42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims are subject to a three-year limitations period, or four years if 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) applies.

Harmon v. Patrolman's Benevolent Ass'n · filed 2006-09-29

Since the applicable statute of limitations on Section 1983 claims is 3 years (or 4 years, if the claims are set forth under 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a)), they were all time-barred.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year limitations period that is tolled while a prisoner exhausts administrative remedies.

McKinney v. Williams · filed 2006-10-02

The two-year limitations period was tolled for a total of 116 days while McKinney exhausted his administrative remedies, i.e., from March 19, 2001, through July 12, 2001. ... Consequently, his complaint, filed on July 11, 2003, was time-barred.

Section 1983 actions use the state personal injury limitations period.

Bernard v. Brannigan · filed 2006-10-24

Federal courts apply state personal-injury limitations periods to actions brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims filed in Wisconsin use the state's six-year personal-injury limitations period.

Miles, Terry L. v. Trempealeau County · filed 2006-11-08

While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain an express statute of limitations, a federal court must adopt the forum state’s limitation period for personal injury ... claims and the correct statute of limitations for claims filed in Wisconsin is six years, as set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.53.

Georgia’s renewal statute does not toll the filing period for a § 1983 action when the prior action was void for lack of service of process.

Geary v. The City of Snellville · filed 2006-11-08

Because her prior action was void due to lack of service of process, the Georgia renewal statute did not toll the time to file her complaint.

Section 1983 claims use the state limitations period for personal injury claims, which is two years in New Jersey.

Hanani v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2006-11-09

With regard to Section 1983, the timeliness of a cause of action is determined by the state statute of limitations regarding personal injuries, which, in this instance, is two years.

A Section 1983 action in Arizona must be filed within two years.

Smith v. Stewart · filed 2006-11-13

The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants because Smith’s section 1983 action is barred by the statute of limitations because Smith did not file his action within the two-year limitations period.

The limitations period for a prisoner’s § 1983 action is tolled while the prisoner follows formal administrative grievance procedures, but not during informal efforts to resolve a grievance.

Santiago, Anibal v. Snyder, Donald · filed 2006-11-20

The statute of limitations, however, is tolled only while the plaintiff seeks to exhaust his administrative remedies. ... Santiago, however, did not comply with formal grievance procedures, and thus the district court was correct not to toll the limitations period.

A § 1983 claim filed outside Washington’s three-year limitations period is time barred when the plaintiff has not established grounds for equitable tolling.

Mitchell v. Lehman · filed 2006-11-27

Mitchell has not demonstrated that the officials engaged in bad faith or deception or made false assurances, or that he diligently pursued his claim. Because he filed this action outside the three-year limitations period, his claim is time barred.

Section 1983 claims may be subject to equitable tolling, waiver, or estoppel of the filing period.

Spector v. Boardof Trustees of Community-Technical Colleges · filed 2006-11-29

As with the plaintiffs’ arguments for an equitable lifting of Title VII’s exhaustion requirement, the plaintiffs assert that the defendants’ breach of the April 15, 2003 Agreement should also toll the statutory period for their § 1983, § 1985, and § 1986 claims. Because the court has incorporated the Morgan analysis into its consideration of its claims, it also holds that Counts Two and Five are subject to equitable tolling, waiver, and estoppel.

Section 1983 claims borrow the state personal injury limitations period, which stops when the complaint is filed under Rule 3 without requiring service under Georgia law.

Tillman v. Georgia · filed 2006-11-29

West dictates, however, that the end date for the borrowed statute of limitations is set by Rule 3 commencement alone, so Georgia’s service rule is inapplicable and Eight’s statute of limitations argument regarding Tillman’s § 1983 claims is rejected.

Section 1983 claims brought in Alabama are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Eubank v. Jefferson County · filed 2006-12-11

His claims against COPAC, filed in December 2004, were thus barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to claims brought in Alabama under § 1983.

In Arizona, § 1983 claims have a two-year limitations period, subject to tolling where a basis is shown.

Elliott v. Cochise County · filed 2006-12-13

The district court properly dismissed as untimely Elliott’s claims arising from an arrest in November 2001 because Elliott did not file his complaint until April 5, 2005, and did not set forth any basis to toll the statute of limitations. See TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir.1999) (“In Arizona, the courts apply a two-year statute of limitations to § 1983 claims.”).

Section 1983 uses the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Foster v. Morris · filed 2006-12-18

The statute of limitations for bringing a civil rights suit under § 1983 is the same as the state statute of limitations for bringing a personal injury action.

A limitations defense did not bar the § 1983 action arising from convictions that were later set aside.

Townsend v. City of Miami · filed 2006-12-21

We also find no merit to the claim that Townsend is barred by the statute of limitations from maintaining his § 1983 action.

Section 1983 actions borrow the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Rivera-Huertas v. Commonwealth of PR · filed 2006-12-29

A Section 1983 action borrows the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 claims filed in Michigan have a three-year limitations period, even when based on false arrest.

Hirmuz v. City of Madison Heights · filed 2007-01-03

Second, and more important, the statute of limitations for claims filed in Michigan based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is three years, not two years. That is true even if the underlying wrongful conduct stems from a false arrest.

At the time of this action, § 1983 takings claims in Ohio were subject to a two-year limitations period once ripe.

McNamara v. Rittman · filed 2007-01-08

And because it was ripe for review in 1994, it was consequently time-barred when the plaintiffs filed in federal court in 2000, well past the then two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 takings actions.

A § 1983 claim in Texas must be filed within two years after the plaintiff learns of the injury.

Guerrero v. Potter · filed 2007-01-08

Guerrero’s civil rights complaint was not filed within two years of the date that he learned of his injury.

Section 1983 suits in Virginia are subject to a two-year limitations period because the state’s one-year period discriminates against those suits.

Edgerton v. Puckett · filed 1975-06-25

The court will therefore continue to apply the two-year limitation period incorporated into federal law by Almond v. Kent, supra.

Section 1983 actions arising in Florida are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

Gomez v. Doe · filed 2007-01-10

We thus conclude that the district court did not err by dismissing Gomez’s complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as barred by the four-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions brought in Florida.

Section 1983 claims borrow the state’s general personal injury limitations period; in New York, that period is three years.

Jennis v. Rood · filed 2007-01-16

The United States Supreme Court has determined that for § 1983 claims, where a State has more than one Statute of Limitations, the applicable Statute of Limitations is the State general limitation for personal injury claims. ... Thus, the applicable Statute of Limitations from New York law is three years.

Section 1983 claims borrow their statute of limitations from state law.

Wilmink v. Kanawha County Board of Education · filed 2007-01-17

Plaintiff’s federal claims are appropriately decided with reference to the state statute of limitations. It is well-settled that “the statute of limitations for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is borrowed from state law.” Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Corrections, 64 F.3d 951, 955 (4th Cir. 1995).

Section 1983 personal injury claims brought in Tennessee are subject to a one-year limitations period.

Jackson Ex Rel. Jackson v. Nix · filed 2007-01-23

Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations applies to claims for personal injury brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims filed in Illinois have a two-year limitations period; the continuing violation doctrine does not save a claim based on an injury the plaintiff already knew about.

Limestone Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont · filed 2007-01-25

Accordingly, Plaintiffs § 1983 claim accrued no later than November 1999 (when Plaintiff says its injury began) and its claim is not otherwise saved by the continuing violation doctrine. Therefore, because the Plaintiff did not file suit until August 1, 2005, well outside the two-year statute of limitations period for such actions in Illinois and this Circuit, Plaintiffs § 1983 claim is time-barred and must be dismissed.

A Section 1983 claim alleging a serial violation is timely when at least one discriminatory act occurs within the limitations period.

Rivera v. Aqueduct & Sewer Authority · filed 2007-01-31

The Court holds that Plaintiff Rivera has alleged a serial violation. Because some of the alleged discriminatory acts occurred within the statute of limitations, her suit is timely.

Section 1983 actions arising in Ohio have a two-year statute of limitations.

Koury v. City of Canton · filed 2007-02-01

The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in Ohio is two years.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury actions.

Taylor v. Nix · filed 2007-02-02

Federal courts apply their forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

This Ohio state court applied a four-year limitations period to § 1983 claims arising in Ohio.

Nadra v. Mbah, Unpublished Decision (2-6-2007) · filed 2007-02-06

Rather, as stated in Prohazka , Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio are subject to a four-year limitations period set forth in R.C. 2305.09 (D).

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own; it uses the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Williams v. City of Tampa Police Dept. · filed 2007-02-07

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, and instead is governed in each case by the forum state’s general personal injury statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims are governed by the personal injury limitations period and tolling laws of the state where the alleged injury occurred.

Maddox v. Berge · filed 2007-02-08

Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by the personal injury statute of limitations and tolling laws in the state where the alleged injury occurred.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so courts borrow the most applicable period from the forum state.

Ogle v. Stewart · filed 2007-02-12

The federal statute providing for Ogle’s cause of action against the officers, § 1983, does not contain its own limitations period. As such, federal courts borrow the most applicable statute of limitations from the forum state.

A § 1983 claim alleging continuing unlawful confinement accrues when that confinement ends, and Florida’s four-year limitations period applies.

Smith v. Shorstein · filed 2007-02-13

We conclude that Smith does allege a continuing violation that did not end until he was released on April 15, 2002. Thus, with regard to his §§ 1983 and 1985 actions, this claim is not time- barred because Smith filed his complaint on April 13, 2006—less than four years after his cause of action had accrued.

Section 1983 claims in California are subject to the state’s one-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Palazzolo v. Sonne · filed 2007-02-20

California’s one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to Palazzolo’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims have a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knew or objectively had reason to know of the alleged violation.

Martinez v. City of New York · filed 2007-02-22

The statute of limitations for an action asserting false arrest/false imprisonment pursuant to § 1983 is three years, commencing from the date that plaintiff knew or objectively had reason to know of the alleged violation.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period.

Foryoh, Prince E. v. Hannah-Porter, Regin · filed 2007-02-22

Although he maintains that this court should use the five-year residual statute of limitations under Illinois law, see 735 ILCS 5/13-205, we have held that the limit for §1983 claims in Illinois is two years, not five.

A § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim must be filed within the applicable limitations period; pending criminal proceedings do not preserve it under the Heck tolling doctrine before a conviction.

Watts v. Epps · filed 2007-02-27

Having revisited the issue, it is clear that Plaintiffs § 1983 action alleging an unlawful arrest, which was brought over three years after the arrest in question, is neither timely under the relevant statute of limitations, nor preserved by the Heck tolling doctrine.

Section 1983 civil rights actions in Washington are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Messmer v. Lehman · filed 2007-02-28

The district court properly dismissed Messmer’s action because Messmer filed his complaint over seven years after the statute of limitations began to run. See Rose v. Rinaldi, 654 F.2d 546, 547 (1981) (the statute of limitations for filing a civil rights action is three years in Washington state).

Section 1983 claims generally have a three-year limitations period, but a continuing series of discriminatory acts can support a claim for earlier violations if an identifiable act occurs within that period.

Resnick v. Town of Canaan · filed 2007-03-01

Nevertheless, petitioners’ claims under 42 USC § 1983 are not time barred. While generally such causes of action are governed by a three-year statute of limitations, one who experiences a continuous series of discriminatory acts may bring a claim for violations that occur outside the limitations period if subsequent identifiable acts of discrimination occur within the period of limitations (see Abbott v Town of Delaware, 238 AD2d 868, 869-870 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 805 [1997]; Corvetti v Town of Lake Pleasant, supra at 824).

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period and tolling rules, with the period tolled while a prisoner completes mandatory administrative exhaustion.

Peralta v. D.O. Caire · filed 2007-03-01

Peralta commenced the administrative grievance process on October 7, 2004, two days before the statute of limitations expired. See Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 335.1 (statute of limitations for personal injury actions in California is two years); Cal.Civ. Proc.Code § 352.1(a) (the limitations period is tolled for an additional two years for incarcerated individuals); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir.2004) (for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s law regarding tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent with federal law); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir.2005) (the applicable statute of limitations must be tolled while a prisoner completes the mandatory exhaustion process). The district court erred when it dismissed Peralta’s action as time-barred.

Section 1983 claims in Nevada are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Richardson Construction, Inc. v. Clark County School District · filed 2007-03-05

Accordingly, Richardson’s §§ 1983 and 1985 claims are barred by their two-year statutes of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period.

Hazel Miller v. The State of Georgia · filed 2007-03-15

Thus, we have held that the proper limitations period for claims brought under §§ 1983 and 1985 is the personal injury limitations period of the forum state.

Section 1983 claims in Washington have a three-year statute of limitations.

Wilson v. Lehman · filed 2007-03-16

Because Wilson’s claim accrued at the latest in July 1997, when he was released from prison, and because the statute of limitations for section 1983 claims in Washington is three years, see Rose v. Rinaldi, 654 F.2d 546, 547 (9th Cir.1981), the statute of limitations had expired by the time he filed the instant action in December 2004.

A failure to promote is a discrete act, so a § 1983 retaliation claim based on a promotion outside the limitations period is time-barred.

Taylor v. Town of Freetown · filed 2007-03-29

Any claims of retaliation arising from the failure to promote prior to December 2000 are discrete acts, which are time-barred.

Section 1983 claims borrow the personal tort limitations period of the state where the claim arose, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) governs its computation.

Wilder v. Hall · filed 2007-03-30

In a section 1983 action, a federal court will borrow the personal torts limitations period from the state in which the claim arose. ... When computing a limitations period, however, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) controls. ... This action was timely filed.

Section 1983 claims in Michigan have a three-year limitations period; for an ongoing seizure of property, the period begins when the property is released.

Herrin v. Dunham · filed 2007-03-30

The Court concludes that the magistrate judge was correct in concluding that the statute of limitations for section 1983 claims in Michigan is three years, but the statute did not begin to run until the property was released.

Section 1983 prisoner civil rights claims arising in North Carolina are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Allen v. Sewyer · filed 2007-04-02

We have reviewed the record and find that Allen’s action is barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to prisoner civil rights claims arising in North Carolina.

Section 1983 claims arising in Georgia have a two-year limitations period borrowed from the state’s personal-injury statute.

Roberts v. The State of Georgia · filed 2007-04-06

For these statutes, Congress did not specify a statutory limitations period, so we look to state law to determine when a claim under them must be filed. Previous decisions of this Court recognize that in Georgia cases § 1983 carries the two-year limitations period provided in Georgia’s statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, Ga. Code Ann. § 9-3-33. ... Accordingly, the district court’s order of dismissal as to the § 1983 and § 1985 claims is also due to be affirmed.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury actions; in New Jersey, that period is two years.

Levine v. New Jersey State Department of Community Affairs · filed 2007-04-10

The statute of limitations for any § 1983 claim is the forum state’s limitations statute for personal injury actions. ... In this case, the applicable statute of limitations is New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so federal courts apply the limitations period for analogous state claims.

Bartelli v. Romanowksi · filed 2007-04-16

While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations period, “federal courts must look to the statute of limitations governing analogous state causes of actions.” Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dep’t, 91 F.3d 451, 457 n.9 (3d Cir. 1996).

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own; federal courts use the limitations period for analogous state causes of action.

Bartelli v. Nagy · filed 2007-04-16

While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations period, “federal courts must look to the statute of limitations governing analogous state causes of actions.”

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so courts borrow the period for analogous state claims.

Bartelli v. Galabinski · filed 2007-04-16

While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations period, “federal courts must look to the statute of limitations governing analogous state causes of actions.”

Section 1983 permits a suit to enjoin a future unconstitutional act, and the limitations period cannot bar that suit before the act occurs.

Jones v. Allen · filed 2007-04-17

Thus, in a case where the plaintiff seeks an injunction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to prevent an unconstitutionally tortious act from occurring in the future, such a claim cannot be barred by the statute of limitations because the tortious act has not yet occurred and the tort is not yet complete.

Section 1983 actions in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations.

Quinn, Delores v. Harris, Vanessa · filed 2007-04-19

For § 1983 actions in Illinois, the applicable state statute of limitations is two years.

For §1983 claims, pursuing required prison grievances tolls the limitations period but does not delay accrual.

Hatch, Charles v. Briley, Kenneth · filed 2007-04-19

Johnson is a tolling rule; it does not de- lay the claim’s accrual. A claim accrues when the victim knows (or should know) that he has been injured. See Behavioral Institute v. Hobart Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2005). For Hatch, that was October 2, 2002. The clock stopped on October 28 and restarted on June 11, 2003. The complaint filed on June 10, 2005, is therefore 25 days late and was properly dismissed.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the violation occurred.

Woodruff v. Wilson · filed 2007-04-27

The statute of limitations for civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is determined by the personal injury law of the state in which the violation took place.

For a § 1983 claim based on an online publication, posting identical material elsewhere on the same website does not create a new cause of action or restart the limitations period.

Cantella v. Van De Kamp · filed 2007-05-02

Applying Oja’s mode of analysis, the California Bar’s decision to add the allegedly offensive disciplinary summary to Canatella’s member search page did not trigger a new cause of action since a verbatim copy of that summary had appeared on the exact same website since February 2000. Thus, contrary to Canatella’s claims, the California Bar’s posting of his disciplinary record in a different section of the same website did not give rise to a new cause of action under Oja, and accordingly, the statute of limitations period expired long before Canatella brought suit in 2005.

For § 1983 claims based on an online publication, posting the same content elsewhere on the same website does not start a new limitations period.

Canatella v. John K. Van De Kamp Marie M. Moffat Jay Goldman Nancy McCarthy California Bar Journal Robert Haw · filed 2007-05-03

Consequently, as Canatella may only bring one cause of action arising from the publication of his disciplinary summary in any single source and the statute of limitations ran on that claim before he filed his complaint, we affirm the district court’s dismissal order.

Section 1983 claims in Georgia are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Evans v. Milton Buddy Nix · filed 2007-05-07

To the extent that Evans’s statement raises a constitutional claim, his claim is barred by Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations applicable to section 1983 cases.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Jones v. City of McMinnville · filed 2007-05-09

Because the statute of limitations for federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is determined by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Appellants’ federal equal protection claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state law statute of limitations.

Bibbins v. City of Baton Rouge · filed 2007-05-11

Under § 1983 claims, federal courts look to state law to determine the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state's limitations period for personal injury claims.

Udujih v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2007-05-14

There is no federal statute of limitations for actions under § 1983, so courts will borrow the statute of limitations for a common law of personal injury claim in the forum state.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable limitations period of the state where the action arose.

Meadows v. Whetsel · filed 2007-05-22

Because § 1983 does not specify a statute of limitations, the United States Supreme Court requires us to apply the law of the state where the action arose.

Section 1983 claims in Louisiana are subject to a one-year limitations period.

Mitchell v. CRESCENT RIVER PORT PILOTS ASS'N · filed 2007-06-01

For Section 1983 and Section 1985 claims in Louisiana, the Fifth Circuit applies the same one-year tort prescriptive period.

Section 1983 claims are treated as personal injury actions when determining the statute of limitations.

Moreno v. PIA · filed 2007-06-04

Section 1983 claims are considered to be personal injury actions for statute of limitations purposes.

Section 1983 actions use the applicable state statute of limitations.

Moreno v. Pia · filed 2007-06-04

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions is determined by state law.

Section 1983 claims must be filed within the state law deadline for personal injury actions.

Bagley v. Bourne · filed 2007-06-05

A party suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must comply with the deadline prescribed by state law for timely filing a personal injury action.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where they arise.

Myers v. County of Somerset · filed 2007-06-11

An action brought pursuant to Section 1983 is subject to the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state in which the claim arises.

Section 1983 claims arising from an inmate assault are time-barred when filed beyond the applicable two-year limitations period.

Butler v. Meyers · filed 2007-06-18

The District Court agreed that Butler’s claims against Meyers and Kensington were barred by the relevant two years statute of limitations. ... We also agree with the District Court that Butler’s claims against Meyers and Kensington are time-barred and that Butler has not stated a claim of denial of access to the courts.

Section 1983 actions use the applicable state statute of limitations and accompanying tolling rules.

Whitington v. Sokol · filed 2007-06-19

The Magistrate Judge also properly states that state law determines the applicable statute of limitations and accompanying tolling provisions for § 1983 actions, citing to Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d 673, 675 (10th Cir.1995).

Section 1983 claims enforcing rights created by the 1991 amendment to § 1981 have a four-year limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 1658.

Williams v. Hawkeye Community College · filed 2007-06-27

The court holds that, under the plain language of § 1658 and the Supreme Court’s holding in Jones, a four-year statute of limitations applies to those portions of Count IV alleging racial discrimination, harassment and retaliation. ... In other words, were it not for the 1991 Act, the portions of Count IV alleging racial discrimination, harassment and retaliation would fail to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims arising in Georgia have a two-year limitations period borrowed from Georgia personal injury law.

Taylor v. Milton E. Nix, Jr. · filed 2007-06-27

Georgia’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and, thus, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising out of events occurring in that state, is two years.

In Kentucky, § 1983 claims have a one-year limitations period.

Dixon v. Clem · filed 2007-07-10

Dixon does not dispute that the statute of limitations on a § 1983 claim, as determined by Kentucky law, is one year. ... Dixon’s claims against Clem, Lawson, and Say-lor—none of whom, incidentally, even attended the second hearing—were therefore properly dismissed by the district court on the ground that they were barred by the governing one-year statute of limitations.

A § 1983 complaint is barred when filed beyond the applicable two-year limitations period.

Anderson v. Humphres · filed 2007-07-12

Lemar J. Anderson appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint as barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state personal injury limitations period; in New Mexico, that period is three years.

Sanchez v. Harrison · filed 2007-07-09

Accordingly, the period of limitation on M r. Sanchez’s cause of action for false imprisonment began to run on October 23, 2003, when he was sentenced after his probation violation. The limitation period ended three years later, on October 23, 2006. In other words, M r. Sanchez’s complaint for false imprisonment, filed on November 21, 2006, was barred by the statute of limitations.

In Iowa, a § 1983 claim for improper extradition is subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

White v. Kautzky · filed 2007-07-17

Adopting the most appropriate Iowa statute of limitations, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 379-80, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004), the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is two years, Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983, 984 (8th Cir.1985). White filed his grievance on March 28, 2002, and his complaint on July 3, 2002, more than two years after the improper extraditions. Thus, any § 1983 claim based on White’s extraditions is manifestly untimely.

Section 1983 claims arising in Iowa have a two-year statute of limitations.

Duane C. White v. Kautzky · filed 2007-07-17

Adopting the most appropriate Iowa statute of limitations, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985), superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Jones v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 379-80 (2004), the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is two years, Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983, 984 (8th Cir. 1985).

Section 1983 claims brought in federal courts in Michigan have a three-year limitations period.

Abner v. County of Saginaw County · filed 2007-07-19

The statute of limitations for claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought in the federal courts in Michigan is three years.

Section 1983 borrows the limitations period for a similar state action; a Pennsylvania racial employment discrimination claim arising from an employment relationship was subject to a six-year period.

Pinckney v. County of Northampton · filed 1976-10-12

Since 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a period of limitations, we must look to the limitations period which would govern a similar action if it were brought in the state court. ... After a careful review of these authorities, we conclude that the better reasoning supports the application of the six-year, not the two-year, state statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims based on alleged police perjury are subject to Ohio’s one-year limitations period for false arrest and false imprisonment, which may be tolled by imprisonment.

Austin v. Lawrence Brammer and Alex Lambros · filed 1977-05-20

Accordingly, while we agree with the district court that O.R.C. § 2305.11 ... is the most nearly analogous statute of limitations, we conclude that the dismissal of plaintiff’s amended complaint on that basis without an evidentiary hearing or appropriate factual finding was inappropriate in the face of the claim that the statute was tolled by O.R.C. § 2305.16.

Section 1983 claims brought in Florida have a four-year statute of limitations.

O'Berry v. State Atty's Office · filed 2007-07-23

In Florida, § 1983 claims are subject to a four year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 suits brought in Colorado are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Wallin v. Arapahoe County Detention Facility · filed 2007-07-27

But as the district court correctly noted, Mr. Wallin’s claims are barred for a separate reason — the two-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 suits brought in Colorado.

Section 1983 claims for wrongful arrest and imprisonment in Louisiana are subject to a one-year prescriptive period.

Matthews v. City of Bossier City · filed 2007-08-15

Plaintiff's state tort law claims and his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for wrongful arrest and imprisonment [5] are subject to a one-year prescriptive period.

A section 1983 claim based on a prisoner’s death was subject to the one-year limitations period in effect when the claim accrued, absent a proper basis for tolling.

Farias v. New Folsom State Prison · filed 2007-08-22

Although Farias has standing to bring a section 1983 claim based on his son’s death, see Tatum v. City and County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1093 n. 2 (9th Cir.2006), any such claim was subject to the one-year statute of limitations in effect at the time the claim accrued, see Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir.2004); Krupnick v. Duke Energy Morro Bay, LLC, 115 Cal.App.4th 1026, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 767, 768-69 (2004). Farias did not allege any proper basis for tolling the statute. The district court therefore properly dismissed Farias’ action as time-barred.

Section 1983 actions in Oregon are governed by the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Bailey v. Hanson · filed 2007-08-22

Bailey’s Section 1983 action is governed by Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

A § 1983 claim is time barred when filed after the applicable limitations period; the discovery rule does not extend that period when the claimant knew of the injury and its cause.

LeBar v. Bahl · filed 2007-08-28

Having reviewed the record, we must agree with the District Court that LeBar’s procedural due process claim was subject to dismissal for having been filed beyond the applicable limitations period. As the District Court correctly concluded, the discovery rule exception is simply not applicable.

Section 1983 claims analogous to general torts in Louisiana have a one-year limitations period.

Woodard v. Jones · filed 2007-08-28

Concerning prescription, the constitutional torts claimed are most similar to a general tort under Louisiana law, which has a one-year prescriptive period.

Section 1983 claims filed in Puerto Rico use a one-year limitations period, and federal law determines when that period begins to run.

RODRIGUEZ v. Trujillo · filed 2007-09-07

In this jurisdiction the one-year period applicable to personal injury actions found at P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5298(2) (1990) has been determined as the pertinent statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. ... Although the local provisions are utilized for determining the length of the statute of limitations period in § 1983 claims, federal law governs the date when the limitations period begins to run. ... Accordingly, we accept plaintiffs testimony regarding the year of her visits to City Hall to address the expansion request and therefore, find that the complaint was timely filed.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal injury limitations period.

Abreu-Velez v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia · filed 2007-09-13

The limitations period for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the personal injury limitations period of the forum state.

Section 1983 uses the statute of limitations of the state where the challenged action occurred.

Equity Lifestyle Properties, Inc. v. County of San Luis Obispo · filed 2007-09-17

While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not specify a statute of limitations, the Supreme Court has instructed federal courts addressing § 1983 personal injury claims to follow the statute of limitations of the state in which the challenged action occurred.

Section 1983 claims use the statute of limitations period applicable to state personal injury actions.

Brown v. Pennsylvania State Department of Health · filed 2007-09-18

Civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are, in essence, constitutional tort claims. ... As such, they are subject to the same statute of limitations period applicable to state personal injury actions.

Equitable tolling can make a § 1983 civil rights claim timely despite the borrowed state limitations period.

Marcario v. County of Orange · filed 2007-09-19

Marcario also contends the court erred in concluding that her remaining causes of action, for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil rights violation, were barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1. ... We consequently conclude the trial court erred in refusing to apply equitable tolling in this case. ... Her claims were thus timely.

Section 1983 actions in Washington are subject to a three-year limitations period; a plaintiff who knew of the injury more than three years before filing needs a basis for equitable tolling.

Young v. Lehman · filed 2007-09-27

The district court properly determined that Young’s section 1983 action was barred by Washington’s three-year statute of limitations, see Wash. Rev.Code § 4.16.080(2); Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir.1991), because Young had reason to know of his injury over three years prior to filing his action, see id. at 760-61, and because he failed to establish a basis for equitable tolling, see Millay v. Cam, 135 Wash.2d 193, 955 P.2d 791, 797 (1998) (“The predicates for equitable tolling are bad faith, deception, or false assurances by the defendant and the exercise of diligence by the plaintiff.”).

Section 1983 actions in California federal court use California’s two-year statute of limitations, subject to applicable tolling.

Jackson v. McMillen · filed 2007-09-27

The district court properly concluded that Jackson’s action, filed in March 2005, was untimely even with the benefit of tolling under California law. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir.2004) (noting that Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 335.1’s two-year statute of limitations applies to section 1983 actions in federal district court in California); Johnson v. State of Cal., 207 F.3d 650, 654 (9th Cir.2000) (noting that Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 352.1(a) provides for a maximum of two years of tolling of prisoners’ claims); Torres v. City of Santa Ana, 108 F.3d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1997) (“In California, the statute of limitations for section 1983 actions is tolled by Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.3 while criminal charges are pending.”).

Section 1983 claims in Connecticut are subject to a three-year limitations period running from the act or omission complained of.

Chisholm v. United of Omaha Life Insurance · filed 2007-09-28

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II of the ADA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, like many federal civil rights statutes, do not contain a specific statute of limitations. Where that is the case, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to borrow the most appropriate state limitations period. ... What statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims is well settled. The Second Circuit has long held that such claims are subject to Connecticut General Statutes § 52-577, which provides that “[n]o action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of.”

Section 1983 claims in Kansas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Tillman v. Creighton · filed 2007-10-01

We have previously held that Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims in Texas have a two-year limitations period, which can make a dismissal without prejudice effectively a dismissal with prejudice.

Brown v. King · filed 2007-10-04

Although the district court dismissed Brown’s action without prejudice, the dismissal was effectively with prejudice due to the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims must be filed within the applicable limitations period; fraudulent concealment warrants equitable tolling only when the facts support it.

Wireman v. Fletcher · filed 2007-10-05

The district court correctly concluded that Wireman failed to bring suit within the applicable statute of limitations period and that equitable tolling for fraudulent concealment was inappropriate in light of the relevant facts of the case.

Section 1983 claims use the limitations period that the state applies to analogous actions in its courts.

Morgan v. State of Texas · filed 2007-10-23

With respect to § 1983 claims, the applicable statute of limitations is that which the state would apply in an analogous action in its courts. ... Accordingly, Morgan’s § 1983 claims are time-barred, and the district court correctly dismissed them.

Section 1983 claims in New Jersey are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Smith v. Township of East Greenwich · filed 2007-10-30

The statute of limitations on a § 1983 action is two years.

Section 1983 claims that accrue in New Jersey are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

County of Hudson v. Janiszewski · filed 2007-11-05

In New Jersey, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 imposes a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims; therefore, claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that accrued within New Jersey are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims filed in federal court in Illinois are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Jenkins, Harold v. Village of Maywood · filed 2007-11-05

In Illinois, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years, and so section 1983 actions litigated in federal courts in Illinois are subject to that two year period of limitations.

The limitations period for a Section 1983 unlawful search claim is not tolled under Pennsylvania’s discovery rule when a reasonably diligent plaintiff could have identified the defendant in time.

Gleeson v. Prevoznik · filed 2007-11-08

The “discovery rule” does not apply where, as here, plaintiff could reasonably have discovered Prevoznik’s identity and named him in the complaint.

Section 1983 claims in Arizona must be filed within two years after the claimant knew or should have known of the injury.

Williams v. Garvey · filed 2007-11-26

Because Williams failed to file his action within two years after he knew or should have known of his injuries, the district court properly dismissed his action as time-barred. See TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991-92 (9th Cir.1999) (applying two-year statute of limitations in Arizona Revised Statute § 12-502 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim).

Section 1983 claims in Texas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Cooper v. Johnson · filed 2007-11-27

Accordingly, any 1997 claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions in Texas. See Stanley v. Foster, 464 F.3d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 2006).

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal injury statute of limitations.

Action Apartment Ass'n v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board · filed 2007-12-03

First, the Wilson limitations period applies to all § 1983 claims, regardless of the civil right asserted.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal injury statute of limitations.

Action Apartment Association v. Santa Monica Rent Control · filed 2007-12-03

It is well-established that claims brought under § 1983 borrow the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims, see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985), and in California, that limitations period is two years. See Cal. Code Civ. P. § 335.1.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state statute of limitations and state tolling rules, including equitable tolling.

Kucharski v. Leveille · filed 2007-12-05

However, just as limitations periods are taken from state law, so are the rules regarding equitable tolling.

Section 1983 claims borrow the state limitations period for personal injury claims; in Nevada, claims filed more than two years after the alleged violations are barred.

Shipley v. D'Amico · filed 2007-12-10

Because Shipley filed his complaint more than two years after the alleged Eighth Amendment violations, the district court correctly concluded counts I, II, and III were barred by the statute of limitations. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e); see also Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 653 (9th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (federal courts should borrow the state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims from the state in section 1983 actions).

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s general personal injury statute of limitations, which is two years in Georgia.

Simon v. City of Atlanta · filed 2007-12-12

Section 1983 claims are governed by the forum state’s general personal injury statute of limitations, see Owens v. Okure, 109 S.Ct. 573, 574 (1989); and in Georgia, the statute of limitations is two years.

Section 1983 actions filed in California are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Li v. County of San Diego · filed 2007-12-12

The district court properly dismissed Li’s action as untimely because he filed it more than nine years after his claims accrued. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir.2004) (a section 1983 action filed in California is governed by California’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1994) (A claim accrues when the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.”).

Section 1983 claims in California follow the state’s personal injury limitations period, which was one year at the time of the alleged violations.

Rosa v. California · filed 2007-12-12

Parties have one year to commence claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, and California’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions (one year at the time of the alleged violations) governs claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985.

For a § 1983 claim based on an ongoing denial of medical treatment, the limitations period starts anew each day treatment is withheld.

Jervis, Jack v. Mitcheff, Michael · filed 2007-12-13

The statute of limitations commences anew every day that treatment is withheld, see id. at 318, so in this case it does not matter whether Jervis sued more than two years after he saw Mitcheff for the first and only time.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Schumacher v. Fannin County · filed 2007-12-14

Because there is no federal statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to § 1983, federal courts apply the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period to § 1983 actions.

State law governs the limitations period and tolling for § 1983 actions.

Bradberry v. Arpaio · filed 2007-12-28

The district court properly dismissed the action as time-barred because Bradberry was not eligible for equitable tolling under Arizona’s tolling provisions.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, which is two years in California.

Summit Media LLC v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, CA · filed 2008-01-02

It is well-established that claims brought under § 1983 borrow the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims, see ... and in California, that limitations period is two years.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's residual or general personal injury statute of limitations.

Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto · filed 2008-01-02

A cause of action under 42 United States Code, section 1983 (§ 1983), is subject to the forum state's "residual or general personal injury statute of limitations."

Section 1983 claims in Texas have a two-year limitations period.

Ortega v. Housing Authority of City of Brownsville · filed 2008-01-03

The statute of limitations period for Plaintiffs claims under the Fair Housing Act, (“FHA”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is two years.

A § 1983 challenge to changed parole procedures accrues when the prisoner knows the factual basis for the claim; later denials do not start new limitations periods.

Jones v. Henry · filed 2008-01-10

A § 1983 claim arising in Oklahoma is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. ... We reject Plaintiff’s argument that each denial of parole consideration is a separate cause of action for statute of limitations purposes.

Section 1983 retaliation claims in Pennsylvania can be time-barred when filed more than two years after the underlying events.

Mattis v. Dohman · filed 2008-01-10

Furthermore, as the district court noted, aside from a lack of causation, Mattis’s retaliation claim is now essentially time-barred. ... The events Mattis references in his complaint occurred over two years prior to his filing the complaint in this case.

Section 1983 claims in Oklahoma are subject to a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or should know the facts underlying the claim.

Ford v. Jenks · filed 2008-01-11

However, the magistrate judge correctly determined that this claim was barred by the statute of limitations. When Plaintiff did not receive an annual parole hearing in 2002, he knew or should have known the factual predicate for his claim. See Traylor v. Jenks, 223 F. App’x 789, 790-91 (10th Cir. 2007). His claim, which was filed in April 2006, was therefore barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Johnson v. Knight · filed 2008-01-16

The statute of limitations for actions under § 1983 is three years.

Section 1983 actions arising in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Sterngass v. Palisades Interstate Park Commission · filed 2008-01-18

For § 1983 actions arising in New York, the statute of limitations is three years.

Section 1983 complaints filed in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Kehres v. Pennsylvania · filed 2008-01-29

The District Court correctly applied the two-year statute of limitations pertaining to a section 1983 complaint filed in Pennsylvania.

In Pennsylvania, a § 1983 substantive due process claim has a two-year limitations period.

Stawairski v. Borough of Summit Hill · filed 2008-01-30

In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim alleging a violation of substantive due process is two years.

Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Rose v. County of York · filed 2008-01-30

Appellant filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Because Appellant’s cause of action originated in Pennsylvania, Appellant’s claims are subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year limitation period governing personal injury causes of action.

A § 1983 method-of-execution claim accrues on the later of completion of state review or the date the prisoner becomes subject to a new or substantially changed execution protocol.

McNair v. Allen · filed 2008-01-30

We hold a method of execution claim accrues on the later of the date on which state review is complete, or the date on which the capital litigant becomes subject to a new or substantially changed execution protocol.

A § 1983 suit concerning events in April 2006 was not time barred from refiling in February 2008.

Hickman v. Grounds · filed 2008-02-06

Hickman is also incorrect to suggest that his suit, which complained about events occurring in April 2006, cannot be refiled because it is time barred. See Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993).

Section 1983 claims in Wyoming have a four-year limitations period and accrue when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged rights violation.

Parkhurst v. Lampert · filed 2008-02-12

Wyoming’s state of limitations for personal injury claims is four years, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (1977), and the cause of action accrued when Mr. Parkhurst knew or should have known that his constitutional rights had allegedly been violated.

A Section 1983 claim is time-barred if filed after the limitations period, and fraudulent concealment occurring before the plaintiff learned the facts underlying the claim does not toll that period.

Scott v. Tarrant County Commissioners · filed 2008-02-12

Scott’s allegations of fraudulent concealment are not a basis for tolling of the limitations period because they relate to actions occurring prior to January 2000. Accordingly, Scott’s § 1983 complaint, filed in July 2005, is barred by the statute of limitations.

In Connecticut, a plaintiff must bring a § 1983 claim within three years of accrual.

Barile v. City of Hartford · filed 2008-02-13

In Connecticut, a plaintiff must bring his § 1983 claim within three years of the date his claim accrues.

Section 1983 claims recover only for overt acts specifically alleged to have occurred within the limitations period.

Budd v. City of Santa Maria · filed 2008-02-13

However, plaintiffs in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case “may recover only for the overt acts ... that they specifically alleged to have occurred within the ... limitations period.”

A § 1983 excessive-force claim arising from an arrest accrues at the arrest and, in Michigan, is subject to a three-year limitations period.

Drake v. City of Detroit · filed 2008-02-21

Drake’s arrest on November 4, 1998, then, sets the date from when a § 1983 excessive force claim may accrue. Drake’s complaint, however, was not filed until November 6, 2002, in excess of the three years prescribed by Michigan’s statute of limitations. So Drake’s excessive force claim is presumptively time-barred.

Section 1983 claims brought in Georgia are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Lopez v. Wallace · filed 2008-02-25

We agree with the district court that even if we assume that Article 36 does grant individual rights enforceable under § 1983, any such claim would be time-barred by Georgia’s two year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in the District of Columbia are subject to a three-year statute of limitations borrowed from the District’s general personal injury statute.

Curtis v. Lanier · filed 2008-02-28

The general or residual statute provided by state law for personal injury actions applies to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). ... The District of Columbia’s general statute for personal injury actions establishes a three year statute of limitations.

State law supplies the limitations period for a § 1983 claim, while federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Moore v. State of Tenn. · filed 2008-03-03

Although state law governs the statute of limitations in a § 1983 action, the characterization of the claim, including the determination of when the cause of action accrued, is a creature of federal law.

In New York, Section 1983 claims have a three-year statute of limitations.

Jeter v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2008-03-04

Based upon New York law, actions under Sections 1981 and 1983 carry a three-year statute of limitations.

A plaintiff whose § 1983 complaint is dismissed as untimely on initial screening must have an opportunity to argue equitable tolling.

Givens v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2008-03-10

Because the district court dismissed the complaint on initial screening, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, without leave to amend, Givens had no opportunity to argue that the statute of limitations should have been equitably tolled.

Section 1983 claims have a three-year limitations period, so earlier failure-to-promote acts are time-barred.

Anderson v. Nassau County Department of Corrections · filed 2008-03-18

Further, as the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is three years, any failure to promote activities before February 17, 2001 are time-barred.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania use the two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Crawford v. Miller · filed 2008-03-20

The applicable statute of limitations for Margaret Crawford’s § 1983 claim is that governing personal injury claims in Pennsylvania. ... Therefore, Margaret Crawford had two years from the time her cause of action accrued in which to file her complaint.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York are subject to the state’s three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Jacobs v. Mostow · filed 2008-03-27

Jacobs’s § 1983 claims are subject to New York’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 suits for constitutional torts in Illinois have a two-year limitations period.

Limestone Development v. Village of Lemont, Ill. · filed 2008-04-01

The statute of limitations applicable to suits for constitutional torts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Illinois is two years, Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir.2006), and all the bad acts of which Limestone complains (they are the same acts as alleged in support of the RICO claim) occurred more than two years before the suit was filed.

Section 1983 claims brought in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations.

Limestone Devmt Corp v. Village of Lemont · filed 2008-04-01

The statute of limitations applicable to suits for constitu- tional torts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Illinois is two years, Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006), and all the bad acts of which Limestone complains (they are the same acts as alleged in support of the RICO claim) occurred more than two years before the suit was filed.

A § 1983 claim arising from an employment termination in California is subject to a two-year limitations period.

Foster v. Granite Broadcasting Corp. (In Re Granite Broadcasting Corp.) · filed 2008-04-03

Finally, Foster’s § 1983 claim is time-barred, because it expired on June 27, 2003, two years after KNTV terminated Foster’s employment.

Section 1983 has no federal limitations period; state law supplies the limitations period, while federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Lopes v. Farmer · filed 2008-04-15

There is no limitation provision contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 setting forth a time period within which the right must be enforced.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico have a one-year limitations period that begins when the injury occurs, even if the plaintiff did not yet know of discriminatory animus.

Morales-Tañon v. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority · filed 2008-04-17

In Puerto Rico, § 1983 claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007). The statute of limitations on such claims begins to run when the injury occurs, even if the plaintiff did not know of the discriminatory animus at that time. Id. at 5-6.

A § 1983 action in Rhode Island generally uses the three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Walden, Iii, Inc. v. State of Rhode Island · filed 1978-06-05

We think the district court was correct. Its analysis is in keeping with Commerce Oil, the leading state case on this issue: the thrust of plaintiffs’ complaint was not that defendants violated private obligations created by contract or the law of property, but rather that they maliciously violated a duty owed to plaintiffs, founded on social policy, not to interfere with their constitutionally protected rights.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, so the most appropriate state limitations period ordinarily applies.

Paschall v. Mayone · filed 1978-07-18

“Since there is no specifically stated or otherwise relevant federal statute of limitations for a cause of action under [42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, or] § 1981, the controlling period would ordinarily be the most appropriate one provided by state law.”

Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, and a state three-year limitations period applies when no federal limitations period is provided.

Rossiter v. Benoit · filed 1979-01-23

In the instant case, no liability would exist for deprivation of a person’s civil rights except for the federal statute (42 U.S.C. § 1983). No common law liability would attach for violation of a person’s constitutional rights. The rights under section 1983 and rights arising under state common law, although similar, are distinct, and while the same set of facts may give rise to violation of section 1983 and the state common law, are not coterminous and essential elements not necessarily the same. ... We conclude that section 338, subdivision 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (three-year statute) is the controlling statute of limitations in this case.