42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims filed in Alabama are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Johnson v. Skoog · filed 2018-06-20

Johnson’s claims about the violations of his civil rights were subject to the statute of limitation in Alabama, McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008), which provided two years to file claims for personal injuries, Ala. Code § 6-2-38.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period that may be tolled for a legal disability under Illinois law.

Tillman v. Village of Wonder Lake · filed 2018-06-21

While the court recognizes and appreciates that plaintiff is not “high functioning” and needs help managing his finances and keeping appointments in a timely manner, these problems (including others as documented) do not rise to the level of a “legal disability” sufficient to toll the applicable two-year statute of limitations in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the statute of limitations regardless of the relief sought.

Bible v. Lorie Davis, Director · filed 2018-06-26

Bible recognizes that binding authority from this circuit holds that the statute of limitations applies in § 1983 actions regardless of the nature of the relief. See Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 408 (5th Cir. 2008). He seeks en banc relief. But this panel is, of course, without authority to contravene Walker or demand en banc consideration.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to the state’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Addlespurger v. Wecht · filed 2018-06-27

Addlespurger’s §§ 1983 and 1985 claims and common law torts are subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims in Hawaii are governed by the state’s two-year personal-injury statute of limitations.

Chung v. City & County of Honolulu · filed 2018-06-27

Hawaii’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries governs Chung’s § 1983 claims.

First Amendment claims under Section 1983 have a three-year statute of limitations.

Raymond v. City of N.Y. · filed 2018-06-27

There is a three-year statute of limitations for First Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims by minors in Oregon have a two-year limitations period that is tolled for five years or until the minor turns nineteen, whichever occurs first.

Sansome v. Fairall · filed 2018-06-28

For minors’ section 1983 claims, we apply Oregon Revised Statutes § 12.160, which tolls the general two-year limitations period for five years or until the minors turn nineteen years old, whichever occurs first.

Section 1983 claims arising in Florida must be filed within four years of the allegedly unlawful act.

Smith v. Florida Commission on Offender Review · filed 2018-07-03

“Section 1983 claims . . . are governed by the forum state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations,” which means that a “plaintiff must commence a § 1983 claim arising in Florida within four years of the allegedly unconstitutional or otherwise illegal act.” Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1188 (11th Cir. 1999).

Section 1983 borrows the limitations period for the most analogous state law cause of action.

McKenzie v. Delong · filed 2018-07-17

While § 1983 provides a federal cause of action, it looks to the most analogous state law cause of action to establish the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois use the state’s two-year limitations period and its tolling rules.

Pruitt v. Illinois Department of Corrections · filed 2018-07-24

Both the statute of limitations and principles of tolling are supplied to Pruitt’s Section 1983 claims by Illinois law. ... Under Illinois law, the applicable limitations period is two years from the date of accrual.

Section 1983 claims filed in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations.

Ryan v. City Of Chicago · filed 2018-07-26

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims filed in Illinois is two years.

A § 1983 action may be dismissed as time-barred.

Kelly v. Fahey · filed 2018-07-31

Randolph D. Kelly appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action. ... We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that the action is time-barred.

Section 1983 claims in Texas use a two-year personal injury limitations period, which begins when the plaintiff knows or has enough information to know of the injury.

Redburn v. Garrett · filed 2018-08-01

Courts considering claims brought under § 1983 must borrow the relevant state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985). In Texas, the applicable limitations period is two years. See Burns v. Harris Cty. Bail Bond Bd., 139 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a)). Federal law governs when a cause of action under § 1983 accrues. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 516 n.10 (5th Cir. 1995). The limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff “becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been injured.” Id. at 516 (internal quotations omitted).

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims.

Reynolds v. Village of Evergreen Park · filed 2018-08-02

Although the issue in Shorters was seemingly unresolved decades ago, it is now well settled that section 1983 claims arising in Illinois are subject to its two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims.

A § 1983 complaint subject to Texas’s two-year limitations period is time barred when the plaintiff gives no facts showing why timely filing was prevented.

Agnew v. Graham · filed 2018-08-07

Assuming arguendo that the Texas statute of limitations could be tolled under that doctrine, Agnew does not identify any action of the defendants that prevented his timely filing, nor does he explain how he was prevented from timely filing his complaint. The district court did not err or abuse its discretion in dismissing Agnew’s complaint as frivolous because it is time barred.

Section 1983 claims arising in Florida have a four-year limitations period.

Chakra 5 v. City of Miami Beach · filed 2018-08-22

In Florida, the limitations period for a § 1983 claim is four years.

Section 1983 claims arising in Oklahoma are subject to the state's two-year personal-injury limitations period.

Cunningham v. City of Waukomis Police Depart · filed 2018-08-22

Oklahoma has a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, which also applies to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims in Arizona are subject to a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Bonelli v. Mulla · filed 2018-08-22

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Bonelli filed his complaint more than two years after his action accrued on February 19, 2010. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1) (action for personal injury shall not be commenced more than two years after accrual); see also Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 871-72 (9th Cir. 2018) (state tolling and statute of limitations for personal injury claims apply to § 1983 claims, and federal law governs when a claim accrues, which is when a plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that forms the basis for his cause of action).

Section 1983 claims filed in Illinois have a two-year limitations period drawn from Illinois personal-injury law.

Bolling v. Kilmaszewsi · filed 2018-08-24

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims filed in Illinois is “governed by Illinois’s personal-injury statute of limitations, which is two years.” Rosado v. Gonzalez, 832 F.3d 714, 716 (7th Cir. 2016).

Section 1983 claims brought in New Jersey are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.

Spencer v. Shack · filed 2018-08-27

Her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, New Jersey’s Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. § 10:6-1 et seq., and New Jersey tort law all are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in West Virginia use the state’s two-year general personal injury statute of limitations.

Ali v. Raleigh County · filed 2018-08-28

As both this Court and the West Virginia Supreme Court have recognized, West Virginia’s two-year general personal injury statute of limitations is applicable to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims filed in Illinois have a two-year limitations period; an amended complaint naming defendants can relate back to a timely original complaint.

Moore v. Chicago Police Dept. · filed 2018-08-28

“In Illinois, the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is two years.” ... Thus, for all the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s SAC relates back to the original complaint under Rule 15(c)(1)(A).

Section 1983 claims filed in California use the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Whiting v. City of Cathedral City · filed 2018-08-29

The limitations period for § 1983 actions is governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Lukovsky v. City & Cty. of S.F., 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008), which in California is two years, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1; see also Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 761 (9th Cir. 2014).

Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

St. Anthony Medical Centers v. Kent · filed 2018-08-30

In 2015, St. Anthony sued the Department, claiming that the Department’s failure to set a new initial reimbursement rate in 2004 had injured St. Anthony and alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... St. Anthony’s claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. ... As a result, we hold that the statute of limitations began to run on St. Anthony’s claim long before the limitations cut-off of September 11, 2013.

Section 1983 claims in New Jersey are subject to the state’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Parness v. Christie · filed 2018-09-11

The District Court properly determined that the amended complaint was time-barred as to the first RICO conspiracy, see Mathews, 260 F.3d at 244-45; that certain of Parness’s § 1983 claims either were time-barred because they are subject to New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2(a); Cito v. Bridgewater Township Police Dep’t, 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989), or failed to state a claim for relief; and that Parness could not proceed under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

Section 1983 claims in Oregon are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Benafel v. Williams Northwest Pipeline · filed 2018-09-13

The district court properly dismissed Benafel’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Northwest and the City Defendants because they are barred by Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in the Virgin Islands use the two-year personal injury limitations period, which begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Cruz v. Roberson · filed 2018-09-17

It is well understood that “[42 U.S.C. §] 1983 claims should be uniformly ruled by the states' personal injury statutes of limitations.” ... In the Virgin Islands, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. ... “Federal law which governs the accrual of section 1983 claims establishes that the limitations period ... begins to run from the time when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the section 1983 action.” ... Here, Cruz should have known of his alleged injuries upon his conviction after the May 11, 2015, trial. More than two-years have elapsed since that date. Cruz’s claims would be time-barred were the Court to dismiss this action.

Section 1983 claims arising in New York are governed by the state’s three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Redd v. Leftenant · filed 2018-09-21

Redd’s claims arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 are governed by New York’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims brought by Pennsylvania prisoners may be tolled while they exhaust required administrative remedies, so alleged exhaustion can prevent dismissal on limitations grounds at the pleading stage.

Buttolph v. Primecare Medical Inc · filed 2018-09-19

Here, Buttolph’s pleading on its face was sufficient to withstand dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.

Each Section 1983 claim is assessed separately for statute of limitations purposes.

Bettencourt v. Town of Mendon · filed 2018-09-26

Furthermore, for statute of limitation purposes, each section 1983 claim is analyzed independently.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico are subject to a one-year statute of limitations borrowed from personal injury law.

Dantzler, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Ports Auth. · filed 2018-09-26

Accordingly, the Court applies a one-year statute of limitations to the plaintiffs' section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims in West Virginia are subject to a two-year limitations period, including claims based on alleged fraud.

Collins v. Keller · filed 2018-09-28

Thus, the Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983, although based on alleged fraud, are still governed by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to Section 1983 claims. Because Mr. Collins did not file his complaint within two years of the alleged fraud, those claims are time barred.

Section 1983 claims filed in New Jersey are subject to the state’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Ong v. Hudson County Superior Court · filed 2018-10-02

In New Jersey, § 1983 claims are subject to New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions.

Section 1983 borrows the state personal-injury limitations period; a search claim accrues when the search occurs, and a false-arrest claim accrues when legal process justifies detention or, without legal process, upon release.

Tam Nguyen v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 2018-10-10

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, but borrows the statute of limitations from state personal-injury torts. ... For a search, that is the moment of the search. For a false arrest, that is the moment when legal process justifies the detention or, absent legal process, the mo- ment of release.

Section 1983 claims brought in the District of Columbia are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Ford v. State of Maryland Attorney General · filed 2018-10-22

Further, plaintiffs’ federal claims (counts 6, 8 and 11) 5 have a maximum statute of limitations of three years. ... see Savage v. District of Columbia, No. 02–7135, 2003 WL 843326, at *1 (D. C. Cir. Feb. 25, 2003) (“The district court properly applied a three-year statute of limitations in this case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (count 11). ... Because plaintiffs filed this complaint well outside the applicable limitations period, it is time-barred and must be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims in California have a two-year limitations period borrowed from state personal-injury law, and an overnight stay in county jail does not toll that period.

Shaw v. Sacramento Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't · filed 2018-10-24

Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff's § 1983 claims stemming from her arrest were not statutorily tolled under § 352.1(a). The statute of limitations for Plaintiff's § 1983 claims ended on April 5, 2016.

Section 1983 claims filed in Texas have a two-year limitations period.

Burleson v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2018-10-25

In Texas, the limitations period for a section 1983 cause of action is two years.

Section 1983 claims use the state limitations period for personal injury actions, which is two years in West Virginia.

Carter v. State of West Virginia · filed 2018-10-31

To the extent Plaintiff’s complaint asserts a § 1983 procedural due process claim for the loss of his clothing, the claim is time-barred. The statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims “is that which the State provides for personal-injury torts.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In West Virginia, actions for personal injuries must be brought “within two years . . . after the right . . . shall have accrued.” W. Va. Code § 55-2-12; Courtney v. Courtney, 437 S.E.2d 436, 438 (W. Va. 1993).

Section 1983 claims brought in Kansas state court are subject to the two-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4).

Jarvis v. Wood · filed 2018-11-09

"Our Supreme Court has held that § 1983 claims brought in state court are bound by K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4)'s two-year statute of limitations." ... Thus, this claim is also barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's limitations period for personal injury actions.

Dixon v. Perdue · filed 2018-11-13

Section 1983 claims are subject to the limitations period applied by the forum state to personal injury actions.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and tolling laws.

Holmes v. Miller-Stout · filed 2018-11-30

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Holmes’s First Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Douglas and Miller-Stout because those claims are barred by the statute of limitations. See Wash. Rev. Code 4.16.080(2) (providing three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and tolling laws apply to § 1983 actions).

Section 1983 constitutional claims brought in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations.

O'Brien v. Vill. of Lincolnshire · filed 2018-12-07

The operative complaint, however, fails to provide any requisite details, and the only evidence referenced anywhere in the pleadings shows (without any dispute between the parties) that even though the IML did make monetary contributions to both Republican and Democrat campaign committees in the past, it stopped doing so after June 1, 2011-well outside of the 2-year statute of limitations period for constitutional claims brought under Section 1983 in Illinois.

Section 1983 claims in Tennessee have a one-year limitations period, and federal law determines when the claim accrues.

William Thomas, Jr. v. Copeland · filed 2018-12-12

Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations for civil rights claims governs Thomas’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims filed in Florida have a four-year statute of limitations.

Jones v. Gadsden County Schools · filed 2018-12-14

Even if he had not waived review, however, the magistrate judge correctly concluded that claims based on events five to nine years before Jones filed the instant suit were time-barred under § 1983. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining in Florida, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 action is four years); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(p).

A § 1983 claim in Illinois has a two-year limitations period.

Morris v. Kulhan · filed 2018-12-21

But the two-year statute for Morris’s proposed § 1983 claim had not expired at the time of the judge’s dismissal.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state statute of limitations.

Dawn Green v. City of Southfield, Mich. · filed 2018-12-26

In § 1983 actions, federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations to determine the applicable time period in which a plaintiff may bring a claim.

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois borrow the state’s two-year statute of limitations.

Frankie Walker, Sr. v. Shan Jumper · filed 2019-01-02

His federal claims arising under § 1983 borrow Illinois’ two-year statute of limitations.

In Illinois, § 1983 claims have a two-year limitations period borrowed from state law.

Mitchell v. City of Elgin, Illinois · filed 2019-01-02

A two-year limitations period, bor- rowed from state law, governs § 1983 claims in Illinois, Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388–89 (2007), but the parties disagree about when that two-year clock started to run.

Section 1983 claims filed in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations.

Malone v. City of Chicago Police Department, The · filed 2019-01-02

And with the clock starting on March 21, 2014, the two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims ran on March 21, 2016—four days before Malone filed his original complaint.

Section 1983 claims use D.C. tolling rules when they borrow a D.C. limitations period.

Doe v. Kipp DC Supporting Corp. · filed 2019-01-03

Accordingly, Doe's Title IX and § 1983 claims are also subject to D.C. tolling rules.

A Section 1983 wrongful detention claim based on fabricated evidence accrues when custodial detention ends; Illinois’s two-year limitations period applies.

Smith v. Chicago · filed 2019-01-03

Because § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, the court looks to the law of the state where the injury occurs to determine the appropriate limitations period. In Illinois, the limitations period is two years. ... Following the Seventh Circuit’s directive, the Court finds that the constitutional claim presented by Smith here—under either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment—accrued when his detention ended in March 2014.

Section 1983 claims filed in Arkansas are subject to the state's three-year personal injury limitations period, which is not tolled after the plaintiff has objective notice of the need to investigate.

Spradling v. Hastings · filed 2019-01-08

On appeal, Spradling does not contest that he filed his § 1983 lawsuit outside of the applicable statute of limitations. ... Because we conclude that the undisputed facts placed Spradling on objective notice of the need to investigate the shooting, we hold that the limitations period was not equitably tolled.

The limitations period for a prisoner’s § 1983 claim is equitably tolled during mandatory administrative exhaustion when state law provides no tolling.

William Battle, III v. Ledford · filed 2019-01-08

Given this structure, Virginia’s no-tolling rule, as applied to prisoners seeking to bring § 1983 claims, frustrates the goals of § 1983 and is thus clearly “inconsistent” with settled federal policy.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Chestra v. Raman · filed 2019-01-10

Federal courts determine the statute of limitations for actions brought under section 1983 by looking to the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the forum state.

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions; in Oregon, the period is two years.

Lambright v. Lambright · filed 2019-01-22

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lambright’s Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claim because the claim is time-barred. See Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions is the state law statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and that the applicable Oregon statute of limitations is two years).

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s limitations period for analogous personal-injury claims; in Illinois, that period is two years.

Lewis v. City of Chicago · filed 2019-01-23

A § 1983 claim borrows the statute of limitations for analogous personal-injury claims in the forum state; in Illinois that period is two years.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury claims.

Mohammed v. Westcare Illinois, Inc. · filed 2019-01-23

The statute of limitations for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is gov- erned by the forum state’s statute of limitations period for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period, and a prisoner’s complaint is filed when given to prison officials for mailing.

Moody v. Conroy · filed 2019-01-28

In May 2010, Moody initiated an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the seizure of his documents without a subpoena violated his constitutional rights. ... Therefore, to be timely under Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations, Moody had to initiate his action on or before May 20, 2010. ... Under these circumstances, we conclude that, under the prison mailbox rule, Moody’s action was filed on May 21, 2010, one day beyond the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s limitations period for the most analogous cause of action, while federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Coss v. Blatt · filed 2019-01-29

While state law provides the limitations period in a § 1983 action, the time the cause of action accrues is determined by federal law. ... Plaintiff’s proposed amendments to the complaint to add facts supporting his § 1983 false arrest claim are futile inasmuch as they do nothing to demonstrate that he filed the claim within the applicable statute of limitations period.

Section 1983 claims in Louisiana are subject to a one-year limitations period.

Williams v. Post · filed 2019-02-01

Louisiana’s one-year limitations period applies to Williams’s § 1983 complaint.

Section 1983 actions borrow the state statute of limitations, while federal law determines when a claim accrues; Colorado’s limitations period is two years.

Alemar v. Raemisch · filed 2019-02-04

But even if we considered those conclusions, there was no error. The court recognized the statute of limitations for a § 1983 action is set by state law, although federal law prescribes when the action accrued. ... In Colorado, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 action is 2 years. ... Under these circumstances, the suit was untimely.

Section 1983 claims filed in Missouri are subject to a five-year statute of limitations.

Allen v. Martin, Leigh & Laws, PC · filed 2019-02-06

Counts I-IV allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1982, and 1983. Sections § 1981-1983 do not prescribe a statute of limitations. ... The most analogous Missouri state law cause of action to Counts I-IV is RSMo § 516.120 prescribing a five-year statute of limitations.

A § 1983 complaint may be dismissed as time-barred.

Yang v. McNeill · filed 2019-02-07

Taeng Yang appeals after the district court1 dismissed his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint as time-barred, denied him leave to amend his complaint on grounds that the proposed amendments would be futile, and denied his post-judgment motion for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Upon careful de novo review, we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Yang’s complaint as time-barred.

Section 1983 has no express limitations period, so courts apply the forum state’s personal injury limitations period and tolling rules.

Doleman v. John Doe Administrator · filed 2019-02-11

In his report and recommendation, the magistrate judge found that Section 1983 does not contain an express statute of limitations; therefore, federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims and its corresponding tolling rules. ... For the reasons set forth above, the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge (ECF No. 34) is AFFIRMED and ADOPTED.

Section 1983 claims filed in Alabama are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Doe v. Marshall · filed 2019-02-11

Because Plaintiffs filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Alabama, they are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

In Massachusetts, § 1983 claims have a three-year limitations period borrowed from the state’s personal injury law.

Decarvalho v. Telford · filed 2019-02-12

Decarvalho’s § 1983 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations under Massachusetts’ statute of limitations for personal injury tort claims.

A § 1983 complaint may be timely yet fail to state a claim for lack of actual harm.

Hendershott v. Strong · filed 2019-02-13

Hendershott’s § 1983 complaint was not time barred, see Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1995), but he has not shown that the district court erred in determining that his complaint was frivolous or failed to state a claim because he has failed to show that he suffered actual harm.

Section 1983 Monell claims borrow California’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Marlowe v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2019-02-20

Applying California’s two-year statute of limitations, the Monell claim was time-barred when Marlowe filed suit in January 2016.

Section 1983 excessive-force claims in North Dakota are subject to the state’s six-year personal-injury limitations period.

Twardowski v. Bismarck Police Department · filed 2019-02-27

There is no dispute that he filed it more than ten years after the allegedly wrongful act occurred—long after the six-year statute of limitations for his excessive-force claim had expired.

Section 1983 claims brought in Illinois have a two-year limitations period.

Spencer v. Village Of Arlington Heights · filed 2019-03-01

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims brought in Illinois is two years.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, while federal law determines when a claim accrues.

Glaser v. City and County of Denver · filed 2019-03-04

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 action is set by state law, although federal law prescribes when the action accrued.

In Illinois, § 1983 claims have a two-year limitations period, and later discovery of supporting evidence does not delay accrual of a search-and-seizure claim.

Zafiro v. Chavez · filed 2019-03-08

In Illinois, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is two years. ... Zafiro’s later discovery that the 911 call did not exist does not delay the accrual of the statute of limitations for his search-and-seizure claim.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own.

Randall v. Philadelphia Law Department · filed 2019-03-20

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois follow the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Cunningham v. The City of Joliet · filed 2019-03-20

“Section 1983 does not contain an express statute of limitations, so federal courts adopt the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims.” Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 521 (7th Cir. 2001). Cunningham’s constitutional claims thus follow Illinois’ two-year limitations period for typical personal injury claims.

Section 1983 claims arising in New Hampshire have a three-year statute of limitations.

Torro v. Mark Goldberg, Marilyn Gordon, and the Town of Bradford · filed 2019-03-22

When a claim under § 1983 arose in New Hampshire, the statute of limitations is three years.

For discrete employment acts, the one-year limitations period on Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico begins when the acts occur, even if their effects continue.

Ruiz-Lugo v. Municipality San Juan · filed 2019-03-25

Rather, the one-year statute of limitations for these discrete acts (and, by extension, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims) begins to run upon their initial occurrence, even if Plaintiff continues to feel the effect of such adverse employment actions for as long as he remains employed with the MSJ.

A § 1983 claim in Pennsylvania must be filed within two years after the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury; pursuing an administrative appeal does not delay accrual.

Rascoe v. Cody · filed 2019-03-26

Therefore, because Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims accrued in April 2013 and the statute of limitations expired in April 2015, the claims in Plaintiffs’ May 2015 complaint are time-barred.

Section 1983 claims arising in West Virginia are subject to the state’s two-year personal injury limitations period.

Redden v. Ballard · filed 2019-03-27

Any action stemming from the alleged assault should have been filed within two years of the assault.

A § 1983 claim is time-barred when the plaintiff had reason to investigate the alleged injury and neither the discovery rule nor estoppel extends the limitations period.

Fitzpatrick v. Timmerman · filed 2019-03-29

Upon careful de novo review, we conclude the district court correctly determined that neither the Iowa discovery rule nor estoppel altered the limitations period, as defendants’ search of Fitzpatrick’s home would have alerted a reasonable person of the need to investigate, a reasonably diligent investigation would have revealed that the search was not authorized by a warrant or court order, and Fitzpatrick’s reliance on information from defendant Newport was unreasonable.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's statute of limitations.

Williams v. Manney · filed 2019-03-31

For claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the limitations period is set by the law of the forum state.

Section 1983 claims brought in Illinois have a two-year limitations period borrowed from Illinois personal injury law.

Caudle v. State of ILL. · filed 2019-04-05

The statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Illinois, and, therefore, also for federal § 1983 claims brought in Illinois, is two years.

Section 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

K.A. Bundy v. J.E. Wetzel, Secretary, PA DOC · filed 2019-04-12

Similarly, here, under either section 5524(6) of the Judicial Code or 42 U.S.C. §1983, Bundy’s claim against several Department officials is subject to a two- ... year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 excessive-force claims in Georgia are subject to a two-year limitations period, and substituting named officials for a fictitious defendant does not relate back when the plaintiff did not know their identities when filing.

Jones v. Georgia Department of Corrections · filed 2019-04-15

And any amendment of Jones’s complaint of excessive force would be futile because the two-year statute of limitations, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33, expired before Jones filed his motion to amend. An amendment to substitute named officials for a fictitious defendant would not relate back, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), because the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the proper defendant when he filed his complaint.

A § 1983 claim that accrues before conviction is not tolled under California law merely because Heck might later require its dismissal.

James Mills v. City of Covina · filed 2019-04-24

For these same reasons, we find that where, as here, a § 1983 claim accrues pre-conviction, the possibility that Heck may require dismissal of that “not-yet-filed, and thus utterly indeterminate, § 1983 claim,” is not sufficient to trigger tolling under California Code of Civil Procedure § 356.

A § 1983 unlawful search and seizure claim is time-barred when filed after the applicable limitations period expires.

Johnathan Fields v. McQueen · filed 2019-04-26

The district court properly dismissed Fields’s Fourth Amendment unlawful search and seizure claim as time-barred because Fields filed this action after the applicable statute of limitations had run.

Section 1983 claims in Kentucky use the state's one-year personal-injury statute of limitations.

B.L. v. Schuhmann · filed 2019-05-02

Thus, the Court will apply Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations for personal injury under KRS 413.140 to Plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 20 U.S.C. § 1681.

In New York, naming John Doe defendants does not toll the three-year limitations period for a § 1983 claim.

Simmons v. NYS Dept of Social Services · filed 2019-05-03

The naming of John Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe” defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any “John Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires.

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year limitations period, and claims against defendants named after that period may be time-barred if the amendment does not relate back.

Vasquez v. DOE · filed 2019-05-06

Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants are time-barred, and must be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims filed in New York have a three-year limitations period borrowed from state personal injury law; federal law determines when the claims accrue.

Wheeler v. Doe · filed 2019-05-07

“The statute of limitation for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is generally the statute of limitations for the analogous claim under the law of the state where the cause of action accrued.” McDonough v. Smith, 898 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, New York’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies.

State law determines the limitations period and tolling rules for a § 1983 claim.

Herrera-Zamora v. Crosby · filed 2019-05-08

It is well-settled, however, that “state law determines the appropriate statute of limitations and accompanying tolling provisions” for § 1983 and Bivens claims.

Section 1983 claims in West Virginia use the state’s two-year residual limitations period for personal injury actions.

Coss v. Blatt · filed 2019-05-17

However, upon further reflection, the court should have applied the residual statute for personal injury actions which provides a two-year statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims brought in South Dakota are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Shaw v. Ponto · filed 2019-05-17

We conclude that the district court did not err in finding that some of Shaw’s claims were time-barred. See Bell v. Fowler, 99 F.3d 262, 265-66 (8th Cir. 1996) (South Dakota’s 3-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 actions).

Section 1983 claims filed in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Chilcott v. Erie County Prison · filed 2019-05-17

Here, the applicable statute of limitations is two years.

Section 1983 claims in the District of Columbia are subject to a three-year residual statute of limitations.

Banks v. Bowser · filed 2019-05-17

A three-year residual statute of limitations applies to Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year limitations period.

Syfert v. City of Rome · filed 2019-05-20

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in New York is three years. ... As a result, any claims Syfert may assert under § 1983 are time barred.

Section 1983 claims in Tennessee have a one-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.

Doe v. Rausch · filed 2019-05-20

It is well settled that in Tennessee claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. ... There is simply no evidence in the record that the Plaintiff knew or should have known of the 2014 Amendment prior to 2016. Further, even if he was aware of the change in the law, he could not have been harmed by it prior to the date when he believed he was eligible to apply for removal. Accordingly, the Court does not find that Plaintiff's claim is untimely.

For a minor’s § 1983 claim, the limitations period begins when the minor turns 18.

Shalabi v. City of Fontana · filed 2019-05-21

In sum, if a minor has a section 1983 cause of action, then the statute of limitations begins running on the minor’s 18th birthday because that is the day the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state personal injury statute of limitations because the section has no limitations period of its own.

EklecCo NewCo LLC v. Town of Clarkstown · filed 2019-05-21

There is no independent statute of limitations set by § 1983 and so courts apply the statute of limitations for personal injury actions under state law.

In New York, a § 1983 claim must be brought within three years after it accrues.

Watkins v. City of New York · filed 2019-05-28

Under New York law, which governs this question, a § 1983 claim must be brought within three years of the date the claim accrues.

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois have a two-year limitations period, which a proposed class action does not toll for defendants who were not named and lacked adequate notice.

Garcia v. Thomas · filed 2019-05-28

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois are subject to its two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims. ... As such, the statute of limitations against the Defendants in this case was not tolled by Willoughby.

Section 1983 claims in New Jersey are subject to a two-year limitations period.

DIBUONAVENTURA v. DALTON · filed 2019-06-03

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the two-year statute of limitations for section 1983 actions prevents consideration of any of Defendants’ conduct prior to March 3, 2015, which is two years before the original Complaint in this matter was filed in Superior Court of New Jersey.

Section 1983 claims borrow the state’s personal injury limitations period, and continuing effects of a past act do not restart that period.

Johnson v. Newton · filed 2019-06-04

In claims brought under Section 1983, courts look to the law of the state in which the personal injury occurred to determine the statute of limitations. ... The continuing violation doctrine does not save plaintiff’s claims and the court finds they are barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions generally use state law to determine the applicable statute of limitations and tolling rules.

Zamudio v. Haskins · filed 2019-06-05

In section 1983 actions, federal courts refer typically to state law to determine the applicable statute of limitations and tolling rules.

A § 1983 claim filed in Illinois has a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Walker v. Dart · filed 2019-06-06

Because Plaintiff delayed in filing this lawsuit more than two years since the events complained of in the complaint, this action is untimely.

A Section 1983 false arrest claim accrues when legal process justifies detention or, if there is no legal process, upon release.

MESADIEU v. UNION COUNTY · filed 2019-06-06

Thus, a false arrest claim accrues “the moment when legal process justifies the detention or, absent legal process, the moment of release.” Jd.

Section 1983 claims use the state personal injury statute of limitations, which is three years in Arkansas.

Crawford v. Singleton · filed 2019-06-10

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state in which the claim arises.

Under Iowa law, a § 1983 claim challenging a suspension falls outside the two-year limitations period if filed more than two years after the suspension.

Charleston v. McCarthy · filed 2019-06-13

The suspension thus falls outside the applicable two-year limitations period, as the district court explained in a previous ruling on a motion to dismiss. Order 6, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 9 (citing White v. Kautzky, 494 F.3d 677, 681 (8th Cir. 2007) for two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claim under Iowa law).

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year limitations period and generally accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Saidin v. City of New York · filed 2019-06-14

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is found in the “ general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions,” Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989). In New York, that period is three years. See Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79- 80 (2d Cir. 2002). Section 1983 claims generally accrue when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the claim. Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013).

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations.

Lyles v. Gambino · filed 2019-06-17

The statute of limitations in this case is two years under Illinois law, as applicable to all Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims filed in New York have a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the action.

Ward v. City of New York · filed 2019-06-17

When filed in New York, section 1983 and 1985 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, accruing “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of [his or her] action.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (Section 1983); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir. 1994) (Section 1985).

Section 1983 claims brought in North Carolina courts are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

N.C. Indian Cultural Ctr., Inc. v. Sanders · filed 2019-06-18

Here, Plaintiff alleged claims against Brooks for tortious interference with contract and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on his alleged role in the enactment of Session Law 2013-186 on 26 June 2013. ... The statute of limitations for both of Plaintiff’s claims against Brooks is three years.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations, so courts borrow the forum state’s general or residual personal injury limitations period.

Gaines v. Cooper · filed 2019-06-18

Because § 1983 does not provide a statute of limitations, “federal courts are to borrow the ‘general’ or ‘residual’ statute of limitations for personal injuries provided under the law of the state where the court hearing the case sits.”

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury claims.

JONES v. LAKE WILDWOOD HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION · filed 2019-06-19

The forum state’s limitation period applicable to personal injury actions is applied to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period, and a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury.

Sherry v. City Of Chicago · filed 2019-06-19

Because he did not initiate this lawsuit until nine years later, a due-process claim based on his suspension is time-barred.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state's personal injury limitations period, which is two years in Alabama.

Davis v. Nail · filed 2019-06-21

Constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury claims in the state where the plaintiff files his lawsuit.

Section 1983 claims brought by a decedent’s estate are subject to New Jersey’s infancy tolling rule.

THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY STROUSE v. ATLANTIC COUNTY · filed 2019-06-24

For the same reasons, the infancy tolling doctrine applies to § 1983 actions brought by a decedent’s estate.

Section 1983 claims brought in Tennessee are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Lowe v. Parris · filed 2019-06-25

Similarly, Plaintiff’s Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) claims and federal claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 are barred by their respective one-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising in New Jersey are governed by the state’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

BRIGHT v. TYSON · filed 2019-06-26

Claims arising in New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by New Jersey’s two- year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

In Illinois, § 1983 claims have a two-year statute of limitations.

Allison v. Renaker · filed 2019-06-28

The allegations, however, reveal that the complained-of conduct occurred approximately two years and a half years prior to his filing of the complaint. See Draper v. M artin, 664 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[i]n Illinois, the statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims is two years, 735 ILCS 5/13-201”).

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period, which is two years in Texas.

Ramirez v. John/Jane Doe 1 · filed 2019-07-01

Because no federal statute specifies a limitation period for § 1983 suits, federal law borrows the forum state’s general personal injury limitation period. ... In Texas, the applicable period is two years.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Bargher v. White · filed 2019-07-01

Because there is no federal statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to § 1983, federal courts borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s general or residual personal injury limitations period.

Davis v. Circuit Court of Washington County, Mississippi · filed 2019-07-01

A federal court borrows the forum state’s general or residual personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 claims ordinarily borrow the forum state's personal injury limitations period.

Miller v. SBA Towers V, LLC · filed 2019-07-08

Miller's § 1983 claim is also untimely. For § 1983 claims, the Court ordinarily borrows the forum state's limitation period governing personal injury.

Section 1983 claims in Massachusetts borrow the state’s three-year personal injury limitations period.

Miller, Trustee v. City of Gloucester · filed 2019-07-08

For § 1983 claims, the Court ordinarily borrows the forum state’s limitation period governing personal injury. ... “Massachusetts prescribes a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.”

A § 1983 claim arising from discrete searches is time-barred when filed after the applicable limitations period; continuing effects of the searches do not delay accrual.

Jiggetts v. Baltimore City Police Department · filed 2019-07-09

His argument that his arrest, commitment, and conviction have had lasting effects on his life does not convert the claims raised into a continuing tort. ... Thus, neither theory of a delayed accrual of plaintiff’s cause of action applies and the complaint is time-barred.

Section 1983 claims brought in Maine have a six-year limitations period; the discovery rule does not extend it when reasonable diligence could have uncovered the facts underlying the claim.

LAUZON v. DODD · filed 2019-07-09

In Maine, cases brought under section 1983 are subject to a six-year statute of limitations pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 752.

A § 1983 unlawful-search claim accrues when the search occurs, even if the plaintiff obtains the search warrants later.

Wheeler v. Artola · filed 2019-07-09

In any event, Plaintiff’s allegation does not change the fact that, under New York law, his claim accrued at the time of the search, rather than at the time he first obtained copies of the warrants, and therefore his claims based on a forged search warrant are time-barred.

Section 1983 actions filed in Connecticut have a three-year limitations period.

Velasco v. Semple · filed 2019-07-10

The limitations period for filing a section 1983 action in Connecticut is three years.

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Cox v. Burnette · filed 2019-07-11

Federal district courts apply the State’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions in proceedings arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Fourth Amendment false arrest claim under § 1983 accrues when the claimant is detained pursuant to legal process.

Johnson v. County of Paulding, Georgia · filed 2019-07-12

Fourth Amendment false arrest claims brought pursuant to § 1983 accrue when the claimant is detained pursuant to a legal process, not later upon his release from custody.

Section 1983 claims brought in Alabama have a two-year limitations period borrowed from state personal injury law.

Prescott v. Wolff · filed 2019-07-12

The law is clear that, in § 1983 federal lawsuits, “federal courts are to borrow the general or residual statute of limitations for personal injuries provided under the law of the state where the court hearing the case sits.”

Section 1983 borrows the limitations period of the state where the claim arose.

Green v. Pfister · filed 2019-07-15

Section 42 U.S.C. § 1983 itself does not have a statute of limitations, but instead adopts the limitations period of the state where the claim arose.

A Section 1983 claim subject to Louisiana’s one-year limitations period survives summary judgment when a factual dispute remains over whether constructive discharge occurred within that period.

Heintz v. Lawson · filed 2019-07-18

Plaintiff puts forth evidence demonstrating a dispute of material fact regarding whether Defendants’ conduct, specifically the disciplinary action allegedly resulting from Plaintiff’s opposition to the quota system, led to his constructive discharge within the one-year prescriptive period for his claims.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury claims, including its tolling rules.

McClellan v. Lozano · filed 2019-07-19

The district court properly dismissed McClellan’s action as time-barred because, even with the benefit of statutory tolling, McClellan failed to file his action within the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims borrow the state statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Lyons v. Peters · filed 2019-07-22

Federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 borrow the statute of limitations from the state law statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 claims brought in Delaware are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Jones v. Carper · filed 2019-07-23

To the extent that Jones alleged any proper cause of action under § 1983 or Bivens, the statute of limitations for such claims in Dela- ware is two years.

Section 1983 claims filed in Delaware are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Jones v. Biden · filed 2019-07-23

To the extent that Jones alleged any proper cause of action under § 1983 or Bivens, the statute of limitations for such claims in Dela- ware is two years.

In Illinois, a Section 1983 claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Simpson v. Cook County Sheriff's Office · filed 2019-07-24

As this Court has previously held, the plaintiff’s section 1983 and Illinois Civil Rights Act claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state limitations period, while federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Rodgers v. Gusman · filed 2019-07-24

Federal courts must apply state statutes of limitations to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims borrow the applicable state limitations period; a three-year period governs the claim here.

Ventura v. Massachusetts General Hospital · filed 2019-07-25

Similarly, a claim for a violation of the First Amendment is barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims in New Jersey are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

D.D. v. STOCKTON UNIVERSITY · filed 2019-07-26

In this case, the applicable statute of limitations for each of Plaintiff’s claims is two years. ... Pearson v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 602 (3d Cir. 2015)(applying the local statute of limitations to § 1983 actions).

Section 1983 claims filed in Tennessee are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Phifer v. Officer Moneymaker · filed 2019-07-29

Tennessee applies a one-year statute of limitations to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own; courts apply the personal injury limitations period of the state where the alleged injury occurred.

Olrich v. Kenosha County · filed 2019-07-30

Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations. ... Federal courts apply the limitations periods used for personal injury cases in the state in which the alleged injury occurred. ... Under either the six-year statute of limitations that applied between 2007 and April 2018 or the three-year statute that has applied since then, the plaintiff’s complaint is time-barred.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own; courts apply the state limitations period for personal injury claims.

Olrich v. City of Kenosha · filed 2019-07-30

Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations. Malone v. Corr. Corp. of America, 553 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2009). Federal courts apply the limitations periods used for personal injury cases in the state in which the alleged injury occurred.

Section 1983 claims arising in Nebraska are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

Jones v. Carter · filed 2019-07-30

In Nebraska, § 1983 actions are subject to a 4-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims brought in Connecticut federal court are governed by a three-year statute of limitations.

El-Massri v. New Haven Correctional Center · filed 2019-07-31

Claims brought in this Court under § 1983 are governed by the three-year statute of limitations codified in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577.

Section 1983 claims may be dismissed when the applicable statute of limitations bar is apparent on the face of the complaint.

Jones v. Ahmed · filed 2019-08-01

Here, the face of Jones’ complaint shows that his claims purportedly advanced pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are, inter alia, barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims brought in Maine are subject to a six-year limitations period.

GIRARD v. DODD · filed 2019-08-02

In Maine, cases brought under section 1983 are subject to a six-year statute of limitations pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 752.

In Illinois, a § 1983 claim enforcing rights created by § 1981 has a four-year limitations period.

Barrett v. Illinois Community College District No. 515 · filed 2019-08-05

And although the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Illinois is two years, when such a claim is brought pursuant to the substantive rights created by § 1981, the § 1981 four-year statute of limitations applies.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own; its claims use the state's personal injury limitations period.

Golike v. Braden · filed 2019-08-05

Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations period, but it is well settled that constitutional claims asserted under § 1983 are governed by the state personal injury statute of limitations.