42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a Title VII charge to identify the date, place, and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Dunn v. McDonough · filed 2026-01-06(b)

“Such a ‘charge’ must include the ‘date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice.’” Id. at 567 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). ... Most obviously, Dunn failed to exhaust her claims of race discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a discrimination charge to be in writing and under oath or affirmation; a preliminary inquiry does not qualify as a formal charge.

Affrunti v. Long Island University · filed 2005-06-22(b)

Affrunti’s effort to convert the initial inquiry she made to the Nassau County Commission on Human Rights in October 1997 into a formal charge is unavailing. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (“Charges shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires.”

An intake questionnaire may satisfy the charge-filing requirement if it manifests an intent to activate the discrimination complaint process.

Barclay v. Amtrak · filed 2004-11-08(e)

Whether an intake questionnaire qualifies as a “charge” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)’s filing requirement is an open question in this circuit. ... I cannot say that under no set of facts could such a questionnaire manifest an intent to activate the ADA’s machinery. Therefore, plaintiffs ADA claim must survive the motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e-5(a) requires an aggrieved person to file a charge under oath with the Commission to invoke its enforcement procedures.

Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. · filed 1967-11-01(a)

This court concludes that the filing of a verified charge with the Commission is necessary to invoke the statutory enforcement procedures. The complaint herein is fatally defective because it fails to allege that the complaint filed with the Commission was under oath.

Section 2000e-5(a) accepts a sworn letter stating the substance of an alleged discriminatory practice as a charge.

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 5 v. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commiss · filed 1968-07-24(a)

In our opinion, Carl’s letter of August 12, 1965, duly sworn to and stating the substance of the alleged discriminatory practice, met all requirements of Section 706(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(a).

Section 2000e-5(e) allows persons named as similarly aggrieved in another person's EEOC charge to sue without filing separate charges.

Antonopulos v. Aerojet-General Corporation · filed 1968-10-28(e)

I have concluded that where, as here, someone has filed a charge with the EEOC containing the names of other persons similarly aggrieved, it is not necessary that those persons named file separate charges as a prerequisite to bringing a civil suit.

Section 2000e-5(a)'s oath requirement for an EEOC charge is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a civil action.

Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Company · filed 1968-10-17(a)

We are of the view that the district court was in error in holding that its jurisdiction to entertain the suit depended upon whether the charge of discrimination filed with the Commission was under oath.

Subsection 706(d) permits a formal charge that cures defects in a timely informal charge to relate back to the original filing date.

Georgia Power Company v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1969-06-10(d)

Therefore, the formal charge relates back to the date of the original charge.

Section 2000e-5(a) requires a person initiating an EEOC charge, whether for himself or a purported class, to be aggrieved by the alleged employment practice.

Graniteville Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1969-10-01(a)

Section 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-5(a) provides that charges may be brought by a person claiming to be aggrieved, thereby initiating Commission action under Title VII. ... Price then has no standing to initiate Commission activity under the Act.

A charge filed within the required period may be verified later; the oath need not accompany the initial filing.

Blue Bell Boots, Inc., Formerly J. W. Carter Company v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1969-10-28(a)

Accordingly, courts have consistently held that a charge filed within ninety days of an alleged unfair practice need not be accompanied by the oath of the complainant. Sworn verification may occur later.

Section 2000e-5(a) requires the Commission to furnish respondents with a copy of a charge, but its failure to do so does not bar a private action.

Holliday v. Railway Express Company, Inc. · filed 1969-12-08(a)

Likewise, the statutory failure of the Commission to serve charges on the defendants should not bar the plaintiff’s action.

Section 2000e-5(a)’s oath requirement is waived when the EEOC acts on and processes an unsigned discrimination charge.

Russell v. American Tobacco Company · filed 1973-01-18(a)

The Commission’s decision to act on and process an unsigned letter alleging discrimination constitutes a waiver of the “under oath” verification requirement.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires charges to be under oath or affirmation, and a charge that is never sworn to leaves the court without jurisdiction over an enforcement suit.

Stewart v. Core Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1978-10-05(b)

It follows that if a charge is never sworn to then jurisdiction is lacking in any enforcement proceedings.

Section 2000e-5(b) allows an EEOC charge to be filed on behalf of an aggrieved person; that person need not file the charge personally before suing.

Eichman v. Indiana State University Board of Trustees · filed 1979-04-25(b)

Title VII does not require that as a prerequisite to suit an individual alleging discrimination must first file a complaint with the EEOC. ... Since Thomas Eichman was named in William Sands’ complaint as a person aggrieved by the University’s retaliatory actions, (and the EEOC apparently deemed him a person aggrieved), we hold that the jurisdictional prerequisite was satisfied and the district court erred in dismissing the complaint on that ground.

Section 2000e-5 allows an EEOC charge filed on behalf of an aggrieved person to satisfy the charge prerequisite to that person's Title VII suit.

EICHMAN v. INDIANA STATE UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES · filed 1979-05-09(b), (f)(1)

Title VII does not require that as a prerequisite to suit an individual alleging discrimination must first file a complaint with the EEOC. Instead, the statutory language speaks of a charge filed "by Or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved" (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)) (emphasis added), and states that a civil action may be brought "by the person claiming to be aggrieved" (§ 2000e-5(f)(1)). Since Thomas Eichman was named in William Sands' complaint as a person aggrieved by the University's retaliatory actions, (and the EEOC apparently deemed him a person aggrieved), we hold that the jurisdictional prerequisite was satisfied and the district court erred in dismissing the complaint on that ground.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an individual claimant to file an EEOC charge before a court can hear the Title VII claim.

Taylor v. Teletype Corp. · filed 1979-08-29(f)(1)

These parties might have had a claim for pre-1974 discriminatory demotion, but it would have to be an individual claim, and the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide it, because neither Mr. Donley nor Mr. Kennard ever filed a charge before the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). The Donley and Kennard claims are therefore also dismissed with prejudice.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits a person to file an EEOC charge on behalf of aggrieved individuals.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1980-03-26(b)

A charge may be filed with the EEOC “by or on behalf of a person” allegedly aggrieved by unlawful employment practices. ... Here, the charging party has satisfied the requirements of this Section with respect to more than 20 allegedly aggrieved persons.

Section 706(e) requires a timely EEOC charge before a private Title VII action.

Guardians Ass'n of New York City Police Department, Inc. v. Civil Service Commission of New York · filed 1980-07-25(e)

The filing of a timely charge with the EEOC is a prerequisite to a private action under Title VII.

An organization’s EEOC charge can satisfy Title VII’s filing requirement for a class action without a duplicate charge from each class representative.

League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Salinas Fire Department · filed 1980-08-19(e)

Duplicate administrative filings are unnecessary as far as Title VII’s purposes are concerned once the organization’s charge has notified the employer of the claim and brought the EEOC into the process.

Section 2000e-5(b) allows a defective EEOC charge to be cured by later verification when the delay does not prejudice the employer.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. · filed 1980-11-07(b)

For these reasons, we hold that the initially defective charge against Sears was cured by Brown’s verification of the charge on September 11, 1973, in his capacity as a de facto Commissioner.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a charge to be in writing under oath or affirmation; the notice of the charge must include the date, place, and circumstances of the alleged unlawful practice.

Shell Oil Co. v. United States EEOC · filed 1981-09-22(b)

As per 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), only notice of the charge must include the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice. The rule only requires that charges be in writing under oath or affirmation and contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires.

Section 2000e-5(b)’s oath and affirmation requirement requires more than routinely inserting a date into an EEOC charge.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. K-Mart Corp. · filed 1981-10-27(b)

As this court reads the oath and affirmation requirement, it requires more than a simple pro-forma insertion of a date in order to satisfy the requirements of Section 706(b).

Section 2000e-5(e) treats a timely charge filed with the EEOC on a person's behalf by a third party as a charge under the section.

Davis v. United States Steel Corp. · filed 1981-11-10(e)

Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) requires the filing of “a charge under this section” within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful practice occurred.” The Court has little difficulty deciding that the third party charge filed February 26, 1979 is a “charge under this section.” The section does not appear to distinguish between a charge filed by a person or a charge filed on his behalf by a third person, and both types of charges are accepted by the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a later EEOC charge alleging related discrimination to amend an earlier charge and relate back to its filing date.

Lois M. WASHINGTON, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. the KROGER COMPANY, Appellee/Cross-Appellant · filed 1982-02-10(e)

When plaintiff did file a second charge of discrimination with the EEOC, it was properly treated by the District Court as an amendment of the first charge. The second charge reiterated the claim of denial of opportunity to perform “checker” duties and also alleged discrimination in discharge which arguably grew out of Kroger’s refusal to assign plaintiff to a checker/clerk position.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires an EEOC charge to give meaningful notice of when the alleged discrimination occurred; inserting Title VII’s effective date without a factual basis does not suffice.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. C. A. Norgren Co. · filed 1982-03-10(b)

Such a pro forma insertion of the Act’s effective date does not give any meaningful notice of the time when the claimed violations allegedly occurred, and therefore I hold that it fails to comply with the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e~5(b).

Section 2000e-5 permits judicial claims rooted in the same basis of discrimination specified in an EEOC charge, even when the complaint alleges additional aspects of that discrimination.

Jones v. METRO. DENVER SEWAGE, ETC. · filed 1982-04-26

Suffice it to say that where judicial claims are rooted in the same basis of discrimination specified in the charge ( i.e., race, sex, national origin), the court may consider them, notwithstanding the fact that additional aspects of that basis of discrimination are alleged in the complaint.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 300-day period is measured from the original EEOC charge when a later, sufficiently related charge qualifies as an amendment.

West v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. · filed 1982-04-05(e)

Despite the apparent narrowness of the first EEOC charge, and the contrasting breadth of the second, I am satisfied that the second one is sufficiently related to the first to qualify as an amendment within the purview of the above-cited regulatory section. Accordingly, to whatever extent the 300-day backward reach becomes significant, that period should commence on January 8, 1973.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires an EEOC charge to state the dates and circumstances of alleged unlawful practices with a factual basis.

Shell Oil Co. v. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1982-04-28(b)

In addition to requiring a charge to contain the date of the alleged unlawful practices, section 706(b) requires a statement of the circumstances of the alleged unlawful practices. As with the date requirement, we read this to require the statement of circumstances to be supported by some factual basis.

Section 2000e-5(b)’s charge verification requirement is nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable considerations.

Margaret PRICE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1982-09-27(b)

Given our decision that the verification requirement is non-jurisdictional, and therefore subject to equitable considerations, we perceive a triable issue of fact with respect to a possible EEOC waiver of that requirement.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a charge to give a factual basis for the dates of alleged unlawful practices, and the charge’s sufficiency is determined from its face.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. K-Mart Corp. · filed 1982-12-08(b)

We agree that the date requirement of section 706(b) is not satisfied merely by including the effective date of Title VII in the charge. ... We hold that the sufficiency of a charge under section 706(b) and 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1601.12(a)(3) should be determined from the face of that charge.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires an EEOC charge to identify when the alleged unlawful practices occurred, and the charge’s sufficiency is determined from its face.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. K-Mart Corp. · filed 1982-12-08(b)

We hold that the sufficiency of a charge under section 706(b) and 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)(3) should be determined from the face of that charge. That neither the original charge nor the amended charge fulfilled the requirements of section 706(b) could and should have been determined from the face of these charges.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires an administrative charge to conform to the EEOC’s required form; a letter the EEOC neither treats nor processes as a charge does not satisfy that requirement.

Bennett v. Russ Berrie and Co., Inc. · filed 1983-06-17(b)

The letter of February 26, 1981 from plaintiff’s counsel to the EEOC, contrary to the requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), was in no way in conformance with the form required by the Commission. The letter was not treated by the EEOC as a charge of discrimination, was not processed or investigated by the EEOC and no notice was ever given to defendant Russ Berrie that a charge of discrimination had been filed against it by Bennett.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a charge to identify the date of the alleged unlawful practice; its oath requirement supports a presumption that the Commissioner selected the date in good faith.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Petitioner-Appellee, v. A.E. STALEY MANUFACTURING CO., Respondent-Appellant · filed 1983-07-01(b)

The “date” element of § 706(b) is an important statutory requirement. ... We note further that “the Commissioner’s good faith is presumed because of § 706(b)’s oath or affirmation requirement.” ... In this case, the bare, unsupported allegations of Staley’s counsel that the EEOC had a policy of inserting pro forma the effective date of the Act did not overcome the good faith presumption accorded the Commissioner’s selection of a date for the charge.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires an EEOC charge to be sworn and to give notice of the date, place, and circumstances of the alleged discrimination, without detailed factual or statistical pleading.

Valley Industrial Services, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1983-07-07(b)

The EEOC charge fully satisfies the pleading requirements of the statute and regulations, which are neither onerous nor hypertechnical. ... The charge was sworn under oath and gives due notice of the date, place and circumstances of the alleged illegal conduct.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a commissioner’s charge to be in writing under oath or affirmation before the EEOC begins the investigation at issue.

In Re EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Petitioner · filed 1983-07-11(b)

While tax investigations may be begun at the discretion of the Service, see I.R.C. § 7602 (1976), the kind of EEOC investigation at issue here may be begun only upon the issuance of a charge “in writing under oath or affirmation” by one of the commissioners.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not provide federal jurisdiction over a Title VII claim when the plaintiff has not alleged presenting the claim to an administrative agency.

Knauth v. North Country Legal Services · filed 1983-10-17(f)(3)

In this instance, however, the court is not faced with a plaintiff who filed late, but a plaintiff who has not alleged presenting his claim to the administrative agencies at all. Under the circumstances, the Title VII claim is so implausible, foreclosed and devoid of merit as to fall outside the ambit of federal court jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5 requires an EEOC charge before suit; an uncharged class member cannot take over as sole representative when the original plaintiff cannot continue the action.

Wakeen v. Hoffman House, Inc. · filed 1983-12-13(e), (f)(1)

The enforcement provisions of Title VII require an aggrieved person to file a written charge with the EEOC as a condition precedent to seeking judicial relief. ... We hold, therefore, that a class member who does not meet the procedural prerequisites for waging a Title VII suit may not use the guise of a motion to intervene to take over as the sole class representative for someone who initiates but is not legitimately able to continue a class action.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires factual or statistical support for the date and circumstances stated in an EEOC charge.

Dresser Industrial Valve Operations v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1984-01-09(b)

In sum, a charge which does not contain factual or statistical information to support the use of the July 2, 1965 date or the statement of circumstances fails to comply with Section 706(b) as amended and 29 C.F.R. 1601.12(a)(3).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge; an employer’s participation in EEOC proceedings does not waive a defense that the charge was late.

Flowers v. Abex Corp. · filed 1984-02-15(e)

Flowers’ EEOC charge thus was untimely. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Flowers’ only argument for relief from the limitation period is that Abex participated in the EEOC proceedings and thereby submitted to the jurisdiction of the EEOC. Flowers cites no authority for the proposition that participation in EEOC proceedings can waive a defense based on untimeliness, and the court believes that such a rule would be detrimental, discouraging reconciliation any time there may be a timeliness defense.

Section 2000e-5 requires an aggrieved person to file an EEOC charge before seeking judicial relief; a class member who has not filed one cannot take over as sole representative after the original plaintiff’s claim is dismissed.

Wakeen v. Hoffman House · filed 1984-02-02(e), (f)(1)

The enforcement provisions of Title VII require an aggrieved person to file a written charge with the EEOC as a condition precedent to seeking judicial relief. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e), (f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(b) requires an EEOC charge to describe the alleged discriminatory practices generally, without setting out detailed supporting facts before an investigation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Appleton Electric Co. · filed 1984-02-29(b)

Accordingly, a charge need not set forth in detail specific underlying facts. ... It is sufficient if it describes generally the allegedly discriminatory practices of an employer.

A timely filed Intake Questionnaire can constitute a Title VII charge when it identifies the parties and generally describes the alleged discrimination; a later formal charge can cure a missing verification.

Casavantes v. California State University, Sacramento · filed 1984-05-09(e)

We are thus led to the inescapable conclusion that the completed Intake Questionnaire, in the context of both the amendment procedures and the liberality to be ascribed to the procedural requirements, is sufficient to constitute a charge.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s deadline for filing an EEOC charge is nonjurisdictional and may be waived or equitably tolled.

John J. JONES, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. CITY OF SOMERVILLE Et Al., Defendants, Appellees · filed 1984-06-01(e)

Filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to sue in federal courts. ... Rather, it is a requirement which may be waived or tolled for equitable considerations.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination; a later amendment adding a claim relates back only if that claim is like or reasonably related to the original charge.

Rizzo v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. · filed 1985-01-11(e)

Section 2000e-5(e) provides: “A charge under this section shall be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred____” ... Thus, Rizzo’s October 11, 1983 amendment can relate back to her initial April 27, 1983 charge only if her sex discrimination charge “is like or reasonably related” to the allegations contained in her initial April 27, 1983 charge. ... Therefore, because Rizzo’s untimely amendment fails to fit within the exception outlined by the applicable E.E.O.C. regulations, her sex discrimination charge is barred.

Section 2000e-5(b) gives the EEOC discretion to set the information required in a charge, permitting identification of the affected persons after filing.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Appellant, v. BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION, Appellee · filed 1985-06-26(b)

Section 706(b) of Title YII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982), provides that charges “shall be in writing under oath or affirmation.and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires.” In exercising the wide discretion given to it by Congress, the EEOC issued the regulation appearing at 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7(a). The Commission interprets that regulation to permit supplying identification information after the filing of the complaint. That strikes us as a reasonable interpretation.

A related EEOC charge considered during the investigation can amend an earlier charge and relate back to its filing date for Title VII’s filing period.

Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. · filed 1985-07-10(e)

The Court concludes that Schneider’s complaint was amended. This conclusion is based on (1) the complaints subsequently filed with the EEOC; (2) the attorney’s letter to the EEOC, and (3) the EEOC’s consolidation of the actions. Because the amendment relates back to the original complaint, October 19, 1976 constitutes the filing date for the entire class in Avagliano.

An EEOC intake questionnaire and accompanying note that are not signed under oath do not count as a discrimination charge.

Sparkman v. Combined International · filed 1988-08-05(b)

Because a complainant who files an EEOC intake questionnaire does not sign such a document under oath, the questionnaire does not qualify as a charge under Title VII. ... Similarly, the handwritten note that Sparkman submitted with her questionnaire does not constitute a formal charge because the note, like the questionnaire, was not signed under oath. Therefore, although Sparkman submitted a questionnaire to the EEOC within the 300-day period, she failed to file a formal charge before the statute of limitations ran.

A timely unverified charge may be cured by a later verified charge that relates back under the EEOC regulation when the employer alleges no prejudice.

Harold PETERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF WICHITA, KANSAS, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1989-12-27(b)

Accordingly, we uphold application of the relating-back provision of the regulation at issue when, as here, the defendant has alleged no prejudice arising from its operation.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits an attorney to file an EEOC discrimination charge on behalf of an aggrieved person.

Montgomery v. Atlanta Family Restaurants, Inc. · filed 1990-12-04(b)

Although defendant makes an issue of the fact that the original correspondence was not plaintiff’s but her attorney’s, Title VII provides that a charge of discrimination may be filed on behalf of any person claiming to be aggrieved.

An EEOC intake questionnaire that identifies the parties and describes the alleged discrimination can constitute a charge if later amended to include a signature and oath.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc. · filed 1991-02-19(b)

Because a writing which suffices as a “charge” was filed within the statutory time limitations, and properly amended to include a signature and oath, the EEOC’s suit is not barred as untimely.

Section 2000e-5(b) allows a timely intake questionnaire that is later verified to constitute a charge in some circumstances.

Philbin v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease · filed 1991-04-05(b)

We find the reasoning of the circuit courts of appeals persuasive, and hold that an intake questionnaire which is later verified may be sufficient to constitute a charge in some circumstances.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a written, verified charge, but verification after the 300-day filing period may relate back to a timely intake questionnaire that served as a charge.

Philbin v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc. · filed 1991-04-05(b)

While the statute does require that a complainant verify a charge, the statute does not require that the verification take place prior to the expiration of the 300-day time period. The EEOC’s interpretation of the statute as allowing technical amendments to relate back to the date of filing is not unreasonable.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely discrimination charge; an intake form did not satisfy that requirement where no formal charge followed and the Union lacked notice within 300 days.

Sanders v. Culinary Workers Union Local No. 226 · filed 1992-02-11(e)

No formal charge was ever filed by Sanders against the Union which could be deemed to relate back to the intake form, and the Union did not have notice of the claim until after the expiration of the 300 day limit.

A missing verification may be cured by an amendment that relates back to the EEOC charge’s original filing date.

Crites v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. · filed 1992-04-03(b)

Although Crites's November 7 letter was not under oath, EEOC regulations provide that amendment may be allowed to cure technical defects in a charge, including the failure to verify the charge, and that such amendments will be deemed to relate back to the original filing date. ... In light of this regulation and Crites's diligence in promptly complying with EEOC instructions, we find her charge timely and therefore remand for further proceedings on the merits of Crites's Title VII claim.

A Title VII charge is timely under § 2000e-5(e) when a discriminatory act occurs within the applicable 300-day filing period.

Palmer v. Barry · filed 1992-07-15(e)

Here, the only issue open for consideration on remand is whether plaintiff proved that any discriminatory act against him occurred within the 300-day period preceding the filing of his charge with the EEOC. Since, on remand, it is reaffirmed that plaintiff suffered discrimination between August 22 and August 30, 1985 and thus within the statutory limitations period, his complaint was timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars a Title VII hiring claim when the employee files an EEOC charge more than 300 days after the hiring decision.

Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs · filed 1992-07-17(e)

Plaintiff further admits that she did not file a charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC until April 4, 1990, more than 300 days after Joyce was hired. American League 3(g) Stmt. ¶ 5. Accordingly, any claim Plaintiff might have arising from the Joyce hiring is time-barred, and the American League is entitled to summary judgment.

An intake questionnaire that does not substantially comply with Section 2000e-5(b)'s charge filing requirements cannot support relation back of a later charge to make it timely.

Hadley v. Midland Steel Products Donald Deleon · filed 1993-11-18(b)

Hadley's intake questionnaire does not substantially comply with the charge filing requirements of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(b). Thus, his late charge did not relate back and amend the intake questionnaire so as to constitute a timely charge.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires an EEOC charge to be verified; an unverified charge cannot be amended to cure that defect after the EEOC closes its file and the claimant files suit.

Balazs v. Liebenthal · filed 1994-08-19(b)

Thus we conclude that a reasonable construction of the EEOC's regulation would simply allow charges to be verified and to relate back only so long as the charge is a viable one in the EEOC's files, but that where, as here, a right to sue letter has issued, a suit has been instituted and the EEOC has closed its file, there is no longer a charge pending before the EEOC which is capable of being amended.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a charge to be in writing under oath or affirmation; a signed declaration under penalty of perjury satisfies that requirement without notarization.

Howard v. Board of Educ. Sycamore Dist. · filed 1995-02-08(b)

That document contains the following statement in the lower left-hand corner: “I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.” This is followed immediately by plaintiffs signature. ... Rather, Illinois merely requires a written charge under oath or affirmation, 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(A)(l), as does Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Therefore, the Board’s argument in this regard, while bordering on the frivolous, is at the very least without merit.

An affidavit and Intake Questionnaire filed with the EEOC can satisfy the charge requirement under § 2000e-5.

Howze v. Polytechnic · filed 1995-07-12(b), (e)(1)

On June 16, 1992, plaintiff alleges that she filed an affidavit and Intake Questionnaire with the EEOC. This is sufficient to satisfy the charge requirement found in 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e-5(b), (e)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge before suing; an intake questionnaire does not serve as a charge notifying defendants.

Vakharia v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital & Health Care Centers · filed 1996-03-07(f)(1)

Congress directs that a party suing for discrimination must file charges with the EEOC before proceeding with a Title VII or ADEA claim in federal court. ... The court finds that this questionnaire does not serve as a “charge” for purposes of notifying Defendants. ... Accordingly, Vakharia has not complied with the EEOC requirements in filing her Title VII and ADEA charges against any Defendant except the hospital.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires an EEOC charge to be verified before the EEOC issues a right to sue letter for the charge to support a Title VII lawsuit.

Danley v. Book-Of-The-Month Club, Inc. · filed 1996-04-19(b)

We agree with the reasoning and conclusions of these cases and hold that a private litigant cannot maintain a Title VII claim where his or her EEOC charge was not verified prior to the EEOC’s issuance of a right to sue letter. When the EEOC has issued its right to sue letter and closed its file, it is not possible for a plaintiff to verify a previously unsworn charge.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a verified charge; an unverified letter does not satisfy that requirement, and a verified charge filed after suit cannot cure it.

Poteat v. Mack Trucks Incorporated, and Robert Walthall · filed 1997-01-28(b)

There is no question but that the December 2, 1992 letter from Poteat's lawyer to SCHAC did not satisfy the basic requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). ... It was unverified, the untimely verified charge could not relate back, and suit was filed before Poteat became entitled to a right-to-sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a written charge under oath or affirmation, though some procedural defects may be excused; an unsigned note that was never verified or produced was not a valid charge.

Munns v. Raytheon Services Nevada, Inc., a Delaware Corporation John Does 1 Through Xx, Inclusive, Roe Corporation · filed 1997-01-06(b)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) mandates that charges are to be "in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires." These requirements are not absolute and, in certain circumstances, discrimination complaints may be valid even though they do not meet all the statutory or regulatory requirements. Despite the liberality to be applied to the procedural requirements of discrimination charges, this court declines to find that an unsigned, handwritten note that was not subsequently verified by the agency and never produced to the district court constitutes a valid charge.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an ADA plaintiff to name each defendant in the EEOC charge before suing that defendant.

Boden v. U.S. Amada Ltd. · filed 1997-06-11(f)(1)

Prior to bringing an ADA action, Plaintiff must satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite of filing a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC which identifies each named defendant as a respondent.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 300-day filing deadline can be satisfied by a timely EEOC intake questionnaire that the EEOC treats as a charge and the complainant later verifies.

Halas v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1997-12-12(e)(1)

Despite defendant’s persuasive argument, this court finds that plaintiffs timely filing of the EEOC questionnaire satisfies the 300-day requirement.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a Title VII administrative charge to be verified under oath or affirmation; an unverified intake questionnaire does not qualify.

Shempert v. Harwick Chemical · filed 1998-07-31(b)

Intake Questionnaires which are neither signed under oath nor verified do not satisfy the statutory requirement for an administrative charge.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a Title VII administrative charge to be in writing under oath or affirmation; an unverified intake questionnaire is not a valid charge.

Shempert v. Harwick Chemical Corp. · filed 1998-07-31(b)

The verification requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), as construed by this circuit, requires us to hold that Shempert's Intake Questionnaire did not constitute a valid charge under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires an EEOC charge to be made under oath or affirmation; an unsworn letter is not a valid charge.

Chappell v. School Board of the City of Virginia Beach · filed 1998-07-20(b)

However, the law is clear that the filing of a sworn charge of discrimination with the EEOC is a mandatory prerequisite to the validity of the charge.

A supplemental Title VII charge can satisfy the charge content and notice requirements by identifying the type of discrimination, the alleged harasser, and an approximate time period.

Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College · filed 1998-08-19(b)

The allegation in the supplement, though sparse, identifies the type of discrimination complained of, the alleged harasser, and an approximate time period, and thus is minimally sufficient to satisfy the requirements for the contents of a charge of discrimination and the purposes of the notice requirement.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits an initially unverified written charge to be completed by a later sworn charge that relates back to the original filing date.

Forehand v. Westinghouse Savannah · filed 1999-07-20(b)

We find that the documents Forehand submitted to the EEOC on March 25th were sufficient to constitute a valid charge in conjunction with the formal charge she filed on May 20th and the amendment and relation-back provisions of the EEOC regulations.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires an EEOC charge to be verified before a plaintiff may bring a Title VII suit.

Vason v. City of Montgomery, Ala. · filed 2000-03-10(b)

Section 2000e-5(b) plainly requires that EEOC charges be verified. Vason has failed to comply with this clear requirement. All courts which have considered the issue since Congress made this a requirement in 1972 have held that verification is an absolute condition precedent to suit. This court agrees. Accordingly, the court finds that all conditions precedent to suit under Title VII have not been satisfied.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a plaintiff 180 days to file an EEOC charge when the relevant state or local agencies lack jurisdiction.

Minott v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey · filed 2000-10-17(e)

In this case, the applicable time period is 180 days because neither the New York nor New Jersey state anti-discrimination agencies have jurisdiction over the Port Authority.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires an EEOC charge to be made under oath or affirmation.

Vason v. The City of Montgomery · filed 2001-01-29(b)

We agree with these circuits and hold the statute mandates that charges be made under oath or affirmation.

A sworn EEOC charge questionnaire filed within 300 days satisfies the filing deadline when the EEOC treats it as a charge and notifies the employer.

Preus v. Dominick's Finer Foods · filed 2001-01-17(e)(1)

But attorney Fail-man’s able response to Dominick’s motion has attached a photocopy of EEOC’s Charge Questionnaire that Preus had filled out and signed “under penalty of perjury” on August 20, 1999, well within the prescribed 300-day period. And that EEOC submission by Preus was followed promptly by EEOC’s assignment of a number to that charge (No. 210994357) and by its September 15, 1999 transmittal of a Notice of Charge of Discrimination to Dominick’s Director of Employee Relations Travis Clemens. As appointed counsel Fairman has pointed out, in this Circuit that sequence of events fully satisfies the statutory 300-day requirement.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an individual to file an EEOC charge within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Bolden v. Bell Dairy Prod Inc · filed 2001-01-22(e)(1)

Also, the pleadings indicate that the statute of limitations has expired in this case. According to a letter attached to Bolden’s pleadings, in which the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) dismissed his complaint, he was terminated on February 22, 1998. However, as is set forth in the letter, he did not file his complaint with the EEOC until August 13, 1999, over 200 days after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, which requires an individual to file a charge within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(e)(1); Washington v. Patlis, 868 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1989).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1), as incorporated into the ADA, gives a plaintiff 180 days to file an EEOC charge, or 300 days if the plaintiff filed a charge with a state agency.

Palummo v. St. Vincent's Medical Center · filed 2001-02-21(e)(1)

Under the ADA, a plaintiff must file an EEOC charge within 180 days unless she has filed a charge with a state agency, in which case the time limit is 300 days. ... Because the plaintiff did not file a charge with the appropriate New York agency, the time limit under the ADA is 180 days.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a timely charge that indicates an intent to invoke Title VII’s enforcement process; an intake affidavit that does not show that intent is insufficient.

Scruggs v. University Health Services · filed 2001-01-30(e)(1)

A charge still must indicate an intent to activate Title VII’s machinery. The Clark case does not validate the HRC intake affidavit.

A Title VII charge may be constructively filed with the EEOC through an agency with actual or apparent authority to accept it, and allegations of a timely constructive filing can defeat dismissal.

Veronda v. California Department of Forestry & Fire Protection · filed 2001-03-21(e)(1)

Our circuit, and other circuits, have held that an employee may constructively file an EEOC complaint with an agency with actual or apparent authority to accept the complaint, and such a filing constitutes an administrative filing with the EEOC. ... Because the allegations demonstrate that Veronda may be able to establish the timely, constructive filing of an administrative complaint with an agency with actual or apparent authority to accept EEOC complaints, the district court erred in dismissing Veronda’s district court complaint.

An unsworn EEOC complaint may count as a timely Title VII charge when it is later verified and the EEOC treats it as a charge, even if the EEOC acts only after verification.

Linton v. City of Marlin · filed 2001-04-30(e)(1)

Our previous cases holding such unsworn claims to be “charges” have been limited to situations where the EEOC treated the unsworn statement, supplemented by a sworn statement outside the limitation period, as a charge by initiating an investigation and notifying the defendant. ... This at the very least creates a fact issue as to whether the EEOC considered the letter to be a “charge” within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(b) did not treat the intake questionnaire in this case as a validly filed Title VII charge.

Pijnenburg v. West Georgia Health System · filed 2001-07-05(b)

We simply hold that under the facts of this case, the questionnaire filed here did not meet the requirements for a validly filed charge.

A verified EEOC intake questionnaire containing basic charge information can satisfy the charge filing deadline when the circumstances show the filer intended to start the administrative process.

Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corporation · filed 2001-10-22(e)(1)

In sum, we hold that a verified intake questionnaire that includes the basic information suggested by 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a) may constitute a charge for purposes of the Title VII statute of limitations when the circumstances of the case would convince a reasonable person that the charging party manifested her intent to activate the administrative process by filing the intake questionnaire with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a person seeking relief for employment discrimination to file a charge with the EEOC or, in a deferral state, a state agency.

Townes v. Finkelstein · filed 2001-11-13(e)(1)

Plaintiff does not allege that she filed a charge with the EEOC or with the MCHR. Therefore, the court finds that Plaintiff has failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Act.

Section 2000e-5(b)'s oath or affirmation requirement is satisfied when a discrimination charge is signed and dated under penalty of perjury.

Fultz v. B.A. Mullican Lumber & Manufacturing Co. · filed 2002-03-01(b)

Fultz complied with the statute by signing and dating the charge underneath the perjury language, again as prescribed. Therefore, this court finds that for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, Fultz has filed a valid charge of discrimination under oath or affirmation, thus giving this court jurisdiction over the subject matter of the charge.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days; a questionnaire and sworn affidavit can constitute a charge against an employer when they identify a claim against it.

Climer v. W.C. Bradley Co. · filed 2002-03-07(e)(1)

It is well settled that in order to obtain judicial consideration of a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must first file an administrative charge with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. ... The Court therefore finds that the intake questionnaire and accompanying affidavit submitted by Plaintiff to the EEOC in this case constituted a valid charge against W.C. Bradley. ... Consequently, since no valid charge was filed with the EEOC against Integra within 180 days, summary judgment is appropriate in favor of Integra.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) bars Title VII claims based on discriminatory acts occurring more than 300 days before an EEOC charge is filed.

Bliss v. Rochester City School District · filed 2002-03-28(e)(1)

It is axiomatic that allegations of discrimination occurring more than 300 days prior to the date a charge is filed are time-barred under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII claimant to file a timely administrative charge before bringing suit.

Garcia-Figueroa v. Rico · filed 2002-05-14(e)(1)

To seek recovery for her Title VII claims, Garcia was required to file administrative charges prior to filing suit. In this case, neither the Amended Complaint nor any of its attachments indicate that Garcia filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC prior to filing the present lawsuit. As a result, Garcia may not pursue a Title VII hostile work environment or retaliation claim in this lawsuit based on the Amended Complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to file an EEOC charge before bringing a Title VII action.

Romney v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2002-05-20(f)(1)

In fact, the filing of charges with the EEOC is a condition precedent to the commencement of a Title VII action (see 42 USC § 2000e-5 [fl [1]; Cornwell v Robinson, 23 F3d 694, 706).

A sworn EEOC questionnaire setting out a discrimination claim can satisfy § 2000e-5’s 300-day charge filing requirement, and a later formal charge can cure defects by relating back.

Thompson v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York · filed 2003-01-23(b), (e)

Certainly, then, plaintiff complied with the requirements that a “writing, under oath or affirmation ... containing] such information ... as the [EEOC] requires” be filed within 300 days. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), (e). ... In this case, I conclude that the timely-filed questionnaire, which was signed by plaintiff under declaration of perjury, constituted a charge of discrimination as required by Title VII. ... I hold further that to the extent there were any defects in the form of the questionnaire (which was an EEOC form), those defects were cured by the formal charge filed on October 27, 2000, which related back to the date the first questionnaire was received.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a timely EEOC charge; the continuing violation doctrine does not make an untimely discrete discriminatory act actionable.

Molina v. Los Angeles County · filed 2003-02-27(e)(1)

Assuming the 300-day period, incidents occurring before December 11, 1999 cannot be the basis for liability. Ms. Molina cannot rely upon the continuing violation doctrine to render untimely asserted discrete discriminatory acts (such as a denial of a promotion) actionable.

In a deferral state, an EEOC charge filed within 300 days of the adverse act is timely when the state agency has waived its initial 60-day exclusive processing period.

Sifferman v. BOARD OF REGENTS, SOUTHEAST MISSOURI · filed 2003-03-11(e)(1)

Because the MCHR has waived its exclusive jurisdiction to investigate charges for the first 60 days under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), the University's argument that the charge of discrimination was untimely filed with the EEOC lacks merit. I find that Sifferman's EEOC charge was properly filed within 300 days of the last promotion denial on February 1, 2000.

A Title VII plaintiff cannot rely on an EEOC charge filed by someone in a separate lawsuit when no plaintiff in the current suit filed a timely charge.

Brewton v. City of Harvey · filed 2003-09-30(e)(1)

The Seventh Circuit has never applied the single filing rule to allow piggybacking onto a timely-filed EEOC charge in a separate law suit, and Judge Moran in Zuckerstein expressly held that “at least one complying plaintiff must be a party to the suit.” 663 F.Supp. at 574 (emphasis added). Because none of the plaintiffs party to this suit have timely filed a charge with the EEOC, their Title VII claim (Count III) is dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days, or within 300 days if the plaintiff first files with a state agency in a deferral jurisdiction; pursuing an employer’s internal grievance process does not toll the deadline.

Hendricks v. Illinois Department of Human Services · filed 2003-11-03(e)(1)

A Title VII plaintiff must file an EEOC charge within 180 days of an alleged employment practice, unless the plaintiff first files with a state agency in a deferral jurisdiction, in which case the plaintiff has 300 days to file the charge. ... An employee’s pursuit of her claim through her employer’s internal grievance process, however, does not toll the limitations period. ... Hendricks’s EEOC charge was not filed within 300 days of the disputed hiring, and the district court properly granted summary judgment on the failure-to-promote claim.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the last alleged unlawful employment practice, extended to 300 days if the complainant first initiates state or local proceedings.

Carey v. Milwaukee Board of School Directors · filed 2003-11-03(e)(1)

In order for a claim under the ADA to be timely, it must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the last alleged act of unlawful employment practice; this period is extended to 300 days if the complainant initiates proceedings first with the appropriate state or local agency. ... Even if we assume that she did not discover her injury (the loss of her *494job) until the later date of December 1998, her filing with the EEOC in May 2000 was untimely because it came well over 300 days later.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s EEOC charge-filing deadline is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.

Stoling v. Arkadelphia Human Development Center · filed 2003-11-18(e)(1)

Filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to initiating a Title VII action in federal court, but it is a requirement—like a statute of limitations—that is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) sets a 300-day EEOC charge filing period for ADA claims in New York; older acts remain barred when the continuing violation doctrine does not apply.

Wisneski v. Nassau Health Care Corp. · filed 2003-12-09(e)(1)

Accordingly, in light of the reasons discussed above, the Court will not consider ADA allegations regarding events that occurred beyond the 300 day limitation provided in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge to be filed within 300 days after the challenged decision is communicated to the employee, even if its effects occur later.

Curby v. Solutia, Inc. · filed 2003-12-15(e)

The district court properly dismissed this claim because the statute of limitations had run. Curby learned she would not get the position on May 20, 1999, but did not file her charge of discrimination until over a year later on May 30, 2000.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires an aggrieved person to file a written, sworn EEOC charge before bringing a Title VII suit.

Castillo v. Norton · filed 2003-12-18(b)

Under Title VII, as a precondition to litigation, a “charge” must be filed with the EEOC by a person aggrieved by an unlawful employment practice. The charge “shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a discrimination charge to be in writing and made under oath or affirmation; an unverified intake questionnaire does not satisfy that requirement.

McCall v. Board of Commissioners of County of Shawnee · filed 2003-10-10(b)

The questionnaire she submitted was not verified, as it was not signed under oath. We do not believe that the submission of this document is sufficient to constitute exhaustion of administrative remedies for the purposes of Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits a timely discrimination charge that lacks verification to be verified later; the initial omission does not bar a suit when the charge gave adequate notice.

McWilliams v. Latah Sanitation, Inc. · filed 2005-08-23(b)

Accordingly, when, as here, the charge provided a sufficient description of the factual allegations to put the employer on notice and allow the administrative agency to conduct a complete investigation of the charges, the initial failure to verify does not prejudice the employer and should not be fatal to the employee’s later filed lawsuit.

Section 2000e-5(b)’s charge verification requirement is subject to waiver when an employer receives the charge and responds to its merits before the EEOC without raising the lack of verification.

Buck v. Dist · filed 2006-06-30(b)

Accordingly, we hold that where, as here, an employer has actual notice of a discrimination charge and chooses to respond to the merits of the claim before the EEOC without asserting lack of verification as a defense it waives its right to secure dismissal of the federal court proceedings on that basis.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires an EEOC charge to be in writing under oath or affirmation; evidence that a signed, notarized charge was filed can defeat summary judgment based on an unsigned copy in the EEOC’s records.

Houston v. Army Fleet Services, L.L.C. · filed 2007-06-18(b)

EEOC regulations require an EEOC charge to be signed and verified. ... For this reason, the Court cannot find that the facts and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Houston, establish that he failed to file a properly verified charge.

Section 2000e-5(b) gives the EEOC broad discretion to set the content and form of a discrimination charge.

Jones v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2007-09-13(b)

Under the relevant statutory provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), the EEOC has broad discretion to determine the content and form of a charge.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) permits timely EEOC intake materials to count as a charge when they satisfy charge-content requirements and show an intent to initiate the administrative process.

White v. Mortgage Dynamics, Inc. · filed 2007-12-20(e)(1)

The Court concludes that although the Charge of Discrimination was filed outside the statutory period, the intake questionnaire and other supporting documents, which included the basic information as required by 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12, does constitute a “charge” for purposes of Title VII and the ADEA because its content satisfied the statutory and regulatory requirements for what information must be included in a charge. Also, Plaintiff manifested her intent to initiate the administrative process by filing her materials with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful termination.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires an EEOC charge to be verified under oath or affirmation; an uncorrected failure to verify the charge supports summary judgment.

Doss v. City of Savannah · filed 2008-03-28(b)

Federal law requires that such charges be in writing under oath or affirmation. 42 USC § 2000e-5 (b). Summary judgment is proper where a plaintiff fails to properly verify her charge and does not attempt to amend the charge to correct this error, even if the EEOC issues the plaintiff a right-to-sue letter. ... The defendants were therefore entitled to summary judgment on this basis.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a charge within 300 days in a deferral state; intake forms can qualify as a charge when they allege discrimination, name the employer, and request EEOC action.

Carson v. Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. · filed 2008-11-19(e)(1)

Under the Holowecki standard, Mr. Carson’s intake forms constitute a charge.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 300 days of an alleged unlawful employment practice when a state or local agency is authorized to seek relief.

Vaughn v. Louisville Water Company · filed 2008-11-24(e)(1)

Accordingly, Vaughn’s claims that she did not receive the Survey and Easements process owner position in 1996, was paid less than Eiler as a result of his promotion, and did not receive the same overtime pay as other exempt male employees, are time-barred because they occurred more than 300 days before Vaughn filed her EEOC charge.

In a non-deferral state, a Title VII charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the discriminatory act.

Gray v. Vestavia Hills Bd. of Education · filed 2008-12-02(e)(1)

Gray filed her EEOC complaint on April 13, 2005. Thus, to be timely, the acts of which Gray complains must have occurred on or after October 15, 2004. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109, 122 S.Ct. at 2070. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it adopted the magistrate’s finding that the claims involving acts before then were time-barred.

A completed EEOC Charge Questionnaire can satisfy Title VII’s charge-filing requirement when it enables the agency to act, even without an express request for action.

Beckham v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. · filed 2008-12-10(e)(1)

Moreover, where no timely charge is subsequently filed, a completed Charge Questionnaire will — and in this case did — activate the agency’s machinery and remedial processes irrespective of whether agency action had been directly requested.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a plaintiff to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice; missing that deadline bars a subsequent Title VII suit.

Crayton v. Alabama Department of Agriculture & Industries · filed 2008-12-18(e)(1)

Thus, if a plaintiff fails to file an EEOC charge before the 180-day limitations period, the plaintiffs subsequent lawsuit is barred and must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives employees in Puerto Rico 180 days to file an EEOC retaliation charge because the local labor agency lacks jurisdiction over those claims.

Velez v. MARRIOTT PR MANAGEMENT, INC. · filed 2008-12-22(e)(1)

Therefore, claims for retaliation must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days from the events complained of.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a claimant to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the allegedly unlawful employment practice.

Clayton v. Pennsylvania Department of Welfare · filed 2008-12-22(e)(1)

Title VII requires a claimant to file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the allegedly unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). ... This was a discrete employment decision, about which Dr. Clayton complained to his superiors but did not file a timely EEOC complaint.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within the applicable 180- or 300-day period; earlier discrete acts cannot be pursued through a later timely charge.

Jackson v. City of Chicago · filed 2009-01-13(e)(1)

The acting-up decisions were discrete acts which could be considered only if they occurred within the appropriate time period covered by his EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge when the claimant files a discrimination charge with a state or local agency that enforces its own anti-discrimination laws.

DeSouza v. EGL Eagle Global Logistics LP · filed 2009-01-26(e)(1)

Connecticut has its own anti-discrimination agency, the CHRO, with which the Plaintiff filed a discrimination charge. Thus, the 300-day limitation applies to the Plaintiffs claims here.

An EEOC filing can count as a Title VII charge when it provides the required information and reasonably requests agency action; the EEOC need not have treated it as a charge.

Semsroth v. City of Wichita · filed 2008-12-22(b)

With respect to the third factor, we now make plain that we do not require evidence that the EEOC actually treated a filing as a charge to construe that document as such.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires an EEOC charge to be verified while it remains pending before the EEOC; an attorney’s signature alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Hugh T. Butler, Sr. v. Greif, Inc. · filed 2009-04-08(b)

Here, Butler’s attorney’s signature did not constitute a verification. The deadline to verify the EEOC charge was while the charge was pending before the EEOC. Butler, though, did not verify it until after the EEOC had dismissed his case.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s filing deadline can be met by a timely EEOC charge questionnaire that identifies the parties and generally describes the alleged discrimination.

Hodge v. United Airlines · filed 2009-10-26(e)(1)

Hodge’s Charge Questionnaire satisfies this standard. Because that Charge Questionnaire was filed within 300 days of his termination, the Court shall deny United’s motion to dismiss Hodge’s Title VII claims as untimely.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a charge to be in writing under oath or affirmation; a court assesses those requirements on the face of the charge.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Schwan's Home Service · filed 2010-06-30(b)

The Amended Charge therefore complies with the writing and oath requirements, and the Court declines to engage in any further factual inquiry to verify the allegations in the Amended Charge.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 300-day deadline for an ADA charge can be satisfied by an intake questionnaire and factual statement that comply with EEOC regulations and reasonably request agency action.

Johnson-Parks v. D.C. Chartered Health Plan · filed 2010-05-25(e)(1)

The papers plaintiff submitted on August 4, 2006 not only comply with the pertinent regulations, but may also be reasonably construed as a request for agency action. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that the submissions the plaintiff made to the EEOC on August 4, 2006, constitute a written charge of disability discrimination, and that the charge was timely filed before the 300-day limitations period had expired.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a timely EEOC charge; an untimely charge bars a Title VII discrimination claim.

Farier v. City of Mesa · filed 2010-06-21(e)(1)

Farier’s claim of discrimination in 2003 was time-barred because he did not file a timely claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) sets a 300-day EEOC charge filing period for the discrete incidents at issue.

Sallis v. Aurora Health Care, Inc. · filed 2010-06-23(e)(1)

As for the remaining claims, not only did she fail to include any of them in her EEOC charge, but most of them arise from discrete incidents that took place well outside the 300-day filing period.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory conduct.

Emmons v. City University of New York · filed 2010-07-02(e)(1)

Emmons filed her administrative charge with the EEOC on July 22, 2008, meaning that any Title VII claims concerning acts that occurred prior to September 26, 2007 are time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 300-day filing period bars a discrimination claim when the EEOC charge is filed too late.

Fulcher v. City of Wichita · filed 2010-07-19(e)(1)

Alternatively, the court concluded that any claim of discriminatory discipline was time-barred; based on undisputed evidence, Mr. Henderson’s last discipline occurred in 2004, well before the 300-day filing period applicable to his EEOC charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (setting forth 300-day limitations period); Nat’l R.R. Pass. Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002) (noting a claim is time-barred if it is not filed within the limits of § 2000e-5(e)(1)). ... As we cannot improve upon its persuasive reasoning, we affirm the district court’s decision for substantially the same reasons expressed therein.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a timely EEOC charge; missing the applicable filing deadline bars recovery for the alleged discrimination.

Albizu-Rodriguez v. Carlos Albizu University · filed 2010-08-09(e)(1)

Timeliness requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) is mandatory and failure to file within the time period means the potential plaintiff loses the ability to recover for the alleged discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(b)’s charge-verification requirement may be waived when an employer responds to the charges on their merits during the EEOC process without objecting.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. JBS USA, LLC · filed 2011-06-09(b)

Therefore, the Court holds that the “technical” verification requirement, like the requirement of timely filing, may be waived under certain circumstances and is not a jurisdictional prerequisite.

A later verified EEOC filing can amend an earlier filing to cure its failure to satisfy the verification requirement for a Title VII charge.

Williams v. CSX Transportation Co. · filed 2011-06-28(b)

For the technical purpose of verification, we conclude that Williams’s second filing amended — and verified — her first filing.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a discrimination charge to be in writing, under oath or affirmation, and to contain the information required by regulation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Schwan's Home Service · filed 2011-07-13(b)

To be valid, a charge of individual or systemic discrimination must meet the statutory requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 67. The statute requires only that the charge be in writing, under oath or affirmation, and contain the information dictated by the Code of Federal Regulations.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a discrimination charge within 180 days in a non-deferral state; an intake questionnaire can qualify as a charge when it clearly requests agency action.

Street v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2011-09-28(e)(1)

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs Intake Questionnaire met the purposes of the statutory standards and administrative requirements and was a clear request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the employee’s rights. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs discrimination claims under Title VII and the ADA as untimely is DENIED.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII charge to be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged practice, or within 300 days if the plaintiff first began state agency proceedings.

Ernandez v. Lynch · filed 2011-10-12(e)(1)

A plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination claim under Title VII must exhaust his or her administrative remedies by complying with the procedural requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. Those requirements include filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, or, if the plaintiff initially instituted proceedings with a state agency, within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a timely discrimination charge; a verified charge and questionnaire can count as filed even if the EEOC cannot locate them or assign a case number.

Kelly v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. · filed 2011-12-05(e)(1)

Although the third charge, which was dated August 31, 2007, is the only one marked received and assigned a case number, Kelly’s prior verified charges and questionnaires were sufficient to constitute a filed charge of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an administrative discrimination charge to be filed within 300 days of the adverse employment action.

Ross-Caleb v. City of Rochester · filed 2011-12-15(e)(1)

Because there is a 300 day limitations period for filing an administrative complaint of discrimination, and because this court may not consider claims of discrimination that were not timely filed or tolled, the court must determine whether or not Mr. Desardouin filed his discrimination complaint with the EEOC within the 300 day limitations period for filing such complaints. ... Because Mr. Desardouin’s employment was terminated in May, 2007, his EEOC complaint filed in September, 2008, was untimely.

When a charge is also filed with a state or local agency, § 2000e-5(e)(1) gives the claimant 300 days to file an EEOC charge, measured from the charge’s filing date.

Clemmons v. Hawaii Medical Services Ass'n · filed 2011-12-29(e)(1)

However, following the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l), the court uses the filing date as the operative date.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a claimant 300 days to file an EEOC charge where a state or local agency can grant relief, and 180 days otherwise.

Robles v. Cox & Co. · filed 2012-01-10(e)(1)

Because New York has its own anti-discrimination laws and enforcement agency, the statute of limitations for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC is 300-days after the alleged occurrence of an unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a claimant in a jurisdiction with a fair employment practices agency 300 days to file an EEOC charge for each discrete discriminatory act.

Featherston v. District of Columbia Superior Court · filed 2012-01-17(e)(1)

Therefore, in this case, any ADA claims concerning discrete discriminatory acts that occurred more than 300 days before plaintiff filed her charge are presumptively time-barred, but any ADA claims concerning discrete acts that occurred 300 or fewer days before plaintiff filed her charge are timely.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff in the District of Columbia to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment action.

Musgrove v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2012-01-31(e)(1)

Musgrove’s hostile work environment claim under Title VII is barred by her failure to timely exhaust her administrative remedies. In the District, a plaintiff must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 300 days “after the alleged unlawful employment action occurred.”

Section 2000e-5 requires a written, verified discrimination charge, but an agency’s mistaken filing instructions can excuse failure to verify an amendment.

James v. Sutliff Saturn Inc · filed 2012-03-15

By complying with those instructions, James satisfied the statutory policy of providing the PHRC with an opportunity to reconcile the grievance. He should not be penalized for the PHRC’s error. On these facts, we conclude that James’s failure to verify the amendment does not bar his disability discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a Title VII charge to be verified.

Ahuja v. Bae Systems Information Solutions, Inc. · filed 2012-04-16(b)

Unlike the ADEA, which was the statute at issue in Holowecki, Title VII requires a charge to be verified.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires verification of an EEOC charge, but the requirement is not jurisdictional and may be forfeited when the EEOC and employer proceed without objecting.

Perkins v. Federal Fruit & Produce Co. · filed 2012-03-22(b)

The verification requirement is directly analogous to the timely filing requirement and is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII suit. ... As in Buck, I conclude that these circumstances amount to a forfeiture by the EEOC and Federal Fruit to enforce the verification requirement.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires an EEOC discrimination charge to be in writing under oath or affirmation; an unverified attorney letter does not qualify as a charge.

Lara v. Raytheon Technical Services Company, LLC. · filed 2012-05-17(b)

A charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC must be in writing under oath or affirmation. ... The letter from Lara’s attorney to the EEOC did not meet these verification requirements and thus does not constitute an EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1), incorporated into the ADA, requires a timely EEOC charge; an intake questionnaire seeking information rather than agency enforcement does not satisfy that requirement.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Summer Classics, Inc. · filed 2012-06-12(e)(1)

Thus, prior to filing a claim for discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Id. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1626.7(a). Failure to file the charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice bars the claim. ... The only reasonable reading of Mr. Lowe’s questionnaire is as a request for information and answers about his rights, rather than a demand for agency enforcement. Id.

Section 2000e-5 requires a private Title VII plaintiff to file a timely EEOC charge before suing.

Chin v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey · filed 2012-07-10(e)(1)

As a prerequisite to filing suit under Title VII, a private plaintiff must first file a timely charge with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1).

An EEOC intake questionnaire can count as a charge when it identifies the employer, alleges discrimination, and reasonably requests agency action.

Leftwich v. Gallaudet University · filed 2012-07-19(f)(1)

These allegations are reasonably interpreted as requests for the EEOC to “activate its machinery and remedial processes,” and are therefore “charges.”

An informal letter can count as a Title VII charge when it asks the EEOC to begin its remedial process.

Thomas v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2012-12-06(e)(1)

The language that plaintiff included in his letter indicating that he wanted to file a complaint based on race, national origin and age discrimination and that he was "filing th[e] complaint" at that time "in order to observe the statute of limitation[s] of 180 days and accelerate the process" would lead an objective observer to conclude that he was requesting that the agency activate its machinery and remedial processes.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a Title VII charge; an intake questionnaire that does not request EEOC action does not qualify as one.

Merchant v. Prince George's County · filed 2013-05-31(b)

Thus, even crediting Plaintiffs contention that she filed her intake form in October 2011, that filing cannot be deemed a charge.

An ADA intake questionnaire must be verified to qualify as an EEOC charge; a later verified charge does not cure that defect if it alleges a new discriminatory act rather than elaborating the original allegations.

Chesnut v. Ethan Allen Retail, Inc. · filed 2013-09-20(b)

Chesnut’s late-filed charge of discrimination is therefore not an amendment of her intake questionnaire, and her intake questionnaire’s defective verification remains uncured.