42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not require a certificate of merit for a medical deliberate indifference claim.

Ornstein v. Cessna · filed 2020-01-29

As to the federal constitutional claim against the Moving Defendants, the Court must also deny the motion because there is no requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that a plaintiff provide a certificate of merit for a medical deliberate indifference claim under U.S. Constitution.

Paying a fine does not, by itself, waive the right to bring a Section 1983 claim.

Muladzhanov v. The City of New York · filed 2020-03-16

The voluntary payment doctrine does not relinquish Plaintiffs’ right to bring a claim under Section 1983.

In this official-capacity claim for prospective relief, the court required a Tennessee policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Wood v. State of Tennessee(PSLC1) · filed 2020-03-27

Notably, Defendant State of Tennessee may only be liable for these claims if its custom or policy caused a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not permit a governmental entity to be held vicariously liable for its officers’ actions under respondeat superior.

Kaswatuka v. DFW Airport Police · filed 2020-04-29

First, § 1983 does not allow a governmental entity to be held vicariously liable for the actions of its officers under a theory of respondeat superior. ... Because plaintiff's § 1983 claims against a unit of government rely on respondeat superior, such claims should be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a governmental entity liable for a constitutional deprivation to allege that its policy, custom, or official with final policymaking authority caused the deprivation.

McQueary v. State of Florida Child Support Enforcement · filed 2020-05-04

To the extent she is suing the Florida child support enforcement agencies for allowing child support to accrue above $100,000, she has not presented a valid constitutional or § 1983 claim because she has not alleged that any of the agencies’ policies, customs, or officials with final policymaking authorities caused the deprivation of her constitutional rights.

An official-capacity claim under § 1983 requires a government policy or custom that caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Broach v. Colorado Department of Corrections · filed 2020-05-08

Rather, to establish a prima facie § 1983 claim against a governmental entity, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to show (1) the existence of a government policy or custom, which (2) directly caused an injury to the plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not make an entity liable solely because its employees acted.

Borden-Vasallo (ID 108165) v. Miami County Sheriff's Office · filed 2020-06-18

Further, an entity is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 simply because its employees took certain actions.

An entity acting under color of state law may face a Section 1983 claim when its policy or custom caused an agent’s constitutional violation.

Smith-Bey v. Warden · filed 2020-08-06

The Court will also allow the claim to proceed as to Wexford, since, construing Plaintiff's pleadings liberally at this early stage, the Court determines he has alleged a Wexford policy, practice, or custom of denying or delaying necessary treatment.

Section 1983 allows claims against government entities, but an entity cannot be liable when none of its officers committed an underlying constitutional violation.

Asprey v. Northern Wyoming Community · filed 2020-08-11

NWCCD is a “person” subject to § 1983 liability. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Under § 1983, a government entity “may not be held liable where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers.” Donahue, 948 F.3d at 1199 ... (internal quotation marks omitted). “Without an underlying constitutional violation” by Trebby, NWCCD “cannot be liable.” Id.

Section 1983 requires a claim against an entity to allege an official policy that directly caused the constitutional violation.

Dunn v. NENMDF · filed 2020-08-20

And, to the extent the Amended Complaint raises claims against GEO Group, there are no allegations demonstrating GEO Group “had an ‘official . . . policy of some nature . . . that was the direct cause or moving force behind the constitutional violations.” Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing an entity that provides prison healthcare to allege that the entity’s policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

PAGLIAROLI v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2020-09-18

Here, Plaintiff would need to provide facts showing that UCHC and/or Rutgers had a relevant policy or custom, and that the policy or custom caused the constitutional violation he alleges.

Section 1983 permits liability against an entity only when its custom or policy causes a violation of federal law.

Baker v. Trinity Services Group · filed 2021-01-08

Moreover, where Baker has asserted this claim only against Trinity and CCS and not an individual correctional or medical staff member, such an entity may be held liable under § 1983 only to the extent that it has a custom or policy that causes a violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, such as a policy of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 727-28 (4th Cir. 1999); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Here, the Complaint does not allege, and does not provide sufficient facts to show, that CCS has such a custom or policy.

Section 1983 makes a government entity liable for a constitutional violation only when its policy, practice, or custom caused the violation.

Stewardson v. Cass County · filed 2021-03-09

A government entity is legally responsible for a constitutional violation only when its policies, practices, or customs caused the violation.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on municipalities or other government entities.

Garza v. Tewalt · filed 2021-03-31

To bring a constitutional claim under § 1983 against a municipality or other government entity, a plaintiff cannot rely on respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold an entity liable under Monell to allege a specific policy or custom that caused the claimed injury.

Flores v. County of Fresno · filed 2021-08-02

Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiff has again failed to allege the existence of a policy or custom by Corizon, and thus the allegations of her Monell claim under brought pursuant to § 1983 against Corizon in the SAC fail to state a cognizable claim. Therefore, the court will dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against defendant Corizon.

A prison medical contractor’s policy cannot support § 1983 liability as applied to a prisoner when the nurse following it committed no constitutional violation.

Shipp v. Murphy · filed 2021-08-13

Because we see no constitutional violation in Nurse Kendall’s actions, CCS’s policy and practice cannot be unconstitutional as applied to Shipp.

Section 1983 allows a prison operator to be liable when a policy it continued to operate caused the alleged wrongdoing.

Mendez v. New Mexico Department of Corrections · filed 2021-09-03

GEO can be liable under Section 1983, but only if it is responsible for the continued operation of a policy that caused the wrongdoing.

Section 1983 does not make an entity automatically liable for its employees’ conduct; a damages claim requires a policy, practice, or custom that caused a constitutional violation.

HAMMONDS v. ISSACS · filed 2021-11-02

These entities are not automatically liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the failings of their employees. To state a § 1983 damages claim against these entities, Mr. Hammonds must allege that their policies, practices, or customs caused a constitutional violation.

A governmental entity is liable under § 1983 only when its policy, practice, or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Edwards v. Department of Human Services · filed 2021-12-14

Though Plaintiff names the Department of Human Services and Child Protective Services as defendants, she has not alleged that any official policy or custom caused her injury.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a governmental entity’s policy or custom caused a constitutional injury.

Raymond v. Minnehaha County State Attorney Office · filed 2021-12-28

Raymond fails to identify a policy or custom that has caused a constitutional injury.

A governmental entity cannot be liable under § 1983 for an employee’s acts under a policy theory if the employee committed no constitutional violation.

Everhart v. CYFD · filed 2022-01-12

As a result of the first requirement, a governmental entity “cannot be held liable under section 1983 for the acts of an employee if . . . [the] employee committed no constitutional violation.” Id. (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam)). ... Based on our earlier conclusions that the Everharts failed to advance evidence capable of supporting the proposition that Ms. Becker violated their constitutional rights, the policy-based claim against CYFD necessarily fails.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a governmental entity to allege that the entity itself committed the unconstitutional acts, rather than relying on acts by its employees or agents.

Hopkins v. Wayside Schools · filed 2022-03-23

In order to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Wayside, Hopkins must allege that the unconstitutional acts he complains of were committed by Wayside itself rather than by its employees or agents.

Section 1983 does not make a private entity liable solely for an employee’s conduct; the plaintiff must allege a policy or custom that caused the violation.

Vreeland v. Carson · filed 2022-03-29

A private company is not generally liable under § 1983 based only on the actions of an employee. ... This single instance is insufficient to plausibly allege a basis for entity liability as no officially adopted policy is identified.

Section 1983 allows an entity-liability claim to proceed when repeated retaliation and ignored complaints plausibly show deliberate indifference and causation.

Elliott v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association, Inc. · filed 2022-03-31

Because Elliott has plausibly alleged deliberate indifference and causation, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count One is denied.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking Monell liability to identify a policy or practice; a conclusory reference to a policy is insufficient.

Dragisich v. Schmaling · filed 2022-04-28

Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding an unconstitutional policy that resulted in his harm, such that either RCJ or Mend, Inc. (“Mend”) (which provides healthcare services to RCJ) could be liable under a Monell framework of liability, are underdeveloped. At one point, Plaintiff alleges that RCJ and Mend discontinued his treatment due to their “policy, practice, procedures, discretionary decisions.” ECF No. 23 at 9. This statement does not adequately identify what that procedure was—it is essentially conclusory.

A Section 1983 claim based on entity liability requires facts plausibly showing that the injury resulted from the entity’s policy or custom.

Gartor Brown v. Moore · filed 2022-06-01

We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Brown did not allege sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim that any injury resulted from the execution of a policy or custom of CEC.

Section 1983 protects against constitutional violations; a violation of police department policy alone does not establish liability.

MITCHELL v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS · filed 2020-03-31

However, the Seventh Circuit “has consistently held that ‘42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of … departmental regulations and police practices.” Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 454 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Scott, 346 F.3d at 760). While the IMPD’s policies are not completely irrelevant to our analysis, they are not determinative of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry here.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of a government agency’s internal policies alone.

Phillips v. Baxter · filed 2020-05-06

Accordingly, any violation of the IDHS policy is not actionable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violating police policy unless the conduct also violates a constitutional right.

Rizk v. City of New York · filed 2020-05-22

Accordingly, an act or omission that violates police policy but does not also violate constitutional rights is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of a state corrections policy alone.

Maddux v. Metzger · filed 2020-11-16

Defendants’ alleged failure to follow DOC Policy 8.60 is not itself a violation subject to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a violation of jail policy actionable unless it also violates a constitutional right.

Newson v. Biederwolf · filed 2021-02-18

And, to the extent that the defendants did not follow policy and procedure, violation of a jail policy is not a constitutional violation enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim merely because a jail official failed to follow jail policy.

Over v. Markwardt · filed 2021-03-16

Whether any defendant failed to follow Jail policy in providing him treatment is not at issue in this lawsuit and is not the basis for a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make state officials liable merely for violating a state corrections policy.

Braun v. D.O.C. · filed 2021-08-26

But the R&R correctly observed that neither 42 U.S.C. § 1983 nor any other provision of federal law known to the Court renders state officials liable merely for violating a state’s own corrections policy.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for violations of prison policy alone without a constitutional violation.

JACOBS v. PHERSON · filed 2022-03-21

A violation of policy by itself is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a court reporter who intentionally alters a transcript to deny a litigant due process; an alleged inaccuracy alone does not establish intentional alteration.

Johnson v. Piontek · filed 2020-04-01

Further, although court reporters can be liable if they intentionally modify transcripts to deny a litigant due process, Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439, 442 (7th Cir. 2006), nothing in Johnson’s allegation that the transcript did not appear “word for word,” nor his assertion on appeal that the transcript “did not coincide with prior proceedings of what was stated on record,” plausibly suggests that Piontek intentionally altered the transcript.

Section 1983 does not provide medical parole as injunctive relief for inadequate medical care.

McGiboney v. Corizon · filed 2020-04-03

The Court agreed with Defendants that medical parole was not available injunctive relief in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and denied the Motion to the extent it requested such remedy.

A prevailing defendant in a § 1983 action may recover taxable costs without showing that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

(PC) Barker v. Osemwingie · filed 2020-04-21

However, unlike with claims brought under the ADA, this same standard does not apply to the award of costs to a defendant prevailing on a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a freestanding claim of actual innocence, even when that claim is unavailable in habeas corpus.

Walker v. Cuomo · filed 2020-05-18

His inability to assert a freestanding claim for actual innocence in a habeas corpus petition does not create a legal right for him to assert such a claim in a Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 cannot be used to expunge a criminal record.

Luster v. Cahokia Police Department · filed 2020-07-10

Finally, Plaintiff cannot use Section 1983 or the FTCA to expunge his criminal record. If he seeks to challenge a sentence or conviction, he should do so in a direct appeal, post-conviction petition, or habeas action.

Section 1983 does not provide expungement of a criminal record as a remedy.

Johnson v. Fulton · filed 2021-12-07

However, expungement is not an available remedy under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to seek another person’s prosecution or an investigation of jail administration.

Chambers v. Carter County Jail · filed 2020-07-16

However, Plaintiff “lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Thus, these claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not let a plaintiff obtain an order directing another person's criminal prosecution.

WARE v. SANCHEZ-BERMUDEZ · filed 2020-11-05

Courts “have long held that a civil rights plaintiff may not seek relief in civil litigation in the form of an order directing the criminal prosecution of some third parties,” finding that those plaintiffs lack standing or that such relief is simply unavailable in a civil suit.

Section 1983 does not allow bystanders to recover for emotional harm from witnessing police conduct when they were neither the objects of that conduct nor physically injured by it.

Crane v. City of Arlington Texas · filed 2020-07-16

Because Plaintiffs failed to plead facts showing that Jefferson, Johnson, or Z.C. were the object of Roper’s conduct or physically harmed by that conduct, the Court finds that they are bystanders of this incident and therefore do not have a § 1983 claim.

The alternate dispute resolution procedure requested by the plaintiff is unavailable in a Section 1983 action.

Logan v. Meeker · filed 2020-10-20

Plaintiff files [6], a letter and [7], a motion, each requesting alternate dispute resolution. This procedure is not available to Plaintiff in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery for an alleged HIPAA violation because HIPAA creates no privately enforceable right.

FELICIANO v. MAY · filed 2021-03-29

So even assuming the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint are true, Plaintiff cannot recover under § 1983 against Officer May for an alleged HIPAA violation.

An inmate may seek postconviction DNA testing under § 1983 when success would not necessarily imply that the conviction is invalid.

Nero v. Crow · filed 2021-06-23

Additionally, an inmate’s request for DNA testing is properly brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not § 2254, because “[s]uccess in his suit for DNA testing would not ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of his conviction.”

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim for a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination violation unless a compelled statement was used against the plaintiff in a criminal proceeding.

Chavez v. Robinson · filed 2021-09-08

We conclude that because Chavez did not make a statement that was used in a criminal proceeding, see Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770 (2003) (plurality opinion), he may not bring a civil action against the government under § 1983 for a violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and we affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim.

A plaintiff waives a § 1983 claim by first pursuing the same cause of action in the Ohio Court of Claims.

Heyward v. Cooper · filed 2021-09-27

The Leaman doctrine provides that a plaintiff waives his right to pursue any cause of action, including claims under § 1983, if the plaintiff first pursued those causes of action in the Ohio Court of Claims.

Section 1983 claims are exempt from Idaho's bond requirement for suits against law enforcement officers.

Bowman v. City of Boise City · filed 2022-04-01

The statutory bond requirement “does not apply to alleged violations of constitutional rights brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Claims under Section 1983 are not subject to Idaho’s bond requirement for suits against law enforcement officers.

Ludwig v. City of Pinehurst · filed 2022-04-18

The statutory bond requirement “does not apply to alleged violations of constitutional rights brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 claims alleging constitutional violations are not subject to Idaho’s bond requirement for suits against law enforcement officers.

Weldon v. Francis · filed 2022-05-31

The bond requirement “does not apply to alleged violations of constitutional rights brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county jail because a county jail is not a legal entity amenable to suit.

Walker v. St. Louis County Justice Center · filed 2021-09-30

The St. Louis County Justice Center is a county jail, and “county jails are not legal entities amenable to suit.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a jail because a jail is not a person under the statute.

Elliott v. Maricopa County Lower Buckeye Jail · filed 2021-12-17

Because a jail is neither a corporation nor a body politic, it is not a person for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a jail because a jail is not a person under the statute.

Crisano v. Rappahanock Regional Jail · filed 2022-01-04

Because RRJ is not a person under § 1983 and lacks the capacity to be sued under Rule 17(b), it must be dismissed as a defendant, with prejudice.

Section 1983 permits suits against persons acting under color of state law; Virginia jails are not persons subject to suit under it.

Fleurival v. Caroline Detention Facility · filed 2022-01-19

Assuming without deciding that the Detention Facility is a proper party, it would not be amenable to suit under § 1983. The statute permits lawsuits only against a “person,” who, under color of state law, deprives another person of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jails in Virginia “are arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes and thus not ‘persons’ under § 1983.” McCoy v. Chesapeake Corr. Ctr., 788 F. Supp. 890, 892 (E.D. Va. 1992). The § 1983 claim therefore cannot proceed against the Detention Facility, and the claim will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a jail because a jail is not a person.

McAlister v. Middle River Regional Jail Staunton VA · filed 2022-01-24

A jail is only a building and cannot qualify as a person subject to being sued under § 1983.

A jail is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Swann v. District Attorney · filed 2022-01-27

However, a jail is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983, and therefore, the Sullivan County Jail must be DISMISSED as a Defendant.

A prison or correctional facility is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

GREEN v. LEHIGH COUNTY PRISON · filed 2022-02-09

The Complaint does not articulate a claim against the Lehigh County Jail under Section 1983 because “[i]n the Third Circuit, it is well-settled that a prison or correctional facility is not a ‘person’ that is subject to suit under federal civil rights laws.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a jail because a jail is not a person under the statute.

LITCHFIELD v. LEHIGH COUNTY PRISON · filed 2022-02-17

However, a jail is not a “person” under § 1983 and therefore is not subject to liability under the Section .

Section 1983 does not permit suits against county jails or local government detention centers because they are not suable entities.

Anderson v. Pemiscot County Jail · filed 2022-02-23

Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Pemiscot County Jail are legally frivolous because jails and local government detention centers are not suable entities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a county jail because a jail is not a person subject to suit.

Morden v. State of Iowa · filed 2022-03-03

The Cedar County Jail, however, is not a person within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county detention center because it is not an entity subject to suit.

Dishner v. Sullivan County Detention Center · filed 2022-03-03

Also, while Plaintiff has named the Sullivan County Detention Center as a Defendant, this is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a Michigan county jail because the jail is not a legal entity capable of being sued.

Gray v. Boose · filed 2022-03-04

The Court will summarily dismiss the case with respect to Defendant Genesee County Jail, as it is not a legal entity capable of being sued under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a jail or detention center to be sued as an entity.

Dortch v. Lewis · filed 2022-03-07

A jail/detention center is not a suable entity under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a jail because a jail is not a person under the statute.

JOHNSON v. RUSSELL · filed 2022-03-11

The claims against LCP are dismissed with prejudice because a jail is not a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county jail because the jail is not an entity subject to suit.

Arnold v. Sullivan County Jail · filed 2022-03-21

Also, while Plaintiff has named the Sullivan County Jail as a Defendant, this is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a money damages claim against a jail because a jail is not a person subject to suit.

Robinson v. Sedgwick County Jail · filed 2022-03-25

Prison and jail facilities are not proper defendants because none is a “person” subject to suit for money damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county jail because a jail is not a person subject to suit.

CHIANCONE v. CAPE MAY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY · filed 2022-04-01

The jail, however, is not a proper defendant in a prisoner civil rights matter, and must be dismissed as such.

A jail is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Poston v. Campbell Co. Jail · filed 2022-04-06

However, a jail is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983, and therefore, the Campbell County Jail must be DISMISSED as a Defendant.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a local jail facility because the facility is not a person subject to suit.

Harris v. Amherst County Adult Detention Center · filed 2022-04-14

A local jail facility itself cannot qualify as a person subject to being sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against county jails because they are not persons under the statute.

Norton v. Franklin County Jail · filed 2022-05-02

County jails are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a jail to be sued because a jail is not a person subject to liability under the section.

Mitchell-Feazell v. Campbell County Jail · filed 2022-05-05

However, a jail is not a person subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a jail because a jail is not a separate suable entity.

Chambers v. Windham · filed 2022-06-03

A jail, however, is not a distinctly suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private prison medical contractor for a widespread practice that causes constitutional injury; evidence of later incidents may help show the practice existed earlier.

Gabor v. Wexford Health Sources Incorporated · filed 2021-12-13

This evidence “sufficiently relates to the central occurrence” because it has the potential to convince a reasonable juror that there was a widespread practice among Wexford-employed doctors to automatically refuse benzodiazepines to inmates who may have required them to maintain the stability of their mental health and avoid dangerous withdrawal symptoms.

A private medical contractor can be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Belton v. Southern Correctional Medicine · filed 2021-10-29

Plaintiff also fails to state a claim against Southern Correctional Medicine because he does not allege the existence of a “custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to [a] constitutional right” and that caused a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a prison medical contractor to be held liable when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Watson v. Ndi · filed 2022-01-28

Such corporations can only be held directly liable if they established or maintained a policy or custom that is responsible for violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against states, state agencies, or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Seugasala v. State of Alaska Department of Corrections · filed 2021-11-17

It is well established that neither a state, nor its agencies, nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity when the state has not waived it.

BURK v. WEST · filed 2021-11-24

Suits against state officials acting in their official capacities are really suits against the employing government agency, and as such, are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Pierce v. Connors · filed 2021-11-30

But, even if the court assumes that the State retaliated against Plaintiff, the State (and any state actor in his or her official capacity) cannot be liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary claims against a state official in an official capacity because the official is not a “person” subject to suit under the statute.

Scott v. Watson · filed 2021-12-06

It is well settled that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against state officials in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Scruggs v. Stirling · filed 2021-12-20

But a state official in his official capacity is not a “person” amenable to a damages suit pursuant to § 1983.

States, state agencies, and their employees sued in their official capacities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Sadler v. Wellpath · filed 2022-02-01

A state, its agencies, and employees sued in their official capacities, however, are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Rucker v. Purviance · filed 2022-02-09

As a result, the complaint fails to state a colorable claim for damages under Section 1983 against the State or any defendant in his or her official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state agencies or state employees sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Jones v. Robey · filed 2022-02-14

States, state agencies, and state employees sued in their official capacities for damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit the official-capacity claims against Justice Center employees asserted in this case.

Johnson v. Saint Louis City Justice Department · filed 2022-03-07

As a threshold issue, plaintiff cannot state a claim against Justice Center employees in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state employees in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Rose v. Adams · filed 2022-03-17

State employees acting in their official capacities are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state, its agencies, or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Dunn v. State of Louisiana Through the Department of Public Safety & Corrections · filed 2022-03-24

Thus, Plaintiffs § 1983 claims are barred against Defendants in their official capacity, as they are not considered “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim for injunctive relief to proceed against an official positioned to implement that relief.

Harris v. Franke · filed 2022-04-06

Typically, official capacity claims for injunctive relief proceed against the high-ranking official responsible for implementing any injunctive relief that is ordered. ... Of the three named defendants, Captain Franke is the most appropriate official to carry out any injunctive relief ordered herein. Count 1 shall proceed against Captain Frank, in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not allow economic damages or other retrospective relief against state employees sued in their official capacities.

Owens v. Pearl River Community College · filed 2022-05-05

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Defendants in their official capacities are barred insofar as Plaintiff seeks economic damages or other retrospective relief.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against a state, its agencies, or state officials acting in their official capacities.

Morrissey v. Massachusetts Department of Correction · filed 2022-05-09

In sum, and in accordance with the above law, the Commonwealth, the DOC, as well as Mici and O’Brien in their official capacities are subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the section 1983 claims against them in the original and amended complaints are subject to dismissal.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against persons acting under color of state law; states and state officials sued in their official capacities are not persons under the section.

Gregory v. Currituck County · filed 2022-05-20

Moreover, claims for damages brought under § 1983 can only be brought against “persons” acting under color of state law, and neither states nor state officials acting in their official capacities are considered “persons” under § 1983. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991).

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against a state, including through an official-capacity claim against a state employee.

Durley v. Ahlborg · filed 2022-05-23

But a state is not a “person” against whom the plaintiff may recover monetary damages under §1983.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against a state, including through claims against state employees in their official capacities.

Acevedo v. Nichols · filed 2022-05-23

But a state is not a “person” against whom the plaintiff may recover monetary damages under §1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Clark-El v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2022-05-26

The State of Missouri is not a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “person” for the purposes of such claims. As he is missing an essential element of a § 1983 action, the official capacity claims must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state through an official-capacity claim against a state officer.

Nichols v. Centurion · filed 2022-05-27

However, a state is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. ... Therefore, Plaintiff cannot sustain suit against Defendant Parker in his official capacity, and he is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state agency or a state employee sued only in her official capacity.

Bush v. Deprtment of Heaith and Human Services · filed 2022-06-03

As the court previously explained, NDHHS is a state agency which cannot be sued for damages under § 1983. And because Plaintiff does not specify that Ms. Dryer is sued in her individual capacity, it must be presumed that she is sued only in her official capacity, which is the same as suing NDHHS. ... Plaintiff instead specifies he is seeking damages, but he continues to sue NDHHS and does not state that he is suing Ms. Dryer in her individual capacity. Thus, no plausible claim for relief is stated against either Defendant.

A section 1983 due process claim concerning IDEA hearing procedures can proceed after an adverse IDEA ruling when it raises issues distinct from whether the child received a free appropriate public education.

Does v. Key · filed 2021-11-19

The Does’ section 1983 claim is not precluded by resolution of the IDEA claim and 1s allowed to proceed.

Section 1983 generally does not apply to federal agencies.

Welsh v. United States Department of State · filed 2022-02-04

Welsh brings his due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but outside of rare situations absent here, neither applies to a federal agency like the State Department.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a federal agency because it is not a person acting under color of state law.

Williams v. Haubenstein · filed 2022-03-04

Because the United States Marshals Service is a federal (not a state) entity, it may not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a “person” acting under color of state law to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 applies to state and local action, not to federal officers acting under federal law.

Poncho-Alderete v. Social Security Administration · filed 2022-03-21

Section 1983 “applies only to actions by state and local entities, not by the federal government . . . and does not apply to federal officers acting under color of federal law.” ... Because Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, asserts claims based on the actions of federal employees, the Court construes her Complaint as asserting claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a federal entity such as the IRS.

Maloy v. Internal Revenue Service · filed 2022-04-11

Plaintiff is seeking a claim against the IRS, a federal entity.13 Therefore, he cannot bring a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against federal agencies because they are not persons acting under color of state law.

Martin v. Martin · filed 2022-05-24

Similarly, a federal agency is not a “person” acting under color of state law and therefore cannot be subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to challenge the validity of a guilty plea or the quality of appointed counsel’s representation through a suit against the governor.

Fusco v. Cuomo · filed 2022-02-04

However, Plaintiff may not challenge the validity of his plea or the quality of his representation by his appointed counsel via a § 1983 suit against Governor Cuomo.

In a § 1983 action, state agency factfinding may have preclusive effect if state courts would give it that effect, the agency acted judicially, and the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

Wallace v. Sharp · filed 2022-02-11

For the ERB decision to have preclusive effect, the Court must find that a Connecticut State court would give the ERB decision preclusive effect, and that: “(1) [the ERB] acted in a judicial capacity; (2) [the ERB] resolved disputed issues of fact properly before it; and (3) the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the relevant factual issues.”

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violation of a jail policy without a constitutional violation.

James v. St Joseph Co Jail · filed 2022-05-10

The Constitution does not protect Mr. James from violations of the jail’s policy. See Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.”). Thus, Mr. James’s complaint does not state a claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a violation of prison policy.

Wooley v. Robey · filed 2022-02-22

Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant White’s presence violated DOC Policies and Procedures fails to state a § 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a violation of prison policy.

Windsor v. Ind Dept of Corrs · filed 2022-03-23

To the extent Windsor’s claim is based on the prison’s violation of its own policy, he does not state a claim. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.”).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of prison policy alone.

Stone v. Torrez · filed 2022-05-16

To the extent Mr. Stone claims Ms. Kelsey’s actions violate Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) policy that mandates he have reasonable access to legal materials, the failure to follow prison policy does not amount to a constitutional violation. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations.”). Therefore, Mr. Stone has not stated a claim.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce a settlement agreement formed in a different case.

(PC)Milliken v. Alfaro · filed 2022-02-28

However, even assuming that Plaintiff could demonstrate a violation of the Ashker settlement, Plaintiff cannot use a § 1983 action to enforce a settlement agreement formed in a different case.

Section 1983 bars a state prisoner’s damages claim when the relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction.

Blake v. Zmuda · filed 2022-04-21

To the extent that Mr. Blake seeks monetary damages, the claim is barred as a state prisoner may not assert a claim for damages under § 1983 when the relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction.

A county cannot be held liable under § 1983 for a district attorney’s policy governing when to seek revocation of probation or deferred adjudication when the district attorney acts as a state policymaker.

Arnone v. County of Dallas · filed 2022-03-23

Texas law therefore points one way in this case: district attorneys act for the state when they decide to seek revocation of probation or deferred adjudication. A policy governing when to exercise that power in the future—whether because of a polygraph result, or not—is inextricably linked to that use of state power, just like it was in Daves. Therefore, the Dallas County district attorney acted as a state policymaker when he decided or acquiesced to the polygraph policy in this case.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate remedy for constitutional claims alleging military-service discrimination covered by USERRA.

Alves v. City of Gloucester · filed 2022-03-29

Therefore, to the extent that plaintiffs are continuing to assert § 1983 claims of discrimination due to their military service under theories of Equal Protection, Due Process, or the First Amendment, such claims are preempted by USERRA and will not proceed to trial.

A court-appointed conservator performing statutory duties acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and is immune from liability under Section 1983.

Lindow v. Conservatorship of Carl E. Lindow · filed 2022-04-06

However, Wallace cannot be deemed a state actor merely by reason of his appointment as a conservator of the court. Conservators who are appointed by the court and are performing their statutory duties are acting in a quasi-judicial capacity and are thus immune from liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not preempt the Texas TCPA’s requirement that a claimant make an early prima facie showing in state court.

Rahul K. Nath, M.D. and Usha Nath v. Baylor College of Medicine. · filed 2022-04-07

We agree and conclude that the TCPA’s prima-facie-showing requirement is not preempted by Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a county’s failure to properly process detainer paperwork.

Harris v. Greene County · filed 2022-05-05

Greene County’s alleged failure to properly process the relevant paperwork, without more, cannot form the basis of a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on false disciplinary charges when the inmate had a hearing and an opportunity to rebut the charges.

Montgomery v. Russell · filed 2022-05-06

The filing of false disciplinary charges does not constitute a claim under § 1983 so long as the inmate was granted a hearing and an opportunity to rebut the charges.