42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state's limitations period, while imprisonment tolling applies only for periods when prisoners lacked free access to federal courts.

Miller v. N. S. Smith, Individually and in His Capacity as a Member of the Dallas Police Department · filed 1980-04-21

Miller should be entitled to invoke tolling as to any period while he was in prison and before access to the federal courts was freely available to state prisoners. If such access was freely available for more than two years prior to February 4, 1976, then his suit was barred when filed.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a six-year statute of limitations under South Carolina law.

Simmons v. South Carolina State Ports Authority · filed 1980-07-30

Based on the foregoing, this court has concluded that plaintiffs’ Section 1981 and Section 1983 claims are barred by the six-year South Carolina Statute of Limitations, since the alleged discriminatory employment practices, the defendants’ refusal to grant the plaintiffs “permanent” employment status for retirement credit purposes, occurred prior to July 30, 1969, more than seven (7) years before such practices were challenged in December, 1976, by the filing of this suit.

Section 1983 contains no limitations period, so courts borrow the most analogous state limitations period and apply federal accrual rules.

Morris v. Hoag · filed 1980-08-21

Because the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1983) itself contains no limitations period, courts are directed to look to the most analogous statute of limitations of the state where the cause of action arose. ... For this reason, and those set out above, I conclude that “accrual” of plaintiff’s claim is tolled until the culmination of criminal proceedings against plaintiff in state court. Consequently, I hold that plaintiff’s claim is timely, and I accordingly deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Section 1983 civil actions use the applicable state statute of limitations.

May v. Enomoto · filed 1980-11-19

The statute of limitations governing civil actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such as this, is provided by California state law.

Section 1983 borrows state limitation periods, but federal law determines when and how those periods are satisfied.

Slaughter v. Haughton · filed 1981-02-13

Under Section 1983 state statutes of limitations (including tolling provisions) are borrowed for the purpose of determining the proper time period within which those statutes must be satisfied. But in any federal cause of action (necessarily including one under Section 1983) the question of when and how the applicable statute of limitations has been satisfied must be determined as a matter of federal law. This Court has previously held that under Fed.R.Civ.P. (“Rule”) 3 the filing of an action (and not the service of process) is both necessary and sufficient to satisfy statutes of limitations.

Section 1983 claims alleging political discrimination in a Massachusetts civil-service promotion are subject to a six-month limitations period.

Hussey v. Sullivan · filed 1980-09-17

Six months was the limitation period adopted by the Court of Appeals as being appropriate for the Burns equal protection claim. I rule that the same period is appropriate for Hussey’s claim of political discrimination. I further rule that Mass.Gen. Laws c. 31 § 42, previously Mass.Gen.Laws c. 31 § 46A, is the “most analogous” state law provision for these facts.

Section 1983 claims against Rhode Island municipalities are governed by the three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, rather than the two-year period for tort claims against municipalities.

Pearman v. Walker · filed 1981-04-14

I hold that R.I.G.L. § 9-1-14, governing actions for “injuries to the person” and prescribing a three-year limitation period, applies to all defendants in the instant action. Therefore, plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the City is not time-barred and the City’s motion to dismiss is hereby denied.

Section 1983 claims generally use state limitation and tolling rules, but fraudulent concealment can create an exception when defendants’ conduct is sufficiently unfair and misleading.

Bell v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1981-06-04

It is the Court’s opinion, then, that the applicable and binding state rule of law on the application of the doctrine of estoppel by fraudulent concealment is not whether each of the six guides enumerated in Boehm is precisely met, but rather is whether the defendants’ conduct and representations were so unfair and misleading as to outbalance the public’s interest in setting a limitation on an action and thus carve an exception for that action out of the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so the applicable state limitations period governs.

Sturts v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1982-01-06

Although § 1983 contains no specific statute of limitations, it is well established that the period of limitations provided by state law must be applied.

Section 1983 borrows an analogous state statute of limitations when Congress has not supplied its own limitations period.

Erdmann v. Board of Education · filed 1982-06-03

Because Congress has not supplied § 1983 with its own statute of limitations, state limitations governing analogous actions are borrowed.

Section 1983 claims are subject to tolling during a pending class action, with the limitations period restarting when certification is denied for lack of numerosity.

Fernandez v. Chardon · filed 1982-06-08

We hold, therefore, that a class action asserting a § 1983 claim tolls the Puerto Rican statute of limitations during the pendency of the class action for all purported class members and that when class certification is denied for lack of numerosity, the limitations period begins to run anew.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the state limitations period governing an analogous cause of action when Congress has not supplied a federal limitations period.

Jones v. Orleans Parish School Board · filed 1982-06-21

Because Congress did not establish a limitations period for §§ 1981 and 1983 actions, federal courts apply the state law of limitations governing analogous causes of action.

Section 1983 claims in Virginia are subject to a two year statute of limitations, accruing when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury.

Buntin v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ETC. · filed 1982-10-07

The court finds that plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy and his characterization of the cases when involving continuing discrimination fail, however, to save this action from defendants’ plea of the statute of limitations. ... The question of when a statutory period begins to run is one which depends upon federal law. “While the time limitation itself is borrowed from state law, the federal rule fixes the time of accrual of a right of action.” ... That rule establishes as the time of accrual the point in time when the plaintiff knew, or had reason to know, of the injury which forms the basis of his action. Id. at 263. ... Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued when he knew, or had reason to know, of the injury which forms the basis of his action. The consequences of defendants’ terminations do not change the accrual point. At the latest, plaintiff’s cause of action accrued in October 1978.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations, so courts apply the limitations period applicable to a similar state law action.

Salaneck v. State Trooper Eric Olena · filed 1983-01-26

Because § 1983 contains no statute of limitations, federal courts have historically applied the limitations period which would be applicable in the state court for an action seeking similar relief under state law.

Section 1983 claims use the most closely analogous state statute of limitations; an assault or excessive force claim is subject to Ohio’s one-year assault period.

Woods v. City of Dayton, Ohio · filed 1983-02-04

The Court finds that the “most closely analogous” state statute for the § 1983 assault/excessive force claim is the one year statute for assault, Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.11(A). Accordingly, that claim is time-barred.

Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action for redressing constitutional deprivations, and its limitations period is borrowed from the most analogous state statute.

Matthewman v. Akahane · filed 1983-11-15

In this regard, it is not necessary that a § 1983 claim fit into H.R.S. § 657-11 in every respect; it is enough if it is determined that § 657-11 is the most closely analogous statute. Since the Ninth Circuit characterizes § 1983 actions as “actions created by statute”, there is no question that the most analogous statute of limitations is H.R.S. § 657-11.

Section 1983 imposes a three-year limitations period for claims based on discrete actions.

Whaley v. City University of New York · filed 2008-04-24

Because plaintiff filed this action on September 7, 2004, no discrete actions that occurred before September 7, 2001 are actionable under § 1983, New York Executive Law § 290, and NYC Administrative Code § 8-107.

A § 1983 action brought in New York is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Salahuddin v. Coughlin · filed 1984-07-03

Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the four-bag rule must also be dismissed because they are time-barred. The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is three years.

Section 1983 actions against Oregon public bodies and their officers are subject to Oregon's two-year limitations period when the claim accrued after the 1977 amendments.

Nored v. Blehm · filed 1984-10-02

In this case, it is clear that the cause of action accrued in 1980; the amendments therefore apply. ... We must follow the state statute when it applies, as it obviously does here.

Section 1983 damages claims in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Dinerman v. City of New York Administration for Children's Services · filed 2008-04-29

Accordingly, the respondents established, prima facie, that ... and that the causes of action to recover damages for civil rights violations under 42 USC § 1983 were also barred by the three-year statute of limitations (see Owens v Okure, 488 US 235, 251 [1989]).

Section 1983 claims arising in Florida are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

Johnny E. Ellison, Jr. v. Lester · filed 2008-04-30

However, we have held that the four-year statute of limitations under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3) applies to § 1983 claims arising in Florida.

Section 1983 actions are not tolled by Washington’s local-government claims-filing provision.

Southwick v. Seattle Police Officer John Doe No. 1 · filed 2008-05-05

Therefore, we hold the tolling provision of RCW 4.96.020(4) cannot be separately applied to a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 has no federal limitations period; courts borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period and applicable tolling provisions.

Aduddle v. Body · filed 2008-05-07

There is no federal statute of limitations for §1983 actions. Federal courts borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period and applicable tolling provisions.

Section 1983 suits are subject to the most analogous state statute of limitations, including suits challenging the constitutionality of a state ordinance.

Miller v. King George County, VA · filed 2008-05-12

We reject the Millers’ contention that this statute of limitations does not apply to § 1983 suits challenging the constitutionality of a state ordinance.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Schomaker v. USA et al. · filed 2008-05-13

Section 1983 claims, in turn, borrow the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

A Section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.

Cao v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico · filed 2008-05-13

As we have time and again repeated, the accrual date for a § 1983 action is simply the date when the potential plaintiff knew or should have known that she was harmed.

Section 1983 claims in the District of Puerto Rico are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Del-Villar-Rosario v. Puerto Rico Department of Justice · filed 2008-05-13

It is well settled law that in this District the applicable statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is one year.

The limitations period for a § 1983 Fourth Amendment search claim begins to run when the search occurs.

Michel v. City of Akron · filed 2008-05-15

In this case, the statute of limitations on Michel’s Fourth Amendment claims began to run from the search on November 23, 2004.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own; in Louisiana, its claims are subject to a one-year prescriptive period.

Cruz v. State of Louisiana · filed 2008-05-15

Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, so the law of the forum court applies and prescribes a one-year period.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a three-year limitations period that begins no later than when the plaintiff becomes aware of the injury.

Baez v. Kahanowicz · filed 2008-05-15

This dismissal was properly with prejudice. Any complaint filed after the district court’s decision on January 16, 2007, would have exceeded the three-year statute of limitations that commenced no later than April 2003 when Baez’s cast was removed and he became aware of his injuries.

Section 1983 claims in Florida have a four-year limitations period and accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury and who caused it.

Eugene Hunter, Jr. v. Miller · filed 2008-05-16

Section 1983 actions do not accrue until the plaintiff knows or has reason to know both (1) that he has been injured, and (2) who has inflicted the injury. ... The district court erred in dismissing Hunter’s complaint as time-barred under Florida’s four-year statute of limitations because the evidence in the record did not demonstrate that there was no proof Hunter could present to support his claim that he is entitled to relief.

Section 1983 method-of-execution claims brought in Georgia are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Crowe v. Donald · filed 2008-05-20

Crowe’s claim accrued no later than 2001, when, after direct review of his convictions had been completed, Crowe became subject to the method of lethal injection that he challenges. See id. at 1177. Crowe’s complaint was filed several years beyond the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Kentucky use the state statute of limitations, while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) governs relation back of amendments.

DeLong v. Arms · filed 2008-05-20

While the relevant state law, here Kentucky, provides the statute of limitations for both the § 1983 claims raised in Counts 16 through 18 and the pendent state law claims in Counts 28 and 29, Collard, 896 F.2d at 182, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) provides the procedure for relation back.

Section 1983 claims based on decades-old alleged conduct can be barred by the statute of limitations.

Lawrence v. Interstate Brands · filed 2008-05-22

This count of Lawrence’s complaint also cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985, but any claim under those statutes is time-barred as well.

Section 1983 claims filed in Kansas are subject to Kansas’s two-year personal-injury statute of limitations.

Bell v. Topeka, Kansas · filed 2008-05-23

Kansas’s two-year personal-injury statute of limitations under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) applies in this case.

For limitations purposes, these § 1983 claims could not be filed before the criminal charges were nolle prossed.

Pardue v. Mobile County Alabama · filed 2008-05-27

First, concerning the statute of limitations argument, we agree with Judge Vollmer’s original ruling that Pardue could not have filed his § 1983 claims before the charges were nolle prossed.

Section 1983 claims brought in Florida are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

Allen v. Charle King · filed 2008-05-28

“Florida's four-year statute of limitations [period] applies to” § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Gordon v. Watley · filed 1985-02-07

The statute of limitations in this case for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is three years.

Section 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year personal injury limitations period, which applies retrospectively to this claim.

Smith v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 1985-06-12

We conclude, considering all the Chevron factors, that Wilson v. Garcia should be applied retrospectively to Smith’s claim as requiring application of the two-year personal injury limitation of 42 Pa.Cons. Stat.Ann. § 5524.

Section 1983 claims brought in Colorado have a two-year limitations period that begins when the facts supporting the claim are or should be apparent.

Coit v. Zavaras · filed 2008-06-10

W e have made clear that the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in Colorado is two years from the time the cause of action accrued. A § 1983 action accrues when facts that would support a cause of action are or should be apparent.”

Section 1983 actions use the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the alleged injury occurred.

Luckett v. Conlan · filed 2008-06-16

Because Section 1983 does not contain an express statute of limitations, a federal court considering a Section 1983 action should apply the personal injury statute of limitations provided by the state where the alleged injury occurred.

Section 1983 claims are not tolled by Washington’s local-government claims-filing provision, RCW 4.96.020(4).

Southwick v. SEATTLE POLICE OFFICER JOHN DOE · filed 2008-06-19

Therefore, we hold the tolling provision of RCW 4.96.020(4) cannot be separately applied to a § 1983 action.

A § 1983 claim enforcing a right made possible by the 1991 amendments to § 1981 has a four-year limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 1658.

Baker v. Birmingham Board of Education · filed 2008-06-25

The district court erred in applying the two-year § 1983 statute of limitations. The statute of limitations applicable to Baker’s claims is 4 years, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1658.

Section 1983 actions borrow state tolling rules; in Puerto Rico, an earlier complaint does not toll claims against unknown defendants who were never identified in that pleading.

Rodriguez v. Laboy · filed 2008-06-26

As with the statutory period, the rules of regarding tolling are borrowed from state statutes in § 1983 actions. ... Since “it is exclusively by virtue of the identification of the unknown defendants in the pleading that the filing of a complaint may have any effect on the statute of limitations,” the filing of the previous complaint did not toll the statute of limitations as to the any of the defendants in this case.

A Section 1983 claim in this court borrowed its limitations period from the underlying state cause of action.

Perez-Sanchez v. Public Building Authority · filed 2008-06-30

A claim under § 1983 takes the statute of limitations from the underlying state cause of action.

Section 1983 claims filed after the applicable limitations period are time-barred when the alleged violation’s continuing effects do not qualify for tolling.

Ohio Midland, Inc. v. Ohio Department of Transportation · filed 2008-07-01

Because the plaintiffs’ amended claims accrued much longer than two years before suit was commenced and do not fall into the “continuing violation” category of claims for which tolling is appropriate, the plaintiffs’ amended claims are all barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 excessive force and false arrest claims accrue when the claimant knows of the injury and are subject to the applicable three-year limitations period.

Roberts v. Babkiewicz · filed 2008-07-02

The plaintiffs claims for excessive force and false arrest accrued on December 1, 2004. ... Accordingly, these two claims are barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations, ... and the defendant’s motion to dismiss on this basis is being granted as to the plaintiffs excessive force and false arrest claims.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Actkinson v. Vargo · filed 2008-07-02

The applicable statute of limitations in Actkinson’s claim, filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the forum state, Oregon.

Section 1983 claims generally use the applicable state statute of limitations for personal injury torts.

Strandlund v. Hawley · filed 2008-07-07

The statute of limitations for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is generally the applicable state law period for personal injury torts.

Section 1983 claims generally use the applicable state limitations period for personal injury torts.

Lonnie Strandlund, etc. v. William Hawley, etc · filed 2008-07-07

The statute of limitations for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is generally the applicable state law period for personal injury torts.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the alleged injury occurred.

Vaden v. Connecticut · filed 2008-07-08

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contains no express time limit for bringing claims, the Supreme Court directs courts to apply the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims in the state in which the tort is alleged to have occurred.

Section 1983 claims generally use the applicable state-law limitations period for personal-injury torts.

Bartow v. Cambridge Springs SCI · filed 2008-07-10

As the Supreme Court has explained, the statute of limitations for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is generally the applicable state-law period for personal-injury torts.

Section 1983 method-of-execution suits in Mississippi are subject to the state's three-year personal-injury limitations period.

Walker v. Epps · filed 2008-07-15

In Mississippi, § 1983 suits are governed by the general statute of limitations, which requires the commencement of an action within three years of the action’s accrual. ... In the absence of circuit precedent that would prohibit its application, the Court determines that it must find that Mississippi’s general statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs this § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois use the two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Loch v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF EDWARDSVILLE · filed 2008-07-15

Similarly, § 1983 does not contain an express statute of limitations, and the Court adopts the two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 actions brought in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

McKithen v. Brown · filed 2008-07-21

The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in New York is three years.

Section 1983 claims use the state's residual personal injury limitations period, and accrual is governed by federal law.

Giles v. Stokes · filed 2008-07-22

Giles's § 1983 action accrued on March 6, 2001. Giles filed his motion to amend three years and nine months after this date on December 15, 2004. Therefore, we find that Giles's cause of action is time-barred, and we must determine if it relates back under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).

Section 1983 claims accrue when the facts supporting the cause of action should have been apparent to a reasonably prudent person and are subject to the forum state's personal injury limitations period.

Arthur v. Allen · filed 2008-07-31

The clear import of the McNair and Lovett lines of authority is that, notwithstanding the fact that Arthur seeks prospective relief from an alleged constitutional infringement (the autopsy) that has not been committed yet, his § 1983 cause of action accrues not at the time of the autopsy, but when the facts which would support a cause of action should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.

Section 1983 claims in Delaware are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Husain v. Abdallah · filed 2008-08-01

In Delaware, § 1983 claims are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico carry a one-year statute of limitations borrowed from state law.

Vega v. Burgos · filed 2008-08-06

Section 1983, which borrows its limitations period from state law, carries a one-year statute of limitations in Puerto Rico.

Section 1983 false arrest claims in Illinois are subject to a two-year limitations period and accrue when detention pursuant to legal process begins.

Brooks v. Davey · filed 2008-08-06

For a § 1983 false arrest claim arising in Illinois, the applicable statute of limitations is two years. ... A § 1983 false arrest claim accrues “at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process.”

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for violations of constitutional or statutory rights under color of state law, with a three-year limitations period for these claims in New York courts.

Brown v. Village of Albion · filed 1985-05-29

Although this court can only speculate as to what the Wilson court would decide if faced with the two New York State personal injury Statutes of Limitation, this court chooses the three-year period based on the concerns expressed in Pauk (supra) and the need for uniformity and consistency as expressed in Wilson (supra).

Section 1983 claims borrow the most appropriate state statute of limitations, and in Illinois the personal injury limitations period applies.

Van Ryn v. County of Franklin · filed 1985-07-26

As Congress has not established a specific statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions, courts are directed to borrow and apply the most appropriate state statute of limitations.

Section 1983 requires courts to borrow the most appropriate state statute of limitations because it has no specific federal limitations period.

Snowden v. City of Carbondale · filed 1985-07-26

As Congress has not established a specific statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions, courts are directed to borrow and apply the most appropriate state statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use a uniform state limitations period that covers the full range of possible § 1983 actions.

Greenfield v. District of Columbia · filed 1985-11-08

Instead, the Wilson Court predicated its holding upon the need to find the most general provision available. ... Wilson counsels the selection of D.C.Code Ann. § 12-301(8) as the applicable limitations period in the instant case all the more so because plaintiff here has alleged negligent as well as intentional torts.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois are subject to the five-year residuary statute of limitations.

Johnson v. Arnos · filed 1985-12-31

This court concludes that the one most appropriate statute of limitations for section 1983 actions in Illinois is the five-year residuary statute.

Section 1983 actions against Mississippi law enforcement officers were subject to a six-year limitations period under the pre-Gates precedent discussed by the court.

Stewart v. Russell · filed 1986-02-05

For the reasons stated above, the court is of the opinion that Gates v. Spinks should not be accorded retroactive application to bar plaintiff’s § 1983 action.

A § 1983 claim arising in New Mexico is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

O'Connor v. St. John's College · filed 2008-08-18

A § 1983 claim arising in New Mexico is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising in Oklahoma are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Gaines v. United States Marshal's Servic · filed 2008-08-19

After Mr. Gaines amended his complaint to name the Sheriff of Muskogee County as a defendant, the district court dismissed Mr. Gaines’s claims against the Sheriff as well, correctly observing that any claims Mr. Gaines might have made against the Sheriff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were time-barred by Oklahoma’s two-year statute of limitations.

The limitations period for a Section 1983 claim cannot be evaded by renewing a request for relief after it expires.

Assa'ad-Faltas v. President of University of SC · filed 2008-08-21

However, the statute of limitations may not be evaded by simply renewing a request for relief after the limitations period has expired.

An untimely § 1983 complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Lamb v. Astrue · filed 2008-08-25

Robert Emerson Lamb appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint and dismissing it for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2000) because it was not filed in a timely manner. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s residual personal injury limitations period, which is four years in Florida.

Sterling R. Lanier, Jr. v. R. Smith · filed 2008-08-29

Lanier’s complaint that his civil rights were violated when officers used excessive force against him, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is governed by the residual statute of limitation for complaints of personal injuries in the forum state; in Florida, this statute of limitation is four years.

Section 1983 actions are subject to the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the claim is brought.

Alderman v. Donald · filed 2008-09-03

Actions brought under § 1983 are subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the claim has been brought.

Section 1983 claims arising from events in California before January 1, 2003 are subject to a one-year personal injury limitations period.

Singh v. City of Oakland · filed 2008-09-03

The District Court correctly ruled that the statute of limitations applicable to this claim is California’s one-year limit for personal injury claims.

A prisoner’s Section 1983 claim is time-barred if the complaint is delivered to prison officials after the limitations period expires.

Robinson v. M. Burns · filed 2008-09-11

However, it is clear that res judicata bars this action and the district court correctly found that Robinson delivered his complaint to prison officials after the expiration of the statute of limitations period.

A § 1983 claim is time barred when the plaintiff files after the applicable limitations period despite knowing of the alleged violation.

Johnson v. City of Casper · filed 2008-09-18

On the § 1983 claim, the district court concluded that Mr. Johnson’s action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations because he knew that his rights had been violated as of August 3, 2000, but he failed to file his complaint on or before August 3, 2004. ... Based on our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable legal authority, we conclude that the district court correctly decided this case. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision for substantially the same reasons stated in its thorough and well-reasoned order dated December 18, 2007.

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year limitations period, and a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the harm.

Van Wormer v. City of Rensselaer · filed 2008-09-22

The applicable statute of limitations is the New York State three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... “While state law supplies the statute of limitations for claims under § 1983, federal law determines when a federal claim accrues. The claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the harm.” ... Nonetheless, we conclude that Van Wormer’s claims are time-barred because he had notice of his proposed termination before April 8, 2002, and he alleges no unconstitutional act after that date.

Section 1983 actions brought in Florida are governed by Florida’s four-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Henyard v. SECRETARY, DOC · filed 2008-09-23

As the district court found, and the parties do not dispute, a § 1983 action brought in Florida is governed by Florida’s four-year personal injury statute of limitations. ... Accordingly, the district court properly denied Henyard’s motion for a stay because his underlying § 1983 complaint is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims brought in Colorado have a two-year limitations period running from accrual.

Martinez v. Martinez · filed 2008-09-24

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims brought in Colorado “is two years from the time the cause of action accrued.” Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006). ... It appears that any attempt by Mr. Martinez to now refile these claims would be barred by the statute of limitations.

A Section 1983 action is barred when it is filed after the applicable limitations period has run.

Wilmshurst v. Lockyer · filed 2008-09-29

The district court properly concluded that Wilmshurst’s section 1983 action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations because the alleged facts underlying Wilmshurst’s claim occurred in 2002 and 2003, and he filed his complaint in January 2006.

Section 1983 claims in Louisiana have a one-year limitations period and accrue when the claimant knows the facts supporting the claims.

Dixon v. Louisiana Department of Corrections · filed 2008-10-06

The statute of limitations, however, began running when Dixon knew the facts that supported his claims. ... The applicable limitations period in Louisiana is one year. ... Accordingly, the district court did not err by ruling that Dixon’s claims accruing prior to January 27, 2006, were barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims are barred when the applicable statute of limitations has expired.

Harlow v. County of Riverside · filed 2008-10-06

We agree with the district court that Harlow’s state and federal claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, and we therefore affirm.

Section 1983 claims in Texas must be filed within two years of the injury giving rise to the claim.

Bowen v. Stewart · filed 2008-10-07

Bowen also arguably asserts that the district court erred in dismissing the instant lawsuit as untimely. He has failed to establish that the proceeding filed in 2007 was filed within two years of the termination of parental rights in 2001.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal injury limitations period and tolling rules because the statute has no federal limitations period.

Starks v. Hollier · filed 2008-10-07

Because there is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 and Bivens claims, federal courts apply the general personal injury limitations period and tolling provisions of the forum state.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a limitations period that bars claims based on events occurring before the applicable cutoff date.

Thomas v. Wheeler · filed 2008-10-08

Accordingly, we find that the District Court properly dismissed all Title VII claims that occurred more than 300 days prior to the filing of Thomas’s EEOC complaint, all § 1981 claims that occurred before March 29, 2001, and all § 1983 claims that occurred before March 29, 2003.

Section 1983 suits brought in Connecticut are subject to the three-year limitations period in Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-577.

DiVerniero v. Murphy · filed 1986-04-03

Accordingly, this court holds that the three-year limitations period of Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-577 is applicable to section 1983 suits brought in Connecticut.

Section 1983 claims in Minnesota are subject to a two-year limitations period, applied retroactively.

Arvidson v. City of Mankato · filed 1986-04-08

Moreover, the federal interests in uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation will be advanced by retroactive application of Wilson v. Garcia. Application of Minnesota’s two-year statute of limitations requires dismissal of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims since they arose in 1980.

In Pennsylvania, § 1983 claims have a two-year limitations period, so a class cannot include people whose claims fall outside that period.

Bullick v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1986-04-28

The definition proposed by the plaintiff is overbroad because it includes persons whose claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. ... Thereafter, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled in Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188 (3d Cir.1985), and Knoll v. Springfield Township School District, 763 F.2d 584 (3d Cir.1985), that actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Pennsylvania are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. ... Consequently, only those persons who were employed by the City of Philadelphia on or after December 13, 1983, could possibly be included in the potential class.

The two-year limitations period for Minnesota § 1983 claims established by Wilson does not apply retroactively when the plaintiff could have relied on the previously settled six-year period.

JOHN DOES 1-100 v. Ninneman · filed 1986-05-07

Applying the Chevron factors to the case sub judice, the court finds that Wilson should be applied nonretroactively and defendants’ motion to dismiss denied.

Section 1983 has no specific limitations period, so courts adopt a local time limit consistent with federal law and policy.

McKinley Brown v. Judge Edgar P. Calhoun · filed 1986-06-13

The Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts do not contain a specific statute of limitations governing actions filed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Hence, a local time limitation is adopted as federal law, if the time is not inconsistent with federal law or policy.

Section 1983 actions brought in Indiana are subject to a two-year limitations period, applied retroactively under Wilson v. Garcia.

Carpenter v. City of Fort Wayne, Ind. · filed 1986-06-17

Therefore, the court finds that Wilson v. Garcia should apply retroactively to § 1983 actions brought in Indiana, thereby requiring that such suits should be brought within two years.

Section 1983 claims in Kentucky use the state's one-year personal-injury limitations period.

William Walker, Jr. v. City of Bowling Green, Kentucky Policeman Scott Bowerman and W.C. Brooks · filed 1986-09-25

Plaintiff's action is analogous to one for personal injury and governed by the applicable state statute of limitations, Kentucky Revised Statutes 413.140(a). ... Accordingly, it was incumbent upon plaintiff to file his action within one year from the date the alleged wrongful incident occurred.

Section 1983 as-applied challenges to an execution method can be barred by the statute of limitations.

Cooey v. Strickland · filed 2008-10-09

That rule compels the conclusion that the statute of limitations has expired on Cooey’s current as-applied challenges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as the district court carefully explained in its opinion.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s limitations period for tort actions.

Colón-Rivera v. Asociación De Subscripción Conjunta Del Seguro De Responsabilidad Obligatorio · filed 2008-10-09

When determining whether an action filed pursuant to Section 1983 is timely, the Court must apply the forum state’s statute of limitations period for tort actions.

Section 1983 lethal-injection claims are time barred when newly asserted medical circumstances restate challenges whose limitations period has expired.

Richard Cooey, II v. Strickland · filed 2008-10-09

Having reviewed the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable precedent, most notably our decision in Cooey II, we conclude that the district court correctly held that each of Cooey’s “new” claims is time barred for the reasons stated in its opinion dated September 30, 2008.

Section 1983 claims filed in Connecticut are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Rohner v. Town of Coventry · filed 2008-10-10

Thus, applicable limitations period in Connecticut for a federal equal protection claim brought pursuant to § 1983 is three years.

A Section 1983 civil rights action in Kansas borrows the two-year limitations period in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4).

Worrell v. Bruce · filed 2008-10-15

As the district court noted, the limitations period for a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is borrowed from the pertinent state statute of limitations, in this case the two-year period specified in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4).

Section 1983 claims borrow the state personal injury limitations period, but federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Verdi v. State of Texas · filed 2008-10-15

While we look to state law for the length of the statute of limitations, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.”

Section 1983 claims borrow their statute of limitations from state law.

Scott v. Jackson County · filed 2008-10-24

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims “must be borrowed from state law.”

A § 1983 municipal liability claim can be time-barred when the plaintiffs’ allegations show they knew of the alleged misconduct before it became public.

Reyes v. City of Chicago · filed 2008-10-28

Accordingly, the Monell claim was not timely filed as to plaintiffs Reyes and Olazaba, and for the reasons discussed above equitable estoppel does not apply.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period, and lingering effects of a single incident do not extend it.

HEIDEGGER v. City of Chicago · filed 2008-10-28

The parties agree on the following basic facts and relevant law, namely: Illinois law on statute of limitations applies; the relevant limitations periods are two years for plaintiffs’ federal claims and one year for plaintiffs’ state law claims; the underlying incident occurred on March 27, 2004; and plaintiffs’ complaint was filed on October 10, 2007. ... Because the only alleged incident supporting plaintiffs’ claims occurred on March 27, 2004, counts II-X are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury torts.

Ginter v. Skahill · filed 2008-10-28

Section 1983 claims are subject to the state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury torts.

Section 1983 actions filed in Georgia are governed by the state’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Thomas v. Lee · filed 2008-11-03

However, it is well-settled that § 1983 actions filed in Georgia are governed by Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury actions and are subject to dismissal when filed after that period.

Mitchell v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2008-11-06

Henry M. Mitchell, Jr., appeals pro se from the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as untimely. ... The district court properly dismissed Mitchell’s complaint because he failed to file his action within the governing statute of limitations.

The limitations period for a prisoner’s § 1983 claim is tolled while the prisoner completes the mandatory grievance process.

Nickolich v. Rowe · filed 2008-11-06

The record shows that Nickolich commenced the prison grievance process immediately after his claim accrued, and filed a complaint within two years of completing the mandatory grievance process.

In New Jersey, Section 1983 medical-care claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Muhammad v. Department of Corrections · filed 2008-11-12

All of Plaintiffs claims arising out of the allegedly substandard provision of medical services are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the state limitations period for personal injury tort actions.

McClintock v. School Board East Feliciana Parish · filed 2008-11-12

With regard to § 1983 claims, federal courts borrow the limitations period from state “tort action[s] for the recovery of damages for personal injuries.”

The three-year limitations period applicable to § 1983 claims was not tolled on the grounds presented.

Vaccarella v. New York · filed 2008-11-12

We have reviewed all of Vaccarella’s contentions on appeal, including his arguments that (1) the District Court order denying his summary judgment motion and granting Jane Doe’s summary judgment motion was error; (2) the Eleventh Amendment should not bar suit against New York State and Queens Family Court in this case; (3) the three-year statute of limitations applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims should be tolled; and (4) Jane Doe’s attorney should be subject to monetary sanctions. We find that none has merit.

A § 1983 claim filed in Alabama is subject to a two-year limitations period.

Estate of Lee ex rel. Cutchen v. Jefferson Metropolitan Healthcare Authority · filed 2008-11-21

The issue raised in this mandamus petition is whether the trial court then erred in allowing the estate to file an amended complaint including a new wrongful-death count and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 count after the original complaint had been dismissed on the ground of sovereign immunity and the statute of limitations on the claims asserted in the amended complaint had expired. We conclude that the trial court did err in allowing the estate to file an amended complaint.

The limitations period for a Section 1983 suit is tolled under RCW 4.96.020(4) when the claimant files a pre-suit claim.

Wyant v. CITY OF LYNNWOOD · filed 2008-11-24

For the reasons stated above, the court holds that the tolling provision of RCW 4.96.020(4) applies to § 1983 suits, and therefore finds that Mr. Wyant timely filed suit.

Section 1983 has no specified limitations period; courts apply the limitations period for personal injury claims in the state where the challenged action occurred.

Equity Lifestyle v. County of San Luis · filed 2008-11-24

While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not specify a statute of limitations, the Supreme Court has instructed federal courts addressing § 1983 personal injury claims to follow the statute of limitations of the state in which the challenged action occurred.

Section 1983 method-of-execution actions are subject to a statute of limitations even when they seek only prospective injunctive relief.

Walker v. Epps · filed 2008-11-24

In sum, we conclude under Wilson that statutes of limitations apply with equal force to § 1983 method-of-execution actions, notwithstanding the nature of the relief they request.

Section 1983 wrongful-discharge claims in Pennsylvania had a six-year filing period when clear circuit precedent establishing that period arose within the first two years after the claim accrued.

Pratt v. Thornburgh · filed 1986-12-15

Thus, within the two-year period prescribed by Wilson v. Garcia, supra, the rulings in Knoll and Perri, by establishing clear precedent, had the effect, under the doctrine of the Chevron Oil Co. case, of extending that limitation period to six years so far as the plaintiff’s suit was concerned.

A § 1983 complaint filed four years after accrual was properly dismissed as untimely.

Brooks v. Ford Motor Company · filed 1987-02-05

Plaintiffs appeal from a district court judgment which dismissed their 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983 and 1985 complaint. The complaint was filed four years after the date of accrual. 3 Upon review of the district court record and the briefs submitted on appeal, this Court concludes that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' complaint.

Section 1983 equal protection claims in the District of Columbia are subject to the District’s three-year residual limitations period.

Muñoz v. Board of Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia · filed 2008-12-03

Plaintiffs equal protection claim is subject to the District’s three-year residual limitation period, D.C.Code § 12-301(8).

In Ohio, a § 1983 claim must arise within two years before suit is filed.

Russell v. Ohio, Department of Administrative Services · filed 2008-12-03

Russell filed her suit in federal court on February 11, 2005. Any instance giving rise to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim must have occurred within two years of that date, meaning after February 11, 2003.

Section 1983 claims in California have a two-year limitations period borrowed from the state statute for personal injury actions.

Frost v. Diocese of San Bernardino Education & Welfare Corp. · filed 2008-12-08

The limitations period here is two years, derived from California’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims brought in Texas have a two-year limitations period.

Cooper v. Owens · filed 2008-12-15

Additionally, any § 1983 challenges to these proceedings is time barred. See Stanley v. Foster, 464 F.3d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 2006) (two-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 actions in Texas).

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Egnotovich v. Greenfield Township Sewer Authority · filed 2008-12-17

The federal civil rights claims accruing prior to September 8, 2003, are time-barred, by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(2); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (state statute of limitations applies to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), and the Egnatoviches failed to allege any “violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988), arising after September 8, 2003.

Section 1983 claims filed in Florida have a four-year statute of limitations, borrowed from the state’s personal injury limitations period.

Lewis v. Asplundh Tree Expert Company · filed 2008-12-30

Florida’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims, and thus for § 1983 claims in that state, is four years.

Section 1983 claims filed in California are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Manriquez v. Castro · filed 2008-12-30

As the district court concluded, Manriquez’s complaint, deemed filed on November 6, 2005, was untimely under the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Cal.Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1.

A § 1983 claim is not equitably tolled while a prisoner awaits denial of a separate California Tort Claims Act claim that was not part of the prison administrative process.

Manriquez v. Castro · filed 2008-12-30

Manriquez is not entitled to additional, equitable tolling until the time his claim under the California Tort Claims Act was denied in December 2003 because this claim was not part of the prison administrative process.

Section 1983 claims arising in New Hampshire are subject to the state’s three-year limitations period for personal actions.

Gorelik v. Costin · filed 2008-12-31

In this case, the applicable limitations period is New Hampshire’s three-year statute for personal actions.

In California, Section 1983 claims are subject to the two-year personal injury limitations period, with tolling available only when adequately alleged.

Reichelt v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2009-01-14

Lawrence Kevin Reichelt, a prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing as time-barred his action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII. ... Reichelt’s federal claims, alleging that the Los Angeles Police Department wrongfully terminated Reichelt and later committed perjury at his workers’ compensation hearing, were not filed within two years of the Reichelt learning of the wrongdoing. ... Moreover, Reichelt did not adequately allege he is entitled to tolling.

Section 1983 claims are treated as personal injury actions for limitations purposes and are subject to Oregon’s two-year personal injury limitations period.

Bergin v. McCall · filed 2009-01-14

The district court properly dismissed Bergin’s claims against his former medical partner because Bergin did not file those claims 'within two years after they accrued, as required by Oregon’s personal injury statute.

For limitations purposes, a § 1983 complaint is constructively filed when delivered to the clerk.

Eriksen v. Washington State Patrol · filed 2009-01-14

However, the district court erroneously dismissed the Eriksens’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim as untimely. For statute of limitations purposes, the Eriksens constructively filed their complaint on June 24, 2005, when they delivered it to the clerk.

Section 1983 suits brought in Mississippi are subject to a one-year statute of limitations that applies retroactively to suits against state law enforcement officials.

Young v. Neal B. Biggers, Jr. · filed 1987-07-02

Jerry Young appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit. We affirm, bound by a previous panel’s holding that Mississippi’s one-year statute of limitations applies retroactively to suits of this type.

A new two-year limitations period for Kansas § 1983 claims need not apply to a claim that accrued when prior circuit law allowed three years, even if the suit was filed after the new rule was announced.

Derstein v. Van Buren · filed 1987-09-14

At the outset, we reject the suggestion that Jackson mandates that Garcia be applied to every Sec. 1983 proceeding filed after Garcia. ... Our consideration of the factors enumerated in Chevron leads us to conclude that the district court did not err in declining to apply Garcia to the instant case.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which is three years in Michigan.

Studley v. The Village of Holly, Thomas Bercher, and William Sudbury, Defendants · filed 1987-10-20

Under Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), claims under section 1983 are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury. We agree with the district court that the applicable statute of limitations here is Mich.Comp.Laws Sec. 600.585, which imposes a three-year limitation period on personal injury actions.

A plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 claim need not plead equitable tolling or estoppel to anticipate a statute of limitations defense, even when the complaint alleges facts suggesting the claim is time-barred.

Tamayo v. Hamer · filed 2009-01-20

Although Ta-mayo has included allegations in her second amended complaint showing that her Section 1983 equal protection claims are time-barred, Tamayo was not required to anticipate in her complaint that Defendants would assert the statute of limitations defense. ... Since Tamayo was not required to address such issues in her second amended complaint, we conclude that it would be more appropriate to address the statute of limitations issue at the summary judgment stage.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying it.

Arauz v. Ricky Bell · filed 2009-01-22

Federal law determines when the statute of limitations begins to run, and under federal law, “the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.”

A § 1983 action is time-barred when filed after the applicable limitations and statutory tolling periods expire.

Pamer v. Lucine · filed 2009-01-23

The district court properly determined that the action was time-barred because Pamer filed suit after the applicable statute of limitations and statutory tolling period had expired.

Section 1983 claims brought in New Mexico borrow the state’s three-year personal-injury limitations period.

Mata v. Anderson · filed 2009-01-24

A three-year statute of limitations applies to Mata’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce his First-Amendment rights. Federal law borrows the three-year statute of limitations from the statute of limitations for personal injury set forth in NMSA 1978 § 37-1-8.

Section 1983 constitutional claims in New Jersey are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Yip v. Union Cty College · filed 2009-02-03

A two-year statute of limitations applies to Yip’s constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as his claim under Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

Section 1983 claims brought in Kansas have a two-year limitations period borrowed from state personal injury law; federal law determines when a claim accrues.

Twitty v. Holliday · filed 2009-02-13

“The forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs civil rights claims under both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983. In Kansas, that is the two-year statute of limitations in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a).” ... While the amount of time that must pass before a claim is barred is governed by state law, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” ... Mr. Twitty’s claim against the Appellees accrued no later than July 1, 2005, when Mr. Twitty walked out of Community Corrections Residential.

A § 1983 plaintiff’s awareness of the injury does not preclude equitable estoppel of a limitations defense based on fraudulent concealment.

Gomez v. City of Torrance · filed 2009-02-13

Plaintiffs filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on February 2, 2007. ... The district court erred in holding that because plaintiffs conceded that they learned of their son’s death in August 2004, they could not show fraudulent concealment, and could not equitably estop the defendants from asserting the statute of limitations. ... Plaintiffs therefore raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendants are equitably es-topped from asserting a statute of limitations defense based on fraudulent concealment.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico have a one-year limitations period that runs from when the plaintiff knows of the injury.

Torres-Rivera v. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority · filed 2009-02-25

It was then that the plaintiff became aware of the injury on which this action is based. These events took place in 2001 and 2003, respectively. Thus, they fall well beyond the one-year statute of limitations for actions under section 1983.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the claim accrues.

Stephens v. Shimpf · filed 2009-03-04

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is the same as the statute of limitations in a personal injury action in the state in which the claim accrues.

Section 1983 claims arising in New York have a three-year limitations period, and conduct outside that period cannot serve as a basis of liability.

Flynn v. New York State Division of Parole · filed 2009-03-06

Accordingly, each of plaintiffs Title VII disparate treatment claims and retaliation claims that are based on conduct that occurred prior to November 4, 2004 and each of plaintiffs § 1983 claims that are based on conduct that occurred before June 20, 2004, are time barred under the relevant statutes of limitations and will not be considered as bases of liability.

Section 1983 retaliation claims in Connecticut have a three-year limitations period that runs from when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the retaliatory injury, rather than from the protected speech.

Valenti v. Torrington Board of Education · filed 2009-03-06

Under Connecticut law, the appropriate statute of limitations is three years. ... The time of accrual in a § 1983 claim begins at the “point in time when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of [the] action.” ... Therefore, any retaliation that may have occurred within three years prior to the filing of plaintiffs February 15, 2007 complaint is actionable. The Court cannot exclude Valenti’s statements made prior to February 15, 2004, as the injury is not the speech, but the response thereto.

Section 1983 claims in Michigan are subject to the state's three-year personal-injury limitations period, which cannot be tolled for prisoner claims.

Hardin v. Straub · filed 1987-12-18

M.S.A. 27A.5805(8) limits the time in which personal injury actions may be brought to three years. This statute governs constitutional claims under section 1983 as well. ... This late filing puts plaintiff's claim outside the terms of the Michigan statute, and the three year period may not be tolled in prisoner section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims in Ohio were subject to a one-year statute of limitations when analogous to defamation.

Vodila v. Roderick Clelland, Dorothy Demharter, Jim Ghersi, Dr. Donald Cotton, Jr., Dorothy Cooper, William Spik · filed 1987-12-28

As we read the pertinent caselaw, however, it does not establish that Dr. Vodila’s § 1983 claim was ever subject to a six-year statute of limitations. What it clearly shows, rather, is that the one-year statute of limitations was the one that was applicable.

Section 1983 actions use the state limitations period for personal injury actions, with a reasonable grace period when a new limitations period would bar a preaccrued claim.

Espinosa v. Superior Court · filed 1988-06-23

When a court establishes a new statute of limitations that would bar a preaccrued claim, a plaintiff must be given a reasonable grace period within which to file suit on the claim. ... This “reasonable grace period” is the shorter of two periods—three years from the date the cause of action accrued or one year after Wilson was decided—April 17, 1986. (Id., at p. 1356.) As the amendment to the complaint was filed on February 17, 1987, more than a year after Wilson was decided, it was not timely.

A section 1983 claim filed more than one year after Wilson v. Garcia is untimely.

Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent of Schools Los Angeles County Office of Education Los Angeles Cou · filed 1989-08-30

We reverse the dismissal of the Title VII claim and affirm the dismissal of the section 1983 claim.

The limitations period for a Section 1983 claim may be tolled during the plaintiff's incarceration.

Webb v. Benny Craft Jean Banks · filed 1989-11-16

However, subsequent to the district court's decision, the Supreme Court ruled that tolling due to the plaintiff's incarceration was permissible and consistent with the policies underlying 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. See Hardin, 109 S.Ct. 1998. Because it is uncertain from the record before us whether the plaintiff was incarcerated for a sufficient amount of time from the date his cause of action accrued and the date he filed his suit so as to render it timely filed, we must remand the case for the district court to make this determination.

A § 1983 claim in Ohio has a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Dixon v. Anderson · filed 1990-01-04

In Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir.1989), the Court held that the applicable statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in Ohio is two years. The issue here is, when did the two year statute of limitations period begin? ... The Court finds that the two years period began to run as to each plaintiff when they were told in 1976 and 1978 that they would not be able to join SERS.

In Wisconsin, a § 1983 claim is subject to a six-year statute of limitations.

Kuemmerlein v. Board of Education · filed 1990-01-30

The defendants have argued to this court that the applicable statute of limitations for section 1983 actions in Wisconsin is three years. Our recent decision in Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 407-09 (7th Cir.1989) makes clear that the appropriate statute of limitations in Wisconsin is six years. The defendants have advanced no reasons why Gray should be so quickly reexamined, and we reaffirm its rule of law. Thus, we will use six years as the statute of limitations for plaintiffs' claims.