42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against a state, including through claims against state employees in their official capacities.

Acevedo v. Nichols · filed 2022-05-23

But a state is not a “person” against whom the plaintiff may recover monetary damages under §1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Clark-El v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2022-05-26

The State of Missouri is not a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “person” for the purposes of such claims. As he is missing an essential element of a § 1983 action, the official capacity claims must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state through an official-capacity claim against a state officer.

Nichols v. Centurion · filed 2022-05-27

However, a state is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. ... Therefore, Plaintiff cannot sustain suit against Defendant Parker in his official capacity, and he is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state agency or a state employee sued only in her official capacity.

Bush v. Deprtment of Heaith and Human Services · filed 2022-06-03

As the court previously explained, NDHHS is a state agency which cannot be sued for damages under § 1983. And because Plaintiff does not specify that Ms. Dryer is sued in her individual capacity, it must be presumed that she is sued only in her official capacity, which is the same as suing NDHHS. ... Plaintiff instead specifies he is seeking damages, but he continues to sue NDHHS and does not state that he is suing Ms. Dryer in her individual capacity. Thus, no plausible claim for relief is stated against either Defendant.

A state agency is not a person under § 1983.

Hock v. Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Health and Human Services · filed 2022-06-17

For purposes of § 1983, a state agency is not considered a person and, accordingly, is protected by the Eleventh Amendment.

A state official acting in an official capacity is not a person who can be sued under § 1983.

Wright v. Bowerman · filed 2022-06-21

“[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Therefore, Wright cannot proceed with an official-capacity claim against Bowerman.

Section 1983 permits a warden to remain an official-capacity defendant when the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief the warden would carry out.

Wilson v. Jeffreys · filed 2022-06-24

Because Wilson requests injunctive relief, Warden David Mitchell will remain a defendant in his official capacity only and shall be responsible for carrying out any injunctive relief that is ordered in this case.

State agencies and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to damages suits under Section 1983.

Woodard v. United States of America · filed 2022-06-28

“It is well established that arms of the state, or state officials acting in their official capacities, are not ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983 and therefore are immune from § 1983 damages suits.” ... The Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for the reasons stated by Judge Ritter.

A state is not a person subject to a claim for money damages under § 1983, so official capacity damages claims against state employees fail.

Stubbs v. State of Missouri · filed 2022-08-02

Here, plaintiff’s official capacity claims against these state employees fail, as the State of Missouri is not a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “person,” and because the state is protected by sovereign immunity.

A defendant sued in an official capacity must be a person amenable to suit under Section 1983.

Smith v. Demory · filed 2022-08-24

Furthermore, pursuant to § 1983, Defendant Demory, acting in his official capacity, is not considered a “person” amenable to suit. ... Therefore, the court agrees with, and wholly ADOPTS, the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations in the Report (ECF No. 43), which is incorporated herein by reference.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against state officials in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Hamilton v. Allison · filed 2022-08-31

State officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” under Section 1983 because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). ... The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or state employees sued in their official capacities because a state is not a “person” under the statute.

Davidson v. Stringer · filed 2022-08-31

Here, plaintiff has sued employees of the Missouri Department of Mental Health for money damages. Those claims are treated as claims against defendants’ employer, which is the State of Missouri. As noted above, a state is not a § 1983 “person” for purposes of such a claim. Because the State of Missouri is not a person, plaintiff is missing an essential element under § 1983. Therefore, these claims must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not treat a state agency or state officials sued in their official capacities as persons subject to claims for monetary relief.

Hughes v. Oklahoma State of · filed 2022-08-31

Because the Supreme Court’s precedent in Will mandates that neither DHS nor the named individual defendants sued in their official capacities qualify as “persons” under § 1983, the court concludes that plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims seeking monetary relief against these defendants are subject to dismissal.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary relief against a state agency or a state official sued in an official capacity, but permits prospective injunctive relief against an official.

Hock v. Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Health and Human Services · filed 2022-09-06

In other words, Plaintiff cannot successfully bring a claim for monetary relief (rather than injunctive relief) against any state entity or state official in their official capacity.

Section 1983 does not allow money-damages claims against a state, its department of corrections, or state officers sued in their official capacities because the state is not a “person” under the statute.

Weyant v. Hubbard · filed 2022-09-06

The State of Missouri is not a “person” for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for money damages, id. at 71, so the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for relief against both the Missouri Department of Corrections and Officers Hubbard and Cunningham in their official capacities.

States, state agencies, and state officials sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to money damages under § 1983.

Cromer 211902 v. Eagan · filed 2022-09-16

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for money damages under § 1983 against the MPB or the individual Parole Defendants in their respective official capacities.

States, state agencies, and officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to suits for monetary relief under § 1983.

Sanchez v. State of Washington · filed 2022-10-19

States, state agencies, and officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” and so are not subject to a suit for monetary relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim against a state through employees sued in their official capacities because the state is not a person under the statute.

Crandall v. Armijo · filed 2022-10-25

Those claims fail because the State of Missouri is not a “person” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and because plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 permits a warden to be named in his official capacity to implement injunctive relief for a detainee’s medical care claim.

Hollins v. Neihoff · filed 2022-10-28

In connection with Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief in Count 4, Warden Spurlock shall be named as a defendant in his official capacity.

A section 1983 due process claim concerning IDEA hearing procedures can proceed after an adverse IDEA ruling when it raises issues distinct from whether the child received a free appropriate public education.

Does v. Key · filed 2021-11-19

The Does’ section 1983 claim is not precluded by resolution of the IDEA claim and 1s allowed to proceed.

Section 1983 generally does not apply to federal agencies.

Welsh v. United States Department of State · filed 2022-02-04

Welsh brings his due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but outside of rare situations absent here, neither applies to a federal agency like the State Department.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a federal agency because it is not a person acting under color of state law.

Williams v. Haubenstein · filed 2022-03-04

Because the United States Marshals Service is a federal (not a state) entity, it may not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a “person” acting under color of state law to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 applies to state and local action, not to federal officers acting under federal law.

Poncho-Alderete v. Social Security Administration · filed 2022-03-21

Section 1983 “applies only to actions by state and local entities, not by the federal government . . . and does not apply to federal officers acting under color of federal law.” ... Because Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, asserts claims based on the actions of federal employees, the Court construes her Complaint as asserting claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a federal entity such as the IRS.

Maloy v. Internal Revenue Service · filed 2022-04-11

Plaintiff is seeking a claim against the IRS, a federal entity.13 Therefore, he cannot bring a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against federal agencies because they are not persons acting under color of state law.

Martin v. Martin · filed 2022-05-24

Similarly, a federal agency is not a “person” acting under color of state law and therefore cannot be subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to challenge the validity of a guilty plea or the quality of appointed counsel’s representation through a suit against the governor.

Fusco v. Cuomo · filed 2022-02-04

However, Plaintiff may not challenge the validity of his plea or the quality of his representation by his appointed counsel via a § 1983 suit against Governor Cuomo.

In a Section 1983 action, a state agency’s factual findings may have preclusive effect if the agency acted in a judicial capacity, resolved facts properly before it, and the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

Wallace v. Sharp · filed 2022-02-11

For the ERB decision to have preclusive effect, the Court must find that a Connecticut State court would give the ERB decision preclusive effect, and that: “(1) [the ERB] acted in a judicial capacity; (2) [the ERB] resolved disputed issues of fact properly before it; and (3) the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the relevant factual issues.” ... Accordingly, the “judicial capacity” requirement has been satisfied.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violation of a jail policy without a constitutional violation.

James v. St Joseph Co Jail · filed 2022-05-10

The Constitution does not protect Mr. James from violations of the jail’s policy. See Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.”). Thus, Mr. James’s complaint does not state a claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a violation of prison policy.

Wooley v. Robey · filed 2022-02-22

Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant White’s presence violated DOC Policies and Procedures fails to state a § 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a violation of prison policy.

Windsor v. Ind Dept of Corrs · filed 2022-03-23

To the extent Windsor’s claim is based on the prison’s violation of its own policy, he does not state a claim. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.”).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of prison policy alone.

Stone v. Torrez · filed 2022-05-16

To the extent Mr. Stone claims Ms. Kelsey’s actions violate Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) policy that mandates he have reasonable access to legal materials, the failure to follow prison policy does not amount to a constitutional violation. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations.”). Therefore, Mr. Stone has not stated a claim.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a prison official’s violation of a prison regulation or administrative directive alone.

Diaz v. Bowles · filed 2022-06-06

The Defendants’ alleged failure to comply with prison regulations or administrative directives, however, does not constitute a basis for relief under § 1983 because “a prison official’s violation of a prison regulation or policy does not establish that the official has violated the Constitution or is liable to a prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Fine v. UConn Med., No. 3:18-CV-530 (JAM), 2019 WL 236726, at *9 (D. Conn. Jan. 16, 2019) (internal citation omitted).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of prison policies or regulations alone.

Durley v. Moore · filed 2022-07-11

And §1983 protects against only constitutional violations, not violations of prison policies or regulations.

Section 1983 permits claims for violations of federal rights, but violations of prison policies alone do not state a claim.

Wadsworth v. Hyatte · filed 2022-07-19

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue for a violation of his federal rights, not of IDOC policies.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violating prison policy alone.

Durley v. Ahlborg · filed 2022-07-20

Section 1983 protects against only constitutional violations; it does not protect against violations of departmental practices or policies.

Section 1983 does not make a prison policy violation actionable without a plausible underlying constitutional violation.

Fuller v. Huneycutt · filed 2022-09-07

However, a policy violation does not rise to the level of a § 1983 claim absent a plausible allegation of an underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not make a violation of prison policy actionable without a plausible underlying constitutional violation.

Fuller v. Slagle · filed 2022-09-07

The Plaintiff’s allegations that the Defendants violated prison policies do not rise to the level of a § 1983 claim absent a plausible allegation of an underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of prison policies or procedures alone.

Ferebee v. Manis · filed 2022-09-26

Thus, the violation of Wallens Ridge policies or procedures, standing alone, is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide redress for violations of prison policy.

Pann 254048 v. Hammer · filed 2022-10-26

Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of prison policy.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of prison policy alone.

Troutman v. Liebel · filed 2022-10-28

To the extent he is claiming Mr. Gapski violated prison policy in connection with the handling of his mail, this cannot form the basis for a constitutional claim. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or . . . departmental regulations”).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a breach of internal prison policy unless the breach rises to a constitutional violation.

Norman v. Brown · filed 2022-11-01

Even if he did intend to do so, they are not cognizable. ... (holding that “prison officials’ failure to follow internal prison policies are not actionable under § 1983 unless the alleged breach of policy rises to the level of constitutional violation”); ... Accordingly, these allegations are dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce a settlement agreement formed in a different case.

(PC)Milliken v. Alfaro · filed 2022-02-28

However, even assuming that Plaintiff could demonstrate a violation of the Ashker settlement, Plaintiff cannot use a § 1983 action to enforce a settlement agreement formed in a different case.

Section 1983 bars a state prisoner’s damages claim when the relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction.

Blake v. Zmuda · filed 2022-04-21

To the extent that Mr. Blake seeks monetary damages, the claim is barred as a state prisoner may not assert a claim for damages under § 1983 when the relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction.

A county cannot be held liable under § 1983 for a district attorney’s policy governing when to seek revocation of probation or deferred adjudication when the district attorney acts as a state policymaker.

Arnone v. County of Dallas · filed 2022-03-23

Texas law therefore points one way in this case: district attorneys act for the state when they decide to seek revocation of probation or deferred adjudication. A policy governing when to exercise that power in the future—whether because of a polygraph result, or not—is inextricably linked to that use of state power, just like it was in Daves. Therefore, the Dallas County district attorney acted as a state policymaker when he decided or acquiesced to the polygraph policy in this case.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate remedy for constitutional claims alleging military-service discrimination covered by USERRA.

Alves v. City of Gloucester · filed 2022-03-29

Therefore, to the extent that plaintiffs are continuing to assert § 1983 claims of discrimination due to their military service under theories of Equal Protection, Due Process, or the First Amendment, such claims are preempted by USERRA and will not proceed to trial.

A court-appointed conservator performing statutory duties acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and is immune from liability under Section 1983.

Lindow v. Conservatorship of Carl E. Lindow · filed 2022-04-06

However, Wallace cannot be deemed a state actor merely by reason of his appointment as a conservator of the court. Conservators who are appointed by the court and are performing their statutory duties are acting in a quasi-judicial capacity and are thus immune from liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not preempt the Texas TCPA’s requirement that a claimant make an early prima facie showing in state court.

Rahul K. Nath, M.D. and Usha Nath v. Baylor College of Medicine. · filed 2022-04-07

We agree and conclude that the TCPA’s prima-facie-showing requirement is not preempted by Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a county’s failure to properly process detainer paperwork.

Harris v. Greene County · filed 2022-05-05

Greene County’s alleged failure to properly process the relevant paperwork, without more, cannot form the basis of a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on false disciplinary charges when the inmate had a hearing and an opportunity to rebut the charges.

Montgomery v. Russell · filed 2022-05-06

The filing of false disciplinary charges does not constitute a claim under § 1983 so long as the inmate was granted a hearing and an opportunity to rebut the charges.

A § 1983 claim may be subject to the prior exclusive jurisdiction rule when it seeks to interfere with an earlier state court proceeding over the same property.

Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Lara · filed 2022-06-10

With this background, it is clear that abstention under the prior exclusive jurisdiction rule can be proper even though the federal action asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

A filing seeking damages for an alleged violation of constitutional rights may be treated as a civil rights claim under § 1983.

Kirk v. United States · filed 2022-06-15

The Court determined that Kirk’s filing is properly treated as a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A full pardon satisfies Heck’s invalidation requirement for a § 1983 claim even if it does not establish innocence.

Carr v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., Ky. · filed 2022-06-16

We hold that a full pardon, regardless of its implications for the question of innocence, meets the requirements of Heck.

Section 1983 generally does not allow an official to avoid liability by saying that the official was following orders.

Shipp, Booker v. Lobenstein, Kenneth · filed 2022-07-05

Shipp is correct that “generally, there is no ‘just following orders’ defense in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not displace Missouri’s procedure for claims against deceased defendants when that procedure does not conflict with the statute’s policies.

Irons v. Neske · filed 2022-07-21

In sum, although I recognize that the specific facts of this case have left Irons without a remedy against Hanlen under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.021, I do not find that the statute is inconsistent with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to such an extent that it should be disregarded in favor of federal common law.

A § 1983 complaint must request discernible relief; asking the court to “declare justice” over defendants does not suffice.

Romo Jr. v. Lindberg · filed 2022-08-01

This is not a proper request for relief in a § 1983 action. The Court is unable to discern what relief Romo seeks. Accordingly, Romo has failed to request any viable relief for his § 1983 claims.

An incarcerated plaintiff in a § 1983 action has no absolute right to attend trial in person.

Griffin v. Hooks · filed 2022-08-02

An incarcerated litigant in a § 1983 action does not have an absolute right to be physically present at the trial of his case.

A § 1983 claim challenging discriminatory harassment is not a selective prosecution claim when it does not question the lawfulness of a later prosecution or conviction.

Simmons v. The City of Southport North Carolina · filed 2022-08-03

Plaintiff's § 1983 claim does not call into question the lawfulness of any subsequent legal prosecution or conviction by the state of North Carolina. Thus, plaintiff's claim is not a selective prosecution claim.