42 U.S.C. § 1983

Under § 1983’s policymaker theory of liability, a First Amendment retaliation claim requires an adverse employment action by a final policymaker.

Levy v. County of Alpine · filed 2018-11-05

Under the “policymaker” theory of liability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a First Amendment retaliation claim requires an adverse employment action made by a final policymaker.

In a § 1983 action asserting federal rights, state constitutional legislative privilege does not apply, but state legislators generally cannot be subjected to discovery about the validity of state legislation absent very compelling reasons.

May v. Cooperman · filed 1983-10-24

I concluded that although the legislative privilege contained in the federal constitution is not available to state legislators and although the legislative privilege contained in the State constitution is not available in § 1983 actions asserting deprivation of federal rights, for general policy reasons the law does not permit individual state legislators to be subjected to discovery in civil cases involving the interpretation or validity of state legislation absent very compelling reasons. Such reasons did not exist here.

A Section 1983 action barred under Heck v. Humphrey is dismissed without prejudice.

Cephas Barton Brewer v. Anderson · filed 2004-05-21

Upon de novo review, see Anderson v. Larson, 327 F.3d 762, 767 (8th Cir. 2003), we find Brewer’s arguments lack merit, and we affirm on the basis that ... the action is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). ... However, we modify the judgment to be a dismissal without prejudice.

A § 1983 claim is not barred under Heck when a judgment for the plaintiff would invalidate no pending or existing criminal charge or conviction.

Shackleford v. Gutermuth · filed 2004-03-24

... the jury’s acquittal means that a finding for Shackleford on her § 1983 claim would invalidate no pending or existing criminal charge or conviction. We therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal of Shackleford’s § 1983 claim and remand for further proceedings.

Expungement of a conviction under Louisiana law does not invalidate it for purposes of a §1983 malicious prosecution claim under Heck.

Delcambre v. Whittington · filed 2003-07-07

Further, Delcambre contends his 42 U.S.C. §1983 malicious prosecution claim is not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because it was rendered invalid by a state tribunal. Though his conviction was expunged and an order of acquittal entered, expunction under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:9 does not render a prior conviction invalid.

Section 1983 claims challenging a conviction are barred unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question through federal habeas relief.

Reed v. Curran · filed 2003-05-27

Further, to the extent that Reed’s complaint is construed as a § 1983 complaint, his claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), because Reed has not established that his conviction has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question through federal habeas relief.

A § 1983 claim alleging breach of a plea agreement is barred by Heck when the alleged breach would call the conviction’s validity into question.

Garner v. Doe · filed 2003-02-17

If true, the breach of a plea agreement would call into question the validity of Garner’s conviction; therefore, the district court did not err in determining that the claim was Heck-barred based on the allegation made in Garner’s complaint.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim for allegedly unlawful incarceration when the conviction and sentence remain in effect.

Hill v. TDCJ-ID · filed 2002-04-12

This court need not address Hill’s exhaustion arguments because the district court correctly determined that Hill’s claim for money damages arising out of his allegedly illegal incarceration is barred by Heck. Although Hill contends that he has overcome the Heck bar by demonstrating that his judgment of conviction was invalidated in November 1997, the amended judgment to which Hill refers simply deleted the jury’s affirmative finding that he used a deadly weapon; Hill’s conviction and 50-year sentence were otherwise unaffected.

Section 1983 claims are barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Beagles v. Ciesynski · filed 2001-08-30

We affirm because success on Beagles’ claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.

A § 1983 damages claim based on the State’s failure to turn over DNA test results can be barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Lewis v. State of Texas · filed 2001-08-23

To the extent Lewis sought damages for the State’s alleged due process violation in not turning over DNA test ... results, this claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

A Section 1983 complaint may be dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey.

McCarroll v. Garrett · filed 2000-12-15

Our review of the record and pleadings indicates that the district court did not err in dismissing McCarroll’s complaint under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

A Section 1983 damages claim barred by Heck cannot proceed until the underlying conviction is set aside.

Brooks v. IA Attorney General · filed 2000-12-20

After a careful review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude Brooks’s claim that Iowa State Trooper Randy Kunert seized and detained him in violation of the Fourth Amendment was properly dismissed as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because Brooks had no potential cause of action against Kunert until his traffic convictions were set aside.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim for denied extradition procedures when proving the claimed loss of liberty would necessarily imply that an outstanding parole revocation is invalid.

Knowlin, Lee v. Thompson, Pat · filed 2000-03-23

So too, here, to establish a sec. 1983 claim for monetary relief, including a showing of damages, Knowlin will have to prove that he suffered some deprivation of liberty greater than that which he would have suffered through extradition in full compliance with the UCEA. That showing, in turn, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his Wisconsin parole revocation, which Heck instructs cannot be shown through a sec. 1983 suit. Heck therefore bars the instant suit.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim challenging a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Savage v. Beavers · filed 1999-10-20

Savage’s claim for monetary damages is not cognizable in a § 1983 action, and he has no cause of action because his...conviction has not been invalidated.

Section 1983 bars a false arrest claim when proving the absence of probable cause for a single arrest would necessarily undermine an outstanding conviction.

Sholley v. Town of Holliston · filed 1999-04-01

Stated somewhat differently, because there was only a single incident, Plaintiff, in order to prevail on his section 1983 false arrest claim, would have to prove that Gatchell did not have probable cause to arrest him for any reason. But proof that there was no probable cause to arrest for any reason necessarily implies the invalidity of the conviction for failure to submit.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims that call into question the loss of good-time credits unless the prisoner has previously obtained habeas relief.

Digges v. Jeffcoat · filed 1998-06-30

As he has not demonstrated that he has previously obtained habeas corpus relief with regard to this punishment, as required by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372-73, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994), these claims cannot now be presented in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires dismissal of a prisoner's damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has already been invalidated.

Munoz v. Cathey · filed 1998-06-18

Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages under § 1983, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless plaintiff can demonstrate the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

A prisoner’s § 1983 claim that disciplinary proceedings retaliated for filing grievances is not barred by Heck.

Sherman v. Quintanilla · filed 1998-06-10

However, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing Sherman’s retaliation claim under Heck. ... Accordingly, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings in connection with Sherman’s claim that disciplinary proceedings were brought against him in retaliation for his filing grievances.

A § 1983 claim that would necessarily implicate the validity of a sentence is not cognizable while that sentence remains valid; the complaint must be dismissed without prejudice so the claim can be reasserted if the sentence is invalidated.

McDaniels v. Los Angeles County · filed 1998-06-12

Because McDaniels' challenge to the procedures by which he was committed to state prison rather than to the Youth Authority would necessarily implicate the validity of his sentence, the district court correctly determined that McDaniels' claim was not cognizable under § 1983. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 1589, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997). The district court, however, was required to dismiss the complaint without prejudice because McDaniels may be able to reassert his § 1983 claim if he ever succeeds in invalidating his sentence.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s retaliation claim when proving it would necessarily imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction that has not been invalidated.

Brown v. Thomas Sommers, Daniel R. McBride Floyd Burton, Susan Tappan, Robert Budak, Mark Durfey, Harold Walk · filed 1998-01-06

Heck holds that a prisoner's claim is not cognizable under § 1983 when "a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." ... Because Brown's theory of retaliation implies the invalidity of his disciplinary convictions, his retaliation claim is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging incarceration under a conviction that has not been invalidated by a means recognized in Heck v. Humphrey.

Palmer v. Stephen Bell, Jim Gilliam, Jack Quirk, Dale Hunt, Kelly Bryan, Jon Orlosky, Richard Reed, and Richard · filed 1997-09-18

He cannot complain in this suit about his being incarcerated under the cocaine charge, because his conviction on that charge has not been invalidated by any of the means specified in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 claims that call into question the validity of a prisoner’s confinement are barred under Heck v. Humphrey.

Taylor v. Birhunko · filed 1996-12-16

Taylor's allegations call into question the validity of his confinement and are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994).

A Section 1983 claim for unlawful arrest or illegal detention is not necessarily barred by Heck v. Humphrey after a conviction when the claim does not necessarily implicate the validity of the subsequent prosecution.

Collins v. Reeves · filed 1996-11-21

Even if Collins has now been convicted, his claim of unlawful arrest or illegal detention, standing alone, does not necessarily implicate the validity of the criminal prosecution following his arrest and detention, and ... therefore would not necessarily be barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

A § 1983 claim that a district attorney and court reporter altered the record of a criminal trial is subject to dismissal under Heck.

Holmes v. Garcia,et al · filed 1996-10-21

We hold that his claim is subject to dismissal pursuant ... to Heck, and we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

A Section 1983 claim alleging a confession coerced by officers through threats and promises can be barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

McIntosh v. Neal · filed 1996-08-23

McIntosh’s allegation that law enforcement officers violated his Fifth Amendment right against self- incrimination by coercing his confession through threats and promises is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994).

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim for unconstitutional imprisonment unless that imprisonment has been invalidated.

Sneed v. Gomez · filed 1996-07-15

However, a claim for damages for unconstitutional imprisonment that has not been invalidated is not cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 claims that necessarily challenge an outstanding conviction must be dismissed without prejudice until the conviction is invalidated.

Fort v. Hailey · filed 1996-06-14

We agree with the district court that Fort's challenges to his arrest, interrogation, and extradition "necessarily require [him] to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement." Id. Because Fort's conviction has not been reversed or questioned as required by Heck, we conclude that the dismissal of the district court was without prejudice, and we affirm.

A § 1983 claim dismissed under Heck should be dismissed without prejudice so it may be brought if the conviction is later overturned.

Fottler v. United States · filed 1996-01-18

When a § 1983 claim is dismissed under Heck, the dismissal should be without prejudice.

A § 1983 damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction must be dismissed when the conviction has not been invalidated.

Stocker v. Hood · filed 1996-05-22

Stocker’s claim meets all of the criteria required for application of Heck. His state court conviction has never been reversed or declared invalid, and in fact it has been upheld on appeal. ... Also, a judgment in Stocker’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, because he is alleging that his conviction was the product of an unconstitutional conspiracy between his defense counsel and the government.

Section 1983 claims may be dismissed when they are barred under Heck v. Humphrey.

Monson v. Doe · filed 1996-05-31

We have reviewed the record and the magistrate judge’s findings and find no reversible error in the district court’s determination that Monson’s claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey.

Section 1983 claims that could invalidate a criminal conviction are subject to Heck and are not ripe before the conviction is invalidated.

Moore v. Collins · filed 1996-11-05

Moore's claims are claims for unlawful actions that could render any conviction in Missouri invalid. Contrary to Moore’s reasoning, Heck applies to his claims and they are not yet ripe.

Section 1983 damages claims that would undermine an outstanding conviction do not accrue until the conviction is invalidated.

Hudson v. Yvonne L. Hughes, Attorney City of New Orleans Unidentified Parties District Attorney's Office Susan Ric · filed 1996-11-05

A section 1983 claim that effectively attacks the constitutionality of a conviction or imprisonment does not accrue until that conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

A § 1983 wrongful-arrest claim arising before a supervised-release revocation should not be dismissed prematurely under Heck.

Armstrong v. Zohn,et al · filed 1998-12-16

Applying the reasoning of our opinion in Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995), we hold that the dismissal of this claim was premature.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s excessive-force claim when success would not necessarily invalidate a prison disciplinary conviction; Heck and Balisok do not govern the admissibility of evidence in that suit.

Marquez v. Guttierez · filed 1999-06-04

In sum, I conclude, as defendant concedes, that the Heck /Balisok doctrine does not bar plaintiffs § 1983 claim for excessive force, and also that, contrary to defendant’s contention, it is irrelevant to the admissibility of evidence in this suit.

A Section 1983 complaint is barred when the plaintiff fails to meet the requirements of Heck v. Humphrey.

Bradley v. Bradford · filed 1999-12-16

Bradley has failed to meet the requirements of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), and thus his complaint is barred.

Section 1983 complaints challenging a prisoner’s conviction may be barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Rochon v. State of Louisiana · filed 2001-02-13

The district court concluded that Rochon’s civil rights complaint was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994), and dismissed the complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. ... § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). This was not an abuse of the district court’s discretion.

Section 1983 permits damages claims for excessive force and deliberate indifference when they do not challenge the fact or length of confinement.

Henson v. Brownlee · filed 2001-02-13

We disagree with the district court, however, that Henson’s damages claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights is barred by Heck. The excessive-force and deliberate-indifference claims do not challenge the fact or length of Henson’s confinement.

Defendants bear the burden of proving that the Heck bar applies to a § 1983 claim.

Beese v. Todd · filed 2002-03-21

Without answers to these questions, we cannot endorse the district court’s application of the Heck rule the defendants must after all prove that the Heck defense applies.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim that would call the validity of his confinement into question unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Foster v. Fulkerson · filed 2002-05-03

As a ruling on these arguments would question the validity of his confinement, these claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

A § 1983 claim avoids the Heck bar when success would not demonstrate the invalidity of the plaintiff’s probation revocation.

Laws v. Sheriff Harris Cty · filed 2002-06-18

If Laws’s probation was revoked based upon “technical violations” instead of the aggravated kidnaping charge, he would escape the Heck bar because the success of his section 1983 action would not demonstrate the invalidity of his probation revocation.

A § 1983 illegal arrest claim cannot be dismissed under Heck without facts showing that a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Brown v. Subbuth · filed 2003-01-02

Brown’s allegations do not clearly challenge the validity of his confinement and they do not reflect whether a favorable judgment on his illegal arrest claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. The dismissal of Brown’s complaint for failure to state a claim without further factual development of his claim was premature.

Section 1983 bars damages that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Trusdale v. Bell · filed 2003-12-30

Awarding Mr. Trusdale damages in this civil suit would imply the invalidity of his conviction, and is barred by Heck .

Section 1983 claims seeking monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief for an alleged conspiracy to arrest, convict, and imprison a person unconstitutionally may be dismissed under Heck.

Shipman v. Doe · filed 2003-12-30

The dismissal of Shipman’s claims for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief, based upon the defendants’ alleged conspiracy to unconstitutionally arrest, convict, and imprison him, was not an abuse of discretion. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Brandley v. Keeshan, 64 F.3d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1995); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973); see also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977).

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been overturned or otherwise declared invalid.

Anderson v. Galveston County District Clerk · filed 2004-01-14

A determination that Anderson’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated would necessarily implicate the invalidity of his conviction, and Anderson has not shown that his conviction has been overturned or otherwise declared invalid. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint as frivolous given that the damages claim raised therein was Heck-barred and thus had no arguable merit.

Section 1983 claims barred by Heck are dismissed with prejudice to being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met.

Stanley v. Stuart · filed 2004-03-17

The “preferred...order of dismissal” under Heck, which was used by the district court, dismisses barred claims “with prejudice to their being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met.”

A Fifth Amendment claim challenging compelled disclosures in a prison counseling program is not barred under § 1983 merely because the prisoner has lost good time credits.

Donhauser v. Goord · filed 2004-04-15

Defendants’ only other substantive argument against the pending motion for preliminary injunctive relief is that, because plaintiff has now actually lost good time credits, instead of merely anticipating the same, his claim cannot be sustained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997). This argument confuses and improperly groups together plaintiffs due process and Fifth Amendment claims. ... Thus, the proposed third amended complaint was read to modify plaintiffs due process claim, but not his Fifth Amendment claim, which was directed at the SOCP and its requirements, and which is the only claim that survived the April 15th MDO.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would call an outstanding conviction into question unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Pergram v. Shortridge · filed 2004-04-21

As Pergram’s numerous arguments challenge the underlying procedures used by police which ultimately led to his conviction, any ruling on Pergram’s arguments would call into question the validity of his convictions. Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing Per-gram’s civil rights complaint. ... However, the dismissal should have been made under the doctrine announced in Heck rather than for the reasons provided by the district court.

In a Section 1983 suit, the public interest in enforcing civil rights weighs heavily in favor of disclosure when the court evaluates a law enforcement privilege claim.

El Badrawi v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2009-07-24

Further, lawsuits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 require special attention to full disclosure because in section 1983 suits: ... This finding weighs heavily in favor of disclosure.

Section 1983 may impose liability on a law enforcement officer who fails to intervene to prevent another officer’s use of excessive force.

Mick v. Brewer · filed 1996-02-20

We reject Defendants’ argument because Tenth Circuit precedent clearly established before June 18, 1992 that a law enforcement official who fails to intervene to prevent another law enforcement official’s use of excessive force may be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit failure-to-intervene liability when the force the officer allegedly failed to stop was not excessive.

Brooks v. Landers · filed 1996-08-14

Moreover, our conclusion that officers Korkowski and Brown did not use excessive force forecloses any derivative claim that Rasmussen and Wilson could be liable for failing to intervene on plaintiff’s behalf.

An officer is not liable under § 1983 for failing to stop another officer’s excessive force when there was no realistic opportunity to intervene.

Jesionowski v. Beck · filed 1996-09-13

It follows that, even if Beck did observe the use of excessive force during Jesionowski’s arrest, he had no realistic opportunity to intervene. Thus, Beck cannot be held liable under the § 1983 claim.

A hospital security officer may face § 1983 liability for failing to protect a patient from an assault by another officer, even without a prior case addressing that exact role, when existing law clearly establishes the duty to intervene.

Durham v. Mahdee Nu'man Roy Hill James Burke Ricky Rhodes, Donnie Glover George Nichols Becky Ahlers Nasiruddin · filed 1996-11-22

Although there has not yet been a case in this Circuit specifically holding that a hospital security officer can be held liable under § 1983 for failing to protect a patient or inmate from being beaten by another hospital security officer, it is not necessary that there be a specific holding in order to find that a constitutional rule in the § 1983 area has been “clearly established.”

Section 1983 does not impose failure-to-intervene liability on officers who immediately act to stop alleged constitutional violations.

Anderson v. Campbell · filed 1996-12-20

Even if we assume plaintiffs’ allegations of excessive force and unlawful arrest to be true, the uncontroverted evidence is that Officers Valencia and Owens immediately ran to the front of plaintiffs’ home when they heard the commotion, and immediately ordered Officers Campbell and Whitson out of plaintiffs’ home, thus taking action to stop any alleged constitutional infringements. Because plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that Officers Valencia or Owens violated any of their constitutional rights or failed to intervene to protect them from any alleged violations by Officers Campbell and Whitson, JMOL in favor of these defendants was appropriate.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who is present during another officer’s excessive force and fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim.

Albritten v. Dougherty County, Ga. · filed 1997-01-03

“It is not necessary that a police officer actually participate in the use of excessive force in order to be held liable under section 1983. Rather, an officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force, can be held liable for his nonfeasance.” ... The Court finds that the record contains genuine questions of. material fact upon which a reasonable jury could find that the individual defendants who did not directly assault Albritten, other, than Hollis Howze, failed take reasonable steps to protect Albritten from excessive force.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who fails to prevent another officer’s excessive force only if the officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Fantasia v. Kinsella · filed 1997-01-16

Keeping in mind that Officer Hartsock will be liable only if he had a realistic opportunity to prevent an attack, Officer Hartsock would have had an opportunity to intervene earlier only if he had not called for backup units.

An officer may be liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene in a fellow officer’s use of excessive force when the officer had an opportunity to intervene.

Crawford by and Through Crawford v. City of Kansas · filed 1997-01-17

An officer who does not prevent a fellow officer’s use of allegedly excessive force “may be liable [under § 1983] if he had the opportunity to intervene but failed to do so.” Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1433 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818, 106 S.Ct. 65, 88 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985); see also Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1528 (10th Cir.1988) (personal participation in the deprivation of a federal right may be found in the defendant’s acquiescence in illegal action).

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer who had an opportunity to intervene to prevent another officer’s unreasonable use of force but failed to do so.

Moore v. Hosier · filed 1998-05-15

While it is not disputed that officers may be liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene to prevent another officer from using unreasonable force, the Defendants maintain that they did in fact attempt to intervene in some fashion. ... In the present case, there exists a material dispute about which Defendants witnessed Hosier’s actions and, even more to the point, whether they had an actual opportunity to intervene but failed to do so. For this reason alone Moore’s suit must survive the motion for summary judgment as it pertains to his claims against Sievers, Loscomb and Swick, although it appears to survive by the slimmest of reeds.

An officer can be liable under § 1983 for failing to stop another officer's excessive force only if the officer was in a position to intervene.

Ensley v. Garrison · filed 1998-06-11

Further, in order for an officer to be liable for failing to stop police brutality, the officer must be "in a position to intervene."

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer who had reason to know another officer was using excessive force and a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Regalado v. City of Chicago · filed 1999-04-02

To succeed on the current motion, then, Regalado must at least create reasonable inferences ... that Acevedo (1) had reason to know Garcia was using excessive force and (2) had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the consequent harm from occurring.

An officer can be liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene in another officer's use of excessive force when the officer is in a position to intervene.

Priester v. City of Riviera Beach · filed 2000-04-04

This liability, however, only arises when the officer is in a position to intervene and fails to do so.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who fails to intervene despite a realistic opportunity to prevent another officer’s excessive force.

Miller, Bogi v. Smith, Andrew · filed 2000-07-10

If Miller can show at trial that an officer attacked him while another officer ignored a realistic opportunity to intervene, he can recover.

Section 1983 permits liability when an officer has a realistic opportunity to prevent another officer’s excessive force but fails to intervene.

Bogi Miller v. Lionel A. Smith, and Kevin Brower · filed 2000-07-10

If Miller can show at trial that an officer attacked him while another officer ignored a realistic opportunity to intervene, he can recover.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who observes another officer violate a person’s constitutional rights and fails to intervene.

Sims Ex Rel. Sims v. Forehand · filed 2000-09-05

The law was clearly established in May 1996 that law enforcement officers who are present at the scene and observe another officer violate an individual’s constitutional rights may be held liable under § 1983 for “nonfeasance.”

Section 1983 permits liability for a prison guard who has a realistic opportunity to prevent another guard’s excessive force but fails to intervene.

Jones-Bey v. Conley · filed 2000-11-27

Under this rule, a prison guard who has a realistic opportunity to step forward and prevent a fellow guard from violating a prisoner’s rights through the use of excessive force but fails to do so can be found liable.

Section 1983 permits liability for failure to intervene only when an officer had a realistic opportunity to prevent another officer’s unconstitutional use of force.

Campbell v. Erie Township · filed 2001-03-07

Before such liability may attach, however, the officer must have a “realistic opportunity” to prevent the unconstitutional use of force. ... Because Plaintiff can point to no witness, or any other piece of evidence, showing that Officer Meyer personally was in a position to intercede on Plaintiff’s behalf to stop an alleged beating, no reasonable jury could find for Plaintiff on count V.

Section 1983 allows liability for an officer who knows or has reason to know of another officer’s constitutional violation and has a realistic opportunity to intervene but fails to do so.

Hall v. Burke · filed 2001-06-12

Next, the district court found, and we agree, that it is clearly established that all law enforcement officials have an affirmative duty to intervene to protect the constitutional rights of citizens from infringement by other law enforcement officers in their presence. An officer who fails to intercede is liable for the preventable harm caused by the actions of the other officers where that officer observes or has reason to know: (1) that excessive force is being used, (2) that a citizen has been unjustifiably arrested, or (3) that any constitutional violation has been committed by a law enforcement official[.] In order for liability to attach, there must have been a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.

State mental hospital staff have a clearly established duty to intervene when another staff member uses excessive force against an involuntarily committed patient.

Davis v. Rennie · filed 2001-09-05

The cases involving police and prison guards clearly established at least the same duty for mental hospital staff at a state institution.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for an officer who is present but fails to take reasonable steps to protect someone from another officer’s excessive force.

Skrtich v. Thornton · filed 2001-10-02

Moreover, an officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force, can be held personally liable for his nonfea-sance.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for an officer who is present during another officer’s excessive force and fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim.

Skrtich v. Thornton · filed 2002-01-29

Moreover, an officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force can be held personally liable for his nonfeasance.

Section 1983 permits liability against a corrections officer who has a reasonable opportunity to intervene in another officer’s beating but fails to do so.

Smith v. Mensinger · filed 2002-06-11

We hold that a corrections officer’s failure to intervene in a beating can be the basis of liability for an Eighth Amendment violation underS 1983 if the corrections officer had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and simply refused to do so.

Under § 1983, officers can be liable for failing to intervene only if another officer violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Harris v. Lair · filed 2002-06-20

The other officers at the scene could be liable for failing to intervene only if Officer Lair had violated Harris’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer for failing to stop force that was not excessive.

Webb v. Tedford · filed 2003-07-31

Webb also alleges that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Officer Ted-ford is liable under § 1983 for failing to stop the others from harming Webb. Because the force used was not excessive, Officer Ted-ford's inaction does not render him liable.

Section 1983 imposes direct liability on supervisory officers who fail to intervene in a subordinate’s excessive use of force.

McQurter v. City of Atlanta, Ga. · filed 1983-09-13

Lauth and Grier as Duncan’s supervisory officers had a duty to intervene in the excessive use of force against McQurter and failed to do so. Therefore, they are directly liable for Duncan’s excessive use of force against McQurter in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against an officer who had reason to know another officer was violating a person’s constitutional rights and a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm.

Abdullahi Ex Rel. Estate of Mohamed v. City of Madison · filed 2005-09-12

Under Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282 (7th Cir.1994), “[a]n officer who is present and fails to intervene to prevent other law enforcement officers from infringing the constitutional rights of citizens is liable under § 1983 if that officer had reason to know: (1) that excessive force was being used, (2) that a citizen has been unjustifiably arrested, or (3) that any constitutional violation has been committed by a law enforcement official; and the officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.” ... Thus, given that the excessive force claim against Brooks is not amenable to summary judgment, the associated failure to intervene claims must go to trial as well.

Section 1983 permits failure-to-intervene liability only when an officer can ascertain that a constitutional violation is occurring and is able to stop it.

Sanders v. City of Union Springs · filed 2005-11-18

Thus, for Love to be liable under this theory, the evidence must be such that a reasonable jury could find that he was either present at the scene or otherwise able to ascertain that Johnson’s pursuit was in violation of the rights conferred by the constitution and actually able to intervene to stop the violation.

Section 1983 permits liability when an officer is present, knows another officer is using excessive force, and fails to stop it.

Hathaway v. Stone · filed 1988-06-27

Therefore, assuming Officer Stone was using unconstitutionally excessive force, Officers Baird and Reed may be held liable if they were present when the plaintiff was beaten, they knew that such force was being used, and they failed to stop Officer Stone from using such force.

Section 1983 may impose liability on an officer who was not directly involved in an arrest for failing to intervene.

Dawkins v. Williams · filed 2006-02-07

Furthermore, even if an officer is not directly involved in an arrest, they may still be liable under § 1983 for their failure to intervene.

Section 1983 may impose liability on an officer who had an opportunity to prevent another officer’s use of excessive force but failed to intervene.

Reindl v. CITY OF LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS · filed 2006-04-18

A law enforcement officer who fails to intervene, if he has the opportunity, to prevent another officer’s use of excessive force may be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability against an officer who fails to intervene when another officer uses excessive force.

Golio v. City of White Plains · filed 2006-11-02

A police officer can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for not intervening in a situation where excessive force is being used by another officer.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who is present during another officer’s use of excessive force and fails to intervene, even if the officer struck no blow.

Velazquez v. City of Hialeah · filed 2007-03-14

Therefore, an officer who is present at such a beating and fails to intervene may be held liable though he administered no blow.

Section 1983 permits liability when an officer present during another officer’s use of excessive force fails to intervene, even if the victim cannot identify which officer struck him.

Velazquez v. City of Hialeah · filed 2007-03-14

His testimony that two officers were present, coupled with their admission that they were present, permits the jury, if it believes that he was beaten, to find that both of the officers administered the excessive force or that one beat him while the other failed to intervene.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against officers who witness excessive force and have a reasonable opportunity to prevent it.

Allen v. City of New York · filed 2007-03-27

Thus, a jury could conclude that, because Merced repeatedly banged Allen’s head against the wall, there was a reasonable opportunity for Sakellardis and Crespo to intervene on Allen’s behalf, if the jury believed that both officers were witnesses to the incident.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who is present during another officer’s use of excessive force and fails to intervene, even if the officer did not strike the victim.

Velazquez v. City of Hialeah · filed 2007-04-20

Therefore, an officer who is present at such a beating and fails to intervene may be held liable though he administered no blow.

An officer who fails to intervene in a constitutional violation can be liable under § 1983 only if the officer was in a position to intervene.

Dukes v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2007-05-10

This court has held “‘[i]f a police officer, whether supervisory or not, fails or refuses to intervene when a constitutional violation such as an unprovoked beating takes place in his presence, the officer is directly liable under Section 1983.’” Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing and quoting Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir. 1986)). This liability only applies when the defendant officer was in a position to intervene.

An officer who fails to intervene in a constitutional violation occurring in the officer’s presence can be directly liable under § 1983, even if the officer did not make the arrest.

Marshall v. West · filed 2007-05-24

For present purposes, the court finds that Defendants’ presence at the scene (see Compl. ¶¶ 22, 24, 26, 28-31) is sufficient for Plaintiffs § 1983 false arrest claim to survive scrutiny on a motion to dismiss because if a law enforcement officer “ ‘whether supervisory or not, fails or refuses to intervene when a constitutional violation ... takes place in his presence, the officer is directly liable under Section 1983.’”

Section 1983 does not impose failure-to-intervene liability on an officer who lacked sufficient time to stop another officer’s excessive force.

Murray-Ruhl v. Shiawassee · filed 2007-08-29

Because the facts here establish that Jenkins lacked sufficient time to act to prevent Passinault’s use of excessive force, summary judgment was appropriate.

Section 1983 failure-to-intervene liability requires an officer to have reason to know of another officer’s constitutional violation and a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm.

Easley, Cynthia v. Reuss, Michael B. · filed 2007-09-14

But to establish a claim for failure to intervene, a plaintiff must show that the officer had reason to know "that any constitutional violation has been committed by another law enforcement official; and the officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring." Windle v. City of Marion, 321 F.3d 658, 663 (7th Cir. 2003).

An officer who fails to intervene to prevent another officer’s excessive force may be liable under § 1983.

Casey v. City of Federal Heights · filed 2007-12-10

As we have held, “a law enforcement official who fails to intervene to prevent another law enforcement official’s use of excessive force may be liable under § 1983.”

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who is in a position to stop another officer’s excessive force but fails to intervene.

King v. Indian River County Sheriff's · filed 2008-03-07

An officer can be liable for failing to intervene when another officer uses excessive force. ... This liability, however, only arises when the officer is in a position to intervene and fails to do so.

Section 1983 permits liability when a police officer fails to stop a private citizen’s physical attack despite being able to intervene with reasonable safety.

Armster v. City of Riverside · filed 1985-05-01

This court holds that the law is clear that police officers may not stand by and watch private citizens physically accost another private citizen if the officers can with reasonable safety stop the attack.

Section 1983 makes an officer liable for failing to intervene when the officer knew of a constitutional violation and had a realistic opportunity to prevent it.

Thurman v. Village of Hazel Crest · filed 2008-08-06

An officer who is present and fails to intervene to prevent other officers from infringing on a citizen’s constitutional rights is liable under § 1983 if that officer had reason to know that: (1) excessive force was being used, (2) an unjustifiable arrest was made, or (3) any constitutional violation was committed; and that officer “had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.”

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who fails to intervene when another officer uses excessive force, even if his involvement was otherwise passive.

Oliver v. City of Orlando · filed 2008-08-20

An officer may be held liable under § 1983 even if his involvement was purely passive because police officers have “a duty to intervene when another officer uses excessive force.” ... This argument is clearly not supported by the facts.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against a state actor who knows another officer is using excessive force, has a realistic opportunity to prevent further harm, and fails to take reasonable steps.

Pinkney v. Thomas · filed 2008-09-17

The only viable claim that Pink-ney offers is whether Peconge knew that Thomas was going to beat Pinkney (that is, at least after the first strike), and had a realistic opportunity to do something to prevent that harm from occurring, yet failed to take reasonable steps to do so.

Section 1983 can impose liability on officers who have the means and opportunity to prevent another officer’s use of force, even if they do not personally deploy the weapon.

Landis v. Baker · filed 2008-10-16

The fact that only Deputy Lynch pulled the trigger on the taser does not absolve Baker and Galarneau of liability. ... A reasonable jury could conclude that they had the means and opportunity to prevent the harm to Keiser.

Section 1983 imposes no failure-to-intervene liability on an officer when the other officer did not use excessive force.

Crenshaw v. Lister · filed 2009-02-06

However, because Lister did not violate Crenshaw’s right to be free from excessive force, Merritt had no attendant obligation to intervene.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer who fails to intervene to prevent another officer’s constitutional violation.

Douglas v. City of New York · filed 2009-02-24

As for Detective Marrero and Sergeant Clark, the strip search claim may proceed against them on a theory that they failed to intervene.

Section 1983 allows liability when a law enforcement officer deliberately fails to make a reasonable attempt to stop another officer from violating a person's constitutional rights in the officer's presence.

O'Neill v. Krzeminski · filed 1988-01-29

A law enforcement officer has an affirmative duty to intercede on the behalf of a citizen whose constitutional rights are being violated in his presence by other officers.

Section 1983 imposes a duty on an officer to intervene against another officer’s excessive force when the officer knows the facts establishing the violation and can prevent it.

Edwards v. TWO UNKNOWN MALE CHIC. POLICE OFFICERS · filed 2009-06-08

An officer has a duty under § 1983 to intervene to prevent the use of excessive force if he is informed of the facts that establish a constitutional violation and has the ability to prevent it.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged deprivation for individual liability, including a realistic opportunity for an officer to intervene in another officer's use of excessive force.

Husbands ex rel. Forde v. City of New York · filed 2009-06-30

And since Livingston was busy trying to put handcuffs on Forde, there is no basis for inferring that Livingston either was the one who kicked Forde in the head or had the opportunity to intervene to prevent such a kick.

An officer may be liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene in another officer’s use of excessive force if the officer had an opportunity to intervene or helped place the person in a vulnerable position.

Coates v. Powell · filed 2009-07-01

Thus, to prevail on her “failure to intervene” claim at trial, Coates must eventually show that Glandon either had an opportunity to intervene or was instrumental in any seizure or use of excessive force.

Section 1983 may impose liability on an officer who allows another officer’s unlawful detention to continue, even if the officer did not make the initial seizure.

Smith v. Kenny · filed 2009-07-24

In other words, if Nathan Smith was unlawfully seized, Kukowski could be held liable for that seizure, because, although she did not effect the seizure herself, there is evidence that she allowed the detention flowing from that seizure to continue and, according to some of the evidence in the record, she personally questioned him.

Section 1983 permits liability for a correctional officer who observes an unlawful beating and fails to intervene, even if the officer did not participate in the assault.

Gregg v. Ohio Department of Youth Services · filed 2009-09-22

The Court of Appeals has recognized since its decision in McHenry in 1990 that a correctional officer who observes an unlawful beating and fails to intervene may be liable under § 1983 notwithstanding the fact that he or she did not actively participate in the assault. Therefore, by November, 2006, these officers should reasonably have been aware that they had a duty to protect a juvenile detainee from physical assaults by other juvenile corrections officers.

An officer who has a duty and opportunity to stop another officer’s excessive force may be liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene.

Krout v. Goemmer · filed 2009-10-06

As of July 2006, it was clearly established that a state actor may be liable for an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment if he fails to intervene to prevent the unconstitutional use of excessive force by another official.

An officer who has a reasonable opportunity to stop another officer’s excessive force may be liable under Section 1983 and may be denied qualified immunity for failing to intervene.

Sandy Krout v. Sawdy · filed 2009-10-06

Based on these facts, a jury reasonably could find that Spears, Cobb, and Winesburg violated Rylee’s clearly established rights by failing to intervene and stop the ongoing assault. Accordingly, they are not entitled to qualified immunity on Krout’s Fourth Amendment claim.

An officer may face liability under § 1983 for failing to intervene in another officer’s excessive force when the officer had a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm.

Betancourt v. Slavin · filed 2009-12-16

On this record, there are disputed issues of material fact as to whether any of the defendants used force, the degree of force used, the necessity for force, whether any force was excessive, and whether any defendant failed to intervene, having a realistic opportunity to do so. ... On this record, summary judgment is DENIED on the Count One claim of excessive force as to defendants Stasaitis and Jones.

Section 1983 permits liability against an officer who could intervene to stop another officer’s excessive force but fails to do so.

Sanchez v. Hialeah Police Department · filed 2009-12-16

Thus, under the facts alleged by Sanchez, Officer Garrido could be held liable for failing to intervene and stop Officer Del Nodal’s use of excessive force.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer present during another officer’s excessive force who fails to take reasonable measures to protect the suspect.

Gilbert v. French · filed 2010-02-02

Further, because we find the police officers’ actions in using deadly force to arrest Gilbert do not amount to an unconstitutional use of excessive force, it ... follows that the district court was correct in granting judgment on Gilbert’s failure to intervene claims. That is, an officer must be present at a scene involving another officer’s use of excessive force before he may be held liable for failure to intervene. See Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1995) (An officer may be liable under § 1983 if she “is present at the scene and does not take reasonable measures to protect a suspect from another officer’s use of excessive force. . . .”). Since we conclude no officer used excessive force in apprehending Gilbert, we simultaneously conclude that no officer unconstitutionally failed to intervene.

Section 1983 can hold an officer liable for failing to intervene when the officer is present during another officer’s excessive force and fails to protect the victim.

Enriquez v. Kearney · filed 2010-02-26

It is not necessary for institutional/] ail officials to actually participate in a use of excessive force in order to be held liable under § 1983, if they are present at the scene and fail to take steps to protect a victim from a fellow officer’s use of excessive force, see Harris v. Chanclor, 537 F.2d 203, 205-6 (5 Cir.1976) (prison official’s failure to intervene).

Section 1983 can hold an officer liable for failing to take reasonable steps to protect a prisoner from another officer’s excessive force, even if the officer did not personally use force.

Vicks v. Correctional Officer FNU Knight · filed 2010-05-26

Moreover, an officer need not actually participate in using excessive force against a prisoner in order to be liable under § 1983 for cruel and unusual punishment. Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1301. “Rather, an officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force, can be held liable for his nonfeasance.” Id.

An officer may be liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene in another officer’s use of excessive force only if the officer had a realistic opportunity to prevent it.

Wallin v. Dycus · filed 2010-06-03

“[A] law enforcement official who fails to intervene to prevent another law enforcement official’s use of excessive force may be liable under § 1983.” Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1136 (10th Cir. 1996). To be liable for failing to intervene, however, an officer must have “a realistic opportunity to step forward and prevent a fellow officer from violating a plaintiff’s rights through the use of excessive force . . . .” Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 505–06 (7th Cir. 2004).

Section 1983 permits an excessive force claim against officers who failed to stop another officer from hitting an inmate, even if the inmate cannot identify who struck him.

Taylor v. Combs · filed 2010-07-22

Even if Taylor could not specifically identify which member or members of the movement team hit him, as he pointed out below, the MDOC defendants did not deny that he was hit during transport while he was face-down on a gurney and cuffed--and thus when he was no longer a threat--or that none of the movement-team members tried to stop the hitting.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against an officer who had a realistic opportunity to stop another officer’s excessive force.

Farrah Ex Rel. Estate of Santana v. Gondella · filed 2010-07-22

Alternatively, an officer who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force may be held liable under section 1983 on a failure to intervene theory. ... However, as Blanchard and Rivet argue, the “failure to intervene” rule applies only when an officer has “a realistic opportunity to intercede.” ... The court cannot, however, so conclude as a matter of law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer who witnesses a constitutional violation, has an opportunity to intervene, and fails to do so.

Heflin v. Miami-Dade County, etc. · filed 2010-08-19

These are sufficient factual allegations to state a claim under § 1983 for a failure to intervene.

An officer may be liable under § 1983 for failing to prevent another officer’s excessive force, but the claim fails if the other officer did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Borneman v. Rozier · filed 2010-10-15

Although “[a]n officer who fails to intervene to prevent a fellow officer’s excessive use of force may be liable under § 1983,” Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008), our holding that Trooper Rozier’s actions did not violate Mr. Borneman’s constitutional rights forecloses this claim against Captain Maples.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who fails to protect an inmate from another officer’s excessive force.

Moss v. Brown · filed 2010-12-15

The failure to protect an inmate from the use of excessive force by others can give rise to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 liability for failing to stop another officer’s excessive force requires a reasonable opportunity to intervene.

Ballard v. Hedwig Village Police Department · filed 2011-01-19

He has failed to point to any evidence, however, that these ... officers had a reasonable opportunity to prevent or stop the attack given that the police dog took commands only from its handler.

Section 1983 allows a claim against an officer who had reason to know another officer was using excessive force and a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Lasalvia v. City of Evanston · filed 2011-04-15

A police officer who fails to intervene to prevent another law enforcement officer from violating a plaintiffs constitutional rights can be held liable under Section 1983 if the plaintiff can establish that the police officer: “(1) had reason to know that a fellow officer was using excessive force or committing a constitutional violation, and (2) had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the act from occurring.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer for failing to prevent another officer’s excessive force when there was insufficient time to intervene.

Bletz v. Gribble · filed 2011-05-27

Although the third category is potentially applicable, see, e.g., Bruner v. Dunaway, 684 F.2d 422, 426 (6th Cir. 1982), “[b]ecause the facts here establish that [Denny] lacked sufficient time to act to prevent [Gribble’s] use of excessive force,” the district court should have granted Denny summary judgment on this claim.

An officer’s failure to intervene can support § 1983 liability only if an underlying constitutional violation occurred.

Mata Ex Rel. J.A.M v. City of Farmington · filed 2011-06-13

Ahlm is entitled to qualified immunity on Mata’s failure to intervene claim on G.M.’s behalf. Establishing a constitutional violation is a necessary predicate to any claim that an officer failed to intervene.

An officer who sees an inmate only after another officer’s alleged use of excessive force cannot be held liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene in that force.

Coleman v. St. Lucie County Jail · filed 2011-07-05

Given that Coleman failed to allege in his complaint that Lieutenant Wilds observed the alleged beating by Officer O’Brien, he failed to a state claim against Lieutenant Wilds under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows prison correctional officers to be held directly liable when they fail or refuse to intervene in a constitutional violation occurring in their presence.

Williams vs Jeff Scott, Humberto Jimenez, Patrick Byrd · filed 2011-07-08

Prison correctional officers may be held directly liable under § 1983 if they fail or refuse to intervene when a constitutional violation occurs in their presence.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who knows a fellow officer is violating a constitutional right, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Chen v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-09-09

Although Officer Ha is not alleged to have participated directly in the alleged search and seizure in question, a defendant police officer may be held liable for the unconstitutional actions of a fellow officer if she “ ‘(1) kn[ew] that [the] fellow officer [was] violating an individual’s constitutional right; (2) ha[d] a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) cho[se] not to act.’ ” Matthews v. District of Columbia, 730 F.Supp.2d 33, 39 (D.D.C.2010) (quoting Fernandors v. District of Columbia, 382 F.Supp.2d 63, 72 (D.D.C.2005)).

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who knows excessive force is being used and has the opportunity and means to stop it, even if the officer does not personally apply the force.

Cole v. City of Dearborn · filed 2011-11-28

Here, even if the record provided sufficient information to differentiate between the actions of the cover officer and the handcuffing officer, Michalski had reason to know that force was being applied, and had the opportunity and means to stop his partner from engaging in further force. Thus, even if Michalski did not actively participate in the application of force, he at least acquiesced to the alleged force, and is not entitled to summary judgment.

An officer’s mere presence at a constitutional violation does not establish § 1983 liability, but failing to intervene to prevent or stop it may.

Scott v. Wallace · filed 2012-02-24

But as the several motions acknowledge, even though mere presence at the scene cannot serve to establish a violation of constitutional rights, the failure to intervene to prevent or to halt constitutional violations by other officers may be a predicate for liability (to that end, each of the motions cites Lanigan v. Vill. of East Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d 467, 477-78 (7th Cir.1997)). Because that issue will-be for the jury to evaluate, all four motions are denied.

Section 1983 can hold officers liable for an unlawful tasing when they were present and able to intervene, even if they did not fire the taser.

Harper v. Perkins · filed 2012-02-29

Thus, because all of the Defendants were together and able to intervene at the time the taser was discharged, they are not shielded from liability at this stage of the case.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against an officer only if the officer had the ability to stop another officer’s excessive force.

Gomez v. Lozano · filed 2012-03-13

A police officer who never hits a suspect yet never prevents another officer’s use of excessive force violates § 1983. ... But that police officer must have the ability to intervene.

A secondary officer is not liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene when the officer has no information suggesting another officer acted improperly.

Tanner v. San Juan County Sheriff's Office · filed 2012-03-21

The Court also finds this logic persuasive, as it seems unfair to hold a secondary officer liable for a primary officer’s conduct in a circumstance where the secondary officer has no information available to him or her suggesting that the primary officer acted improperly.

An officer present during another officer’s use of excessive force may be liable under Section 1983 for failing to take reasonable steps to protect the victim when the officer had an opportunity to intervene.

Bailey v. Officer Jose Reina · filed 2012-04-25

It is clearly established in this Circuit “that an officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force, can be held liable for his nonfeasance.” Velazquez v. City of Hialeah, 484 F.3d 1340, 1341–42 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). “But it must also be true that the non-intervening officer was in a position to intervene yet failed to do so.” Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008).

Section 1983 failure-to-intervene liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Bryant v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2012-09-12

As a failure to intervene claim requires the existence of a constitutional violation, Plaintiff has also failed to meet his burden with respect to his claim against Defendants Leatherberry, Bullock, and Sgt. Fraser. Because the Court found that Defendants Leatherberry, Bullock, and Sgt. Fraser did not unlawfully seize, falsely arrest, or use excessive force in seizing the Plaintiff, Defendants Leatherberry, Bullock, and Sgt. Fraser could not be liable for failing to intervene to prevent a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who knows another officer is using excessive force and has the opportunity and means to intervene.

Dixon v. Roscommon County · filed 2012-09-18

Had they been so inclined, they had time to tell Sergeant Tatrai “stop” and, moreover, to act to stop him. The Deputies are not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 can hold an officer liable for failing to take reasonable steps to protect a victim when the officer was in a position to intervene.

Steve Ledlow, Jr. v. Stanthony Givens · filed 2012-12-12

Even when an officer is not a participant in the excessive force, he can still be liable if he fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim.

Section 1983 permits personal liability for an officer who fails to intervene in another officer’s constitutional violation when the officer had a realistic opportunity to prevent it.

Padilla v. City of Chicago · filed 2013-03-26

That does not mean, however, that an officer must necessarily be the direct actor in a deprivation to be held personally liable in a Section 1983 action. Instead a police officer can be held liable for failing to intervene when a citizen’s constitutional rights are being violated by another law enforcement official, as long as the observing officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the constitutional deprivation (Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir.1994)).

An officer sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity for failing to intervene in an arrest by an officer of equal rank when no clearly established duty to intervene exists.

Roddy v. City of Huntsville · filed 2013-05-24

Officer Lucas had no clearly established duty to intervene to prevent, much less undo, an unlawful arrest by a police officer of equal rank.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer who was in a position to intervene and stop another officer’s excessive force but failed to do so.

Detris v. Coats · filed 2013-07-11

As we have held, an officer may be liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene and stop another officer’s use of excessive force. ... Viewed in the light most favorable to Detris, Campbell and Key were in a position to intervene because White, Frost, and Tournai continued to assault Detris after he was pinned on the floor and begging for them to stop.

Section 1983 failure-to-intervene liability requires an officer to have an opportunity to prevent the harm.

Wells v. City of Dearborn Heights · filed 2013-08-26

Accordingly, we find that Wells has failed to make out one of the key elements of a § 1983 “failure to intervene” claim, i.e., the opportunity for Ciochon and Pellerito to prevent harm from befalling Wells.

An officer may be liable under § 1983 for failing to stop another officer’s excessive force only if the officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Savannah v. Collins · filed 2013-11-26

But the officer must have had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent harm from occurring.

An officer who fails to intervene to prevent another officer’s excessive force may be liable under § 1983.

Estate of Marvin L. Booker v. Gomez · filed 2014-03-11

Second, even if a single deputy’s use of force was not excessive, “a law enforcement official who fails to intervene to prevent another law enforcement official’s use of excessive force may be liable under § 1983.” Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1136 (10th Cir. 1996).

Section 1983 permits liability for failing to stop another officer’s excessive force when the officer knew or had reason to know of the force and had the opportunity and means to prevent it.

Amerson v. Waterford Township · filed 2014-04-15

Next, Amerson claims that because Mahoney stood nearby while Stechly punched and kicked Amerson in the head, Mahoney had a duty to intervene, and in failing to do so, Mahoney is liable for excessive force under § 1983. ... Mahoney had no opportunity to prevent the alleged use of force, given that the alleged events took place quickly and without any forewarning.

Section 1983 permits liability for failing to stop another officer’s excessive force only when the officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Miller v. Gonzalez · filed 2014-08-05

A police officer can be liable for another officer’s excessive force only if that officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene and stop the first officer’s actions.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-intervene claim against an officer who has a realistic opportunity to prevent another officer’s excessive force.

Powell v. City of Berwyn · filed 2014-09-19

Consequently, viewing the facts in Plaintiffs favor, all three had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and thus the failure to intervene claims as to Officers Lopez, Siciliani, and Tovar survive summary judgment.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who fails to intervene to prevent another officer’s excessive use of force.

Aldaba v. Marshall County · filed 2015-02-04

Moreover, while Officer Pickens and Deputy Atnip did not themselves tase Mr. Leija, it is clearly established in this circuit that “[a]n officer who fails to intervene to prevent a fellow officer’s excessive use of force may be liable under § 1983.” Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008). ... Thus, Officer Pickens and Deputy Atnip may be found liable for their decision not to intervene after it became clear that Deputy Beebe intended to tase Mr. Leija.

Section 1983 permits liability for a bystander officer who knows of a constitutional violation and has a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Flint v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2015-03-20

However, even as a bystander, an officer can be held liable under § 1983 if Flint can show the officer: “(1) had reason to know that a fellow officer was using excessive force or committing a constitutional violation, and (2) had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the act from occurring.”

Section 1983 liability for failing to intervene in another officer's use of excessive force requires a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm.

Rogoz v. City of Hartford · filed 2015-08-10

In order for a law enforcement officer to be held liable for another officer's use of excessive force, "there must have been a realistic opportunity [for the former] to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring." Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994). ... Rogoz did not proffer any evidence from which a juror could rationally infer that the officers who were present had a realistic opportunity to prevent Watson's jump.

Section 1983 permits direct liability for an officer who fails or refuses to intervene when unconstitutional conduct occurs in the officer’s presence.

Goldwire v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2015-09-11

If an officer fails or refuses to intervene when unconstitutional conduct takes place in his presence, that officer is directly liable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose failure-to-intervene liability when an encounter unfolds too quickly for officers to prevent the harm.

Crawford v. Geiger · filed 2015-09-22

Circumstances such as these offer too little time for the obligation to intervene to arise.

An officer may be liable under § 1983 for failing to take reasonable steps to stop another officer’s excessive force.

Maresca v. County of Bernalillo · filed 2015-10-22

Moreover, while the Marescas’ evidence indicates it was primarily Deputies Swint and Quintana who pointed their weapons directly at members of the Maresca family, a jury could find that Fuentes and/or Grundhoffer was liable for not taking steps to stop the other deputies from using excessive force; it is clearly established “that a law enforcement official who fails to intervene to prevent another law enforcement official’s use of excessive force may be liable under § 1983,” Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1136 (10th Cir. 1996); accord Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1441-42 (11th Cir. 1985) (“It is not necessary that a police officer actually participate in the use of excessive force in order to be held liable under section 1983. Rather, an officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force, can be held liable for his nonfeasance.”).

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who has a reasonable opportunity to intervene in another officer’s constitutional violation but fails to do so.

Cotto v. City of Middletown · filed 2016-01-19

Even officers who do not actively participate in a strip search may still be found liable for a failure to intervene if they had a reasonable opportunity to do so.

Section 1983 can hold an officer liable for failing to intervene when fellow officers use excessive force and the officer has an opportunity to stop them.

Miranda-Rivera v. Toledo-Davila · filed 2016-02-12

However, we agree with Plaintiffs that Sgt. Rodríguez can nevertheless potentially be held liable for his failure to stop Pérez and Rivera from using excessive force.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who had reason to believe another officer was violating someone’s constitutional rights and a reasonable, realistic opportunity to intervene.

Fields v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2016-02-19

An officer is only liable for failing to intervene if Geraci can show: (1) another officer violated her constitutional rights; (2) the officer had a reason to believe that his colleague was committing a constitutional violation; and (3) he had a reasonable and realistic opportunity to intervene.

Section 1983 conspiracy and failure-to-intervene claims require an underlying constitutional violation.

Moore v. City of Chicago · filed 2016-06-21

Because Plaintiff has failed to prove an underlying constitutional violation in connection with the June 2013 traffic stop, his conspiracy and failure-to-intervene claims based on this incident also fail.