42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party only if the party conspires with state officials to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Hason v. Tourtellotte · filed 2001-03-28

A private party may only be liable ... under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if that party conspires with state officials to deprive others of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a private employer acting without state authority.

Banks v. Jefferson-Smurfit · filed 2001-12-18

As Defendant is a private employer, § 1983 does not provide Plaintiff with a cause of action against Defendant.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce federal statutes against a private university.

Slovinec v. Depaul University · filed 2003-06-18

DePaul is a private university, so Slovi-nec cannot use 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the approach of Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980), to enforce these federal statutes.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private entity without proof that it acted under color of state law.

Acevedo v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. · filed 2003-10-02

The district court dismissed his suit on the ground that R.J. Reynolds is a private entity, not liable under § 1983 in the absence of proof that the company acted under color of state law. ... Seeing no error in the district court’s analysis, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Section 1983 does not cover claims against purely private parties.

Gordon v. Madison · filed 2004-08-17

To the extent that Gordon’s arguments can be liberally construed as raising a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that he was denied access to the courts, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not cover claims against purely private parties, and, therefore, this also is not a cognizable federal claim.

Section 1983 permits claims alleging unconstitutional age discrimination even when the ADEA provides a remedy for age discrimination.

Bradds v. Marchbanks · filed 2021-01-27

The Court agrees with the now-Chief Judge’s reasoned decision in Crawford and ultimately concludes that the ADEA does not preclude a § 1983 constitutional claim.

Section 1983 permits an equal protection age discrimination claim against state officials despite the ADEA.

Reinebold v. Indiana University at South Bend · filed 2020-12-21

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a civil remedy for constitutional violations—here, alleged age discrimination under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a claim isn’t precluded by the ADEA, see Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 617-18 (7th Cir. 2012), and no one disputes that the two athletic directors here were acting under color of law when they made their decisions for this state university’s hiring committee, see Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014).

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for employment age discrimination because the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for those claims.

GUEVARA v. ELIZABETH PUBLIC SCHOOLS · filed 2019-07-18

Though ESD has not moved to dismiss, Plaintiff’s § 1983 age discrimination claim against ESD is precluded because “Congress intended the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (‘ADEA’)] to be the exclusive remedy for claims of age discrimination in employment.”

Section 1983 permits a distinct constitutional age-discrimination claim alongside an ADEA claim.

Reed v. Garden City Union Free School District · filed 2013-12-16

The Court is guided by the precedent of the Second Circuit, and rejects Defendants’ argument that the § 1983 claim is preempted by Plaintiffs ADEA claim.

Section 1983 does not support an age discrimination claim that merely repeats an ADEA claim without an independent constitutional claim.

Alba v. Housing Authority of City of Pittston · filed 2005-11-23

Likewise, in our case, we agree with Defendants (Doc. 32, p. 12), and we find that Plaintiff Alba has not shown an independent constitutional claim for age discrimination. Plaintiffs § 1983 claim (Count IV of Second Amended Complaint, Doc. 26, pp. 6-7) is simply a re-averment ... of his ADEA claim.

Section 1983 permits an independently grounded equal protection claim alongside an ADEA claim; the ADEA does not automatically preempt it.

Hornfeld v. City of North Miami Beach · filed 1998-11-09

To summarize, an ADEA claim does not automatically preempt a simultaneously pled § 1983 claim.

The ADEA preempts § 1983 employment age discrimination claims based on equal protection.

Migneault v. Peck · filed 1998-10-23

For numerous, well-founded reasons we need not repeat here, both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have concluded that age discrimination claims brought under § 1983 are preempted by the ADEA. ... We therefore adopt the holding and rationale of Lafleur v. Texas Dep’t of Health as the law of this circuit, and hold the clearly established law on this issue operates to defeat Ms. Migneault’s § 1983 claim against Dr. Henney.

Section 1983 permits an employment age discrimination claim alongside an ADEA claim when the Section 1983 claim rests on a substantive right distinct from rights established by the ADEA.

Jungels v. State University College of New York · filed 1996-04-02

In view of the court’s reasoning in Mummelthie, and of the rationale behind the Second Circuit’s holding in Saulpaugh that claims under § 1983 are not precluded by concurrent Title VII claims, this court finds that the ADEA does not preempt concurrent claims of age discrimination in employment under § 1983, when the § 1983 claims are based on substantive rights distinct from those established under the ADEA.

Section 1983 permits a separate equal protection claim for age discrimination that the ADEA does not preempt.

Purdy v. Town of Greenburgh · filed 2001-09-26

Because plaintiff presents a separate, cognizable § 1983 equal protection claim, this Court holds that it is not preempted by the ADEA.

Section 1983 permits an independent constitutional age discrimination claim against a person acting under color of state law despite the ADEA.

Mustafa v. Nebraska Department of Correctional Services · filed 2002-03-06

Accordingly, I conclude that section 1983 claims asserting an independent constitutional claim for age discrimination are not impliedly repealed by the ADEA.

Section 1983 equal protection claims for age discrimination in employment are precluded by the ADEA.

Camacho v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority · filed 2003-03-25

Since the ADEA is the statutory remedy that occupies the field of age discrimination in employment, plaintiffs section 1983 — equal protection claim — is precluded.

Section 1983 permits an Equal Protection age discrimination claim even when the ADEA also applies.

Shapiro v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2008-06-13

This Court agrees that, given the reasoning of Saulpaugh, the effective law in the Second Circuit is that the ADEA does not preempt a § 1983 claim for age discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection clause.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for age discrimination in employment because the ADEA is the exclusive remedy, even when the claim rests on constitutional rights.

Ahlmeyer v. Nevada System of Higher Education · filed 2009-02-18

We choose to follow the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Zombro and hold the ADEA precludes the assertion of age discrimination in employment claims, even those seeking to vindicate constitutional rights, under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims for age discrimination are foreclosed by the ADEA.

Torres-Santiago v. Alcaraz-Emmanuelli · filed 2009-05-22

As an initial matter, Torres-Santiago’s claim of age based discrimination pursuant to section 1983 is foreclosed by the ADEA.

Section 1983 permits an age discrimination claim based on an independent equal protection right despite the ADEA.

Levin v. Madigan · filed 2010-03-10

Based on the legislative history and language of the ADEA, and the statute’s analogy to Title VII, the Court finds that the ADEA does not foreclose Plaintiffs equal protection claim for age discrimination under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an equal protection claim for age discrimination in public employment despite the ADEA’s separate remedy.

Levin v. Madigan · filed 2012-08-17

Although the ADEA enacts a compre- hensive statutory scheme for enforcement of its own statutory rights, akin to Sea Clammers and Rancho Palos Verdes, we find that it does not preclude a § 1983 claim for constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits a nonfederal employee to bring an equal protection claim for age discrimination despite the ADEA.

Edwards v. Borough of Dickson City · filed 2014-01-16

Because the ADEA does not preclude Plaintiffs § 1983 equal protection claim and since Plaintiff has stated a valid § 1983 equal protection claim, Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss will be denied.

Section 1983 permits a distinct equal protection claim based on age discrimination alongside an ADEA claim.

Volpi v. Center Moriches Union Free School District · filed 2014-03-24

The Court is guided by the precedent of the Second Circuit- and rejects Defendants’ argument that the § 1983 claim is preempted by Plaintiffs ADEA claim.

Section 1983 permits constitutional age discrimination claims despite the ADEA.

Crawford v. Columbus State Community College · filed 2016-07-11

To the contrary, plaintiffs may continue to bring § 1983 actions that allege unconstitutional age discrimination.

The ADEA’s enforcement scheme precludes a § 1983 age-discrimination claim.

Patterson v. Rural Water District 2 Cotton County · filed 2020-02-07

Section 1983 cannot be used to vindicate a violation of federal law where Congress has otherwise created a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual § 1983 enforcement. ... On this basis, Plaintiff’s fifth claim for age discrimination under § 1983 is subject to dismissal.

Section 1983 and the ADEA are mutually exclusive routes to recovery for employment age discrimination.

Vernacchio v. Davis · filed 2020-02-11

Liberally construed, the complaint states a cognizable § 1983 claim for an equal protection violation and a cognizable claim for an ADEA violation based on age discrimination. Recovery may be had under only one of those theories because they are mutually exclusive.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate remedy for alleged age discrimination when the ADEA supplies the exclusive remedy.

Faulkner v. Townsell · filed 2020-05-29

The weight of authority suggests that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for alleged age discrimination, not claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for age discrimination alleged under the Equal Protection Clause, even when the ADEA also applies.

Reinebold v. Bruce · filed 2021-11-18

Section 1983, which authorizes suits against state and local officials who violate federally pro- tected civil rights, also provides a civil remedy for age dis- crimination when, as here, a plaintiff alleges age discrimina- tion under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not provide an age-based employment discrimination claim under the Equal Protection Clause because the ADEA supplies the exclusive remedy.

Normore v. Dallas Independent School District · filed 2021-12-08

Simmons correctly contends the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) preempts Normore’s age-based equal protection claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate remedy for workplace age discrimination covered by the ADEA unless the plaintiff pleads facts supporting an independent § 1983 claim.

Montague v. City of Moss Point, Mississippi · filed 2022-03-08

Montague’s allegations raise age discrimination claims that fall squarely within the purview of the ADEA, and as such his § 1983 claims in Count Three are preempted because his pleadings “only allege facts that show a claim for age discrimination.”

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for age discrimination claims covered by the ADEA.

WOOD v. CITY OF WARNER ROBINS GEORGIA · filed 2022-03-31

Nevertheless, as to Defendants’ first argument, the Court agrees that Plaintiff cannot assert an age discrimination claim under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for age discrimination and retaliation claims covered by the ADEA when the facts support no independent Section 1983 claim.

Posey v. City of Moss Point, Mississippi · filed 2022-05-19

Posey’s allegations raise age discrimination and retaliation claims that fall squarely within the purview of the ADEA, and as such his § 1983 claims in Count Three are preempted because his pleadings “only allege facts that show a claim for age discrimination.”

Section 1983 permits retroactive monetary relief when it is incidental to declaratory and injunctive relief.

Velazquez v. State · filed 1996-04-04

Retroactive monetary relief pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see, Deutsch v Crosson, 171 AD2d 837, lv denied 78 NY2d 857) was appropriate because it was incidental to the declaratory and injunctive relief sought (see, Shields v Katz, 143 AD2d 743, 745; cf., Murphy v Capone, 191 AD2d 683, 684-685; Casillas v Perales, 154 AD2d 420; Antonsen v Ward, 943 F2d 198, 203-204).

Section 1983 does not provide monetary relief for exposure to a risk of harm when the plaintiff shows no resulting harm.

Raines v. Lomax · filed 2003-05-05

Raines submitted no evidence that he was harmed by any alleged racial tension in the facility. Further, failure to prevent exposure to the risk of harm cannot provide monetary relief.

Section 1983 does not permit a federal court to grant retroactive relief against a state when the Eleventh Amendment bars that relief.

Nadhum Shashoua, M.D. v. Arthur F. Quern, Director of Illinois Department of Public Aid · filed 1980-01-09

The fact that the plaintiff has posited his cause of action upon section 1983 does not permit the federal court to grant retroactive relief.

Section 1983 claims for compensatory and punitive damages are not barred by the Gillespie rule governing equitable claims about prison conditions.

White v. Epps · filed 2006-07-25

However, White is not seeking equitable relief only, but is also seeking compensatory and punitive damages. To the extent that the district court dismissed such claims pursuant to Gillespie, this was error.

Section 1983 expressly permits monetary relief.

Daker v. Ferrero · filed 2007-02-26

Unlike RLUIPA, § 1983 explicitly provides for an award of monetary relief.

Section 1983 requires allegations connecting a claimed constitutional injury to the policy of an entity sued for that injury.

Ornelas v. Alaniz · filed 2020-08-17

The refusal to timely treat Plaintiff’s detached retina was not traceable to any specific policy by Alaniz, and the original complaint contained conflicting allegations about whether the offending vision policy was traceable to CCCS (the contract medical provider) or CCDC (the jail).

Section 1983 does not make an Illinois county liable under Monell for alleged misconduct by the sheriff’s office when the county does not control that office’s policies or practices.

Fonza v. Will County Jail · filed 2018-01-02

Plaintiff’s allegations in this case are based on alleged misconduct by the sheriff’s office, and therefore the Monell claim against the County will be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits claims against local governments for constitutional violations.

Schofield v. County of Volusia, Florida · filed 1978-09-20

While Schofield’s appeal was pending in this court, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York,-U.S.-, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), which overruled Monroe v. Pape insofar as it held local governments wholly immune from suit under section 1983. In light of Monell, we vacate the district court’s order, remand the cause, and direct that Schofield’s complaint be reconsidered.

Section 1983 requires a consistent and widespread practice of constitutional deprivations to hold a local government liable for an unofficial custom.

Arlanda Arnay Smith v. Mercer · filed 2014-07-14

A plaintiff must identify a “consistent and widespread practice” of constitutional ... deprivations to prove local government liability for an unofficial custom. ... In addition, his claims arise out of a single incident, and any unofficial custom must be “consistent and widespread.”

A § 1983 claim against a municipality requires action under color of law, deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right, causation, and damages.

Brown v. City of Barre · filed 2012-07-12

In order to prevail on a claim against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs must establish (1) actions taken under color of law; (2) a deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; and (4) damages.

Section 1983 requires evidence that an official policy, custom, or decision by a final policymaker caused the alleged violation to hold a governmental entity liable for an employee’s actions.

Leija v. Laredo Community College · filed 2011-04-20

Thus, in order to establish liability on the part of the College for violation of his freedom of worship, Leija was required to present more than a scintilla of evidence that the discriminatory actions of a College employee were representative of an official policy or custom of the College or were made by an official with final policy-making authority.

Section 1983 requires allegations connecting a defendant to the plaintiff’s injury; a claim against a county must identify the policy or custom attributed to it.

Wainscott v. Dallas County, Texas · filed 2011-01-13

To the extent that these allegations describe separate causes of action against Price in his individual and official capacities under § 1983, they do not form a basis for overturning the district court’s dismissal of those claims. Wainscott has not alleged how Price caused his injury. Nowhere does Wainscott establish that either Price or Dallas County had the authority to direct the actions of the Board or a duty to supervise the Board, nor does he describe the alleged “improper policies, customs and practices” that he attributes to Dallas County in his pleadings.

A § 1983 claim against WMATA requires an allegation that the deprivation occurred pursuant to an established WMATA policy or practice.

Dant v. District of Columbia · filed 1987-09-11

The complaint nowhere alleges, however, that Dant was subjected to malicious prosecution and abuse of process pursuant to an established WMATA policy or practice. The complaint thus fails to allege a necessary element of a section 1983 violation, namely, that there be a deprivation of rights “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State____” Cf Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (municipal liability under section 1983 attaches only when deprivations of right occur pursuant to policy).

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for a judge’s personnel decision when the judge’s policymaking authority comes from the state judiciary rather than the county.

Jakomas v. McFalls · filed 2002-10-31

We have no difficulty deciding, under Pennsylvania law, that Judge McFalls was not acting as a policymaker for the County when he discharged his staff. Judge McFalls’ authority to hire, supervise, and discharge his personal employees came from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. It did not — and could not — come from the County because the County has no policy-making authority over the Pennsylvania courts. Accordingly, the § 1983 claims alleged against Allegheny County in Count II of the Amended Complaints shall be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits local government liability when an official policy or custom causes a deprivation of rights.

Herrera v. Medical Center Hospital · filed 2002-08-05

Local government entities may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only for a deprivation of rights inflicted pursuant to an official policy or custom.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation under state authority of a right created by federal law, and permits suits against state political subdivisions and their officials acting within their authority.

Eagle v. Kenai Peninsula Borough · filed 1980-04-30

To establish a claim under § 1983, the claimant must show deprivation under state authority of some right created by federal law. State political subdivisions and their officials, acting within authority, may be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against private parties who act under color of state law by acting in concert with state or municipal officers to deny federal rights.

United States Ex Rel. McClaughlin v. PEOPLE OF ST. OF NY · filed 1973-04-06

Private parties who act in concert with state (or city) officers to deny federal rights are themselves subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... By interposing itself as an agent of a municipality between the defendants and their right to counsel, The Legal Aid Society is so far involved with state action that it should not be immune from suit. Since it is under contract with a subdivision of the state to supply attorneys, it is acting under color of state law even though its individual attorney-employees are not.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a claimed deprivation arising from the ordinary, customary, and uniform administration of a county jail and its internal inmate discipline.

Temple v. Pergament · filed 1964-10-14

There is no showing that he was discriminated against, or suffered deprivation, through state action in the denial of equal protection of the laws in a manner different from the treatment of others similarly situated (42 U.S.C. § 1981, ante.); nor that he was discriminated against, or suffered deprivation, regarding his real or personal property [he merely asserts loss of personal property while in jail caused by “persons unknown”] 42 U.S.C. § 1982, ante; nor that he was deprived of civil rights by being subjected to the ordinary customary and uniform administration of the Atlantic County Jail and the internal discipline of its inmates (42 U.S.C. § 1983) ; nor that a conspiracy by 2 or more persons, to do any or all of the things complained of existed (42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986, ante.).

Section 1983 treats a municipality as a person for purposes of injunctive relief.

Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Mississippi · filed 1971-01-23

Appellees argue that such relief is not possible for tlie Town of Shaw is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This issue, however, has been decided in the case of Harkless v. Sweeney, 5 Cir., 427 F.2d 319. That case held that a municipality is a person under § 1983 for purposes of injunctive relief.

Section 1983 treats a municipality as a “person” for a suit seeking declaratory relief and an injunction.

Melton v. City of Atlanta, Georgia · filed 1971-02-05

This Court is persuaded by the reasoning in Harkless, and holds that the City of Atlanta is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983 for the purpose of a suit seeking declaratory relief and injunction.

Section 1983 permits suits against state and municipal officers acting under color of law for violations of constitutional and federal rights, and official immunity does not bar the claims against these defendants.

Winters v. Miller · filed 1969-11-21

Although Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-192, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) did hold that a city is not subject to suit under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, the case also held, 365 U.S. at 172-187, that police officers, employees of the city, were liable to suit under the act. Officials of state and city hospital systems have specifically been held to have no immunity in suits brought under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 in at least two Second Circuit cases, Birnbaum v. Trussell, 347 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1965) and Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966). ... Official immunity does not extend to the present defendants.

Section 1983 damages liability is barred by derivative immunity when a municipal entity and its chief executive take actions required by an administrative commission’s binding decision.

DeFelice v. Philadelphia Board of Education · filed 1969-12-18

Applying the principles of immunity outlined above to the present case, I have concluded that the defendants are immune from civil liability. It is simply inconceivable that a municipal entity and its chief executive officer could be held liable in damages for actions which the Commission’s decision required them to take.

Section 1983 reaches official conduct taken under color of state law, and for injunctive relief its term “person” includes municipalities and school boards.

Ayala v. District 60 School Board of Pueblo, Colorado · filed 1971-04-19

Since plaintiffs in this action claim that their right to equal protection of the laws has been denied by Colorado officials, acting in their capacities as officials, this court clearly has jurisdiction to hear the constitutional claim and, should plaintiffs be successful, to grant the relief sought. It makes no difference that plaintiffs have not cited a state or local law upon which defendants’ conduct may be based. It is set- ... tied that the phrase “under color of” comprehends all official behavior, even that which is patently unlawful under state, as well as federal, law. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). Furthermore, when the relief sought is an injunction rather than damages, the word “person” in section 1983 has been construed in this circuit and district to include municipalities, Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970), and school boards. School District No. 1 v. Denver Classroom Teachers Association, CA C-1393 (D.Colo., June 3, 1970).

Under § 1983, a supervisor's liability for a subordinate's conduct depends on the supervisor's knowledge and participation, and supervisory and policymaking employees' knowledge may bear on municipal liability.

Crawford v. Dominic · filed 1979-04-26

Under Section 1983 (of Title 42), the extent of supervisors’ knowledge of and participation in the acts of their subordinates determines the scope of their liability for their subordinates’ action.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to prove that the constitutional violation resulted from governmental policy or custom, rather than respondeat superior.

Larson v. Wind · filed 1982-02-22

As to each of the municipal defendants Larson must prove for Section 1983 liability that the claimed constitutional violations by police officers were the product of governmental “policy” or “custom.”

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a person acting under color of state law for deprivation of constitutional rights, but a county's violation of a state statute is not cognizable under § 1983.

Noren v. Straw · filed 1982-03-09

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a person acting under color of state law is liable to any other person who has been deprived of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” A violation by a county of a Montana statute is not cognizable under §. 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits against municipalities and municipal employees for constitutional violations, but legislators are immune from suit for actions within legitimate legislative activity.

Trina Dee, Inc. v. Township of Plainfield (In Re Trina Dee, Inc.) · filed 1982-03-15

The United States Supreme Court examined the common law precedents for immunity and found, “. .. there is no tradition of immunity for municipal corporations, and neither history nor policy support a construction of § 1983 that would justify qualified immunity [for the City of Independence].” ... For these reasons, we find that the Township of Plainfield is not immune from the suit filed herein. ... Defendant Rutt claims immunity because the actions which form the basis of the complaint against him were duties in the course of his official conduct. However, it is this fact which brings his actions within the purview of this Court as establishing the requisite state action element of the § 1983 claim. There is no statutory grant of immunity to a defendant in Rutt’s position; neither is there a common law tradition which would justify extending immunity to him. Various municipal employees in positions analogous to Rutt’s have been held to be liable under § 1983 and we see no distinction between his case and those we are following. ... The Supervisors in the instant case were acting in their legislative capacity in approving the subdivision plan. ... For these reasons, we find that the Supervisors are immune from suit and dismiss the complaint against Elwood Brewer, William Donner, and John A. Hauch.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability without a causal connection between the municipality’s action or inaction and the constitutional deprivation.

Berry v. McLemore · filed 1982-03-08

A municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 absent a causal connection between its action or inaction and the constitutional deprivations visited on the plaintiff.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a deprivation of a constitutionally or statutorily protected interest caused by an official municipal policy, custom, or usage.

Starstead v. City of Superior · filed 1982-03-16

Accordingly, proof of two elements is necessary to establish municipal liability under § 1983: plaintiffs must establish that (1) they have suffered deprivation of constitutionally or statutorily protected interests, and that (2) the deprivation was caused by an official policy, custom, or usage of the municipality.

Section 1983 allows a municipality to be sued only for its own actions and not solely for its employees’ constitutional torts under respondeat superior.

James M. Hearn, Jr., Cross-Appellant v. The City of Gainesville and Richard C. Corriveau, Cross-Appellee · filed 1983-01-31

A municipality can be sued under § 1983 only for its own actions, that is, it cannot be held liable for its employees’ constitutional torts solely under the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when the challenged action implements a county policy, custom, or practice.

Dennison v. Vietch · filed 1983-03-18

Pine County may be liable under § 1983 only if Vietch’s actions may be considered to implement a policy, custom, or practice of the county.

To hold a political subdivision liable under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the unlawful decision was part of a custom or policy.

Morris v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 1983-03-08

In order to impose liability on a political subdivision, as distinct from its employees or officials, a section 1983 plaintiff must also show that the unlawful decision was part of a “custom or policy” of unlawful firings on such grounds.

Section 1983 permits claims against local government entities when a constitutional deprivation is causally linked to a governmental policy or custom, and requires pleading similar incidents beyond a single incident.

Mui v. Dietz · filed 1983-03-16

It is settled that local government entities are “persons” subject to liability under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when a plaintiff can causally link the constitutional deprivation he or she suffered to a governmental “policy” or “custom.” ... Also, a single incident of unconstitutional conduct, allegedly perpetrated to a policy or custom of a government entity, is inadequate to state a cause of action under § 1983. ... Rather, a plaintiff must plead, in addition to a specific incident of misconduct and a governmental policy or custom of perpetrating such wrongs upon persons, the existence of other, similar incidents. ... While it is not necessary to plead the specific details of the similar incidents of misconduct, such similar instances involving either the plaintiff or other similarly situated persons must be pled.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a governmental entity; the entity must cause the constitutional injury through a policy or custom.

Burrell, Jr. v. University of Maine · filed 2000-07-25

First, it is well established that a governmental entity cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability; the governmental entity itself must proximately cause the constitutional injury, through the promulgation (or tacit approval) of a policy or custom.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a governmental entity to plead a policy or custom that caused the rights violation; liability cannot rest solely on respondeat superior.

Eastwood v. North Central Missouri Drug Task Force · filed 2000-04-11

Because Mr. Eastwood failed to plead a policy or custom of the Drug Task Force which violated his constitutional rights and based his § 1983 claim solely on a theory of respondeat superior, he failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a public entity to show that the entity deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right pursuant to its policy or custom.

Griffin v. Triton College · filed 1993-06-04

Under those holdings, in order to bring a § 1983 claim against an entity such as Triton College, a plaintiff must show that the entity deprived him of a constitutionally protected right pursuant to a policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not make a county commission liable for a sheriff’s actions solely because the commission funds the sheriff’s department; liability requires evidence of the commission’s own involvement in the harm.

Oliver v. Townsend · filed 1988-09-30

We hold that the summary judgment in favor of the Winston County Commission was proper, because no evidence was presented to show that any direct actions of the commission proximately resulted in harm to Oliver. ... The plaintiff here showed only that the Winston County Commission funded the sheriff's department. No allegation is made, and no scintilla of evidence was presented to indicate, that the commission had any control over the operation of the department. As we have already stated elsewhere in this opinion, no cause of action against a county commission can be based on a respondeat superior theory that is based on actions of the county sheriff.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality’s discretionary decision not to build a bridge actionable when the municipality owes no duty to the plaintiff to build it.

James M. Dollar and Etta Marie Dollar v. Haralson County, Georgia · filed 1983-05-19

Since the county was under no duty to build the bridge, Commissioner Smith’s administrative decision not to construct it is not compensable under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits against local government bodies; they are not entitled to absolute immunity.

Kurtz v. City of Waukesha · filed 1979-06-29

Local government bodies are not entitled to absolute immunity under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for employees’ actions only when those actions were executed pursuant to a municipal policy or custom.

Gross v. Sizemore · filed 1996-12-17

Municipalities cannot be sued under § 1983 for the actions of their employees or agents unless those actions were executed pursuant to a policy or custom of the city.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom directly causes the alleged constitutional violation.

Hardy v. City of Glendale Officer Dekruff Sgt. Barnes Mr. Peatrowsky Glendale Humane Society Officer Muzquiz Office · filed 1996-12-20

In order to state a claim against a municipality under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation.

In a § 1983 municipal liability claim, the judge identifies the official whose decisions constitute final municipal policy before the case goes to the jury.

Patel v. Penman · filed 1996-12-26

The identification of the official whose decisions constitute final policy is a question of law for the judge to decide before submission of the case to the jury.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice to hold a city liable.

Espinosa v. Moran · filed 1997-01-06

Specifically, the Espinosas have not raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding their § 1983 claim because they have not produced any evidence implicating a policy, custom or practice of the City of Houston as required under Monell v. Dept. of Social Svcs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).

Section 1983 makes a county and its officials acting in their official capacities liable only for constitutional deprivations caused by an official policy or custom.

Haslar v. Megerman · filed 1997-01-06

Our analysis begins with the recognition that liability under § 1983 attaches to governmental entities and governmental officials acting in their official capacity for only those constitutional deprivations that result from the execution of official policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not impose county liability for visitation denials by lower level jail staff who were neither county policymakers nor carrying out county policy.

N.E.W. v. Kennard · filed 1997-01-07

Plaintiffs properly assert that Perry asked for special visits and filed grievances which were denied by lower level staff officers who were not defendants in this case or policy makers for the county. They are not parties to this action. There is no showing they were carrying out or making County policy. Therefore, there is no basis for finding County liability.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only for constitutional violations caused by municipal policies or customs, not vicarious liability for officers’ acts.

Lester v. City of Chicago · filed 1997-01-13

Although a municipality is a “person” under § 1983, vicarious liability is not available under that section. ... Instead, a municipality is liable only for constitutional violations caused by its policies.

Section 1983 requires a close causal link between a municipal policy decision that is not itself unconstitutional and the resulting constitutional violation; mere but-for causation is insufficient.

Jones v. Wellham · filed 1997-01-14

The causation requirement for imposing municipal liability for policy maker decisions not themselves unconstitutional is a stringent one deriving from the necessity to avoid the effective, but forbidden, imposition of vicarious liability on municipalities. ... there must be an "affirmative link" between the policy and the violation; mere but-for causation will not suffice, Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823, 105 S.Ct. at 2436.

A § 1983 claim against a local detention facility requires evidence that a policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Vasquez v. Bexar Cty Adt Deten · filed 1997-01-15

Vasquez failed to present evidence demonstrating a policy or cust om which caused the purported constitutional violations.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality or local governmental department to show that an official policy or custom caused the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Forman v. Richmond Police Department · filed 1997-01-15

In order to pursue a § 1983 claim against a municipality or local governmental department, such as a police department, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have suffered a deprivation of their constitutional rights based on some official policy or custom of the municipality or department.

Section 1983 allows suits against municipalities, but municipal liability requires a policy or custom that caused the constitutional injury.

Kampfer v. County of Fulton, Fulton County Court and Richard Giardino, Fulton County District Attorney, His A · filed 1997-01-15

Moreover, although section 1983 suits against municipalities are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, see Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), such entities "cannot be held liable [under section 1983] unless a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional injury" to the plaintiff.

A city’s five-month delay in stopping an alderman’s sexual harassment does not by itself establish a municipal custom of nonresponse supporting § 1983 liability.

Jarman v. City of Northlake · filed 1997-01-16

Although Northlake’s five-month delay in responding to Jarman’s harassment complaint may not qualify as an “immediate” response so as to insulate the City from Title VII liability, ... we think it is sufficiently responsive to contradict Jarman’s claim that Northlake had a “custom or policy” of nonresponse to harassment complaints. Thus, Northlake cannot be held hable for Dexter’s acts of harassment under § 1983, and its motion to dismiss this claim is granted.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a municipal policy or custom; a policy of withholding bail status until a detainee asks can satisfy that element if proved.

Gaylor v. Does · filed 1997-01-22

We hold that such a policy not to inform detainees of their bail status until they asked, if found to have been followed by Denver, would satisfy the first element for municipal liability -- "the existence of [the alleged punitive] municipal policy or custom." Hinton v. City of Elwood, Kansas, supra, 997 F.2d at 782.

Section 1983 permits liability against a municipality or local official in an official capacity for an injury caused by a governmental policy or custom; a single incident alone is insufficient without proof that an existing unconstitutional policy caused it.

Kessler v. Barowsky · filed 1997-01-29

Proof of a single incident standing alone cannot sustain a finding of municipal or local governmental liability under § 1983, unless there is proof that the incident was caused by an existing unconstitutional policy. ... Lenore did not present evidence of other incidents of excessive force by CRT. Therefore, the trial court was correct in dismissing the § 1983 claims against the county and the sheriff in his official capacity.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality only when the constitutional deprivation occurred pursuant to a governmental policy or custom.

Tyler v. New York · filed 1997-01-29

In order to state a § 1983 claim against a municipal defendant, plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation occurred pursuant to a governmental custom, policy, ordinance, regulation, or decision, whether made by its lawmakers, or by those officials whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.

Section 1983 requires sufficient allegations and evidence of a municipality’s failure to train or supervise before that theory can support municipal liability.

Drake v. City and County of Denver · filed 1997-01-30

Drake’s claims against the City fail because Drake has inadequately alleged, and has presented no evidence to support, his “failure to train or supervise” theory of constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on an official’s policy requires proof that the official had final authority to establish that policy.

Gardner v. VILLAGE OF GRAND RIVER, OH · filed 1997-01-31

Despite his representations to the contrary, Mr. Gardner has not even alleged, much less shown that Sergeant Livingston possessed final authority to establish the “policy” at issue here. Accordingly, Mr. Gardner’s arguments based on Sergeant Livingston’s involvement must fail.

Section 1983 does not make a town liable for the judicial acts of a town judge who lacks municipal policymaking authority.

Estes-El v. Town of Indian Lake · filed 1997-02-04

Therefore, the court concludes that the Town is not responsible for Judge Hutchins’ conduct when he acts in his judicial capacity, as he did in the present case.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a constitutional injury only when an official policy, custom, or pattern caused the injury.

Thomas v. Galveston County · filed 1997-02-04

Although municipalities are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, they may only be held liable if the constitutional harm suffered was the result of an “official policy, custom, or pattern.”

Section 1983 does not make a police chief or city vicariously liable for an officer’s conduct without an independent basis for their liability.

Ed Spence v. Michael South, Police Officer Kunkell, Chief of Police for the City of Exeter Exeter Police Dept. City of E · filed 1997-02-06

Neither Kunkel nor the City would be vicariously liable for South's actions, see Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1977); Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir.1993), and Spence has failed to produce evidence to support an independent basis for their liability.

A governmental entity is liable under § 1983 only when its official policy is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Moore v. City of Creedmoor · filed 1997-02-10

For a governmental entity to be liable under section 1983, the “official policy must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’ ”

Section 1983 imposes municipal liability for an employee’s unconstitutional acts only when those acts directly result from a municipal custom or policy.

Zappala v. Albicelli · filed 1997-02-10

Municipalities are liable for the unconstitutional acts of non-policy making municipal employees only when the employee’s acts are the direct result of a municipal custom or policy.

Section 1983 permits recovery against a city after an individual officer is exonerated only if the plaintiff suffered a constitutional injury.

Milligan v. Nopanen · filed 1997-02-10

In Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 355 (9th Cir.1996), we explained that a § 1983 plaintiff could only recover against a city when the individual officer was exonerated "if the plaintiff established that he suffered a constitutional injury." Id. at 355 (citation omitted). Because the jury found no use of excessive force, Quintanilla precludes recovery against the City of Medford, and the excluded evidence is therefore irrelevant.

A plaintiff suing a municipality under § 1983 must allege or show a municipal practice, custom, or policy that caused the injury.

Manetta v. County of Macomb · filed 1997-02-12

It is well-established that, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim against a municipality must allege or demonstrate a municipal practice, custom, or policy which is a source of the plaintiffs injury.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for unconstitutional actions that implement or execute an officially adopted policy or decision.

Richardson v. Dailey · filed 1997-02-13

For a municipality to be held liable, an action must be taken that unconstitutionally implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or a decision that has been officially adopted and promulgated by the body’s officers.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability for an allegedly unconstitutional arrest absent a constitutional violation by the arresting officer.

Rhomberg v. Wilson · filed 1997-02-18

When a person sues under § 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional arrest, the city cannot be held liable absent a constitutional violation by the arresting officer.

Section 1983 requires a demonstrated basis for holding a county liable as a municipality.

O'Guinn v. County of Santa Clara · filed 1997-02-20

Here, O'Guinn failed to establish a basis to hold the County liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for unconstitutional actions of officers committed pursuant to an official policy or custom.

Wallace v. Estate of Davies Ex Rel. Davies · filed 1997-02-27

Under § 1983, a municipality may be held liable for the unconstitutional actions of its officers committed pursuant to an official policy or custom.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to allege a municipal policy or custom that authorized the challenged actions.

Bodunde v. Mitchell Parizek and Village of Schaumburg · filed 1997-03-05

We also conclude that the district court was correct in its dismissal of the § 1983 claim against the Village due to Bodunde's failure to allege a municipal policy or custom that authorized the actions in question.

A § 1983 claim against a sheriff or county for lacking a written suicide policy requires a link between that omission and the inmate’s death.

Bahner v. Carmack · filed 1997-03-06

Finally, the district court correctly determined that the plaintiffs failed to allege or demonstrate how the lack of any written suicide policy by Carmack or the County contributed to Bahner's death.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or practice to support a damages claim against local officers in their official capacities.

Ippolito v. Meisel · filed 1997-03-10

Because plaintiff has made no allegations, and we see no basis for concluding, that the officers’ allegedly unconstitutional actions constituted a policy or practice of their respective municipalities, plaintiff has not, and apparently cannot state a claim for damages against the individual officers in their official capacities.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for sexual harassment only when the harassment was undertaken pursuant to a municipal policy or custom.

Sharp v. City of Houston · filed 1997-03-11

A municipality, however, cannot be held liable for sexual harassment under § 1983 unless the plaintiff can show that the alleged sexual harassment was undertaken pursuant to a municipal policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a government policy or custom causes the injury.

Wade v. City of Inglewood · filed 1997-03-11

Municipalities can be held liable under § 1983 "when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy" causes the injury.

A § 1983 claim against a city must identify a city policy or custom that violates a constitutional right.

Garrett v. McDougle · filed 1997-03-12

The complaint fails to state a claim against the City of Lebanon for violation of constitutional rights by failing to specify a policy or custom attributable to the City which violates a constitutional right.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a constitutional deprivation results from the municipality’s custom, usage, or policy.

Ridder v. City of Springfield, Clark County, Gene A. Kelly, Roger Evans, Robert Marcum, Ronald Mendah, R · filed 1997-03-13

As to the City of Springfield, a municipality will be liable under § 1983 only if a person was deprived of constitutional rights pursuant to a custom, usage, or policy of that entity.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on municipalities; a municipality is liable only for constitutional violations caused by its policies.

Chapman v. Village of Homewood · filed 1997-03-17

Vicarious liability is not available under § 1983. ... Instead, a municipality is liable only for constitutional violations caused by its policies.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality requires evidence connecting the deprivation to an established governmental procedure or deliberate indifference in police training or supervision.

Taylor v. District of Columbia · filed 1997-03-20

Mr. Taylor failed to sustain his burden with respect to the second element; no testimony was introduced concerning any established procedure of the District. Moreover, there was no showing of deliberate indifference by the District in the training and supervision of its police officers.

Section 1983 does not impose local-government liability based on a Kentucky jailer’s conduct because the jailer lacks final policymaking authority.

Wimberly v. Livy Leavell, Jr. · filed 1997-03-24

A Kentucky jailer does not have final policy-making authority sufficient to subject the government to § 1983 liability.

A township may be liable under § 1983 for a policy or custom that causes a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Dubuc v. Green Oak Township · filed 1997-03-25

Defendants do not make any persuasive argument, however, as to why plaintiff cannot possibly prove that the Township is liable under § 1983 for a policy or custom through which the individual defendants or the ZBA may have acted resulting in deprivation of plaintiffs constitutional rights (i.e., through retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality or its agency liable to show that a governmental policy caused the injury.

Soto v. Schembri · filed 1997-03-28

To find New York City and the Department of Corrections liable under Section 1983, plaintiffs must demonstrate that a governmental policy of discrimination injured plaintiffs.

Section 1983 municipal liability claims are subject to ordinary notice pleading, with no heightened pleading standard.

Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest · filed 1997-03-28

We are mindful that our conventional system of notice pleading applies to § 1983 actions against municipalities and that there is no heightened pleading standard in these cases.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to show that a municipal policy or custom caused a constitutional deprivation.

Craddock v. Harris County Texas · filed 1997-04-01

In order to establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal policy or custom caused a constitutional deprivation.

A Section 1983 claim against a county or officials in their official capacities requires an alleged or shown governmental custom or policy causing the constitutional violation.

Korkowski v. Clancy · filed 1997-04-04

Further, we agree with the district court that the Fourth Amendment claim against the County and the individual defendants in their official capacities fails because the Korkowskis did not allege or show the existence of a governmental custom or policy of violating citizens' Fourth Amendment rights during the execution of search warrants.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability when the officers committed no constitutional violation.

Estate of LaFazio v. City of Ft. Bragg · filed 1997-04-04

Because we conclude that the officers did not commit any constitutional violations, there can be no municipal liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 makes a county liable for a constitutional violation only when it results from a county custom or policy.

K.F.P. v. Dane County, a Body Corporation Richard Raemisch, Dane County Sheriff John Does and Jane Does 1-10, Dane Count · filed 1997-04-04

Counties are liable under section 1983 only if the alleged constitutional violation results from a custom or policy, see Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); see also Pembaur v. Cincinnati 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (municipal liability for decisions of policy makers).

A county or sheriff’s department cannot be liable under § 1983 without evidence that its policy or custom caused a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Moisescu v. Harris County Texas · filed 1997-04-07

Even if the sheriff’s department is amenable to suit along with the county, see Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 1992), Mr. Moisescu cannot recover from either institutional defendant under § 1983. He has made no effort to present evidence of a policy or custom that caused a deprivation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impute a school board member’s independent assault outside his official duties to the school board.

Piwonka Ex Rel. Piwonka v. Tidehaven Independent School District · filed 1997-04-15

Assuming that the alleged assault took place, it seems axiomatic to the Court that Dr. Devant clearly acted outside the scope of his official duties on the school board, and such independent action cannot impute to the school board. As a school board member, in no way was Dr. Devant authorized to employ the use of force in discharging any of his duties.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on a custom requires a permanent, well-settled practice; isolated incidents in one case do not suffice.

Roach v. City of Evansville, Evansville Police Department by Art Gann, in His Official Capacity · filed 1997-04-16

Like the district court, we find that no reasonable jury could infer from these isolated incidents, both occurring in the same case within a very short span of time, that the City was engaged in a permanent and well-settled practice of depriving residents of their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for isolated incidents of correctional officer misconduct.

Franklin v. District of Columbia · filed 1997-04-16

While the plaintiffs have identified several disturbing incidents involving correctional officers, in particular Corporal Harper, these isolated incidents are not sufficient to establish municipal liability.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must allege that a municipal policy or custom caused the harm.

Mulleneaux v. State · filed 1997-04-22

It follows that at a minimum the pleading must allege that a municipal policy or custom was responsible for the harm. The amended complaint failed to meet this liberal pleading requirement.

Section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability and requires proof of an official policy or custom to hold a government department liable.

Kipkirwa v. Santa Clara County Probation Dept. · filed 1997-04-25

However, because respondeat superior liability is not cognizable under section 1981 and 1983, see Fed'n of African American Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1215-16 (9th Cir.1996), and because Kipkirwa failed to provide evidence beyond his mere allegations that showed that the Probation Department had an official policy or custom of discrimination, see Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Fed'n of African American Contractors, 96 F.3d at 1215-16, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Probation Department for the section 1981 and 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom to be the moving force behind a civil rights violation before the municipality can be held liable.

Semple v. City of Moundsville · filed 1997-04-28

Finally, and in the alternative, assuming that plaintiffs have shown that they have been wrongfully deprived of a constitutionally protected interest, this Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to show that this wrongful deprivation stems from a City of Moundsville custom or policy. As previously discussed, in order to impute liability upon a municipality for a civil rights violation, it must be shown that a municipal policy or custom must be the “moving force” behind the violation.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory or municipal liability premised on officers’ conduct when the officers committed no constitutional violation.

Forrett v. Linford Richardson, Terry Frizell Ronald O. Loveridge Jack Clarke · filed 1997-04-28

Because we conclude that the officers did not violate Forrett’s constitutional rights, neither Richardson nor the City can be liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 imposes municipal liability for an employee’s constitutional violation only when the injury results from a municipal policy or custom.

Avello v. Hammons · filed 1997-04-29

Rather, to establish a municipality’s liability based on the actions of its employees, a Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he suffered a constitutional injury and (2) that the injury resulted from a policy or custom of the municipality.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely because its employee committed a tort; respondeat superior does not apply.

Sudul v. City of Hamtramck · filed 1997-04-29

Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be premised upon more than a municipal employee's status as a tortfeasor. Further, a municipality cannot be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.