42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits a claim against a city based on allegations that its policies or customs tolerated excessive police force and failed to review, discipline, supervise, or retrain officers.

Green v. Nevers · filed 1997-04-29

Count IV of the complaint alleges that the City of Detroit’s police department and chief of police “permitted, encouraged, tolerated and ratified a pattern and practice of unjustified, unreasonable, and excessive force by police officers.” The complaint further alleges that the City of Detroit “has maintained no system of review or has failed to identify instances of improper use of force or to discipline, more closely supervise, or retrain specific officers who in fact improperly used such force,” and that “[t]he foregoing acts, omissions, and systematic deficiencies are policies and customs” of the city. As the district court noted, the allegations in Count IV are sufficient to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal failure-to-train liability when unsettled law made officers reasonably believe their conduct was constitutional, so the municipality could not have been deliberately indifferent by failing to teach otherwise.

Joanne Joyce, Individually and as of the Estate of James D. Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, Massachusetts, John R. MacKey Al · filed 1997-04-29

However, our rationale here for granting qualified immunity to the officers — that the unsettled state of the law made it reasonable to believe the conduct in this case constitutional — also precludes municipal liability. Tewksbury could not have been “deliberately indifferent” to citizens’ rights, Bowen v. City of Manchester, 966 F.2d 13, 18 (1st Cir.1992), in failing to teach the officers that their conduct was unconstitutional.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy or custom caused the injury; an employment relationship alone is insufficient.

Torres v. Knapich · filed 1997-05-01

Municipal liability under § 1983 must be predicated upon proof that the injuries complained of resulted from a municipal policy or custom. Allegations of respondeat superior are insufficient to support a claim against a municipality.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its own policy or custom causes the injury; liability cannot rest solely on an employee’s acts.

Torian v. City of Beckley · filed 1997-05-07

Municipal governments may be liable under federal law only for their own illegal or unconstitutional policies; they are not liable for the acts or omissions of their employees: ... Plaintiff has presented no evidence indicating either a policy of inadequate training or supervision or showing an official custom of condoning unconstitutional acts. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs federal claims against the City of Beckley.

A § 1983 complaint can plausibly allege a municipal custom by identifying three similar instances in which the municipality failed to follow its stated employment policies and allegedly deprived employees of due process.

Langford v. County of Cook · filed 1997-05-08

Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, as we must do on a motion to dismiss, we find that these three instances reasonably imply the existence of a municipal custom of not adhering to its stated policies.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for a state court judge’s official judicial conduct because that conduct is not attributable to the county.

Botts v. Crider · filed 1997-05-15

the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that a state court judge acting in his official judicial capacity does not constitute a government official whose actions are attributable to a county. ... In light of this extensive and long-standing precedent, we find no error in the district court’s conclusion that Botts’s claim against Lee County based on Judge Grubbs’s alleged inaction was without foundation.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for a jail employee’s episodic constitutional violation when it resulted from a municipal policy or custom adopted or maintained with objective deliberate indifference to detainees’ rights.

Scott v. Moore · filed 1997-05-20

Under Hare, as we have stated, this latter burden may be met by putting forth facts sufficient to demonstrate that the predicate episodic act or omission resulted from a municipal custom, rule, or policy adopted or maintained with objective deliberate indifference to the detainee’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for an employee’s acts under respondeat superior.

West ex rel. Norris v. Waymire · filed 1997-05-21

But the doctrine of respondeat superior is not available to a plaintiff in a section 1983 suit.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable merely because it negligently supervised an officer.

West v. Waymire · filed 1997-05-21

There is little doubt that, as the expert opined, the Town of Frankton failed to exercise due care. But that cannot make it liable in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 without evidence that inadequate officer training or a municipal policy or custom caused a constitutional deprivation.

Thomas v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Scott Lang, Officer Joe Kelly, Officer Karl Conklin David · filed 1997-05-21

Thomas contends that the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (the Department) is liable for failure to train its officers properly. Thomas has shown no evidence that the Department inadequately trains its officers or that any policy or custom of the Department caused any constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation.

Morreale v. Criple Creek, City · filed 1997-05-27

Likewise, a municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a constitutional injury; an employee’s conduct alone does not establish municipal liability.

Cook v. BD. OF COUNTY COM'RS OF CTY. OF WYANDOTTE · filed 1997-05-29

Under Monell, a municipality can be held directly liable under § 1983 when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts a constitutional injury.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when a municipal policy or custom caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Selerski v. Village of West Milwaukee · filed 1997-06-03

Although "municipalities and other local governmental bodies are 'persons' within the meaning of § 1983," a plaintiff seeking to impose § 1983 liability on a municipality must "identify a municipal 'policy' or 'custom' that caused the plaintiffs injury."

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires evidence of the city’s deliberate indifference; an employee’s conduct alone generally does not create a triable issue.

Torres v. McLaughlin · filed 1997-06-05

At issue in a Mo-nell claim is a city’s deliberate indifference, and the conduct of one of its employees, without more, generally cannot create a jury question on that point.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages from a sheriff’s office or district attorney’s office to allege a practice, policy, or custom that caused the injury.

Wagner v. Santa Clara Sheriff's Office · filed 1997-06-05

The district court also properly dismissed the claims against the Sheriff's Office and the District Attorney's Office on the ground that the first amended complaint failed to allege the existence of any practice, policy, or custom which caused Wagner's alleged injury.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim based on allegations that a city’s failures to review, discipline, supervise, or retrain officers are its policies or customs.

Green v. Nevers · filed 1997-06-06

The complaint further alleges that the City of Detroit "has maintained no system of review or has failed to identify instances of improper use of force or to discipline, more closely supervise, or retrain specific officers who in fact improperly used such force," and that "[t]he foregoing acts, omissions, and systematic deficiencies are policies and customs" of the city. As the district court noted, the allegations in Count IV are sufficient to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a causal link between an alleged constitutional violation and a municipal policy or custom to hold a municipality liable.

Martins Timehin v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 1997-06-09

Even if Timehin had shown a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, he failed to establish a causal link between the alleged constitutional violation and City policy or custom.

Section 1983 requires proof of a municipal policy or custom to hold a city liable for an officer’s actions.

Graff v. Motta · filed 1997-06-10

Furthermore, with respect to Graffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the city of Warwick, Graff would also have to prove, in addition to the elements discussed above, that the actions of Captain DeFeo were taken in accordance with an overall policy or custom of the city of Warwick to deprive the citizens of that city of their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable for its officials’ acts or omissions under a respondeat superior theory.

Hicks v. Bexar County, Tex. · filed 1997-06-13

The first problem with plaintiffs claims against the City of San Antonio is that he cannot rely upon the alleged actions of Municipal Court Judges Smith or Mitchell or Captain Gleinser as a basis for holding the City liable under Section 1983. The City cannot be held liable under a respondeat superior theory of liability for the acts or omissions of Judges Smith or Mitchell or Captain Gleinser.

A municipal-liability claim under § 1983 fails when there is no evidence that the relevant officials or employees acted improperly.

Parcell v. City of Pasadena · filed 1997-06-13

Because there is no evidence that Oliver or any school board employee acted improperly, Parcell's Monell claim fails.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable when a constitutional violation results from a deliberate choice by an official with final policymaking authority over the matter.

Wagner v. City of Memphis · filed 1997-06-19

In addition, because the Mayor’s actions represented a deliberate choice to follow a course of action made from among various alternatives by the official responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question, the City is also responsible for this violation.

A municipality may face liability under § 1983 when its policymakers adopt a policy that is the moving force behind an alleged deprivation of federal rights.

Buckeye Community Hope Foundation v. City of Cuyahoga Falls · filed 1997-06-20

Moreover, it is clear that the policymakers of Cuyahoga Falls did so pursuant to provisions of their City Charter and that this city policy was the moving force which gave a staying effect to the citizens’ petition and referendum.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability when there is no underlying constitutional injury.

Camara v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1997-06-24

A local government may not be held liable, however, if there is no underlying constitutional injury.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when officials with final policymaking authority ratify a subordinate’s action, even without formal approval in official records.

Hyland v. Wonder · filed 1997-06-25

The executive committee’s ratification does not require formal approval for the purpose of establishing a violation of federal law under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability solely because a municipality employs an officer who committed a tort.

Rowe v. City of Marlow · filed 1997-06-26

This argument, if premised on § 1983, clearly fails. The Supreme Court has repeatedly and unequivocally stated that “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor -- or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”

A municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior.

Sarantakis v. Village of Winthrop Harbor · filed 1997-06-26

The United States Supreme Court, however, has consistently articulated the principle that a municipality may not be held liable under section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 holds a municipality liable only when an official policy or governmental custom or usage causes the constitutional deprivation.

Billy D. Sams, D/B/A Grant Park Auto Sales v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1997-06-26

To hold a municipality liable under section 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the constitutional deprivation resulted from either an official policy of the municipality or from a governmental custom or usage, even if such custom was not formally approved by the municipality.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for a single incident of officer misconduct without direct involvement by a municipal policymaker.

Green v. City of Paterson · filed 1997-06-26

A single incident of unconstitutional behavior by a police officer, without any direct involvement by a municipal policy maker, is not sufficient to impose municipal liability.

Section 1983 requires proof that an officer’s constitutional violation was pursuant to an official policy or custom to hold the relevant municipality liable.

DuFour-Dowell v. Cogger · filed 1997-06-27

Since the burden would be on plaintiffs to prove there is a municipal policy or custom, they also bear that burden on summary judgment. ... Since DuFour-Dowell has failed to point to evidence supporting that Morgan’s conduct was pursuant to an official policy or custom, her Count XIX claim will be dismissed in its entirety.

A county cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely for its employees’ acts; the plaintiff must allege an unconstitutional county policy.

Michaels v. State of New Jersey · filed 1997-06-30

Here, Michaels does not even allege that her constitutional rights were violated by any official policy enacted by the County and, instead, relies ... solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Consequently, her § 1983 claim against the County must be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim to proceed when alleged inaction by policymakers who knew of discrimination could establish an unofficial policy or custom.

Penhollow v. BD. OF COMMISSIONERS CECIL COUNTY · filed 1997-06-30

Although this may or may not be true, appellant has sufficiently alleged inaction on the part of Kennedy and the Board of Commissioners, despite their alleged knowledge of gender discrimination, such that she may be able to show “that a [local government’s] actual policies were different from the ones that had been announced.” ... Accordingly, the trial court erred when it dismissed appellant’s § 1983 action on the basis that appellant had not sufficiently alleged or proven an official policy or custom on the part of the county.

Section 1983 requires factual support for a municipal policy claim; boilerplate allegations of a policy do not state a claim.

Bills Ex Rel. Bills v. Homer Consolidated School District Number 33-C · filed 1997-07-01

Nevertheless, boilerplate allegations of a municipal policy entirely lacking in factual support are insufficient to state a claim.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality requires an allegation that its official policy, custom, or usage caused a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Burger v. Borough of Ingram · filed 1997-07-01

We point out that Burger never averred in her complaint that an official policy, custom or usage of the Borough of Ingram and the Borough of Crafton had deprived her of rights protected by the Constitution. As we have noted, such allegations are the touchstone of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a constitutional violation caused by an identified municipal policy, custom, or practice.

Byas v. New York City Department of Correction · filed 1997-07-01

Even construing the complaint as an action against the City of New York, the plaintiff must establish that his constitutional rights were violated and that the constitutional violation resulted from an identified policy, custom, or practice of the municipality.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 when no constitutional violation occurred.

Monday v. Officer John Oullette and the City of Monroe · filed 1997-07-02

Because no constitutional violations occurred in this ease, however, the City of Monroe necessarily is not liable to plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a county board adopts adverse actions taken by its personnel committee in retaliation for protected speech.

Hulbert v. Wilhelm · filed 1997-07-07

Not surprisingly, the full board ratified the personnel committee’s actions by adopting its recommendations. This meant that the County Board itself adopted the recommendation that Hulbert should be placed in Grade 11, Step 3, with a frozen salary. Based on these facts, the jury found that Pierce County took adverse job actions against Hulbert because of his public statements. Its finding was supported by the evidence and consistent with the law on municipal liability as recently explained by the Supreme Court.

A municipal official whose decisions are subject to meaningful administrative review lacks final policymaking authority for § 1983 municipal liability.

Scala v. City of Winter Park · filed 1997-07-10

Final policymaking authority over a particular subject area does not vest in an official whose decisions in the area are subject to meaningful administrative review.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable only when its policy or custom causes the constitutional deprivation or an authorized policymaker approves the challenged conduct.

Grendell v. Gillway · filed 1997-07-11

The Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to whether the Town had a policy of allowing its police officers to engage in the sort of conduct allegedly committed by Gillway. There is similarly no genuine issue as to whether Gillway’s alleged conduct was authorized by one of the Town’s decision makers. Accordingly, the Town cannot be liable under § 1983 for Gillway’s alleged conduct the Court finds to be shocking to the conscience.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability through respondeat superior; a municipal policy or custom must cause the constitutional injury.

Suarez v. Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders · filed 1997-07-11

There is no municipal respondeat superior liability under § 1983. ... A municipality can only be held liable if a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional injury.

A § 1983 claim against a city must plead an unconstitutional municipal practice, custom or policy related to the alleged deprivation.

Laise v. City of Utica · filed 1997-07-14

Here, plaintiffs have not pled the existence of an unconstitutional practice, custom or policy by the City of Utica as it relates to the facts of this case.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on failure to train or deliberate indifference requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Contreras v. City of Chicago · filed 1997-07-16

The liability of the City of Chicago for any deliberate indifference or for failing to train DCS inspectors is therefore secondary to the basic issue of whether a constitutional guarantee has been violated.

Municipal liability under § 1983 for failure to train or deliberate indifference depends on an underlying constitutional violation.

Contreras v. City Of Chicago · filed 1997-07-16

Those cases presume that a constitutional violation has occurred (typically by a municipal employee) and then ask whether the municipality itself may be liable for the violations.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if the alleged violation is attributable to its policy or custom, but a plaintiff need not produce evidence of that prerequisite at summary judgment when the municipality has not raised it.

Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville · filed 1997-07-17

We are less confident that the harassment to which the Does allegedly were subjected can be attributed to Belleville as a “policy or custom” of the city as it must if Belleville is to be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The Does were under no obligation to put forward evidence that would satisfy the prerequisites to municipal liability, when the city itself did not seek summary judgment on that ground.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a governmental policy, procedure, or custom causes a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Sunburst Bank v. Patterson · filed 1997-07-21

A municipality can be liable for a Section 1983 violation only when a plaintiff’s constitutional rights are deprived as the result of a governmental policy, procedure, or custom.

Whether an official has final policymaking authority for municipal liability under § 1983 is a legal question for the court, not the jury.

Morro v. City of Birmingham · filed 1997-07-21

However, the Supreme Court has made plain that the question of whether the Chief is a final policymaker is a legal question for the court, not the jury.

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 without an unconstitutional policy or custom.

Bedford v. Sharp · filed 1997-07-23

Absent an unconstitutional policy or custom a municipality can not be held liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to allege a municipal policy or custom that caused the injury.

Simmons v. Chacon · filed 1997-07-29

After consideration of Mr. Simmons' arguments and review of the record, we agree with the district court that Mr. Simmons failed to allege sufficient facts to state a § 1983 claim against the City. In his complaint and on appeal, Mr. Simmons merely recites the events of his arrest from his perspective. He does not allege or mention a policy or custom of the City, which caused his injuries. Without such allegations, even in the barest form, Mr. Simmons fails to state a claim against the City upon which relief may be granted.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when an unconstitutional ordinance enacted by its highest policymaking authority causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Nichols v. Village of Pelham Manor · filed 1997-07-31

The statute in question is undoubtedly a municipal policy that was promulgated by the highest decision making authority of the Village.

A city may face § 1983 liability for due process violations allegedly caused by its established procedures for implementing an ordinance, even if the ordinance is facially valid.

McKenzie v. City of Chicago · filed 1997-07-31

The City argues-that, because the Ordinance is not facially unconstitutional, it cannot be liable under § 1983 for implementing the Ordinance. This argument misses the obvious fact that the plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge is still alive and well. ... There can be no doubt that these Fast Track procedures, which the City allegedly uses to demolish 1,000 buildings every year, constitute a municipal policy or practice. ... Thus, the claims against the City cannot be dismissed at this time.

Section 1983 does not impose derivative municipal liability for an officer’s actions when the officer committed no constitutional violation.

Verri v. Nanna · filed 1997-08-01

Because we have granted summary judgment to defendant Nanna on all of Verri’s constitutional claims, we also grant defendant Elmsford’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that it is not liable as a municipality under § 1983 for Nanna’s actions. Elms-ford cannot be held derivatively liable where there has been no constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable for its employees’ acts solely on a respondeat superior theory.

Daniele v. City of Springfield · filed 1997-08-01

A city may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a municipal policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Fox v. Doran · filed 1997-08-04

Thus, Fox, in order to sustain his section 1983 claim against the City must not only show the existence of a policy that caused his termination, but also a causal connection between that policy and the allegedly retaliatory termination.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on custom can proceed without direct proof that the policymaker received notice when a continuing, persistent, and widespread practice of unconstitutional misconduct permits an inference of notice.

Powell v. City and County of Denver, Colo. · filed 1997-08-04

Cannon also implies that proof of direct notice to the policy maker is not necessary in a case like this where there is a question of fact of a continuing, persistent and widespread practice of unconstitutional misconduct.

Section 1983 requires an official policy or custom to hold a city liable for alleged civil rights violations.

Childress v. City of Richmond · filed 1997-08-05

The district court dismissed these claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on the ground that the City had no “official policy or custom” of discrimination that would subject it to § 1983 liability and, further, that the officers’ complaints involved intramural rather than public concerns. ... We affirm the dismissal of these claims on the reasoning of the district court.

Section 1983 does not make a local governmental entity vicariously liable for its employees; the plaintiff must connect the alleged deprivation to the entity’s policy.

Reno v. Metropolitan Transit Authority · filed 1997-08-12

Local governmental entities, such as Metro, are not vicariously liable for the actions of their employees under § 1983. ... Reno has failed, either in her complaint or in her reply to Metro’s motion for summary judgment, to identify a specific policy that caused the constitutional deprivation she claims occurred.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 unless a municipal officer committed an underlying constitutional violation.

Ogletree Ex Rel. Estate Ogletree v. Columbia County · filed 1997-08-13

A necessary prerequisite to any finding of municipal liability under § 1983 is the occurrence of a constitutional violation, for if the acts or omissions of a particular municipal officer for which a plaintiff seeks to sue a ... municipality under § 1983 are found to be constitutional, then there can be no recovery under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an official policy or custom for claims against a local government, but not for claims against individual defendants in their official capacities.

Mann v. Alvarez · filed 1997-08-18

It is well settled that the requirement of pleading an official policy or custom of a municipality through which constitutional injury has been inflicted upon a plaintiff, applies only to 1983 claims against a local government, and not to such claims insofar as they are asserted against individual defendants in their official capacities (see, Monell v Department of Social Servs., 436 US 658, 694; Fiacco v City of Rensselaer, 783 F2d 319, 325-326, cert denied 480 US 922).

A municipal housing authority is liable under § 1983 for its employees’ misconduct only if an official policy or practice caused the misconduct.

Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 1997-08-19

The suit is against the Authority, which cannot be held liable under Section 1983, the only statute invoked by Carrero, unless the acts of which Carrero complains — and which the Court assumes for purposes of this motion occurred — were caused by an official policy or practice of the Authority.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a local government entity only when its policy or custom causes the deprivation of federal rights.

Rogan v. Menino · filed 1997-08-19

Rather, a governmental entity is liable under section 1983 only when the “government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable for constitutional violations to show that the violations were attributable to municipal policy or custom.

Venters v. City of Delphi and Larry Ives · filed 1997-08-19

Without a showing that the asserted constitutional violations were attributable to municipal policy or custom, Venters could not prevail.

A local governmental entity is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Zisis v. St. Joseph Tp. of Allen County · filed 1997-08-25

Such an entity can only be held liable under § 1983 if the alleged constitutional violation was the result of a policy or custom of the entity.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 when the individual defendants receive qualified immunity because the court finds that no underlying legal violation occurred.

Butler v. City of Prairie Village · filed 1997-08-25

As a concomitant result, the court holds that because the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity based on the court’s threshold determination that no violation of a law occurred, which is equivalent to a decision on the merits of the case, this finding also precludes the imposition of liability on the defendant municipal body.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to show that an official policy or custom caused the constitutional injury.

Szoke v. Carter · filed 1997-08-25

It is well established that in order to sustain a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a municipal defendant, the plaintiff must show the existence of an officially adopted policy or custom that caused injury and a causal connection between that policy or custom and the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a constitutional violation and a municipal custom or policy to hold a city liable.

Danielson v. Chevron Corp. · filed 1997-09-05

Moreover, Danielson's claims against the City fail because she did not submit any evidence of a constitutional violation, let alone a custom or policy of such violations. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the plaintiff’s constitutional injury; an unrelated policy is insufficient.

Harrell v. City of Jacksonville · filed 1997-09-05

Rather, the plaintiff must point to some policy or custom which inflicted an injury that the local government as an entity is responsible for under § 1983. ... The City’s alleged policy of failing to investigate citizen complaints has no relationship to Plaintiffs’ alleged deprivation of the right of access to the courts.

Section 1983 can make a local government liable for an official’s actions when state law gives that official final policymaking authority.

Johnson v. Turner · filed 1997-09-08

It is well-established that a local government official with final policy-making authority under state law may, by his actions, subject the local government for which he works to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy or custom caused the claimed injury.

Jefferies v. Wyandotte County Board of County Commissioners · filed 1997-09-17

A plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality must identify a municipal “policy” or “custom” that caused his injury.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to show that a municipal policy caused the injury.

Joyner v. Deptuy Sheriff Taylor · filed 1997-09-18

In Section 1983 cases, the plaintiff must produce evidence that the policy at issue caused his injury.

A city may be liable under § 1983 when its agents’ actions represent an official municipal policy or custom.

Huffman v. City of Prairie Village, KS · filed 1997-09-18

A city can be held liable under § 1983 only if the actions of its agents can be characterized as representing an official policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability on an official-capacity claim only when a municipal policy, custom, or practice caused the constitutional injury; allegations of individual officers’ conduct alone do not suffice.

Mason v. Barker · filed 1997-09-18

Although Plaintiffs have raised allegations sufficient to implicate the protections of the Due Process Clause, they have not alleged a policy, custom, or practice of the City of McCrory that would permit the Court to grant relief premised on municipal liability. Nothing in Plaintiffs’ Complaint suggests that the alleged constitutional violation was the product of municipal action such that the City of McCrory itself is in some way responsible. The allegation that Defendants were acting under color of state law is clear, but the Complaint is devoid of any allegation to transform the alleged illegal conduct from violations by individual tortfeasors into unconstitutional activity by the governmental body. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants in their official capacities.

A single chain of events does not establish a municipal custom for liability under Section 1983.

Liverseed ex rel. Liverseed v. County of Rice · filed 1997-09-18

The evidence of this single chain of events does not raise a genuine issue of material fact that Rice County had a practice or custom of ignoring the rights of the mentally disabled. There is no evidence of a continuing, widespread, or persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct. Thus, the Court grants the County summary judgment as to the claim under Section 1983.

A § 1983 claim against a city and its supervisor for a hostile work environment requires evidence that they acquiesced in or were deliberately indifferent to the violation.

Houck v. City of Prairie Village · filed 1997-09-23

The court does not believe that any reasonable jury reading the record in a light most favorable to plaintiff would conclude that either the City or defendant Vernon had acquiesced or was deliberately indifferent to the existence of a hostile working environment in the public works department. The City had a policy against sexual harassment. Training took place to help implement this policy. Both defendant Vernon and Bob Pryzby, as public works directors or city administrator, made investigations and took actions in response to plaintiffs complaints to prevent the appearance or perception of sexual discrimination. Accordingly, both defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this grounds against plaintiffs claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for an officer’s tortious acts merely because it employed the officer.

Doe v. Hudgins · filed 1997-09-23

A municipality cannot be held hable under section 1983 for the tortious actions of a police officer simply because the officer was an employee of the city.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy or custom caused a constitutional injury.

Fincher v. County of Westchester · filed 1997-09-26

In order to impose § 1983 liability upon a municipality, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a constitutional harm resulted from a municipal policy or custom.

A plaintiff seeking to hold a county liable under § 1983 must identify a county policy or custom that caused the injury.

J.B. v. Washington County · filed 1997-10-07

A plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a county under § 1983 must identify a policy or custom that caused the plaintiffs injury.

Section 1983 does not support an inadequate training or supervision claim against a municipality without a constitutional violation by the supervised officers.

Goodman v. Town of Golden Beach · filed 1997-10-08

A claim of inadequate training and supervision under section 1983 cannot be made out against a supervisory body without a finding of constitutional violation by the persons supervised.

A county may face Section 1983 liability for a single act furthering official policy or a single decision by a policymaker.

Upton County, Tex. v. Brown · filed 1997-10-08

In appropriate circumstances a single incident of conduct by an agent acting in furtherance of an official policy will result in Section 1983 liability, as well a single decision by a policymaker.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a city or county only when an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom caused the injury.

Stemler v. City of Florence · filed 1997-10-08

Therefore, in order to state a claim against a city or a county under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that his injury was caused by an unconstitutional “policy” or “custom” of the municipality.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a constitutional injury caused by an express policy, a settled custom, or a person with final policymaking authority.

Thomas v. Chicago Housing Authority · filed 1997-10-09

There are three instances under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which a government entity may be held liable for violating the civil rights of a person: (1) there was an express policy that, when enforced, caused a constitutional violation; (2) there was a widespread practice that, although not expressly authorized, was so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; or (3) the alleged constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policymaking authority.

In an episodic act or omission case, § 1983 municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional violation by an official.

Flores v. County of Hardeman, Tex. · filed 1997-10-14

Because we have held that plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against Ingram fail, those claims against Hardeman County necessarily fail as well.

A city can be liable under § 1983 for conduct pursuant to a municipal policy or custom, but an officer’s testimony about handling similar disputes alone does not establish such a policy or custom.

Goodwin v. City of Fultondale · filed 1997-10-17

Clearly, the above testimony, alone, is insufficient to establish that Officer Hamilton was acting pursuant to a well-established municipal policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for its officers’ actions solely because it employs them.

Swales v. Township of Ravenna · filed 1997-10-20

Thus, Ravenna may not be held hable for the actions of its officers simply on the basis of its employment relationship with them.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 for an unconstitutional search absent a genuine factual issue that an official policy or practice authorized it.

Oase v. Sallee · filed 1997-10-23

Because Oase failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of an official government policy or practice that authorized City of Tucson officials to perform unconstitutional searches, see id. at 918-21, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to City of Tucson.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for a constitutional violation solely because it employed the person who committed it.

Thompson v. Chapel · filed 1997-10-29

However, § 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on such employers.

Section 1983 may impose municipal liability for how town agents enforce state law, even when the challenged law is not a town policy.

Lestrange v. Town of Oxford, No. Cv95 0052342s (Nov. 4, 1997) · filed 1997-11-04

To accept the defendant's argument would immunize towns from § 1983 liability when the claim goes to how or the manner in which they enforced state law not necessarily that they were enforcing state law.

Section 1983 permits liability against a state or municipal actor when one of its policies is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Andrew Bridgman, a Minor, by and Through Lynne C. Bridgman, His Mother and Guardian v. New Trier High School District No · filed 1997-11-04

A state or municipal actor such as New Trier may be liable under § 1983 if one of its policies was the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a pretrial detainee’s episodic injury only after an official acts with subjective deliberate indifference to the detainee’s constitutional rights.

Flores v. Cty of Hardeman, TX · filed 1997-11-06

To prove an underlying constitutional violation in an episodic act or omission case such as this one, a pretrial detainee must first establish that an official acted with subjective deliberate indifference. Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 54 (5th Cir.1997). Only then may he hold a municipality accountable for that due process violation.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality vicariously liable for its employees’ constitutional violations; a failure-to-train claim requires deliberate indifference to the risk of a constitutional violation.

Stemler v. City of Florence · filed 1997-11-13

While a municipality may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a constitutional violation directly attributable to it, § 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a municipality for the constitutional torts of its employees. ... Therefore, because the plaintiffs cannot show that either the city or the county acted with deliberate indifference to the risk of a constitutional tort, the award of summary judgment to the municipal defendants must be affirmed.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an employee’s conduct only when the municipality ordered or sanctioned it, a final policymaker caused it, or it followed municipal policy, practice, or custom.

Lorbacher v. Housing Authority of Raleigh · filed 1997-11-18

The Housing Authority only can be held liable for the actions of its employees if it officially ordered or sanctioned the conduct, the employees responsible for plaintiffs demotion and discharge had final policy-making authority, or the action was taken pursuant to a municipal policy, practice or custom.

Section 1983 liability for a municipality or municipal agency requires a pattern or practice or another basis beyond respondeat superior.

Crisonino v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 1997-11-18

Any Section 1983 claims against NYCHA must be dismissed. To state a claim against a municipality or a municipal agency, plaintiff must allege either that the complained-of act was a result of a pattern or practice or that some other basis for liability-other than respondeat superior—exists.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability based solely on respondeat superior or vicarious liability; a claim against a municipality requires an independent basis for its liability.

Tarr v. McNamara · filed 1997-11-19

Moreover, the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against defendant Ashland is barred as a matter of law. “Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983." City of Canton v . Harris, 489 U.S. 3 7 8 , 385 (1989). The plaintiff has not alleged any independent basis for defendant Ashland’s liability. Therefore, the federal claim against defendant Ashland must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a local government to prove both a constitutional violation causing her harm and the government’s responsibility for that violation.

Wyke v. Polk County School Board · filed 1997-11-19

However, to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a local government entity, a plaintiff must prove both that her harm was caused by a constitutional violation and that the government entity is responsible for that violation.

Section 1983 requires a policy or custom to impose liability on a sheriff’s office, and a plaintiff cannot avoid that requirement by suing directly under the Constitution.

Lawrence T. Newman and Beverly R. Newman v. State of Indiana · filed 1997-11-19

This charge founders on the absence of any indication of a policy or custom of the office that resulted in the detention; and the “policy or custom” requirement of the Monell decision, interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, may not be avoided by the facile expedient attempted by the Newmans of simply omitting any reference to that statute and suing directly under the Constitution.

A plaintiff who bases § 1983 municipal liability on a county policy must produce sufficient evidence of that policy to survive summary judgment.

Birdwell v. W.T. Flanagan, Detective Mohave County Mohave County Board of Supervisors Steve Conn, Judge Gary · filed 1997-11-21

Upon our review of the record, we conclude that Birdwell failed to produce sufficient evidence to support his allegations that defendant Flanagan submitted a blank search warrant application or his allegation that Mohave County had a policy endorsing such a practice.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for constitutional deprivations caused by government policy or custom, but not on a respondeat superior theory.

Fox v. District of Columbia · filed 1997-11-25

However, it is now rudimentary “hornbook” law that § 1983 does not countenance respondeat superior liability for local governments; rather, it authorizes suits for constitutional deprivations inflicted pursuant to government custom or policy.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality requires a discriminatory custom, practice, or policy supported by evidence.

Eyster v. City of Los Angeles Los Angeles Police Department · filed 1997-11-28

Regarding Eyster's § 1983 claim against Los Angeles and the LAPD, he does not allege that these defendants maintained a custom, practice, or policy of discrimination. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Moreover, even if Eyster had so alleged, no evidence in the record would support that allegation. Thus, we affirm the district court's dismissal of this claim.

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires a deprived constitutional right, a municipal policy, deliberate indifference, and a causal link between the policy and the violation.

Plumeau v. School District 40 · filed 1997-12-04

To impose municipal liability under § 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights plaintiff must show: “(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which [s]he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiffs constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the ‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.’ ”

A § 1983 claim against a city can proceed when evidence raises genuine factual disputes over whether its decision to return an officer to patrol was deliberately indifferent and a moving force behind the alleged injury.

Centamore v. City of Houston · filed 1997-12-10

Plaintiff thus has demonstrated the existence of genuine issues of material fact concerning whether returning Hayden to patrol duties, in light of his history while he was still participating in the Personnel Concerns Program, and based on an ambiguous and possibly uninformed psychological evaluation, constituted deliberate indifference and was a moving force behind the assault.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim when alleged facts, if proven, show that a municipal policy caused a violation of constitutional rights.

Appell v. Giaccone, et al. · filed 1997-12-11

Thus, factual allegations that, if proven, would show a municipal policy caused a violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights state a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability for a municipal governing board and for a fire department to which the board delegates policymaking authority.

Vickery v. Minooka Volunteer Fire Department · filed 1997-12-15

The Board can be liable as the governing body of a municipal entity and the Department can be liable if the Board delegated authority to it.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a triable underlying constitutional violation.

Marie v. County of Los Angeles, Rosa Cardenas Clifford Wofford · filed 1997-12-17

Because Ste. Marie failed to establish a triable issue as to the existence of a constitutional violation, he could not establish municipal liability.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom has an affirmative link to the alleged rights violation.

Heron v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1997-12-22

There has been no testimony or other evidence elicited from any such policy maker, and absent such evidence of a policy maker’s authorization of a policy or knowledge of a problem and scienter-like indifference to it, plaintiff cannot establish the affirmative link necessary from a City policy or custom to any constitutional violation suffered by plaintiff.

Section 1983 generally requires municipal liability for employee conduct to rest on official policy, a well established custom, or action by an official with final policy making authority.

Gillus v. City of Norfolk · filed 1997-12-24

Municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the acts of its employees must generally be based on official policy, a well established custom, or an action by a municipal official with final policy making authority.

A Section 1983 Monell claim against a city cannot proceed when there is no factual issue regarding the officers’ alleged misconduct.

Ramirez v. City of Redondo Beach · filed 1997-12-29

Because there is no issue of fact regarding the officers' alleged misbehavior, Ramirez cannot assert a Monell claim against the city See Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir.1994).

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a policy or custom causing the rights violation, or a deliberate unconstitutional choice by officials responsible for final municipal policy.

Hart v. City of Jersey City · filed 1998-02-25

No municipal ordinance, policy or custom triggering a violation of plaintiffs rights has been identified, ... nor has there been any showing of a deliberate choice to pursue unconstitutional conduct on the part of officials responsible for setting final policy for the municipality.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability based on a policymaker’s ratification of a subordinate’s decision only if the policymaker knew of and ratified the improper basis for it.

Gattis v. Brice · filed 1998-03-03

Gattis must therefore present evidence that Administrator Brice not only accepted the recommendation of his deputy chiefs, but knew of and ratified the improper motives behind their recommendation.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires evidence of a policy, practice or custom that caused the alleged improper conduct.

Villagrana v. County of Sacramento · filed 1998-03-04

The Villagranas also failed to present evidence that the County of Sacramento or its Board of Supervisors or any other official adhered to a policy, practice or custom that resulted in the alleged improper search of the Villagranas' residence. Accordingly, their claim of section 1983 liability based upon a municipal policy, practice or custom also fails.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 for an officer’s alleged excessive force when the officer committed no constitutional violation.

Abraham v. Raso · filed 1998-03-05

Since, as this Court holds above, Raso did not violate Abraham’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures, there can be no § 1983 liability on the part of Cherry Hill Township for such a violation.

A municipality is liable under Section 1983 only when the unconstitutional conduct follows its declared policy or a custom effectively accepted as municipal policy.

Baffa v. Black · filed 1979-11-13

However, the narrow ground-rules of municipal suability laid down by Monell —that a city is liable under Section 1983 only on proof that the unconstitutional conduct complained of was pursuant to declared municipal policy, or at least to “custom” effectively accepted as municipal policy — are not met by any of the allegations relating to the City of Philadelphia contained in this complaint.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against municipalities when the execution of their ordinances or policies abridges constitutional rights.

Citizens for a Better Environment v. City of Chicago Heights · filed 1979-11-15

Clearly, municipal bodies are subject to claims for damages under section 1983 where pursuant to the duly authorized execution of its ordinances or policies constitutional rights are abridged.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a local government when the alleged deprivation arises from a decision issuing from its policy or custom.

Abraham Shamie, Cross-Appellant v. City of Pontiac, Cross-Appellee · filed 1980-04-21

What triggers the Monell exception is that such a deprivation has been claimed from a decision issuing from a policy or “custom” of the local government. We therefore find that the jurisdictional limitations imposed by Monell do not encompass the present case.

Section 1983 does not permit liability against a municipal entity based solely on respondeat superior.

Heath v. Redbud Hospital District · filed 1980-05-30

Plaintiff’s tendered Second Amended Complaint relied specifically and exclusively upon the doctrine of respondeat superior to pin liability to the entity defendants. Monell precludes such reliance.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a government policy or custom caused the constitutional injury before a county can be held liable.

Epps v. Gwinnett County · filed 1998-03-06

In the instant case, the record is barren of any evidence of implementation of an intentionally corrupt or impermissible policy by any of the Gwinnett County defendants so as to authorize a cause of action against Gwinnett County under 42 USC § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff pursuing a school-board inaction claim to show a persistent pattern of abuse, board notice, tacit approval amounting to deliberate indifference, and a direct causal link to the constitutional deprivation.

Burnell v. Williams · filed 1998-03-06

To state a claim under an “inaction” theory, Burnell must establish: (1) the existence of a clear and persistent pattern of sexual abuse by school employees; (2) notice or constructive notice of the School Board; (3) the School Board’s tacit approval of the unconstitutional conduct, such that a court can say that their deliberate indifference amounted to an official policy of inaction; and (4) that the School Board’s custom was the “moving force” or direct causal link in the constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on local governments; liability requires a policy responsible for violating a federally protected right.

Pearson v. City of Atlanta · filed 1998-03-11

“Under the law applicable to actions under 42 USC § 1983 against local governments, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a basis for imposing liability. To impose liability, it must be shown that some policy of [the City of Atlanta] was responsible for the violation of [the deceased’s] federally protected rights.” ... The record supports no such showing.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to show that an official policy or custom deprived them of a federal right.

Labensky v. County of Nassau · filed 1998-03-11

In establishing municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there was an official policy or custom that deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by federal law or the U.S. Constitution.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a school board to show that a board policy or tolerated custom caused the deprivation; two incidents of neglect by school officials did not establish such a custom.

Doe v. New Philadelphia Public Schools Board of Education · filed 1998-03-12

These two incidents of neglectful conduct on the part of two New Philadelphia officials are troubling, but they do not rise to the level of a custom within the district, and certainly do not implicate the School Board in any way. Plaintiff is therefore unable to make out a crucial element of a 1983 claim under these circumstances, and summary judgment must be awarded to Defendant New Philadelphia.

A § 1983 Monell claim against a municipality requires proof that an individual officer inflicted a constitutional injury.

Daniels v. Loizzo · filed 1998-03-13

To prevail on his Monell Claims, Plaintiff must show that one of the Individual Defendants inflicted a constitutional injury.

Section 1983 municipal claims can survive a motion to dismiss when the plaintiff alleges that an official policy caused the constitutional injury.

Ramirez v. United States · filed 1998-03-16

The plaintiffs allegation that his alleged false arrest and imprisonment was caused by the municipality’s official policy is sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability based on ratification only when an official with final policymaking authority approves a subordinate’s decision and its basis.

Baskin v. City of Des Plaines, a Municipal Corporation, and Bruce Sotirakis, Individually and in His Official Ca · filed 1998-03-17

As discussed above, it is well settled that a plaintiff seeking to establish a § 1983 claim against a municipality based on a “ratification” theory must allege that a municipal official with final policymaking authority approved the subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when decisions by officials with final authority are attributable to it.

Catanzaro v. Weiden · filed 1998-03-17

Moreover, the City of Middletown is not entitled to immunity, because the Commissioner and Mayor's decisions are sufficient to impute liability to the municipality.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a county based on prosecution policies of a district attorney who acts for the state under state law.

George v. County of San Diego · filed 1998-03-17

The California Supreme Court recently held in Pitts v. County of Kern, 17 Cal.4th 340, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 840, 949 P.2d 920 (Cal.1998), that no federal claim under § 1983 may be stated against a county based on the actions of its district attorney's office because a district attorney represents the state, and not the county, when preparing to prosecute and when prosecuting crimes, and when establishing policy and training employees in these areas. Because neither a state nor a state official acting in his or her official capacity is subject to suit for damages under § 1983, Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-64, 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), appellants cannot state a valid federal claim.

A county’s liability under § 1983 requires facts implicating a county custom, pattern, or practice.

J.S. Brattain v. County of San Bernardino Hugh Jacoby, Deputy Sheriff · filed 1998-03-18

Because Brattain did not allege any facts that implicated a County of San Bernadino ("County") custom, pattern or practice, the district court properly entered summary judgement for the County.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a city policy is a moving force behind a constitutional violation, and a policy enabling an officer to respond to an emergency may satisfy that requirement.

Drain v. Galveston County · filed 1998-03-30

However, in this case the Plaintiffs must only show that the City’s policy of allowing Cooper to respond to delicate emergency situations was a “moving force” behind the constitutional violation. In this case, Cooper was enabled to respond and cleared to the scene by League City. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have proffered sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to find that the Mutual Aid Agreement was the moving force behind Cooper’s presence at the scene, and the subsequent shooting.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a city to be based on an official policy or custom that causes the alleged violation.

Mroz v. City of Tonawanda · filed 1998-03-31

To be actionable under § 1983, a claim against a city must be based upon the municipality’s official policy or custom which results in the alleged violation.

Section 1983 permits county liability only when an official policy causes a constitutional violation.

Limbert v. Twin Falls County · filed 1998-04-01

Under this theory, a county can only be held hable if the action was conducted pursuant to an official pohcy and caused the constitutional tort.

A § 1983 municipal liability claim fails when the plaintiff cannot establish an underlying constitutional injury.

Campanaro v. City of Rome · filed 1998-04-02

In the present case, Plaintiff has failed to even establish a jury question that he suffered a constitutional injury; thus, a Monell claim based on the same injury must fail as well.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to plead and prove that an official policy or custom caused the denial of a federal constitutional right.

Weimer v. City of Johnstown · filed 1998-04-02

Turning to plaintiff’s first cause of action under 42 USC § 1983, it is well settled that in order to prevail under this statute, a plaintiff must plead and prove “(1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes [the plaintiff] to be subjected to (3) a denial of a [Federal] constitutional right” (Howe v Village of Trumansburg, 199 AD2d 749, 751, lv denied 83 NY2d 753; see, Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658, 690; Di Palma v Phelan, 81 NY2d 754, 756).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to plead and prove that a constitutional violation occurred pursuant to an official government policy.

Young v. County of Fulton · filed 1998-04-06

To prevail on such causes of action, the plaintiff would be required to plead .and prove that any violations of her constitutional rights were committed pursuant to an official government policy.

Section 1983 holds a municipality liable only when its deliberate conduct is the moving force behind a constitutional injury.

Delaney v. City of Hampton, Va. · filed 1998-04-06

For Defendant City to be liable on a § 1983 claim, Delaney must show that the City of Hampton, through its deliberate conduct, was the “moving force” behind Delaney’s alleged constitutional injury.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely for an unconstitutional act by an employee below the policymaking level.

DeCarlo v. Fry · filed 1998-04-06

And a mumeipality may be not be held liable in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for actions alleged to be unconstitutional by its employees below the policymaMng level solely on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 claims against a city must satisfy Monell’s municipal-liability requirements, and claims against other defendants require state action.

Levy v. City of Alexandria · filed 1998-04-07

Appellant appeals from the district court's orders (1) dis- missing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint with respect to the City of Alexandria under Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and with respect to the remaining defendants for want of state action and (2) denying his motion for reconsidera- tion. We have reviewed the record including the transcript of the hearing on the motion to dismiss and find no reversible error and no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an express policy, a settled custom, or a final policymaker causes a constitutional deprivation.

BISBEE, BY BISBEE v. Reynard · filed 1998-04-14

Before a municipality can be liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must show either: (1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policy making authority.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on a challenged policy requires evidence that a person with final policymaking authority promulgated it.

Bisbee ex rel. Bisbee v. Reynard · filed 1998-04-14

The Court is unable to discern from the excerpts on which Plaintiff relies any evidence of a policy promulgated by a person with final policy making authority. Simply, from the alleged non-responsiveness of Brienen and the above-noted passage Plaintiff has not met her burden of showing that such a policy exists.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a county solely for its employee’s conduct.

Erwin, et. ux. v. Lovell · filed 1998-04-15

As we have indicated, the county’s liability in a § 1983 claim is not based on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a county through respondeat superior; liability must rest on the county’s own conduct.

Erwin v. Rose · filed 1998-04-15

As we have indicated, the county’s liability in a § 1983 claim is not based on respondeat superior. To be liable, the county itself must be found to have engaged in the same conduct that would give rise to liability on the part of an individual.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only for violations carried out through the municipality’s law, policy, or custom.

Davis v. DiPino · filed 1998-04-16

Instead, a municipality can be held legally responsible under § 1983 only for its actions executed through the municipality's law, policy, or custom.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when the municipality acts through official policy.

Mission Springs Inc. v. City of Spokane · filed 1998-04-23

Municipal liability for section 1983 purposes attaches when he municipality acts through official policy.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a governmental policy or custom causes the constitutional violation.

Sova v. City of Mt. Pleasant · filed 1998-04-24

In other words, a municipality can be liable under § 1983 only where its policies are “the moving force” behind the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a city or its police department to show that a governmental policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional injury.

Sova v. City of Mt. Pleasant · filed 1998-04-24

As for the municipal defendants, a plaintiff who sues a city and its police department for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must establish that a governmental policy or custom caused the alleged injury.

Section 1983 permits local government liability when an express policy, a settled custom, or a final policymaker causes a constitutional injury.

Oney v. Leroy Nennig, Jr., Wolfgang Schrauth, Richard Davis · filed 1998-04-27

In order to hold a local government responsible under § 1983, the local government's policy must violate the person's civil rights. Such a violation can be shown in one of three ways: "(1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional violation, (2) a widespread practice, that although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with 'final policymaking authority.' " McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir.1995) (internal citations omitted).

A city is not liable under § 1983 for its police chief’s conduct when the chief lacks final policymaking authority for the city.

Kiersey v. Diamond · filed 1998-04-29

Moreover, we agree with the district court that the City is not liable because the Police Chief is not the final policy-maker for the City.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a government policy causes the injury; an injury inflicted solely by employees or agents does not suffice.

Williams v. City of Baton Rouge · filed 1998-04-30

However, we agree with the City/Parish that the trial court's conclusion that the City/Parish violated plaintiffs' civil rights under § 1983 was erroneous; [30] therefore, the insurers may not rely on a § 1983 violation as a basis for invoking this exclusion in the Personal Injury Liability section of the F & C policy. ... [30] A local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, when execution of a government's policy—whether made by its lawmakers or those whose acts represent official policy—inflicts the injury, the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.

Section 1983 holds a county liable for its own unconstitutional or illegal policies, not merely for its employees’ tortious acts.

Barney v. Pulsipher · filed 1998-05-01

The County may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only for its own unconstitutional or illegal policies and not for the tortious acts of its employees.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable only when an official policy, custom or practice causes the injury or deprivation of a federally protected right.

Walt v. City of Dallas · filed 1998-05-05

However, municipalities are only subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if an official policy, custom or practice was responsible for the injury or the deprivation of a federally protected right.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a school board based on a constitutional tort by a final decisionmaker when no discriminatory custom is alleged.

Hazel v. School Bd. of Dade County, Fla. · filed 1998-05-08

Hazel has not alleged facts that suggest a “custom” of sexual discrimination within the School Board. Therefore, in order for a § 1983 claim to exist against the School Board, Hazel must allege that a final decisionmaker for the School Board committed a constitutional tort against her.

Section 1983 ordinarily requires an official policy or custom, or municipal ratification of unlawful conduct, to establish municipal liability.

Canell v. Officer Roderick Lightner · filed 1998-05-08

In order to establish municipal liability on the part of the Multnomah County Detention Center under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Canell must ordinarily show that the deprivation of his First Amendment rights occurred as a result of an official policy or custom, see Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), or that the municipality ratified the unlawful conduct, see Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646-47 (9th Cir.1991). Canell has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Lightner's actions were in any way related to such municipal action. Summary judgment for the municipal entity was therefore proper.

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 merely because its officers may make mistakes while carrying out a lawful policy.

Mistretta v. Prokesch · filed 1998-05-12

In essence, plaintiff contends that a legal policy is an illegal policy because, on a case-by-case basis, mistakes will be made in attempting to comply with it. If accepted, the argument would swallow the rule that “a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely for its employee’s acts under respondeat superior.

Devlin v. Smalley · filed 1998-05-18

Municipalities are not liable for the acts of their employees under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipal policy or custom causes an employee’s violation of federal rights; the municipality is not liable merely because it employs the violator.

Riordan v. City of Joliet · filed 1998-06-04

To carry out Section 1983’s requirement of direct rather than vicarious responsibility, municipalities may be held liable for civil rights violations committed by their employees if a municipal policy or custom inflicts the constitutional deprivation (Baskin v. City of Des Plaines, 138 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir.1998)).