42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 actions brought in New York are subject to a three-year limitations period derived from the state’s personal injury law.

Styles v. Goord · filed 2005-05-02

“A three-year statute of limitations, derived from New York’s general personal injury statute of limitations, is applied to § 1983 actions brought in New York.”

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, so courts borrow state limitations and tolling rules.

Wilson v. Hamilton · filed 2005-05-06

Because § 1983 itself does not have a statute of limitations, federal courts borrow statutes of limitation and tolling provisions from state law.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the alleged injury occurred.

Behavioral Institute of Indiana, LLC and 61st Avenue Building, LLC v. Hobart City of Common Council, School City of Hoba · filed 2005-05-09

Section 1983 claims are subject to the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state in which the alleged injury occurred.

Section 1983 claims use the state personal injury statute of limitations, which is three years in Michigan.

Bradley v. MacOmb County · filed 2005-05-17

The Sixth Circuit has stated that “[i]t is well established that the appropriate statute of limitations for actions under § 1983 is the state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions.” ... The Sixth Circuit further noted that “Michigan has a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.” ... The alleged injury in this case occurred on August 23, 2001. Thus, the three-year statute of limitations expired on August 23, 2004.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York have a three-year limitations period.

Hussain v. COMMISSIONER (JD) NASSAU CNTY. PD · filed 2005-05-18

The statute of limitations for claims brought in New York under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 is three years.

Section 1983 claims challenging the October 2000 seizures and removal were subject to a two-year limitations period.

Zolbrod v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Service · filed 2005-05-18

The Zolbrods’ challenges to the October 2000 seizures of Barbara, Regina, and Catherine and the forced removal of Morilun from the family home at that time are barred by the applicable two-year limitations period.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York have a three-year limitations period.

Hussain v. Commissioner (John Doe) of the Nassau County Police Department · filed 2005-05-18

The statute of limitations for claims brought in New York under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 is three years.

Section 1983 claims brought in federal court in Utah are subject to a four-year limitations period.

Curiale v. Hawkins · filed 2005-05-19

We find no error in either the magistrate judge’s application of the statute of limitations to the claims based on Mr. Curiale’s 1996-97 commitment or her recommendation to dismiss his claims that Defendants’ statements violated his civil rights.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico are subject to the forum’s one-year personal injury statute of limitations.

JIMENEZ v. University of Puerto Rico · filed 2005-05-24

The First Circuit Court of Appeals has more than established that the applicable statute of limitations for suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state’s statute of limitation for personal injury which, in Puerto Rico, is one (1) year.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury actions.

Howell v. Smith · filed 2005-06-14

Because this is a § 1983 action, the applicable statute of limitations is the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 actions in Washington are subject to a three-year limitations period under Wash. Rev.Code § 4.16.080.

Blatt v. Deede · filed 2005-06-22

The district court properly concluded that Blatt’s current action was untimely pursuant to Wash. Rev.Code § 4.16.080 because the action was filed more than three years after the alleged events.

Section 1983 claims must be dismissed when they are time-barred.

Atanasoff v. Town of Fountain Hills · filed 2005-06-22

The district court properly dismissed Atanasoffs action because his claims are time-barred.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Jones v. Falor · filed 2005-06-23

As an initial matter, the District Court correctly applied the two-year statute of limitations period for a Pennsylvania § 1983 action to bar any claim predicated upon acts or events that occurred more than two years prior to Jones’ filing of his initial Complaint on December 29, 2003.

Section 1983 claims in Oregon are subject to a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Wimberly v. Kitzhaber · filed 2005-06-24

The district court properly dismissed this civil rights action under Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, see Cooper v. City of Ashland, 871 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir.1989) (citing Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110(1)), because it is clear from the face of the complaint that the statute had expired before Wimberly filed the action, and Wimberly cannot prove the statute was tolled, see Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir.1980).

Section 1983 claims generally use the applicable state personal injury limitations period, which begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the alleged injury.

Sidney v. Wilson · filed 2005-06-24

“The statute of limitations for a [Section] 1983 claim is generally the applicable state-law period for personal-injury torts.” ... The limitation period for actions brought under Section 1983 begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the alleged injury.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state's personal-injury statute of limitations, while federal law determines when the limitations period begins to run.

Wolfe v. Perry · filed 2005-06-27

Because Congress did not specifically adopt a statute of limitations governing § 1983 actions, “federal courts must borrow the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state in which the section 1983 action was brought.”

Section 1983 claims based on these California prison board decisions were barred when filed after the applicable one-year limitations period.

Monk v. Koening · filed 2005-06-28

The district court correctly held that causes of action based on the Board’s 1992 decision were barred under the one-year statute of limitations, former CahCode Civ. Proc. § 340(3). ... Accordingly, any causes of action based on the 2001 decision also are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions use the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the alleged violation occurred.

Mun v. University of Alaska at Anchorage · filed 2005-06-29

The statute of limitations governing a § 1983 action is the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state where the alleged § 1983 violation occurred.

Section 1983 claims alleging constitutional due process violations in Washington are subject to the state’s three year limitations period for personal injury torts.

Nieshe v. Concrete School District · filed 2005-07-05

Thus, the three year statute of limitations ... for personal injury torts under Washington law applies to a § 1983 action alleging due process violations.

Section 1983 tort claims in Puerto Rico are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Morales v. Fantauzzi · filed 2005-07-07

The statute of limitations that applies to a tort case arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the one-year period established in Article 1868, 31 P.R. Laws. Ann. § 5298, of the Puerto Rico Civil Code.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations.

Burkley v. Correctional Healthcare Management of Oklahoma, Inc. · filed 2005-07-08

Section 1983 claims are “best characterized as personal injury actions” and as a result, “the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations should be applied.”

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are governed by the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Mitchell v. Guzick · filed 2005-07-12

Moreover, under Garcia, Mitchell’s federal § 1983 abuse of process claim is also governed by this two-year statute of limitations period.

Section 1983 claims brought in Idaho are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Martin v. School District No. 394 · filed 2005-07-14

Thus, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions in Idaho must meet the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions established by Idaho Code § 5-219(4).

Section 1983 claims in Washington are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Kelley v. Lake Forest Park City · filed 2005-07-15

The district court properly determined that Kelley’s federal claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. See Wash. Rev.Code § 4.16.080(2); RK Ventures, Inc., 307 F.3d at 1058 (applying state statute of limitations to claims brought under sections 1983 and 1985).

Section 1983 claims use the statute of limitations of the state where the violation occurred.

Hoagland, Daniel v. Clear Lake Indiana · filed 2005-07-18

For §§ 1983 and 1985 claims, the statute of limita- tions is determined by the law of the state in which the violation took place.

Section 1983 claims use the limitations period of the state where the violation occurred; in Indiana, that period is two years.

Hoagland v. Town Of Clear Lake · filed 2005-07-18

For §§ 1983 and 1985 claims, the statute of limitations is determined by the law of the state in which the violation took place. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Indiana's statute of limitations for personal injury claims is 2 years.

For § 1983 claims in Illinois that accrued before Wilson v. Garcia, the court applied the limitations rule to set the class period at five years before the action was filed.

Doulin v. City of Chicago · filed 1987-04-20

This case was filed as a class action on November 3, 1982, before Wilson. Accordingly, the statute of limitations period for class members began on November 3, 1977.

Section 1983 actions brought in Ohio are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Michael Valan, Iii, Richard Alexander v. Gerald T. McFaul Bruce Stafford · filed 1987-05-22

In Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 2901 (1986), this court held that Ohio's one-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. SS 2305.11, governs actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Plaintiff does not dispute that all of his claims arose on or before the date of his discharge on November 22, 1983. The district court, accordingly, correctly determined that plaintiff's action was barred because it was not filed within one year after the alleged cause of action arose.

A § 1983 claim that accrued in Illinois before Wilson v. Garcia is time-barred if filed more than five years after accrual.

Bieneman v. City of Chicago · filed 1987-06-08

Because Bieneman’s cause of action under § 1983 arose in 1976, more than five years before he brought this suit, the statute of limitations bars his claim.

A § 1983 action may be dismissed as time-barred under Minnesota’s statute of limitations.

Olson v. City of Sartell · filed 2005-07-19

Minnesota inmate Vernon Olson appeals the district court’s1 dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as time-barred by Minnesota’s statute of limitations. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm.

Section 1983 claims arising in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Michels v. Greenwood Lake Police Department · filed 2005-08-02

Section 1983 claims arising in the State of New York are governed by a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 has no specific limitations period, so courts apply the most analogous period provided by state law.

Leech v. Andrews · filed 2005-08-03

Because there is no specific statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal courts must adopt the most analogous limitations period provided by state law.

Section 1983 claims brought in Washington are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Galberth v. Washington · filed 2005-08-04

The district court properly determined that appellants’ federal claims, filed more than five years after the state court decision, were barred by a three-year statute of limitations. See Wash. Rev.Code § 4.16.080(2); RK Ventures, Inc., 307 F.3d at 1058 (applying state statute of limitations to claims brought under sections 1983 and 1985).

Section 1983 actions are governed by the applicable state statute of limitations.

Laney Brentwood Homes, LLC v. Town of Collierville · filed 2005-08-08

A section 1983 action alleging a violation of civil rights or personal injuries is governed by the applicable state’s statute of limitations.

Filing an administrative complaint did not toll the limitations period for this § 1983 claim through the agency’s later disposition.

Vega v. Hernandez · filed 2005-08-09

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ instant cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is time barred because that the filing of the administrative complaint within the administrative agency of A.D.T. on December 8, 2001 did not toll the running of the statute of limitations for claims pursuant to § 1983 until August 21, 2003.

Section 1983 due process claims in Washington use the state's three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Nieshe v. Concrete School Dist. · filed 2005-08-09

Thus, the three year statute of limitations for personal injury torts under Washington law applies to a § 1983 action alleging due process violations.

Section 1983 claims arising in New York use a three-year personal-injury limitations period, with accrual determined by federal law when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Jackson v. New York State · filed 2005-08-11

§ 1983 claims are governed by state statutes of limitations. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 871 (2d Cir.1994). In New York, such claims are governed by the general three year personal injury limitations period. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989); Ormiston v. Nelson, 117 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir.1997); N.Y.Civ.Prac.L. & R. § 214(5) (McKinney 1996). Accrual of the claim, however, is a question of federal law. Ormiston v. Nelson, 117 F.3d at 71. A § 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir.2002) As noted above, this action was commenced on May 9, 2003. Accordingly, all conduct occurring within three years of that date is timely for purposes of plaintiff § 1983 claims.

A Section 1983 claim is time-barred when filed after the limitations period has run and there is no valid basis for tolling.

Nurnberg v. Dretke · filed 2005-08-16

By Nurnberg’s own admission, she was aware of both her alleged injury and its causal connection to the defendants in January 2002. Accordingly, Nurnberg’s lawsuit, filed in late February 2004, was time-barred.

Section 1983 damages claims in New York are subject to a three-year limitations period, with each discrete refusal assessed separately for timeliness.

Quadrozzi Concrete Corp. v. City of New York · filed 2005-08-23

As for Quadrozzi’s equal protection claims for damages, because the complained-of refusals constitute discrete, even if related, acts, see National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002), the district court properly dismissed as untimely all claims but one: the 2001 Newton Creek project rejection, see Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 317 (2d Cir.2004) (noting three-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims).

A plaintiff cannot avoid the limitations period for a § 1983 discrimination claim merely by alleging a pattern or practice.

Turner v. District of Columbia · filed 2005-08-25

It is not the case, as plaintiff argues, that any plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim who employs the words “pattern or practice” in her complaint may avoid the statute of limitations.

The continuing effects of a discrete act do not extend the limitations period for a § 1983 claim.

McCormick v. Farrar · filed 2005-08-30

McCormick cannot use the continuing violation theory to challenge a discrete act that occurred outside of the limitations period even though the impact of the act continued.

Section 1983 actions in Nebraska have a four-year statute of limitations.

In Re Tyler · filed 1987-08-25

Such a limit will not deny him access to the court, particularly in view of the fact that the statute of limitations for filing actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Nebraska is four years.

Section 1983 claims commenced in Ohio are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Lowary v. Lexington Local Board of Education · filed 1987-10-21

The Sixth Circuit has made clear that the statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions commenced in Ohio is the one-year statute of limitations contained in Ohio Revised Code § 2305.11.

In Connecticut, a section 1983 action must be filed within three years.

Barile v. City of Hartford · filed 2005-08-31

The limitations period for filing a section 1983 action is three years.

For a § 1983 claim that would call a criminal conviction into question, the limitations period does not begin until the criminal charges are dismissed.

Mettetal v. Vanderbilt University, Legal Department · filed 2005-09-01

Thus, we conclude that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on these § 1983 claims until the criminal charges against Mettetal were dismissed in December 2002, and thus the dismissal of these claims by the district court was in error.

In prisoner § 1983 suits, the applicable statute of limitations is tolled while the prisoner completes mandatory administrative exhaustion.

Brown v. Valoff · filed 2005-09-06

We do not regard the intersection of the exhaustion and statute of limitations requirements as creating a problem for prisoners, however, as we agree with the uniform holdings of the circuits that have considered the question that the applicable statute of limita- tions must be tolled while a prisoner completes the mandatory exhaustion process.

Section 1983 claims for damages arising from improper extradition in Iowa are subject to a two-year personal injury limitations period.

White v. Kautzky · filed 2005-09-08

Moreover, even though the court found that White’s improper extradition claim was cognizable as a claim for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute of limitations on such a claim has also expired. Such a claim would have been subject to a two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, Iowa Code § 614.1(2).

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Ormsby v. Luzerne County Department of Public Welfare Office of Human Services · filed 2005-09-12

As the District Court explained, claims brought pursuant to § 1983 or § 1985 are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which is two years in Pennsylvania.

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Deters v. City of Poughkeepsie · filed 2005-09-19

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims in New York is three years.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico use the one-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Ramos v. Puerto Rico Police Department · filed 2005-09-20

The most analogous statute of limitations period for a § 1983 claim is the one for personal injury actions, which in Puerto Rico is one year.

Section 1983 claims arising in Michigan are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Bates v. Colony Park Ass'n · filed 2005-09-27

This same three-year period of limitation governs federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that arise in the State of Michigan.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state's equitable tolling principles along with its statute of limitations.

Soliz v. Bennett · filed 2005-09-29

As the Texas statute of limitations is borrowed in § 1983 cases, we also look to Texas’s equitable tolling principles.

A § 1983 claim of this kind is timely when filed within two years after the State vacates the conviction.

Roberts v. Atty Gen NJ · filed 2005-10-04

Thus, when plaintiff filed his suit on October 29, 2003, just over eighteen months after New Jersey vacated his conviction, he was within the two-year statute of limitations applicable to this case.

Section 1983 claims use the limitations period of the state where the conduct occurred, which is two years in Alabama.

Stuart v. Jefferson County Department of Human Resources · filed 2005-10-06

In particular, the applicable statute of limitations under § 1983 follows the statute of limitations applicable in the state in which the conduct occurred, which, in Alabama, is two years.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's limitations period for personal injury actions.

Gonzalez-Alvarez v. Cubano · filed 2005-10-17

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we apply the forum state's statute of limitations period for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 procedural due process claims in California are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Morgan v. Komers · filed 2005-10-20

The plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims are barred by the statute of limitations, which is two years.

Section 1983 claims arising in Oklahoma have a two-year statute of limitations.

Latimer v. Tulsa Retirement Board of Trustees · filed 2005-10-25

The statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims arising in Oklahoma is two years.

Section 1983 claims in Ohio are subject to a one-year limitations period whose retroactive application must be decided case by case.

Thomas v. Walter Shipka, in His Capacity as Clerk of the Parma Municipal Court · filed 1987-11-18

The Supreme Court’s action taken with respect to Vodila compels the conclusion that the one-year statute of limitations adopted in Mulligan for all § 1983 claims brought in Ohio is not to be automatically applied retroactively and that the decision as to retroactivity must be made on a case-by-case basis.

Section 1983 actions in federal court may use a state renewal or savings statute that is interrelated with the applicable limitations period.

Corliss v. City of Fall River · filed 2005-11-01

I conclude that the Massachusetts renewal/savings provision enacted in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 32 applies to § 1983 actions brought in federal court because it is equally interrelated with the length of the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions, while federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Cox v. Fort Lee · filed 2005-11-04

An action brought under § 1983 or § 1985(3) is subject to the state statute of limitations that governs personal injury actions. ... Although state law sets the applicable limitations period, federal law dictates when the action accrues.

A state court clerk’s delay in processing a prisoner’s records request does not toll the limitations period for a § 1983 claim when the prison mailbox rule does not apply and the delay did not prevent timely filing.

Walker v. David Jastremski, Charles Buerer, Frank Halloran, and Tedja Tjandra · filed 2005-11-15

Because Houston’s prison mailbox rule does not apply to processing delays in the state court clerk’s office, and because Walker has not met his burden of demonstrating that the clerk’s delay prevented his timely filing, he is not entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations.

A Section 1983 damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a prison sentence is premature while that sentence remains in effect.

Ayuso-Figueroa v. Rivera-Gonzalez · filed 2005-11-18

It follows that prior to said date Plaintiffs cause of action for damages under Section 1983 would have been premature since a success on that front would have implied the invalidity of her sentence.

Section 1983 claims brought in Georgia use the state’s two-year personal injury limitations period.

Oduok v. Phillips · filed 2005-11-18

The statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Georgia is two years. ... Neither the Georgia renewal statute nor the relation back doctrine renders Oduok’s complaint timely.

Section 1983 actions filed in California before January 1, 2003, were subject to the state’s former one-year limitations period and two years of tolling for imprisonment.

Winters v. Galaza · filed 2005-11-21

The district court properly dismissed Winters’s action as time-barred because his action relates to an incident that allegedly occurred on January 27, 1997, and he did not initiate this action until December 19, 2001. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir.2004) (applying California’s prior one-year statute of limitations to civil rights action filed before January 1, 2003); Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 352.1 (providing two years of tolling for the disability of imprisonment).

Section 1983 claims in the District of Columbia are subject to the three-year residual statute of limitations.

Does I through III v. District of Columbia · filed 2005-11-21

Like many federal statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations. ... Accordingly, the court finds that D.C.Code § 12-301(8), which imposes a three-year statute of limitations on actions where “a limitation is not otherwise prescribed,” is the relevant District of Columbia limitations period.

Section 1983 borrows the forum state's general personal injury limitations period; in Puerto Rico, that period is one year.

Sanchez v. Public Building Authority · filed 2005-11-29

Section 1983 does not have a built-in limitations period, but instead borrows the forum state’s general statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Wade v. Ratella · filed 2005-12-01

Actions predicated upon § 1983 are governed by the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s general personal-injury limitations period.

Charleston v. Boone · filed 2005-12-06

In the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 context, a federal court “borrows” a statute of limitations from the forum state’s general personal-injury limitations provision.

Section 1983 actions brought in federal district court in New York have a three-year limitations period.

Buric v. Kelly · filed 2005-12-06

The “repeated terminations” and “restricted duty assignments” that Buric claims were retaliatory all took place prior to 2000 and thus are beyond the three-year statute of limitations for this case, which Buric commenced in 2003. See Jewell v. County of Nassau, 917 F.2d 738, 739 (2d Cir.1990) (holding that N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214 governs limitations period for § 1983 actions brought in federal district court in New York); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214 (McKinney 2003).

Section 1983 claims in Washington are subject to the three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Gossage v. Washington · filed 2005-12-13

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Gossage’s claims arising from events that occurred before March 13, 2000, because they were time-barred. See Wash. Rev.Code § 4.16.080(2) (providing a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions).

Section 1983 claims use the state limitations period for personal injury actions.

Douglas v. York County · filed 2005-12-28

Since there is no federal statute of limitations for federal civil rights actions, courts look to the state limitations period for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims filed in Illinois are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Evans v. City of Chicago · filed 2006-01-06

The statute of limitations applicable to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Illinois is the same two-year provision which governs personal injury actions in the state, 735 ILCS 5/13-202.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Evans, Ronnie v. City of Chicago · filed 2006-01-06

Thus, because the statute of limitations began running in late December 1997 and Evans didn’t file suit until three years later, in November of 2000, both Evans’ § 1983 claim and his state law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim were properly dismissed as being beyond the respective two and one year statutes of limitation.

Section 1983 claims brought in Washington are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Mariano v. Everett Housing Authority · filed 2006-01-17

The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of EHA because Mariano’s section 1983 claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims filed in Connecticut are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Dontigney v. Paramount Pictures Corp. · filed 2006-01-19

In Connecticut, the limitations period for filing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is three years.

Section 1983 actions brought in Ohio use the state’s two-year general personal injury statute of limitations.

Thomas v. Walter Shipka, in His Capacity as Clerk of the Parma Municipal Court · filed 1989-04-19

Although this is not the issue raised in the case at bar, it nonetheless was clear from Owens that we had erred in borrowing Ohio’s one-year statute of limitations instead of its two-year general statute.

Section 1983 actions brought in Colorado have a two-year limitations period beginning when the cause of action accrues.

Fogle v. Pierson · filed 2006-01-27

We have made clear that the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in Colorado is two years from the time the cause of action accrued.

In Tennessee, a § 1983 claim for damages is subject to the one-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Johnson v. Corrections Corporation of America · filed 2006-01-31

Mr. Johnson did not specify whether he was bringing his claim as one for simple negligence under state law or as a civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the purposes of the statute of limitations, however, there is no distinction. The personal injury one-year statute of limitations applies to “[c]ivil actions for compensatory or punitive damages, or both, brought under the federal civil rights statutes.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3).

Section 1983 claims are governed by the forum state’s general personal injury statute of limitations.

Sylvester L. Reynolds, Sr. v. Murray · filed 2006-01-31

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, and instead is governed in each case by the forum state’s general personal injury statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims brought in Oklahoma are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Arps v. Cormack · filed 2006-02-03

... unconstitutional conduct occurring more than two years prior to the filing of the complaint and are, therefore, barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims brought in Oklahoma.

Section 1983 claims have a two-year limitations period, but a continuing violation is not barred by that period.

League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Blackwell · filed 2006-02-10

The statute of limitations for § 1983 violations is two years. ... However, if a violation is continuing, the statute of limitations poses no bar. ... Thus, the violations LWV alleges are continuing and the statute of limitations poses no bar to plaintiffs’ suit.

Section 1983 has no express statute of limitations, so courts use the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury claims.

Moore v. Morales · filed 2006-02-13

Section 1983 does not contain an express statute of limitations; therefore, federal courts have adopted the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

In Puerto Rico, a section 1983 political-discrimination claim must be brought within one year after the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the discriminatory act.

Villanueva-Mendez v. Nieves-Vazquez · filed 2006-03-01

The time to bring a section 1983 claim on this ground was within one year of February or March 2001. Villanueva did not do so and his federal claim is therefore barred.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Berg v. California Horse Racing Board · filed 2006-03-02

Claims brought under § 1983 “are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.” Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir.2001).

Section 1983 claims in Michigan are subject to the tolling rule in Mich.Comp. Laws Ann. Sec. 600.5851(1).

Jordan v. Michael Johnson and James Bundy · filed 1989-11-08

The recent Supreme Court case, Hardin v. Straub, 109 S.Ct. 1998 (1989), effectively overturned Higley v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 835 F.2d 623 (6th Cir.1987), upon which the District Court relied. Appellee has stipulated that because the Court in Hardin held that Mich.Comp. Laws Ann. Sec. 600.5851(1) (West 1987) is applicable in Sec. 1983 cases, this Court should vacate the Order of the District Court granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. ... Accordingly, the Order of the District Court is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.

A time-barred § 1983 claim cannot be raised as a recoupment defense when it arises from a different transaction than the plaintiff’s claim.

Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing Home & Allied Services Union v. C.N.H. Management Associates, Inc. · filed 1990-12-11

Assuming therefore, without deciding, that Neiman may amend his answer as a matter of course pursuant to Rule 15(a), Neiman’s affirmative defense based on § 1983 must derive from the same transaction or series of transactions as Local 144’s claim. However, the § 1983 claim does not arise from the same occurrences or transactions as Local 144’s claim. ... Therefore, for the reasons set forth in the court’s June 1 opinion, and pursuant to Rule 8(c), Fed.R. Civ.P., Neiman's sixteenth affirmative defense is time-barred.

Section 1983 claims brought in federal court in Utah are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

West v. Christine A. Godnick, Dixie L. Minson, Tracey Hill, John and Jane Does 1-25, Pamela Hunt · filed 1992-02-25

The district court's ruling was based upon this court's opinion in Mishmash v. Murray City, 730 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1052 (1985), which held that all § 1983 claims brought in federal court in Utah are subject to the four year statute of limitation. ... We find no error in the district court's dismissal of the complaint. We have reviewed Mr. West's contentions on appeal as well as the Order Granting All Defendant's Motions to Dismiss of the district court and AFFIRM the dismissal of Mr. West's complaint for substantially the same reasons set forth in the district court's Order Granting All Defendant's Motions to Dismiss.

For Indiana § 1983 claims that accrued before Wilson v. Garcia, the filing deadline is the earlier of five years after accrual or two years after Wilson.

William W. Ward Also Known, as Wilbert Moore v. Unknown Individuals of Gary Police Department · filed 1992-08-04

This court has held that plaintiffs whose § 1983 actions accrued before Wilson must file suit within the shorter period of either five years from the date the action accrued or two years after Wilson. ... Rather, under Loy, Mr. Ward had until April 17, 1989, to file his complaint. Nevertheless, Mr. Ward was too late. He did not file suit until September 1, 1989. Consequently, his action was time-barred and the district court's order denying IFP is AFFIRMED.

Filing a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement does not toll the limitations period for a § 1983 claim.

Campbell v. Van Osdale · filed 1992-10-28

The Sixth Circuit, as well as other federal districts courts in the Sixth Circuit, have made clear that the filing of a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement does not toll the limitation period of an applicable federal civil rights statute, such as § 1983.

Section 1983 actions use state law to determine the applicable limitations period and tolling provisions.

Smith v. Ortiz · filed 2006-03-14

State law determines the applicable statute of limitations and accompanying tolling provisions for § 1983 actions.

A § 1983 false-arrest claim was time-barred where the charges from the arrest were dropped within a day and the action was filed too late.

Logan v. New York City Police Department · filed 2006-03-14

We note that Logan stated at oral argument that the charges from her allegedly false 1996 arrest were dropped within twenty-four hours, removing any doubt that the corresponding § 1983 claim is time-barred, as the district court had concluded.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state’s personal injury limitations period; in New Jersey, that period is two years.

Akinola v. Clifton · filed 2006-03-15

Accordingly, New Jersey’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions governs Akinola’s claims.

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Young-Flynn v. Kelly · filed 2006-03-15

The statute of limitations applicable to actions brought under § 1983, borrowed from the applicable state-law period for personal injury torts, is three years, and begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which gave rise to the lawsuit.

Section 1983 claims in Connecticut are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Inkel v. Connecticut Department of Children & Families · filed 2006-03-17

As this Court held in its previous Ruling, the statute of limitation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is three years.

Section 1983 actions are governed by state statutes of limitations.

Bridges v. Department of Maryland State Police · filed 2006-03-20

Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by state statutes of limitations.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Gross, Leticia M. v. White, Jesse · filed 2006-03-24

Because the statute of limitations for bringing § 1983 claims is two years, see Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep’t of Natural Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1036 (7th Cir. 2003); Mitchell v. Donchin, 286 F.3d 447, 450 (7th Cir. 2002), her claim that she was demoted in 1999 is time-barred.

For a § 1983 claim in Indiana, a prior suit dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not extend the filing deadline under the Journeys Account Statute.

Thomas v. Timko · filed 2006-03-31

Mr. Thomas’ first lawsuit was dismissed without prejudice because he had not exhausted his administrative remedies. That omission constitutes negligence in the prosecution of that action and therefore the Journey’s Account Statute does not resuscitate these claims.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Hickey v. City of New York · filed 2006-03-31

However, the Hickeys failed to name the “Doe” defendants by their proper names within the three-year statute of limitation required for 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An Ohio § 1983 claim may be refiled under Ohio’s savings statute within one year after a prior action ends otherwise than on the merits.

Lett v. Sahenk · filed 2006-04-04

However, the court determined that Lett’s claim was covered by the Ohio savings statute, Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.19, which allows plaintiffs to refile claims within one year of the termination of a prior claim “otherwise than upon the merits.” ... The district court held that Lett’s prior state action against Sahenk and other defendants was sufficient to save the federal cause of action. ... Therefore, on the grounds identified by the district court, we affirm both the district court’s September 27, 2002, denial of Sahenk’s motion to dismiss Lett’s complaint and its February 23, 2005, grant of summary judgment for Sahenk.

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year limitations period.

Didden v. Village of Port Chester · filed 2006-04-05

The statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims in New York is three years. ... Appellants, however, brought suit in January 2004, more than three years after the date their claims accrued, and thus their claims are time-barred.

State law governs whether a Section 1983 claim can be renewed after the limitations period expires, and Georgia’s renewal statute requires service of the original complaint.

Wimberly v. Department of Corrections · filed 1993-08-18

Wimberly also argues that because he sued under the federal Civil Rights Act, the tolling of the statute of limitation must be determined pursuant to federal law. This is not the case, in Scott v. Muscogee County, 949 F2d 1122 (11th Cir. 1992), the court determined that the renewal of a case dismissed for improper venue was not valid where the original complaint was not served upon the defendant.

Section 1983 claims brought in Connecticut are subject to the three-year limitations period in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577.

In Re State Police Litigation · filed 1995-05-16

All other federal and state courts in Connecticut that have considered the question have construed section 52-577, not section 52-584, as the residual limitations statute applicable to civil rights actions.

Section 1983 claims in New Jersey are subject to the state’s two-year personal-injury limitations period.

Cruz v. City of Camden · filed 1995-08-04

Therefore the proposed amendment as to McHugh, Sampona, and Michalak is not within the two years statute of limitations period for purposes of both the § 1983 claim and the additional claims of false imprisonment and negligence.

Section 1983 uses the forum state’s limitations period and tolling rules for personal injury claims because it has no limitations period of its own.

Norman v. City of Evanston · filed 2006-04-11

Section 1983 does not have its own statute of limitations, so federal law incorporates the forum state’s limitations period and tolling provisions for personal injury cases.

A § 1983 action brought in Florida is subject to Florida’s four-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Raymond C. Miller, Jr. v. Woodham · filed 2006-04-12

A § 1983 action brought in Florida is governed by Florida’s four-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Section 1983 has no express limitations period; courts apply the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury claims.

Foryoh v. Hannah-Porter · filed 2006-04-18

There is no express statute of limitations contained in Section 1983; instead, the applicable statute of limitations is the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so courts apply the state’s limitations period for personal injury claims.

T. R. v. Boy Scouts of America · filed 2006-04-19

Because section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, we apply the state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Stacey v. City of Hermitage · filed 2006-04-19

We agree that the Staceys’ § 1983 claims arising out of events they allege occurred before November 6, 2000 are time-barred based upon the filing of the complaint on November 6, 2002.

Section 1983 actions use the applicable state statute of limitations; a claim challenging a transfer accrues when the transfer occurs.

Bernal v. Kline · filed 2006-04-25

“In civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we apply the applicable state statute of limitations.” ... In this case, Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations applies. ... We agree with the district court that it began to run on October 14, 2002, and therefore the filing deadline for the present action was October 14, 2004.

Section 1983 claims in Texas use the state’s two-year limitations period and equitable-tolling principles.

Henderson v. Enns · filed 2006-04-27

The Texas two-year statute of limitations is borrowed in § 1983 cases, and this court also looks to Texas’ equitable-tolling principles.

For a § 1983 challenge to a method of execution that concedes execution can proceed constitutionally, the limitations period begins when execution becomes imminent and the plaintiff knows or has reason to know the facts supporting the challenge.

Cooey v. Taft · filed 2006-04-28

First, Plaintiff Hill, when he moved to intervene in the instant action, initiated his civil rights action challenging Ohio’s lethal injection protocol in a timely fashion as specifically outlined by this Court in its Opinion and Order of March 28, 2005. (Doc. # 14.) There, the Court concluded that “the statute of limitations on claims raising specific challenges to a method of execution, but otherwise conceding that the execution can be carried out in a constitutional manner if the specific challenges are addressed, begins to run when the execution becomes imminent and the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the facts giving rise to his specific challenges.”

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Edwards v. Media Borough Council · filed 2006-04-28

Section 1983 claims are subject to state statutes of limitations governing personal injury actions. ... The applicable Pennsylvania statute of limitations is two years.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state personal injury statute of limitations.

Perkins v. Johnston · filed 2006-05-11

Because there is no federal statute of limitations for actions filed pursuant to § 1983, courts apply the most appropriate state statute of limitations. ... Section 1983 claims are considered as personal injury claims for purposes of determining the applicable state statute of limitations. ... Because all of the events in which Defendant Johnson was involved occurred more than two years before Mr. Perkins submitted his complaint to the court, the claim against him is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Savage v. Bonavitacola · filed 2006-05-15

Claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims in Colorado are subject to a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Williams v. State of Colorado · filed 1997-07-30

Plaintiff’s claims are time- barred. See Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1265-66 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding § 1983 claims are governed by Colorado’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions); 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (providing that ADEA claim may be brought within ninety days after receipt of notice of termination of EEOC action).

A § 1983 claim for wrongful conversion of food stamps was barred by Louisiana's one-year prescriptive period because it did not relate back to an earlier accident claim.

Hammons v. City of Tallulah · filed 1998-02-25

In his federal claims, Plaintiff sought to recover under 42 U.S.C. Sec.1983, alleging three separate violations of his federal constitutional and statutory rights: (1) that DCAA had wrongfully seized and converted his food stamps; (2) that DCAA had withheld his patient records; and (3) that DCAA had failed to protect his person at the half-way house. ... Delictual actions are subject to a one year prescriptive period. La. C.C. art. 3492. ... Plaintiff has not shown that the claim for wrongful conversion of food stamps arose out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence as the trip-and-fall claim. The trial judge was not incorrect in finding that the action for the conversion of food stamps has prescribed.

A Section 1983 claim may be timely yet fail to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Jackson v. Correctional Medical · filed 1998-02-26

We note that although the Appellant's claim was not time-barred, ... the district court properly dismissed the complaint be- cause it failed to state a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Section 1983 claims brought in Idaho are subject to the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, including claims involving sexual abuse.

Osborn v. Salinas · filed 1998-05-19

Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson, Idaho courts have held that § 1983 actions must meet the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions set forth in I.C. § 5-219(4).

Section 1983 actions in Arkansas have a three-year statute of limitations.

Robinson v. Jordan · filed 1998-06-08

We note that the statute of limitations has not yet run on this action. See Ketchum v. City of W. Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (three-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 action in Arkansas).

Section 1983 claims in New York are subject to a three year statute of limitations.

Sterngass v. Town of Woodbury · filed 2006-05-18

Any claim about actions taken or not taken by the Town in 1953 or in 1979 are of course barred by the three year statute of limitations applicable to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are governed by the state's general personal-injury limitations period, which is three years in Arkansas.

Long v. Asemota · filed 2001-04-09

Upon our de novo review, we agree with the district court not only that Long’s claim against Dr. Asemota was time-barred, see Ketchum v. City of W. Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th ... Cir. 1992) (§ 1983 claims are governed by general personal-injury statute of limitation of state in which they accrued; in Arkansas, limitations period is 3 years); ... but also that Long failed to rebut Dr. Asemota’s evidence that he did not know of Long’s condition prior to the doctor’s arrival in surgery, see Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997).

Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Daly v. Harris · filed 2002-04-25

The Court notes that though Plaintiff Daly, by virtue of her recent (within 2 years of the filing of the lawsuit) visit to Hanauma Bay may not be amenable to a statute of limitations defense, members of the proposed Class and subclass I who visited Hanauma Bay prior to July of 1999 are subject to such a defense with respect to their Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims filed in Ohio are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Harrison v. City of Akron · filed 2002-08-08

Because Harrison filed suit on November 27, 1999, his federal claims arising before November 27, 1997, were barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico are subject to a one-year limitations period.

Calderón-Garnier v. Sánchez-Ramos · filed 2006-06-12

Section 1983 borrows the appropriate state statute of limitations, unless contrary to federal law. ... The relevant statute of limitations for civil rights claims in Puerto Rico is one year.

Section 1983 claims arising in Texas have a two-year limitations period.

Wells v. Edwards · filed 2006-06-21

The applicable statute of limitations is two years.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations.

Nathaniel Porter, Jr. v. Walter S. Ray, Jr. · filed 2006-06-21

“Federal courts apply their forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

An Arkansas § 1983 claim alleging police assault is not governed by the one-year assault-and-battery limitation; either the three-year statutory-liability period or the five-year general period applies.

Leo Glasscoe and Leroy Davis v. Howell · filed 1970-08-12

We do not feel that the appellee’s action here can be narrowly characterized as merely an action for assault and battery. ... We feel that the applicable statute of limitations here is either; (1) the three-year limitation for actions “founded on any contract or liability,” which has been construed by the Arkansas courts to cover actions based upon a liability created by statute, McDonald v. Mueller, 123 Ark. 226, 183 S.W. 751 (1916); Zimmerman v. W & S Fire Insurance Company, 121 Ark. 408, 181 S.W. 283 (1915); Nebraska National Bank v. Walsh, 68 Ark. 433, 59 S.W. 952 (1900); or (2) the five-year general statute of limitations. It is unnecessary for us to determine which of these two statutes is applicable since the action was instituted within the statutory period of both statutes.

Section 1983 claims in Florida use the four-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Lesley v. David · filed 2006-06-28

“Federal courts apply their forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” ... In Florida, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is four years. ... Therefore, his claims relating to the Commission’s actions in 1999 were untimely.

Section 1983 claims are treated as personal injury actions when determining the applicable limitations period.

Sanchez v. Daniels · filed 2006-07-07

It is well settled that § 1983 claims are properly characterized as personal injury actions for purposes of determining the relevant limitation period.

Section 1983 actions filed in Alabama are subject to a two-year statute of limitations under the state’s residual personal injury law.

Ben Burt, Jr. v. Timothy Martin, Sr. · filed 2006-07-14

In states where more than one statute of limitations exists, the forum state’s general or residual personal injury statute of limitations applies to all § 1983 actions filed in federal court in that state. ... In Alabama, the residual personal injury limitation period is two years.

Section 1983 borrows the forum state’s general personal injury statute of limitations because it has no limitations period of its own.

Joseph v. State Mutual Life Insurance Co. of America · filed 2006-08-04

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, and instead is governed in each case by the forum state’s general personal injury statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims brought in Wyoming state courts have a four-year statute of limitations.

Ray v. St. Vincent Healthcare, Inc. · filed 2006-08-07

Therefore, the proper statute of limitations to apply in Wyoming state courts for § 1983 claims is the four-year limitations period contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § l-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (LexisNexis 2005) ... and not the two-year period in § 1-3-115.

Section 1983 claims have a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know the basic facts of the injury and its alleged cause.

Styles v. Goord · filed 2006-08-10

The district court correctly held that Styles’s § 1983 claim is barred by the statute of limitations, which expires three years from the date when Styles knew or had reason to know the basic facts of both his injury and its alleged cause.

In Illinois, Fourth Amendment § 1983 claims arising from an arrest generally accrue at the time of arrest and must be filed within two years.

Orange v. Burge · filed 2006-08-11

Based on the decision in Wallace, Orange’s claims accrued in 1984 at the time of arrest and should have been filed within two years of that arrest.

Section 1983 claims brought in Iowa are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Waterman v. Nashua-Plainfield Community School District · filed 2006-08-15

Accordingly, the court shall dismiss Waterman’s § 1983 claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because they are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims filed in Indiana are subject to the state's two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Armstead, Courtney v. Clark, Officer · filed 2006-08-17

Armstead’s request to add his claim against Official Brown came more than two and a half years after these events and therefore fell outside Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 claims arising in Texas must be filed within two years.

Marchant v. American Equity Insurance · filed 2006-08-28

Marchant’s claims, both under § 1983 and under state law, were required to be filed within the applicable two-year limitations period.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own; the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period applies.

Ross v. Officer Joey Mickle · filed 2006-09-06

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations, and the limitations period is governed by the forum state’s general personal injury statute of limitations.

Section 1983 excessive force claims in Oregon are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Parham v. Multnomah County · filed 2006-09-13

The district court properly dismissed Parham’s excessive force claim as barred by the statute of limitations because Par-ham did not file his complaint within the two-year limitations period.

Section 1983 suits use the forum state’s statute of limitations.

Stanley v. Foster · filed 2006-09-15

In a § 1983 suit, district courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations.

A § 1983 excessive-force claim accrues after a resisting-arrest conviction is overturned when success on the claim would necessarily imply that the conviction was invalid.

Swiecicki v. Delgado · filed 2006-09-15

Success on his § 1983 claim prior to the invalidation of his conviction by the Ohio Court of Appeals, therefore, would have necessarily implied the invalidity of his conviction for resisting arrest. ... We therefore hold that the statute of limitations for Swiecicki’s excessive-force claim did not begin to run until the Ohio Court of Appeals overturned his conviction.

Section 1983 claims borrow the applicable state's personal injury limitations period, while federal rules govern accrual and time computation.

Cornett v. WEISENBURGER · filed 2006-09-21

However, for a § 1983 action, the statutory time period is borrowed from state law, while the accrual is governed by federal rules. Based on the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a), the two-year statute of limitations period would begin to run November 8, 2003, the day after Cornett was allegedly attacked.

Section 1983 claims filed in Virginia are subject to the state's two-year personal-injury limitations period.

Couch v. Jabe · filed 2006-09-22

The Commonwealth of Virginia has a two-year statute of limitations period for personal injury actions which applies in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims arising in Massachusetts are subject to a three-year limitations period.

O'MALLEY v. Town of Egremont · filed 2006-09-26

Upon de novo review, the court hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation of Chief Magistrate Judge Kenneth P. Neiman. As the Magistrate Judge found, the portions of the complaint ordered to be dismissed are barred by the three-year statute of limitations.

In Illinois, § 1983 claims have a two-year statute of limitations.

Foryoh, Prince E. v. Triton College · filed 2006-09-26

It is well-settled, however, that the two-year period is the appropriate statute of limitations in Illinois for § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 actions in Wisconsin have a six-year statute of limitations.

Cramer, Jan v. Schroeder, James · filed 2006-09-26

Moreover, as the district court recognized, the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in Wisconsin is six years, see Wis. Stat. § 893.53; Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 409 (7th Cir. 1989), so the dismissal of the nurses was not tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice.

Section 1983 claims in Indiana are subject to the state’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Hurt v. WEST LAFAYETTE COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION · filed 2006-09-27

Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations period for personal injury claims applies to a claim of injury under Indiana tort law or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.