42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims filed in Texas have a two-year limitations period, even when they arise from sexual abuse.

King-White v. Humble Independent School District · filed 2015-10-20

In Texas, applying the “general or residual” personal injury statute of limitations means applying the two-year period in Section 16.003, regardless of whether the facts underlying the particular claim make an exception potentially applicable.

A § 1983 claim alleging an ongoing failure to provide requested medical care is not necessarily time barred on the face of the complaint when it pleads a continuing violation.

Boswell v. Claiborne Parish Detention Ctr · filed 2015-10-21

The district court dismissed Boswell’s claim regarding the denial of medical attention and medication for his hernia on grounds that the claim was prescribed; however, as Boswell argues, he has pleaded a continuing violation based on “a failure to provide needed and requested medical attention.” Lavellee v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129, 1132 (5th Cir. 1980). Thus, it is not clear from the face of his complaint that the claim was prescribed.

Section 1983 claims use the state's limitations period for personal injury actions.

Thornton v. Hens-Greco · filed 2015-10-23

The statutes of limitations for bringing a civil rights suit under §§ 1983 and 1985 are the same as the state statute of limitations for bringing a personal injury action.

Section 1983 actions use the relevant state’s personal injury limitations period.

Borda v. Chase · filed 2015-10-26

Section 1983 actions are in turn subject to the relevant state’s personal injury limitations period.

A § 1983 claim brought in Colorado has a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or should know of the constitutional injury, even if its consequences occur later.

Walker v. White · filed 2015-10-27

The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in Colorado is two years from the time the cause of action accrued. ... Thus, we conclude that all of Walker’s claims against the State Defendants are time-barred.

Section 1983 actions in Washington have a three-year limitations period, subject to equitable tolling.

Mora v. Ely · filed 2015-10-29

Dismissal of Mora’s action with prejudice was proper because it was time- barred, and Mora failed to show that she was entitled to any tolling. See Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991) (limitations period for § 1983 action is three years under Washington state law); Perez v. Garcia, 198 P.3d 539, 545 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (explaining equitable tolling under Washington law).

Section 1983 claims in California are subject to a two-year limitations period, and a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Schneider v. Amador County · filed 2015-10-29

The district court properly dismissed Schneider’s First Amendment retaliation claim as barred by the statue of limitations because Schneider filed his action more than two years after his claims accrued and Schneider did not show any basis for equitable estoppel.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state's statute of limitations and tolling rules.

Norwood v. City of Mendenhall, MS · filed 2015-11-06

For § 1983 claims, we borrow the statute of limitations and tolling principles from the forum state.

Section 1983 has no limitations period and requires borrowing the forum state’s personal injury limitations period.

McLaughlin v. Boston Retirement Board · filed 2015-11-12

§ 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations provision, and courts have accordingly been directed to “borrow the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.”

Section 1983 uses state law to govern the statute of limitations and tolling.

Graham v. Teller County · filed 2015-11-27

In a § 1983 action, state law governs the statute of limitations and tolling.

Section 1983 claims borrow the applicable state statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and the limitations period begins when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.

Tommy Davis Construction, Inc. v. Cape Fear Public Utility Authority · filed 2015-12-01

The statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims is borrowed from the applicable state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, even when a plaintiff’s particular § 1983 claim does not involve personal injury. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275-80 (1985); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). And we have applied Wilson to conclude that § 1983 claims arising in North Carolina are limited by “the three-year period for personal injury actions set forth in § 1-52(5).” Nat’l Advertising Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1162 n.2 (4th Cir. 1991). The limitations period for a § 1983 claim begins to run when the plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action” -- in other words, when it could have “file[d] suit and obtain[ed] relief.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (quoting Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)).

Section 1983 claims in Illinois are subject to a two-year limitations period, generally accruing when the plaintiff knows the fact and cause of the injury.

Falkner v. City of Chicago · filed 2015-12-09

“[T]he statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in Illinois,” however, “is two years." O’Gorman v. City of Chicago, 777 F.3d 885, 889 (7th Cir.2015); see also 735 ILCS § 5/13-202. Further, “[t]he date at which the claim accrues and thus starts the running of the limitations period is a matter of federal law,’ and generally occurs when,a plaintiff knows the fact and the cause of an'injury.” Id. Here, Plaintiff received his citation on February 10, 2013 and paid the fine soon thereafter. Plaintiff filed his § 1983 cl^im, however, on May 1, 2015 — over two years later. Thus, the Court dismisses Count Three as time-barred.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the forum state’s personal injury limitations and tolling laws; federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Rick Sandoval v. Chino State Prison · filed 2015-12-16

The district court properly dismissed Sandoval’s action as time-barred because, even with the benefit of statutory tolling due to incarceration, Sandoval failed to file his action within the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period and tolling rules; a claim filed after that period may be dismissed absent grounds for equitable tolling.

Calloway v. Rangel · filed 2015-12-16

The district court properly dismissed Calloway’s action because, even with the benefit of statutory tolling due to incarceration, Calloway failed to file his action within the applicable statute of limitations and failed to demonstrate he was entitled to equitable tolling.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and tolling laws.

Calloway v. Adams · filed 2015-12-16

The district court properly concluded that Calloway’s claims relating to events and conduct occurring before October 14, 2010 were barred by the statute of limitations. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 335.1, 352.1 (two-year statute of ... limitations for personal injury claims; two-year tolling period due to incarceration); Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2007) (forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and tolling laws apply to § 1983 actions).

A Section 1983 action is time barred if it is filed after the applicable limitations period, even with incarceration tolling, and the plaintiff does not establish equitable tolling.

Calloway v. Scribner · filed 2015-12-16

The district court properly dismissed Calloway’s action because, even with the benefit of statutory tolling due to his incarceration, Calloway failed to file his action within the applicable statute of limitations, and he failed to demonstrate he was entitled to equitable tolling.

Section 1983 actions must be filed within the forum state's personal injury limitations period, subject to its tolling rules.

Demondza Hunter v. Ballard · filed 2015-12-16

The district court properly dismissed Hunter’s action because, even with the benefit of statutory tolling due to incarceration, Hunter failed to file his action within the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims brought in Maryland are subject to a limitations period of no more than three years.

Martin v. Montgomery County Department of Police · filed 2015-12-17

Martin’s claims, whether brought under state law or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), were subject to, at longest, a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims filed in Maryland are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Martin v. Montgomery County Police · filed 2015-12-17

Martin’s claims, whether brought under state law or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), were subject to, at longest, a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Maryland are subject to a limitations period of no more than three years.

Martin v. Maryland Courts · filed 2015-12-17

Martin’s claims, whether brought under state law or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), were subject to, at longest, a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims brought in Maryland are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Martin v. Baltimore City Police · filed 2015-12-17

Martin’s claims, whether brought under state law or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), were subject to, at longest, a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Maryland are subject to a limitations period of no more than three years.

Martin v. State's Attorney's Office · filed 2015-12-17

Martin’s claims, whether brought under state law or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), were subject to, at longest, a three-year statute of limitations.

A California § 1983 action is time-barred if it is filed after the applicable limitations period, even with tolling for incarceration.

Watkins v. Spears · filed 2015-12-17

'The district court properly dismissed Watkins’ action as time-barred because, even with the benefit of statutory tolling due to incarceration, Watkins failed to file his action within the applicable statute of limitations.

A § 1983 method-of-execution claim in Alabama has a two-year limitations period and accrues when state review ends or the prisoner becomes subject to a new or substantially changed execution protocol, whichever is later.

Grayson v. Dunn · filed 2015-12-22

It is well settled that “a method of execution claim accrues on the later of the date on which state review is complete, or the date on which the capital litigant becomes subject to a new or substantially changed execution protocol.” ... The statute of limitations applicable to this claim is two years.

Section 1983 damages claims that sound in tort are subject to Alaska’s two-year personal injury limitations period.

Hertz v. Joe Schmidt, Jeffrey Edwards, Alaska Board of Paro · filed 2015-12-23

Because Hertz’s claims sound in tort, they are governed by the two-year period of limitations in AS 09.10.070.

Section 1983 claims in Massachusetts are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Buntin v. City of Boston · filed 2015-12-29

Buntin's Section 1983 claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Georgia use a two-year limitations period and may receive applicable state tolling.

Meyer v. Gwinnett County · filed 2016-01-06

“[T]he proper limitations period for all section 1983 claims in Georgia is the two year period set ... forth in O.C.G.A. § 9–3–33 for personal injuries.” ... “When applying state limitations periods to § 1983 claims, we also apply any relevant state tolling provisions.”

Section 1983 claims are subject to Louisiana’s one-year limitations period and accrue when the plaintiff knows or should have known the facts underlying the claim.

Trent Griffin, Sr. v. New Orleans City · filed 2016-01-06

In this § 1983 case, Griffin’s claims are governed by Louisiana’s prescriptive period for tort actions, which is one year.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations, so courts borrow the forum state's limitations period unless it conflicts with the Constitution or federal law.

Luongo v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2016-01-11

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, courts look to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which requires use of the statute of limitations for the state where the federal court sits, unless its application would conflict with the Constitution or with federal law.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Dunn v. City of Chicago · filed 2005-10-05

Defendant is correct, however, that Robinson’s Class I claims are time-barred. The parties agree that a two-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims. ... Accordingly, Robinson, who was arrested and held in October 2000, is barred by the statute of limitations from representing or being a member of Class I.

Section 1983 claims may be dismissed when Heck v. Humphrey bars the requested relief or when they are untimely without grounds for tolling.

Ames v. State of Oklahoma · filed 2005-12-07

Second, to the extent Mr. Ames contends he is falsely imprisoned and seeks relief out of the alleged use of false testimony, planted evidence, and the destruction of favorable evidence, we hold that the district court properly dismissed these claims without prejudice pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Finally, as to the remaining claims, we agree with the district court that these claims are barred by the statute of limitations and Mr. Ames has not alleged any facts to support statutory or equitable tolling.

Section 1983 claims must be filed within the applicable statute of limitations.

Anderson v. XYZ Correctional · filed 2006-02-27

Rodney Elmer Anderson appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint as untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.

Section 1983 claims may be dismissed when defendants are immune or the claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

Adamson v. Clingman · filed 2006-08-07

For substantially similar reasons to those laid out by the district court in its September 19, 2005, order, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of M r. Adamson’s claim.

Section 1983 claims borrow the state limitations period applicable to personal injury actions when no federal limitations period applies.

Wakefield v. Moore · filed 2006-12-07

We have held that New Jersey’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, applies to civil rights claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims that expired before January 1, 2003 are subject to California’s former one-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Lewis v. Bayh · filed 2007-04-24

The district court properly concluded the remaining claims were time-barred. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954-55 (9th Cir.2004) (California’s former one-year personal injury statute of limitations is applicable to section 1983 claims that expired before January 1, 2003).

Section 1983 claims are governed by the forum state's personal injury limitations period; claims arising from dismissed criminal charges accrue when the charges are dismissed with prejudice.

Grandon v. State · filed 2016-01-14

The statute of limitations for his claims therefore commenced on that date. ... As appellant did not file his complaint until May 29, 2012, more than two years after the statute of limitations commenced for his claims, the district court correctly determined that ... appellant's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. NRS 11.190(4)(e); see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) (holding that a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by the forum state's personal injury statute of limitations).

Section 1983 claims use the state’s personal injury statute of limitations; in Alabama, the period is two years.

Brooks v. Warden · filed 2016-01-19

The statute of limitations applicable to Brooks’s Eighth Amendment claim is two years. See Ala. Code § 6-2-38 (1975) (establishing a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); McNair, 515 F.3d at 1173 (holding that courts must look to state’s personal injury statute of limitations to determine statute of limitations under § 1983).

Section 1983 claims in New Jersey have a two-year statute of limitations.

Patterson v. Strippoli · filed 2016-01-20

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in New Jersey is two years.

Section 1983 actions typically use the state limitations period for personal injury claims.

Allen v. DeKalb County Jail's Medical Providers/Private Contractors · filed 2016-01-22

The limitations period for filing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is typically determined by the state law period for personal injury torts.

Section 1983 claims arising in Massachusetts use the state’s three-year tort limitations period, while federal law determines when a claim accrues.

Kimball v. Town of Provincetown · filed 2016-01-26

Because the alleged misconduct occurred in Massachusetts, that state’s three-year statute of limitations for tort actions, Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 260, § 2A, applies to both the Plaintiffs’ state law claims and their federal claims. ... For the federal claims, federal law determines when the clock began to tick.

A Section 1983 action must be filed within the applicable limitations period, accounting for statutory and equitable tolling.

Edward Ray, Jr. v. Leal · filed 2016-01-28

Edward Vincent Ray, Jr., a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force. ... Dismissal of Ray’s action was proper because, even with the benefit of statutory and equitable tolling, Ray failed to file his action within the applicable statute of limitations.

Under Puerto Rico tolling law, an EEOC filing does not restart the limitations period for a § 1983 political-discrimination claim when the EEOC lacks jurisdiction over that claim.

Martinez-Rivera v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico · filed 2016-01-29

Having uncovered no authority to the contrary, and given Puerto Rico's tolling caselaw, we conclude that Martínez's EEOC filing did not reset the ... limitations clock for her section-1983 political-discrimination claim.

Section 1983 actions borrow their statute of limitations from state law.

Graham v. Taylor · filed 2016-02-10

The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is borrowed from state statute.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own; courts use the forum state's general limitations period for personal injury claims.

Heilman v. Jefferson County · filed 2016-02-12

Section 1983 does not prescribe a statute of limitations. Instead, “[t]he statute of limitations for a suit brought under § 1983 is determined by the general statute of limitations governing personal injuries in the forum state.”

Section 1983 claims in Oklahoma use a two-year limitations period; earlier acts cannot independently support recovery, even when later alleged acts are timely.

Ingram v. Cooper · filed 2016-02-18

The Court finds that plaintiffs § 1983 claims should not be dismissed based on the statute of limitations, because plaintiff has alleged that certain acts of retaliation occurred after February 5, 2013. However, the scope of plaintiffs claims is limited to the extent that she cannot rely on any complaints made before February 5, 2013 as an independent basis for recovery.

State law supplies the limitations period for § 1983 claims, but federal law determines when those claims accrue.

Black v. Griffin · filed 2016-02-19

While state law provides the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, the date of accrual for these claims is a question of federal law.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Young v. Corcoran · filed 2016-02-19

The statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in New York State is three years.

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Barry v. Cadman Towers, Inc. · filed 2016-02-24

Causes of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 “accrue [ ] ‘when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action’ ” (Palmer v State of New York, 57 AD3d 364, 364 [2008], quoting Pearl v City of Long Beach, 296 F3d 76, 80 [2d Cir 2002]).

Section 1983 claims arising in New Mexico have a three-year limitations period and are governed by general tolling principles rather than the New Mexico Tort Claims Act’s tolling prohibition.

JL ex rel. Thompson v. New Mexico Department of Health · filed 2016-02-24

Pursuant to controlling Supreme Court precedent, Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim is subject to New Mexico’s three-year general statute of limitations for personal injury claims. ... The Court further holds that general principles of tolling govern Plaintiffs’ claims and not the Tort Claims Act’s specific prohibition on tolling.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Donovan v. INCORPORATION VILLAGE OF MALVERNE · filed 2008-02-19

There is no dispute that the statute of limitations governing the plaintiffs claims under § 1983 is three years.

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the action.

Palmer v. State · filed 2008-12-18

A cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action” (Pearl v City of Long Beach, 296 F3d 76, 80 [2002], cert denied 538 US 922 [2003] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Harrell v. Oreck · filed 2009-03-05

The district court properly concluded that the federal claims were time-barred. See Cal. Civ. Proc. § 335.1 (providing a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir.2004) (“For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.”); Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir.2002) (“Although federal law determines when a Bivens claim accrues, the law of the forum state determines the statute of limitations for such a claim.”); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) (explaining that the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action).

Section 1983 claims challenging Ohio’s lethal injection protocol accrue at the later of direct review’s conclusion or Ohio’s adoption of lethal injection as its sole execution method.

Broom v. Strickland · filed 2009-09-01

Cooey II held that “the two-year statute of limitations for a § 1983 lawsuit challenging Ohio’s lethal-injection protocol begins to accrue on the latest of the following possible dates: (1) ‘upon conclusion of direct review in the state court or the expiration of time for seeking such review,’ or (2) in 2001, when Ohio adopted lethal injection as the sole method of execution.”

Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period.

Peele v. McLaughlin · filed 2016-02-25

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.

Section 1983 claims filed in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period.

Brookins v. Bristol Township Police Depart · filed 2016-02-25

In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for claims under § 1983 is two years.

Section 1983 claims challenging punitive segregation are subject to a three-year limitations period that begins on the date of the disciplinary hearing determination.

Azor v. City of New York · filed 2016-03-01

Plaintiff’s claim for alleged civil rights violations during disciplinary hearing proceedings, under 42 USC § 1983, is barred by the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [5]; Owens v Okure, 488 US 235, 250 [1989]; 423 S. Salina St. v City of Syracuse, 68 NY2d 474, 486 [1986], cert denied 481 US 1008 [1987]). Plaintiff’s time to commence the section 1983 action began to accrue on the date of the disciplinary hearing determination, as it impliedly challenged the conditions of his confinement, namely, punitive segregation, and not the fact or duration of his confinement (see Jenkins v Haubert, 179 F3d 19 [2d Cir 1999]; cf. Edwards v Balisok, 520 US 641 [1997]; Heck v Humphrey, 512 US 477 [1994]).

In Illinois, § 1983 claims have a two-year limitations period, and First Amendment retaliation claims generally accrue when the retaliatory act occurs.

Gekas v. Vasiliades · filed 2016-03-01

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Illinois is two years. ... Generally, the statute of limitations clock begins to run on First Amendment retaliation claims immediately after the retaliatory act occurred.

A § 1983 fabrication of evidence claim that would undermine a conviction accrues when the conviction is invalidated.

Smalls v. City of New York · filed 2016-03-02

Plaintiff could not have alleged his denial of a fair trial claim until that appeal was' resolved, meaning the statute of limitations did not begin to run until April 26, 2011.

Section 1983 employment discrimination claims brought in New York have a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Wright v. City of Ithaca · filed 2016-03-07

Actions brought in New York for employment discrimination under § 1983 or the NYSHRL are governed by a three-year statute of limitations, “running from the time a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury giving rise to the claim.”

Section 1983 claims use the state limitations period for personal injury claims; in Oklahoma, that period is two years.

Starr v. Kober · filed 2016-03-11

Oklahoma law establishes the relevant two-year statute of limitations for Mr. Starr’s excessive force claim. See Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep’t, 195 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir. 1999) (“State statutes of limitations applicable to general personal injury claims supply the limitations periods for § 1983 claims.”); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3) (two-year statute of limitations).

Section 1983 claims in Texas are subject to a two-year limitations period, and a plaintiff must show grounds for tolling it.

Kriss Camp v. Potter County · filed 2016-03-15

Camp has shown no grounds for tolling the applicable two-year Texas statute of limitations during the pendency of his divorce proceedings.

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations and tolling rules for personal-injury claims.

Lewis v. Stenz · filed 2016-03-15

Claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and some arising under Title II of the ADA use the statute of limitations and tolling rules that states employ for personal-injury claims.

Section 1983 claims filed in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Jones v. Bay Shore Union Free School District · filed 2016-03-16

For Section 1983 actions filed in New York, the applicable statute of limitations is Section 214 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (“C.P.L.R.”), which allows three years to file suit.

Section 1983 claims in North Carolina have a three-year limitations period, and federal law determines when that period begins to run.

Maisha v. University of North Carolina · filed 2016-03-17

While North Carolina’s three-year statute of limitation applies to claims under Title VI and § 1983, see Tommy Davis Construction, Inc. v. Cape Fear Public Utility Authority, 807 F.3d 62, 67 (4th Cir. 2015) (§ 1983 claims); Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 187 (4th Cir. 1999) (Title VI claims), federal law controls when the statute of limitations beings to run.

Section 1983 claims against prison officials are dismissed as untimely when the plaintiff provides no basis for tolling the statute of limitations.

McKinney v. Prack · filed 2016-03-21

Because Plaintiff has failed to respond to this Court’s Decision and Order dated March 30, 2015 (Dkt.3) with any basis for tolling the statute of limitations, Defendants Fischer and Bezio are dismissed from this action.

Section 1983 claims in New Jersey have a two-year statute of limitations.

Bradford v. Bolles · filed 2016-03-22

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in New Jersey is two years.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period and accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Edward Ray, Jr. v. Basa · filed 2016-03-24

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ray’s due process claims because Ray failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he filed his action within the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the state limitations period for general personal injury actions.

Neelley v. Walker · filed 2016-03-25

Federal courts must look to state law for the applicable statute of limitations in a § 1983 action, applying the state limitations period prescribed for general personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims filed in Kansas are subject to the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Wanjiku v. Johnson County · filed 2016-03-29

The two-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. § 60-513 for personal injury actions applies to §§ 1983 and 1985 claims.

Federal law governs when a § 1983 claim accrues, even though the limitations period is borrowed from state law.

Finkle v. Ryan · filed 2016-03-30

Although the statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims is borrowed from state law, federal law continues to govern when a § 1983 claim accrues.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Cruz v. Fischer · filed 2016-03-30

The events described in the complaint occurred in September 2011, and the statute of limitations for claims asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is three years.

For a facial § 1983 challenge outside the property rights context, the limitations period does not automatically begin when the challenged rule is enacted; it begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the actual injury.

Scheer v. Kelly · filed 2016-04-04

The State Bar asserts that Action Apartment held that the statute of limitations for facial challenges brought under 42 U.S. § 1983 begins running at the time the challenged statute or ordinance was enacted. We disagree. ... The statute of limitations did not begin running on Scheer’s claim when the rules she challenges were enacted.

Section 1983 claims in Georgia have a two-year limitations period that imprisonment does not toll.

Kelsey v. Macon Bibb County Board of Commissioners · filed 2016-04-12

Prisoners are therefore subject to the generally applicable two- year limitations period for § 1983 suits.

Section 1983 claims filed in Pennsylvania are subject to the state’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Tate v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2016-04-12

Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims applies to Tate’s action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An elective administrative appeal does not toll the limitations period for a § 1983 claim when exhaustion is not required.

Johnson v. City of Bessemer · filed 2016-04-12

Therefore, because Johnson did not file his original complaint until December 11, 2014, and the statute of limitations did not toll during Johnson’s elective administrative appeal, Counts I and II of the Second Amended Complaint are due to be dismissed as untimely, and judgment is due to be granted in favor of all Defendants on these claims.

State law supplies the limitations period for § 1983 claims, while federal law determines when those claims accrue.

Cauley v. Dawson · filed 2016-04-19

Although state law controls the limitations period for § 1983 claims, federal law determines when a cause of action accrues.

Section 1983 claims filed in Idaho are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Greenfield v. City of Post Falls Municipalit · filed 2016-04-19

The district court properly dismissed Greenfield’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim because it is barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999) (state law governs the statute of limitations period for § 1983 suits); Hallstrom v. Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1476 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying the two-year statute of limitations in Idaho Code § 5-219(4) to claims brought under § 1983).

Section 1983 permits claims for ongoing systemic violations of federal law that continue into the limitations period.

Mansourian v. Regents of University of California · filed 2010-04-20

Section 1983 “is presumptively available to remedy a state’s ongoing violation of federal law.” ... A plaintiff has adequately pled an ongoing claim if she can “show a systematic policy or practice that operated, in part, within the limitations period — a systematic violation.” ... A university’s ongoing and intentional failure to provide equal athletic opportunities for women is a systemic violation. As the plaintiffs were students and therefore subject to the policy that allegedly discriminated on the basis of sex at the time they filed their complaint, their § 1983 claim is not time-barred.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state's personal injury statute of limitations.

Walker v. Barrett · filed 2011-08-18

Neither § 1983 nor Title IX contains its own statute of limitation. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that § 1983 claims accruing within a particular state should be governed by that state's statute of limitations governing personal-injury claims. ... Thus, for the same reason Walker's state-law claims are time-barred by § 516.120.4, Walker's claims under § 1983 and Title IX are also time-barred.

Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

J.M. Cicchiello v. SEIU 1199P Union Service Employees International Union · filed 2016-04-26

We also conclude that Count I is barred because it was filed beyond the statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims. “[A] § 1983 claim is governed by the statute of limitations that applies to personal injury tort claims in the state in which such a claim arises.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 639 (3d Cir. 2009). Pursuant to Section 5524(7) of the Judicial Code, such actions are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. 42 Pa. C.S. § 5524(7).

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to the state’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Singer v. Bureau of Professional & Occupational Affairs · filed 2016-05-03

Singer’s claims against Sally Ulrich, John Gillespie, and Agent Harris are barred by Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations. See 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5524(1); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989) (forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to § 1983 actions).

Section 1983 claims are not preserved by the continuing violation doctrine when the alleged affirmative acts fall outside the limitations period.

First State Towing, LLC and Katharine E. Morris v. Div. of State Police, Dep't of Safety and Homeland Sec., State of Del · filed 2016-05-04

Thus, taking the well-pled facts of the Complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of Plaintiffs, I conclude Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating that the continuing violation doctrine preserves their § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state personal injury statute of limitations.

King-White v. Humble Independent School District · filed 2016-05-06

§ 1983 claims are subject to state personal injury statutes of limitations.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so Maryland’s three-year limitations period for civil actions applies.

Bailey-El v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City · filed 2016-05-09

Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not specify a limitations period, this Court looks to Maryland law for the appropriate statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in the District of Columbia are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Tyler v. Washington, D.C. Correction · filed 2016-05-16

Second, in any event a claim under § 1983 must be brought within three years, ... and since plaintiff’s cause of action arose in 2007, the limitations period would have expired in 2010, nearly six years ago.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury actions, which is two years in Kansas.

Reynolds v. Wright · filed 2016-05-17

Indeed, where, as here, an action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the limitations period is established by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which in Kansas is two years.

Section 1983 claims alleging Fourth Amendment violations in Rhode Island are subject to the state’s three-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Richer v. Parmelee · filed 2016-06-01

The statute of limitation for bringing a claim alleging a Fourth Amendment violation pursuant to § 1983 is subject to Rhode Island’s personal injury statute of limitations — which is only three years.

Section 1983 claims filed in Georgia are subject to a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions.

Flowers v. Fulton County School System · filed 2016-06-07

It is also well-settled that § 1983 claims filed in Georgia are governed by the same two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions.

A § 1983 false arrest claim accrues when the plaintiff becomes held pursuant to legal process, and Georgia’s two-year personal-injury limitations period applies.

White v. Duane L. Hiers, Jr. · filed 2016-06-09

White had two years from May 18, 2011, when he became held pursuant to legal process, to commence an action for false arrest. White waited more than two years, until July 19, 2013, to file his complaint. White’s complaint against Hiers and the City was untimely.

Section 1983 procedural due process claims in Pennsylvania are treated as personal injury claims subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Walker v. Williams · filed 2016-06-28

Thus, Walker’s claim is treated as a personal injury claim under § 1983 and is subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims filed in Louisiana are subject to a one-year limitations period.

Smith v. Regional Transit Authority, e · filed 2016-06-28

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is “the forum state’s personal-injury limitations period,” which in Louisiana is one year.

Section 1983 false imprisonment claims arising in Florida are subject to a four-year limitations period.

Navarro v. City of Riviera Beach · filed 2016-06-29

As the Plaintiffs arrest occurred more than four years prior to the filing date of this action, to wit, August 24, 2015, any section 1983 claim alleged by Plaintiff for false imprisonment is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying it; a later administrative decision affirming that injury does not delay accrual.

Printup v. Director, Ohio Department of Job & Family Services · filed 2016-06-30

Thus, Printup’s cause of action accrued and the statutory period began to run when she lost her job based on her designation by BCCSB social workers as a child abuser without due process of law, not when the hearing officer issued his decision upholding that designation.

Section 1983 claims arising in New York have a three-year limitations period.

Soos v. Niagara County · filed 2016-07-01

Plaintiff filed the complaint within three years of the incident, which is clearly contemplated as a reasonable amount of time for such an action by the governing three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising in Tennessee are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Howell v. Farris · filed 2016-07-07

Because Howell did not bring his federal § 1983 claims within the one-year time period set forth in Tennessee’s statute of limitations, the district court was correct to dismiss those claims.

Section 1983 claims in Rhode Island are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Riggs v. Curran · filed 2016-07-07

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are clearly governed by the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Louisiana use the state’s one-year personal injury limitations period.

Crane v. Childers · filed 2016-07-11

As such, both Crane’s state law claims and § 1983 claim are subject to the one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions under Louisiana law.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the injury occurred.

Neita v. City of Chicago · filed 2016-07-19

Claims brought under § 1983 are governed by the statute of limitations for personal-injury claims in the state where the plaintiff’s injury occurred.

For a § 1983 Contracts Clause claim, federal law sets the accrual date when the challenged law impairs the plaintiff’s contractual right.

Tutor v. Town of Fuquay-Varina · filed 2016-07-19

Thus, “the constitutional injury, the injury which triggered] the statute of limitations for purposes of § 1983, occurred when the [2006 Personnel Policy] became law.” Smith, 149 F.3d at 1154. Accordingly, plaintiffs impairment of contract claim accrued on January 1, 2006, and the two-year statute of limitations expired on January 1, 2008.

Section 1983 suits use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the federal district court sits; in Colorado, that period is two years.

Gosselin v. Kaufman · filed 2016-07-19

The personal injury statute of the state in which the federal district court sits determines the limitation period for § 1983 suits. Mondragon v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008). The general limitation for personal injury claims in Colorado is two years from when the action accrues.

Section 1983 claims in Nebraska are subject to the four-year limitations period in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207.

Parker v. Thurston County, Nebraska · filed 2016-07-21

Following de novo review of the grant of the motion to dismiss, see Adams v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 813 F.3d 1151, 1154 (8th Cir. 2016), and careful review of the parties’ submissions on appeal, we agree with the district court that the complaint is untimely under the four-year limitations period set out in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207, see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985), and we conclude also that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying postjudgment relief, see Stults v. Am. Pop Corn Co., 815 F.3d 409, 414 (8th Cir. 2016); Arnold v. Wood, 238 F.3d 992, 998 (8th Cir. 2001).

Section 1983 claims in Arkansas are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Briley v. Roberson · filed 2012-07-19

See Ketchum v. City of W. Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (three-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 action in Arkansas).

Section 1983 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

CLAIROL DEVELOPMENT, LLC v. VILLAGE OF SPENCERPORT · filed 2012-11-16

We also note that the claims pursuant to 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1988 are subject to a three-year statute of limitations (see Rimany v Town of Dover, 72 AD3d 918, 921, lv denied 15 NY3d 705), and respondents do not contend that those claims are time-barred by that period of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Wisconsin are subject to a six-year statute of limitations.

Kennedy v. Huibregtse · filed 2016-07-27

Only it hasn’t for one of his claims; the statute of limitations for section 1983 claims in Wisconsin is six years, not three, Reget v. City of La Crosse, 595 F.3d 691, 694 (7th Cir. 2010); Malone v. Corrections Corporation of America, 553 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2009), and therefore a newly filed suit under section 1983 would be timely because the alleged malpractice occurred within the last six, though not the last three, years.

Section 1983 claims borrow analogous state statutes of limitations because Congress established no federal limitations period.

Eyring v. Fondaco · filed 2016-08-02

In the context of Section 1983 claims, the requisite clear statement is necessarily missing: Congress did not establish any federal statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims, let alone state that such a deadline would be jurisdictional.

Section 1983 claims in Texas are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Tiras v. Bailey Properties, L.L.C., e · filed 2016-08-10

A two-year limitations period ... applies to Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims in this district have a three-year statute of limitations borrowed from state personal injury law.

American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. New York State Thruway Authority · filed 2016-08-10

In this district, the applicable statute of limitations on a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is three years from the date on which suit is commenced.

Section 1983 claims filed in Oklahoma have a two-year statute of limitations.

Panicker v. City of Oklahoma City · filed 2016-08-23

Under Oklahoma law, Panicker had two years to file his claims under § 1983.

A § 1983 claim accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff should have discovered the injury, even if the plaintiff has not yet identified the defendants.

Ruiz-Bueno v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. · filed 2016-08-25

Regardless of whether their cause of action accrued in May 2012 or by September 4, 2012, the plaintiffs did not file their lawsuit against the defendants here until December 8, 2014, after the two-year limitations period had expired. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is time-barred.

Section 1983 has no federal limitations period or tolling rule, so courts look to the forum’s law for the applicable period.

Jones v. Kirchner · filed 2016-08-26

There is no federal limitations period or tolling rule for actions brought under § 1983, so 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a companion statute that governs the rules of decision applicable to civil rights claims, directs federal courts to look to state law to fill the gap. ... Because the District of Columbia is the forum “state” in this case, pursuant to § 1988, we look to District law for the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 false arrest claims have a three-year statute of limitations.

Laboy v. County of Ontario, N.Y. · filed 2016-09-09

The statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim of false arrest is three years.

In Indiana, a § 1983 claim must be filed within two years after it accrues.

Lane v. Murrie · filed 2016-09-19

Lane had two years from the time his claim accrued to file his § 1983 claim, see Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4; Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767-68 (7th Cir. 2013).

A Section 1983 action is time-barred if it is filed after the applicable limitations period, even with available statutory and equitable tolling.

Williams v. Kerkfoot · filed 2016-09-21

The district court properly dismissed Williams’ action as time-barred because, even with the benefit of statutory and all arguably applicable equitable tolling, Williams failed to file his action within the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in California have a two-year limitations period, and a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury.

Williams v. Aparicio · filed 2016-09-21

The district court properly dismissed Williams’ action as time-barred because, even with the benefit of all arguably applicable equitable tolling, Williams failed to file his action within the applicable statute of limitations.

A § 1983 claim brought in Georgia has a two-year limitations period, which does not begin before the plaintiff knew or should have known the facts supporting the claim.

Holland v. Governor of Georgia · filed 2016-10-05

Because there are no facts showing Holland knew or should have known of his claim more than two years before he filed suit, the district court erred in dismissing his complaint.

Section 1983 claims arising from a Fourth Amendment arrest in Alabama have a two-year limitations period that begins when the claimant is detained pursuant to legal process.

Mickel Shepherd v. Wilson · filed 2016-10-06

We conclude that the district court did not err in determining that Shepherd’s § 1983 claims against Stringer are barred by the two-year Alabama statute of limitations. Shepherd was detained pursuant to legal process when he was arrested on September 13, 2011. Therefore, the two-year Alabama statute of limitations for any § 1983 claims alleging a violation of the Fourth Amendment arising out of that arrest expired on September 13, 2013.

Section 1983 claims brought in New Jersey have a two-year statute of limitations, borrowed from the state’s personal injury law.

El Mujaddid v. Wehling · filed 2016-10-12

Because New Jersey’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years, the statute of limitations for Mujaddid’s § 1983 claims here is also two years.

A § 1983 action filed in New York is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Lin v. Joedy · filed 2016-10-12

A § 1983 action filed in New York is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the state limitations period for personal injury actions because the section has no federal limitations period.

Wyatt v. Owens · filed 2016-10-12

Because “[t]here is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, ... the state limitations period which governs personal injury actions is applied.” Lewis v. Richmond City Police Dep’t, 947 F.2d 733, 735 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254, (1985)).

Section 1983 claims brought in New York have a three-year limitations period borrowed from state personal injury law.

Smith v. City of New York · filed 2016-11-03

“The statute of limitations for claims brought under [§] 1983 is governed by state law,” and, in the present case, the three-year period for personal injury actions under New York state law applies.

In Washington, a § 1983 claim has a three-year limitations period and accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Robert Denham, Jr. v. Cease · filed 2016-11-03

The district court properly dismissed Denham’s action as barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080 (three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.3d 758, 761-62 (9th Cir. 1991) (a § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of the action).

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period; federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Cooper v. Igbinosa · filed 2016-11-04

Dismissal of Cooper’s claims against defendants Cate and Schwarzenegger was proper because Cooper filed this action more than eight years after he contracted valley fever in 2006. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1 (statutory tolling for up to two years due to incarceration); Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (for § 1983 claims, federal courts apply the forum state’s ... personal injury statute of limitations and apply federal law to determine accrual; a § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of the action).

For Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico, a complaint does not toll the limitations period against a defendant it does not name.

Díaz v. Rivera · filed 2016-11-16

For section 1983 claims, tolling of the statute of limitations is governed by Puerto Rico law. ... Because Plaintiff did not name Sgt. Rosario as a defendant, the federal complaint did not toll the limitations period as to Sgt. Rosario.

Section 1983 constitutional claims are subject to the state limitations period for personal injury actions, which is two years in Alabama.

Grayson v. Dunn · filed 2016-11-18

To reiterate, “[a]ll constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been brought,” McNair, 515 F.3d at 1173. The statute of limitations in Alabama is two years.

Section 1983 claims filed in Louisiana use the state’s one-year personal-injury limitations period.

Armstrong v. Serpas · filed 2016-11-21

For § 1983 claims, the statute of limitations is “‘the forum state’s personal- injury limitations period,’ which in Louisiana is one year”.

Section 1983 claims filed in Kansas are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Lee v. Reed · filed 2016-11-22

This limitation applies to Plaintiffs § 1983 claim of deprivation of liberty interest.

Section 1983 claims in Maryland are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Martin v. Howard Walsh, III · filed 2016-11-23

Martin’s claims, whether brought under state law or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), were subject to, at longest, a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions in Oregon use the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Hartfield v. Oregon State Bar · filed 2016-11-23

Sean Hartfield appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a Fourteenth Amendment claim. ... The district court properly dismissed Hartfield’s action because it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims follow the forum state’s personal injury limitations and tolling laws.

Marroquin v. Fernandez-Carr · filed 2016-11-23

The district court properly dismissed Marroquin’s deliberate indifference and retaliation claims against defendants Ward and Hudson because those claims are barred by the statute of limitations and Marroquin failed to plead facts demonstrating that any tolling should apply. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and tolling laws apply to § 1983 actions).

Section 1983 claims arising in Florida are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

Barcelona v. Detective Lisa K. Fogelgren · filed 2016-11-29

“Section 1983 claims are governed by the forum state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations, which in Florida is four years.”

Section 1983 actions use the applicable state's personal injury limitations period and its procedural rules affecting that period, including any savings statute.

Webster v. Spears · filed 2016-11-30

In the absence of a federal statute of limitations period for an action under § 1983, we look to the applicable state law where the injury allegedly occurred to determine the statute of limitations for personal injury. ... Where, as in this case, a court “use[s] a state’s Statute of Limitations, [it] also use[s] its procedural rules affecting that Statute of Limitations[,]” including any savings statute.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, subject to equitable estoppel.

Polk v. Cavin · filed 2016-12-01

Nor was it an abuse of discretion to find Polk’s claims against the County Defendants ineligible for equitable estoppel and accordingly dismiss them as time- barred by the statute of limitations on summary judgment. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275-76 (1985) (federal courts adopt the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Section 1983 cases); Cal Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (establishing a two-year statute of limitations).

Section 1983 actions arising in Connecticut are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Harnage v. Torres · filed 2016-12-05

Section 1983 actions arising in Connecticut, like this one, are governed by the three-year limitations period set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577.

A Section 1983 claim that would call a conviction into question cannot be brought until the conviction is vacated, so the limitations period does not begin to run before then.

Gonzalez v. City of Waukegan · filed 2016-12-06

If Gonzalez had attempted to bring a Section 1983 claim challenging his coerced confession within two years after that confession — a period during which he was serving time for his conviction — the Heck principle would have precluded him from doing so. So the statute of limitations for Gonzalez’s coerced confession claim did not begin to run until his conviction was vacated on March 9, 2016 (Heck at 489, 114 S.Ct. 2364).

Section 1983 claims use the limitations period for personal injury actions in the state where the suit is filed.

Smith v. Warden · filed 2016-12-07

A § 1983 claim is a tort action that is subject to the statute of limitations that governs personal injury claims in the state where the § 1983 action is filed.

Section 1983 claims in Louisiana are subject to the state's one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions unless a legislative exception applies.

Everhome Mortgage Co. v. Lewis · filed 2016-12-07

In determining the timeliness of a claim under § 1983 civil rights provisions, state limitation statutes are applied. ... Such actions are subject to the same one year prescriptive period contained in La. C.C. art. 3492, unless plaintiff shows an exception established by legislation.

A § 1983 claim accruing in New York has a three-year statute of limitations.

Pepin v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2016-12-14

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim accruing in New York is three years.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, subject to applicable tolling rules.

Wafer v. Suesberry · filed 2016-12-20

The district court properly dismissed Wafer’s action because Wafer failed to file it within the applicable two year statute of limitations, see Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1, and Wafer had not established a basis for tolling under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 352.1. See Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008) (in § 1983 suits, federal courts use the forum state’s statutes of limitations for personal injury actions).

The limitations period for a prisoner’s Section 1983 suit is tolled during mandatory administrative exhaustion.

Rodriguez v. Grifftin · filed 2016-12-22

While lack of timeliness is a valid ground of sua sponte dismissal, Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53–54 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) on statute of limitations grounds), the statute of limitations in Section 1983 prisoner suits is tolled while a prisoner is satisfying the mandatory administrative exhaustion process, Gonzalez v. Hasty, 651 F.3d 318, 323–24 (2d Cir. 2011).

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period and accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury.

Beaudoin v. Schlachter · filed 2016-12-23

The district court properly dismissed Beaudoin’s action as time-barred because the documents attached to Beaudoin’s complaint show that the last date that Beaudoin could have been sexually assaulted was in July 2009.

Section 1983 claims based on conduct in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period measured from when the claim accrues.

Whitenight v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2017-01-04

For § 1983 actions based on conduct in Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations is two years from the date the claim accrued.

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury and is tolled while the plaintiff actively exhausts administrative remedies.

Moreau v. Peterson · filed 2017-01-12

Section 1983 claims in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations that runs from the time the “plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury giving rise to the claim.” Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961, 963 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This period is tolled while a plaintiff is “actively exhausting his administrative remedies.” Gonzalez v. Hasty, 651 F.3d 318, 322-24 (2d Cir. 2011).

Section 1983 retaliation claims in New York must be filed within three years of the offending acts.

Birch v. City of New York · filed 2017-01-12

Retaliation claims brought under § 1983 must be asserted within three years of the offending acts.

Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows of the injury.

Fallin v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation · filed 2017-01-12

Thus, Fallin’s claims accrued at least by April of 2008, see Kach, 589 F.3d at 634, and the two-year statute of limitations expired in April of 2010, over four and a half years before Fallin filed suit.

Section 1983 claims in Texas are subject to the state’s two-year personal injury limitations period.

Pena v. Texas Medical Board · filed 2017-01-17

In this case, the Texas two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries applies to Dr. Pena’s Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims brought in Wisconsin have a six-year limitations period for injuries to personal rights.

Moore v. Vagnini · filed 2017-01-19

Civil-rights lawsuits brought in Wisconsin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, like Moore’s, are governed by the state’s six-year statute of limitations for injuries to personal rights.

Section 1983 claims in Michigan have a three-year limitations period; a continuing violation requires proof of a longstanding policy of discrimination.

Katz v. Village of Beverly Hills · filed 2017-01-25

In Michigan, the statute of limitations for federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is three years. ... A plaintiff can establish a continuing violation if he or she shows a ... “longstanding and demonstrable policy of discrimination.” ... Thus, we agree that the continuing violations doctrine does not apply and that all injuries that occurred before April 5, 2010 are time barred.

Section 1983 has no express limitations period, so courts use the applicable state period; in Virginia, it is two years.

Abeles v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. · filed 2017-01-26

Because § 1983 does not contain an express statute of limitations, we use state statutes of limitations, and here Virginia’s two-year statute-of-limitations period applies.

Federal law governs when a § 1983 claim accrues.

Johnson v. Coupe · filed 2017-01-26

The accrual of a cause of action under § 1983 is governed by federal law.

Section 1983 claims in Washington have a three-year limitations period.

Ressy v. Pierce County · filed 2017-01-30

The district court properly dismissed Ressy’s claim as barred by the statute of limitations. See Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 750 (9th Cir. 1991) (limitations period for § 1983 claim is three years under Washington state law); see also Woods View II, LLC v. Kitsap Cnty., 352 P.3d 807, 816 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (the statute of limitations for a negligence action is three years).