims were properly dismissed because a judgment in Thompson’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary sanctions and parole decision.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary or declaratory claims whose success would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary sentence affecting the duration of confinement.

Walker, Curtis v. McCaughtry, Gary · filed 2005-06-28

Insofar as Walker seeks monetary and declaratory relief, however, these claims, if successful, would imply the invalidity of his sentence and may not be raised in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims challenging prison disciplinary procedures are barred when success would imply the invalidity of a punishment that revoked good-time credits; those claims must be dismissed without prejudice.

Taylor v. Stewart · filed 2006-02-21

The district court properly dismissed Taylor’s due process claims because his challenge to the procedures used in ... proceedings that resulted in the loss of good-time credits necessarily implied the invalidity of the punishment imposed. ... We vacate the judgment to the extent it dismisses Taylor’s action with prejudice, and we remand for entry of judgment dismissing the action without prejudice as to the claims barred under Balisok.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil rights remedy for an inmate challenging a prison disciplinary finding that affects the duration of custody; the inmate must seek habeas corpus relief.

Garner v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions Division · filed 2006-07-27

It is well settled that if an inmate wishes to challenge a disciplinary conviction or punishment that he receives while he is incarcerated, as in this case, he must file a habeas corpus action in federal court.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim when proving the allegations would implicate the validity of a prison disciplinary proceeding.

Treece v. Andrews · filed 2006-09-20

Treece’s allegations, if proven would implicate the validity of the disciplinary proceeding, and thus are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging prison disciplinary procedures are subject to dismissal under Edwards v. Balisok.

Carter v. Jones · filed 2007-03-30

The magistrate judge correctly recommended dismissal of the § 1983 claim, which sought monetary damages for due process violations of prison disciplinary procedures, in accordance with Edwards.

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner to challenge parole procedures when the claim does not seek release or challenge the duration of confinement.

Georgevich v. Strauss · filed 1985-09-05

Since plaintiffs’ claim relates only to process and not to the actual duration of confinement, we hold that it could properly be brought as a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not allow a due process claim when a judgment for the prisoner would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary proceeding.

Curbow v. Jackson · filed 2009-01-21

Curbow’s due process claim is not cognizable in his § 1983 suit because a judgment in his favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity” of his prison disciplinary proceeding.

Section 1983 does not apply to challenges to punishments imposed for prison disciplinary infractions unless the disciplinary conviction has been set aside.

Doyle v. Cella · filed 2009-03-26

Ultimately, Mr. Doyle’s claims amount to challenges to his convictions for violating the Colorado Department of Corrections Code of Penal Discipline (COPD). But, as the district court noted, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is inapplicable to “‘challenges to punishments imposed as a result of prison disciplinary infractions,’” unless the disciplinary conviction has been set aside.

A claim that parole was unconstitutionally denied is not cognizable under § 1983 when barred by Heck and is dismissed without prejudice.

Kilgore v. Neal · filed 1999-02-18

Additionally, the court dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff’s claim that he was unconstitutionally denied parole because it is not cognizable under section 1983 pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), and Crow v. Penry, 102 F.3d 1086, 1087 (10th Cir. 1996). After reviewing Plaintiff’s briefs and the record, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under section 1983. The court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s claim of access to the courts and properly dismissed without prejudice his denial of parole claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for an isolated challenge to a prison disciplinary ruling when the requested relief would undermine a ruling that has not been invalidated.

Evans v. Andrea E. Eldridge, Michael Jackson, Lana K. Podsim, Tony Clemments and Heather Junkermeier · filed 2009-08-13

Evans does not make a “broad due process challenge” to the conditions of confinement; rather, he merely contends that he was deprived of fair hearings in this particular, isolated instance. We therefore conclude that, under the doctrines set forth in Preiser and Alexander, none of Evans’s civil rights claims are cognizable under sections 1983 or 1985 of title 42 of the United States Code.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner's challenge to an isolated disciplinary hearing when habeas corpus is the available remedy.

Evans v. Adrienne Hernandez and Michael Jackson · filed 2011-03-24

We therefore conclude, as we did in Eldridge , that, under the doctrines set forth in Preiser and Alexander , Evans's civil rights claims in this case are not cognizable under sections 1983 or 1985 of the United States Code.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a prison disciplinary decision revoking good-time credits; that challenge must be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Santiago v. Anderson · filed 2012-08-06

Yet that error has little significance because, as the defendants argued in the district court, the loss of good time must be challenged in an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, not a suit under § 1983, Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997).

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek damages or declaratory relief for procedural defects in a disciplinary proceeding when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment.

Swartz v. Co II Velo · filed 2016-04-19

A prisoner cannot pursue a § 1983 claim for declaratory relief and damages based on alleged procedural defects in a disciplinary proceeding that, if successful, would “necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed.”

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek damages for claims that would invalidate a prison disciplinary decision unless that decision has been overturned.

Brown v. Vasquez · filed 2017-10-23

If Brown’s claims are credited, they necessarily imply that the finding of guilt and punishment for his prison violation was invalid. Because Brown has not shown that the disciplinary decision has been overturned, he cannot maintain a § 1983 action for damages.

A prisoner cannot use § 1983 to challenge a disciplinary punishment that affects time served unless the disciplinary adjudication has been invalidated.

Stuckey v. Lemma · filed 2019-09-05

However, Plaintiff has never had the disciplinary adjudication invalidated. Therefore, his § 1983 action is not cognizable in light of Heck and Balisok.

Section 1983 is the proper avenue for a prisoner’s disciplinary challenge when success would not necessarily shorten confinement or reduce the level of custody.

Hash v. Santoro · filed 2020-03-03

In sum, because Petitioner’s success on the merits will not necessarily shorten the duration of his confinement, nor result in a reduced level of custody, he fails to establish grounds for federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Thus, Petitioner’s challenge is more properly brought under section 1983, rather than in habeas.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary proceeding that cost him earned-time credits; he must seek relief through habeas corpus.

Stanton v. Timmons · filed 2021-04-29

It’s apparent from the complaint that Mr. Stanton lost earned-time credits in the disciplinary proceeding, so he can’t challenge it in this civil rights action; his remedy is through habeas corpus.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action for a prisoner challenging a monetary restitution sanction imposed in a disciplinary proceeding.

CARR v. WARDEN · filed 2021-11-02

If Mr. Carr wants to challenge the sanction of paying restitution, he must utilize the proper vehicle to do so by filing a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A prisoner whose disciplinary determination has not been invalidated must waive claims affecting the duration of confinement to pursue a Section 1983 challenge to sanctions affecting conditions of confinement.

Richardson v. Kucmack · filed 2022-03-09

Plaintiff also failed to provide a Peralta waiver indicating whether he waives for all times all claims in this action relating to disciplinary sanctions affecting the duration of his confinement (i.e., the recommended loss of good time) in order to proceed with claims ... challenging sanctions affecting the conditions of his confinement.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce RCRA because RCRA’s comprehensive enforcement scheme precludes that cause of action.

Leland v. Moran · filed 2002-12-16

RCRA’s comprehensive statutory scheme precludes a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 gives public housing tenants a cause of action to enforce their right to a housing authority grievance procedure.

Conway v. Housing Authority of City of Asheville · filed 2002-12-19

The undersigned finds that the Plaintiff has a valid cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Defendants’ failure to provide Plaintiff access to the Housing Authority’s established grievance procedure.

Section 1983 provides a right of action against state officials for violations of rights secured by Section 8 of the Housing Act.

Holly v. Housing Authority of New Orleans · filed 1988-05-04

Accordingly, the Court holds that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Wright, Section 1983 provides Holly with a right of action to redress violations of the Housing Act by state officials.

Section 1983 permits a former prisoner to seek damages for revoked good-time credits when habeas relief is moot because the challenged incarceration has been fully served, even if success would imply that the revocation was invalid.

Nonnette v. Larry Small R. Schelke E. Castro D. Johnson M.A. Corbin J. Builtman · filed 2002-12-26

Does'the unavailability of a remedy in habeas corpus because of mootness permit Nonnette to maintain a § 1983 action for damages, even though success in that action would imply the invalidity of the disciplinary proceeding that caused revocation of his good-time credits? Although the answer is not entirely clear under Heck and its progeny, we join the Second and Seventh Circuits in concluding that, in these circumstances, a § 1983 claim may be maintained.

A former prisoner’s sentence-credit claims require reconsideration under § 1983 when release from prison may have made habeas relief unavailable.

Igbinovia v. Dzurenda · filed 2021-11-18

However, to the extent that the district court dismissed Igbinovia’s due process and Eighth Amendment claims challenging the statutory deductions to his maximum sentences on the ground that they were barred under Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005), we vacate the judgment on these claims because the record shows that Igbinovia is no longer in prison, and thus habeas relief may no longer be available to him. We remand for consideration in light of our decision in Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 877, 878 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiff could proceed with § 1983 action because habeas relief was no longer available).

Section 1983 does not allow a private plaintiff to bring a criminal action for violations of state penal law.

(PC) Kidwell v. Cisneros · filed 2022-03-25

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot bring a criminal action under § 1983 against Defendants for violation of the California Penal Code.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to bring criminal charges through a civil action.

WATSON v. MCPHATTER · filed 2022-02-11

Plaintiff’s desire to convert (A) a civil trial on a single (relatively simple) claim against a solitary Defendant (employed by a municipality), into (B) a sweeping criminal inquisition about far-flung fraud and obstruction of justice via poisoning by a wide-array of state executive and judicial officials, could not possibly justify the Court’s solicitation of free legal representation for Plaintiff, because – as explained in connection with the denial of his Motion for Quasi Criminal Proceeding (Docket Entry 72) – “‘Plaintiff cannot bring criminal charges through a [Section] 1983 action’” (Third Text Order dated Feb. 4, 2022 (quoting Fiore v. Benfield, No. 1:15CV271, 2015 WL 5511156, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2015) (unpublished) (Peake, M.J.), recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Oct. 7, 2015) (Biggs, J.))).

Section 1983 does not authorize dismissal of pending criminal charges.

Mitchell v. East St. Louis Police Department · filed 2021-05-06

Section 1983 does not authorize dismissal of pending criminal charges.

Section 1983 does not authorize a court to impose criminal penalties on defendants through a civil rights action.

Tunsil v. Wolf · filed 2020-02-18

This Court cannot impose criminal penalties on any of the Defendants through the mechanism of a civil rights action, absent actions amounting to contempt of court.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to obtain criminal charges against defendants in a civil action.

Wirfel v. Leahey · filed 2009-11-03

Wirfel also seeks to have criminal charges brought against the judicial defendants. However, such relief may not be obtained in a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim to have another person criminally prosecuted.

Watson v. Winborn · filed 2003-04-22

Watson’s contention that Winborn should have been prosecuted for his behavior is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a private plaintiff to seek the criminal prosecution of defendants.

Hudson v. United States Attorney General · filed 2009-03-05

To the extent that the plaintiff seeks the criminal prosecution of the defendants, his complaint also fails for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon which relief may be granted. Only the federal government can bring a federal criminal prosecution.

Section 1983 does not provide relief in the form of criminal prosecution of defendants.

Fortune v. Domestic Relations York County · filed 2011-07-29

We also agree with the District Court that Fortune‟s request for criminal prosecution of the Defendants is not an appropriate request for relief under section 1983.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires proof that the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; an officer’s failure to discover information undermining a witness’s credibility does not establish that element.

Johnson v. Logan · filed 2018-01-22

Regarding the first element, “[d]ecisions have recognized that a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim might be maintained against one who furnished false information to, or concealed material information from, prosecuting authorities.” ... Because the Officers did not initiate criminal proceedings against Johnson, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on these claims.

Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action for deprivation of federal rights, but does not let a private plaintiff initiate criminal charges.

Padgett v. Wetzel · filed 2019-08-12

Padgett may not use this civil lawsuit as a vehicle for instituting a criminal prosecution against the named defendants.

Section 1983 does not let an individual bring criminal charges or compel a prosecutor to seek prosecution.

Robinson v. Fenner · filed 2020-02-20

However, § 1983 does not provide a mechanism by which an individual may bring criminal charges against another, and it does not provide a mechanism for compelling a prosecutor to seek the prosecution of another.

Section 1983 does not allow a private plaintiff to criminally prosecute anyone.

Stevens v. Norwood · filed 2020-10-28

Plaintiff cannot use Section 1983 to criminally prosecute anyone.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to compel criminal charges against another person.

McCormick v. Hall · filed 2021-12-29

As an initial matter, McCormick cannot use a § 1983 action to require the court or law enforcement authorities to bring perjury charges against anyone.

Section 1983 permits a claim for failure to comply with the knock-and-announce rule.

Battiste v. Rojeski · filed 2003-05-12

A failure to comply with the “knock-and-announce” rule is actionable under § 1983 and is a clearly established right that, if proven, would abrogate qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits Alaska Native villages to sue as parens patriae to enforce their members’ federal rights.

State, Department of Health & Social Services, Division of Family & Youth Services v. Native Village of Curyung · filed 2006-12-15

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the superior court’s ruling that the villages are proper plaintiffs to bring parens patriae claims under § 1983.

An Indian tribe asserting sovereign treaty rights is not a person entitled to sue under Section 1983.

Robinson v. Salazar · filed 2012-01-18

These treaty-based claims do not give rise to actions cognizable under section 1983. As a sovereign, the Kawaiisu is not a “person.” Accordingly, the section 1983 claims against the County of Kern must be dismissed with prejudice.

An Indian tribe cannot use § 1983 to vindicate its sovereign immunity from state court proceedings, including through a parens patriae claim.

Cheyenne & Arapaho Tribes v. First Bank & Trust Co. · filed 2014-02-11

Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of the parens patriae doctrine in order to maintain any § 1983 claims against Judge Haught or First Bank that are directed at the state court action.

Section 1983 permits an Indian tribe to assert rights available to comparable nonsovereign entities, but not rights grounded in tribal sovereignty.

Texas v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo · filed 2019-02-11

If a Tribe could not bring its claim if it were not a sovereign, then the claim should be barred by Inyo County. ... Thus, the Court concludes that Inyo County bars the Tribe from pursuing a § 1983 claim based on this theory.

An Indian tribe is not a person subject to suit under §1983.

Thurmond v. Church · filed 2020-01-30

And an Indian tribe is not a “person” subject to suit under §1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim for an unlawful traffic stop even without racial motivation; the violation is not too minor to support the remedy.

Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach · filed 2003-05-19

We agree with the district court that an unlawful traffic stop, even if not racially-motivated, may give rise to a § 1983 violation. Schreiber's argument that the de minimis doctrine applies here improperly conflates Fourth Amendment and § 1983 doctrines.

Section 1983 permits a claim for an unlawful traffic stop even when the stop was not racially motivated; the violation is not too minor for a Section 1983 remedy.

BINGHAM v. CITY OF MANHATTAN BEACH · filed 2003-08-28

We agree with the district court that an unlawful traffic stop, even if not racially-motivated, may give rise to a § 1983 violation. Schreiber's argument that the de minimis doctrine applies here improperly conflates Fourth Amendment and § 1983 doctrines. Although the Supreme Court has held that some governmental intrusions may be so minor as not to violate the Fourth Amendment at all, see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977) ("There is ... a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned."), it has never held that actions that do violate the Fourth Amendment may result in such little harm that § 1983 is not an available remedy.

Discovery from defendants appealing immunity rulings in a § 1983 suit should remain stayed until those immunity questions are resolved.

McCormick v. City of Lawrence · filed 2003-10-16

As such, it is well settled that discovery should not be allowed from these defendants until those threshold immunity questions are resolved.

Discovery in a § 1983 action may be stayed while the defendants’ immunity remains unresolved.

Pina v. Warden Lewis · filed 2018-04-03

The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting defendants’ motion to stay discovery because the question of defendants’ immunity had not been resolved.

When a defendant moves to dismiss a Section 1983 claim on qualified immunity grounds, discovery generally should be stayed until the immunity issue is resolved.

Rancho del Oso Pardo, Inc. v. New Mexico Department of Game and Fish · filed 2020-07-02

Thus, in general, when a defendant asserts the defense of qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss, the district court should stay discovery until the immunity issue is resolved.

Section 1983 provides an adequate legal remedy for a prisoner's alleged constitutional rights violations by the Department of Corrections.

Reamey v. Terrangi · filed 2003-10-28

If, as alleged by the petitioner, his constitutional rights are being violated by the DOC, the petitioner has a specific and adequate legal remedy for that violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus the petitioner has failed to show that the respondent has a duty which ought to be performed or that the petitioner does not have an adequate remedy at law.

Section 1983 provides an adequate alternative remedy for a public employee alleging discharge in retaliation for First Amendment speech.

Getz v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2002-03-08

In this case, plaintiffs claim is precluded because the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provide plaintiff with an adequate alternative remedy.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for property deprivation when the state supplies an adequate postdeprivation remedy.

Minix v. Stoker · filed 2008-07-21

Minix’s contention that Branham wrongly disposed of his property fails to set forth a valid § 1983 claim because the state of Texas provides an adequate avenue of relief for this claim.

Section 1983 permits a foster child to hold a state official individually liable for an unjustified placement or continued placement made with deliberate indifference to danger the official knew of or would have known of but for that indifference.

Weatherford Ex Rel. Michael L. v. State · filed 2003-12-17

We hold, therefore, that a foster child can establish § 1983 liability against a state official by showing that the official, without justification, acted with deliberate indifference by placing a child in foster care or by maintaining a placement when the official knew that the placement exposed the child to danger or would have known of the danger but for the official’s deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on negligent hiring and supervision of jail personnel when that conduct foreseeably causes a violation of a prisoner’s civil rights.

Hirst v. Gertzen · filed 1982-05-10

Appellants’ offer of proof, in our view, was sufficient to allege a triable issue that the county defendants’ conduct in hiring and supervising their deputies was negligent and created a foreseeable risk that a violation of Hirst’s civil rights would occur, and in fact proximately caused his death.

Section 1983 permits a tenant’s claim against housing authority officials for negligently hiring an employee with a prior record of rape and assault.

PLC v. Housing Authority of County of Warren · filed 1984-06-05

In conclusion, we find that the allegation of negligent conduct on the part of the Authority and its membership in hiring an employee with a prior criminal record of rape and assault is sufficient to state a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 liability for negligent supervision or training requires a deliberate deprivation of constitutional rights; even gross negligence is insufficient.

Williams v. Independent School District No. 5, of Tulsa County, Oklahoma · filed 2021-04-27

Liability under § 1983 must be predicated on a “deliberate” deprivation of constitutional rights and cannot be predicated on negligence, even gross negligence.

In a First Amendment employment retaliation claim under § 1983, liability for the adverse action rests with the final decision-maker.

Johnson v. State of Louisiana · filed 2004-05-05

As to causation, only final decision-makers may be held liable for First Amendment retaliation employment discrimination under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a school district to be held liable for a termination decision made by its final decision maker.

Salge v. Edna Indep Sch Dist · filed 2005-06-13

EISD does not dispute that Wells is a final decision- maker and therefore EISD may be held liable under § 1983 for his decision to terminate Salge.