42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 suits use the state law limitations period and related tolling rules; in Oregon, the applicable period is two years.

Maxfield v. Fairall · filed 2012-11-19

The district court properly dismissed the complaint as time-barred because Maxfield filed it after the statute of limitations had run. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (“State law governs the statute of limitations period for § 1983 suits and closely related questions of tolling.”).

Section 1983 claims filed in Oregon are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Appleton Pickett, Jr. v. Williams · filed 2012-11-19

The district court properly concluded that the seventh, twelfth, and thirteenth claims set forth in the operative complaint are time-barred because the alleged acts or omissions occurred more than two years before Pickett filed the complaint.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period and accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Holland v. City of Phoenix · filed 2012-11-19

The district court properly dismissed Holland’s claims as time-barred because all claims accrued more than two years before Holland filed his complaint. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821 (one-year statute of limitations for actions against any public entity or public employee); TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991-92 (for § 1983 claims, federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims, which begin to accrue “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury”); see also Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) (mere continuing impact from past violations not actionable).

Section 1983 claims in New Mexico are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Casanova v. Central New Mexico Correction Deparment · filed 2012-11-20

Casanova’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Washington are subject to the state’s three-year personal injury limitations period, tolled during mandatory prison grievance procedures.

Robin Combs, Sr. v. Lehman · filed 2012-11-20

The district court properly dismissed as time-barred those claims for which Combs exhausted his administrative remedies more than three years before filing his complaint.

A § 1983 claim accrues under federal law, and each independently wrongful act starts a new limitations period for a claim based on that act.

Pouncil v. Tilton · filed 2012-11-21

Federal law determines when a cause of action for a Section 1983 claim accrues and, hence, when the statute of limitations begins to run. ... Those cases lead to the conclusion that each wrongful act starts a new clock for filing a claim alleging that act.

Section 1983 claims in Minnesota have a six-year statute of limitations.

United States v. Bailey · filed 2012-11-30

The statute of limitations on claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), is six years in Minnesota.

Section 1983 claims use state law for the limitations period and tolling rules.

Nottingham v. Richardson · filed 2012-12-04

For suits under § 1983, “state law supplies the applicable limita- ... tions period and tolling provisions.”

Federal law governs when a Section 1983 claim accrues, including whether the continuing-tort doctrine delays accrual.

Nottingham v. Richardson · filed 2012-12-07

The continuing-tort doctrine is one of accrual and thus a question of federal, rather than state, law.

A Section 1983 method-of-execution claim accrues on the later of completed state review or a new or substantially changed execution protocol.

Manuel Pardo, Jr. v. Palmer · filed 2012-12-11

With regard to the statute of limitations, “[w]e have consistently held that a method of execution claim accrues on the later of the date on which state review is complete, or the date on which the capital litigant becomes subject to a new or substantially changed execution protocol.” Ferguson, No. 12-15191, 2012 WL 4946112, at *2 (quoting McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because Pardo filed his “method of execution” challenge outside of the running of the statute of limitations, and because we have explicitly held that changes to the first and second drugs in the three-drug sequence do “not constitute a substantial change,” see id. (citing Powell, 643 F.3d at 1304), Pardo’s claim comes too late.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, including when reasonable diligence would have revealed it.

Onyx Properties LLC v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2012-12-12

As I have previously determined, however, the law in the Tenth Circuit is that a § 1983 action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action which, in turn, occurs once the plaintiff knows of his injury or should have discovered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.

Section 1983 claims in Ohio have a two-year statute of limitations.

Al-Mosawi v. Plummer · filed 2012-12-21

The claims raised in the complaint are a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claim, a personal injury claim based on negligence, and an action against a political subdivision to recover damages for an injury that occurred in connection with a governmental or proprietary function. All these of these claims have a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 suits filed in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations.

Jimenez v. Waller · filed 2012-12-21

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 suit in Illinois is two years.

A § 1983 claim against a defendant identified in the original complaint by an unknown first name is not time barred when that defendant accepts service of the original complaint and answers under that designation.

Butchard v. County of Doña Ana · filed 2012-12-21

Jason Gonzales properly entered this case when he accepted service of the original complaint and filed an answer as FNU Gonzales in February 2012. ... The answer was filed in response to the original complaint, and the § 1983 claims contained against Gonzales in the original complaint are not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims brought in the District of Columbia use its three-year residual statute of limitations.

Earle v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-12-28

We apply the three-year residual statute of limitations to a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, and an access-to-courts claim accrues when the lower court enters judgment in the underlying action.

Traxtle v. Holman · filed 2013-01-03

The district court properly dismissed Traxtle’s action as time-barred because his access-to-courts claim accrued more than two years before he filed his complaint. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Douglas, 567 F.3d at 1109 (for § 1983 claims, courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000) (an access-to-courts claim accrues when the lower court issues its judgment in the underlying action, not when the appeals of that judgment have been exhausted).

Section 1983 claims in California are subject to the state’s two-year personal injury limitations period, with time tolled during mandatory grievance exhaustion.

Claudell Martin v. Woodford · filed 2013-01-03

The district court properly dismissed Martin’s deliberate indifference claim against McGuiness on the basis of the statute of limitations because Martin failed to file his complaint within two years of the final rejection of his appeal of his grievance.

Section 1983 actions arising in Michigan have a three-year statute of limitations.

Cornelius v. Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission · filed 2013-01-07

A three-year statute of limitations applies to section 1983 actions arising in Michigan.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Tyrone Green v. Sneath · filed 2013-01-07

Green’s claim that Sneath and the SCI-Smithfield official coerced him into dropping his criminal complaint against Officer Montgomery during the December 19, 2006, interview is barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in New Jersey are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Patyrak v. Apgar · filed 2013-01-25

In New Jersey, § 1983 claims are subject to New Jersey‟s two-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to the two-year personal injury limitations period, including claims for injunctive relief.

Sheller v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2013-01-30

For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Third Circuit has held that the state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies. ... In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for personal injury is two years. ... As the Third Circuit has not, to our knowledge, held that actions for injunctive relief are excepted from this rule, the Plaintiffs’ (b)(2) class does include claims that are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Voneida v. Stoehr · filed 2013-01-31

His claims made pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 and Bivens, as well as any state law tort claims he may include, are governed by 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2), Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for tort actions.

Section 1983 claims arising from a traffic stop in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Gach v. Borough · filed 2013-02-05

By operation of the two-year statute of limitations applicable to Fourth Amendment claims, Gach’s window for filing a Section 1983 complaint arising from this traffic stop expired on November 14, 2011.

Section 1983 claims in the District of Columbia have a three-year limitations period, and discrete acts outside that period cannot support a discrimination claim.

Motley-Ivey v. District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2013-02-14

Thus, all discrete acts that Motley alleges occurred prior to March 26, 2006—more than three years before she initiated this action—are time-barred and cannot support her § 1983 claim under a traditional discrimination analysis.

Section 1983 claims in New York must be filed within three years after they accrue.

Ruane v. County of Suffolk · filed 2013-02-14

However, for those claims arising out of the December 17, 2007 retention hearing to be timely, plaintiff had to initiate an action within three years. Since the present Complaint was filed on April 4, 2012, more than three-years after December 17, 2007, those claims of unlawful conduct arising out of the retention hearing would be time-barred.

Section 1983 borrows the state limitations period for personal injury actions; in Puerto Rico, that period is one year.

Albino v. Municipality of Guayanilla · filed 2013-02-15

Because section 1983 does not provide a statute of limitations, courts have applied a state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury tort actions. ... In Puerto Rico, personal-injury tort actions have a one year statute of limitations. ... Any political harassment that happened prior to January 30, 2011, therefore, is barred by the statute of limitations because the alleged harassment occurred more than one year prior to the complaint’s filing date.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to the state’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Jacobs v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2013-02-19

Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions applies to Jacobs’ action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal injury limitations period, which is tolled during mandatory administrative exhaustion.

Walter Rodenhurst, Iii v. Bauman · filed 2013-02-19

The district court properly dismissed as time-barred Rodenhurst’s claims stemming from his incarceration in Hawaii prior to his April 2006 transfer because Rodenhurst filed his complaint more than two years after exhausting administrative remedies for those claims.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s limitations period and accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Lawrence v. Dr. Berry · filed 2013-02-19

The district court properly dismissed Lawrence’s action as time-barred because all claims accrued more than four years before Lawrence filed her complaint. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 335.1, 352.1(a) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims; limitations period may be tolled for an additional two years for prisoners); Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (§ 1983 actions are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations; a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action; continuing impact from past violations does not cause a claim to accrue anew).

A district court may dismiss a prisoner’s Section 1983 action on its own initiative as time-barred only if the complaint clearly presents no meritorious tolling issue or the prisoner has had notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Thompson v. Pitkins · filed 2013-02-22

Furthermore, a district court “may not sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s § 1983 action on the basis of the statute of limitations unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that there are no meritorious tolling issues, or the court has provided the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Abbas v. Lt. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007)).

A Section 1983 claim seeking access to DNA evidence in Florida has a four-year limitations period that begins when the state litigation seeking access ends.

Pettway v. McCabe · filed 2013-02-26

Mr. Pettway’s § 1983 complaint is subject to Florida’s four- year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which begins to run at “the end of the state litigation in which [Mr. Pettway] unsuccessfully sought access to the evidence.” Van Poyck v. McCollum, 646 F.3d 865, 867 (11th Cir. 2011).

A Section 1983 claim is time-barred when the plaintiff cannot justify tolling the limitations period after the claim accrues.

Hicks v. Moore · filed 2013-03-01

Here, the district court acknowledged that Hicks's section 1983 claim was likely time-barred. ... Hicks failed, however, to account for the decade-long delay in filing the complaint since the claim had first accrued. ... We have independently reviewed the record and, even liberally construing the amended complaint, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Hicks's claim as time-barred.

Section 1983 actions use the applicable limitations period of the forum state.

Allen Bridget, Sr. v. John Crawford, M. D. · filed 2013-03-06

Actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983 are governed by the applicable prescriptive periods or statutes of limitations of the forum state.

Section 1983 actions are governed by the applicable limitations period of the forum state.

Bridget v. Crawford · filed 2013-03-06

Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by the applicable prescriptive periods or statutes of limitations of the forum state.

Section 1983 claims in California are subject to a two-year personal-injury statute of limitations.

Lewis v. Ken Salazar · filed 2013-03-12

The third cause of action, based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that the Individual Defendants acted under color of law when they wronged Plaintiffs. California’s two-year personal-injury statute of limitations applies to this claim.

Section 1983 claims arising in New York have a three-year limitations period.

Mahadeo v. New York City Campaign Finance Board · filed 2013-03-18

The limitations period for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising in New York is three years.

Section 1983 claims in Wyoming use the four-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Deloge v. Scott Homar, Laramie District Attorney and Cheyenne Police Department · filed 2013-03-19

In ruling on the timeliness of Section 1983 claims, federal law requires that state courts apply the statute of limitations applicable to a state personal injury claim, which in Wyoming is a four-year statute of limitations.

A § 1983 civil rights claim based on an incident more than two years before filing is barred by the applicable two-year limitations period.

Gay v. Rojas · filed 2013-03-21

Gay’s complaint is based upon a November 28, 2008, incident, but he did not file the underlying complaint until December 1, 2011. ... The magistrate judge recommended Gay’s complaint be dismissed because it was filed outside of the two-year statute of limitations for civil rights claims. ... Gay complains about the dismissal of his complaint on statute-of-limitations grounds and the denial of his request to amend his complaint to add the City of Denver as a defendant. He also argues the merits of his underlying complaint, asserting his constitutional rights were violated. With regard to these arguments, we affirm for substantially the same reasons stated in the “Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge” filed June 12, 2012, and the district court’s order adopting the recommendation filed July 9, 2012.

Section 1983 claims brought in Colorado have a two-year statute of limitations measured from accrual.

Rodriguez v. State Of Colorado · filed 2013-03-22

The statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 29 U.S.C. § 794 claims brought in Colorado is two years from the time the cause of action accrued.

Section 1983 claims brought in Illinois are subject to the two-year limitations period for general personal injury actions, including claims involving childhood sexual abuse.

Woods v. Illinois Department of Children & Family Services · filed 2013-03-25

In line with Wilson and Owens, this court has consistently held that the limitations period applicable to § 1983 actions brought in Illinois is the two-year period for general personal injury actions set forth in 735 ILCS 5/13-202.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico use the one-year limitations period for tort actions.

Rivera-Delgado v. Chardon · filed 2013-03-26

In Puerto Rico, the one-year statute of limitations in tort actions applies to section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims have a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Rodriquez v. County of Nassau · filed 2013-03-27

The applicable statute of limitations period governing § 1983 actions is three years from the time the claim accrued.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Cangemi v. United States · filed 2013-03-29

With respect to Plaintiffs’ federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the applicable statute of limitations is three years.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the action is brought.

Lindley v. Robertson · filed 2013-04-03

Constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are tort actions subject to the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the action has been brought.

In Washington, a § 1983 claim is time-barred if filed more than three years after the plaintiff knew of the injury.

Safouane v. Hassett · filed 2013-04-03

The district court properly concluded that the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the remaining defendants is time-barred because the Safouanes knew more than three years before they filed their complaint that their children may have been ... abused in foster care.

A Section 1983 claim arising in New York has a three-year limitations period.

Walters v. City Department of Correction · filed 2013-04-09

The limitations period for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising in New York is three years.

A § 1983 retaliation claim based on acts before March 2006 was time-barred.

Baur v. Crum · filed 2013-04-17

The District Court concluded that: (1) Baur’s § 1983 claim for retaliatory acts that occurred before March 2006 was time-barred, see O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127-29 (3d Cir. 2006); ... For essentially the reasons stated by the District Court, we agree that the Defendants were entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983’s limitations period is not tolled while a plaintiff pursues other proceedings if the claim could be brought independently.

Cooper v. Jackson · filed 2013-04-23

In other words, where a plaintiff may concurrently pursue claims independent of internal grievance procedures, such as those under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., courts do not toll the limitations period for those claims.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, and a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Jaquez v. Johnson · filed 2013-04-23

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Jaquez’s action was time-barred, as all claims accrued more than four years before Jaquez filed his complaint.

Section 1983 claims arising in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Smith v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2013-05-02

Smith's claims of First Amendment retaliation arising out of acts occurring prior to November 6, 2006 are barred by the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Whiteford v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 2013-05-03

In any event, we express our agreement with the District Court that his claims are barred by Pennsylvania‟s applicable two-year limitations period, as they all accrued, at the latest, by 2008.

Section 1983 claims brought in Louisiana are subject to a one-year limitations period under state law.

Darryl Dean v. City of New Orleans · filed 2013-05-03

The 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are prescribed by Louisiana state law. ... Dean did not sue until July 2011 —more than three years later, and well after the one-year statute of limitations had run.

A § 1983 claim may be dismissed sua sponte when it is clearly barred by the applicable two-year limitations period and no meritorious tolling issue is present.

Southerland v. County of Hudson · filed 2013-05-10

The District Court dismissed this claim after concluding that it was untimely under the applicable two-year statute of limitations. ... Our review of the complaint convinces us that the District Court correctly found that this claim was clearly time-barred and that no meritorious tolling issues were present.

Section 1983 claims in New Jersey are subject to a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Rogers v. Maretz · filed 2013-05-14

As noted by the Magistrate Judge, Rogers’ proposed claims regarding incidents from 2006 would not withstand a motion to dismiss, as they are barred by New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 actions are treated as personal injury actions and are subject to the forum state's applicable statute of limitations.

Voss v. State · filed 2013-05-15

Namely, § 1983 actions are considered to be personal injury actions and are subject to the forum state's applicable statute of limitations.

When the parties agree that the six-year contract limitations period applies, a § 1983 claim over exclusion from a county retirement plan accrues when the employee discovers the exclusion.

Bailey v. Shelby County, Tennessee · filed 2013-05-16

Having determined that Appellants’ causes of action accrued when they discovered their injury - that they were not included in the County retirement system - we turn to whether a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding when Appellants discovered that they would not be included in the County’s retirement system. ... Summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Appellants’ declaratory judgment actions and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims on the basis of expiry of the statute of limitations is affirmed.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations, which is three years in Massachusetts.

McGunigle v. City of Quincy · filed 2013-05-16

There is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. Instead, § 1983 borrows the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims. ... Under Massachusetts law, the applicable statute of limitations is three years.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period and tolling law.

Hubbs v. County of San Bernardino · filed 2013-05-21

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Hubbs’s claims stemming from his incarceration at West Valley Detention Center, ending on May 2, 2006, were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See Jones, 393 F.3d at 927 (for § 1983 actions, “courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s law regarding tolling”); Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2002) (California personal injury statute of limitations is applicable to ADA claims).

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, subject to applicable tolling rules.

Bodnar v. Riverside County Sheriff's Dep · filed 2013-05-22

California state prisoner Thomas Bodnar appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing as time-barred his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force during his arrest. ... The district court properly dismissed Bodnar’s action as time-barred because Bodnar filed this action more than four years after the alleged use of excessive force.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, while federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Collins v. State of Washington · filed 2013-05-23

The district properly granted summary judgment because Collins filed suit more than three years after his workers’ compensation claim closed in August 2007. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2) (three year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (for § 1983 claims, federal courts apply the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and federal law for determining accrual).

Section 1983 claims filed in Delaware are subject to the state's two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Manuel v. Mears · filed 2013-05-29

The Delaware statute of limitations on personal injury cases applies here because plaintiffs claims arise out of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In Delaware the statute of limitations for personal injury suits is two years from the date on which the alleged injuries were sustained.

Section 1983 claims use the state personal injury limitations period, which begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Reybold Venture Group v. Delaware Department of Education · filed 2013-05-30

Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations period, the Supreme Court has determined that the applicable limitations period should be the period determined by each state for personal injury actions. ... The limitations period for purposes of § 1983 claims begins to run “from the time when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the section 1983 action.”

Section 1983 claims use a single limitations period borrowed from state law.

Watkins v. Chicago Housing Authority · filed 2013-06-04

Claims brought under § 1983 are governed by a single limitations period, based on state law.

Section 1983 claims in Oklahoma have a two-year limitations period; claims filed more than five years after the alleged wrongdoing are time-barred absent applicable tolling.

Kerchee v. Smith · filed 2013-06-04

The MJ concluded the Melvin’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), were time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. See Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1522 (10th Cir. 1988) (observing a two-year statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims under Oklahoma law); Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009) (same regarding Bivens claims). He explained the alleged wrongdoings stemming from Melvin’s prosecution and conviction would have been complete by the time of sentencing ... on November 8, 2005, but Melvin (and Deborah) waited until April 26, 2011, to file a complaint. Neither offered an applicable tolling theory to extend the time. ... We have reviewed the parties’ materials, the relevant legal authorities, and the record on appeal, and agree with the MJ’s thorough and well-reasoned analyses, all of which were, for the most part, adopted by the district judge.

Section 1983 claims in Florida are subject to a four-year personal-injury statute of limitations.

Lewis v. Regional Director for Broward County · filed 2013-06-05

Lewis’s section 1983 claim is subject to Florida’s four-year personal-injury statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, which is two years in Georgia.

Bell v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority · filed 2013-06-07

The forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to § 1983 claims, which in Georgia is two years.

Section 1983 claims generally follow state tolling rules unless those rules undermine federal policy; Delaware’s fraudulent concealment rules apply.

Estate of Kenneth J. Miller II v. Hudson · filed 2013-06-13

Application of those principles would not undermine the remedial goals of § 1983. As a result, Delaware law applies.

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which is two years in Pennsylvania.

Tengood v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2013-06-17

It goes without saying that ―claims . . . brought under section 1983 are subject to state statutes of limitations governing personal injury actions.‖ Garvin v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989)). Similarly sound, personal injury actions in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising from Delaware parole denials are subject to a two year statute of limitations.

Rahim v. Danberg · filed 2013-06-19

To extent that the § 1983 claim is connected to plaintiffs denials of parole prior to June 2008, said denials are barred by the applicable two year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 borrows the applicable state personal injury limitations period, and continuing harm from an earlier violation does not extend it.

Singer v. Bureau of Professional & Occupational Affairs · filed 2013-06-19

Section 1983 does not include a statute of limitations. Rather, courts borrow a section 1983 statute of limitations from similar state laws, here undoubtedly the personal injury law of Pennsylvania. ... But the continuing violation doctrine cannot apply here. The Board suspended Singer’s license 20 years ago and the ongoing harm that he has suffered is traceable to that suspension. Therefore, the statute of limitations is a defense to this action.

Section 1983 political discrimination claims in Puerto Rico have a one-year limitations period; a plaintiff who knew of an alleged discriminatory act when it occurred cannot revive a claim based on that act through the continuing violation doctrine.

Falcon-Cuevas v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority · filed 2013-06-28

In Puerto Rico, First Amendment claims for political discrimination pursuant to section 1983 are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. ... Because plaintiff Falcon admits that she felt discriminated against at the time of the study leave request incident, it must be treated as a discrete act. ... Accordingly, the Court will not consider this incident as part of a continuing violation, and the statute of limitations for this incident has run.

Section 1983 suits in Illinois have a two-year limitations period that is tolled while a prisoner exhausts administrative grievances.

Turley v. Rednour · filed 2013-07-03

Section 1983 suits in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations, which is tolled while the prisoner exhausts the administrative grievance process.

A § 1983 claim in Texas is subject to a two-year limitations period.

Tolbert, Rickey Wayne v. Otstott, George A. · filed 2013-07-03

The statute of limitations for appellant’s § 1983 claim is two years.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania must be filed within two years of when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.

Zapata v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 2013-07-03

Whether those allegations were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985—as Zapata’s complaint cites both sections of the statute—he had to file this action within two years from the time when he “knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is based.”

Section 1983 claims arising in New Jersey are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Vickers v. Childs · filed 2013-07-03

Therefore a § 1983 claim arising in New Jersey will be time-barred if more than two years has passed since its accrual.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Morales v. County of Suffolk · filed 2013-07-06

The statute of limitations for claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 depends on the law of the state in which the claims are brought. For eases brought in New York, the statute of limitations is three years.

Section 1983 claims in Delaware are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Day v. Toner · filed 2013-07-09

In Delaware, § 1983 claims are subject to Delaware’s two-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions.

A Section 1983 claim arising from alleged recordings in Pennsylvania is subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period.

Sze v. Pui-Ling Pang · filed 2013-07-09

Sze’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation explicitly stated that the alleged illegal recordings occurred in Dunmore, Pennsylvania; accordingly, Sze’s Fourth Amendment claim is governed by the two-year limitations period found in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2).

A § 1983 claim based on an incorrect sentence calculation accrues when the calculation is corrected and may be barred by the limitations period.

Stapleman v. Department of Public Safety & Corrections · filed 2013-07-30

No later than 9 December 2010, a commissioner of the Louisiana 19th Judicial District Court ordered the Department of Public Safety and Corrections to correct Stapleman’s prison records to give him credit for 18 months of a five-year sentence imposed in 1998 in Docket No. 35478. There is no error in the court’s determining Stapleman’s claim accrued under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), on that date, and that the instant complaint, filed in district court on 4 April 2012, was untimely.

Section 1983 claims brought in Michigan are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Curran v. City of Dearborn · filed 2013-07-31

In Michigan, a three-year statute of limitations applies to federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 action is time-barred if filed after the applicable limitations and statutory tolling periods expire.

Hall v. Cohen · filed 2013-08-02

The district court properly dismissed Hall’s action as time-barred because Hall filed his action after the applicable statute of limitations and statutory tolling period had expired.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations.

McKee v. Peoria Unified School District · filed 2013-08-05

Because § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, courts borrow the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

An Equal Protection claim brought under § 1983 in New York has a three-year limitations period.

Fahs Construction Group, Inc. v. Gray · filed 2013-08-08

The statute of limitations on an Equal Protection claim brought in New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is three years.

Section 1983 claims filed in Michigan have a three-year limitations period.

Foster v. Judnic · filed 2013-08-12

“For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years.” ... The Court has reviewed the entire record and agrees with Defendants-Plaintiff cannot recover for any alleged constitutional violations Defendants took before November 3, 2008.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the claim accrues.

Victorian v. Cooper · filed 2013-08-16

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is the same as the statute of limitations in a personal injury action in the state in which the claim accrues.

State-law tolling rules apply to § 1983 suits.

Hayes v. Roger Walker, Jr. · filed 2013-08-16

State-law tolling provisions apply in § 1983 suits, Ray, 662 F.3d at 773; Jenkins v. Vill. of Maywood, 506 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 2007), and Hayes had two possible tolling arguments.

A Section 1983 vote-dilution claim filed within one year of the most recent election is timely even if Kentucky’s one-year limitations period applies.

Brown v. Kentucky Legislative Research Commission · filed 2013-08-16

Concerning the statute of limitations, the Plaintiffs have filed their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Therefore, the statute of limitations is no bar to the Plaintiffs’ ability to assert these claims.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Ostuni v. WaWa Mart · filed 2013-08-22

In this case, Ostuni’s claims were subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims brought in Massachusetts are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Tomaselli v. Beaulieu · filed 2013-08-30

Therefore, in Massachusetts, claims brought under § 1983 are subject to a three year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Kentucky are subject to the state's one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Burnett v. Transit Authority · filed 2013-09-05

The applicable statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Congress did not set out a statute of limitations for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims in Georgia have a two-year statute of limitations.

Terrell v. Paulding County · filed 2013-09-09

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Georgia is two years.

Section 1983 claims arising in Maryland have a three-year statute of limitations.

Weathersbee v. Baltimore City Fire Department · filed 2013-09-10

Thus, in Maryland, the statute of limitations under § 1983 is three years.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the cause of action arose; in Louisiana, that period is one year.

Earton Smith v. Humphrey · filed 2013-09-23

The statutes of limitations for § 1983 and § 1985 claims are the same as the statute of limitations in a personal injury action in the state in which the cause of action arose.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state personal injury limitations period, which is two years in Texas.

Rowland Martin, Jr. v. Grehn · filed 2013-09-25

“In determining the limitations period for a section 1983 claim, we apply ... the applicable period provided by state law, in this case the two-year Texas personal injury limitations period.”

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Delgado v. Polk · filed 2013-09-27

Delgado sued 4 years after receiving the citations, so his claims are barred by the 2-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims arising in Illinois, see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Ray v. Maher, 662 F.3d 770, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2011), and by the 1-year statute of limitations governing state-law claims against a municipality and its employees, see 745 ILCS 10/8-101(a); Williams v. Lampe, 399 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 2005).

Section 1983 claims arising in Indiana are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Gibens v. Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles · filed 2013-09-27

On appeal Gibens asserts that § 1983 does not have a statute of limitations for civil-rights violations. The district court correctly noted that it does, see Wallace v. Koto, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007), and that Gibens’s lawsuit — occurring as it did four years after his license was suspended — was outside the 2-year statute of limitations, see Logan, 644 F.3d at 582; Hoagland v. Town of Clear Lake, Ind., 415 F.3d 693, 699-700 (7th Cir.2005).

A § 1983 claim follows the forum state’s tolling rules; in Maryland, voluntarily dismissing an action without prejudice does not extend the time to file a second complaint based on the same facts.

Resper v. Baer · filed 2013-09-30

Wayne Resper appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2006) as barred by the statute of limitations. ... Accordingly, we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by the district court. ... In addition, we note that “in Maryland, following the voluntary dismissal of a civil action without prejudice, a second complaint based upon the same facts still must be filed within the applicable limitations period.” Sheng Bi v. Gibson, 45 A.3d 305, 309 (Md. App. 2012). ... Federal courts must apply the forum state’s rules for tolling the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Indiana are subject to the two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Gibbs-El v. Meloy · filed 2013-10-01

Gibbs-El did not file his complaint until July 20, 2012, more than two years after his alleged injuries occurred. Thus, Gibbs-El’s claims are barred, and the trial court properly dismissed the complaint on this basis, as well. See Parks v. Madison Cnty., 783 N.E.2d 711, 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the statute of limitations for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 is the same as for personal injury actions).

A later decision that is only a delayed, inevitable consequence of an earlier act does not make a Section 1983 claim timely.

Kaulick v. Martinez · filed 2013-10-03

Any claim based on the original 2001 designation is clearly time-barred. Moreover, any claim based on the 2006 decision is also time-barred to the extent that the 2006 decision was a “delayed, but inevitable, consequence of the original [2001 designation].”

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations, so courts use the state personal injury limitations period.

Rader v. Misty Cowart · filed 2013-10-07

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has no statute of limitations, the prescriptive period is based on state law.

A § 1983 complaint may be dismissed when it is barred by the statute of limitations.

Johnson v. Rick Thaler · filed 2013-10-14

Elloyd Johnson, Texas prisoner # 840854, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in his appeal of the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. ... He has not shown that the district court erred by dismissing his complaint as barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Minnesota are subject to a six-year statute of limitations.

Anunka v. City of Burnsville · filed 2013-10-16

Upon careful de novo review, see Northstar Indus., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 576 F.3d 827, 831 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard of review), we agree with the district court that Anunka’s complaint, liberally construed, contained a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, and that this claim was untimely under the applicable Minnesota six-year statute of limitations, see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387-88 (2007) (state statute of limitations for personal-injury torts applies in § 1983 actions; § 1983 action accrues when plaintiff has complete and present cause of action); Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 618 n.3 (8th Cir. 1995) (in Minnesota, § 1983 claims are governed by six-year limitations period under Minnesota’s personal-injury statute); see also Strawn v. Mo. State Bd. Of Educ., 210 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2000) (statute-of-limitations determination is question of law subject to de novo review).

Section 1983 claims in Washington have a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Anderson v. Baseball Club of Seattle · filed 2013-10-17

Anderson alleges violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute of limitations for such a claim is borrowed from state law and begins to run when “the plaintiffs know or have reason to know of the injury that is the basis of their action.” RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). Under Washington law, the statute of limitations for an action for the taking of personal property or injury to other rights is three years. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2).

Section 1983 claims arising in South Dakota are subject to a three-year limitations period, and an untimely claim is barred without grounds for tolling.

Tieszen v. Judge John Bastian · filed 2013-10-23

He did not commence this action until 2011, however, and he offered nothing to support tolling of the limitation period for bringing suit. Thus, Tieszen’s claims-- whether brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or state tort law--are time-barred.

Section 1983 claims use the limitations period for personal injury actions in the applicable state.

Pantoja v. Fort Worth Texas Police Dept, et · filed 2013-10-24

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is the same as for a personal injury action in the applicable state.

Section 1983 actions use the applicable state personal injury statute of limitations, accruing when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Cherry v. Shedd · filed 2013-10-25

The district court properly dismissed Cherry’s access-to-courts claim against defendant Shedd because it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and it was evident from Cherry’s complaint and supplemental complaint that neither delayed discovery nor a continuing violations theory applied to extend the limitations period. See Idaho Code Ann. § 5-219(4); Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (state personal injury statute of limitations applies to § 1983 actions; a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action, and the continuing impact from past violations does not cause a claim to accrue anew).

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state's personal injury statute of limitations, which is two years in California.

Calop Business Systems, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2013-10-30

It is well-established that claims brought under § 1983 borrow the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims, and in California, that limitations period is two years.

A § 1983 action in Indiana must be filed within two years from the time the claim accrues.

Koch v. Gregory · filed 2013-10-28

Koch had two years from the time his claim accrued to file his § 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims in the District of Columbia have a three-year limitations period, and a procedural due process claim accrues when the deprivation occurs.

Morris v. Carter Global Lee, Inc. · filed 2013-11-05

Therefore, pursuant to the three-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims in the District of Columbia, his claim for violation of his procedural due process rights is time-barred.

A § 1983 denial-of-access-to-courts claim is frivolous when barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Mayberry v. Anderson · filed 2013-11-08

Although his federal habeas petition was dismissed in March 1998, he argues that the statute of limitations for this § 1983 claim began to run in August 2010 when he allegedly discovered the proof necessary to substantiate his claim. The MJ did not abuse his discretion in finding that this denial of access to courts claim was frivolous as it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, which is two years in Texas.

Bell v. Children's Protective Services · filed 2013-11-12

Accordingly, the district court was correct that the two-year statute of limitations bars Bell’s claims under § 1983 and that those claims should be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, including claims alleging sexual assault of a minor.

Hampton v. Rita · filed 2013-11-15

And since Hampton makes no other argument, the judgment dismissing his § 1983 suit as barred by the statute of limitations must be upheld.

A Section 1983 claim must be filed within three years after the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury.

Hecking v. NH Conjunctive Parties · filed 2013-11-26

Claims under Section 1983 and RICO must be filed within three and four years, respectively, of the date when plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury on which the action is based. ... Plaintiff filed this suit in 2013, well beyond the date he knew or should have known of his injury.

Section 1983 claims arising from the drug testing at issue are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Stubenfield v. Chicago Housing Authority · filed 2013-11-26

Since there are no allegations that Roy has been subject to the drug testing since 2006, he is well beyond the two-year statute of limitations. This Court therefore finds his claim is untimely.

Section 1983 claims accruing in Arkansas are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Early v. Baker · filed 2013-12-05

Thus, we apply the three-year limitations period to appellant’s § 1983 claims.

A § 1983 retaliation claim arising from prison discipline can accrue before the disciplinary conviction is overturned, and Louisiana's one-year limitations period applies.

Hanna v. Maxwell · filed 2013-12-06

Federal courts look to federal law to ascertain when a § 1983 action accrues and the limitations period begins to run; however, “state law supplies the applicable limitations period and tolling provisions.” ... When retaliation is alleged, an inmate need not show that a disciplinary conviction has been overturned. ... We find that the district court correctly dismissed his lawsuit as time barred because Hanna filed the instant action in 2008, five years after the relevant disciplinary action in 2003.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Hernandez v. Tisdale · filed 2013-12-06

Because there is no federal statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to § 1983, federal courts borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 claims in Missouri are subject to the state’s five-year limitations period for personal-injury actions.

Hoelscher v. Huff · filed 2013-12-10

Because the Hoelschers were aware of their alleged injuries no later than December 2004, their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims were time-barred by Missouri’s 5-year limitations period for personal-injury actions.

For a § 1983 claim based on a refusal to hire, the limitations period begins when the hiring decision is made; later challenges to that decision do not make it a continuing violation.

Rodriguez v. County of Nassau · filed 2013-12-16

Rodriguez alleges that the defendants refused to consider his application for employment on the basis of national origin in violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as his federal statutory rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... A refusal to hire is a “discrete act[]” that “constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice,’” such that the applicable statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the adverse hiring decision. ... Thus, we find that the district court correctly rejected the application of the continuing violation doctrine and found Rodriguez’s federal claims to be time-barred.

Section 1983 claims brought in Alabama are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Johnson v. Champions · filed 2014-01-02

The § 1983 and § 1985 conspiracy claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

A § 1983 claim filed in Indiana after the two-year limitations period is untimely when a temporary disability ends early enough to permit filing on time with due diligence.

Richards v. Mitcheff · filed 2014-01-08

He filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in December 2010, more than the two years ordinarily available to a plaintiff in Indiana. ... Indiana’s tolling doctrine therefore does not excuse the lateness of this suit.

Claims under § 1983 are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Spencer v. Courtier · filed 2014-01-14

The statute of limitations for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is two years.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Hernandez v. Tisdale · filed 2014-01-20

Because there is no federal statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to § 1983, federal courts borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 plaintiffs in Florida have four years to file suit.

Moore v. Harris · filed 2014-01-23

And where Florida is the forum state, § 1983 plaintiffs have four years to file suit.

In Washington, a § 1983 claim has a three-year limitations period, and a retaliation claim accrues without waiting for an infraction to be invalidated when success would not necessarily call that infraction into question.

Cardenas v. Miller-Stout · filed 2014-01-28

Moreover, Cardenas’s retaliation claim was never barred by Heck because a favorable resolution on the claim would not necessarily implicate the validity of the previous infraction or accompanying revocation of good time credits.

A § 1983 claim arising in Illinois has a two-year limitations period; a claim based on removal from a position accrues when the plaintiff learns of the removal.

Hesbol v. Board of Education of Laraway Community Consolidated School District 70-C · filed 2014-02-03

Here, Dr. Hesbol’s § 1983 claim accrued on August 12, 2011, when he learned of his removal. ... But Dr. Hesbol did not file his Complaint until August 13, 2013, which is more than two years after his claim accrued. Consequently, the statute of limitations bars the claim.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s residual personal injury limitations period, which is four years in Florida.

Stephenson v. Warden · filed 2014-02-06

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is governed by the forum state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations, which in Florida is four years.

A § 1983 claim based on a completed act accrues when the plaintiff knows of the injury; continuing effects do not extend Illinois’s two-year limitations period.

Olson v. City of Chicago · filed 2014-02-13

But this doctrine does not save the Olsons’ claims. As the district court explained, the Olsons were aware of their injury as soon as the fence was erected and the statute of limitations is measured based on the timing of the injury, not the length of its lingering effects.

Section 1983 claims arising in New York have a three-year limitations period.

Rankel v. Town of Somers · filed 2014-02-25

I agree with the DEC Defendants that any § 1983 claims arising from the events of October 25, 2008 are time-barred. The statute of limitations for a § 1983 action arising in New York is three years.

Section 1983 claims in California use the state’s two-year personal-injury limitations period, subject to applicable tolling rules.

Doss v. City of Long Beach · filed 2014-03-03

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Doss’s action, brought more than five years after his claim accrued, was time-barred.

Section 1983 claims in California are subject to the state’s two-year personal injury limitations period, tolled while the plaintiff is a minor.

Tryon Smith v. Kouri · filed 2014-03-17

The district court properly dismissed Smith’s action with prejudice because, although the statute of limitations was tolled until Smith turned eighteen on February 10, 2007, see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352(a) (tolling if person is under the age of majority at the time the claims accrued), Smith did not file his complaint until November 30, 2009, more than nine months after the two-year limitations period expired on February 10, 2009.

A § 1983 false imprisonment claim based on detention past a lawful release date accrues when the detention ends, even if the prisoner knew earlier that his sentence credits were miscalculated.

Panzica v. Corrections Corp. of Am. · filed 2014-03-17

We conclude, consistent with Wallace, that the statute of limitations began to run on November 19, 2010, the day his false imprisonment ended. His complaint, filed on November 18, 2011, was therefore timely filed and the district court’s determination to the contrary was in error.

Section 1983 borrows the applicable state’s general or residual limitations period for personal injury claims.

['Hill v. Gray'] · filed 2014-03-21

Because § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, courts apply the applicable state’s general or residual statute of limitations for personal injury tort actions.

Section 1983 actions in Alabama have a two-year statute-of-limitations period.

Kalim A.R. Muhammad v. Brenda L. Bethel Muhammad · filed 2014-03-31

As for the arrest, § 1983 actions in Alabama have a two-year statute-of-limitations period, and torts under Alabama law generally have a two-year limitations period.

Section 1983 claims in Wyoming have a four-year limitations period, so claims based on earlier conduct are untimely.

Pfeil v. Lampert · filed 2014-03-31

Any allegations of actions or inactions occurring prior to August 23, 2008, are untimely and cannot support Plaintiffs RLUIPA and § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims have a three-year statute of limitations.

Bowen-Hooks v. City of New York · filed 2014-03-31

The statute of limitations for claims brought under § 1983 is three years.

Section 1983 claims use state law to determine the limitations period and related tolling rules.

Moore v. Mrs. B. E. Chamberlain, Nurse · filed 2014-04-02

In actions filed pursuant to § 1983, the length of the statute of limitations period and the closely related questions of tolling an application are governed by state law.

Section 1983 claims in Utah have a four-year limitations period and accrue on the date of the constitutional violation.

Loard v. Sorenson · filed 2014-04-08

Utah has a four-year statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims, Utah Code § 78B-2-307(3), which accrue on the date of the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 false imprisonment claims in Oklahoma have a two-year limitations period; federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Titsworth v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections · filed 2014-04-11

For these claims, we apply Oklahoma’s two-year period of limitations. See, e.g., McCarty v. Gilchrist, 646 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir. 2011). On appeal, Mr. Titsworth focuses solely on his § 1983 claim involving false imprisonment. To determine when this claim accrued, we look to federal law.

Section 1983 claims in California are subject to a two-year limitations period unless equitable tolling or estoppel applies.

Polk v. Daly · filed 2014-04-14

Dismissal of Polk’s claims under §§ 1983 and 1985 for alleged violations of her First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights, and for a conspiracy to discriminate based on religious animus, was proper because Polk failed to file this action within the applicable two-year statute of limitations, or establish grounds for equitable tolling or equitable estoppel.

Section 1983 borrows the applicable state statute of limitations.

Cleveland v. Stuart · filed 2014-04-30

Section 1983 borrows the applicable state limitations period.

Section 1983 actions in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Salley v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2014-05-01

Salley appears to have raised no objection to the District Court’s dismissal of those claims arising beyond the two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions, and we discern no error with respect to that determination.

Class members with time-barred § 1983 claims cannot remain in the class after their claims for injunctive relief are dismissed.

Miri v. Clinton · filed 2014-05-01

Seeing as the Court has dismissed the claim for injunctive relief, the 151 class members whose § 1983 claims are time barred are no longer eligible to be members of the class.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period.

Cruz v. SCI SMR Dietary Services · filed 2014-05-05

The statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims in Pennsylvania is two years.

State law governs tolling of the limitations period for § 1983 claims.

Shinault v. Foster · filed 2014-05-22

Tolling for § 1983 claims is governed by state law.

In New York, Section 1983 claims have a three-year limitations period.

Eaton v. Wayne Central School District · filed 2014-06-02

The statute of limitations for an action under Section 1983 is three years.

Section 1983 claims use the limitations period for personal injury actions in the state where the federal court sits.

Dimitracopoulos v. City of New York · filed 2014-06-02

The statute of limitations for actions under § 1983 is the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions occurring in the state in which the federal court sits.

A § 1983 claim challenging an employee’s job classification accrues when the classification is made and is subject to a one year limitations period in Tennessee.

Wood v. Karla Davis, Commissioner of Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development · filed 2014-06-06

However, in a companion case, Wood v. Davis, No. M2013-00400-COA-R3-CV, issued contemporaneously, this court holds that the claim accrued in November 2007 at the time of the alleged erroneous classification. Thus, by the time Wood began to challenge his termination, the one year statute of limitation for § 1983 actions had already run.

A Section 1983 claim is not saved by an initial complaint that was never served when the plaintiff serves an amended complaint after the limitations period has run.

Rudder v. Williams · filed 2014-06-10

Even if MPO Williams had notice of this particular lawsuit when it was filed, which she does not admit, it cannot be-and is not_ the rule that a never-served complaint tolls a statute of limitations beyond the time allotted by Rule 4(m) for service.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal injury limitations period, and an anticipated change in the source of pentobarbital did not restart that period for this execution challenge.

Wellons v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections · filed 2014-06-17

Claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the statute of limitations period governing personal injury actions in the state where the action is brought. ... However, the Georgia Department of Corrections’ anticipated use of an adulterated pentobarbital does not establish a “significant alteration in the method of execution.”