42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations.

Baden v. City of Wheaton · filed 2011-05-19

Thus, we agree with the district court that the majority of events in Baden’s complaint precede 2007 and are beyond the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in Illinois.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury underlying the complaint, even if the alleged misconduct continues.

Ms. Serpentfoot v. Rome City Commission · filed 2011-05-20

Serpentfoot claims that the district court’s statute of limitations rulings on ... her section 1983 and RICO claims were in error because she complained of continuing violations and defendants have not ceased their wrongdoings. But the statute of limitations began to accrue on these claims when Serpentfoot knew or should have known that she suffered the injury that formed the basis of her complaint, not upon the eventual termination of defendants’ misdeeds.

Section 1983 method-of-execution claims brought in Alabama are subject to a two-year limitations period; substituting pentobarbital for sodium thiopental did not restart that period.

Powell v. Thomas · filed 2011-06-09

Powell’s § 1983 Complaint challenging the constitutionality of the method of his execution by lethal injection is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Powell was required to file his § 1983 Complaint within two years of July 31, 2002, but did not file it until May 13, 2011, more than six years too late.

Section 1983 method-of-execution claims in Alabama have a two-year limitations period; a substantially changed execution protocol can start a new accrual period.

Powell v. Thomas · filed 2011-06-15

“All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been brought.” ... Hence, Powell’s challenge to execution by lethal injection accrued on July 31, 2002, absent a later “significant change” in the state execution protocol.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state-law limitations period.

Bridgewater vs DeKalb County · filed 2011-06-16

The length of the limitations period governing a § 1983 action is dictated by state law.

Section 1983 claims use the general or residual personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the alleged conduct occurred.

Lewicki v. Commonwealth of PA · filed 2011-06-21

Claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by the general or residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions applicable in the state where the complained-of conduct occurred.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state limitations period; Michigan's three-year period bars claims filed outside that window.

Trefry v. Phillips · filed 2011-06-30

She pointed out that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the applicable state statute of limitations applies and, as Ms. Trefry’s claim is controlled by Michigan law, the three year Michigan statute of limitations controls. ... The Court affirms the Recommended Decision and orders the Amended Complaint dismissed.

Section 1983 claims in Michigan use the state’s three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Awrey v. Gilbertson · filed 2011-06-30

First, the claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations because Plaintiff was informed of his ineligibility by the University on October 13, 2007, and he did not file his complaint until more than three years later on November 29, 2010. See McCune v. City of Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 905 (6th Cir.1988) (concluding the applicable statute of limitations in § 1983 cases is the state’s statute of limitations in personal injury actions); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10) (Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions).

Section 1983 claims in California are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Garcia v. Lunes · filed 2011-07-01

The district court properly dismissed as time-barred Garcia’s claim challenging the 1996 placement in his file of information obtained from a confidential informant. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing California’s two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims).

Section 1983 claims are subject to the applicable state personal injury statute of limitations.

Fennell v. Danberg · filed 2011-07-07

Fennell‟s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were subject to Delaware‟s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a three-year limitations period and accrue when the discriminatory employment act occurs.

Bonds v. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District · filed 2011-07-08

Defendants also argue that plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination based on the 2005 Reorganization Audit are time-barred because they did not file their complaint within the three-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. ... The Court finds plaintiffs claims of discrimination relating to the reorganization are untimely. “A discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act ‘occurred’ on the day that it ‘happened.’ ”

Section 1983 claims accrue when the facts supporting the cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a reasonably prudent person.

Van Poyck v. McCollum · filed 2011-07-15

The statute of limitations on a section 1983 claim begins to run when “the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.”

Section 1983 claims in California are subject to a one-year limitations period running from the injury.

Foster v. Kntv Television, Inc · filed 2011-07-19

Likewise, amending Foster’s § 1983 claim would have been futile, because that claim was barred by the statute of limitations, which ran one year from the date of her termination in 2001.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the state’s personal-injury statute of limitations and accrue when the plaintiff receives notice of termination.

Davis v. Biloxi Public School District · filed 2011-07-19

Therefore, Mississippi’s general three-year statute of limitations, section 15-1-49 (Rev.2003), is applicable to Gilda’s 1983 claims. ... Thus, Gilda’s alleged section 1983 and constitutional rights claims began to run on April 29, 2004, when she admittedly received the non-renewal notice from the School District.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the action is brought.

DeYoung v. Owens · filed 2011-07-20

Section 1983 claims “are tort actions, subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been brought.”

Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Shalhoub v. Depreta · filed 2011-07-21

As the District Court explained, Shalhoub’s § 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Utah are governed by a four-year residual statute of limitations.

Brock v. Herbert · filed 2011-07-27

The district court correctly applied the four-year limitations period to the § 1983 claims. See Fratus, 49 F.3d at 675. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, limitation periods for other types of claims have no bearing on the issue. Their claims related to incidents occurring outside of the applicable four-year statute of limitations period were properly dismissed.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico have a one-year limitations period.

Diaz v. Roman · filed 2011-07-29

Plaintiff had an opportunity to respond to that argument, but failed to demonstrate any circumstance or additional factual allegation that would preclude the clear application of the one-year prescriptive period applicable to section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ remaining section 1983 claims against all defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action whose limitations period uses state personal injury law while accrual is governed by federal law.

Wilson v. GROZE · filed 2011-08-01

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action, but in several respects federal law looks to the law of the state in which the cause of action arose. ... While state law governs the statute of limitations, the accrual date of a Section 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not. resolved by reference to state law. ... Aspects of Section 1983 which are not governed by reference to state law are governed by federal rules conforming in general to common-law tort principles.

Section 1983 claims use the state limitations period for personal injury actions, which is two years in Pennsylvania.

Poole v. Marks · filed 2011-08-08

Claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which in this case is two years.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period because the section has no federal limitations period.

Hendrix v. Thompson · filed 2011-08-09

Because there is no federal statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to § 1983, federal courts borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 claims in the District of Columbia have a three-year statute of limitations.

Chandler v. Jones · filed 2011-08-09

Finally, plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims for violations of their constitutional rights (Counts 4, 5, and 6) have a statute of limitations of three years.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Hralima v. Prison Health Services · filed 2011-08-10

The district court properly dismissed Hralima’s action because his § 1983 claims, filed more than two years after his causes of action accrued, were barred by the statute of limitations. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e); Taylor v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d 710, 711-12 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims).

A Section 1983 claim cannot be dismissed as time-barred at the pleading stage when alleged threats could support equitable estoppel.

Polk v. Cavin · filed 2011-08-17

Polk sufficiently alleged that defendants threatened and intimated her. ... Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings on Polk’s claims against the county defendants.

Section 1983 claims arising in Oregon are subject to a two-year limitations period, which may be equitably tolled when warranted.

Rodriguez v. Williams · filed 2011-08-17

The district court properly granted summary judgment as to Rodriguez’s claims regarding the conditions of his confinement because these claims were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations, and Rodriguez failed to establish circumstances warranting equitable tolling.

Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period.

Humphries v. Houghton · filed 2011-08-18

“The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.” ... We agree with the District Court that Humphries is barred from asserting claims based on acts allegedly committed by defendants prior to November 8, 2008.

Section 1983 claims use the state's personal injury limitations period, accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury, and may be tolled while a prisoner exhausts administrative remedies.

Paluch v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department Corrections · filed 2011-08-19

In § 1983 cases, federal courts apply the state personal injury statute of limitations, which is two years in Pennsylvania. ... “A [§] 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is based.” ... Because exhaustion of prison administrative remedies is mandatory under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions may ... be tolled while a prisoner exhausts.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state limitations period, while federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Am. Tax Funding L.L.C. v. Miamisburg · filed 2011-08-19

Even though the applicable limitations period in state law determines the statute of limitations period for 42 U.S.C. §1983 actions, “federal law governs the determination of the accrual date (that is, the date the statute of limitations begins to run) for purposes of the statute of limitations in a section 1983 action.” Ormiston v. Nelson, at p. 71. Application of the discovery rule may be appropriate in those actions. Id. The statute of limitations begins to run “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Singleton v. City of New York (1980), 632 F.2d 185, 191.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

A Society Without a Name v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 2011-08-24

With regard to the § 1983 and equal-protection claims, the statute-of-limitations period for both is two years.

Section 1983 Equal Protection claims alleging gender discrimination have a two-year statute of limitations.

Rollins v. ALABAMA COMMUNITY COLLEGE SYSTEM · filed 2011-08-26

Therefore, the only § 1983 claims are gender discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause, which have a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 challenges to Florida’s lethal injection method are subject to a four-year limitations period, which can restart after a significant change to the execution protocol.

Valle v. Singer · filed 2011-09-07

Consequently, to the extent Valle wished to challenge Florida's intention to execute him by lethal injection, he was required to bring his § 1983 action within four years of February 13, 2000, i.e., by February 13, 2004, absent a later "significant change" in Florida's execution protocol.

Section 1983 actions in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period that bars recovery for conduct outside that period.

Washington v. Grace · filed 2011-09-26

... the two-year statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions in Pennsylvania bars recovery for conduct taking place before June 24, 2006.

Section 1983 claims use the state's personal injury statute of limitations, regardless of the right underlying the claim.

Asociacion De Suscripcion Conj v. Juarbe-Jimenez · filed 2011-09-29

Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations; instead, the courts apply the state's personal injury statute of limitations to all § 1983 claims, regardless of the underlying law on which the claim is based.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Donaldson v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2011-09-30

His complaint falls well outside the three-year statute of limitations for section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Section 1983 claims are treated as personal injury actions and are subject to the relevant state limitations period.

Carner v. Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Co. · filed 2011-10-03

All of Carner’s claims against BCBSLA are delictual, including her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, which under Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985), is characterized as a personal injury action and therefore subject to the relevant state prescription period.

A Section 1983 claim filed more than five years after the alleged conduct is untimely even under a proposed five-year limitations period.

Smith v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2011-10-03

Even if we accepted this contention, it would not help Smith, because he filed his complaint more than five years after the complained-of conduct. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state's statute of limitations.

Alexander v. Foegen · filed 2011-10-04

As to the claims against the arresting officer, actions brought under § 1983 are subject to the statute of limitations of the forum state.

A § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania has a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.

Cain v. City of Philadelphia Police Department · filed 2011-10-12

“The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.” ... A cause of action under § 1983 “accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based.”

Section 1983 actions filed in federal courts in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Jean-Laurent v. Hennessy · filed 2011-10-24

A three-year statute of limitations applies to section 1983 actions filed in federal courts in New York.

The administrator of an estate must pursue a decedent’s § 1983 claim within the applicable limitations period; a beneficiary’s minority does not toll it.

Ray v. Maher · filed 2011-11-01

When someone entitled to sue under § 1983 dies, and the claim inures to his or her estate, the administrator must diligently pursue the claim or lose it, much like the allegedly injured person entitled to bring the claim in the first place.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so courts borrow the forum state's general personal injury limitations period.

Lawler v. Ms Department of Corrections, Et · filed 2011-11-01

Congress has not provided a limitations period for § 1983 actions. Therefore, in those actions, federal courts are to borrow the general personal- injury limitations period of the forum state.

California’s two-year personal-injury limitations period applies to § 1983 claims; a claim filed beyond even three years is untimely.

Peters v. Board of Trustees of the Vista Unified School District · filed 2011-11-01

The district court properly dismissed Peters’s claims as time-barred because the applicable statute of limitations is three years, at most, and Peters filed his action beyond that time. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (California’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims)

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying it, starting the limitations period.

Thomas Redmond, Sr. v. Rantz · filed 2011-11-01

The district court properly concluded that Redmond’s claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations because Redmond’s cause of action accrued in 2006 when he was told that he needed additional post-operative physical therapy and that the additional therapy had been denied. See TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A] claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.”).

Section 1983 claims brought in Louisiana are subject to a one-year limitations period.

Darrin Lewis, Sr. v. Ascension Parish School Board · filed 2011-11-03

The magistrate judge found that Lewis’s equal protection claims based upon the School Board’s 2002 modification of its feeder plan were prescribed under the one-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims in Louisiana. ... The district court correctly held that the 2002 feeder plan modification claims are time-barred.

Section 1983 claims in Idaho use the state’s two-year limitations period.

Stafford v. Owyhee Village Inc. · filed 2011-11-03

The district court properly concluded that Stafford’s action was time-barred. ... Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 926 (9th Cir. 2004) (Idaho’s two year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims)

In Georgia, § 1983 claims for false arrest, illegal search, and excessive force are subject to a two-year limitations period that begins when the claimant knows the supporting facts.

Jones v. Union City · filed 2011-11-18

Jones’s § 1983 claims of false arrest, illegal search, and excessive force are time-barred. The facts supporting the claims arose and were known by Jones in November 2004, but he filed his claims in December 2008, more than two years later.

State law governs tolling of the limitations period for § 1983 claims.

Barnett v. Correction Corp. Of America · filed 2011-11-18

State law governs tolling in § 1983 cases. ... We find that the district court was correct in finding no grounds for equitable tolling.

Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania have a two-year statute of limitations.

Lomax v. Police Chief of Erie · filed 2011-11-22

“The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.” ... Thus, Lomax’s civil rights action, filed in September 2010, was filed beyond the two-year statute of limitations period, and is time-barred.

A § 1983 claim is untimely when filed more than two years after the plaintiff knew its factual basis.

Bonner v. Bosworth · filed 2011-11-23

Bonner first argues that the district court erred in dismissing his § 1983 claims regarding a search and seizure and the imposition of conditions of pretrial release as frivolous because they were filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations. The district court found, and the record shows, that Bonner knew the factual basis underlying these claims more than two years before filing this action. See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing these claims as untimely.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to the state’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Reyes v. Sauers · filed 2011-12-05

Pennsylvania’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations applies to Reyes’ § 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania for false arrest and excessive force have a two-year limitations period and generally accrue on the date of the arrest or assault.

Leblanc v. Snavely · filed 2011-12-06

In this case, LeBlanc’s claims were subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... Claims for false arrest and assault (which would include LeBlanc’s excessive force claim) typically accrue on the date of the arrest or the assault, because, at that point, the plaintiff has reason to know of the injury.

Section 1983 claims in New York are subject to a three-year limitations period, with accrual determined by when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the harm.

Giacopelli v. Incorporated Village of Malverne · filed 2011-12-12

Accordingly, the Plaintiff cannot assert a Section 1983 cause of action with regard to the Defendant’s failure to promote him to Lieutenant. ... However, to the extent that the Plaintiff argues that the retaliatory act that forms the basis of his Section 1983 action is his forced retirement, then the Court finds that Section 1983 claim is timely.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions.

Sterling v. Redevelopment Authority · filed 2011-12-13

Sterling’s due-process claims, like all section 1983 claims, are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007), which in Pennsylvania is two years, see Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir.1998); see also 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5524.

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, and the applicable limitations period is the state's general personal injury period.

Aly v. City of Lake Jackson · filed 2011-12-16

The only issue in this appeal is when Aly’s § 1983 cause of action accrued. “[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is . . . governed by federal rules conforming in general to common-law tort principles. Under those principles, it is the standard rule that [accrual occurs] when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” ... Thus, Aly’s claim accrued on January 26, 2007, when he was arrested and charges against him were brought.

Section 1983 borrows state personal-injury limitations periods and related state tolling rules.

Granger v. Rauch · filed 2011-12-22

Section 1983 borrows not only the state statute of limitations for personal-injury claims but also all related state tolling rules.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Smith v. Kansas Department of Corrections · filed 2011-12-23

Jerry Wayne Smith, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his civil rights action, which brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Kansas Constitution, the Kansas Tort Claims Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. ... The fact that Mr. Smith brought these same claims or similar claims in prior cases does not alter the district court’s conclusion that Mr. Smith’s claims in the instant case are barred by the application of the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Colorado that do not assert § 1981 violations are subject to a two-year residual personal injury limitations period.

Allstate Sweeping, LLC v. City of Denver · filed 2011-12-23

The applicable statute of limitation for § 1983 claims brought in Colorado which do not assert violations of § 1981, such as the Title VI and Fourteenth Amendment claims asserted by plaintiff, is the two-year residual personal injury statute set forth at C.R.S. § 13 — 80—102(1)(i). ... Therefore, to the extent that the Third, Fourth and Fifth claims are based on acts that occurred before or during the term of the contract, or at other times on or before January 28, 2009, they are time barred and the motion to dismiss such claims is granted.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations and accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know that constitutional rights were violated.

Draper v. Martin · filed 2011-12-30

In Illinois, the statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims is two years, 735 ILCS 5/13-202; Jenkins v. Vill. of Maywood, 506 F.3d 622, 623 (7th Cir. 2007), and the claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights have been violated,” Hileman v. Maze, 367 F.3d 694, 696 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Kelly v. City of Chicago, 4 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1993)).

Section 1983 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Bloom v. Fischer · filed 2012-01-03

Since plaintiffs habeas petition was granted in April 2008, his complaint, which was filed in this Court in May 2011, is untimely under the three-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims use state personal injury limitation periods, accrue under federal law, and may be equitably tolled in appropriate cases.

Watkins v. Craft · filed 2012-01-04

“State statutes of limitations applicable to general personal injury claims supply the limitations period for § 1983 claims, but federal law governs the time of accrual of § 1983 claims.” ... “In appropriate cases, the doctrine of equitable tolling can apply in § 1983 cases and prevent the running of the applicable statute of limitations.” ... “We conclude that Mr. Watkins has failed to provide sufficient specificity about (1) his alleged lack of access to writing and legal research materials during his time in West Virginia; and (2) how the alleged lack of access affected his ability to file a timely § 1983 complaint.”

Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period, subject to a continuing violations exception for conduct forming a continuing practice.

Ozoroski v. Maue · filed 2012-01-04

“The statute of limitations period for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.” ... “The Continuing Violations Doctrine, however, is an “equitable exception to the timely filing requirement,” which applies “when a defendant’s conduct is part of a continuing practice” and is “more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts.” ... “Under the Doctrine, “an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period.””

Section 1983 claims in Nevada are subject to a two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Friedman v. State of Nevada · filed 2012-01-04

The district court properly dismissed the claims against the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) because the alleged and proposed causes of action against the LVMPD accrued more than two years before Friedman filed this action. See Perez v. Seevers, 869 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations governs § 1983 claims, ... which is two years in Nevada); see also Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 261 n.15 (1980) (mere requests to reconsider a previous decision cannot be used to extend limitations period).

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal injury limitations period, accrue under federal law when supporting facts are apparent, and in Oklahoma have a two-year limitations period.

Jackson v. Standifird · filed 2012-01-06

The statute of limitations on a Section 1983 claim is determined by reference to the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the forum state.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury claims.

Baugus v. Billings Police Department · filed 2012-01-10

The district court properly dismissed Baugus’s action as time-barred. See Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-204(1) (three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (“For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions[.]”); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007) (“The cause of action accrues even though the full extent of the injury is not then known or predictable.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Section 1983 claims in Oregon use the state’s two-year general personal injury limitations period rather than its specialized child abuse limitations period.

Bonneau v. Centennial School District No. 28J · filed 2012-01-11

Accordingly, in this § 1983 suit, the district court appropriately borrowed Oregon’s residual two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Gardner v. City of Berkeley · filed 2012-01-17

The statute of limitations for § 1983 and § 1985 claims is the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

In Puerto Rico, § 1983 claims have a one-year limitations period; earlier acts may be considered under the continuing violation doctrine if they are part of the same unlawful employment practice as a timely act.

Ayala-Sepúlveda v. Municipality of San Germán · filed 2012-01-18

In Puerto Rico, § 1983 claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. ... Because Ayala has not demonstrated that he was subjected to a hostile work environment to which the continuing violation doctrine could apply, his allegations regarding events occurring prior to the one-year statute of limitations period are time-barred.

Section 1983 claims in Nevada are subject to a two-year limitations period measured from accrual.

Cotton v. City of Las Vegas · filed 2012-01-25

The district court properly dismissed as untimely Cotton’s claims concerning the City’s alleged failure to provide proper notice regarding the demolition of structures on his property and the assessment of abatement fees because Cotton filed this action more than two years after his claims accrued.

Section 1983 claims in New Mexico have a three-year statute of limitations.

Schrader v. Richardson · filed 2012-01-31

As the district court correctly concluded, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim in New Mexico is three years.

Section 1983 claims use the state’s personal injury limitations period, but federal law determines when a claim accrues.

Gilarno v. Borough of Freedom · filed 2012-02-01

The statute of limitations applicable to a § 1983 claim is the applicable state’s statutory period for personal injury actions. ... However, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.”

Section 1983 claims arising in Colorado have a two-year limitations period that begins when the facts supporting a claim are or should be apparent.

Romero v. Lander · filed 2012-02-02

Under Colorado law, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is two years. Under federal law, the statute of limitations on a §1983 begins to run when the facts that would support a cause of action are or should be apparent.

In Puerto Rico, Section 1983 claims have a one-year limitations period that begins when a discharged employee receives an unambiguous, final termination decision.

Reyes-Orta v. Highway & Transportation Authority · filed 2012-02-14

In this case, the requisite unambiguous, final termination notice came on May 5, 2010, when Reyes-Orta received the termination letter. ... Thus, Plaintiffs are correct in arguing that May 5, 2010, not December 2009, started the one-year statutory clock for ReyesOrta’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Southersby Development Corp. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills · filed 2012-02-14

Thus, Southersby’s Section 1983 claims are subject to a two year statute of limitations.

The two-year limitations period for Taylor’s § 1983 claim was tolled while he exhausted administrative remedies.

Taylor v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2012-02-28

The district court's calculation was not quite right because the two-year statute of limitations period was tolled while Taylor exhausted his administrative remedies.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations.

Turner v. Department of Education · filed 2012-02-29

Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies.

Section 1983 claims enforcing rights created by the 1991 amendments to § 1981 are subject to the four-year federal catch-all limitations period.

DeNigris v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. · filed 2012-03-09

Here, to the extent Plaintiffs § 1981 and § 1983 claims seek recovery for discriminatory acts occurring in the course of her contractual relationship with Defendants, her cause of action was authorized by the 1991 amendment and the four-year federal catch-all statute of limitations will apply.

Section 1983 claims in Mississippi have a three-year limitations period.

Ricks v. City of Winona · filed 2012-03-12

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims in Mississippi is three years.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the claim accrues.

Lewis v. Sheriff's Dept Bossier Parish, et · filed 2012-03-13

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is the same as the statute of limitations in a personal injury action in the state in which the claim accrues.

Section 1983 actions arising in Kentucky have a one-year statute of limitations.

Webb v. Kentucky State University · filed 2012-03-14

The applicable statute of limitations for a § 1983 action arising in Kentucky is one year.

Section 1983 claims use the state’s personal injury limitations period, while federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Newman v. Guedry · filed 2012-03-15

Federal law controls the date of accrual for actions brought under section 1983. ... Because the statute of limitations for actions brought under section 1983 is governed by the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state where the challenged conduct occurred, Texas’s two-year statute of limitations applies to this case.

Section 1983 claims filed in New York have a three-year limitations period borrowed from state personal injury law.

Choquette v. City of New York · filed 2012-03-19

The plaintiffs’ claims are asserted under § 1983. Federal law does not provide a statute of limitations for claims brought under § 1983; instead, federal courts “should borrow the [state] general or residual statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989). In New York, the applicable limitations period is three years.

A § 1983 challenge to Alabama’s method of execution can overcome a limitations defense if filed within two years of a significant change in that method.

Arthur v. Thomas · filed 2012-03-21

In order to defeat Alabama’s statute of limitations defense, Arthur must show that he filed his § 1983 complaint within two years of a significant change in Alabama’s method of administering lethal injections.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the claimant knows of the injury; delayed accrual for a claim arising from a conviction does not extend a separate claimant’s deadline.

Edmonds v. OKTIBBEHA COUNTY, MISS. · filed 2012-03-26

Although a § 1983 action arising from Edmonds’s conviction could not be sought until that conviction was overturned, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), that accrual pertains to his action, not Clay’s. Assuming that the Fourteenth Amendment countenances her injury, her cause of action accrued on May 12, 2003, because she was immediately aware of her separation from Edmonds at a point at which she, a fit parent, believed it in his best interest not to answer questions without her being present. Her claim was thus long time-barred when she and Edmonds sued on March 20, 2009.

Section 1983 claims in Colorado have a two-year limitations period measured from when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury; a prison grievance appeal may affect whether a claim is timely.

Anderson v. Colorado, Department of Corrections · filed 2012-03-26

The Court concluded that the period of limitations applicable to the claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (One through Four) is two years from the date that Mr. Anderson knew or should have known of the injury that was the basis for the claim. ... I agree with the plaintiff, however, that because there was a form of “appeal” by way of the grievance procedure, his filing of a Complaint based on the denial of Wellbutrin was timely.

A § 1983 false arrest claim accrues when the plaintiff is arrested and formally charged, and is time-barred if filed after the limitations period without grounds for equitable tolling.

Covington v. New York City Police Department · filed 2012-03-27

Upon de novo review, see Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2004), we find that the district court correctly concluded, under Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388-89 (2007), that the statute of limitations for Covington’s false arrest claim accrued on February 19, 1990, the date he was arrested and formally charged.

A later impediment to filing does not revive a § 1983 false-arrest claim after the limitations period has expired.

Vasquez Arroyo v. Gross · filed 2012-03-30

Second, any impediment that arose in 2005 to his bringing suit would not save his claim because the limitations period had long since expired in 2000, two years after the 1998 arrest.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the alleged violation occurred.

Baur v. Crum · filed 2012-03-30

As Defendants argue and Plaintiff concedes, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 constitutional claim is determined by the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state where the alleged violations occur. ... Here, Plaintiff filed her initial complaint on March 12, 2008. Thus, any claims before March 12, 2006, are time barred.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Quiles-Santiago v. Rodriguez-Diaz · filed 2012-04-02

In Puerto Rico, section 1983 claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. ... Plaintiffs filed this complaint on March 16, 2011, which is past the one-year statute of limitations. Therefore, the Court will not consider this incident in its analysis.

In New York, Section 1983 claims are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Stinson v. City of New York · filed 2012-04-23

Because of the three year statute of limitations applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the applicable class period begins in May 2007.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Dodd v. Unknown Parties · filed 2012-04-26

The district court properly dismissed Dodd’s claims as time-barred because the claims accrued more than four years before Dodd filed his complaint. See id. at 927 (for § 1983 claims, the courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions).

A § 1983 claim filed in California was subject to the then-applicable one-year personal injury statute of limitations and California’s tolling rules.

St. Amand v. Block · filed 2012-04-26

The district court properly granted summary judgment because the complaint, filed more than eleven years after St. Amand’s claims accrued, was barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations, and St. Amand failed to establish circumstances warranting equitable tolling.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a statute of limitations and can be dismissed when filed after the limitations period expires.

Staves v. The City of Los Angeles · filed 2012-04-26

Frederick James Staves appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) on statute of limitations grounds. ... The district court properly dismissed Staves’s claims as time-barred because Staves filed this action over nine years after the claims accrued.

The limitations period for a § 1983 action is tolled during mandatory administrative exhaustion only while the prisoner is actively exhausting those remedies.

Melendez v. Greiner · filed 2012-04-27

The statute of limitations, however, is only tolled during the period when a prisoner is “actively exhausting” his administrative remedies. See id. at 322 n.2. The record reflects that Melendez did not “actively” exhaust his administrative remedies. It follows that the statute of limitations was not tolled in this case.

Section 1983 actions filed in Washington are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Eriksen v. Serpas · filed 2012-04-27

The district court properly dismissed the action because the Eriksens filed it well after the applicable three-year statute of limitations period had run.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to the state’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

DiLauri v. Mullen · filed 2012-04-30

As recognized by the Magistrate Judge, Pennsylvania’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations applies to DiLauri’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims in Louisiana use the state’s one-year prescriptive period.

Walker v. Prieto · filed 2012-05-02

In the alternative, the district court did not err by dismissing Walker’s § 1983 complaint as time barred and therefore frivolous. “In § 1983 claims, the applicable statute of limitations is that which the state would apply in an analogous action in its courts. In accordance with applicable Louisiana law, we apply a one-year liberative prescriptive period to these claims.” Bourdais v. New Orleans City, 485 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted) (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3492). Therefore, contrary to Walker’s argument, the district court correctly applied the one-year prescriptive period in Louisiana Civil Code article 3492.

Section 1983 claims in Michigan are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Hunt v. State of Michigan · filed 2012-05-08

The search and arrest about which Hunt complains occurred in October 1998, but Hunt did not file his complaint until November 2009, well beyond the three-year statute of limitations that applies to § 1983 claims in Michigan.

The limitations period for a prisoner’s § 1983 claim is tolled while the prisoner exhausts required administrative remedies under the PLRA.

Surles v. Andison · filed 2012-05-08

The statute of limitations for claims subject to the PLRA is tolled while the plaintiff exhausts his required administrative remedies.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, which is tolled while a prisoner completes the administrative grievance process.

Gomez v. Randle · filed 2012-05-14

Although the district court correctly noted that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim in Illinois is two years, see Dominguez v. Hendley, 545 F.3d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 2008), it failed to recognize that “the limitations period is tolled while a prisoner completes the administrative grievance process.”

Section 1983 claims may be time-barred, and equitable estoppel does not prevent defendants from asserting the statute of limitations defense when the plaintiff lacks due diligence.

Neil v. City of New York · filed 2012-05-15

It is undisputed that plaintiff’s federal civil rights claims against the “Doe” defendants are time-barred. Although the IAS court did not specifically address the issue, we find that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not act to bar any of the defendants from raising the statute of limitations as a defense to plaintiff’s federal claims.

Section 1983 claims use the state personal injury statute of limitations, which is two years in Pennsylvania.

Muhammad v. Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County · filed 2012-05-15

In § 1983 cases, federal courts apply the state personal injury statute of limitations, which is two years in Pennsylvania.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico are subject to a one-year limitations period that runs from notice of the alleged injury.

Jardin De Las Catalinas Ltd. Partnership v. Joyner · filed 2012-05-21

Second, plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred because plaintiffs filed a complaint after the statute of limitations on their section 1983 claim had run. ... Thus, by April 15, 2010, plaintiffs were aware of how many credits they would be allocated, and how many credits were allegedly seized by the defendant. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on April 19, 2011, more than one year later; therefore, their claim is time-barred.

Section 1983 claims filed in Indiana have a two-year statute of limitations.

Martin v. Heuer · filed 2012-05-23

The statute of limitations for a violation of § 1983 in Indiana is two years.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal injury statute of limitations; in Iowa, that period is two years.

Barkley v. Woodbury County · filed 2012-05-23

There is no dispute that the applicable statute of limitations here is Iowa’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Iowa Code § 614.1(2).

Section 1983 has no designated limitations period, so the forum state’s general tort limitations period applies.

Smith v. Acevedo · filed 2012-05-24

Because § 1983 does not have a designated statute of limitations, the forum state’s general tort statute of limitations applies; in Texas, this statute of limitations period is two years.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Willis v. City of Salem, Oregon · filed 2012-05-25

The district court properly dismissed Willis’s action as time-barred. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Douglas, 567 F.3d at 1109 (for § 1983 claims, courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007) (“The cause of action accrues even though the full extent of the injury is not then known or predictable.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

A § 1983 claim filed more than ten years after the initial injury was time-barred.

Bryan Ransom v. Gray · filed 2012-05-25

The district court properly granted summary judgment to Santiago because Ransom’s action, brought more than 10 years after his initial injury, was time-barred.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the forum state’s personal injury limitations period and accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury.

Goodrick v. Sonnen · filed 2012-05-31

The district court properly dismissed Goodrick’s retaliation claims as time-barred because the claims accrued more than two years before Goodrick filed his complaint on January 16, 2009. ... The fact that Goodrick learned in 2008 that the disciplinary charge was dismissed does not alter the accrual date because Goodrick knew at the time of the hearing and sentence that the discipline was based on the alleged false evidence and other improprieties and resulted in damage to him.

Section 1983 claims brought in Florida are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

Lewis v. The Broward County School Board · filed 2012-06-11

In a § 1983 case brought in the forum state of Florida, the statute of limitations is four years.

A stipulation reserving a § 1983 claim in a state court action does not reset the claim’s limitations accrual date.

Onyx Properties LLC v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2012-06-12

As such, I reject the Rohrbaehs’ assertion that their stipulation in the state court action acted to re-set the accrual date of their § 1983 claim raised here.

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year limitations period and accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Way v. City of Beacon · filed 2012-06-13

Causes of action asserted pursuant to section 1983 have a three-year statute of limitations in New York (see CPLR 214; Matter of Greenfield v Town of Babylon Dept. of Assessment, 76 AD3d 1071, 1073-1075 [2010]), and accrue “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of [the] action” (Pearl v City of Long Beach, 296 F3d 76, 80 [2002] [internal quotation marks omitted], cert denied 538 US 922 [2003]; see Rimany v Town of Dover, 72 AD3d 918, 921 [2010]; Palmer v State of New York, 57 AD3d 364 [2008]).

Section 1983 claims in Georgia use the two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Thompson v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 2012-06-18

The statute of limitations for Mr. Thompson’s § 1983 deliberate indifference claim is that which Georgia provides for personal injury torts, see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007), and that limitations period is two years from the accrual of the right of action.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s general or residual personal injury statute of limitations.

Hynoski v. Columbia County Redevelopment Authority · filed 2012-06-27

The statute of limitations for actions brought under § 1983 is drawn from the general or residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state where the case is brought.

Section 1983 personal injury claims filed in Texas use a two-year limitations period.

Maciel v. City of Fort Worth Drug Task, et · filed 2012-07-03

The applicable statute of limitations, which in Texas is two years, required Maciel to file a complaint for his personal injuries by July 16, 2009, and to seek damages for his wife’s wrongful death by November 2009.

Section 1983 claims brought in Ohio are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Filer v. Polston · filed 2012-07-03

Filer’s § 1983 claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations and thus are dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 claims brought in Kentucky have a one-year limitations period that generally begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Duff v. Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure · filed 2012-07-10

The statute of limitations applicable to a § 1983 claim brought in Kentucky is one year. ... Generally, the limitations period commences when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action. ... Because Duff’s claims are based on the defendants’ actions culminating in the final order restricting his medical license, his claims accrued, at the latest, in March 2005. As a result, his complaint, filed in 2010, is untimely.

A prisoner’s § 1983 action should not be dismissed as time-barred when it remains unclear whether administrative grievances tolled the limitations period.

Jones v. Holmes · filed 2012-07-12

The district court prematurely dismissed Jones’s action as time-barred. It is not clear at this stage in proceedings whether the statute of limitations was tolled while Jones filed any administrative grievances.

Section 1983 claims use the state’s general personal injury limitations period and accrue under federal law when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Dodson v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2012-07-13

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation is adopted with respect to all claims. ... Actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the general personal injury limitations period of the state in which the action arose. ... Because Plaintiff was terminated on June 29, 2009, his causes of action accrued on that date, and the claims arising from his termination were timely filed less than two years later.

Section 1983 claims brought in Florida have a four-year limitations period.

Davies v. Former Acting District Director - Orlando, USCIS · filed 2012-07-16

In a § 1983 case brought in the forum state of Florida, the statute of limitations is four years.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal injury statute of limitations, with tolling during mandatory exhaustion.

Lambert Chambers v. Dane · filed 2012-07-17

The district court properly dismissed Chambers’s action as barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations because, at the latest, his claims were tolled until his administrative proceedings ended in January 2007, and he did not file this action until May 2009. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 974 (§ 1983 claims are governed by forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions); see also Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005) (“the applicable statute of limitations must be tolled while a prisoner completes the mandatory exhaustion process”).

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico are subject to a one-year limitations period.

Cruz v. Puerto Rico Power Authority · filed 2012-07-17

In Puerto Rico, the appropriate limitations period for Section 1983 claims is one year.

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Carlton Mills v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2012-07-23

Claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 are governed by the state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims. See Pratt v. Thornburgh, 807 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1986). In Pennsylvania, a plaintiff must bring a cause of action within two years of the injury giving rise to the alleged violations. See 42 Pa C.S. §5524. Mills’ claims stem from the July 23, 2008 notice. Mills concedes that he was made aware of the hearing before it took place in August of 2008. We agree with the District Court that all claims arising from the notice are barred by the statute of ... limitations. Any claims arising from the erroneous notice in December 2008 are also barred, as Mills concedes that he discovered his house had been sold in January 2009.

Section 1983 actions use the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and Oregon's limitations period is two years.

Kyger v. State of Oregon · filed 2012-07-23

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Kyger failed to introduce evidence sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to any of his claims, and many of his claims are time-barred. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is the state law statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and that Oregon’s statute of limitations for such actions is two years); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (plaintiff must demonstrate he has suffered an actual injury to bring a claim for denial of access to courts); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (states are not “persons” subject to liability under § 1983); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (elements of retaliation claims); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining deliberate indifference standard); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1994 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (“Liability under § 1983 must be based on the personal involvement of the defendant.”).

Section 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania are governed by the state’s two-year personal injury limitations period, which runs from the date of injury.

Massey v. Fair Acres Geriatric Center · filed 2012-07-25

Whether framed as a survival claim or standing alone, the § 1983 claim is governed by Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2), which began to run from the date of injury, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5502(a).

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois are subject to the state’s two-year general personal injury limitations period, including claims based on childhood sexual abuse.

Woods v. Department of Children & Family Services · filed 2012-07-27

Accordingly, because Illinois’ two-year statute of limitations applies to this case and Woods has failed to allege any grounds for the tolling of the statute, despite being offered the opportunity to do so, his Section 1983 claim is time-barred.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state limitations period and related state rules for determining timeliness, while federal law controls when the claim accrues.

Woodward v. City of Gallatin · filed 2012-07-30

Given that this is not an issue of accrual governed by federal law, this Court is bound to consider T.C.A. § 20-1-119 and the state court decisions interpreting it, in conjunction with the state-supplied statute of limitations, in determining the timeliness of Plaintiffs civil rights suit against the individual defendants here.

Section 1983 claims of ongoing retaliatory harassment must allege specific conduct within the statute of limitations.

Dieffenbach v. Department of Revenue · filed 2012-07-31

Even after amending his complaint several times, Dieffenbach failed to support his claims of ongoing retaliatory harassment with any specific facts alleged to have occurred within the statute of limitations, and we agree that this is sufficient reason to grant defendants’ motion to dismiss all of Dieffenbach’s Section 1983 claims.

Claims under Section 1983 arising from an incident are barred after the applicable statute of limitations expires.

Richardson v. Ray · filed 2012-08-01

Any claims arising from the 2007 incident were clearly barred by the statute of limitations, and Richardson failed to demonstrate how viewing the 2007 tape would shed light on the validity of the 2009 tape.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Haagensen v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2012-08-02

Section 1983 claims are subject to Pennsylvania‘s two year statute of limitations for personal injuries.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Abdullah v. Thomas Jefferson Univ Hosp · filed 2012-08-07

The District Court correctly concluded that this suit is barred. As explained by the District Court, Abdullah’s claims are plainly time-barred under the statute of limitations. See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382-84 (2004) (holding four-year statute of limitations governs § 1981 claims based on amended version of § 1981; otherwise, most analogous state limitations period governs); Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations governs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims).

In Indiana, a § 1983 false arrest claim has a two-year limitations period that begins on the date of arrest.

Alexander v. McKinney · filed 2012-08-08

In Indiana, there is a two-year statute of limitations for false arrest claims under § 1983, accruing from the date of arrest.

Section 1983 claims use the limitations period and tolling rules that states apply to personal injury claims.

Richards v. Mitcheff · filed 2012-08-09

Suits under §1983 use the statute of limitations and tolling rules that states employ for personal-injury claims.

Section 1983 constitutional claims use the state statute of limitations for personal-injury torts.

Maxwell's Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner · filed 2012-08-14

Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the state law statute of limitations for personal-injury torts.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal injury statute of limitations.

Richards v. Cobb County, Georgia · filed 2012-08-23

“Federal courts apply their forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

A Section 1983 claim in Puerto Rico is subject to a one-year limitations period, which a timely extrajudicial letter can toll if it gives fair notice of the later claim.

Grajales v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority · filed 2012-08-27

The letter sent by Plaintiff Grajales’ counsel on March 13, 2012, meets all three of the identicality requirements, and, therefore, tolls the one-year statute of limitations against PRPA.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the claim arises.

Wilhite v. Corrections Corporation of Amer. · filed 2012-09-04

The statute of limitations applicable to an action brought under § 1988 alleging a violation of civil rights or personal injuries is the state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions under the law of the state where the § 1983 claim arises.

Section 1983 claims use the state personal injury limitations period, but federal law determines when they accrue.

Logar v. West Virginia University Board of Governors · filed 2012-09-07

To determine the applicable statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim, a court must look to the state statute of limitations for personal injury torts. ... “[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 action[, however,] is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” ... We have carefully considered the relevant legal authorities and conclude that the district court did not err in determining when the Appellants’ claims accrued.

The limitations period for a Section 1983 claim is tolled during a prisoner’s mandatory inmate appeal process.

Mizzoni v. McDaniel · filed 2012-09-25

The district court improperly dismissed Mizzoni’s due process claim as time barred because the statute of limitations was tolled during the inmate appeal process and, from the face of the complaint, Mizzoni may have filed within the limitations period.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury suits.

Scott v. Bender · filed 2012-09-26

Section 1983 does not contain an express statute of limitations, so the Court must apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury suits to claims brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico use a one-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Padilla-Ruiz v. United States · filed 2012-09-27

The statute of limitations began to run on plaintiffs’ claim on the date plaintiff Padilla was terminated from employment with COMTek on August 13, 2008. Plaintiffs did not file a complaint in this Court against the federal defendants until April 25, 2011, almost three years after plaintiff Padilla knew of the injury which was the basis for his claim. Thus, because plaintiffs’ claim is clearly untimely, and because plaintiffs are not entitled to equitable tolling (as discussed above), defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ section 1983 civil rights claims is GRANTED.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.

Celestial Community Development Corp. v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2012-09-28

Accordingly, the two-year limitations period on Celestial’s section 1983 claim began to run, at the latest, on November 19, 2008 and the discovery rule does not apply in this situation to toll the limitations period.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico use a one-year limitations period borrowed from personal injury law.

Torres v. Gonzalez · filed 2012-09-30

In the case of Puerto Rico, the most analogous statute of limitations to a § 1983 claim is the one year personal injury action statute of limitations.

In New York, a § 1983 claim may proceed alongside an Article 78 claim under a three-year statute of limitations.

Mulcahy v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2012-10-11

Supreme Court erred in dismissing the petition as an untimely commenced article 78 proceeding and rejecting petitioner’s claim that it was actually a hybrid action under 42 USC § 1983, which provides for a three-year statute of limitations.

A § 1983 method-of-execution claim in Florida is subject to a four-year limitations period that begins when state review is complete or when the prisoner becomes subject to a new or substantially changed execution protocol, whichever is later.

Ferguson v. Warden, Florida State Prison · filed 2012-10-18

We have consistently held that “a method of execution claim accrues on the later of the date on which state review is complete, or the date on which the capital litigant becomes subject to a new or substantially changed execution protocol.” ... Thus, Ferguson had four years from the date his sentence became final, February 12, 2000, in which to file his challenge to Florida’s method of execution absent a “substantial change” in Florida’s execution protocol.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so courts use the limitations law of the state where the suit is filed.

Click v. Thompson · filed 2012-10-18

Section 1983 lacks its own statute of limitations and tolling provisions. Federal courts thus determine a Section 1983 suit’s timeliness by looking to the state law of the district where the suit is filed.

Section 1983 claims in Georgia are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Brantley v. Muscogee County School District · filed 2012-10-30

The statute for Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims is two years.

Section 1983 has no built-in statute of limitations; courts in the District of Columbia apply a three-year period to claims under it.

Seitu v. Baber · filed 2012-11-01

“Because sections 1983 and 1985 do not have any built-in statute of limitations, courts in this jurisdiction apply the three-year statute of limitations imposed by D.C. law.” ... Hence, the Court will dismiss this action as time-barred.

Section 1983 false imprisonment claims in Ohio are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal-injury torts.

Huffer v. Bogen · filed 2012-11-01

His claim of false imprisonment under § 1983 was subject to the statute of limitations that Ohio provides for personal-injury torts, which is two years.

Section 1983 actions in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Rose v. County of Nassau · filed 2012-11-09

In New York, the applicable statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions is three years.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions and accrue when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.

Hornback v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government · filed 2012-11-16

The statute of limitations applicable to a § 1983 action is the state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions under the law of the state in which the § 1983 claim arises. ... Therefore, because Plaintiffs § 1983 claim was untimely filed, this Court must dismiss the claim in its entirety.