42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims generally use the forum state's residual personal injury limitations period.

Nicholas v. Boyd · filed 2009-03-19

The applicable statute of limitations in § 1983 actions is generally the residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the forum state.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Salcedo v. Town of Dudley · filed 2009-03-20

A claim under § 1983 accrues “when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of [her] injury.”

Section 1983 claims use the state’s general personal-injury limitations period, and prosecutors have absolute immunity from damages claims for conduct within their advocacy function and jurisdiction.

Smith v. Belle · filed 2009-03-20

The Supreme Court has directed that the state statute of limitations period applicable to personal injury actions should be applied to all actions brought under § 1983. ... Thus, the district court correctly concluded that Smith’s claims against Persac were untimely because he did not file his complaint within the applicable four-year statute of limitations period. ... Because this allegation only implicates actions taken by Belle while she was performing her function as an advocate for the government, and there is no allegation that she was acting outside the jurisdiction of her office, the district court correctly found that she was entitled to absolute immunity.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state statute of limitations, including a retroactively applied longer limitations period.

Flowers v. Dickens · filed 1990-05-25

Accordingly, the court finds that Owens should be applied retroactively and, pursuant to the holding in Owens, plaintiff’s claim is controlled by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972).

Section 1983 actions in Alabama are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, applied retroactively to claims accruing before Owens.

Lufkin v. McCallum · filed 1990-11-13

The court finds that the limitations period established by Owens and by Preuit & Mauldin II should be enforced here, whether the application is described as “retroactive” or simply as a recognition of the original' intent of the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), decided prior to Lufkin’s obtaining his legal advice.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a limitations period, with equitable tolling limited to continuing harm or affirmative inducement to delay.

Hackenburg v. Zukowski · filed 1991-01-07

We decline to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling in this case and conclude that Hackenburg’s action is barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions use the state statute of limitations for personal injury cases.

Vaughan v. Grijalva · filed 1991-03-01

The appropriate state statute of limitation for section 1983 actions is that for personal injury cases.

Section 1983 borrows the forum state's personal injury statute of limitations, including applicable tolling rules.

Martin v. Barr · filed 1991-04-18

We agree with the reasoning of the district court, adding only that the Illinois Court of Appeals has held that subsequent periods of incarceration will not further toll the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in California are subject to a limitations period of one year under Wilson v. Garcia, with retroactivity rules determining the applicable period.

De Anza Properties X, Ltd. v. County of Santa Cruz · filed 1991-06-28

Under Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), the statute of limitations for all section 1983 claims in California is now one year.

In Nevada, § 1983 claims have a two-year limitations period borrowed from the state’s personal injury law.

Chachas v. City of Ely, Nev. · filed 2009-03-31

In Nevada, based on the statute of limitations for personal injury claims, the statute of limitations for claims brought pursuant to § 1983 is two years.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal-injury statute of limitations.

Comer v. Lindley · filed 2009-04-01

The forum state’s personal-injury statute of limitations is applied to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 actions use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the claim arose.

Marcum v. Harris · filed 2009-04-02

Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by the personal injury statute of limitations of the state in which the cause of action arose.

An allegation of imprisonment that may toll the limitations period for a Section 1983 claim must be accepted as true at the pleading stage, requiring further proceedings before dismissal as untimely.

Winters v. George Voinovich Reginald Turner William T. Hanton · filed 1986-08-05

This action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 was brought by filing a pro se complaint in the United States District Court while the appellant was incarcerated at the Lima Correctional Facility. ... Thus, the appellant's claim of disability must be taken as true. ... Thus, Austin v. Brammer clearly requires a remand.

For a § 1983 claim that accrued in Indiana before Wilson, the plaintiff had to file within the shorter of five years from accrual or two years after Wilson.

Slaton v. City of Evansville, James Haller, Earl Chapman · filed 1992-04-14

Under this test, "an Indiana plaintiff whose section 1983 cause of action accrued before the Wilson decision, April 17, 1985, must file suit within the shorter period of either five years or two years after Wilson." ... In Slaton's case, the judge appropriately applied the Loy test, and found that Slaton failed to file within two years of Wilson.

Section 1983 claims are subject to an applicable statute of limitations and may be dismissed when filed too late.

Himes v. Mesa County · filed 2001-10-10

Mr. Himes filed this action in March 2000, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The district court dismissed the action on the ground that Mr. Himes’ claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. ... We AFFIRM the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado for substantially the reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s recommendation of November 8, 2000, as approved by the district court.

Section 1983 actions filed in federal court in Illinois have a two-year limitations period that is procedural and potentially subject to equitable tolling and equitable estoppel.

Smith v. City of Chicago Heights · filed 1992-01-13

Because personal injury actions were recognized at common law, this statute of limitations is procedural rather than jurisdictional. Therefore, the limitations period at issue in this case is potentially subject to equitable tolling and equitable estoppel.

Section 1983 claims in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations and the state's tolling rules.

Decarolis v. Town of Vienna · filed 2009-04-08

“[Federal constitutional claims, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are governed by New York’s three-year statute of limitations impersonal injury actions, as well as the state’s tolling rules.”

Section 1983 claims in Virginia have a two-year limitations period, and a claim alleging unconstitutional acts within two years before filing is timely.

Al-Amin v. Shear · filed 2009-04-10

The district court dismissed Al-Amin’s claims regarding Ramadan of 2001 as barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 suits in Virginia. ... The parties do not dispute that Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations applied to this equal protection claim. ... Because Al-Amin specifically alleged unconstitutional actions within two years prior to filing the complaint, his claim was improperly dismissed as untimely.

Section 1983 actions use the applicable state statute of limitations.

Ontiveros v. Los Angeles County · filed 2009-04-18

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions is determined by state law.

Section 1983 claims arising in Kentucky are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Bonner v. Perry · filed 2009-04-20

Thus, Bonner’s argument must fail, and a one-year statute of limitations must be applied to Bonner’s claim.

A Section 1983 claim based on an allegedly discriminatory discharge accrues when the discriminatory acts end.

Douchette v. Bethel School District No. 403 · filed 1991-11-14

She alleged the following causes of action: wrongful discharge; age discrimination in violation of both state law (RCW 49.60) and federal law (29 U.S.C. § 623); violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and the tort of outrage. ... We conclude Douchette's discharge became effective on February 15, 1983. No continuing acts of discrimination could have occurred after that date, thus all of her claims commenced running on that date.

Section 1983 claims may be timely when the statute of limitations is tolled while related state proceedings are pending.

Rodriguez v. Holmes · filed 1992-06-19

Thus, we hold that the statute of limitations was tolled during the period between September 1987 and November 1989 because Rodriguez' state suit was actually pending.

Section 1983 constitutional tort claims filed in Virginia are governed by the state’s two year personal injury limitations period.

Van Horn v. Lukhard · filed 1975-04-08

The Court, therefore, holds as a matter of federal law that the timeliness of § 1983 “constitutional tort” actions shall be governed by Virginia’s two year “personal injury” statute for the reasons enunciated by Judge Winter in Almond v. Kent, supra, 459 F.2d at 200.

Section 1983 claims filed in New York have a three-year limitations period, running from accrual unless an applicable toll suspends it.

Woods v. Candela · filed 1993-06-25

The statute of limitations governing claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in New York is three years. Because the claim accrued on September 25, 1989 but was not filed until May 1993, and no federal or New-York State provision for tolling the statute of limitations pertaining to § 1983 claims applies to the circumstances of this case, Plaintiffs claim for relief is time-barred and defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is granted in.its entirety.

Section 1983 claims based on these allegations are time barred.

Battle v. Sparks · filed 1993-11-22

Additionally, to the extent that Battle’s allegations are sufficient to support a possible violation of 42 USC § 1983, they are time barred.

For a Section 1983 claim challenging an agency decision, the limitations period begins when the agency issues its final decision.

McCoy v. San Francisco, City & County, a Municipal Corp. · filed 1994-01-07

We conclude that the written decision rather than the oral decision triggered the statute of limitations. Although McCoy “knew” of the Commission’s decision at the conclusion of the August 29 hearing, he also knew that the Commission would issue a more detailed written decision. That written decision supplied the rationale of the Commission, addressed the defenses raised by McCoy, and set the dates of the suspension. The written decision clearly was the “final decision” that triggered the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions use the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Watson v. Wigginton · filed 1994-01-24

In an action brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, federal courts apply the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are treated as personal injury actions subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Maxwell Downs, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1994-02-28

The statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Pennsylvania is two years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524. Montserrat’s cause of action arose on April 10, 1986, when the Art Commission denied it permission to construct the sidewalk cafe. Montserrat initiated its Section 1983 claim on April 4, 1989, more than two years after its cause of action accrued.

Section 1983 actions in Iowa are subject to the state's two-year limitations period for tort actions.

Triplett v. Azordegan · filed 1977-10-12

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has generally held § 1983 actions to fall within the two-year statute of limitations for torts. Though the court is uncomfortable with mechanically equating an action based on the deprivation of constitutional rights with a common law tort, overwhelming authority leads it to the conclusion that the case at bar is controlled by the two-year statute.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations, so courts apply the limitations period for the most closely analogous state action.

Willett v. Wells · filed 1977-10-25

42 U.S.C. § 1983 contains no statute of limitation, so this Court must apply the Tennessee statute of limitation which would be applicable in the most closely analogous state action.

Section 1983 claims for unconstitutional discharge in Puerto Rico use the Commonwealth’s one-year tort limitations period; an earlier related mandamus action does not toll it.

Matilde R. Ramirez De Arellano v. Jose A. Alvarez De Choudens, Etc. · filed 1978-05-10

Federal courts ordinarily look to the period of limitations applicable to the most closely analogous state cause of action to determine when a § 1983 suit is time barred. ... Because the mandamus action brought by plaintiff in the Commonwealth courts did not toll the one year statute of limitations, her claim was time barred and should have been dismissed.

Section 1983 damages claims against an Indiana public officer for acts in an official capacity are subject to a five-year statute of limitations.

Sacks Brothers Loan Co., Inc. v. James F. Cunningham, Etc. · filed 1978-05-24

Applying the approach taken in Beard and Teague v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 566 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1977), we hold that the five-year statute of limitations is applicable, so that plaintiff’s claim for damages may proceed for the years 1972-1974.

Section 1983 actions apply the relevant state limitations period and its tolling rules.

Betty Q. Keasler Rubin v. O'KOren · filed 1981-05-11

This is true because federal courts, in § 1983 actions, must not only apply the appropriate state statute of limitations, but also must apply the applicable state rule for tolling that statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the state's residual personal injury statute of limitations.

Kariniemi v. University of Minnesota · filed 1994-06-28

Although Kariniemi brought new equal protection and discrimination claims under Sec. 1981 and Sec. 1983 against the remaining defendants, we agree with the district court that these claims are barred by Minnesota statutes of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the general or residual personal-injury statute of limitations.

Gates v. Walker · filed 1994-09-12

The Jim Beam rule requires this court to give retroactive treatment to the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims established by the Owens decision.

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury.

Daugherty v. Sarasota County · filed 1994-09-20

To provide consistency in all claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the state statute of limitations used for personal injury is applied.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Shelford v. New York State Teachers Retirement System · filed 1994-10-11

Consequently, their claims are time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations on suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and their Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the applicable statute of limitations.

Bell v. Cox · filed 1994-10-17

Appellant appeals from the district court's orders denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) complaint and his motion for reconsideration. ... Appellant's complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations * and was, therefore, properly dismissed.

Section 1983 claims arising from this Massachusetts civil service promotion dispute are subject to a six-month limitations period.

Hussey v. James Leo Sullivan, Edward C. Hussey v. James Leo Sullivan · filed 1981-06-19

As stated in Burns, we consider it reasonable to require a plaintiff to bring actions of this type within six months of the occurrence of the alleged unlawful act.

Section 1983 claims based on third-party beneficiary rights under a written contract use the analogous state limitations period for written contracts.

Jones v. LOCAL 520, INTERN. U. OF OPER. ENGINEERS · filed 1981-10-05

By express statement of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, plaintiffs’ claim is based upon third party beneficiary rights. Thus, employing in this § 1981 and § 1983 action the most analogous statute of limitations of the state where the alleged deprivation of civil rights occurred, Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975), the ten (10) year statute of limitations applying to written contracts should apply.

Section 1983 claims arising in New York have a three-year limitations period; claims for unlawful searches accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Triestman v. Probst · filed 1995-09-06

For Section 1983 actions arising in New York, the statute of limitations is three years. ... Claims resulting from these searches accrued when the acts occurred on March 25 and 26, 1992, because plaintiff should have known or had reason to know of the injury.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a three-year limitations period, which CPLR § 208 does not toll when the plaintiff was able to protect her legal rights.

Wenzel v. Nassau County Police Department · filed 1996-02-14

Based on these facts, this Court adopts the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and holds that the three year statute of limitations applicable in section 1983 claims was not tolled during the period from May 1990 to October 1993.

Section 1983 claims based on incidents before the applicable limitations cutoff are time barred.

Beatty v. Debruyn · filed 1996-02-21

The statute of limitations bars Beatty's claims for incidents before November 1, 1991.

For a § 1983 action, state law supplies the limitations period, but federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Fiesel v. Board of Education · filed 1982-04-09

While the statute of limitations applicable to a section 1983 action is determined by reference to state law, Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 449 (2d Cir. 1980); Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d 726, 728 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830, 98 S.Ct. 112, 54 L.Ed.2d 90 (1977), accrual of the cause of action remains a question of federal law, Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 613 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 908, 101 S.Ct. 1975, 68 L.Ed.2d 295 (1981); Kaiser v. Cahn, 510 F.2d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 1974).

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania use the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Knoll v. Springfield Township School District · filed 1985-06-07

Pennsylvania has a two-year limitations period for actions to recover damages for personal injuries. ... Applying this statute to the facts before us, see 699 F.2d at 139, 145-46, appellant’s § 1983 action is not time-barred.

In a § 1983 action, federal law determines when the limitations period begins, while state tort law supplies the limitations period and tolling rules.

Rush v. Sch · filed 2000-09-29

In the context of a § 1983 action, federal law governs the date on which the statute begins to run, while state tort law governs the limitation period and tolling provisions.

Section 1983 actions filed in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period.

Kastaleba v. Judge · filed 2009-04-28

Thus, in Pennsylvania, the limitations period for a § 1983 action is two years.

Section 1983 claims that accrued in California before January 1, 2003, are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Senator v. City of Orange Police Department · filed 2009-04-28

The district court correctly determined that Senator’s claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations to the extent that they were based on events that took place in 1998 or earlier. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954-55 (9th Cir.2004) (explaining that California’s one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to § 1983 claims that accrued prior to January 1, 2003).

A § 1983 claim may be untimely when a claimant fails to diligently seek available court authority to assert an estate’s property rights, even if that effort might fail.

Stone v. Whitman · filed 2009-04-29

Thus, Ms. Stone could have petitioned the court to allow her to make a claim on behalf of the estate. Moreover, the district court did not conclude that Ms. Stone’s § 1983 claim was untimely because she actually failed to retrieve the guns; rather, the court noted that Ms. Stone had not been reasonably diligent in attempting to retrieve them. Petitioning the court to make a claim on behalf of Mr. Breeden’s estate, even if ultimately unsuccessful, would have satisfied this legal prerequisite.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period borrowed from the state’s personal injury statute.

Hunt Ex Rel. Chiovari v. Dart · filed 2009-04-30

Plaintiffs federal claim under § 1983 is governed by a two-year statute of limitations. This limitation period is drawn from Illinois’ statute of limitation applicable to personal injury claims.

Section 1983 claims in Tennessee are subject to a one-year limitations period; a continuing violation can keep older acts from being barred.

Enochs v. Willard · filed 1996-05-31

Here, plaintiff's claims that his treatment was unconstitutional involves actions which occurred beyond the applicable one-year statute of limitations. See Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir.1984); Wright v. Tennessee, 628 F.2d 949, 951 (6th Cir.1980) (en banc). Further, plaintiff's claims do not involve a continuing violation not barred under the statute of limitations.

An internal grievance procedure or collateral review of an employment decision does not toll the limitations period for a § 1983 claim.

Wagner v. TEXAS a & M UNIVERSITY · filed 1996-09-10

The court need not determine whether negotiations between Wagner and TAMU constitute a grievance procedure, because grievance procedures and collateral reviews of employment decisions do not toll the running of limitations periods under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims in Colorado are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Workman v. Colorado DOC · filed 1996-11-04

The district court applied Colorado's two-year statute of limitations for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and dismissed the action. Mr. Workman appeals the district court's dismissal, arguing the two-year statute "should be tolled because of its being inadequate." We find Mr. Workman's argument on appeal lacks merit. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED for substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a limitations period, and claims filed after it expires are barred.

Robertson v. City of Sugarland · filed 1996-11-19

The district court did not err by dismissing Robertson’s § 1983 action as barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in New Jersey, including inverse condemnation claims, are subject to the state’s two year personal injury statute of limitations.

287 Corporate Center Associates v. The Township of Bridgewater, a Municipal Corporation of the State of New Jersey · filed 1996-11-27

Therefore, we will affirm the district court’s application of New Jersey’s two year statute of limitations to Associate’s § 1983 action.

Section 1983 false arrest claims arising in Illinois have a two-year limitations period.

Brooks v. City of Chicago · filed 2009-05-01

The applicable statute of limitations for a § 1983 false arrest claim arising in Illinois is two years.

Section 1983 claims in Kentucky are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Anderson v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF FAYETTE COUNTY · filed 2009-05-01

Accordingly, a one year statute of limitations applies to the causes of action alleged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 20 U.S.C. § 1681.

Section 1983 actions filed in Louisiana are subject to a one-year limitations period.

Gleason v. Pattison · filed 2009-05-01

Louisiana Civil Code article 3492’s one-year prescriptive period applies to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims in New Jersey are subject to the state's two year personal injury statute of limitations, including claims for inverse condemnation.

287 Corp Ctr Assoc v. Bridgewater Twp. · filed 1996-11-27

Therefore, we will affirm the district court's application of New Jersey's two year statute of limitations to Associate's § 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims in the Sixth Circuit have a two-year statute of limitations.

Yanacos v. LAKE COUNTY, OH · filed 1996-12-23

It is well established in the Sixth Circuit, that the statute of limitations for claims filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is two years after the discrimination occurs.

Section 1983 claims in California are subject to the one-year limitations period in Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340(3), not the period in Cal.Gov't.Code § 945.6.

Chatman v. County of Santa Clara · filed 1997-01-27

Williams v. Horvath, 129 Cal.Rptr. 453, 457-58 (1976) (section 1983 claims not subject to Tort Claims Act), therefore, Gov't.Code § 945.6 cannot serve as the limitations period for § 1983 or § 1985 actions. The appropriate statute of limitations in this case is § 340(3).

Section 1983 claims in Arizona are subject to the two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Madden-Tyler v. Maricopa County · filed 1997-03-06

Therefore, we hold that the two-year limitations period of A.R.S. § 12-542(1) applies to appellant’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims are governed by a three-year statute of limitations.

Abbott v. Town of Delaware · filed 1997-04-24

A cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 is governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations (see, Corvetti v Town of Lake Pleasant, 227 AD2d 821, 824; see also, Owens v Okure, 488 US 235, 249-250).

Section 1983 actions use the forum state's personal injury statute of limitations.

Castillo v. Blanco · filed 2009-05-15

When a plaintiff brings a § 1983 action in federal court, the court applies the personal injury statute of limitations of the forum state.

A Section 1983 action based on a November 1987 incident and filed in September 2006 is time-barred under the applicable limitations rules.

Robinson v. Beor · filed 2009-05-26

The district court properly dismissed the action as time-barred because the action relates to an alleged incident that occurred on November 30, 1987, and Robinson did not initiate the action until September 28, 2006.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland · filed 2009-06-01

Under Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit case law, § 1983 claims are subject to Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations governing personal injury actions. ... As she filed her Complaint on October 14, 2008, the Court is barred from considering it due to the statute of limitations.

A Section 1983 retaliation claim accrues when the plaintiff learns of each separate retaliatory act.

Morin v. Tormey · filed 2009-06-03

Instead, each of plaintiffs claims accrued when she learned of each separate act of retaliation committed by defendants. Any other result would frustrate the purpose of retaliation claims brought pursuant to § 1983 as a defendant could simply wait three years before discharging an employee in retaliation for exercising her right to free speech.

In New Jersey, a § 1983 claim filed more than two years after the alleged wrong is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Juan v. Sanchez · filed 2009-06-05

Juan filed his § 1983, § 1981, and state law claims based on this refusal more than two years later, in November 2007. Accordingly, the claims against Johnson and Gerstein were properly dismissed as barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Taney v. Town of Waterloo · filed 1997-12-31

The three-year Statute of Limitations with respect to the 42 USC § 1983 cause of action, however, has not expired.

Defendants who plead the statute of limitations in their answers do not waive that defense to § 1983 claims by omitting it from a pre-answer motion when the plaintiffs suffer no prejudice.

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency · filed 1998-01-28

Therefore, we hold that the defendants have not waived their right to raise the correct statute of limitations for § 1983 claims as a defense to the plaintiffs’ claims against the 1987 Plan, and that the plaintiffs’ claims against the 1987 Plan are in fact barred by this statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Washington are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Conway v. Standard Insurance · filed 1998-08-04

In sum, the three year statute applies to all claims, but even if the six-year statute were applied, only the ADA claims would arguably survive assuming, as does plaintiff, that they , accrued on the effective date of the Act.

The three-year limitations period for a § 1983 action begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Griswold v. Driscoll · filed 2009-06-10

For § 1983 actions, the three-year statute of limitations begins to run “when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury on which the action is based.”

Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Smith v. Municipality of Lycoming County · filed 2009-06-12

A two-year statute of limitations governs the claims Smith brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal injury limitations period, and untimely claims must be dismissed.

Gillis v. Taylor · filed 2009-06-18

In identifying the applicable statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim, the court uses the limitations period provided for personal injury torts within the state it sits. ... Accordingly, the court applies a two-year statute of limitations to § 1983 claims. ... A § 1983 claim not filed within two years of having accrued is time-barred and must be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims in Florida use a four-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Sairras v. Schleffer · filed 2009-06-22

Sairras did not file his § 1983 claim within Florida’s four-year statute of limitations for filing personal injury actions.

Section 1983 uses the forum state's general personal injury limitations period when it has no limitations period of its own.

Miles v. Vanderburgh County Jail · filed 2009-06-25

Indiana indeed has a five-year statute of limitations for suits filed against a sheriff for acts performed in an official capacity, Ind.Code § 34-11-2-6, but § 1983 — which does not have its own statute of limitations — incorporates the forum state’s limitations period for personal-injury claims, Malone v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 553 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir.2009); Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 521 (7th Cir.2001).

A Section 1983 action can be barred by the statute of limitations.

Peabody v. Wackenhut Corp · filed 1998-08-27

Ap- pellant’s action under § 1983 was barred by the statute of limita- tions and was not cognizable against the private Defendants.

Section 1983 borrows state limitations law, including an applicable state savings statute.

Chao v. Ballista · filed 2009-07-01

And because Section 1983 draws upon state law for its statute of limitations, a state savings statute like Mass. Gen. L. ch. 260, § 32 is applicable.

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot use Alabama’s fictitious-party relation-back rules to save a claim if the plaintiff failed to diligently identify the defendants.

Mann v. Darden · filed 2009-07-02

Thus, the court cannot find that Mann exercised due diligence in pursuing the identity of the defendants. ... As a result, Mann’s claim under § 1983 is time-barred, and summary judgment will entered in favor of Darden and Emmanuel on this claim.

Section 1983 claims in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations borrowed from state personal injury law.

Alaimo v. TRI-VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. · filed 2009-07-06

Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not specify a statute of limitations, federal courts apply the analogous state period for personal injury claims. ... Thus, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

In Georgia, a § 1983 action has a two-year limitations period; a claim challenging a prison grooming policy accrues when the policy is first applied to the prisoner.

Price v. Owens · filed 2009-07-08

A two-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 actions filed in a Georgia district court. ... This Court agrees with Defendants’ argument that the basis of Plaintiffs claim is the application of the grooming policy to him, not each individual hair cut. Thus, Plaintiffs injury occurred in 2001, when he should have discovered the factual predicate for his claim.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury and who inflicted it; disputed knowledge may leave a limitations defense for the jury.

M.S. ex rel. Soltys v. Seminole County School Board · filed 2009-07-10

Under the facts of this case, the question of when M.S.’s parents knew or should have known of the abusive conduct inflicted upon M.S. and who inflicted it are questions of fact for a jury to decide, especially in light of the nature of the alleged injuries.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own; claims brought in Rhode Island use the three-year period for personal injuries.

Paul v. City of Woonsocket · filed 2000-02-11

Since 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, federal courts are “required to apply the state statute of limitations which governs the forum state’s most analogous cause of action.” ... The appropriate residual statute for personal injury claims is § 9 — 1—14(b).

Section 1983 actions in Arkansas are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

White v. Rogers · filed 2000-06-29

We also agree White's action was time-barred. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-105 (Michie 1994) (three-year statute of limitations); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985); O'Mara v. Dykema, 942 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Ark. 1997).

A § 1983 takings claim challenging an ordinance accrues when the ordinance clearly and concretely interferes with the property's primary use.

New Pulaski Co v. Mayor & City Council · filed 2000-07-20

(Maryland's three-year statute, embodied in Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101, applies to this § 1983 action.) ... For all of the foregoing reasons we hold that Pulaski's claim accrued upon the enactment of the Moratorium, for that was when the City interfered with Pulaski's use of its property in a clear, concrete fashion.

A § 1983 claim filed six months after it accrued is not barred by a two-year limitations period.

Picht v. PEORIA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 11 OF MARICOPA COUNTY · filed 2009-07-16

Plaintiffs § 1983 claim is based on the non-renewal of his employment contract in April 2007. (Doc. 1-3 at 13.) Defendants do not explain how a two-year limitation period bars an action commenced 6 months after the claim accrued, and therefore Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this basis.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico are subject to a one-year limitations period from accrual.

Marrero-Colón v. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority · filed 2009-07-17

In Puerto Rico, one must bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 within one year of the time the cause of action accrues.

A § 1983 retaliation claim based on acts indicating a continuing practice can survive a statute of limitations defense.

Huppert v. City of Pittsburg · filed 2009-07-21

We therefore disregard the City's argument that the statute of limitation bars this portion of Huppert’s claim.

Section 1983 claims in New Jersey are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Schottanes v. Borough of North Haledon · filed 2009-07-23

The counts in Schottanes’s complaint are premised on his claims that the conduct of the Borough and Ferrantes either violated his civil rights (actionable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983) or constituted tortious activity; as a result, the applicable statute of limitations period for all claims in the complaint is two years.

Section 1983 claims in the District of Columbia are governed by the three-year residual limitations period, even when they overlap state-law claims.

Parker v. Grand Hyatt Hotel · filed 2000-11-06

In this case, D.C.Code § 12-301(8)’s three-year limitations period serves as the residual statute of limitations that applies to the plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 actions in Puerto Rico have a one-year limitations period.

Burgos-Hernandez v. Laboy · filed 2000-12-04

The court concluded that the transfer claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions in Puerto Rico. We agree.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the forum State's statute of limitations; repeated effects of a single wrongful act do not establish a continuing violation.

Shewchun, PHD v. State of Rhode Islan · filed 2001-01-29

The district court held that plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were barred by the forum State's statute of limitations. ... Reviewing the preserved issues de novo in light of the briefs and the record on appeal, we agree with the district court that the suit was filed almost eight years too late.

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Polite v. Town of Clarkstown · filed 2001-02-06

The statute of limitations applicable to actions commenced under Section 1983 is three years.

Section 1983 suits use state limitations periods and tolling rules, while federal common law determines when a claim accrues.

Delbert Heard v. Sheahan · filed 2001-06-13

The statute of limitations for suits under section 1983 is supplied by state law--not only the limitations period but also the tolling rules. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975). Tolling interrupts the statute of limitations after it has begun to run, but does not determine when it begins to run; that question is the question of accrual, Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1991), and in section 1983 suits as in other suits under federal law the answer is furnished by federal common law rather than by state law.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, so courts apply the most appropriate state limitations period.

Karlen Ex Rel. J.K. v. Westport Board of Education · filed 2009-07-29

There is no statute of limitations contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, the court must apply the most appropriate state statute of limitations.

A two-year limitations period bars untimely § 1983 claims.

Miller v. Dewberry · filed 2001-02-14

The 1996 incident is plainly barred by the two-year statute of limitations, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Miller’s remaining allegations as ... frivolous.

Section 1983 claims in Washington are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Walls v. Pierce County Sheriff'S Dept. · filed 2009-07-30

The district court properly entered summary judgment because Walls filed his complaint more than three years after his claims accrued.

A § 1983 challenge to Ohio’s lethal-injection protocol accrues no later than Ohio’s 2001 adoption of lethal injection as its sole execution method, and Baze did not restart the two-year limitations period.

Getsy v. Strickland · filed 2009-08-13

This means that, under Cooey II, Getsy’s two-year statute of limitations began to accrue in 2001, when Ohio adopted lethal injection as its exclusive method of execution. But Getsy’s complaint was not filed until May 2007, several years after the two-year time frame had already elapsed. We therefore conclude that Getsy’s constitutional challenge to the Ohio’s lethal-injection protocol should be dismissed as untimely pursuant to Cooey II.

A § 1983 claim challenging a permit denial has a two-year limitations period that begins with the agency’s final decision on that permit application.

Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Authority · filed 2009-08-14

For each of their orchards, the Braggs applied to the Authority for a permit and the Authority issued a final decision, triggering a separate two year § 1983 statute of limitations with each decision.

A § 1983 complaint may be time-barred even if the plaintiff discovers the legal basis for the claim later.

Wilson v. Wilson · filed 2001-08-23

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Wilson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, which alleged a conspiracy to falsely arrest him for, and accuse and convict him of rape and kidnaping from October 1982 through March 1983, as time-barred.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s personal injury limitations period.

Chatterjee v. School District of Philadelphia · filed 2001-10-02

There is no federal statute of limitations for actions under §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985(3); the limitations period is determined with reference to the common law of personal injury in the forum state.

A § 1983 action is time-barred when filed after the applicable limitations period, measured from when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.

Markay v. Gomez · filed 2002-02-22

Because Markay did not file the instant complaint until March 4, 1996, over six years after he first knew, or should have known, of his injury, the district court properly dismissed his action as time-barred.

Section 1983 claims filed in Maryland are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Knickman v. Prince George's County · filed 2002-03-06

Maryland law requires that a civil action be brought within three years of the date that it accrues. ... The Supreme Court has held that the state statutes of limitations for state tort claims such as false arrest, assault and battery, or personal injuries apply to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Accordingly, Counts I, II, III, VII, and VIII of Plaintiffs complaint are barred by the applicable statute of limitations as to all defendants.

Section 1983 damages claims in Colorado are subject to a two-year limitations period; a later license issuance does not extend that period without a continuing violation.

Ortiz v. Durland · filed 2002-03-11

Plaintiff Martin J. Ortiz, appearing pro se, appeals from the dismissal of his claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. ... We are unpersuaded by plaintiff’s claim that he showed a continuing violation until April 30, 1999. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s decision that the suit is barred by the statute of limitations.

A § 1983 action filed in Washington is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Kim v. Targa Real Estate Service, Inc. · filed 2009-08-19

The district court properly dismissed Kim’s action because it was filed well after the applicable three-year statute of limitations had expired. See Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir.1991) (explaining that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 action filed in Washington “is the three-year limitation of Wash. Rev.Code § 4.16.080(2)”).

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois follow the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Brooks v. Ross · filed 2009-08-20

A plaintiff in Illinois must pursue a personal injury action within 2 years from the accrual of the claim. 735 ILCS 5/13-202. Brooks’s § 1983 claims follow suit.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Santana-Castro v. Toledo-Davila · filed 2009-08-27

Plaintiffs' complaint brought claims under § 1983, which borrows the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Rodríguez-García v. Municipality of Caguas, 354 F.3d 91, 96 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Wilson v. García, 471 U.S. 261, 277-80 (1985)).

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own; claims under it in Pennsylvania use the state's two-year personal-injury period.

Jackson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 2009-08-31

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, courts look to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which requires use of the statute of limitations for the state where the federal court sits, unless its application would conflict with the Constitution or with federal law. ... As Pennsylvania sets forth a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524 (2004), that same two-year period is applicable to Plaintiffs section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims arising in Arizona are subject to the state's two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Atanasoff v. Town of Fountain Hills · filed 2002-04-16

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Atanasoff s claims are time-barred.

Section 1983 actions in Texas are subject to a two-year limitations period that begins when the claim accrues; imprisonment does not toll it.

Gonzalez v. Prasifka · filed 2002-10-29

Although Texas law formerly considered imprisonment to be a disability which tolled the running of the statute of limitations, the former ... Article 5535 was repealed effective September 1, 1987, and the two-year limitations period now begins to run when the cause of action accrues. ... Therefore, the magistrate judge did not err in dismissing Gonzalez’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Colorado are subject to a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and its cause.

P.R. v. Zavaras · filed 2002-10-30

Plaintiffs’ claims are governed by Colo. Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102, which requires a civil suit to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. ... For plaintiffs’ federal claims, “[t]he statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know the existence and cause of the injury which is the basis of his action. A plaintiff has reason to know of his injury when he should have discovered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.”

Section 1983 claims filed in Michigan are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Cantu v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2009-09-01

Contrary to this assertion, for civil rights suits filed in federal court in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. ... Because Plaintiff filed suit on January 22, 2007, all constitutional claims based on events subsequent to January 22, 2004 are actionable.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury and who inflicted it, and Florida's limitations period is four years.

Aruanno v. Martin County Sheriff · filed 2009-09-01

A cause of action for a § 1983 claim accrues when “the plaintiffs know or should know (1) that they have suffered the injury that forms the basis of their complaint and (2) who has inflicted the injury.” Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003). In Florida, the statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims is four years. Id.

Section 1983 claims may use the continuing violation doctrine when an ongoing policy of deliberate indifference and acts furthering that policy occur within the limitations period.

Shomo v. City of New York · filed 2009-09-02

We hold that the continuing violation doctrine can apply to Eighth Amendment claims of medical indifference brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the plaintiff shows an ongoing policy of deliberate indifference to his or her serious medical needs and some acts in furtherance of the policy within the relevant statute of limitations period.

Section 1983 claims are subject to Arkansas’s three-year statute of limitations.

Kentrell Hill v. Officer Reyes · filed 2009-09-08

Arkansas inmate Kentrell Hill appeals the district court’s1 dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint as time-barred by Arkansas’s three-year statute of limitations. Upon de novo review, see Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d 316, 317 (8th Cir. 2004), we conclude dismissal was proper for the reasons stated by the district court. Accordingly, we affirm.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, and discrete discriminatory acts are not treated as a continuing violation.

Smith v. Township of East Greenwich · filed 2009-09-08

The District Court applied the two-year statute of limitations of both § 1983 and NJLAD and concluded that all of her claims were barred except for the failure to promote her to lieutenant in 2005 and for the disciplinary action that was initiated for conduct that occurred in 2003. The District Court properly rejected Smith’s continuing violation theory because each alleged act of discrimination was a discrete employment act — either a failure to promote or a disciplinary action.

Section 1983 claims arising before the applicable limitations date are barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations.

Webb v. North Carolina Department of Crime Control & Public Safety, Alcohol Law Enforcement Division · filed 2009-09-11

To the extent that Webb seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, any claim arising before June 3, 2005, is barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 method-of-execution claims are subject to a statute of limitations.

Richard Cooey, II v. Strickland · filed 2009-09-23

Arthur Tyler appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenge to Ohio’s method of execution. ... After this Court held that Cooey’s challenge was time-barred, Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 424 (6th Cir. 2007), the district court dismissed Tyler’s complaint on the same grounds. ... The reasoning set forth in Broom, Getsy, and Cooey II is binding on this panel and, to the extent the cases have already addressed Tyler’s arguments, we adopt their reasoning here.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury suits.

James v. Richardson · filed 2009-09-24

For actions brought under § 1983, federal courts look to the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury suits.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period.

Redford v. Gwinnett County Judicial Circuit · filed 2009-09-25

Federal courts apply their forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims challenging a method of execution are subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period even when they seek only injunctive relief.

Chester v. Beard · filed 2009-09-28

Considering this, together with the fact that the Third Circuit has previously stated that § 1983 claims seeking injunctive relief are subject to statutes of limitation, and the fact that the literal language of Wilson extends to all § 1983 actions, the Court can only conclude that the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s lethal injection protocol is governed by a two-year limitations period.

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Atwell v. Schweiker · filed 2009-09-29

Claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 has no federal limitations period; courts borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Wilke v. Meyer · filed 2009-10-01

There is no federal statute of limitations for §1983 claims and the federal courts borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

State law governs the statute of limitations and tolling in § 1983 actions.

Bloom v. McPherson · filed 2009-10-05

While exhaustion is required by federal statute, we have otherwise held state law governs statute of limitations and tolling issues in § 1983 actions.

An ongoing sanction does not make a § 1983 claim a continuing violation; tolling requires a class-wide policy rather than discrete acts directed at the plaintiff.

Cherry v. City of Bowling Green, Kentucky · filed 2009-10-05

Mere continuity of a sanction does not make it a continuing violation; and Cherry’s allegations, if credited, would show only “discrete acts of discrimination” against him personally, id. at 267, not the class-wide policy necessary for the doctrine to apply. ... The district court was correct, therefore, to hold that Cherry’s § 1983 claim was time-barred.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Roselle v. United States · filed 2009-10-06

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Scott because the claims against him are time-barred. See Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara, 344 F.3d 822, 828 (9th Cir.2003) (“The applicable statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.”); Mont.Code Ann. § 27-2-204(1) (statute of limitations governing personal injury actions is three years).

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury claims; in California, the applicable period for a claim accruing in 2004 is two years.

COMMITTEE CONCERNING COMMUNITY IMP. v. Modesto · filed 2009-10-08

Claims under § 1983 are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury claims. In California, that state rule is two years; however, prior to 2003, the rule was one year. The District Court does not appear to have decided whether the two-year or one-year limitation applied. Because we conclude that the plaintiffs can base their claims on the express renewal of the MTSA in 2004, the claim accrued at that time, and the two-year period applies.

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Committee Concerning Community Improvement v. City of Modesto · filed 2009-10-08

Claims under § 1983 are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 personal injury claims use the state limitations period for personal injury torts.

Miranda v. Young · filed 2009-10-09

State limitations periods for personal injury torts apply to a section 1983 action for ... personal injuries, and thus the four-year statute of limitations would still apply under a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Greer v. Diguglielmo · filed 2009-10-09

The District Court correctly applied Pennsylvania’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations, given that section 1983 claims are subject to the state’s statute of limitations governing personal injury actions.

The limitations period for § 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims begins when the alleged false imprisonment ends.

Lynch v. Suffolk County Police Department, Inc. · filed 2009-10-14

For a § 1983 claim of false imprisonment — and for a claim of false arrest, which is a “species” of false imprisonment — the statute of limitations begins to run “when the alleged false imprisonment ends.”

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's general personal injury limitations period, which is three years in New York.

Murray v. Goord · filed 2009-10-19

Consistent with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the applicable limitations period is derived from the general or residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions under the laws of the forum state, see Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 582, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989), plaintiffs claim in this action is governed by the three-year statute of limitations which applies in New York to personal injury claims of an otherwise unspecified nature.

Section 1983 claims use the personal-injury statute of limitations of the state where the claim arose.

Hall v. Spencer County, Ky. · filed 2009-10-20

For claims under Section 1983, the Court applies the statute of limitations for personal-injury tort actions in the state where the cause of action originated.

Section 1983 claims use the personal-injury statute of limitations of the state where the claim arose.

Hall v. Spencer County, Kentucky · filed 2009-10-20

For claims under Section 1983, the Court applies the statute of limitations for personal-injury tort actions in the state where the cause of action originated.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, and the court rejected tolling for a claim filed more than four years after the alleged retaliation.

County of Hudson v. Janiszewski · filed 2009-10-22

This time frame is well beyond § 1983’s two-year statute of limitations, and Sandoval’s arguments for tolling are unpersuasive.

A state court action tolls the limitations period for a Section 1983 claim when the state and federal actions seek the same relief, rest on the same substantive claim, and name the same defendant.

Colón-Rivera v. Asociación De Suscripción Conjunta Del Seguro De Responsabilidad Obligatorio · filed 2009-10-26

To meet the identicality requirement, the new federal complaint must: (1) seek the same form of relief as the state complaint; (2) have causes of action based on the same substantive claims as the state complaint; and (3) be asserted against the same defendants. ... As a result, the statute of limitations was tolled by the state action and therefore Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim is timely.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period, and ordinarily accrue when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.

Koehnke v. City of McKeesport · filed 2009-10-28

Claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the statute of limitations “which the State provides for personal-injury torts,” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007), which in Pennsylvania is two years.

A § 1983 claim arising in Florida must be filed within four years of the alleged unconstitutional or illegal act.

Driessen v. Florida Department of Children & Families · filed 2009-10-29

“[A] plaintiff must commence a § 1983 claim arising in Florida within four years of the allegedly unconstitutional or otherwise illegal act.”

Section 1983 actions are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

D'Alfonso v. Carpino · filed 2009-11-17

An action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is subject to the state statute of limitations governing personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims use the most analogous state law statute of limitations.

Everett v. Cherry · filed 2009-11-20

Federal courts apply the most analogous state law statute of limitations in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Accordingly, this two-year statute of limitations also applies to the Plaintiff's § 1983 claim.

A Section 1983 claim is untimely when filed more than two years after the plaintiff knew the facts needed to assert it.

Crawford v. Washington County Children & Youth Services · filed 2009-11-24

From the removal to the termination of their parental rights, Appellants had the facts necessary to assert their Section 1983 claim and failed to do so until December 22, 2006. Their claim is untimely.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Wright v. Drug Enforcement Agency · filed 2009-11-30

Claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 actions use the state limitations period for personal-injury torts.

Chen v. Township of Fairfield · filed 2009-12-02

The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions “is that which the State provides for personal-injury torts.”