42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims in Texas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Ruiz v. Hildreth · filed 1996-09-13

Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ruiz’s motion to amend his complaint, since § 1985 claims are subject to the same two-year limitations period as his original Bivens and § 1983 claims.

A Section 1983 claim filed within three years of accrual is timely for limitations purposes, even if service of process was untimely.

Romero v. Keeney · filed 1996-09-26

Insofar as the argument is directed to the Section 1983 claim, the argument is without merit. This action was commenced within three years of the date on which the cause of action accrued and therefore is timely for limitations purposes, although it will be dismissed as against NYCHA without prejudice for failure to serve process within the 120-day period.

Section 1983 claims arising in Tennessee are subject to the state’s one-year statute of limitations.

Craven v. Bi-Lo, Inc. · filed 1996-09-27

For purposes of § 1983, state statutes of limitations apply to determine the timeliness of the claims asserted under the act. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1985). The one-year statute of limitations period found in Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a) applies to civil rights claims arising in Tennessee.

Federal law determines when a § 1983 cause of action accrues, while state law supplies the applicable limitations period.

Laprime v. Foti · filed 1996-09-27

Although we look to Louisiana law to determine the applicable limitations period, federal law governs when a cause of action under § 1983 accrues.

Section 1983 claims by Virginia inmates are barred unless they deliver the complaint to prison officials for mailing within two years after they knew or had reason to know of the injury.

Garrett v. Angelone · filed 1996-10-02

In Virginia § 1983 cases, then, if an inmate has not delivered his complaint to prison officials for mailing within the two-year period following the time when he knew or had reason to know of his alleged injury, the Virginia statute of limitations bars that inmate from bringing suit about that injury.

Section 1983 claims in Texas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Thomas v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division · filed 1996-10-02

A two-year statute of limitations applies to Thomas' claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003 (West 1986 and Supp. 1996), and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Burrell v. Newsome , 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989).

Section 1983 claims against Kentucky prison officials are subject to the applicable Kentucky statute of limitations.

Walker v. Taylor · filed 1996-10-07

Walker's claim as to the Marion officials was barred by the statute of limitations. See Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 413.140(1)(a) (Michie 1992); Collard, 896 F.2d at 182.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Garcia v. City of Oakwood · filed 1996-10-15

The statute of limitations for § 1983 civil rights actions arising in Ohio is contained in OHIO REV.CODE ANN § 2305.10 (Anderson 1995), which requires that actions for bodily injury be filed within two years after their accrual.

Section 1983 claims challenging termination accrue when the defendant makes a final termination decision; denial of a futile reinstatement application does not restart the limitations period.

Kasemeier v. Indiana University · filed 1996-10-16

When a defendant terminates its relationship with a plaintiff (whether the relationship is school/student, employer/employee or some other relationship whereby improper severance violates federal law), the point at which the defendant actually undertakes the termination (not the effective date if such is later) starts the clock on the statute of limitations. Webb, 931 F.2d at 435. If the defendant makes it clear to the plaintiff that its decision is final and will not be revisited, so that a future application for reinstatement by the plaintiff would be useless, then the defendant's denial of an application for reinstatement is not considered a new act that restarts the statute of limitations.

A Section 1983 plaintiff cannot use the continuing violation doctrine to extend the limitations period based on an inconsequential act within that period.

Ulibarri v. Lopez · filed 1996-10-17

We agree with the district court that the only event which occurred within the statutory period, the denial of mileage, was “so inconsequential when compared to the prior alleged acts” that it would not “justify application of the continuing violation doctrine,” Appellant’s App. 45.

Section 1983 has no specified statute of limitations; courts borrow the most analogous state limitations period.

Bell v. Fowler · filed 1996-10-23

Neither § 1983 nor § 1985(3) contains a specific statute of limitations. The Supreme Court has instructed courts to apply the most analogous state statute of limitations to claims made under these provisions.

Section 1983 claims brought in South Dakota are subject to a three-year limitations period borrowed from state law.

Bell v. Fowler · filed 1996-10-23

Neither § 1983 nor § 1985(3) contains a specific statute of limitations. ... In South Dakota, a specific statute provides that civil rights actions must be brought within three years after the alleged constitutional deprivation occurred or the action will be barred.

Section 1983 damages claims filed in Illinois are subject to the state’s two-year residual personal-injury statute of limitations.

Deerwester v. Brienen · filed 1996-11-04

Federal district courts sitting in Illinois hearing § 1983 claims must apply Illinois' two-year residual statute of limitations in actions for damages for an injury to the person.

Section 1983 claims arising in Tennessee are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Force v. City of Memphis · filed 1996-11-14

This case arose from the wrongful arrest of Mr. Force, which occurred on February 25, 1993, and the plaintiff's claims under § 1983, as well as his pendent state tort claims, are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising out of events in Kentucky have a one-year limitations period, but earlier events may still be used as evidence of a timely claim.

1996-11-20 · filed 1996-11-20

Section 1983 claims arising out of events in Kentucky are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. ... The district court held that he could not prove his claim of constructive discharge with evidence of events occurring prior to April 12, 1992. This was error. Statutes of limitations apply to claims, not the evidence supporting the claims.

Section 1983 claims in Virginia are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Pledger v. City of Virginia Beach · filed 1996-11-21

He conceded that the last overt act of alleged discrimination occurred in May 1992. Yet, he failed to file his § 1983 claim until October 20, 1994--more than two years after the last overt act of discrimination.See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(A) (Michie 1992); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180 (1976).

Section 1983 claims in Virginia are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Pledger v. City of VA Beach · filed 1996-11-21

Yet, he failed to file his § 1983 claim until October 20, 1994--more than two years after the last overt act of discrimination.

Section 1983 claims use the state limitations period for personal injury torts.

1996-11-26 · filed 1996-11-26

State law determines the length of the limitations period. The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is the same as the state's limitations period for personal injury torts.

Section 1983 claims borrow the personal injury limitations period of the state where the claim arises.

Myers v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System · filed 1996-11-26

For actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Federal courts apply the statute of limitations for personal injury áctions of the state in which the claim arises.

A § 1983 claim should remain on the district court’s docket during exhaustion of state remedies if dismissal would create a statute of limitations problem.

Alexander v. Gossett · filed 1996-11-27

Although the general rule is that the case should be dismissed rather than retained on the district court's docket pending exhaustion of state remedies, Slayton v. Smith, 404 U.S. 53, 54 (1971), a civil rights claim should be retained on the docket if dismissal would create a statute of limitations problem.

Section 1983 claims in Nevada are subject to Nevada’s two-year residual limitations period for personal injury actions.

Lyons v. Thomas Steffen Nevada Supreme Court Nevada Supreme Court Justices · filed 1996-12-06

Nevada's two-year residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e), applies to Lyons' section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims in Ohio have a two-year statute of limitations.

Watford v. City of Cleveland, John Brady, Melvin Mervine, and Edward P. Kovacic · filed 1996-12-18

For reasons stated by the district court in its Memorandum and Order of August 21, 1995, the applicable statute of limitation to plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is two years, but also for reasons stated therein, Watford's claims under § 1983 of illegal search and seizure, invasion of privacy, and false arrest/imprisonment are not time-barred.

Section 1983 claims filed in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Lagana v. Dillon · filed 1996-12-19

Because Lagana stated that she was evicted on August 13, 1986, and did not file her complaint in federal court until October 3, 1994, her claim is barred by New York's three-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 access-to-courts claims against Hawaii public safety officials are subject to Hawaii’s limitations period, and the cited Hawaii tolling provision does not apply.

Martinez v. Neilson · filed 1996-12-20

We affirm the district court's dismissal of Martinez's access to the courts claims because, as the district court noted, any claims occurring before April 24, 1991 are barred by Hawaii's statute of limitations. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1988); Haw.Rev.Stat. § 657-7. Moreover, we agree with the district court that the tolling provision cited by Martinez does not apply to actions against the Department of Public Safety and its officials. See Haw.Rev.Stat. §§ 657.13 & 2-14.6(f).

Section 1983 suits in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Pearson v. Vaugh · filed 1997-10-28

Therefore, Pearson, having been injured on March 16, 1994, missed the two year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 suits in Pennsylvania when he failed to file suit by March 16,1996, and instead filed suit on March 28,1996.

Section 1983 claims in Georgia are governed by the two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

DOE 102 v. Department of Corrections · filed 1997-11-03

The two-year statute of limitation in OCGA § 9-3-33 governs claims brought under 42 USC § 1983 because such claims are most accurately characterized as personal injury actions.

California's tolling statute applies to Section 1983 claims, but it cannot revive a claim whose limitations period expired before tolling began.

Fink v. Buena Park Police Department Richard Tefank One Unknown Detective · filed 1997-11-06

While Fink is correct that California's tolling statute applies to his § 1983 claims, see Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir.1994), this tolling cannot save Fink's § 1983 claim for the allegedly illegal 1987 seizure as the statute of limitations on this claim had expired before the date of his incarceration.

For an Illinois Section 1983 employment termination claim, the plaintiff may rely on a notice stating that termination is effective immediately to establish when the two-year limitations period begins.

Draghi v. County of Cook · filed 1997-11-12

Having stated the matter in those express terms in its notice to Draghi, Board cannot now resort to a different contention that its termination action had been effective on April 5 rather than “effective immediately” on April 11. Even though it may be difficult to understand why Draghi waited as long as he did to file this lawsuit (if he had done so as late as 23 months after his final termination, say by the end of March 1997, there could have been no possible dispute as to timeliness), that is after all what statutes of limitation are for. Draghi was entitled to rely on the April 11 date in bringing his Section 1983 action, rather than being placed on inquiry notice as to a possible earlier date of termination (as defendants would have it).

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury damages claims.

Lembach v. State of Indiana · filed 1997-11-14

As Defendants properly point out, “[t]he statute of limitations for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state’s statute for recovery of damages for personal injuries.”

Section 1983 has no specific limitations period, so courts borrow the state limitations period for personal injury actions.

Celestine v. Foster · filed 1997-11-21

Because § 1983 contains no specific statute of limitations, we borrow state statutes of limitations for personal injury actions in § 1983 suits.

A § 1983 complaint filed outside the applicable three-year limitations period is untimely even if an earlier action raising the same allegations tolled that period.

Ellerbee v. McDade · filed 1997-11-25

Even if Appellant's prior 1995 action, which raised the same allegations, tolled the limitations period, the complaint in this appeal was filed outside the applicable three-year statute of limi- tations.

A § 1983 action in Tennessee is subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Brown v. Davidson · filed 1997-12-05

Brown’s action in federal court would have been based on 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Supp. 1997). The statute of limitations for an action brought under a federal civil rights statute and an action for malicious prosecution is one year.

Section 1983 claims in Ohio use the two-year personal-injury limitations period, which accrues when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the alleged injury.

James v. Upper Arlington City School District · filed 1997-12-15

The statute of limitations under § 1983 is the same as the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... As discussed more fully above, legal actions in Ohio for torts involving personal injuries must be brought within two (2) years. ... The claims under § 1983 accrued when the Plaintiffs knew or should have known of the alleged injury, not when they become aware that such injury might be redressable.

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows of the injury on which the claim is based.

Jaghory v. New York State Department of Education · filed 1997-12-15

Under federal law, which governs when claims brought under §§ 1983 and 1985 accrue, the statute of limitations begins to run once the plaintiff knows of the injury on which the claim is based.

Section 1983 claims that accrue in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Jaghory v. New York State Department Of Education · filed 1997-12-15

Because the statute of limitations for a claim under § 1983 that accrued in New York is three years, see Board of Regents of S.U.N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980), the period between Jaghory's application for a license and the Board's waiver of two of the years of residency required of him falls outside the statute.

Section 1983 actions use the state personal injury statute of limitations.

Lucien v. Jockisch · filed 1998-01-07

The state statute of limitations for personal injury suits provides the limitations period for Lucien’s § 1983 action.

In Arizona, a § 1983 action has a two-year limitations period.

Carrillo v. State of Ariz. · filed 1998-01-09

In Arizona, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 cause of action is two years.

Section 1983 claims arising in Arkansas are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Flynt v. Univ. Hospital of AR · filed 1998-01-12

Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that the applicable three-year statute of limitations barred Flynt&s claim arising from events that occurred in 1977 or 1978.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal-injury limitations period.

Jacobsen v. Osborne · filed 1998-01-16

Of course, for a § 1983 action, the court looks to the forum state’s personal-injury limitations period.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality is time-barred when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged municipal policy or custom more than three years before filing suit.

DeVito v. Incorporated Village of Valley Stream · filed 1998-01-21

In sum, the Court finds that no rational jury could conclude that Plaintiff did not know, or could not have known, of the existence of an alleged “policy or custom” of the Village to terminate Village employees on the basis of their political affiliation prior to November 28,1991. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs Section 1983 cause of action against the Village is dismissed as time-barred.

A § 1983 claim may be dismissed when barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Roberts v. Brown · filed 1998-01-30

Roberts and Core appeal from the dismissal of their 42 USC § 1983 claim against the city of West Point and three of its police officers, including Brown, resulting from a search claimed to be illegal. The complaint was dismissed, based on the statute of limitation, pursuant to the defendants’ motion. For two reasons, we affirm. ... Second, even if we were to consider the argument made, the issue has been determined adversely to plaintiffs.

Section 1983 actions filed in Illinois are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

McLaughlin v. Cook County Dep't of Corrections · filed 1998-02-05

In Illinois, section 1981 and section 1983 actions are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. ... Accordingly, the court finds that McLaughlin’s section 1981 and section 1983 claims are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period borrowed from the state’s personal injury statute.

Mohr v. CHICAGO SCHOOL REFORM BD., BD. OF EDUC. · filed 1998-02-09

The statute of limitations for Section 1981 and Section 1983 claims is the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions: two years in Illinois.

A § 1983 complaint may be dismissed when the claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

Haner v. Sergeant Kaup · filed 1998-02-19

Dan Haner, Texas prisoner # 704002, appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action as frivolous. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing his complaint on statute of limitations grounds.

Section 1983 suits brought in California have a one-year limitations period measured from accrual.

Larramendy v. Newton · filed 1998-02-23

The statute of limitations for suits under § 1983 brought in California is one year from the date of accrual.

Section 1983 claims use state law for limitations periods and tolling; California’s tolling provision applies to a prisoner serving life with the possibility of parole.

Martinez v. Gomez · filed 1998-03-03

State law governs both the statute of limitations and the tolling of the statute. ... Because Martinez can claim the benefit of section 352(a)(3), his claim is not time-barred.

Section 1983 claims filed in Pennsylvania are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Okan's Foods, Inc. v. Windsor Associates Ltd. Partnership (In Re Okan's Foods, Inc.) · filed 1998-03-06

The parties are in agreement, and correctly assert, that the limitations period applicable to the Debtor’s § 1983 claims is the Pennsylvania two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims brought in Wisconsin are subject to the six-year limitations period in Wis. Stat. § 893.53.

Hemberger v. Bitzer · filed 1998-03-13

In sum, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 893.53, providing a six-year statute of limitations, is Wisconsin's general and residual personal injury statute of limitations. Therefore, it is applicable to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so courts borrow an appropriate period from state law.

Battle v. Morrison · filed 1998-03-17

Because § 1983 does not contain a limitation period, an appropriate limitation period must be borrowed from the analogous Virginia law cause of action.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

United States Ex Rel. Long v. SCS Business & Technical Institute · filed 1998-03-26

Furthermore, a civil rights claim begins to accrue when the aggrieved party knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis for the § 1983 action.

In Kansas, § 1983 claims are subject to a two-year limitations period under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(4).

Gaschler v. Scott County, Kansas · filed 1998-04-01

Those claims are subject to the two-year limitations period in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(4).

Section 1983 claims in Kansas are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Gaschler v. Scott County, Kan. · filed 1998-04-01

We agree with the district court that plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, regarding his arrest on March 11, 1992, are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Those claims are subject to the two-year limitations period in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(4).

Section 1983 actions in Texas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Canty v. Woods · filed 1998-04-07

... that his action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions in Texas. ... We AFFIRM this ruling.

Section 1983 claims use the state's personal-injury limitations period; in Pennsylvania, that period is two years.

Sameric Corp of DE v. Cty of Philadelphia · filed 1998-04-10

In actions under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, federal courts apply the state's statute of limitations for personal injury. ... Thus, because Pennsylvania's statute of limitations for personal injury is two years, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5524 (West Supp. 1997), Sameric's due process claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Sameric Corporation Of Delaware, Inc. v. City Of Philadelphia · filed 1998-04-10

In actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal courts apply the state's statute of limitations for personal injury.

Section 1983 claims in Texas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Phillips v. Jeff Co Prob Dept · filed 1998-04-15

Henry Lee Phillips appeals from the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of his complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We have reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, and find that the district court did not plainly err in finding that the complaint was barred by the Texas two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 borrows the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury torts.

Ricotta v. State of California · filed 1998-04-15

Because §§ 1983 & 1985 do not contain their own limitations period, federal courts look to the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts.

Section 1983 claims arising in Iowa are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Rounds v. Sandy Baker · filed 1998-04-15

In May 1997, Robert Rounds filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he suffered an unconstitutional search and seizure on March 8, 1995. The district court1 dismissed his claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) because it was barred by the two- year statute of limitations. ... After careful review of the record, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.

Section 1983 claims arising in Iowa are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Rounds v. Sandy Baker Sharon Lamb Chrys Harvey Nan Horvat Larry Penland · filed 1998-04-15

In May 1997, Robert Rounds filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he suffered an unconstitutional search and seizure on March 8, 1995. The district court 1 dismissed his claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) because it was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. See Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983, 987 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1028, 106 S.Ct. 1230, 89 L.Ed.2d 339 (1986); Iowa Code Ann. § 614.1(2) (West Supp.1997). After careful review of the record, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.

Section 1983 claims filed in Colorado are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Crumpton v. Perryman · filed 1998-04-16

The two-year statute of limitations in § 13-80-102, C.R.S.1997, applies to claims made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In Massachusetts, § 1983 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Tedeschi v. Reardon · filed 1998-04-21

Claims under § 1983 are subject to a three year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions in Tennessee must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Ali v. Moore · filed 1998-04-24

A l i ’ s 4 2 U . S . C . § 1 9 8 3 a c ti o n i s li k e w i s e b a r r e d f o r th e r e a s o n s s t a t e d a b o v e , b e c a u s e s u c h a c ti o n m u s t b e f i l e d w i t h i n o n e y e a r a f t e r t h e c a u s e o f a c ti o n a c c r u e s .

Section 1983 claims brought in Maryland are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass'n v. Glendening · filed 1998-04-28

The proper limitations period in Maryland for actions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and Title VI is three years, as provided by Md. Ann.Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101.

A § 1983 action filed in Arizona more than two years after the cause of action accrued is time-barred.

Ed Finkelstein v. Allan Chapman City of Tucson · filed 1998-04-28

The district court properly dismissed Finkelstein's action as time-barred because Finkelstein filed his action on January 31, 1997, more than two years after his cause of action accrued in early 1993.

Section 1983 actions use state law to determine the limitations period and tolling.

Martinez v. Gomez · filed 1998-05-01

State law governs both the statute of limitations and the tolling of the statute.

Section 1983 claims use the limitations period for the most closely analogous state-law claim.

Jane Doe One v. Garcia · filed 1998-05-06

A federal court adjudicating rights under § 1983 and § 1681 adopts the state statute of limitations of the most closely analogous state law claim.

Section 1983 actions filed in Illinois have a two-year limitations period.

Ashafa v. City of Chicago · filed 1998-06-01

Therefore, under the analysis outlined in Owens, the correct statute of limitations for § 1983 actions filed in Illinois is two years as set forth in § 202.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Eison v. McCoy · filed 1998-06-02

In § 1983 actions, federal courts adopt the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

In Tennessee, a § 1983 action must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Ali v. Moore · filed 1998-06-16

Ali’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is likewise barred for the reasons stated above, because such action must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Whiting v. Incorporated Village of Old Brookville · filed 1998-06-17

There is no dispute that claims brought under Section 1983 are subject to New York’s three year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 has no federal statute of limitations, so courts borrow the forum state's general personal injury limitations period.

Hunt v. Anderson · filed 1998-06-18

Because there is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 actions, the federal courts borrow the forum state's general personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Burns v. Harris County Bail Bond Board · filed 1998-06-18

As no federal statute of limitations exists for § 1983 actions, federal courts defer to the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Eison v. Mccoy · filed 1998-07-07

In § 1983 actions, federal courts adopt the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s personal injury limitations period and equitable tolling principles.

Rotella v. Pederson · filed 1998-07-14

Because the Texas statute of limitations is borrowed in § 1983 cases, Texas’ equitable tolling principles also control.

Section 1983 claims in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Whiting v. Incorporated Village of Old Brookville · filed 1998-07-20

Moreover, to the extent this claim rests on his allegation that on May 14, 1993, the Police Department denied his three Freedom of Information Law (“FOIL”) requests for the rules, it is barred by the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims for unreasonable search and seizure and invasion of privacy are treated as personal injury claims and subject to Virginia’s two-year limitations period.

Wood v. Commonwealth of VA · filed 1998-07-23

Appellants' claims of unreasonable search and seizure and invasion of privacy brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are, as a matter of law, claims for personal injury and therefore subject to Virginia's two-year limitation period for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 arrest claims in Oklahoma are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Dicesare v. Baldridge · filed 1998-08-11

Therefore, this claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations. See Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1522-24 (10th Cir. 1988) (adopting two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Oklahoma); Johnson v. Johnson County Comm’n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Claims arising out of police actions toward a criminal suspect, such as arrest, interrogation, or search and seizure, are presumed to have accrued when the actions actually occur.”).

Section 1983 claims use the state personal injury limitations period, which is two years in Oregon.

Gowin v. Multnomah County · filed 1998-08-31

Section 1983 actions are governed by the statute of limitations that applies under state law to personal injury actions. ... Accordingly, based on ORS 12.110, Gowin’s Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

A claim for damages under § 1983 must be commenced within the three-year limitations period governing personal injury actions in New York.

Bidnick v. Johnson · filed 1998-09-21

Since the plaintiff commenced this action more than three years after his resignation and the termination of his employment, his 42 USC § 1983 claim is time-barred.

Section 1983 claims filed in the District of Columbia are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Smith-Haynie, J. C. v. Davis, Addison · filed 1998-09-22

... court dismissed the sections 1981 and 1983 and Equal Pay Act claims as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (three year statute of limitations in the District of Columbia for sections 1981 and 1983); 29 U.S.C. s 255(a) (three year statute of limitations for willful violations of the Equal Pay Act). This was not an abuse of discretion and dismissal of these claims will be upheld.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Dunmars v. City of Chicago · filed 1998-09-24

In a § 1983 action, the federal courts adopt the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 employment discrimination claims are subject to a six-month limitations period borrowed from Massachusetts law.

Mamos v. School Committee of Town of Wakefield · filed 1983-01-03

Accordingly, I hold that under the reasoning of the Burns-Hussey-Holden trilogy, the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are barred by the six-month limitations period provided in M.G.L. c. 151B, § 5 and c. 31, § 42.

Section 1983 claims against state and city officials filed in New York federal court have a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the alleged deprivation.

McCoy v. Drug Enforcement Administration · filed 1983-05-23

It is well settled that an action commenced in a federal district court in New York against state and city officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by the three year statute of limitations set forth in N.Y.Civ.Prac. Law § 214(2) (McKinney Supp.1982-1983) (“CPLR 214(2)”); Pauk v. Board of Trustees of City University of New York, 654 F.2d 856, 866 (2d Cir.1981). It is also clear that the three year limitation period begins to run when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the alleged deprivation.

The limitations period for a § 1983 action is tolled when the complaint and motion to proceed in forma pauperis are lodged with the court.

Jones v. Waters · filed 1983-05-31

The statute of limitations was tolled once his complaint and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis were lodged with the court.

Section 1983 actions use the statute of limitations supplied by state law.

Matasareanu v. Williams · filed 1998-10-02

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions is determined by state law.

Section 1983 actions in Texas are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Gonzales v. Wyatt · filed 1998-10-23

In this section 1983 action, the applicable limitations period is the two-year period provided by Texas law.

A § 1983 action filed in the District of Connecticut has a three-year statute of limitations.

Walker v. Jastremski · filed 1998-11-03

When a § 1983 action is filed in the District of Connecticut, it is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims filed in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations.

Taylor v. Rockford Police Department, Rockford Coroner Office, Ed Yavitz Eye Center · filed 1998-11-09

Moreover, to the extent that they could conceivably have a basis in rational fact, and were not the subject of one of Taylor's many previous complaints, the allegations concerning the alleged police assaults are time-barred, because they occurred more than two years before he filed his complaint. Ashafa v. City of Chicago, 146 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir.1998) (statute of limitations for § 1983 claims filed in Illinois is two years).

Section 1983 claims filed in Puerto Rico are subject to a one year limitations period borrowed from Puerto Rico personal injury law.

Montalvo v. Municipality of Arecibo · filed 1998-11-11

The Court must first determine the applicable statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim. ... Thus, this Court defers to the one year statute of limitations period for physical or emotional injuries under Puerto Rico law.

Section 1983 actions use the state’s general personal injury limitations period, which is three years in New York.

Buckley v. City of Syracuse · filed 1998-12-01

In section 1983 actions, the applicable statute of limitations is found in the general or residual statute of the state for personal injury actions. ... Thus, in this case, New York’s three-year statute of limitations for unspecified personal injury actions applies.

Section 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Epps v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 1998-12-07

Thus, the § 1983 equal protection claim based upon these incidents is barred by the running of the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the analogous state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Heyward v. Monroe · filed 1998-12-07

With regard to Heyward's § 1983 claims, there is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 actions; the analogous state statute governing personal injury actions applies.

Section 1983 actions brought in Texas have a two-year limitations period.

Li v. University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston · filed 1998-12-10

And, the relevant limitation period is two years in Texas for an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983.

Section 1983 has no limitations period, so courts use an analogous state period unless it conflicts with federal policy.

Watts v. Odom Graves, Sheriff · filed 1983-12-12

Because section 1983 contains no limitation provision, we look to analogous state statutes to determine whether the action is time-barred, as long as application of the statute is not inconsistent with federal policies.

Section 1983 claims in Hawaii are subject to the one-year limitations period in Haw.Rev.Stat. § 657-11.

Lai v. City and County of Honolulu · filed 1983-12-14

Moreover, accepting Hawaii’s selection of a one-year long period does not frustrate the purposes served by the federal law, namely section 1983. ... The court, therefore, declines to follow Matthewman, and holds that section 657-11 is constitutional as applied to this section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 uses the applicable state personal injury statute of limitations.

Rowe v. Board of Trustees for the Florida School for the Deaf & Blind · filed 1998-12-15

Section 1983 adopts the applicable state personal injury statute of limitations which, in this case, is four years.

Section 1983 claims in Texas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Nickerson v. Texas · filed 1998-12-21

Plaintiffs allege § 1983 and § 1985 civil rights claims; civil conspiracy, fraud, invasion of privacy claims and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. For all of them, the statute of limitations (2 years) has run.

A Section 1983 civil rights claim filed within one year after the plaintiff received notice of the alleged injury was timely.

De La Rosa v. Adm. De Derecho Al Trabajo · filed 1998-12-23

Por ello, al instar su demanda por violación a sus derechos civiles el 26 de mayo de 1994, exactamente un año más tarde, su reclamación fue presentada oportunamente.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so courts borrow an analogous state limitations period.

Hill v. Gilliam · filed 1999-02-01

Because § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitation, courts rely on analogous state statutes for determining the limitations period.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, which is two years in Oklahoma.

Martin v. Punches · filed 1999-02-23

The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is the forum state’s statute for personal injury actions. ... In Oklahoma, that limitations period is two years.

Section 1983 actions arising in California use the state’s one-year general residual tort statute of limitations, rather than the special limitations period for claims presented to public entities.

Silva v. Crain · filed 1999-02-26

We hold, as we must, that California’s general residual tort statute of limitations of one year, and not its sometimes longer and sometimes shorter special statute of limitations for actions on claims presented to public entities, is the proper statute to use for § 1983 actions arising in that state.

Section 1983 claims in Maine have a six-year statute of limitations.

Burns v. Town of Lamoine · filed 1999-03-11

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 cases in Maine is six years.

Section 1983 borrows the state’s general personal injury limitations period, which in Maryland is three years.

Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass'n v. Glendening · filed 1999-04-05

It is well-settled that sections 1983 and 1985 borrow the state’s general personal injury limitations period, which in Maryland is three years.

Section 1983 borrows the state's general personal injury limitations period, which is three years in Maryland.

Winder v. Glendenning · filed 1999-04-05

It is well-settled that sections 1983 and 1985 borrow the state's general personal injury limitations period, which in Maryland is three years.

Federal law determines whether an amended state tolling statute applies retroactively to a § 1983 claim.

Tworivers v. Lewis · filed 1999-04-06

Thus, in view of the principles set forth in West, Wilson, and Vaughan, we apply federal law, not state law, in deciding whether to apply the amended § 12-502 retroactively.

Section 1983 claims arising in New York must be brought within three years.

Meckenberg v. New York City Off-Track Betting · filed 1999-04-13

The applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in New York requires claims to be brought within three years.

Section 1983 claims brought in Ohio are generally subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Tolbert v. Ohio Department of Transportation · filed 1999-04-16

All of the Cherrywood residents’ claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.

A § 1983 civil rights claim appended to a Title VII claim is subject to dismissal for an untimely EEOC charge, subject to equitable tolling.

Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend · filed 1983-12-29

It is axiomatic that the untimely filing of a charge with the EEOC renders the Title VII claim or the civil rights claim appended thereto subject to dismissal for failure to meet the statute of limitations.

Section 1983’s statute of limitations does not bar a facial First Amendment challenge to an ordinance merely because the ordinance was previously applied to the plaintiff.

Frye v. City of Kannapolis · filed 1999-04-29

Defendants’ argument is, in effect, that the Section 1983 statute of limitations should apply to a plaintiff who brings a facial challenge to an ordinance which has been applied against him or her. The court cannot find any authority for such a rule, especially in light of the Fourth Circuit’s language in National Advertising, 947 F.2d at 1168 (declining to apply statute of limitations to facial First Amendment challenge to zoning ordinance which had been applied to plaintiff).

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state statute of limitations; in Colorado, the period is two years.

Holmes v. Regents of the · filed 1999-05-07

As for Dr. Holmes’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, because no federal law provides a period of limitation, we must “apply the relevant state statute of limitations applicable to such actions.” Hunt , 17 F.3d at 1265. In Colorado, a two-year statute of limitations applies to “actions upon liability created by a federal statute.” See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g).

In Oklahoma, a § 1983 action has a two-year limitations period beginning when the cause of action accrues.

Bedford v. Rivers · filed 1999-05-10

As the court noted, the statute of limitations in a § 1983 action filed in Oklahoma is two years from the time the cause of action accrued.

Section 1983 discrimination claims based on acts outside the limitations period are barred when the plaintiff fails to establish a continuing violation.

Collins v. Christopher · filed 1999-05-25

Because this Court agrees that plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to establish a continuing violation, summary judgment is granted on those claims under § 1983, Title VII and the New York Human Rights Law based on events that occurred outside of the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Texas have a two-year limitations period, which can make a dismissal without prejudice an effective bar to refiling.

Williams v. Johnson · filed 1999-06-01

Although the district court dismissed Williams’s suit without prejudice, he is effectively barred from refiling because of the two- year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Beers v. Incorporated Village of Floral Park · filed 1999-06-01

However, the petitioner’s first cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 is timely because the Statute of Limitations for that cause of action is three years (see, CPLR 214 [5]; 423 S. Salina St. v City of Syracuse, 68 NY2d 474, cert denied 481 US 1008; cf., Collard v Kentucky Bd. of Nursing, 896 F2d 179), and contrary to the Library’s contention, the petitioner’s assertion that she was deprived of a hearing presents a substántive due process claim (see, Carter v Western Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Ctr., 767 F2d 270).

Section 1983 claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.

Belcher v. Ohio Department of Human Services · filed 1999-06-09

Like claims filed pursuant to § 1981, claims filed under § 1983 are governed by a two year statute of limitations.

In Puerto Rico, a Section 1983 claim alleging a continuing violation is timely when the last alleged discriminatory act occurred within one year before filing.

Reyes v. Municipality of Guaynabo · filed 1999-06-24

Accordingly, plaintiffs complaint was timely filed, since the last allegedly discriminatory act occurred within a year before the filing of this suit.

Section 1983 claims arising in Florida must be filed within four years of the allegedly unlawful act.

Burton v. City of Belle Glade · filed 1999-06-25

Specifically, a plaintiff must commence a § 1983 claim arising in Florida within four years of the allegedly unconstitutional or otherwise illegal act.

For a § 1983 search claim seeking damages related to pending criminal proceedings, the limitations period begins when those proceedings end; if the charges are dismissed, it begins on the dismissal date.

Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan · filed 1999-07-01

We hold, therefore, that the proper starting point for the running of the statute of limitations is the date of the dismissal of the criminal charges.

Section 1983 claims filed in Georgia are subject to a two-year limitations period, regardless of the relief sought.

Lewis v. McDade · filed 1999-07-13

However, for over thirteen years it has been clear that the two year personal injury statute of limitations found in § 9-3-33 governs all § 1983 claims filed in Georgia regardless of the type of relief sought.

Section 1983 actions in Hawaii have a two-year statute of limitations measured from the date of the violation.

Allen v. Iranon · filed 1999-07-15

In Hawaii, the statute of limitations for actions under Section 1983 is two years from the date of the violation.

Section 1983 has no limitations period, so courts borrow the forum state’s period; in Texas, it is two years.

Allison v. City of Fort Worth, Texas · filed 1999-07-22

Because § 1983 does not have a limitations provision, courts borrow from the law of the forum state. Texas’s two-year statute of limitations applies.

Section 1983 actions in Louisiana use the state’s one-year personal-injury limitations period and its tolling rules.

McKnight v. Canulette · filed 1999-07-26

Because there is no federal statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to § 1983, federal courts borrow the forum state’s general personal-injury limitations period, which is one year in Louisiana. ... State law also controls the applicable tolling provisions for a § 1983 cause of action.

A pending Title VII action does not toll the limitations period for a § 1983 claim.

Patzer v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System · filed 1984-01-19

The Court held that the pendency of Patzer’s Title VII action did not toll the statute on the § 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims in North Carolina are subject to a three-year limitations period under N.C.G.S. § 1-52(2).

Lugo v. City of Charlotte · filed 1984-01-20

Since there is no federal statute of limitation governing these sections, the appropriate limitation period is the most relevant period provided by state law. ... The most relevant period provided by North Carolina law is N.C.G.S. § 1-52(2), which imposes a three-year limitation period “upon a liability created by statute, either state or federal, unless some other time is mentioned in the statute creating it.”

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so courts use the most analogous period provided by state law.

Cook v. Ashmore · filed 1984-01-23

Since 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, it is well settled that the period of limitations to be used is the most analogous one provided by state law.

Section 1983 claims arising in New York must be filed within three years of accrual.

Harris v. City of New York · filed 1999-08-03

In addition, his Rehabilitation Act and Section 1983 claims based on his non-promotion to sergeant are time-barred because more than three years passed between the accrual date of April 7, 1993 and his October 4, 1996 court filing date.

Minnesota’s six-year limitations period applies to § 1983 claims brought there.

Superior-FCR Landfill, Inc. v. County of Wright · filed 1999-08-06

It is undisputed that the six-year statute of limitations for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is applicable.

Section 1983 actions use the statute of limitations of the state where the federal court sits.

Lewis v. Booker · filed 1999-08-23

In § 1983 actions, the applicable statute of limitations is that of the state in which the federal court is located.

Texas § 1983 claims use a two-year limitations period.

Joseph v. Johnson · filed 1999-08-27

The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that under the applicable two-...year statute of limitations, see Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 439 (5th Cir. 1990), Joseph’s § 1983 action was time-barred.

Section 1983 claims brought in Mississippi have a three-year limitations period.

Steward v. Burton · filed 1999-08-27

Mississippi has a three-year limitations period. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995); James v. Sadler, 909 F.2d 834, 836 (5th Cir. 1990) (three-year personal-injury statute of limitations applies in § 1983 cases in Mississippi). The limitations period will not expire until January of 2000.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio are subject to the two-year limitations period in R.C. 2305.10.

Archer v. Payne, Unpublished Decision (9-17-1999) · filed 1999-09-17

Appellant filed his 1983 action on September 15, 1998, more than 4 years after the latest date on which a constitutional violation by appellees could have occurred. Because R.C. 2305.10 required appellant to file his complaint on or before October 28, 1996, we find the action is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own; federal courts apply the forum state’s personal injury limitations period.

Fink v. L. Shedler Susan Hubbard J. Valedez M. Jones T. Rosario D. Chefthaw Theo White · filed 1999-09-23

Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations. Rather, federal courts apply the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations for section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims brought in Puerto Rico are subject to the one year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Lopez v. Padilla · filed 1999-09-30

Under Puerto Rico law the applicable statute to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims is the one year limitations period provided for personal injury actions under Article 1868 of the Civil Code, P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5298 (1990).

A § 1983 claim challenging a termination accrues when the termination decision is communicated; later refusals to change that decision do not restart the limitations period.

Garland v. Shapiro · filed 1984-01-31

A refusal to change one’s mind does not necessarily make for a continuing violation. In this case, the Supreme Court’s directive in Ricks clearly indicates that Garland’s cause of action accrued at the time he was officially notified of his termination. In that this action was filed more than three years after such notification, Garland’s action is barred by the statute of limitations, and defendants’ motion to dismiss is therefore granted.

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Nieves v. McSweeney · filed 1999-11-02

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury on which the claim is based.

Section 1983 claims borrow the state personal injury limitations period, which is three years in Rhode Island.

O'ROURKE v. City of Providence · filed 1999-12-07

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is borrowed from state personal injury law. ... In Rhode Island, the applicable statute specifies a limitations period of three years.

Section 1983 claims brought in Louisiana are subject to the state's one-year prescriptive period.

McCoy v. City of Monroe · filed 1999-12-08

Prescription for § 1983 actions is determined by state limitations statutes, in determining the timeliness of a claim under civil rights provisions. Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 594 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.1979). In Louisiana, such actions are limited by the one year prescriptive period contained in La. C.C. art. 3492.

A § 1983 claim against officers first identified after the applicable two-year limitations period is time-barred when the amendment does not relate back.

Cook v. Tulsa Police Dept. · filed 1999-12-14

While the action was filed within the applicable two-year statute of limitations, see Scheerer v. Rose State College, 950 F.2d 661, 664 (10th Cir. 1991), it was not amended to identify the police officers until March 18, 1998, after the statute of limitations had run. ... The district court thoroughly analyzed whether the amendment to name the individual officers related back to the original filing. After reviewing the record, the briefs, and the relevant authorities, we find no error in the district court’s analysis or judgment.

A § 1983 claim challenging a disciplinary charge accrues when the plaintiff is served with the charge; the applicable two-year limitations period runs from that date.

Mullen v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey · filed 1999-12-17

Under these narrow circumstances, the plaintiffs cause of action accrued when he was served with the charge and specification on September 21, 1992, almost five years prior to the filing of his § 1983 Complaint and well outside of the two year statutory period.

Section 1983’s limitations period began when the plaintiff received notice of his suspension and was not tolled during review by an independent hearing examiner.

Dawson v. Houston TX Fire Dept · filed 1999-12-28

Having carefully reviewed the record and fully considered the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations both because the period commenced upon Dawson’s notification of the suspension on June 22, 1996, See Freeze v. Griffith, 849 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1988), and because the limitations period was not tolled during the pendency of the review by the independent hearing examiner.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio are subject to the four-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.09.

Fowler v. Coleman, Unpublished Decision (12-28-1999) · filed 1999-12-28

Because the conduct that gave rise to appellant's Section 1983 claim occurred on May 7, 1994, and her amended complaint was filed in March 1997, her amended complaint was filed within the four-year statute of limitations contained in R.C. 2305.09 .

Section 1983 claims filed in the District of Connecticut have a three-year statute of limitations.

Mendlow v. Seven Locks Facility · filed 2000-01-04

The statute of limitations applicable to a Section 1983 claim filed in the District of Connecticut is three years.

A Section 1983 claim based on an alleged breach of contract by a New Mexico governmental entity is subject to the two-year limitations period in Section 37-1-23.

Sena School Bus Co. v. Board of Education of the Santa Fe Public Schools · filed 1984-02-09

The breach of these contracts, written or oral, was the basis for plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim. Accordingly, we hold that Section 37-1-23 is the most analogous state cause of action and, thus, its two-year statute of limitations applies.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so courts borrow the state limitations period for the most similar cause of action.

Winton v. Burton · filed 1984-02-15

Since § 1983 does not itself contain a limitations period, the federal courts will borrow the state statute of limitations which applies to the most similar state cause of action.

A § 1983 claim borrows the forum state's limitations period for similar torts.

Bruce v. Smith · filed 1984-02-16

In determining which state statute of limitations applies to a § 1983 action, a federal court should apply the time bar used by the forum state for similar torts.

Section 1983 has no express federal limitations period; courts borrow an analogous state period based on the nature of the claim, regardless of whether the defendant is a municipality.

Fomby v. City of Calera · filed 1984-02-21

There is no federal statute of limitations expressly applicable to suits brought under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In such cases federal courts “borrow” the most nearly analogous state statute of limitations. ... The essential nature of the claim does not vary from party to party.

In New York, a Section 1983 claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Weimer v. Lake · filed 2000-01-13

In light of the above, measured from March 3, 1994, plaintiff’s claims for the intentional torts of assault, battery and false imprisonment are barred by the one-year Statute of Limitations (see, Bardi v Warren County Sheriff’s Dept., 260 AD2d 763, 764; see also, CPLR 215) and those for alleged constitutional deprivations and violation of 42 USC § 1983 are barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (see, Brown v State of New York, 250 AD2d 314, 318; see also, CPLR 214 [5]).