42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims in Arizona are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Houston v. Arizona State Board of Educati · filed 2014-06-18

The district court properly dismissed Houston’s § 1983 claims as barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Texas have a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff becomes aware of the injury.

Collard v. Noah · filed 2014-06-19

Thus, appellant clearly was aware that she had “suffered an injury” on that date. See Bell, 547 Fed. Appx. at 456. Appellant did not file her original petition until August 17, 2011, more than five years later and well outside the two-year limitations period. See id. We hold that the trial court did not err in finding that appellant’s section 1983 claims were barred by limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Louisiana are subject to a one-year limitations period.

Lucas v. Cain · filed 2014-06-19

The district court’s dismissal without prejudice will very likely operate as a dismissal with prejudice because Lucas will be barred by the one-year limitations period for seeking § 1983 relief.

Section 1983 claims brought in Connecticut have a three-year statute of limitations under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-577.

Gagnon ex rel. MacFarlane v. East Haven Board of Education · filed 2014-06-19

The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that the appropriate statute of limitations for section 1983 actions in Connecticut is governed by Conn. GemStat. § 52-577, which provides for three years in which to bring such claims.

Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania have a two-year statute of limitations.

Jackson v. City of Erie Police Department · filed 2014-06-20

The statute of limitations for a §1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.

Section 1983 Establishment Clause claims challenging a still-existing religious display are not subject to a state statute of limitations.

Tearpock-Martini v. Borough of Shickshinny · filed 2014-06-23

At issue in this appeal is whether an Establishment Clause challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to a still-existing monument erected on municipal property is subject to a state-law statute of limitations. We hold that it is not.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the claim arose.

Cibula v. Fox · filed 2014-06-26

For § 1983 claims, federal courts apply the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the cause of action arose.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Lacey v. Yates County · filed 2014-06-27

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim brought in New York is three years.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the injury occurred; in Pennsylvania, that period is two years.

Leonard v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 2014-06-30

The statute of limitations for a claim under § 1983 is imported from the personal injury tort law of the state in which the injury occurred, which in Pennsylvania is two years.

Section 1983 claims in New York use the three-year limitations period for general personal injury actions.

Tardif v. City of New York · filed 2014-07-02

New York has more than one statute of limitations for personal injury actions; courts therefore apply the three-year statute of limitations for general personal injury claims of C.P.L.R. § 214.

Section 1983 claims arising in Kentucky are subject to Kentucky’s one-year limitations period for personal-injury actions.

Gilley v. Dunaway · filed 2014-07-08

Because Kentucky’s one-year limitation for personal-injury actions applies to both state personal-injury claims and federal § 1983 claims, Gilley had until one year following her 18th birthday, or until September 2006, to bring any claims that accrued during her infancy.

In Colorado, § 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Williams v. Colorado Springs Police Department · filed 2014-07-09

Further, any false arrest or false imprisonment claim based on the 2007 arrest not barred by Heck is otherwise barred under the two-year statute of limitations applicable to this case.

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Collura v. Ford · filed 2014-07-14

Mr. Collura’s cause of action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for which courts apply the state statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 claims arising in Arkansas have a three-year statute of limitations borrowed from state law.

Mountain Home Flight Service, Inc. v. Baxter County · filed 2014-07-15

In § 1983 cases arising in Arkansas, the applicable statute of limitations is three years.

Section 1983 claims in Ohio must be brought within two years of the alleged adverse action; the continuing-violation doctrine did not revive the earlier discrete acts alleged here.

Dharma Agrawal v. Montemagno · filed 2014-07-23

The continuing-violation theory does not revive these time-barred claims.

Section 1983 claims in Florida must be brought within four years of the allegedly unconstitutional or otherwise illegal act.

Rembert v. State of Florida · filed 2014-07-24

Based on the four-year statute of limitation for § 1983 claims, Rembert's last date to timely file a civil action was in 1999.

Section 1983 damages claims for constitutional violations use the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the claim arose.

Foster v. Cerro Gordo County · filed 2014-07-25

Claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages arising from alleged constitutional violations are subject to the statute of limitations that applies to a personal injury action in the state in which the cause of action arose.

Equitable estoppel does not toll the limitations period for a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff knew enough to investigate before the period expired.

Goldberg v. Kaufman · filed 2014-07-30

Moreover, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the statutes of limitations applicable to the plaintiffs’ claims against Kaufman in her individual capacity were not tolled by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, as the record establishes that the plaintiffs had “timely awareness of the facts requiring [them] to make further inquiry before the statute [s] of limitations expired” (Putter v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 7 NY3d 548, 553-554 [2006]).

The limitations period for a Section 1983 claim cannot begin before the conduct giving rise to that claim occurs, even if the plaintiff could have sued over earlier, separate conduct.

Foster Group, Inc. v. City of Elgin · filed 2014-07-30

Plaintiffs section 1983 claims, based on the city’s actions in 2008, were timely, and that remains true even if plaintiff could have pursued other claims based on other wrongful conduct at an earlier time.

Section 1983 claims filed in Alaska are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Rhodes v. Treaver Miller · filed 2014-07-31

The district court properly dismissed Rhodes’ federal constitutional and state law claims arising from his allegedly unlawful arrest and an allegedly unlawful search and seizure because Rhodes filed his complaint more than two years after these claims accrued.

Section 1983 claims arising in Idaho are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

MacY v. Howard · filed 2014-08-01

The district court properly dismissed Macy’s § 1983 claims against defendants Howard and Lind on the basis of acts that occurred on February 7, 2011, as barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Clifford v. Regents of the University of California · filed 2014-08-01

The district court properly dismissed Clifford’s Title IX claim against defendants and his § 1983 equal protection and First Amendment retaliation claims against defendant Cody because the statute of limitations had run before Clifford filed his complaint.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's general personal injury statute of limitations, which is two years in Illinois.

Snyder v. Village of Midlothian · filed 2014-08-07

I agree with Defendant that Plaintiffs amended complaint containing the § 1983 claims was filed outside the two-year statute of limitations. While § 1983 does not expressly provide for a time limit within which a claim may be brought, the United States Supreme Court has looked to the law of the state in which the cause of action arose, using that state’s general statute of limitations for personal injury torts.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s general personal injury statute of limitations, which is two years in Texas.

Shelby v. City of El Paso, Texas · filed 2014-08-08

The Supreme Court in Wilson v. Garcia, stated that all § 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury actions, and therefore, the state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions applies to all § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year limitations period, and claims based on a continuing pattern of discrimination can be timely when the last act falls within that period.

Williams v. King · filed 2014-08-11

“Federal constitutional claims, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are governed by New York’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, as well the state’s tolling rules.” ... This argument also fails because the pre-2008 deprivations were part of a pattern or practice of discrimination whose last act, the denial of Williams’s participation in Muharram in 2010, took place within the three-year statute of limitations period.

Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period.

Montanez v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2014-08-14

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.

Section 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Trimble v. Shaw · filed 2014-08-14

Trimble’s claims, made pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, are governed by 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2), Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for tort actions.

A later discovered memo does not extend the time to file a § 1983 action when the plaintiff already knew the facts supporting the claim.

Bell v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority · filed 2014-08-14

Although Bell discovered the Memo in April 2013, he was aware of all the facts which would support a cause of action when MARTA responded to his initial Open Records Act request in January 2008, but he did not file the underlying § 1983 action until April 2010, outside of the limitations period. Therefore, the memo did not affect the district court’s statute of limitations ruling, which we previously affirmed.

Section 1983 claims in Texas use the two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, but federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Ivie v. Abbott · filed 2014-08-15

Although the statute of limitations applicable in this case is the two-year limitations period used for Texas personal injury claims, see Stanley v. Foster, 464 F.3d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 2006), “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law,” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007).

Section 1983 claims arising in Georgia have a two-year statute of limitations.

Rehberger v. Henry County, Geoergia · filed 2014-08-18

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in Georgia is two years.

Section 1983 claims filed in New York have a three-year limitations period; equitable tolling does not apply when plaintiffs were able to pursue their rights in time.

Kelly v. City of New York · filed 2014-08-19

In New York, § 1983 actions must be brought within three years of the accrual of the claim. ... We agree with the District Court that plaintiffs were not prevented from timely exercising their rights, as evidenced by the fact that they did exercise those rights in Kelly I. It was not, therefore, error or abuse of discretion to deny equitable tolling and find that the instant claims are barred under the three-year statute of limitations.

In Ohio, a § 1983 claim has a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Joseph Holson, Jr. v. Good · filed 2014-08-27

In Ohio, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is two years and runs from “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis” of the claim.

Section 1983 claims use the analogous state limitations period for personal injury actions.

Robbin v. City of Santa Fe · filed 2014-09-03

Under Supreme Court precedent, for a section 1983 claim based on Mr. Buller’s violation of Mr. Robbin’s property right to a continued employment classification, we apply the analogous residual state limitations period for personal injury tort actions.

Section 1983 claims borrow the limitations period of the proper forum state, so filing first in an improper venue does not preserve a claim under that venue’s longer period.

Brown v. Pepe · filed 2014-09-08

Because section 1983 claims borrow the statute of limitations of the forum state, a plaintiff should not be able to avoid the shorter statute of limitations of the proper forum state by instituting an action in a state with a longer limitations period.

Section 1983 claims use the state personal injury limitations period and its applicable tolling rules, but tolling under a separate state tort claims act does not apply.

DeVries v. Driesen · filed 2014-09-10

Section 1983 claims are governed by the state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims and may be subject to any tolling rules that Iowa courts have applied to that statute. The tolling provision DeVries relies on, however, comes from the Tort Claims Act, not from the personal injury statute, and so it has no application here.

Section 1983 has no built-in limitations period, so courts borrow the forum state's limitations period for personal injury actions.

Jardín De Las Catalinas Ltd. Partnership v. Joyner · filed 2014-09-12

Since section 1983 does not contain a built-in statute of limitations, courts borrow the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the action is brought.

Clarence McFarlin, Jr. v. Douglas County · filed 2014-09-30

Section 1983 claims are subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been brought.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state's limitations period, while federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Conjugal Partnership Acevedo-Príncipe v. United States · filed 2014-10-06

Though § 1983 borrows the limitations period itself from local law, the accrual date for a § 1983 claim is set by federal law.

Section 1983 actions arising in Pennsylvania have a two-year statute of limitations.

Reginald Johnson, Sr. v. Mondrosch · filed 2014-10-08

The applicable statute of limitations for a § 1983 action arising in Pennsylvania is two years.

Section 1983 claims use the limitations period for general personal injury actions in the state where the claim arose.

Heuston v. Ballard · filed 2014-10-09

Because Congress has not expressly provided a statute of limitations for actions brought under § 1983, such claims are subject to the statute of limitations of the general personal injury statute in the state where the action arose.

Section 1983 actions use the general personal injury limitations period of the state where the federal court sits, unless that period conflicts with federal law.

Omar v. Blackman · filed 2014-10-09

For §§ 1983 and 1985 actions, “we look to the general, residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions” from the state where the federal court sits unless the state limitations period is inconsistent with the Constitution or federal law.

Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania have a two-year statute of limitations.

Montanez v. Secretary Pennsylvania Depart · filed 2014-10-15

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.

Section 1983 actions use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the cause of action arose.

Bennett v. Susquehanna County Children & Youth Services · filed 2014-10-22

The limitations period for a § ... 1983 action is the limitations period for personal injury torts in the state where the cause of action arose.

Section 1983 actions in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations.

Jackson v. White · filed 2014-10-27

We conclude that Jackson’s suit is barred by the two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in Illinois, and affirm.

Section 1983 claims in Arkansas are subject to the state's personal injury statute of limitations.

Jones v. Frost · filed 2014-10-30

The Arkansas personal injury statute of limitations applies to Jones' claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Hickox v. County of Blair · filed 2014-11-04

Claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to state statutes of limitations governing personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims use the state’s general or residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Lilly v. Town of Lewiston · filed 2014-11-07

“In section 1983 actions, the applicable limitations period is found in the ‘general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.’”

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the injury occurred, which is two years in Indiana.

Allen v. Richard Hinchman, M.D. Richard Tanner, M.D. and Jeffery Smith, M.D. · filed 2014-11-10

Therefore, the statute of limitations for a section 1983 action is governed by the personal injury statute of the state where the alleged injury occurred. ... In Indiana, that period of limitations is two years.

A Section 1983 limitations defense cannot support dismissal when untimeliness is not apparent from the complaint.

Neelley v. Walker · filed 2014-11-10

For this reason, it is not apparent from the face of Plaintiffs pleading that her federal-law claims are time-barred, see La Grasta, 358 F.3d at 845, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the running of the statute of limitations is due to be denied.

An EEOC right-to-sue letter does not toll the limitations period for a § 1983 claim.

Hoover v. S O S Staffing Services, Inc. · filed 2014-11-12

Hoover’s argument that an EEOC right-to-sue letter tolls the prescriptive period for her § 1983, § 1985, and state law claims is wholly unsupported.

Section 1983 constitutional claims are subject to the personal injury statute of limitations in the state where the action is brought.

Chadwick D. Banks v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2014-11-13

All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been brought.

Section 1983 has no built-in limitations period, so courts ordinarily borrow the forum state’s personal injury limitations period.

Williams v. City of Brockton · filed 2014-11-13

“Section 1983 does not contain a built-in statute of limitations.” ... Consequently, “a federal court called upon to adjudicate a section 1983 claim ordinarily must borrow the forum state’s limitation period governing personal injury causes of action.”

Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania have a two-year statute of limitations.

Kreider v. Philhaven Adolescent Inpatient Treatment Center · filed 2014-11-14

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.

Section 1983 claims brought in Louisiana have a one-year limitations period.

Robert McGuire, Jr. v. Larpenter · filed 2014-11-18

Under applicable Louisiana law and Fifth Circuit precedent, the limitations period for McGuire’s § 1983 claims is one year.

Section 1983 claims brought in Nebraska are subject to the limitations period in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207.

Anthony K. v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs. · filed 2014-11-21

In Nebraska, § 1983 claims are governed by the statute of limitations in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207 (Reissue 2008).

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania must be filed within two years of accrual.

Bryan Angle v. Hayes · filed 2014-11-25

Angle had two years from the date his § 1983 claim accrued to file his complaint.

Section 1983 claims in Virginia use the state's two-year personal injury limitations period.

Scott v. Clarke · filed 2014-11-25

First, the Supreme Court has held that the state limitations period for personal injury cases is applicable to § 1983 claims.. ... Virginia applies a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 borrows the state-law limitations period for personal injury actions.

Ceara v. Deacon · filed 2014-11-25

Because •§ 1983 does not provide for a specific statute of limitations, courts apply the statute of limitations for personal injury actions under state law.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged deprivation.

McLaughlin v. Forty Fort Borough · filed 2014-11-26

While the Second Amended Complaint does not make clear precisely when in 2006 Plaintiffs knew or should have known of the alleged due process violation, it is clear the cause of action accrued sometime in 2006. As a result, Plaintiffs had until December 31, 2008, at the latest, to bring a timely § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 claim arising from an arrest is subject to a three-year limitations period under Washington law, which may be tolled for imprisonment or disability.

Beito v. City of Airway Heights · filed 2014-12-03

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the basis that Beito’s action is time-barred because Beito filed his action more than three years after his 2006 arrest, which was when his § 1983 claim accrued, and the combined duration of his imprisonment and disability did not sufficiently toll the limitations period.

In New Jersey, a § 1983 malicious-use-of-process claim has a two-year limitations period and accrues when the underlying proceeding ends in the plaintiff’s favor.

Ali v. Jersey City Parking Authority · filed 2014-12-10

This claim is governed by New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims. See Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). The District Court, without specifying any particular basis for Ali’s § 1983 claim, concluded that it accrued when Ali received the parking ticket on April 1, 2011. We agree that most of Ali’s claims accrued on that date and are untimely for that reason. This claim, however, did not accrue until the proceeding terminated in Ali’s favor when the Municipal Court dismissed the ticket on April 26, 2011. See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 348-49 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, this claim is timely because Ali filed his complaint exactly two years later.

Section 1983 claims in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

King v. New York City Employees' Retirement System · filed 2014-12-10

King’s due process action is governed by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period; a continuing violation requires further unlawful acts within that period.

Keslosky v. Borough of Old Forge · filed 2014-12-11

As a result, Plaintiff is outside the requisite two year statute of-limitations, cannot assert any continuing violation after June 2005, and is time-barred from bringing a § 1983 claim.

In Florida, a Section 1983 facial challenge to a land-use plan accrues when the plan is enacted and is subject to a four-year limitations period.

Dibbs v. Hillsborough County · filed 2014-12-12

Because the statute of limitations has expired as to the facial claim asserted in Count I, it is time-barred. Accordingly, the County is entitled to summary judgment in its favor' as a matter of law - on Count I to the extent Dibbs asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the U.S. Constitution.

Section 1983 claims arising in Wisconsin use the state’s six-year personal rights statute of limitations.

Givens v. Luedtke · filed 2014-12-17

With the accrual date established as March 8, 2007, we turn to whether Givens’s claim is timely under Wisconsin’s six-year personal rights statute of limitations, see Wis. Stat. § 893.53, the residual statute for personal-injury actions, which we have adopted for use in § 1983 actions in that state, see Malone v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 553 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir.2009); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 407-09 (7th Cir.1989).

A § 1983 claim arising in New Jersey has a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury.

Kaminski v. Township of Toms River · filed 2014-12-23

They had two years from that date of accrual to bring their claims. See id.; see also N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2; Dique, 603 F.3d at 185 (“[A] section 1983 claim arising in New Jersey has a two-year statute of limitations.”). Kaminski I was filed in 2010, making their claim untimely.

Section 1983 claims in Florida are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

Bozeman v. Poole · filed 2015-01-05

Bozeman’s federal claims, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, must be filed within the statute of limitation provided under Florida law, which is “within four years of the allegedly unconstitutional or otherwise illegal act.” Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1188 (11th Cir. 1999). Bozeman alleged that the accident occurred in 2007, but she did not file her complaint until 2014, approximately three years after the statute of limitation expired.

The limitations period for a Pennsylvania Section 1983 claim is tolled while a prisoner exhausts administrative remedies required by the PLRA.

Pearson v. Secretary Department of Correc · filed 2015-01-07

Because we hold that the PLRA is a statutory prohibition under Pennsylvania’s tolling statute, we reverse the District Court’s order dismissing Pearson’s complaint. We remand the case to the District Court for a determination of whether Pearson exhausted his administrative remedies on all of his § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the claim arose.

Warner v. B. Pietrini & Sons Construct · filed 2015-01-07

Moreover, § 1983 claims are governed by the statute of limitations for personal injury torts in the state where the claim arose.

Section 1983 actions arising in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations.

Sneed v. City of Harvey · filed 2015-01-13

As the district court correctly recognized, however, a two-year statute of limitations governs § 1983 actions arising in Illinois.

Section 1983 contract impairment claims brought in Georgia are subject to a two-year limitations period; the period began when the ordinance allegedly impaired the plaintiffs’ rights.

Wood v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County · filed 2015-01-13

The parties further agree that the applicable statute of limitations for the contract impairment claim under the U.S. Constitution, which Plaintiffs brought through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is two years. ... Each Plaintiff was therefore required to bring the state law claims by 2008 and the § 1983 claims by 2004. They did not do so. Their claims based on the 2002 ordinance must be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims filed in Texas are subject to a two-year limitations period; a claim for inadequate jail medical care is untimely when the plaintiff should have known of the alleged inadequate care more than two years before filing.

Reed v. Eddy Lange · filed 2015-01-14

Taking Reed’s factual allegations as true, he should have known before April 1, 2012, two years before he filed his complaint, that he may have received constitutionally inadequate medical care for his broken hand from the jail medical staff.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York have a three-year limitations period measured from accrual.

Schoolcraft v. City of New York · filed 2015-01-16

As to Plaintiffs federal claims against Officers Weiss and Mascol, the limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New York state is three years from date of accrual, i.e., October 31, 2012.

Section 1983 actions based on conduct in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period running from accrual.

Harper v. Dinella · filed 2015-01-21

For § 1983 actions based on conduct in Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations is two years from the date the claim accrued.

A Section 1983 wrongful arrest claim accrues when the claimant is detained pursuant to legal process, and New Jersey’s two-year limitations period applies.

Williams v. Trenton Police Department · filed 2015-01-23

For Williams, this means that the statute on his wrongful arrest claim began to run on May 2, 2009, the night he was arrested and jailed. As he filed this action on October 28, 2011, it is time-barred.

Section 1983 claims filed in Illinois have a two-year limitations period borrowed from state law.

O'Gorman v. City of Chicago · filed 2015-01-26

The limitations period for § 1983 claims is based in state law, and the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in Illinois is two years.

Section 1983 claims brought in Georgia are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Major Fortson v. State of Georgia · filed 2015-01-28

Significantly, Fortson’s §1983 and § 1985 claims are all barred by the Georgia two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 retaliation and discrimination claims accrue when the plaintiff knows of the challenged action.

Ellis v. Wilkinson · filed 2015-01-28

Plaintiffs claims for retaliation and discrimination accrued when the Town first took action on the project, which plaintiff claims occurred in September 2010.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, and federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Wise-Johnson-Bey v. Tolbert · filed 2015-02-02

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Bey’s action is barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1048 (for § 1983 claims, federal courts apply the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and federal law for determining accrual; a § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of the action).

Section 1983 claims do not receive the six-month extension under Iowa’s Tort Claims Act tolling provision.

Turner v. Palmer · filed 2015-02-04

Iowa Code § 669.18 is a tolling provision of the Iowa Tort Claims Act, and therefore, under the holding of DeVries, does not apply to Plaintiffs § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims arising in Wyoming are subject to a four-year limitations period.

Pfeil v. Lampert · filed 2015-02-20

Events prior to August 2008 are barred by the four year limitations period applicable to claims under both § 1983, see Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 2010), and RLUIPA, see Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 76 (2013).

Section 1983 actions in Florida have a four-year limitations period running from the date of injury.

Dillard v. United States · filed 2015-02-20

The statute of limitations for a section 1983 action in Florida is four years from the date of injury.

Section 1983 actions in Washington are subject to the state's three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Calvin v. Elfo · filed 2015-02-26

The district court properly dismissed Calvin’s action as time-barred because Calvin filed his complaint more than three-year after his release from jail.

Section 1983 actions filed in Idaho are subject to a two-year limitations period borrowed from state personal injury law.

Roles v. Armfield · filed 2015-02-27

The district court properly dismissed Roles’s due process claim as barred by the statute of limitations because Roles filed this action more than two years after his claim against defendant Armfield arose.

Section 1983 method-of-execution claims are subject to the personal injury limitations period of the state where they are brought.

Gissendaner v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections · filed 2015-03-02

Like other actions brought under § 1983, a challenge to a state’s method of execution is subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the challenge was brought.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations.

Hines v. Thomas · filed 2015-03-02

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is governed by the forum state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations, which in Alabama is two years.

A § 1983 action in Pennsylvania is subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Bazargani v. Radel · filed 2015-03-03

We need not resolve that question here because amendment would be futile. Bazargani’s Title VII claim is legally flawed and, as the defense noted in the District Court, an action under § 1983—the only other conceivable federal claim—would be barred by the two-year statute of limitations, among other obstacles.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period that is tolled while a prisoner completes the administrative grievance process.

Gomez v. Palmer · filed 2015-03-03

The statute of limitations started running when the IDOC denied Gomez’s grievance on November 3, 2009, See Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir.2008) (“[T]he limitations period is tolled while a prisoner completes the administrative grievance process.”); see also 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.850(f) (stating that IDOC Director renders “the final determination of a grievance”).

Section 1983 claims filed in Puerto Rico use the one-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Torres v. Junto De Gobierno De Servicio De Emergencia · filed 2015-03-10

In civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court applies the forum state’s statute of limitations period for personal injury actions, which in Puerto Rico is one year.

Section 1983 actions use the limitations period supplied by state law.

Ervin v. Carbon County Sheriff's Department · filed 2015-03-11

For § 1983 actions, the limitations period is determined by state law.

Section 1983 claims arising in Arkansas are subject to the state’s three-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Winston v. Burl · filed 2015-03-17

Additionally, the statute of limitations barred any claims based on conduct that occurred before December 30, 2010, see Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 739 (8th Cir. 2001) (Arkansas 3-year statute of limitations for personal injuries applies to § 1983 claims), and, to the extent the complaint raised timely claims against Lynette Dickerson based on retaliation, denial of access to the courts, or violations of prison policies, remand is unnecessary because the allegations failed to state a claim, see Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to infer retaliatory animus to state retaliation claim); Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 831-32 (8th Cir. 2008) (denial of access to courts claim must be supported by showing actual injury, i.e., that non-frivolous legal claim was frustrated or impeded); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430-31 (8th Cir. 1997) (violating prison policy does not give rise to § 1983 claim).

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal injury limitations period and accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury.

Gonzalez v. Gardemal · filed 2015-03-19

The district court properly dismissed as time-barred Gonzalez’s retaliatory transfer claim and his due process claims stemming from his re-validation as a gang member in 2004 and 2006, and his inactive status review in 2006. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (§ ... 1983 claims are governed by forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and they accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that is the basis of the cause of action); see also Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he applicable statute of limitations [is] tolled while a prisoner completes the mandatory exhaustion process.”).

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the constitutional injury, and the continuing violation doctrine does not extend limitations for an injury that continues after the unconstitutional act is complete.

Haywood v. Champaign County, Illinois · filed 2015-03-20

The statute of limitations begins running when a plaintiff knew or should have known that his constitutional rights had been violated.

Section 1983 claims in Massachusetts are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Cayo v. Fitzpatrick · filed 2015-03-24

In this case, Massachusetts law provides the applicable statute of limitations, including the statute of limitations for the Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims in New York are subject to a three-year personal injury limitations period.

Weslowski v. Zugibe · filed 2015-03-31

For § 1983 actions, “the applicable limitations period is found in the general or residual state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.”

Section 1983 actions use the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which is two years in Alabama.

Belue v. Benn · filed 2015-04-01

“Federal courts must apply a “forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1182 (11th Cir. 2003).

A § 1983 claim over deductions from a prisoner’s account accrues when prison employees actually deduct the money.

Aultman v. Community Education Centers In · filed 2015-04-02

Because the statute of limitations does not begin to run until prison employees actually deduct the money from the inmate’s account, see id., we cannot conclude on this record that Aultman’s due process claim is time- barred.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal-injury limitations period because the section has no federal statute of limitations.

Treadwell v. St. Tammany Parish Jail · filed 2015-04-08

There is no federal statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to § 1983, and, thus, the applicable limitations period is determined by reference to the forum state’s statute regarding personal injury claims.

Section 1983 claims subject to Heck may not accrue until the plaintiff is released from confinement.

Wilson v. Copperwheat · filed 2015-04-15

Although Wilson may have known of his potential claim more than two years before he filed his action, pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994) and Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2014), Wilson’s claims may not have accrued until he was released from confinement. Accepting the district court’s determination that Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations is applicable, Wilson’s complaint alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was filed within two years of his release from confinement.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Atkinson v. Middlesex County · filed 2015-04-21

Atkinson’s claims were all based on § 1983 and state-law torts, all of which have two-year statutes of limitations. See, e.g., Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A [§] 1983 claim is characterized as a personal-injury claim and thus is governed by the applicable state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury claims,” which in New Jersey is two years); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.

Section 1983 claims may be dismissed as time-barred when they are filed after the applicable limitations period.

Deshazer v. City of Paragould · filed 2015-04-24

Upon careful de novo review, we agree with the ... District Court’s decision.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Laboy v. Ontario County · filed 2015-05-04

It is well-settled that the statute of limitations for a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is three years.

Section 1983 uses the forum state's personal-injury limitations period for claim timeliness.

Gilyard v. Gibson · filed 2015-05-05

Under § 1983 or Bivens, timeliness is determined through the state’s limitations period for a personal injury claim.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Benvenutti v. McAdams · filed 2015-05-07

The Conservators filed both Section 1983 claims, which have a three-year statute of limitations, and Tort Claims Act claims, which have a one-year statute of limitations. ... If the Conservators knew or should have known of tortious conduct on the part of Harrison County and McAdams, i.e., their failure to require an accounting from Pringle, by the January 24, 2008, hearing, when all parties acknowledged that Pringle had not filed an accounting since his being appointed as conservator, the Conservators’ MTCA claims should have been filed by January 24, 2009, and their remaining claims should have been filed by January 24, 2011. As their claims were ... not timely filed, the trial court properly dismissed the claims based on the running of the statutes of limitation.

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows the facts supporting the claim, even if the plaintiff does not know a legal cause of action exists.

Goosby v. Robertson · filed 2015-05-07

With respect to accrual of his claims, while Goosby argues that he was unaware he had a claim until after the statute of limitations had run, a plaintiff need not realize that a legal cause of action exists for the limitations period to run; rather, he need only know the facts that would support a claim.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations that begins when the claim accrues, and employment claims accrue upon an adverse employment action.

Duncan v. City of Simi Valley · filed 2015-05-11

The statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff’s claim accrues. ... In the employment context, the claim accrues when the plaintiff suffers an adverse employment action. ... To challenge the placement on paid administrative leave that he does allege to be retaliatory, Duncan was required to file his suit by March 2012, but his complaint was not filed until January 14, 2013.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Milburn v. City of York · filed 2015-05-14

In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for claims under § 1983 is two years.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal injury limitations period, with federal law governing accrual.

Johnson v. Di Vittorio · filed 2015-05-26

To the extent Johnson alleged a separate § 1983 claim against Stanhope, the district court properly granted summary judgment because the claim was time-barred. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2) (three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (for § 1983 claims, federal courts apply the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and apply federal law to determine accrual; a § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of the action).

Section 1983 claims are subject to the forum state's personal injury statute of limitations.

Johnny Woods, Jr. v. City of Chandler · filed 2015-05-26

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Woods’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims because Woods did not raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he filed his complaint within Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims are treated as personal injury claims and are subject to Indiana’s personal injury statute of limitations.

Sigman v. State of Indiana and Sharon Hawk (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-05-29

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such as the one Sigman presents in his complaint, are considered personal injury claims and are subject to Indiana’s statute of limitation for personal injury.

A § 1983 complaint filed more than two years after the criminal proceedings ended is time-barred when no continuing wrongful conduct or basis for tolling is shown.

Ruffin v. District Attorney's Office · filed 2015-06-04

Even if the limitations periods did not begin to run until the proceedings were terminated in Ruffin’s favor, see Price v. City of San Antonio, 431 F.3d 890, 894 (5th Cir. 2005), Ruffin still waited more than two years before filing his § 1983 complaint.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period, which is two years in Texas.

Williamson v. County Montgomery · filed 2015-06-08

For actions brought pursuant to § 1983, federal courts borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period. ... In Texas, that period is two years.

Section 1983 claims use the limitations period from the state’s general personal injury statute.

Goldsmith v. Unknown Sharrett · filed 2015-06-11

In actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we apply the statute of limitations from the state’s general personal injury statute.

Section 1983 actions based on conduct in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period that begins when the claim accrues.

Brown v. F. Buck, Jr. · filed 2015-06-12

For section 1983 actions based on conduct in Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations is two years from the date the claim accrued.

Section 1983 claims based on conduct in Pennsylvania must be filed within two years after they accrue.

Barren v. Allegheny County Pennsylvania · filed 2015-06-12

For section 1983 actions based on conduct in Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations is two years from the date the claim accrued.

For Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico, an extrajudicial letter that is not addressed to the defendants does not toll the limitations period.

Rivera-Torres v. Castillo · filed 2015-06-16

Because plaintiff Rivera-Torres’s extrajudicial letter was not addressed to defendants, it did not meet the identicality requirements necessary to toll the statute of limitations for her claims. Therefore, plaintiffs section 1983 claims are time-barred and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

A § 1983 takings claim accrues when the state denies just compensation after the claimant uses available state procedures, starting the limitations period.

Kearney v. Foley & Lardner · filed 2015-06-18

California’s two-year statute of limitations governing Kearney’s § 1983 claim had not run when she filed her federal action.

Section 1983 claims arising from conduct in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period that begins when the cause of action accrues.

Friend v. Dawn Vann · filed 2015-06-19

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising out of conduct in Pennsylvania is two years, and begins to run on the date that the cause of action accrues.

An EEOC charge alleging ADA or ADEA violations does not toll the limitations period for a separate § 1983 claim.

Cosme-Perez v. Municipality of Juana Diaz · filed 2015-06-26

Moreover, a claim filed under ADA and/or ADEA do not toll the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Federal law determines when a Section 1983 claim accrues, while state law supplies the limitations period.

Gonzalez v. AT & T · filed 2015-07-09

Unlike the limitation period itself, the accrual date of a section 1983 claim is a matter of federal law.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the action is brought, which is four years in Florida.

Cardelle v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2015-07-14

Section 1983 claims are subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state in which the action was brought. ... In Florida, the applicable limitations period is four years.

Section 1983 claims use the state limitations period for personal injury actions and accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Wicks v. Anderson · filed 2015-07-16

A § 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that constitutes the basis of the cause of action.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state personal injury limitations period, which is four years in Wyoming.

Yellowbear v. Newell · filed 2015-07-17

The limitations period for claims ... brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the applicable state statute of limitations for personal injury suits, which is four years in Wyoming.

In Texas, a § 1983 claim has a two-year limitations period.

Thomas v. City of Houston · filed 2015-07-22

In Texas, the applicable limitations period for Thomas’s § 1983 due process claim is two years.

Section 1983 claims in the District of Columbia have a three-year limitations period that is suspended while a class action covering those claims is pending.

Barryman-Turner v. District of Columbia · filed 2015-07-24

Under American Pipe, the filing of a class action thus functions as a pause button for the claims of all purported class members. The statute of limitations ceases to run for the entire period from the day a class action is filed until the class is decertified or the court declines to certify the class, after which it runs for the full number of days that were remaining on the statute when the class action was commenced. Because Plaintiff’s claims were covered by a class action that was filed before those claims accrued, and because Plaintiff’s claims were filed within three years of the decertification of the class, the claims are not barred by the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising in the District of Columbia are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Lattisaw v. District of Columbia · filed 2015-07-28

The conduct that Lattisaw appears to challenge in the Section 1983 claim he brings here took place in the course of his employment with the MPD, which ended on September 6, 2006, and because Lattisaw did not file the instant action until more than six years later, his Section 1983 claim falls well outside the applicable three-year limitations period.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim is tolled while a prisoner exhausts administrative remedies, but a duplicative grievance does not extend tolling after the original grievances are resolved.

Wagner v. Hardy · filed 2015-07-28

We agree with the district court that because that grievance is duplicative of the first two, the statute of limitations was tolled only until the first two grievances were resolved.

Section 1983 claims filed in Puerto Rico have a one-year limitations period borrowed from state law.

Vélez-Vélez v. Puerto Rico Highway & Transportation Authority · filed 2015-07-29

"Section 1983, which borrows its limitations period from state law, carries a one-year statute of limitations in Puerto Rico."

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims.

Parker v. Lehigh County Domestic Relation Court · filed 2015-07-29

Section 1983 claims must be brought within the state limitations period governing personal-injury torts, see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007), which is two years in Pennsylvania.

In Arizona, a plaintiff may sue under § 1983 for alleged discrimination that occurred within two years before filing the complaint.

Greene v. Buckeye Valley Fire Dept · filed 2015-07-30

Moreover, Plaintiff may sue directly under § 1983 for alleged discriminatory acts that occurred less than two years before she filed her complaint.

Section 1983 claims filed in Texas have a two-year limitations period borrowed from the state’s personal-injury tort limitations period.

Lilly v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2015-08-04

In Texas, the limitations period for a personal-injury tort is two years; therefore, the limitations period for a section 1983 cause of action in Texas is two years.

Section 1983 suits brought in Illinois have a two-year limitations period that is tolled while a prisoner exhausts administrative remedies.

Nally v. Ghosh · filed 2015-08-24

The district judge dismissed the suit as untimely on two grounds: because the defendant had known that he was diabetic or prediabetic in 2007, so that the two-year statute of limitations applicable to section 1983 suits brought in Illinois had expired before he sued (which remember was not until 2013), and because in any event he had sued more than two years after learning in November 2010 that his glucose counts were abnormal. These grounds for dismissal were erroneous. ... Nally may not have known of the cause of his distressing symptoms until November 2010, and the two-year statute of limitations would have been tolled during the interval between that discovery and his filing suit because he was exhausting prison administrative remedies as a prelude to suing.

Section 1983 employment termination claims brought in New York have a three-year limitations period that begins when the employee receives definite notice of termination.

Delaney v. Farley · filed 2015-08-25

Each of Delaney’s discrimination and retaliation claims is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. ... We therefore conclude that the applicable three-year statutes of limitations for Delaney’s claims began to run on April 7, 2010.

Section 1983 claims in Indiana are subject to the state’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Denna Delacruz and Barry Barger v. Wittig · filed 2015-08-27

Claims brought under § 1983 are subject to Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations; in Georgia, the period is two years.

Robert Harvey, III v. Alexander Daniels, Officer, Forsyth Police Department · filed 2015-09-02

All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action was brought. ... Harvey filed his complaint in federal court more than two years after his arrest, past the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period and tolling rules; a grievance filed before an alleged retaliatory transfer does not toll the transfer claim.

Davis v. Erving Young · filed 2015-09-02

We determine the applicable limitations period and tolling provisions by referring to the forum state’s statute regarding personal injury claims. ... Although the time during which a prisoner exhausts administrative remedies is not counted toward the prescriptive period, see Harris, 198 F.3d at 158, Davis did not pursue administrative remedies as to his claim of retaliatory transfer because he filed the ARP request before his transfer. Therefore, the period of limitations for his retaliatory transfer claim ended on December 13, 2013, one ... year after his transfer and several months before he filed suit.

Section 1983 claims use state tolling rules; a related appeal does not toll the filing period when the plaintiff could file a new suit.

Morris v. Milligan · filed 2015-09-04

We give effect to the state’s tolling provisions in determining whether a civil rights complaint is timely. ... His argument is insufficient to establish that he was “precluded” from seeking relief through the filing of a new lawsuit, and he therefore has not established that he is entitled to tolling.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period borrowed from state personal injury law.

Alarm Detection Systems, Inc. v. Orland Fire Protection District · filed 2015-09-08

In Illinois, the statute of limitations period for a personal injury action and-thus, for a Section 1983 claim, is two years.

In New York, a Section 1983 claim has a three-year statute of limitations.

Smith v. City of New York · filed 2015-09-08

In New York, the statute of, limitations for a § 1983 claim is three years.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Great Elk Dancer for his Elk Nation v. City of Logan · filed 2015-09-09

The applicable statute of limitations is — in fact — set under Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10. ... Accordingly, any cause of action arising from the stop by Officer Mowery is time barred.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the claim arises; for a prisoner transport claim dependent on trip duration, that is the state where the trip ends.

Cedillo v. TransCor America, LLC · filed 2015-09-16

It follows that a Plaintiffs cause of action is only complete at the end of the trip and his claim “arises” in the terminus state.

Section 1983 actions in Tennessee are subject to a one-year limitations period.

Dunfee v. Finchum · filed 2015-09-21

The statute of limitations period for § 1983 actions is one year.

Section 1983 claims in New Jersey are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury torts.

Shine v. Bayonne Board of Education · filed 2015-09-22

Because § 1983 and Title IX have no statute of limitations, such claims must be brought pursuant to New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury torts.

In Arizona, § 1983 permits a direct suit for alleged discrimination occurring less than two years before the complaint was filed.

Greene v. Buckeye Valley Fire Dept · filed 2015-09-22

Moreover, Plaintiff may sue directly under § 1983 for alleged discriminatory acts that occurred less than two years before she filed her complaint.

A § 1983 claim accrues under federal law; a claim based on a refusal to investigate is untimely when that refusal occurred outside the three-year limitations period.

Falso v. Town of Dansville Police Department · filed 2015-09-24

The continuing tort doctrine speaks to when a cause of action accrues, and “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” ... Even under that doctrine, Falso’s claims would have accrued no later than the date defendants told him that they would not investigate his claims, which date fell well outside the three-year statute of limitations.

In Massachusetts, § 1983 claims have a three-year limitations period.

Thomas v. Town of Salisbury · filed 2015-09-28

In Massachusetts, claims brought under § 1983 are subject to a three year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal-injury limitations period and generally its tolling rules.

Canfield v. Douglas County · filed 2015-09-29

In § 1983 actions we apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007), and generally apply the forum state’s tolling rules, id. at 394.

A Section 1983 claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying it.

College Hill Properties, LLC v. City of Worcester ex rel. Department of Building & Zoning · filed 2015-09-30

As stated previously, a claim under section 1983 generally accrues when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury on which the action is based.

Filing a Title VII charge with the EEOC does not toll the limitations period for a Section 1983 claim because the EEOC lacks jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims.

Hernandez-Mendez v. Rivera · filed 2015-09-30

Plaintiffs argument is defeated by the fact that the EEOC has “no jurisdiction over claims brought pursuant to § 1983.”

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, so courts apply the most analogous state limitations period.

Moore v. Rees · filed 2015-10-13

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide its own statute of limitations, courts apply the most analogous statute of limitations from the state where the events occurred.