42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims use the state personal injury limitations period, which is one year in Puerto Rico.

Velazquez-Rivera v. Danzig · filed 2000-01-24

Yet, in establishing the timeliness of a constitutional tort, the Court should look to the state statute for personal injury actions, which in this case is one year. ... The Court will therefore dismiss Plaintiffs section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico are subject to a one-year limitations period that begins when the claim accrues under federal law, unless Puerto Rico tolling law applies.

Ramos v. Roman · filed 2000-01-31

In other words,-Plaintiffs are required to bring a § .1983 claim within “365 days, or 366 days in a leap year” one day after the time their cause of action accrued under federal law, unless the statute of limitations can be tolled pursuant to Puerto Rico law.

A § 1983 action in Texas is subject to a two-year limitations period, so a dismissal without prejudice can effectively bar refiling after that period expires.

Hatchet v. Nettles · filed 2000-02-04

The district court’s dismissal without prejudice operates as a dismissal with prejudice because Hatchet is now barred from refiling the action due to the expiration of the two-year limitations period.

Section 1983 claims arising from arrests in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Csoka v. County of Suffolk · filed 2000-02-07

This case was filed on July 11, 1997 and thus, any proceedings relating to the arrests prior to July 11, 1994 would be barred by the three year statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Herbil Holding Co. v. Brook · filed 2000-02-14

Claims under Section 1983 are governed by a three-year statute of limitations in New York.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, which is one year in Louisiana.

Taylor v. City of Winnfield · filed 2000-02-14

In determining the applicable limitations period in a § 1983 action, the court looks to the forum state’s personal injury limitations period. ... In Louisiana, that limitations period is one year.

In Kansas, a § 1983 claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Snodderly v. Kansas · filed 2000-03-09

In this case, Kansas’ two year statute of limitations applies.

The limitations period for a § 1983 false-arrest claim begins on the date of the arrest, rather than the date of a later state-court adjudication.

Perry v. Sullivan · filed 2000-03-14

The statute of limitations on a § 1983 complaint begins to run on the date of the arrest, rather than the date of the subsequent state court adjudication.

Section 1983 claims use California’s personal injury limitations period and its tolling rule while related criminal charges are pending, including in federal court.

Harned v. Landahl · filed 2000-03-17

It is established that the § 945.3 tolling provisions apply to suits brought pursuant to § 1983. ... Each of the reasons noted by the Harding Court applies, whether the criminal action is pending in state or federal court, and the interrelationship between the one year statute and the tolling provision is the same whichever forum entertains the criminal case.

Section 1983 actions in California are subject to the state's one-year personal injury statute of limitations.

DeGrassi v. City of Glendora · filed 2000-03-20

We apply California’s personal injury statute of limitations to § 1983 actions. ... Accordingly, the one-year statute bars her claims for conduct prior to September 23, 1996.

Section 1983 claims are subject to Texas equitable tolling rules, which permit tolling when another proceeding precludes the plaintiff’s legal remedy.

Davenport v. Nethery · filed 2000-04-13

Although Texas’ equitable tolling principles apply to § 1983 lawsuits, Texas permits the tolling of a statute of limitations only where a plaintiff’s legal remedies are precluded by the pendency of other legal proceedings.

Section 1983 suits in Texas are subject to the state’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Law v. Station KRIV Channel · filed 2000-04-14

Law’s § 1983 suit is subject to Texas’ two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

A § 1983 suit filed almost four years after the alleged injury is barred by the statute of limitations when tolling does not apply.

Hernandez v. Janica · filed 2000-04-14

Lucio Gonzales Hernandez, Texas prisoner number 686188, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the sheriff of Jackson County. Hernandez’s suit was filed almost four years after his alleged injury occurred. Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining that the statute of limitations had run.

State law supplies the statute of limitations and tolling rules for § 1983 actions.

Burkholz v. Joyce · filed 2000-04-17

“For section 1983 actions, state law determines the appropriate statute of limitations and accompanying tolling provisions.” ... For these reasons, we hold the district court did not err by determining Mr. Burkholz knew the facts underlying his causes of action, properly applied the law of Utah as articulated by the Utah Supreme Court, and correctly granted summary judgment to Granite and Mr. Joyce.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Gordon v. Lowell · filed 2000-04-18

In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for personal injury under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is two years.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a statute of limitations and are barred when filed too late.

Hale v. Baird · filed 2000-04-17

The ... record reflects that Hale’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims filed in Oklahoma are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Hudson v. Norick · filed 2000-04-28

In sum, the district court correctly determined Mr. Hudson did not file his complaint against Officer Jennings within the two-year limitation period.

Section 1983 claims in Tennessee have a one-year limitations period; a claim for denial of the right to vote accrues when the voter is turned away at the polls.

Lawson v. Shelby County · filed 2000-05-03

Tennessee law requires that actions brought under the federal civil rights statutes shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues. ... The Lawsons were not denied the right to vote when they were notified that their registrations had been rejected, they were denied the right to vote when they presented themselves at the appropriate polling place and were denied access to the voting booth. ... The complaint was then filed within one year after the cause of action accrued, thus satisfying the statute of limitations.

A § 1983 claim may be time-barred even if Heck does not bar it.

Chick v. Baldridge · filed 2000-05-15

Even were Chick able to show that Heck requirements do not bar his claim, his appeal would lack arguable merit because it would be time-barred.

Section 1983 claims against a telephone company for aiding wiretapping are subject to the two-year limitations period in 47 U.S.C. § 415(b) when that period is directly applicable, most analogous, and allows a reasonable opportunity to sue.

Sharon Margaret Pavlak, Cross-Appellee v. John R. Church, Individually and in His Capacity as Chief of Police for the Ci · filed 1984-03-12

This provision does not preclude application of an appropriate federal statute of limitations to civil rights claims under Titles 42 or 18 U.S.C.

Section 1983 has no federal limitations period; courts apply the most appropriate period provided by state law.

Foster v. Bill Armontrout, Associate Warden and Captain Tucker, Guard Captain · filed 1984-03-16

Congress did not prescribe a specific statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The controlling limitations period for such an action is, therefore, the most appropriate one provided by state law.

Section 1983 actions brought in Oklahoma are subject to a two year statute of limitations.

Rideout v. Saffle · filed 2000-05-19

The two year statute of limitations found in Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 95(3) is the applicable limitations period for bringing a § 1983 action in Oklahoma.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year limitations period under Ohio law.

Harris v. Walker, Unpublished Decision (6-1-2000) · filed 2000-06-01

This court applies a two-year statute of limitations period under R.C. 2305.10 for Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's statute of limitations.

Connell v. Board of Selectmen · filed 2000-06-06

For actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute of limitations is derived from the forum state's law.

Section 1983 claims in Tennessee are subject to the state's one-year personal injury limitations period.

Hughes v. Vanderbilt University · filed 2000-06-07

Indeed, "[i]n all actions brought under § 1983 alleging a violation of civil rights or personal injuries, the state statute of limitations governing actions for personal injuries is to be applied." Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 883 (6th Cir. 1986). Following this rule, the applicable limitations period in Tennessee is one year.

Section 1983 actions filed in California use the state personal injury limitations period; a claim that misconduct caused the loss of an earlier suit accrues when judgment is entered, and the period is tolled during the appeal.

Morales v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2000-06-12

The one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions set forth in Cal.Civ.Proc. Code § 340 applies to § 1983 actions filed in California. ... Morales’s and the Medranos’ causes of action accrued when the alleged police misconduct resulted in judgments being entered against them. ... In other words, the limitations period begins to run on the date of judgment, is tolled from the date the notice of appeal is filed, and begins to run again when the state appellate court issues a remittitur. ... We agree that California’s tolling rule applies in these cases.

Section 1983 has no federal limitations period, so federal courts borrow the forum state's general personal injury limitations period.

Rich v. Thomas · filed 2000-06-14

Because there is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 actions, the federal courts borrow the forum state's ... general personal injury limitations period.

In Louisiana, Section 1983 claims are subject to a one-year limitations period, and a complaint filed after that period is time-barred if it does not relate back to an earlier lawsuit.

Nasim v. Fuselier · filed 2000-06-14

Nasim appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit as time- barred, but he implicitly concedes that his complaint was not filed within the applicable one-year limitation period. ... We find no merit to Nasim’s argument that his claims should be deemed to relate back to a prior lawsuit.

In Louisiana, a § 1983 claim for false arrest accrues when the plaintiff is arrested, and a claim for false imprisonment accrues no later than release from custody; each is subject to a one-year limitations period.

Sheehan v. Ryan · filed 2000-06-14

Under federal law, Sheehan’s claims accrued on the date she was arrested and the date she was released from custody. As Sheehan had one year to file her section 1983 complaint after the date of accrual, we conclude that her claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Henderson v. Village of Dixmoor · filed 2000-06-15

In a § 1983 action, the federal courts adopt the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

State law determines the statute of limitations and tolling rules for § 1983 actions.

Aston v. Cunningham · filed 2000-06-21

State law determines the appropriate statute of limitations and accompanying tolling provisions for § 1983 actions.

An administrative appeal tolls the limitations period for a § 1983 action under Puerto Rico law only if its claims and requested relief have a precise and specific identity with the lawsuit.

Andino-Pastrana v. De San Juan · filed 2000-06-22

Here, the identity between plaintiff's administrative appeal and this lawsuit is insufficiently precise and specific for the appeal to constitute an extrajudical claim.

State law governs tolling of the limitations period for § 1983 claims.

Ortiz v. Com. of Puerto Rico · filed 2000-06-22

It is well settled that tolling of the § 1983 statute of limitations is governed by state law.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Jones v. Fountain · filed 2000-07-07

No federal statute of limitations exists for section 1983 actions therefore, federal courts borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

A Section 1983 claim is barred when the applicable statute of limitations has run.

Hogrefe v. State of NE · filed 2000-07-12

Among other things, Hogrefe’s complaint is based on an injury he received twenty-two years ago. It is therefore barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

For § 1983 claims that accrued in California before Wilson v. Garcia, suit had to be filed within three years of accrual or one year after Wilson, whichever came first.

Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1986-10-17

Adapting this approach to California law, a plaintiff whose § 1983 cause of action accrued before the Wilson decision, April 17,1985, must file suit within the shorter period of either three years from the date his action accrued or one year after Wilson, April 17, 1986.

For a § 1983 claim arising in Indiana before April 17, 1985, the plaintiff had the shorter of five years from accrual or two years after that date to file suit.

Loy v. Clamme · filed 1986-10-29

Accordingly, we find, as in Anton, an Indiana “plaintiff whose section 1983 cause of action accrued before the Wilson decision, April 17, 1985, must file suit within the shorter period of either five years from the date his action accrued or two years after Wilson.” Id. Because Loy filed suit well before the expiration of the shorter five-year limitations period, his § 1983 claim is not time-barred.

Section 1983 claims in Alaska are subject to the two-year statute of limitations in AS 09.10.070(1).

Jenkins v. Daniels · filed 1988-03-04

The § 1983 claim is time barred because AS 09.10.070(1) is the applicable statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims in Alaska, and Wilson requires us to use this two-year statute.

A Section 1983 complaint may be dismissed as time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations.

Welch v. Donny Ford · filed 2000-07-21

Billy Edward Welch appeals the district court's dismissal of Welch's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint as time-barred. Having reviewed the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude the district court correctly applied the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Texas are subject to a two-year limitations period that begins at the end of a continuing violation.

Dews v. Town of Sunnyvale, Tex. · filed 2000-08-01

Plaintiffs’ claims under the Civil Rights Acts are subject to the two year limitations period provided under Texas law for personal injury tort actions. ... As with the Fair Housing Act claims, the two year limitations period begins to run at the end of a continuing violation.

Section 1983 claims borrow the analogous state personal injury statute of limitations.

Laurino v. Tate · filed 2000-08-08

Section 1983 is silent concerning the applicable statute of limitations, leading federal courts to borrow the analogous state statute for personal injury.

Section 1983 actions in Oklahoma are subject to a two-year limitations period under Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 95(3).

Allen v. Middleton · filed 2000-08-15

The two year statute of limitations found in Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 95(3) is the applicable limitations period for bringing a § 1983 action in Oklahoma.

Section 1983 claims filed in Oklahoma are subject to a two-year limitations period, unless that period is tolled.

Brelo v. Keating · filed 2000-08-18

The district court thus correctly determined that Brelo’s claims accruing more than two years prior to the time he filed his complaints, which comprise the majority of his claims, are barred.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking tolling must provide enough facts to determine its duration and whether the complaint was timely filed.

Gibbs v. Ward · filed 2000-08-23

Gibbs essentially argues that the one-year statute of limitations applicable to his § 1983 claim should have been tolled while he was incarcerated at the David Wade Correctional Center because, during this time, prison officials threatened to kill him if he pursued his claim. ... Gibbs's argument is conclusional and unsupported. Moreover, Gibbs does not allege when he left Louisiana. Gibbs also does not provide any authority for his position that the statute of limitations should have been tolled. Accordingly, even if the circumstances of this case would warrant tolling of the limitations period, the district court could not determine how long the period was tolled for or how long after the limitations period began, Gibbs actually filed his complaint.

Section 1983 actions use the applicable state limitations period, but federal law governs when the action is commenced.

Gross v. Weber · filed 2000-08-28

Although we apply the state statute of limitations in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, commencement of an action is a procedural matter governed by federal law.

Section 1983 claims in Utah use the four-year limitations period in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3).

Whitehat v. College of Eastern Utah · filed 2000-08-29

The statute specifically refers to personal injuries against the State and its employees, and it is clear to this court that the Utah legislature intends the statute to apply to section 1983 actions exclusively. ... For this reason, the applicable statute of limitations is the four year statute set forth in § 78-12-25(3) and the filing of the Complaint on March 17, 2000 was within the four year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims filed in Puerto Rico are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Souffront v. Alvarado · filed 2000-09-14

In Puerto Rico, a one-year statute of limitations governs section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims borrow the general or residual state personal injury limitations period when a state has multiple personal injury limitations statutes.

Larson v. Snow College · filed 2000-09-15

In states with multiple personal injury statutes of limitations, courts considering § 1983, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 actions in Tennessee have a one-year limitations period.

Montgomery v. Carter County · filed 2000-09-18

In Tennessee, the statute of limitations for actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is one year.

Section 1983 actions in Indiana are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Doe, Jane R. v. Howe Military School · filed 2000-09-21

Furthermore, as Giles points out, it would have been futile to have allowed the Does to amend their complaints to assert a sec. 1983 action, because such an action would also have been time- barred under Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions in Indiana are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Jane R. Doe and Jane C. Doe v. Howe Military School · filed 2000-09-21

Furthermore, as Giles points out, it would have been futile to have allowed the Does to amend their complaints to assert a § 1983 action, because such an action would also have been time-barred under Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims brought in federal court have a three-year statute of limitations.

Lugo v. Senkowski · filed 2000-09-25

Claims brought in federal court under § 1983 have a statute of limitations of three years.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s general or residual personal injury limitations period.

Belser v. Tx State Board · filed 2000-09-28

No specified federal statute of limitations exists for § 1983 cases. Therefore, federal courts borrow the forum state’s general or residual personal injury limitations period.

A § 1983 action is barred when the applicable statute of limitations has expired.

Love v. Johnson · filed 2000-10-04

Willie Love appeals the district court’s1 dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. ... we agree that Love’s action was barred.

Section 1983 claims borrow the general or residual personal injury limitations period when a state has multiple personal injury statutes of limitations.

Larson v. Snow College · filed 2000-10-12

In states with multiple personal injury statutes of limitations, courts considering § 1983, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions.

Filing a state action within the limitations period does not make a later federal § 1983 action timely.

Mack v. Williams · filed 2000-10-19

Mack’s argument is without merit as the filing of a state action has no bearing on the timeliness of the instant federal § 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims are subject to applicable state tolling provisions.

Newell v. Gaines · filed 2000-10-19

In both § 1983 and diversity cases, any applicable state tolling provision also applies.

Section 1983 claims borrow the limitations period from analogous state law, while federal law determines when that period begins to run.

Albright v. City of New Orleans · filed 2000-11-03

While the length of the prescriptive period for claims under § 1983 is determined by reference to analogous state law1, when the prescriptive period begins to run is a matter of federal law.

Section 1983 claims in Colorado use the two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Armbeck v. Quinones · filed 2000-11-07

The relevant limitation period for this section 1983 claim is the two-year Colorado period for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims in Ohio have a two-year limitations period measured from accrual.

Harman v. Sheriff Phil Chance, Unpublished Decision (11-14-2000) · filed 2000-11-14

The applicable statute of limitations for a valid section 1983 claim in Ohio is two years from the accrual date.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period, which is two years in Texas.

Dickerson v. Jordan · filed 2000-11-17

Although the district court dismissed Dickerson’s suit without prejudice, he is effectively barred from refiling because of the two-year statute of limitations. ... See Long v. Simmons, 77 F.3d 878, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1996); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)(the general provision injury statute of limitations for the forum state is used for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (2000).

Section 1983 actions have a three-year limitations period.

Paige v. Police Department of the Schenectady · filed 2000-11-30

The applicable statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to Sections 1983 and 1985 is three years.

Section 1983 claims in Kansas have a two-year statute of limitations.

Gragg v. KcKune · filed 2000-12-08

As a result, the appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 suits in Kansas is 2 years.

Filing a state-court cause of action for the same injury does not toll the two-year limitations period applicable to a § 1983 complaint.

Murphy v. Goffery · filed 2000-12-13

Murphy’s state-court cause of action did not toll the two-year limitations period.

A § 1983 claim that calls a conviction into question does not begin to accrue until the conviction is invalidated.

McPherson v. Mossbarger · filed 2000-12-13

The limitations period did not begin to run until the conviction was invalidated.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Olech v. Village of Willowbrook · filed 2000-12-13

And, indeed, there is no dispute that a two-year statute of limitations applies in this case. See Williams v. Heavener, 217 F.3d 529, 531 (7th Cir.2000) (Illinois’ two-year personal injury statute of limitations applies to claims brought under Section 1983). Under that statute of limitations, a claim on behalf of the Olech Estate would be untimely if filed after March 1998.

Section 1983 causes of action are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Kubik v. New York State Department of Social Services · filed 2000-12-14

While we agree with plaintiffs that a three-year Statute of Limitations is applicable to causes of action under 42 USC § 1983 (see, Matter of Beers v Incorporated Vil. of Floral Park, 262 AD2d 315, 316; Lopez v Shaughnessy, 260 AD2d 551, 552), we nevertheless conclude that the complete dismissal of the ninth and tenth causes of action is appropriate under the particular circumstances presented herein.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own; in California, the one-year personal injury limitations period applies.

Motley v. Parks · filed 2000-12-15

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations. ... In California, the personal injury statute of limitations is one year.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico are subject to a one-year limitations period.

Velazquez-Rivera v. Danzig · filed 2000-12-20

The court properly held the § 1983 claim time-barred, applying to the allegations of a constitutional tort the appropriate one year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a three-year limitations period under Rhode Island law.

Davis v. Hauser, Kc 93-0295 (2000) · filed 2000-12-21

This Court is satisfied that any difficulty of analysis has been resolved by Walden III, Inc. v. State of Rhode Island, 576 F.2d 945 (1st Cir. 1978), which applied the three year limitation in G.L. § 9-1-14 (a) to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the most analogous state statute of limitations. The applicable period for these counts is three years.

Section 1983 claims brought in Mississippi are subject to Mississippi's three-year statute of limitations.

Randle v. Clay County Sheriff · filed 2000-12-15

We find that Randle's claims are barred by the Mississippi three-year statute of ...limitations, and the district court did not err.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a limitations period that can bar claims filed years after the challenged conduct.

Rosendahl v. Norman · filed 2000-12-27

Having carefully reviewed the record and Rosendahl’s arguments on appeal, we agree with the district court that most of the claims involve conduct that occurred between 1991 and 1993. To the extent they are not barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), these claims are time-barred.

Section 1983 actions are subject to Montana’s three-year general tort statute of limitations.

Madison v. Graham · filed 2001-01-04

For example, even if Plaintiffs’ claims were meritorious, it appears to the court that Plaintiffs have slept on their rights far too long, having missed the three-year general tort limitations deadline by approximately twelve years. ... Moreover, the statute of limitations bar applies whether Plaintiffs are permitted to go forward with a direct substantive due process claim or the alternative section 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims brought in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations.

Manley v. City of Chicago · filed 2001-01-05

Additionally, in Illinois, a two-year statute of limitations applies to claims brought under §§ 1983 and 1985.

A defendant waives a statute of limitations defense to a § 1983 claim by failing to raise it when that failure prejudices the plaintiff.

Stonelight Tile, Inc. v. Bay Area Air Quality Management District · filed 2001-01-18

The failure to raise such issue is a waiver, where the opposing party is prejudiced thereby. ... Here, the prejudice is apparent as plaintiffs were afforded no opportunity to assert that the statute of limitations did not apply. ... We conclude that the summary judgment order as to the federal civil rights claim must be reversed, because defendants have waived any statute of limitations defense they may have possessed as to that claim.

A defendant must be named within the statute of limitations period for a Section 1983 action.

Strother v. Frerichs · filed 2001-01-24

Strother also failed to name Howland as a defendant within the statute of limitations period for section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims filed in Michigan are governed by Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations.

Fleece v. Rhines · filed 2001-01-26

Fleece’s § 1983 claim is governed by Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury actions.

Clavette v. Sweeney · filed 2001-01-30

Federal law does not specify a limitations period for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Instead, federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims arising in Tennessee have a one-year limitations period; a claim generally accrues when the plaintiff has reason to know of the injury.

Frasure v. Shelby County Sheriff's Department · filed 2001-02-06

The statute of limitations for civil rights actions arising in Tennessee is one year. ... Under federal law, a cause of action generally accrues when the plaintiff has reason to know of his injury, id., or at the time of the defendants’ action, and not when the consequences become most painful.

A § 1983 retaliation claim based on a prison transfer accrues when the prisoner knows of the transfer and has reason to know of the alleged retaliatory motive; Tennessee’s one-year limitations period applies.

Gant v. Campbell · filed 2001-02-06

Jonah Louis Gant, a Tennessee prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals a district court order dismissing his civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Gant’s retaliation claim accrued in February 1998. By that time he knew that he had been transferred, and knew or had reason to know that the defendants, many of whom he had previously sued or named in grievances, resented his litigation activities. ... Gant did not file his civil rights complaint until February 2000, one year after Tennessee’s statute of limitations had run.

A § 1983 complaint may be dismissed as time-barred.

Harris v. Stalder · filed 2001-02-16

We have reviewed the record and brief submitted by Harris and find that the district court did not plainly err in determining that Harris’s federal complaint was time-barred.

Section 1983 actions brought in North Carolina are subject to the three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Plimpton v. Cooper · filed 2001-02-22

Moreover, the three year statute of limitations provided for personal injury actions by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1-52(5) applies to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims in Nevada have a two-year statute of limitations.

Stafford v. County of Washoe · filed 2001-02-23

Therefore, the two-year statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims in Nevada, Nev.Rev. Stat. 11.190(4)(e), expired in mid-1996, over a year before this lawsuit was filed.

Section 1983 claims brought in Alabama are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Smith v. Alabama Department of Corrections · filed 2001-02-27

All claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 in Alabama are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

In Illinois, § 1983 claims have a two-year statute of limitations.

Cage v. Lyons · filed 2001-03-12

The district court properly dismissed Cage’s complaint as untimely. In Illinois a two-year statute of limitations applies to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 actions use the relevant state's personal injury limitations period; in Michigan, that period is three years.

Cole v. Yukins · filed 2001-03-19

The personal injury statute of limitations in the relevant state establishes the statutory period for actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), and the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in Michigan is three years.

Section 1983 actions arising in Virginia have a two year limitations period under the state's general personal injury statute, including actions filed by prisoners.

Shelton v. Angelone · filed 2001-03-21

The court concludes that under Wilson and Owens, the court must apply the two year limitation period set forth in § 8.01-243(A) to all § 1983 actions arising in Virginia, whether or not the plaintiff is confined in prison when he files the lawsuit.

Section 1983 claims in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Bembry v. Darrow · filed 2001-03-23

Bembry’s claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, see Wilson v. Fairchild Republic Co., 143 F.3d 733, 738 n. 5 (2d Cir.1998); Ormiston v. Nelson, 117 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir.1997), as is Bembry’s pendant state law claim brought under the New York Human Rights Law.

In Ohio, § 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Wells v. Jefferson County Sheriff Department · filed 2001-03-28

The statute of limitations in Ohio for § 1983 actions is two years. ... Because the above events occurred prior to December 21, 1997, they are barred by the statute of limitations and may not form the basis of any § 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois are subject to the two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Penn v. Chicago State University · filed 2001-03-30

The two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims applies to Penn’s § 1983 and Illinois state claims against Mack.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injuries.

Thomas v. City of Chicago · filed 2001-03-30

Plaintiff apparently brings his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which borrows the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injuries.

A § 1983 action borrows the state personal injury limitations period; a false arrest claim accrues later with a malicious prosecution claim only when the arrest is part of a malicious prosecution conspiracy.

Horne v. Katzfey · filed 2001-03-30

In determining the statute of limitations period for a § 1983 action, we look at the time period provided by state law for general personal injury claims. ... They hold that a false arrest claim accrues when the plaintiff is released only if the claim is a part of a malicious prosecution conspiracy. ... Here, Horne did not allege, let alo ne hint, in his complaint of a malicious prosecution conspiracy. ... Because we hold that Horne’s complaint is time-barred, we need not address the merits of the district court’s qualified immunity analysis.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury.

Elliott, Reihner, Siedzikowski & Egan, P.C. v. Pennsylvania Employees Benefit Trust Fund · filed 2001-03-30

Under Pennsylvania law, the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries is applied to Section 1983 claims. ... Assuming all facts in the complaint to be true, the court finds that, as of May 24, 1995, plaintiff knew, or reasonably should have known, that defendants had “retaliated” against it for exercising First Amendment rights.

Section 1983 medical injury claims are subject to the Texas statute of limitations used for medical injury claims.

Ware v. Scott · filed 2001-04-03

Furthermore, the magistrate judge properly applied to Ware’s claims the Texas statute of limitations utilized for medical injury claims.

Section 1983 claims in Connecticut are subject to the three-year limitations period in General Statutes § 52-577.

Quik Power Int. v. City of Danbury, No. Cv98-033 32 18 S (Apr. 11, 2001) · filed 2001-04-11

The three year limitation in § 52-577 is also the operative statute of limitation for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's general personal injury statute of limitations.

Soliz v. Linam · filed 2001-04-12

For § 1983 claims, federal courts apply the general personal injury statute of limitations of the forum state.

A § 1983 plaintiff in Arkansas may use the state's saving statute to bring a new action within one year after a timely action is dismissed without prejudice.

Miller v. Norris · filed 2001-04-12

Because a plaintiff in a state action that is governed by the three-year time limitation in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105(3) may claim the benefits provided by the saving statute, see Carton v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 295 Ark. 126, 128-29, 747 S.W.2d 93, 94 (1988), a plaintiff in a § 1983 action, which is governed by the same statute of limitations, also may do so.

In New York, a section 1983 claim is subject to the three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Crosland v. City of New York · filed 2001-04-16

The statute of limitations for a section 1983 claim is governed by New York’s residual three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims in Arkansas are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Jackson v. Norris · filed 2001-04-18

We also conclude that to the extent Jackson's claims are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata, they are barred by Arkansas's three-year statute of limitations.

The limitations period for a Section 1983 claim can bar suit when the claim accrued upon injury and the claimant had a reasonable time to file after an amendment to state tolling law.

Williams v. County of Pinal · filed 2001-04-18

The district court did not err by dismissing Williams’ 1999 action based on the Arizona statute of limitations because Williams’ claim accrued at the latest in 1991 when he was injured, see id. at 914, and Williams had a reasonable amount of time to file suit after the effective date of the amended Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-502 (1995), see id. at 915-16 (almost two years after the effective date of a statutory amendment is a reasonable amount of time to file suit).

Section 1983 claims are barred when filed after the applicable statute of limitations.

Cisneros v. Regents of the University of California · filed 2001-04-18

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to the ADA and section 1983 claims because those claims were barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims are not tolled by alleged concealment once public information would prompt inquiry and plaintiffs fail to investigate with reasonable diligence.

Curtis v. City of New Orleans · filed 2001-04-23

Also, any alleged concealment ended when the details of the murders were made available in the public record, in newspaper articles, and in television news broadcasts, and plaintiffs did not show that they tried to gain access to this information with reasonable due diligence.

Section 1983 claims in Mississippi are subject to the state's general three-year statute of limitations.

Hubbard v. MISSISSIPPI CONF. OF THE UNITED METHODIST · filed 2001-04-25

Accordingly, in Mississippi, the general three year statute of limitations of section 15-1-49 of the Mississippi Code applies to section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims use the state limitations period for personal injury actions.

Sengupta v. University of Alaska · filed 2001-04-27

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim is prescribed by the state statute of limitations for a personal injury action.

Section 1983 takings claims are subject to Maine’s general personal injury limitations period.

Stickney v. City of Saco · filed 2001-05-02

Similarly, plaintiffs’ federal takings claim, pursuant to § 1983, has been extinguished by the expiration period prescribed under 14 M.R.S.A. § 752 (1980).

Section 1983 actions arising in Ohio have a two-year limitations period.

Griffin v. City of Columbus · filed 2001-05-02

A two-year limitations period applies to civil rights actions that arise in Ohio.

Section 1983 actions arising in Tennessee are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Vaughn v. Vaughn · filed 2001-05-08

The statute of limitations for actions arising in Tennessee and brought under the federal civil rights statutes is one year.

Section 1983 claims filed in Puerto Rico are subject to a one-year limitations period borrowed from personal injury law.

Pagan Velez v. Alvarado · filed 2001-05-10

Therefore, we apply the one-year prescriptive period to Plaintiffs section 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois are subject to a two-year limitations period borrowed from state personal injury law.

Burke v. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees · filed 2001-05-14

Accordingly, under Illinois law, Burke’s § 1983 claim is subject to a two-year limitations period.

Section 1983 claims use state law to determine the limitations period and whether it is tolled.

Britt ex rel. Britt v. Smith · filed 2001-05-15

In claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal courts look to state law to determine both the relevant statute of limitations period and whether that limitation period is tolled.

Section 1983 claims arising in Colorado are subject to the two-year limitations period in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102.

Wilkins v. Colorado Department of Social Services Division of Vocational Rehabilitation · filed 2001-05-16

Nonetheless, under any theory, plaintiff’s claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitation found in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102, applicable to negligence claims arising in Colorado, including claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims filed in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations.

Henderson, Carlos v. Bolanda, Dennis · filed 2001-05-16

The correct statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions filed in Illinois is two years as set forth in 735 ILCS sec. 5/13-202.

Section 1983 claims filed in Illinois have a two-year limitations period.

Carlos Henderson and Charlie Richardson v. Officer Dennis Bolanda, Star No. 32 · filed 2001-05-16

The correct statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions filed in Illinois is two years as set forth in 735 ILCS § 5/13-202.

Section 1983 civil rights actions filed in Kentucky have a one-year statute of limitations.

Jones v. Seabold · filed 2001-05-22

The statute of limitations on civil rights actions filed in Kentucky is one year.

A Section 1983 claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when it is barred by the statute of limitations.

Johnson v. New York City Employees Income Retirement System Pension Plan · filed 2001-05-25

Plaintiff-appellant Theodore F. Johnson (“Johnson”) filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, alleging that the appellees violated his rights to equal protection and due process by denying, and conspiring to deny, applications he had filed for disability retirement benefits. The district court found that Johnson’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and granted the appellees’ motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). We find no error in the district court’s statute of limitations analysis and affirm.

In Nevada, the limitations period for § 1983 claims alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations is two years.

Linschoten v. Gedney · filed 2001-05-30

Because Linschoten filed his complaint more than two years after the alleged Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, the district court correctly granted summary judgment on Counts I, III, and IV.

Section 1983 actions in Nevada are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Grace v. Bennett · filed 2001-05-31

Because Grace failed to file his complaint within Nevada’s two-year statute of limitations, the district court properly dismissed his action as time-barred.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim begins when plaintiffs have notice of the facts underlying the claim, and earlier alleged deceit does not toll the period after that notice.

Grimsley v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2001-06-06

Even accepting plaintiffs’ assertions of fraud and deceit as true, it is clear that plaintiffs were on notice of the facts surrounding the tax sale on May 20, 1996, when the Gabbarts initiated the quiet title action. It is at this time that the statute of limitations began to run against plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. Defendants’ alleged fraudulent or deceitful conduct occurring before that time, even if true, cannot serve to toll the running of the limitations period.

In Kentucky, a § 1983 claim must be brought within one year of accrual.

Bowden v. City of Franklin · filed 2001-06-06

Thus, Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim must have been brought within one year of accruing.

Section 1983 actions use state law to determine the limitations period and tolling rules.

McCoy v. Damron · filed 2001-06-07

“For section 1983 actions, state law determines the appropriate statute of limitations and accompanying tolling provisions.” Fratus v. Deland, 49 F.3d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1995). McCoy points to no Oklahoma authority that supports his argument that the statute of limitations should be tolled.

Section 1983 suits borrow the state limitations period and tolling rules.

Heard, Delbert v. Sheahan, Michael F. · filed 2001-06-13

The statute of limitations for suits under section 1983 is supplied by state law--not only the limitations period but also the tolling rules.

In Ohio, a plaintiff facing summary judgment on the limitations period for a Section 1983 discrimination claim must produce evidence that the discriminatory act occurred or continued within two years.

Conley v. Willis, Unpublished Decision (6-14-2001) · filed 2001-06-14

When faced with the motion for summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations, it was appellant's legal duty to come forward with evidence to show that the alleged discriminatory act occurred or continued within the two year statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims brought in Indiana are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

O'Neill v. Burks · filed 2001-06-18

In Indiana, a two-year statute of limitations applies to claims brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims brought in Illinois are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Cardenas v. Washington · filed 2001-06-19

Regarding the limitations issue, in Illinois a two-year statute of limitations applies to claims brought under § 1983.

A California prisoner’s § 1983 action is time-barred when filed more than three years after he first knew of his injury.

Markay v. California Department of Corrections · filed 2001-06-21

Because Markay did not file the instant complaint until June 29, 1999, more than three years after he first knew of his injury, the district court properly dismissed his action as time-barred.

A § 1983 claim may survive a limitations challenge when continuing wrongful acts cause injury to accrue after the initial event.

Choate's Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc. v. Light, Gas & Water Division · filed 2001-06-22

This Court conducts a three-part inquiry for determining whether a continuing violation exists, looking first to whether the defendant’s wrongful behavior continued after the precipitating event; then to whether the plaintiffs injury continued to accrue after that event; and finally, to whether further injury to the plaintiff could have been avoided if the defendant had ceased its wrongful conduct. ... It appears, however, that the alleged harm continued to accrue after this point, as MLGW continued to enter licensing agreements, collect payments under those agreements, and update and service the relevant contracts, all of which activity occurred in relation to the disputed property in this case. We therefore decline to dismiss Choate’s claim on this basis.

A § 1983 complaint cannot be dismissed at screening as time barred when exhaustion of prison remedies may have tolled the limitations period.

Leal v. Georgia Department of Corr. · filed 2001-06-25

Because the statute of limitations may have been tolled on account of Leal's exhaustion of administrative remedies, it does not appear beyond a doubt from the complaint itself that Leal can prove no set of facts which would avoid a statute of limitations bar.

Section 1983 claims brought in Louisiana are subject to a one-year prescriptive period.

Nolan v. JEFFERSON PAR. HOSP. SERV. DIST. NO. 2 · filed 2001-06-27

In Louisiana, such actions are limited by the one year prescriptive period contained in La. C.C. art. 3492.

Section 1983 actions in Minnesota are subject to a six-year limitations period, with equitable tolling available only when the circumstances justify it.

Anunka v. Campbell · filed 2001-07-05

Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs, we agree that the complaint was filed after the expiration of the applicable six- year limitations period, see Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989); Berg v. Groschen, 437 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), and that the circumstances did ... not justify equitable tolling, see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985); Ochs v. Streater, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 858, 860 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).

Section 1983 claims filed after the applicable limitations period may be dismissed as frivolous.

Dellis v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 2001-07-08

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed as frivolous Plaintiffs claims arising out of his incarceration at HCCF inasmuch as any such claim is barred the by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising in Tennessee are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Dellis v. Corrections Corporation of America · filed 2001-07-18

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed as frivolous Plaintiff's claims arising out of his incarceration at HCCF inasmuch as any such claim is barred the by the applicable statute of limitations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3); Merriweather v. City of Memphis, 107 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff was transferred from HCCF to WCF on July 25, 1998, and filed this action on August 2, 1999. Thus any claim he had accrued more than one year before he filed suit.

Section 1983 claims in Texas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Nugent v. City of Houston · filed 2001-07-20

Defendants argue, and the court agrees, that a two-year statute of limitations applies to plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Section 1983 actions use the applicable state's personal injury limitations period.

Boyd v. Rhode Island Department of Corrections · filed 2001-07-20

In actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a state’s personal injury statute governs the time limitations period.

The limitations period for these § 1983 claims began when the state court dismissed the underlying criminal charges without prejudice.

Conlon v. Rogers · filed 2001-07-20

The district court did not err in determining that Conlon’s section 1983 claims were barred by the statute of limitations, because the statute of limitations began to run when the Arizona state court dismissed the criminal charges against Conlon without prejudice.

For a § 1983 constructive discharge claim, the limitations period begins when the employee resigns.

Salopek v. State · filed 2001-07-24

However, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Salopek’s § 1983 claim alleging constructive discharge in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. We have said that in constructive discharge cases, periods of limitation begin to run on the date of resignation.

The limitation period for a Section 1983 action is tolled according to state law.

Robinson v. City & County of Denver · filed 2001-07-27

The tolling of the limitation period in a section 1983 action is governed by state law.

Illinois-based Section 1983 actions have a two-year limitations period, and timeliness is an affirmative defense rather than a precondition to suit.

Brogan v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago · filed 2001-07-31

What both defense counsel have failed to think through is that the two year statute of limitations on their Illinois-based Section 1983 actions is an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c), rather than constituting a precondition to suit.

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations.

Long v. Williams · filed 2001-08-06

Therefore, while a two-year statute of limitations applies to Long’s federal claims, a one-year statute of limitations applies to his state law claims against Defendants.

Section 1983 claims in North Carolina have a three-year statute of limitations.

Morley v. NC, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES · filed 2001-08-07

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in North Carolina is three years.

Section 1983 claims in North Carolina have a three-year statute of limitations.

Morley v. North Carolina Department of Health & Human Services/Broughton Hospital · filed 2001-08-07

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in North Carolina is three years.

A Section 1983 wrongful-arrest claim in Louisiana is time-barred if filed more than one year after the arrest.

Batiste v. Landors · filed 2001-08-08

Batiste’s complaint, filed on March 1, 2000, was filed more than one year after the accrual of his cause of action, his purportedly wrongful arrest on October 21, 1998. Accordingly, the district court did not err by dismissing Batiste’s action as time-barred.

Section 1983 actions arising in Tennessee have a one-year limitations period.

Griffin v. Eidson · filed 2001-08-10

For § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee, the statute of limitations is one year.

Section 1983 claims in Utah are subject to the four-year limitations period in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3).

Sanders v. State of Utah · filed 2001-08-13

The four-year limitations period in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) provides the limitations period for plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims brought in Tennessee are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Gabhart v. City of Newport · filed 2001-08-15

The district court also determined that Gabhart’s claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations to the extent that the claims were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that any claim for in-junctive relief was moot. ... Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is hereby affirmed for the reasons set forth ... in the district court’s order of October 16, 2000.

Section 1983 claims are treated as personal injury actions, with the limitations period determined by state law.

Pelster Ex Rel. Boyer v. Walker · filed 2001-08-20

Section 1983 claims are characterized as personal injury actions, and the applicable statute of limitations is determined by state law.

Section 1983 claims in Texas have a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows of the injury and who caused it.

Corbett v. Barr · filed 2001-08-23

The two-year limitations period began to run on January 10, 1996, the date of the alleged excessive use of force because on that date Corbett was aware of “critical facts that he ha[d] been hurt and who ha[d] inflicted the injury.” ... Corbett did not file this § 1983 action until December 29, 1998, after the expiration of the two-year limitations period.

Section 1983 claims filed in Louisiana federal district courts have a one-year limitations period.

Price v. Stalder · filed 2001-08-23

A one-year limitations period applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims filed in Louisiana federal district courts.

Section 1983 has no federal limitations period; courts borrow the forum state's general personal injury limitations period.

Knight v. Calhoun County, MS · filed 2001-08-23

Knight is correct that there is no federal limitations period for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions; because there is no statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, federal courts borrow the general personal injury limitations ... period of the forum state.

Section 1983 claims in Massachusetts are subject to the state's three-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Hamilton v. Dineen · filed 2001-08-29

As a result, the Massachusetts three- year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to this case.

Section 1983 claims brought in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations borrowed from personal injury actions.

Aikens v. City of Chicago · filed 2001-09-14

The statute of limitations applied to claims brought in Illinois pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the two year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.