42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims in Oregon are subject to Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Barker v. Fugazzi · filed 2001-09-17

Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, set out in Oregon Revised Statute § 12.110(1), applies to this claim.

A § 1983 claim for failure to investigate accrues when the alleged failure occurs and may be dismissed as time-barred when filed years later.

Wilson v. McMillen · filed 2001-09-20

This section 1983 claim accrued in November, 1993, and Wilson did not file his action until June 15, 2000. It is clear from the face of the complaint that this claim is time-barred.

Section 1983 actions in Illinois are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Pitts, Michael v. City of Kankakee · filed 2001-09-24

It is undisputed that Pitts and Lawson did not file their lawsuit until November 1999, some 29 months after the three signs were posted, and thus 5 months beyond the two years permitted for actions under sec. 1983 in Illinois.

Section 1983 actions arising in Ohio have a two-year limitations period under Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.10.

Thrower v. Mengel · filed 2001-09-27

The district court did not err in dismissing Thrower’s complaint as time-barred. The limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Ohio is the two-year period found in Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.10.

Section 1983 claims in New Mexico are subject to the state’s three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Perry v. Stout · filed 2001-09-28

The district court ruled that Mr. Perry’s complaint was barred by New Mexico’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-8; Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985). We agree and AFFIRM the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico on this issue for substantially the reasons set forth in the magistrate judge’s order of September 11, 2000.

In Maryland, § 1983 claims are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Jackson v. State of Maryland · filed 2001-10-16

In addition, the allegation regarding Plaintiffs request to get a part-time job should not be considered for purposes of determining whether Defendants violated § 1983 because it occurred more than three years before Plaintiff filed suit.

In Illinois, § 1983 claims have a two-year limitations period, and a retaliation claim based on a single posting accrues when the sign is posted, even if it remains displayed.

Michael Pitts and Charles Lawson v. City of Kankakee, Illinois · filed 2001-10-18

The retaliatory acts that form the basis of the complaint Pitts and Lawson filed were complete in 1997. Only their effects lingered on until the signs were removed. ... It is undisputed that Pitts and Lawson did not file their lawsuit until November 1999, some 29 months after the three signs were posted, and thus 5 months beyond the two years permitted for actions under § 1983 in Illinois.

Section 1983 claims filed in Texas are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Robinson v. Dallas Police Dept · filed 2001-10-26

Robinson has not shown that the district court erred in dismissing his § 1983 action as barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim is not tolled while a plaintiff who knows of the injury tries to identify the proper defendants.

Dowdy v. Prison Health Services · filed 2001-10-26

Here, Dowdy was clearly aware of the wrong having occurred, and was therefore put on inquiry to identify the proper defendants. The statute of limitations is not tolled while a plaintiff attempts to identify the correct defendants.

Section 1983 borrows the limitations period for personal injury actions in the state where the court sits.

Behm v. Luzerne County Children & Youth Policy Makers · filed 2001-10-31

As 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a specific statute of limitations period, courts apply the statute of limitations period applicable to personal injury actions in the state in which they sit.

Section 1983 actions use the state personal injury statute of limitations, which is two years in Ohio.

Wheat v. Ohio · filed 2001-11-07

For all § 1983 actions, federal courts apply the state personal injury statute of limitations. ... The appropriate statute of limitations for personal injury actions arising in Ohio is two years.

Section 1983 suits filed in Tennessee are subject to Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations.

Rowsey v. Police Department, Metropolitan Nashville · filed 2001-11-08

Rowsey alleged that he was arrested without probable cause on November 11, 1998. It is undisputed that he did not file suit until January 2001. Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations, Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3), bars Rowsey’s suit.

In California, § 1983 claims accruing after 1985 have a one-year statute of limitations.

Darmanin v. San Francisco Fire Department · filed 2001-11-08

In California, the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims accruing after 1985 is one year.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal injury limitations period because the section has no federal statute of limitations.

Wright v. Smith · filed 2001-11-09

Because there is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, district courts use the forum state's personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a statute of limitations and may be dismissed when time-barred.

Davis v. California State Personnel Board · filed 2001-11-15

The district court properly dismissed Davis’ section 1983 claims because they are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the claim arises.

Daniel v. Safir · filed 2001-11-28

Claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by the limitations period for personal injury suits under the laws of the state where the cause of action arises.

Section 1983 actions filed in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Housing Works, Inc. v. Turner · filed 2001-11-29

In New York, the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is three years.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico use a one-year limitations period for local tort actions, while federal law determines when a claim accrues.

Reyes-Garcia v. Municipality of Guaynabo · filed 2001-11-30

Although this Court will apply the one-year period applicable for local tort actions the date of accrual is a federal law question.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period; an employer official’s denial of liability does not equitably estop the employer from asserting that limit absent a fiduciary relationship.

Bishop, Anthony v. Gainer, Terrance · filed 2001-12-05

Their cases were dismissed based on failure to meet the 2- year statute of limitations for sec.1983 cases in Illinois and/or the 300-day time limit in Title VII. ... As a denial of liability it cannot constitute a basis for equitable estoppel unless Parker had a fiduciary relationship to the plaintiff. ... The district court was on solid ground when it snuffed out Reeves’ suit because it was filed too late. We affirm that decision.

Section 1983 claims filed in Michigan are subject to the state’s three-year personal injury limitations period.

Manning v. Bolden · filed 2001-12-07

The district court properly determined that these claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations under Michigan law. ... In Michigan, the general statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years.

Section 1983 civil rights actions filed in Kentucky have a one-year statute of limitations.

Brown v. Morgan · filed 2001-12-10

The statute of limitations for filing civil rights actions in Kentucky is one year.

A § 1983 claim may be dismissed when it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Echols v. Hayes · filed 2001-12-27

Inmate Antoine Echols, Sr., appeals the district court's* dismissal of Echols's action asserting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims, and the denial of his motions for reconsideration. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude dismissal was proper because Echols's claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.

A § 1983 action is time-barred when filed after the applicable limitations period measured from when the plaintiffs learned of their injury.

Mattarolo v. Rorback · filed 2001-12-28

Appellants did not file the instant complaint until January 25, 1999. Because they learned of their injury on September 7, 1997, the district court properly determined the action was time-barred.

Section 1983 claims brought in Arizona must be filed within two years of when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.

Bishop v. Pinal County Jail · filed 2001-12-28

Because Bishop failed to file his action within two years of when he knew or should have known of his injuries, the district court properly dismissed his action as time barred.

Section 1983 claims brought in Michigan are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Eight v. City of Ferndale · filed 2002-01-02

From the face of the complaint, it clearly appears that the Michigan three year statute of limitations bars the claim.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's general personal injury limitations period, which is two years in Texas.

Cowan v. Scott · filed 2002-01-04

For § 1983 claims, federal courts apply the general personal injury statute of limitations of the forum state, Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989), which is two years in Texas.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own; federal courts borrow the applicable state limitations period and tolling rules, while federal law governs accrual.

Cordero v. Autonomous Municipality of Ponce · filed 2002-01-22

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not set forth a limitations period for claims brought pursuant to it. While federal law governs the date in which the cause of action accrues, federal courts borrow the limitations period and tolling doctrine from state law.

Section 1983 actions brought in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Murcia v. County of Orange · filed 2002-01-24

The statute of limitations for actions brought in the State of New York pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or brought pursuant to any other statute, is three years.

Section 1983 claims brought in Washington are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Skinner v. Riveland · filed 2002-01-25

The district court properly found that Skinner’s Eighth Amendment claim alleging inadequate mental healthcare was barred by the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Oklahoma are subject to the two-year limitations period in Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(3).

Nunley v. Pioneer Pleasant Vale School District 56 · filed 2002-01-28

The statute of limitations applicable to Section 1983 claims is the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(3).

Section 1983 claims brought in Tennessee are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Alston v. Tennessee Department of Corrections · filed 2002-01-28

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Alston’s complaint as barred by Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims borrow the applicable state limitations period and tolling rules; a motion seeking to reinstate a dismissed complaint can toll that period until the court resolves it.

Lozano v. Corona · filed 2002-02-11

The most analogous state statute of limitations as well as its tolling provisions will be applied to § 1983 actions. ... Therefore, so long as a plaintiff is actively pursuing his rights in court by following the procedural mechanisms available to set aside the dismissal of the complaint these will operate to toll the statute of limitations period until the court either reinstates the claim or rejects the request at which time the one year will commence to run anew.

State law determines both the length and tolling of the limitations period for § 1983 actions.

Van Derheydt v. County of Placer · filed 2002-02-12

The case law is clear that state law determines both the length and any tolling of the limitations period to be applied to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 actions in Alabama have a two-year limitations period, but an ongoing equal-protection violation continues for limitations purposes each day it occurs.

McCord-Baugh v. BIRMINGHAM CITY BD. OF ED. · filed 2002-02-15

Our Supreme Court has held that a § 1983 action is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. ... However, when an equal-protection claim involves an ongoing or "continuing violation," the violation is deemed to continue for statute-of-limitations purposes every day that it occurs. ... The trial court's entry of a summary judgment therefore could not properly have been based upon a statute-of-limitations bar.

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Breyette v. Amedore · filed 2002-02-21

Nonetheless, section 1983 claims have a three year statute of limitations period. Thus, the proposed amendment seeking to assert claims under section 1983 are timely.

Section 1983 actions in Nevada are subject to a two-year limitations period, measured from when the plaintiff has reason to know of the injury, unless a basis for equitable tolling is established.

Smith v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2002-02-22

The district court properly determined that Smith’s section 1983 action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations pursuant to Nevada state law, see Perez v. Seevers, 869 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir.1989) (per curiam), because Smith had reason to know of his injury over two years prior to filing his action, see Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760-61 (9th Cir.1991), and because he failed to establish a basis for equitable tolling, see Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.250 (Nevada’s tolling statute).

Section 1983 claims in New York are subject to a three year limitations period; an arrest claim accrues on the date of arrest.

Cea v. Loudermilk · filed 2002-02-27

The district court correctly ruled that New York’s three year statute of limitations barred the action against the five officers not initially named. Cea’s claim accrued on September 2, 1996, when he was arrested.

Section 1983 claims brought in California were subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Ejikeme v. Reddington · filed 2002-03-07

A one-year statute of limitations applies to all § 1983 claims brought in California.

A § 1983 harassment claim is time-barred when no act within the limitations period can support a continuing violation.

Lampley v. Ohio · filed 2002-03-15

Finding that Lampley did not identify a single act of sexual harassment within the statutory period that could serve as the basis for a continuing violation, the district court dismissed Lampley’s claims as time-barred under both Title VII and § 1983. ... Accordingly, based upon the reasoning set out in the opinion below, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.

Section 1983 claims filed after the applicable one-year limitations period are barred.

Denham v. County of El Dorado · filed 2002-03-19

Denham’s claims are therefore barred by the one-year statute of limitations that applies to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 complaint alleging discovery of concealed misconduct within the limitations period cannot be dismissed as time-barred on the pleadings.

Robertson v. Vanzandt · filed 2002-03-20

Because Robertson alleges in his complaint that he first learned of the conspiracy through 1998 newspaper articles and because all of the factual allegations in his complaint must be considered true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in his favor at this stage in the proceedings, see TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir.1998), we hold that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint as time-barred.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury on which the action is based.

Sulsona v. University of Puerto Rico · filed 2002-03-21

In § 1983 cases, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury on which the action is based.

Section 1983 claims filed in federal court in Illinois have a two-year limitations period.

Mitchell, Alonzo v. Donchin, Emanuel · filed 2002-04-09

Pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/13-202, the statute of limitations for section 1983 cases filed in federal court is two years.

Section 1983 claims filed in federal court in Illinois have a two-year limitations period drawn from Illinois personal injury law.

Mitchell v. Emanuel Donchin and Julian Rappaport · filed 2002-04-09

Pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/13-202, the statute of limitations for section 1983 cases filed in federal court is two years.

A § 1983 claim can be time-barred when filed long after the alleged injury.

Scruggs v. Howie · filed 2002-04-10

Scruggs’ instant complaint was filed in August 2001, yet his claims arise out of an alleged assault that occurred February 29, 1984, making the instant complaint time-barred.

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois are subject to a two-year limitations period; Campbell’s claim accrued when he was injured.

Campbell v. Detella · filed 2002-04-26

Nevertheless because Campbell is proceeding pro se, we will construe his brief liberally and point out that the district court correctly determined that the statute of limitations barred Campbell’s Eighth Amendment claim: that claim accrued at the time of his injury in May 1995, and he did not file his claim until October 2001, well after the two-year limit in Illinois.

Section 1983 civil rights claims arising from these Michigan events are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Carlson v. Bates · filed 2002-04-29

A three-year limitations period applies to Carlson’s civil rights action.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Yaman v. D'ANGELO · filed 2002-04-30

Therefore, since plaintiff commenced this action on June 28, 2001, any claims for acts which occurred prior to June 28, 1998 would be time-barred.

A § 1983 claim challenging disbarment can be barred as untimely.

Pugach v. First Department Disciplinary Committee · filed 2002-05-14

Plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging his disbarment is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, is untimely, and lacks merit substantially for the reasons stated in Judge Trager’s Memorandum and Order dated August 22, 2001.

Section 1983 claims use the state limitations period for general personal injury claims.

Robert W. Lohman, Sr v. Kempker · filed 2002-05-16

To determine the applicable limitations period for § 1983 claims, federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations for general personal injury claims.

Section 1983 actions in Utah have a four-year statute of limitations.

Elwood v. Provo City Corp. · filed 2002-05-20

Under Utah law, the statute of limitations for actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is four years.

Section 1983 claims in Colorado use the two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Neiberger v. Hawkins · filed 2002-05-22

The relevant limitation period for this § 1983 claim is the two-year Colorado period for personal injury actions.

Filing a claim under the California Government Claims Act does not toll the limitations period for a section 1983 action.

Javor v. Taggart · filed 2002-05-23

But, as we shall explain, the act does not affect the running of the limitations period on a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims brought in Connecticut are subject to a three-year limitations period running from when the plaintiff knew of the injury.

Langer v. Town of Trumball · filed 2002-05-23

Thus, the Langers had three years from the time they knew that their property had been destroyed to file their § 1983 action. Because they failed to meet this deadline, the district court properly dismissed their federal claims.

In New York, a section 1983 action has a three-year statute of limitations and is not time-barred by Town Law § 282.

D & S Realty Development, L.P. v. Town of Huntington · filed 2002-06-03

Thus, as the statute of limitations for a section 1983 action is three years, this action is not time barred as against the Planning Board and its members pursuant to Town Law § 282 (see 423 S. Salina St. v City of Syracuse, 68 NY2d 474, cert denied 481 US 1008; Lopez v Shaughnessy, 260 AD2d 551; Bidnick v Johnson, 253 AD2d 779).

The limitations period for a prisoner’s § 1983 action is tolled while an administrative grievance is pending.

Smalley v. Benjamin · filed 2002-06-05

Furthermore, his concern regarding the limitations bar on his § 1983 action is meritless because the limitations period will be tolled during the pendency of his grievance.

Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Ahmed v. Dragovich · filed 2002-06-10

By then, specifically by April 3, 2000, the statute of limitations on Ahmed’s S 1983 claim had expired, as it was more than two years since the incident that is the subject ... of Ahmed’s complaint.

Accrual of a Section 1983 action is governed by federal law, while tolling is governed by state law.

Aromi v. Doe 00cv2305 · filed 2002-06-13

While the accrual period for a § 1983 action is governed by federal law, tolling is governed by state law.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the applicable statute of limitations and may be dismissed as time-barred.

Mottahedeh v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2002-06-17

The district court properly dismissed Mottahedeh’s section 1983 claims as time-barred.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Poole v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2002-07-01

Actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims may be dismissed as time-barred.

Carpenter v. Doe · filed 2002-07-02

We hold that the district court correctly dismissed Carpenter’s claims arising from the events that occurred between September 25, 1998, and November 11, 1998, as time-barred.

A § 1983 claim based on an ongoing violation of constitutional rights remains challengeable even when the challenged law was enacted more than two years before suit.

Kuhnle Brothers, Inc. v. County of Geauga · filed 1997-01-07

A law that works an ongoing violation of constitutional rights does not become immunized from legal challenge for all time merely because no one challenges it within two years of its enactment.

Section 1983 claims arising in New Mexico are subject to the state’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Whitney v. New Mexico Guarantee · filed 1997-01-08

Counts 1, 2, and 4 were filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and are subject to New Mexico's three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims for discriminatory failures to promote are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Kresnak v. City of Muskegon Heights · filed 1997-01-22

At the conclusion of Plaintiffs’ case on liability, this Court, in response to the City’s Rule 50 motion, ruled that Plaintiffs would have no claim for any failure to promote which occurred prior to June 16, 1992, which date was three years prior to this case having been filed. The rationale for this decision was that Plaintiffs were asserting claims under several statutes, and three of those statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, have three-year statutes of limitations.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so courts use the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury claims.

Woodward v. Sedgwick County Jail · filed 1997-01-27

As 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, we look to the underlying state’s statute of limitations governing personal injury claims.

Section 1983 claims arising in Indiana are subject to Indiana’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Monger v. Purdue University · filed 1997-02-14

Consequently, Indiana’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations applies to Monger’s section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims arising in Tennessee use the state’s one-year personal tort limitations period, which ends on the same calendar date the following year.

Merriweather v. City of Memphis · filed 1997-02-20

The applicable statute of limitations for all the claims is that stated in Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3) (Supp.1996), which governs personal tort actions brought under the federal civil rights statutes. ... In this case, the statute of limitations began to run on October 19,1994; even though that day is excluded from the computation, the one-year period ended on the 365th day and the same calendar date, October 19, 1995.

Section 1983 actions brought in Arkansas have a three-year limitations period.

Buchanan v. City of Little Rock · filed 1997-02-26

Significantly, we note that although the district court's dismissal was without prejudice, the three- year statute of limitations expired December 8, 1995, precluding Buchanan from re-filing his lawsuit. See Morton v. City of Little Rock, 934 F.2d 180, 183 (8th Cir. 1991) (statute of limitations in Arkansas for § 1983 action is three years); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105 (Michie 1987).

Section 1983 claims brought in Alabama are subject to a two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Anderson-Free v. Steptoe · filed 1997-02-27

Claims brought in Alabama and arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to a two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Section 1983 back-pay claims use the most analogous Georgia statute of limitations.

Buskirk v. State · filed 1997-03-03

Inasmuch as the statute of limitation for the recovery of back pay under 42 USC § 1983 must follow the most analogous Georgia statute of limitation, Cook v. Ashmore, 579 FSupp. 78 (N.D. Ga. 1984), plaintiffs’ federal civil rights claims are also time barred.

Section 1983 claims use the state personal injury limitations period and state tolling rules.

Torres v. City of Santa Ana · filed 1997-03-04

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is determined by state law. ... Section 1983 claims are characterized as personal injury actions for statute of limitations purposes. ... State law also governs the application of tolling doctrines.

A two-year statute of limitations governs a § 1983 action in Ohio.

Daryl Smith v. Wilkinson · filed 1997-03-13

The district court properly denied Smith's motion to amend his complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), because: 1) there was undue delay that would have prejudiced the defendants; 2) it would have been futile to allow Smith to amend; 3) many of the allegations in Smith's proposed amendment merely restated Smith's retaliation claim presented in his original complaint; and 4) the remaining allegations in the amendment surrounded events that took place beyond the two-year statute of limitations governing this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations.

Franklin v. City of Kansas City · filed 1997-03-20

In order to determine the statute of limitations for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts must look to the underlying state’s statute of limitations governing personal injury claims.

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year limitations period, and a new claim added after that period must relate back to the original complaint.

Husbands v. McClellan · filed 1997-03-26

Because the three year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions has expired, Husbands’ would be allowed to amend his complaint only if the amended complaint “relates back” to the claims in his original complaint.

For § 1983 claims filed in Tennessee, the one-year personal injury limitations period applies, and a pro se prisoner's complaint is filed when placed in the mail or delivered to prison officials for mailing.

Meehan v. Rees · filed 1997-03-27

The limitations period for filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is determined by looking at the most analogous personal injury statute of limitations of the state in which the complaint was filed. ... The most analogous Tennessee statute is that found at Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a), which provides a one-year limitations period. ... In the context of lawsuits filed by pro se prisoners, the date when a complaint is "filed" for statute of limitations purposes is not the date when the complaint is file-stamped by the district court clerk's office, but is, instead, the date when the prisoner places the complaint in the mail or delivers it to prison officials for mailing.

An administrative discrimination charge does not toll the limitations period for a § 1983 claim when the agency lacks jurisdiction over constitutional claims.

Leon-Nogueras v. University of Puerto Rico · filed 1997-03-31

There are two reasons why, in the case at hand, the plaintiffs charge before the ADU did not toll the running of the statute of limitations for her cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 against Dr. Gordils. First, the filing of the charge could not serve as an extrajudicial claim of her cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 for the alleged violation of her constitutional rights because neither the E.E.O.C. nor the Puerto Rico Anti-Discrimination Unit have jurisdiction over such claims.

Section 1983 has no federal statute of limitations.

McNeese v. Cook · filed 1997-04-10

There is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims brought in Texas are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Porter v. Charter Medical Corp. · filed 1997-04-28

Porter’s § 1983 claims are subject to Texas’s two-year limitations period for personal injury.

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Daniels v. Loizzo · filed 1997-04-29

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is three years.

Section 1983 claims arising in Indiana are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Gentry v. Jack R. Duckworth, Superintendent, Mauro Chavez, Doctor, Han C. Choi, Doctor, Karen Allen, Head Nur · filed 1997-05-13

Most of Gentry's claims are based on allegedly illegal conduct that occurred in 1991, more than two years prior to his filing suit in September 1994, thus they are barred by the applicable Indiana statute of limitations, Ind.Code § 34-1-2-2; see Perez v. Sifel, 57 F.3d 503, 505 (7th Cir.1995).

Section 1983 claims brought in Oklahoma have a two-year limitations period that may be tolled under Oklahoma law if the claimant had a legal disability, including mental incapacity, when the claim accrued.

Maynard v. Sharon Casebolt Renee Swope Denise Cale J.R. Pearman · filed 1997-05-19

No statute of limitations is expressly provided for claims under § 1983, but the Supreme Court has held that we must look to state law for the appropriate period of limitations in § 1983 cases. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). This court has determined that the appropriate period of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in the State of Oklahoma is two years, pursuant to Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 95(3). Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1522-24 (10th Cir.1988). ... The Supreme Court has also held, however, that in addition to the limitations period, the "closely related questions of tolling and application" are also governed by state law. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 269. In this case, Oklahoma's two-year limitations period may be tolled until one year after the removal of a disability if the "person entitled to bring an action ... at the time of the cause of action accrued, [was] under any legal disability...." Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 96. Under Oklahoma law, the term "legal disability" may include mental incapacity.

Section 1983 claims arising in Florida must be brought within four years of the allegedly unconstitutional or otherwise illegal act.

Burton v. City of Belle Glade · filed 1997-05-20

Section 1983 cases arising in Florida must be brought within four years of the allegedly unconstitutional or otherwise illegal act.

Section 1983 claims arising in California have a one-year limitations period measured from accrual.

Diaz v. Carlson · filed 1997-05-22

The limitations period applicable to section 1983 and 1985 claims arising in California is one year from the date of accrual.

Section 1983 claims brought in Alabama are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Shuford v. Alabama State Board of Education · filed 1997-05-23

At that time, the statute of limitations period applicable to actions brought in Alabama pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was two years.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico have a one-year limitations period under local law and accrue under federal law when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Gutierrez-Usera v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co. · filed 1997-05-30

First, local law determines the relevant statute of limitations under section 1983. ... In Puerto Rico, the relevant statute of limitations requires that a case be filed within a year of the injury. ... Second, the rule for when the action accrues depends on federal law. ... The action starts to accrue when the “plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury on which the action is based.”

Section 1983 actions brought in California were subject to a one-year limitations period under the law applied in 1997.

Bellon v. Mike Delgado Russell Clawiter Internal Revenue Service · filed 1997-06-05

Accordingly, the district court did not err by dismissing all of Bellon's claims as time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations for actions brought in California under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state statute of limitations.

Johnson v. Hill · filed 1997-06-10

Although no specific federal statute of limitations applies to section 1983 actions, the Supreme Court has held that the state statute of limitations applies to all section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims brought in California were subject to a one-year statute of limitations under the then-applicable California law.

Burley v. Ferreira · filed 1997-06-19

Bernard Burley appeals pro se the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 civil rights action as time-barred. ... Contrary to Burley's protestations, the relevant statute of limitations is one year. See McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 673 (9th Cir.1991); Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 558 (9th Cir.1987); see also Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340(3) (West 1996). Because it is apparent on the face of Burley's first amended complaint that the time for filing his action ran on March 29, 1994, the district court properly dismissed his action as time-barred. See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir.1980).

Section 1983 actions use the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the action arose.

Brown v. City of Pompano Beach · filed 1997-06-23

The statute of limitations that applies in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is that which applies to personal injuries in the state in which the action arose.

In California, a Section 1983 action is subject to a one-year statute of limitations unless tolling applies.

Lattimore v. City of Salinas, Dan Nelson, Chief Charles Lincoln, Daniel Lewtschuck, Rachel Amparano · filed 1997-06-24

Because the applicable statute of limitations in this action is one year, and there is no indication that any tolling provision applies, the district court did not err by dismissing Lattimore's action on statute of limitations grounds.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois federal courts use Illinois’ two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Lara v. City of Chicago · filed 1997-06-25

The applicable limitations period for § 1983 claims in Illinois federal courts is Illinois’ two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations.

Johnson v. The State of Illinois · filed 1997-07-15

The statute of limitations for §§ 1983 and 1985 claims arising in Illinois is two years.

Section 1983 suits in Indiana must be filed within two years after the claim accrues.

Newlin v. David W. Helman, Jesse E. Robinson v. B. Smith, James C. Griffin v. William R. Harris · filed 1997-07-23

Section 1983 suits in Indiana must commence within two years after the claim accrues.

Section 1983 claims arising in California have a one-year limitations period; for prisoners whose claims accrued before January 1, 1995, incarceration tolls that period for two years from accrual or until January 1, 1995, whichever is later.

Parker v. Marcotte · filed 1997-07-30

In California, the one year statute of limitations prescribed by California Code of Civil Procedure section 340(3) applies to civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. ... This Court believes option four best implements the intent of the Legislature, while satisfying constitutional concerns. Option four tolls claims that accrued prior to January 1, 1995 for two years from accrual, or until January 1, 1995, whichever occurs later.

A § 1983 action in New York is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

American Automobile Manufacturers Ass'n v. Cahill · filed 1997-08-05

It is undisputed that the statute of limitations applicable to this § 1983 action is three years.

Section 1983 actions in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Valentin v. David Dinkins, Nyc Police Commissioner, Mario Cuomo, Donovan, Nyc Police Officer · filed 1997-08-05

The problem with the City’s argument is that the statute of limitations in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is three years, not fifty-three days (the time between the incident and the sealing of the file) or five months (the time between the incident and Valentin’s incarceration).

Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period.

Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1997-08-13

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.

Section 1983 claims based on acts or omissions in Alabama must be filed within two years after they accrue.

Cove Properties, Inc. v. Walter Trent Marina, Inc. · filed 1997-08-22

However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims based upon acts or omissions occurring in Alabama must be brought within two years of their accrual.

Section 1983 actions in Louisiana are governed by the one-year prescription period for personal injury actions.

Ford v. Scallen · filed 1997-09-08

A federal civil rights action in Louisiana is governed by the one year prescription period applicable to Louisiana personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims filed in New York are governed by the three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Legal Aid Society v. City of New York · filed 1997-09-11

In New York, the 3-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [5]) is applicable to such claims ... Accordingly, the third cause of action is not time-barred.

Section 1983 claims arising from a public employee’s termination are subject to Nevada’s two-year statute of limitations.

Watson v. William Szczepaniak Las Vegas Valley Water District · filed 1997-09-12

To the extent that Watson's claims of violation of his constitutional rights arise from his termination, the district court correctly dismissed them as barred by the relevant statute of limitations, see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e). ... Watson's federal claims against defendant Donnelly were barred under Nevada's two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims against police officers are barred when the applicable statute of limitations has expired.

Hittle v. City of Garland, Tex · filed 1997-09-16

We have reviewed the record, including the orders of the district court addressing the numerous motions filed in the case, and the briefs of the parties, and affirm the district court’s court’s orders granting the defendants’ motions for summary judgment based on the complaint against the defendant officers being barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal-injury limitations period and applicable state tolling provisions.

Day v. Rogers · filed 1997-09-22

In § 1983 suits, federal courts borrow the forum state’s personal-injury limitations period and any applicable state tolling provisions.

Section 1983 claims in New York are governed by the state’s three year personal injury statute of limitations.

Carney v. NYS Division of Housing & Community Renewal · filed 1997-09-22

Similarly, to the extent Carney alleges that defendants violated her due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by failing to comply with the pretermination requirements of § 73 of the New York Civil Service Law, that claim would also be governed by New York’s general three year personal injury statute of limitations, and is barred.

Section 1983 claims concerning an arrest are time-barred when the complaint is filed after the applicable one-year limitations period expires.

Gabor v. Ferriera · filed 1997-09-24

After a de novo review of the record, see Stone v. Travelers Corp., 58 F.3d 434, 436-37 (9th Cir.1995), we agree with the district court's conclusion that the Gabors' allegations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding John Christopher Gabor's arrest are time-barred because the complaint was filed after the one-year statute of limitations had expired, see McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir.1991); Davis v. Harvey, 789 F.2d 1332, 1333 n. 1 (9th Cir.1986).

Section 1983 claims borrow the applicable state statute of limitations because Congress did not provide a federal limitations period.

Whitedeer v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1997-09-26

Because Congress did not expressly provide a federal statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, this circuit looks to state law, in this case the one-year statute of limitations of Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340(3).

Section 1983 claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

O'Connor v. Moreland · filed 1997-09-26

Claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988 are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in California have a one-year limitations period.

Lawrence v. City of Richmond, a Municipal Corporation Leonard Whorton · filed 1997-10-01

We have held that claims in California under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1985 have a one year limitations period.

Section 1983 claims in Massachusetts are subject to the three-year limitations period in G.L.c. 260, §2A.

DiBiase v. Commissioner of Insurance · filed 1997-10-16

Furthermore, G.L.c. 260, §2A applies to §1983 suits. ... Therefore, for all DiBiase’s claims, the applicable statute of limitations, is G.L.c. 260, §2A, or three years from the time the action accrued.

Section 1983 actions borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Reed v. Quarterman · filed 1997-10-24

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 action is borrowed from the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 claims filed in Missouri are subject to the state’s five-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Sulik v. Taney Cty. · filed 2005-01-04

Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) (2000), applies to all of Sulik’s section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims brought in Missouri are subject to the state's five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Sulik v. Taney County · filed 2005-01-04

Missouri's five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120(4) (2000), applies to all of Sulik's section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims against local defendants in Maryland are subject to a three-year limitations period borrowed from state law.

Thompson v. United States Dept. of Housing & Urban Development · filed 2005-01-06

Plaintiffs’ claims against Local Defendants are enforced via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In regard to Constitutional and statutory tort claims as involved in the instant case, Federal courts have “borrowed” appropriate state law limitations rules. ... Accordingly, the limitations period applicable to Local Defendants, for all claims against them herein, is three years.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, so courts borrow the limitations period for analogous state claims.

Getchey v. County of Northumberland · filed 2005-01-06

Because neither 42 U.S.C. § 1983 nor § 1985(3) contains a statute of limitations, “federal courts must look to the statute of limitations governing analogous state causes of action,” Urritia v. Harrisburg County Police Department, 91 F.3d 451, 457 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Samerie Corp. of Delaware v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico have a one-year limitations period borrowed from the personal injury statute.

Llantin-Ballester v. Negron-Irrizary · filed 2005-01-07

It is well-settled that the limitations period for § 1983 claims “is governed by the applicable state statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which is one year in Puerto Rico”.

A § 1983 claim arising in New York is time-barred three years after the plaintiff knows of the alleged injury, even if its effects continue.

Ognibene v. Niagara County Sheriff's Department · filed 2005-01-11

Because Ognibene was aware of the alleged constitutional violations of the relevant defendants more than three years prior to bringing the present § 1983 action, see Jaghory v. New York State Dep’t of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 331-32 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that the statute of limitations governing § 1983 actions arising in New York is three years), his claims against those defendants are time-barred, notwithstanding any continuing detrimental effects he may be suffering as a result of the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 claims filed in Texas use the state’s two-year personal injury limitations period.

Merrill v. Perry · filed 2005-01-13

Although the district court dismissed Merrill’s suit without prejudice, he is effectively barred from refiling one of his personal injury claims because of the two-year statute of limitations. See Long v. Simmons, 77 F.3d 878, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1996)(statute of limitations can cause a dismissal without prejudice to operate as a dismissal with prejudice); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989) (the general provision injury statute of limitations for the forum state is used for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (West 1998)(two-year injury limitations period in Texas).

Section 1983 claims arising in Oklahoma have a two-year limitations period.

DeYonghe v. Ward · filed 2005-01-26

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim arising in Oklahoma is two years.

Section 1983 political discrimination claims use the applicable state limitations period for personal injury actions.

Camacho-Cardona v. Pena · filed 2005-02-15

The limitations period for a political discrimination action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by the applicable state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, so courts use the applicable state limitations period.

Roberson v. TN · filed 2005-02-15

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, the Court must look to state law to determine the appropriate limitations period.

Section 1983 claims filed in Tennessee have a one-year limitations period.

Roberson v. State of Tennessee East Tennessee State University James H. Quillen College of Medicine, Ronald Franks · filed 2005-02-15

Tennessee provides for a one-year limitations period for civil rights actions under § 1983.

Section 1983 actions in Maine are governed by the six-year limitations period in 14 M.R.S.A. § 752.

Jong Hee Small, Personal Representative of the Estate of Delbert Small v. The Inhabitants of the City of Belfast and Jam · filed 1986-06-27

We are in agreement with the plaintiff that the district court erred in adopting the Maine two-year statute of limitations, 14 M.R.S.A. § 753, and find that the Maine six-year statute of limitations, 14 M.R.S.A. § 752, is the appropriate one to be used for section 1983 cases in the state of Maine.

A § 1983 claim can be barred by the statute of limitations.

Cross v. Brooks · filed 2005-02-16

The district court held that the statute of limitations bars the Crosses’ § 1983 claim, ... Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion, we AFFIRM.

Section 1983 claims in Texas are subject to a two-year limitations period that runs from accrual.

Matthews v. Speier · filed 2005-02-18

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendants on the ground that Matthews’s claim was barred by the applicable Texas limitations statute. ... The limitations period expired two years after the claim accrued in late 1998.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York must be filed within three years of the plaintiff becoming aware of the alleged injury.

Levine v. McCabe · filed 2005-02-23

A three-year statute of limitations applies to Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Section 1983 borrows the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, which is one year in Puerto Rico.

Rivera-Sanchez v. Autoridad De Energia Electrica · filed 2005-03-01

Further, in cases brought pursuant to § 1983, the Court applies the forum state’s statute of limitations period for personal injury actions, which in Puerto Rico is one year.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois are subject to a two-year limitations period, and a later claim does not relate back to an untimely original complaint merely because it rests on the same facts.

Williams v. John Lampe and Village of Cahokia Police Department · filed 2005-03-01

If an original complaint against Illinois local governmental defendants is not filed within one year of the injury and does not claim a constitutional violation, we will not deem a later § 1983 claim timely merely because it rests on the same factual allegations included in the original complaint.

Section 1983 suits may be refiled within the applicable state saving period when the original action was timely.

Cook v. Gibbons · filed 2005-03-01

We further conclude that Cook’s January 2004 complaint was timely, because he had one year from October 2003 — the date his petition for certiorari in Cook I was denied — to file a new action.

A § 1983 excessive force claim accrues when the plaintiff first knows of the alleged constitutional injury.

Hodge v. City of Elyria · filed 2005-03-03

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for excessive force does not call into question the validity of his conviction, and as such, is not barred by Heck. Accordingly, Hodge’s claim began to accrue on the date when he first knew of the alleged constitutional injury, the day of his arrest. Because Plaintiff filed his claim on August 27, 2002, over two years after the incident in question, his claim is barred by Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania have a two-year statute of limitations.

Smith v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2005-03-16

The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in Pennsylvania is two years.

In Pennsylvania, Section 1983 claims use a two-year limitations period.

Rode v. Dellarciprete · filed 1986-11-10

We will, however, grant summary judgment in favor of defendant, Harhigh on the grounds that Hileman’s claims against him (Counts IV and V) are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. It is undisputed that Harhigh terminated his employment relationship with the PSP in November, 1983 and had no further dealings with the PSP or Hileman. It is also undisputed that Hileman did not file his complaint until December 23, 1985. Thus, applying the two year statute of limitations for civil rights actions, Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113 (3d Cir.1985), we conclude that Hileman’s claims against Harhigh are time barred.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York have a three-year limitations period that may be tolled under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 205(a).

Allaway v. McGinnis · filed 2005-03-28

The statute of limitations for constitutional torts brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in New York State is three years. ... I find that plaintiff is entitled to toll the statute of limitations pursuant to C.P.L.R. 205(a), and that this action is, therefore, timely.

Section 1983 claims arising from events in Alabama have a two-year statute of limitations.

Fleming v. Dowdell · filed 2005-03-29

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising out of events occurring in Alabama is two years.

Section 1983 claims in Colorado have a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Vaughn v. Krehbiel · filed 2005-04-11

Thus, the question to be considered is when the Plaintiffs § 1983 or § 1985 claim accrued for limitations purposes. A civil rights claim accrues when the Plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action. ... Thus, the Plaintiffs § 1983 or § 1985 claim accrued no later than May 3, 2002, and is therefore barred by the statute of limitations.

Continuing effects of a past Section 1983 violation do not extend the limitations period.

Normandeau v. City of Phoenix · filed 2005-04-12

Moreover, the continuing impacts from past violations of § 1983 are not actionable.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's general statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Centro Medico Del Turabo, Inc. v. De Melecio · filed 2005-04-19

Because it does not contain a built-in limitations period, a federal court adjudicating a section 1983 action must borrow the forum state's general statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 does not borrow a state's restart tolling rule when applying it after a dismissal for misconduct would conflict with federal policies of repose and prompt resolution of qualified immunity defenses.

Lopez-Gonzalez v. Comerio · filed 2005-04-21

Whatever the correct reading of Puerto Rico's law, however, the egregious conduct exhibited in this case warrants our holding that federal policies underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983 require that we apply in this federal case something less than Puerto Rico's restart tolling principle.

Section 1983 does not borrow a state’s restart tolling rule when applying it after a dismissal for repeated disobedience of court orders would conflict with federal policy.

López-González v. Municipality of Comerío · filed 2005-04-21

We think federal policy requires in this instance that the restart rule not be used as the dispositive yardstick. We hold that application of that rule here would contravene significant policy concerns underlying plaintiffs’ cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio have a two-year limitations period, and time spent in a dismissed action does not reduce that period absent a contrary statute.

Bowles v. City of Cleveland · filed 2005-04-25

With respect to the federal claim, the parties have mistakenly contended that a one year statute of limitations also applies to Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim. In Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1989) (en banc), the Sixth Circuit held that the appropriate statute of limitations for §1983 actions arising in Ohio is two years. Nevertheless, this Circuit holds that absent a statute to the contrary, a party cannot deduct from the limitations period the time during which the claim was pending. Bomer v. Ribicoff, 304 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1962). Thus, since this federal claim was dismissed more than two years after the limitations period began to run, the district court effectively dismissed the claim with prejudice.