42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims arising in Florida must be filed within four years of the alleged unlawful conduct.

Betts v. Hall · filed 2017-02-09

A plaintiff must therefore “bring a section 1983 claim arising in Florida within four years of the alleged unlawful [conduct].”

Section 1983 privacy claims filed in New York have a three-year limitations period, subject to equitable tolling.

Lefebvre v. Morgan · filed 2017-02-10

Because the three-year statute of limitations governing Plaintiffs § 1983 privacy claim began to run no later than March 2011, Plaintiff’s Action filed.in July 2014 is untimely. As Plaintiff is not entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations, his privacy claim is dismissed.

A plaintiff whose Section 1983 claim appears untimely bears the burden of establishing equitable tolling.

Johnson v. City of South Bend · filed 2017-02-21

Johnson filed his complaint long after the statute of limitations appears to have run, so it was his burden to establish that equitable tolling or some other theory avoids this defense.

Section 1983 claims use the state’s personal injury limitations period, while federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Heslep v. Rick Thaler · filed 2017-02-21

In a § 1983 action, federal law looks to the personal injury statute of limitations for the state in which the cause of action arose. ... Federal law determines when an action accrues and the limitation period starts.

Section 1983 actions use the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the claim arose.

Heslep v. Rick Thaler · filed 2017-02-22

In a § 1983 action, federal law looks to the personal injury statute of limitations for the state in which the cause of action arose.

Section 1983 claims in Georgia are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Seibert v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections · filed 2017-02-23

Constitutional claims brought under § 1983 tort actions are subject to the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which, in Georgia, is two years.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations.

Atkins v. Governing Board of Creighton School District · filed 2017-02-27

The district court properly dismissed Atkins’s equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as barred by Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations because Atkins filed this action eight years after the injury accrued.

Section 1983 claims arising in Delaware are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.

Davis v. Noble · filed 2017-03-03

As noted above, however, Davis’s § 1983 claims are governed by a two- year statute of limitations.

In Pennsylvania, Section 1983 claims have a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff suffers an injury.

Fetterman v. Westmoreland County Childrens · filed 2017-03-06

In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is two years, which begins running when the plaintiff suffers an injury.

Section 1983 claims in Texas are governed by the state’s personal injury statute of limitations.

Wood v. Bryan Collier · filed 2017-03-06

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims for each of the Plaintiffs is controlled by Texas’s personal injury statute of limitations.

Section 1983 method-of-execution claims use the forum state's personal injury limitations period and accrue at the later of the end of direct review or adoption of the challenged protocol.

Wood v. Bryan Collier · filed 2017-03-07

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims for each of the Plaintiffs is controlled by Texas’s personal injury statute of limitations. ... A cause of action for a method-of-execution claim accrues at the later of two dates: (1) the conclusion of direct review or (2) the adoption of the challenged protocol.

Section 1983 actions in Oklahoma are subject to the two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims.

Barlor v. Patton · filed 2017-03-07

His due-process claims related to his 1985 and 1991 escapes, and his 2003 reclassification, are time-barred. See Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep’t, 195 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that in Oklahoma the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is the two-year period for personal injuries). Because by 2005, when Mr. Barlor filed his federal lawsuit, he knew or should have known of his asserted due-process deprivations arising from his misconduct incidents and reclassification, he can present no set of facts under which any of these claims could be timely.

Section 1983 claims filed in New York have a three-year statute of limitations under New York law.

Neal v. Wilson · filed 2017-03-09

For section 1983 actions filed in New York, the applicable statute of limitations is section 214 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”), which allows three years to file suit.

A Section 1983 claim arising from a September 2015 shooting has a limitations period that expires in September 2019.

Prosper v. Martin · filed 2017-03-10

With regard to Plaintiffs concerns about the statutes of limitations, the section 1983 claim’s limitations period expires in September 2019, well beyond any stay the Court would countenance or permit.

Section 1983 claims in Hawaii are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Beckstrand v. Read · filed 2017-03-13

Hawaii’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to Beckstrand’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 actions in Nevada are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Polk v. Dwayne Deal · filed 2017-03-21

The district court properly dismissed as untimely Polk’s claims arising from the alleged taking of Polk’s personal property in 2008, 2009, and 2010 because Polk filed this action years after the statute of limitations had run. See Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2014) (under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e), the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in Nevada is two years).

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury and who caused it.

McGinley v. Mauriello · filed 2017-03-21

A claim accrues under § 1983—as a matter of federal law—when “the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that he has been injured” and by whom.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Smith v. Graham · filed 2017-03-22

However, both of these allegations occurred in 2008, and any claim based on them was therefore barred by New York’s three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in New Hampshire are subject to the state's three-year limitations period for personal actions.

NIMCO Real Estate Associates, LLC, et al. v. Nadeau, et al. · filed 2017-03-23

A state’s statute of limitations for tort claims applies to federal civil rights claims. Gorelik v. Costin, 605 F.3d 118, 121 (1st Cir. 2010). New Hampshire’s statute of limitations for personal actions, including torts, is RSA 508:4, which provides that claims must be brought within three years “of the act or omission complained of.”

Section 1983 municipal liability claims under Monell are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Bishop v. County of Suffolk · filed 2017-03-31

Moreover, such records fall well outside the three-year statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiffs claims, including the Monell claim.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the applicable state limitations period, but a state special statute of limitations does not toll that period.

Boston v. Kitsap County · filed 2017-04-07

For the reasons set forth below, we find RCW 4.96.020 to be more akin to the special statute of limitations addressed in Silva than the standard tolling provision of Harding. We therefore hold that RCW 4.96.020 has no bearing on § 1983 actions, and as a result Appellee’s claims in this case are time barred.

Section 1983 retaliation and access-to-court claims in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

McFadden v. Amodio · filed 2017-04-13

With respect to plaintiff’s 42 USC § 1983 claims against Amodio, we agree with Supreme Court that, even assuming— without deciding — that plaintiff’s amended complaint alleged causes of action upon which relief could be granted, plaintiff’s retaliation and access-to-court claims are barred by the three-year statute of limitations (see e.g. Higgins v City of New York, 144 AD3d 511, 512 [2016]; Matter of Resnick v Town of Canaan, 38 AD3d 949, 953 [2007]).

Section 1983 claims in Illinois are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Patterson v. Dimas · filed 2017-04-13

That said, Patterson’s claim for injunc-tive relief against Dimas still is barred by the statute of limitations. The claim accrued when Patterson knew or should have known that his right to due process was violated.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period and accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Garcia v. Leroux · filed 2017-04-21

The district court properly determined that Garcia’s action was time-barred because all claims against defendants accrued more than two years before Garcia filed his complaint. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821 (one-year statute of limitations for actions against any public entity or public employee); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991-92 (9th Cir. 1999) (for § 1983 claims, federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims, which begin to accrue “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury”).

Section 1983 claims may be tolled while a prisoner completes mandatory administrative exhaustion, and allegations of that process can make dismissal as time-barred premature.

Hendrix v. Rohan · filed 2017-04-21

Liberally construed, these allegations show that Hendrix may be entitled to further tolling on the ground that he was completing the mandatory exhaustion process.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and tolling laws; California’s limitations period is two years.

Marroquin v. R. Bowman · filed 2017-04-21

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Marroquin’s medical deliberate indifference claims because those claims are barred by the statute of limitations. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and tolling laws apply to § 1983 actions and California’s relevant statute of limitations is two years).

Section 1983 claims brought in Maryland are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Bailey-El v. Housing Authority of Baltimore · filed 2017-04-27

Ronald G. Bailey-El appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012). ... Bailey-El’s claims were subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 damages claims in Colorado are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Lyall v. City of Denver · filed 2017-04-27

Plaintiffs originally proposed that the class period begin on May 14, 2012, which would be well outside the two-year statute of limitations for a damages claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The two-year limitations period for a prisoner’s Section 1983 claim resumes when the grievance process for that claim ends.

Hoban v. Anderson · filed 2017-05-05

The exhaustion of those claims ended the tolling of the statute of limitations that occurred during the administrative grievance process and triggered the two-year time limit to sue.

Section 1983 claims filed in Alabama are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Boyd v. Warden,Holman Correctional Facility · filed 2017-05-09

The remainder of Boyd’s claims are untimely as they were filed well beyond the two-year statute of limitations that govern § 1983 claims in Alabama.

Section 1983 method-of-execution claims use the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the claim is brought.

Ledford v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections · filed 2017-05-15

A § 1983 challenge to a state’s method of execution is subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the challenge is brought.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim is tolled while a prisoner pursues mandatory administrative remedies.

Wisniewski v. Fisher · filed 2017-05-16

This Court has held, however, that because exhaustion of prison administrative remedies is mandatory under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions should be tolled while a prisoner pursues the mandated remedies. ... We conclude that the District Court erred in dismissing these claims as barred by the statute of limitations without considering whether Wisniewski properly exhausted administrative remedies and whether and to what extent the limitations period should be tolled.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state personal injury statute of limitations, which is two years in New Jersey.

McCargo v. Camden County Jail · filed 2017-05-22

A claim raised under § 1983 is “characterized as a personal-injury claim and thus is governed by the applicable state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury claims,” which in New Jersey is two years.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations.

Whidbee v. Pierce County · filed 2017-05-26

“The applicable statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.” ... Therefore, Washington’s three-year personal injury statute of limitations applied to all of Whidbee’s claims.

Section 1983 claims borrow the limitations period of the state where the incident forming the basis of the claim occurred.

Nicholson v. Eckstein · filed 2017-05-26

In § 1983 actions, the statute of limitations is borrowed from “the state where the incident forming the basis of the claim occurred.” King v. One Unknown Fed. Corr. Officer, 201 F.3d 910, 913 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2017). For claims arising in Tennessee, the applicable statute of limitations is one year. Johnson v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 777 F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B)). That would mean that a § 1983 claim against the persons who injured him had expired years before 2007, when the defendants allegedly seized and concealed his documents.

A plaintiff’s later discovery of an allegedly pretextual reason for defendants’ conduct did not, on the facts alleged, delay accrual of the § 1983 claim.

Allen v. City of Arcata · filed 2017-05-26

We reject Allen’s argument that the statute of limitations for his 2010 injury did not accrue until 2014, when he allegedly learned of the pretextual reasons for Defendants’ actions, because this argument lacks legal support and is unpersuasive in light of the facts alleged in the complaint.

In a § 1983 action, a court must consider whether state law tolls the limitations period because the plaintiff lacked legal capacity when the claim accrued.

Sykes v. Los Angeles Sheriff's Dep't. · filed 2017-05-31

However, the district court failed to consider whether the statute of limitation should be tolled because Sykes “lack[ed] the legal capacity to make decisions” at the time the claims accrued.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the forum state’s personal injury limitations and tolling rules.

Rubenstein v. Whittier Police Department · filed 2017-05-31

The district court properly determined that Rubenstein’s action was time- barred because all claims accrued more than two years before Rubenstein filed her complaint, and Rubenstein did not establish that she was entitled to tolling.

Section 1983 actions in Louisiana are subject to the state’s one-year liberative prescription period and applicable tolling provisions.

Norman v. Johnson · filed 2017-05-31

Louisiana’s one-year liberative prescription scheme, including any applicable tolling provisions, applies to Norman’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year limitations period, and claims arising from known injuries accrue no later than the plaintiff’s release from prison.

Warren v. Sawyer · filed 2017-06-01

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Warren’s claims, which were based on allegations from when he was imprisoned, as time barred. Warren alleged that he was released from prison on May 10, 2012. Therefore, his claims accrued at the latest on that date. But he did not file his complaint until May 14, 2015, after the three-year statute of limitations for his claims had run. See Smith v. Campbell, 782 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2015) (three- year statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims in New York); Morse v. Univ. of Vermont, 973 F.2d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 1992) (three-year statute of limitations for Section 504 claims in New York).

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff sustains the alleged injury; a suit filed three years later is untimely under the applicable two-year limitations period.

Armando v. Lorie Davis, Director · filed 2017-06-01

Accrual occurred in 2012 when he sustained injuries after the denial of his transfer to another prison. See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001). Thereafter, he untimely filed this action in 2015.

Section 1983 claims arising from Bell’s arrest, beating, and murder charge accrued by the time of the charge and were barred by the two-year limitations period.

Armani Bell v. City of Chicago · filed 2017-06-02

Therefore, because Bell’s federal causes of action began accruing at the time of his murder charge, they are time- barred under the two year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, so federal courts borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Manuel v. Lehmberg · filed 2017-06-07

As Congress has not provided a statute of limitations in § 1983 cases, the federal courts borrow from the forum state’s general personal-injury limitations period.

Section 1983 claims borrow the state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Manion v. North Carolina Medical Board · filed 2017-06-08

Finally, we conclude that the remaining § 1983, § 1985, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and medical malpractice claims against Pendergast are barred by their respective statutes of limitations. “It is well settled that [§ 1983 and § 1985] borrow the state’s general personal injury limitations period . . . .”

Section 1983 claims filed in Michigan are subject to the state’s three-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions.

Roberson v. Macnicol · filed 2017-06-19

As for Roberson’s § 1983 claims, we apply Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions.

Federal law governs when a § 1983 claim accrues, while state law supplies its limitations period.

Amin Ijbara Equity Corp. v. Village of Oak Lawn · filed 2017-06-19

Federal law determines when a § 1983 claim accrues, but the statute of limitations is bor- rowed from state law.

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which is three years in Washington.

Fager v. Olympic Peninsula Narcotics Enforcement Team · filed 2017-06-21

The district court correctly concluded that the Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Fourth Amendment, due process, and wrongful discharge claims were barred by Washington’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. See RCW 4.16.080; Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by the state statutes of limitations for personal injury actions.”).

Section 1983 claims in Texas are subject to the state’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Hudson v. Lubbock Police Department · filed 2017-06-23

The district court correctly concluded that Hudson’s § 1983 claims were untimely, as Texas’s two-year statute of limitations under TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a) applies to § 1983 claims in Texas.

Section 1983 claims filed in Illinois have a two-year limitations period borrowed from Illinois personal injury law.

Liberty v. City of Chicago · filed 2017-06-27

The appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 cases filed in Illinois is two years, as set forth in Illinois’ personal injury statute, 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-202.

Section 1983 claims filed in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Fahlund v. Nassau County · filed 2017-07-14

Furthermore, the Plaintiffs Section 1983, New York State constitutional violation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence claims against the proposed substitute defendant? are not time-barred because the statute of limitations for each of those causes of action is three years.

Section 1983 claims in California are subject to the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Jasper Crook v. Thibedeaux · filed 2017-07-17

To the extent that Crook challenges the dismissal with prejudice of civil rights claims alleged in his Second Amended Complaint, the district court properly dismissed those claims as time-barred. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008) (California’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts applies to § 1983 and § 1985 claims).

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations.

Gomez v. State of California · filed 2017-07-18

Section 1983 claims are governed by the applicable state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims challenging restrictions on property use in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Holihan v. Town of Orangetown · filed 2017-07-26

The Supreme Court properly directed the dismissal of the four causes of action alleging that the Town committed federal civil rights violations by restricting the plaintiffs’ use of the second dwelling. These causes of action were each governed by ... a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [4], [5]; Owens v Okure, 488 US 235, 240, 251 [1989]; Mallard v Potenza, 376 Fed Appx 132, 133 [2d Cir 2010]; Corsello v Verizon N.Y., Inc., 77 AD3d 344, 361 [2010], mod on other grounds 18 NY3d 777 [2012]).

A Section 1983 claim that accrues more than three years before suit is barred by the applicable Massachusetts limitations period.

Chalifoux v. Chalifoux · filed 2017-07-26

After reviewing the record, we conclude that Joseph's first set of claims, meaning those claims that relate to Officer Woods's alleged accessing and dissemination of Joseph's personal information, accrued prior to July 5, 2013, and are therefore time-barred. ... We also affirm dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Jackson v. Beard · filed 2017-08-04

Because Jackson did not file his complaint until August 2011, this claim is plainly time-barred by Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Boyd v. PA DOC · filed 2017-08-16

The statute of limitations for claims brought under Section 1983 is determined by the state statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 civil rights claims filed in Tennessee are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Olivier v. City of Clarksville · filed 2017-08-17

A one-year statute of limitations is applicable to claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrageous conduct, false imprisonment, malicious harassment, and civil rights violations.

Section 1983 claims in California are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injuries.

Jackson v. Fong · filed 2017-08-31

The statute of limitations relevant to Jackson’s § 1983 claims was California’s two-year limit for personal injuries.

Section 1983 claims arising in Florida are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

Alphonso L. Lee, Jr. v. Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Georgia · filed 2017-08-31

Florida’s four-year statute of limitations therefore applies to § 1983 claims arising in Florida.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury limitations period of the state where they are filed; in Alabama, that period is two years.

West v. Commissioner, Alabama DOC · filed 2017-09-06

Claims like Appellants’ brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to “the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been brought.” McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008). Thus, in this case, Alabama’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions applies.

Section 1983 claims for false arrest and illegal search and seizure are subject to the applicable statute of limitations.

Jaramillo v. Renner · filed 2017-09-06

His § 1983 complaint, filed no earlier than April 7, 2015, was thus untimely as to his claims of false arrest and illegal search and seizure.

In New York, a Section 1983 claim has a three-year limitations period and accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Williams v. City of New York · filed 2017-09-13

The cause of action alleging civil rights violations pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 is not time-barred because the statute of limitations for a cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 is three years (see Owens v Okure, 488 US 235, 251 [1989]; Rimany v Town of Dover, 72 AD3d 918, 921 [2010]), and the cause of action “accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his or her action” (Rimany v Town of Dover, 72 AD3d at 921 [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted]; see Pearl v City of Long Beach, 296 F3d 76, 80 [2002]; see also Wallace v Kato, 549 US 384, 388 [2007]).

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

E. Collins and G. Dieffenbach v. E. Crago, T. Scott, M. Garman · filed 2017-09-15

As such, claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 are subject to a two-year statute of limitations in Pennsylvania.

Section 1983 claims arising in New Jersey are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Ojo v. Luong · filed 2017-09-13

The statute of limitations for those claims is two years. ... Thus, the District Court properly concluded that all of these claims are untimely because Ojo did not file his complaint until more than two years later on July 7, 2014.

Section 1983 claims in Massachusetts use state limitations and relation-back law, allowing an amendment substituting a defendant to relate back to a timely original complaint.

Abernathy v. Dewey · filed 2017-09-28

With respect to the proposed federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the law that “provides the applicable statute of limitations” is, again, Massachusetts law. See Cayo v. Fitzpatrick, 95 F.Supp.3d' 8,13 (D; Mass. 2015). Following the same line of reasoning, those new claims would, if allowed, relate back to the date of the original complaint. Because plaintiff filed his original complaint within the three-year limitations period, the motion to amend is timely.

Section 1983 claims filed in New Jersey are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Camick v. Smith · filed 2017-09-29

In New Jersey, § 1983 claims are subject to New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions.

A § 1983 action may be dismissed as untimely when filed after the applicable three-year period.

Mimms v. Lewis · filed 2017-10-05

The district court properly dismissed Mimms’s action because Mimms filed his action more than three years after he began serving his prison sentence for his 1998 criminal conviction.

Section 1983 claims in Kentucky are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Maryann Bullock v. City of Covington · filed 2017-10-06

Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations applies to Bullock’s § 1983 claims. ... Her § 1983 claims are therefore untimely.

Section 1983 has no limitations or tolling rules of its own, so courts borrow the state rules for an analogous cause of action.

Chrisco v. Holubek · filed 2017-10-06

As the district court correctly explained, § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations or a body of tolling rules; to fill the void, we turn to the state statute of limitations and tolling rules for the analogous cause of action.

Section 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims in California are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Lopez v. City of Santa Ana · filed 2017-10-06

The district court properly dismissed Lopez’s §§ 1983 and 1985 claims for false arrest and false imprisonment on the basis of the applicable statute of limitations because Lopez’s claims accrued more than two years before he filed this action.

A § 1983 claim based on rescission of a zoning permit accrues when the plaintiff has reason to know the issuing authorities are rescinding it.

Basista Holdings, LLC v. Township · filed 2017-10-11

The key inquiry is whether plaintiffs had reason to know that their permit was being rescinded by the issuing authorities. Since that was the case, they were on notice that their legal interests were at risk and the statute of limitations clock began to run.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s residual personal injury limitations period, which is two years in Georgia.

Omanwa v. Catoosa County, Georgia · filed 2017-10-11

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “are governed by the forum state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations,” which in Georgia is two years.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal injury limitations period, which is two years in Alabama.

Joe Daniel Holt, Jr. v. Baker · filed 2017-10-12

Constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions “subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been brought.” McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008). In Alabama, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years from the date that the action accrued.

A Section 1983 claim for declaratory relief is subject to the same statute of limitations as a claim for damages under the section.

Nunn v. Tennessee Department of Correction · filed 2017-10-23

We find this reasoning persuasive and conclude that Nunn’s claim for declaratory relief under section 1983 is subject to the one year statute of limitations that would govern a claim for damages under the statute.

Section 1983 claims brought in Arizona are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Fressadi v. Arizona Municipal Risk Retention Pool · filed 2017-10-26

The district court properly dismissed Fressadi’s § 1983 claims because Fressadi failed to file his action within the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in New Mexico are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Kirk v. Winn · filed 2017-10-26

Kirk has known of the alleged facts supporting his wrongful death claim and the compromise of that claim for the past thirty-one years. The Court therefore concludes that the three-year statute of limitations bars Kirk's § 1983 claims.

A court must evaluate asserted grounds for tolling a § 1983 claim under the applicable state equitable tolling doctrine.

Mitchell v. Snowden · filed 2017-11-01

However, Mitchell also argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled because of his mental illness and multiple prison transfers. These factors should have been evaluated under California’s equitable tolling doctrine.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations, including its tolling rules.

Lee v. Master · filed 2017-11-08

The district court properly dismissed Lee’s excessive force claim because it was barred by the statute of limitations. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (two- year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims, including state law regarding tolling).

Section 1983 claims use the limitations law of the state where the federal court sits because the section has no federal statute of limitations.

Dacosta v. City of N.Y. · filed 2017-11-08

For a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations" is the law of the state in the jurisdiction in which the federal district court sits because there is no federal statute of limitations.

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim arising in Pennsylvania has a two-year limitations period.

Daniels v. City of Phila. · filed 2017-11-08

The statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution claim brought under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Pennsylvania law is two years.

Section 1983 claims in Alabama have a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury and who inflicted it.

Nathaniel Bracy d/b/a The Toy Box v. The City of Prichard, Alabama · filed 2017-11-09

Therefore, the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in Alabama is “two years from when the claim accrues.” ... Plaintiffs knew or had reason to know that they had been injured, and Plaintiffs should have been aware that it was Defendant who inflicted the injury when Defendant did not allow Plaintiffs to apply for a business license.

Section 1983 claims in Georgia have a two-year limitations period that may be tolled for mental incapacity under Georgia law.

Meyer v. Gwinnett County · filed 2017-11-14

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists in the record as to whether Meyer suffered mental incapacity sufficient to ... toll the statute of limitations during the three-week period following his release from jail. See O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-90, 9-3-91. Because that additional three weeks would render Meyer’s complaint timely filed within two years of the date of his release, the date the district court used to determine timeliness, we vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 1983 claims borrow the state personal injury limitations period and tolling rules; in Virginia, the period is two years and may be tolled for incapacity or a defendant’s obstruction of filing.

Evans v. Kuplinski · filed 2017-11-17

Because there is no explicit statute of limitations for claims brought under § 1983, courts borrow the state law personal injury statute of limitations, Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 955 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266–69 (1985)), and tolling rules, Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483–84 (1980). Accordingly, Evans’s claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, see Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A), which may be tolled for any period during which Evans was incapacitated or a defendant directly or indirectly prevented him from filing suit, see id. §§ 8.01-229(A)(2)(b), 8.01-229(D).

A Section 1983 claim filed after the applicable two-year limitations period is time-barred.

Hollowell v. Arizona Dept. of Child Safety · filed 2017-11-20

The district court properly dismissed Hollowell’s remaining claims because Hollowell failed to file them within the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s tort limitations period; in Texas, a minor does not lose tolling because a next friend previously litigated the claims.

Chance Clyce v. Nadine Butler · filed 2017-11-22

Civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for tort claims. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred by “fashioning a rule of [its] own making” to find that Chance forfeited the protection of Texas’s tolling provision when his parents brought suit as next friends.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury claims, including its tolling rules.

Foss v. Rowen · filed 2017-11-30

The district court properly dismissed Foss’s action as time-barred because, even with the benefit of statutory tolling and accepting Foss’s argument that his claim accrued in October 2006, Foss failed to file this action within the applicable statute of limitations, and equitable tolling did not apply. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Jones, 393 F.3d at 927 (§ 1983 claims are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims, including state law regarding tolling); Azer v. Connell, 306 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 2002) (three-pronged test for equitable tolling in California).

A § 1983 claim challenging a conviction accrues when custody ends and federal habeas relief becomes unavailable, if the claimant pursued habeas relief while in custody.

Savory v. Cannon · filed 2017-12-01

So, because Savory's § 1983 claims accrued when the Heck bar lifted, because the Heck bar lifted when Savory could no longer seek federal habeas relief, and because Savory could no longer seek habeas relief as of the termination of his parole on December 6, 2011, Savory's § 1983 claims accrued on that date, and the statute of limitations expired two years later, on December 6, 2013.

Section 1983 claims brought in Alabama are subject to the state's two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Kennedy v. Warren Properties, LLC · filed 2017-12-01

Therefore, Alabama's two-year limitations period for personal injury actions applies.

A § 1983 false imprisonment claim accrues when the alleged false imprisonment ends, and restrictions imposed by a court after release on bond do not extend it.

Brown v. Dart · filed 2017-12-05

Brown’s alleged false imprisonment ended when the court released him from the jail. To the extent Brown’s liberties were restricted while he was released on bond, the court, not the sheriffs department, was responsible for those restrictions. Thus, Brown’s claim against the sheriff and the county accrued—and the two-year statute of limitations began to run—on December 16, 2013.

Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Dorsey v. Pennsylvania Department of Cor · filed 2017-12-06

Appellant’s claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

A § 1983 arrest claim in Illinois must be filed within two years.

Bond v. Perley · filed 2017-12-13

Under § 1983 Bond had two years to file them.

Section 1983 claims alleging USERRA violations do not inherit USERRA’s unlimited filing period.

John W. Wood, Jr. v. Kelly · filed 2017-12-14

Accordingly, § 4327(b) does not “otherwise provide[]” the limitations period (or lack thereof) for Wood’s § 1983 claim alleging violations of USERRA.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois use the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Jones v. John Doe - Prosecution Office · filed 2017-12-18

Jones’ § 1983 claim is governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims, in this case, two years.

Section 1983 suits use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, and a complaint must be filed before that period expires.

Scheveck v. City of Boise · filed 2017-12-22

The district court properly dismissed Scheveck’s action as time-barred because Scheveck did not submit to the court any document that functioned as a complaint before the applicable statute of limitations had run.

A § 1983 claim challenging a discrete denial of prison visitation accrues when the denial occurs, even if visitation remains unavailable afterward.

Easterling v. Thurmer · filed 2018-01-05

We cannot accept this characterization or the suggested analogy. The 2004 denial was complete once the visitation was denied, and Mr. Easterling could have sought redress then.

Section 1983 claims filed in Washington have a three-year statute of limitations, borrowed from the state's personal injury limitations period.

A.T. v. Everett Sch. Dist. · filed 2018-01-09

Therefore, in a Washington forum, the statute of limitations for a section 1983 claim and a Title IX claim, as well as the torts of negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress, is three years.

Section 1983 claims filed in New York have a three-year limitations period; an employment discrimination claim accrues when the employer communicates the challenged decision.

Phillips v. City of N.Y. · filed 2018-01-09

The three-year statute of limitations of New York CPLR 214(5) applies to all Section 1983 actions filed in New York, with the claim accruing on the date the discriminatory decision was communicated to the employee.

A § 1983 claim in Florida is timely if filed within four years after it accrues.

Simpson v. State of Florida · filed 2018-01-10

In light of the accrual date of September 24, 2012, and the filing date of September 23, 2016, Simpson’s complaint was timely filed within Florida’s four- year statute of limitations for §1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year limitations period, and an injury from alleged state action accrues when that action occurs.

Vaughn v. Phoenix House New York Inc. · filed 2018-01-16

Upon review, we conclude that Vaughn’s claims under § 1983 are time barred. ... Accordingly, any injury from the state action accrued in April 2011, more than three years before Vaughn filed his original complaint in May 2014.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Milsap v. Habitat Co. LLC · filed 2018-01-18

Because the statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 cases in Illinois is two years, id., she had until October 2014 to file suit. But Milsap did not sue until January 2015, so this claim is time-barred.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal injury limitations period, with tolling while a prisoner completes administrative exhaustion.

Edward Jones, Jr. v. Richardson · filed 2018-01-19

The district court properly dismissed as time-barred Jones’s Fourteenth Amendment claim arising from an erroneous entry in Jones’s disciplinary record because, even with the benefit of tolling during the pendency of the administrative exhaustion process, Jones failed to file his claim within the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury claims.

James v. Halter · filed 2018-01-25

Section 1983 claims are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims, in this case, two years.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the injury occurred.

Vergara v. Dal Ponte · filed 2018-01-31

Claims brought pursuant to § 1983 are subject to the statute of limitations applicable to personal injuries in the state where the injury occurred.

Section 1983 claims in Maine have a six-year statute of limitations.

Dubois v. Town of Arundel · filed 2018-02-01

However, a six-year statute of limitations applies to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 complaint need not anticipate a limitations defense or plead facts establishing tolling; dismissal at the pleading stage requires a limitations defense apparent from the complaint.

Laskowski v. Chandler · filed 2018-02-12

Because defendant Dominguez’s argument does not reveal an “airtight” defense of statute of limitations based on plaintiffs complaint, the court finds this affirmative defense to be improperly brought at this stage of the litigation.

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois have a two-year limitations period, subject to equitable tolling or estoppel when their requirements are met.

Pulliam v. The City of Calumet City · filed 2018-02-12

Based on the allegations of the complaint, neither equitable tolling nor equitable estoppel conceivably apply to Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim, which otherwise accrued on March 15, 2014. Because Plaintiff did not file suit until February 2017, almost three years later, this claim is barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims filed in Illinois have a two-year limitations period, tolled while a prisoner properly exhausts administrative remedies.

Bowers v. Dart · filed 2018-02-13

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim in Illinois is two years. ... The statute of limitations was tolled until February 26, 2013. Since he did not file this lawsuit within two years of that date, the statute of limitations bars this claim.

Section 1983 claims in Massachusetts have a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows the facts underlying the claimed injury.

Vinnie v. Henry · filed 2018-02-16

Accordingly, all the facts that form the basis of the plaintiff's 2015 complaint were known to him in August, 2004, thus starting the clock on the three-year limitations period. We conclude, therefore, as did the judge below, that the plaintiff's § 1983 claims are time-barred.

Section 1983 claims use the limitations period for state personal injury claims.

Hughey v. Septa—Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 2018-02-21

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is governed by the limitations ... period for state law personal injury claims.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations; in Nevada, that period is two years.

Kinford v. Pincock · filed 2018-02-23

The district court properly dismissed Kinford’s medical deliberate indifference claim and medical malpractice claim because they were barred by the statute of limitations. See NRS 11.190(4)(e); Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims and Nevada’s relevant statute of limitations is two years); Libby v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 325 P.3d 1276, 1279-80 (2014) (Nevada law “requires a plaintiff to satisfy both the one-year discovery rule and the three-year limitations period” for medical malpractice claims under NRS 41A.097(2)).

Section 1983 claims arising in Florida are subject to Florida’s four-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Salley v. Officer Terry Goldston · filed 2018-02-27

The district court properly determined that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff alleged that the actions giving rise to his § 1983 claims occurred in 2001. Because his claims accrued in 2001, he should have filed his complaint by 2005.

Section 1983 false arrest claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period that begins when legal process commences.

Dorobanov v. Caesars Entertainment Corporation · filed 2018-02-27

So the false arrest claim here accrued when the arrest warrant was issued pursuant the indictment on March 6, 2014, which Plaintiffs allege lacked probable cause.

Section 1983 claims arising in Oklahoma are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Lawson v. Okmulgee County Criminal · filed 2018-02-28

Thus, the district court correctly determined that the estate’s §1983 claims are subject to a two-year limitations period.

The limitations period for a prisoner’s Section 1983 claim is tolled while the prisoner pursues the prison grievance process, including time spent following officials’ directions when no written procedure exists.

Brown v. Vail · filed 2018-03-01

However, taking the amended complaint’s factual allegations as true, Brown is also entitled to tolling for the period from February 5, 2012, when he first filed his grievance with the prison captain’s office, to April 22, 2012. ... Thus, Brown’s original complaint in this action, mailed on March 31, 2015, ... was timely.

Section 1983 claims in Arkansas are subject to the state's three-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Crippen v. Grill · filed 2018-03-01

Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations. ... In Arkansas, this is the three year personal injury statute of limitations, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105(3).

In Illinois, Section 1983 claims arising from a search or seizure must be filed within two years of when the plaintiff knows of the injury and its cause.

Larson v. LaSalle County · filed 2018-03-05

Courts thus routinely dismiss Section 1983 Fourth Amendment claims filed two years after the complained-of search or seizure. ... Applying those rules here, Larson’s Section 1983 claims are time-barred.

A § 1983 action may be dismissed on summary judgment when it is barred by limitations.

Broussard v. Brown · filed 2018-03-06

Jeffery Broussard, Louisiana prisoner #613311, appeals the dismissal of his civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The district court did not err in granting summary judgment based on limitations.

An equal protection claim under Section 1983 is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Matter of Karamalla v. Devine · filed 2018-03-16

In any event, petitioner is seeking the same substantive relief with his equal protection claim asserted under 42 USC § 1983, which is subject to a three-year statute of limitations ( see Mulcahy v New York City Dept. of Educ ., 99 AD3d 535, 536 [1st Dept 2012] ; see generally Barry v Cadman Towers, Inc ., 136 AD3d 951, 952 [2d Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 913 [2017]; Acquest Wehrle, LLC v Town of Amherst , 129 AD3d 1644, 1646 [4th Dept 2015], appeal dismissed 26 NY3d 1020 [2015]).

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knew or should have known that his rights were violated.

Matthews v. Debus · filed 2018-03-19

The claims against defendants Beckman and Hannon are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Matthews' claims accrued, and the statute of limitations started to run, when he knew or should have known that his rights were violated, see, e.g., Washington v. Summerville, 127 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 1997), which in this case was on August 4, 2013. The clock ran out on Matthews' state law claims one year later, on August 4, 2014, and on his federal claims two years later, on August 4, 2015.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period and tolling rules.

Raynolds-Morris v. Buell · filed 2018-03-22

The district court properly dismissed Raynolds-Morris’ action as time-barred because Raynolds-Morris failed to file her action within the applicable statute of limitations or establish any basis for equitable tolling.

Section 1983 actions are not governed by the four-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a).

Birch v. Sprint/Nextel Corporation · filed 2018-03-23

But we have held that § 1658 does not apply to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, while federal law determines when the claims accrue.

Bishop v. West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority · filed 2018-03-26

Therefore, actions brought under § 1983 are governed by the analogous statute of limitations in the state in which the action is brought. ... When a § 1983 claim accrues, however, is determined by federal law. ... Because, as discussed more fully above, none of the tolling doctrines are applicable here, the Court FINDS that Bishop’s § 1983 claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising before the limitations cutoff are time-barred unless the continuing violation doctrine saves them.

Crichlow v. Fischer · filed 2018-03-26

The Court clarifies that, other than the claims specifically saved by application of the continuing violation doctrine, Plaintiff's claims arising before October 16, 2009, are barred by the statute of limitations.

A § 1983 claim in Oregon is subject to the state's two-year personal injury limitations period unless equitable tolling or estoppel applies.

Lujan v. Ford · filed 2018-03-27

The district court properly dismissed Lujan’s action as time-barred because Lujan filed this action after the applicable statute of limitations had run, and he did not establish that equitable tolling or equitable estoppel applied.

Section 1983 claims use the state limitations period for personal injury actions, which is two years in Pennsylvania.

Moore v. Giorla · filed 2018-03-28

Claims brought under § 1983 are subject to the state statutes of limitations governing personal injury actions.

A Section 1983 claim concerning termination of a housing voucher accrues when the tenant receives notice of the termination and knows of the injury.

McClean v. Del. Cnty. Hous. Auth. · filed 2018-03-28

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party, however, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims regarding his rent accrued on November 1, 2013, when he received notice that his housing voucher was terminated. At that time Plaintiff knew, and a reasonable person would have known, that he suffered injuries.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period.

Brainer v. Dart · filed 2018-03-28

But plaintiff’s claims arise under § 1983, meaning the applicable statute of limitations is two years.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period; a public-employment due process claim accrues on the employee’s actual termination date.

Sapia v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago · filed 2018-03-31

As discussed above, the statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims is two years in Illinois. The claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know that his constitutional rights have been violated. Draper, 664 F.3d at 1113. In procedural due process cases, a claim for deprivation of public employment accrues on the actual termination date of the employee and not on the date when the decision to lay off the employee is made.

Section 1983 claims in Massachusetts are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Padmanabhan v. Hulka · filed 2018-04-03

Plaintiff's remaining claims include tort claims for fraud (Count IV), tortious interference with contract (Count V), trespass to chattels (Count VI), violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a claim for a declaratory judgment (Counts IX and X). These claims all have a three-year statutes of limitations.

Section 1983 claims filed in New Jersey have a two-year limitations period.

Reardon v. Zonies · filed 2018-04-11

In New Jersey, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is two years.

An administrative appeal does not toll the two-year limitations period for a § 1983 claim brought in Kansas state court.

Srivastava v. University of Kansas · filed 2018-04-13

Meanwhile, Kansas caselaw and federal caselaw support that the filing of an administrative appeal does not toll the two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims from running.

Section 1983 claims borrow the state personal injury limitations period and its tolling rules.

McFields v. Cook County · filed 2018-04-13

When federal courts borrow a state statute of limitations for a § 1983 case, they must also apply state tolling rules.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period.

Cole v. Lemke · filed 2018-04-24

Therefore, Plaintiff had until August 8, 2016 to bring any Section 1983 claims related to the events described in his grievance against Defendant Ononiwu.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim in Illinois is tolled while a prisoner completes the administrative grievance process.

Damien Terry v. Spencer · filed 2018-04-27

The judge also prematurely concluded that the statute of limitations bars Terry’s deliberate-indifference claims. ... But as Terry pointed out in his motion to reconsider, “a federal court relying on the Illinois statute of limitations in a § 1983 case must toll the limitations period while a prisoner completes the administrative grievance process.”

Section 1983 claims arising in Michigan use the state’s three-year limitations period for personal-injury claims.

Carleton Buck v. City of Highland Park, Mich. · filed 2018-05-02

We have held that the appropriate statute of limitations to be borrowed for § 1983 actions arising in Michigan is the state’s three-year limitations period for personal-injury claims.

Section 1983 claims use the limitations period supplied by state law.

Hawks v. City of Chicago Police · filed 2018-05-14

The limitations period for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is taken from state law.

Section 1983 claims arising in Georgia have a two-year statute of limitations.

Guy W. Harrison, III v. Fulton County, Georgia · filed 2018-05-17

Similarly, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising out of events occurring in Georgia is two years.

A Section 1983 action may be time-barred even after tolling the limitations period during a prisoner’s administrative exhaustion process.

Gibbs v. Farley · filed 2018-05-17

California state prisoner Kenneth Gibbs appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force and failure to protect claims. ... The district court properly dismissed Gibbs’s action as time-barred because, even with the benefit of tolling during the pendency of the administrative exhaustion process, Gibbs failed to file his action within the applicable statute of limitations.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury giving rise to it.

Pedrote-Salinas v. Johnson · filed 2018-05-22

To determine the date of accrual of § 1983 claims, the court should first identify the injury of which the plaintiff complains and then determine when the plaintiff could have filed suit for that injury. ... Pedrote’s claims thus survive any statute of limitations challenge.

Section 1983 actions in Oregon are subject to the state's two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Harrington v. Menteer · filed 2018-05-24

The district court properly dismissed Harrington’s false arrest, false imprisonment, cruel and unusual punishment, and due process claims because Harrington failed to file his action within the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois use a two-year personal injury limitations period and federal accrual rules.

Richardson v. City of Chicago · filed 2018-05-29

Richardson’s Section 1983 claims are governed by Illinois’ two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, but federal accrual rules apply to these claims.

Section 1983 claims in Texas are subject to the state's two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Bob Ahmadi v. Pool · filed 2018-06-04

In this case, the applicable statute of limitations is the Texas limitation period of two years for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 actions in Texas have a two-year limitations period, and the discovery rule does not delay accrual when diligence could have revealed the injury earlier.

Vega v. Town of Flower Mound, Texas · filed 2018-06-05

Consequently, the discovery rule does not apply, meaning the limitations period commenced on 19 November 2013, when his property was destroyed, and expired two years later, on 19 November 2015. See id. at 190. Because Vega filed this action in February 2016, it is untimely.

Section 1983 claims brought in Arkansas are subject to the state’s three-year personal-injury limitations period.

Humphrey v. Eureka Gardens Public Facility · filed 2018-06-06

Arkansas’s three-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions applies to the Humphreys’ § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims arising in New Jersey have a two-year statute of limitations.

Moore v. Middlesex County Prosecutors O · filed 2018-06-07

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in New Jersey is two years.

In Delaware, a Section 1983 claim for an unlawful search has a two-year limitations period that begins when the search occurs.

Walsh v. Popp · filed 2018-06-07

In Delaware, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is two years, see McDowell v. Del. State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 1996), and Walsh’s claim accrued when the search occurred, see Estate of Lagano v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 769 F.3d 850, 861 (3d Cir. 2014), on October 6, 2014. Walsh did not file his complaint until July 24, 2017, after the limitations period expired.

Section 1983 claims filed in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Pulte Homes v. Town of Carmel · filed 2018-06-08

The statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims in New York is three years.

Section 1983 looks to state law for its statute of limitations.

Redleski v. Plumley · filed 2018-06-13

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action, but it looks to state law to establish the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Pulte Homes v. Town of Carmel · filed 2018-06-13

The statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims in New York is three years.

A § 1983 action is untimely if filed after the applicable limitations period expires.

Martinez v. Hidalgo County, Texas · filed 2018-06-14

Because Martinez did not file his § 1983 action by July 22, 2013, it is untimely.