42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims in Indiana are subject to the state’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Cecil A. Bates v. J.W. Holliday · filed 1994-12-20

Wilson was effective at the time this action accrued and therefore Bates was subject to Indiana's two year limitations period. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 279 (Sec. 1983 actions are subject to statute of limitations governing personal injury claims in state where injury occurred); see Ind. Code Sec. 34-1-2-2(1) (two year statute of limitations in Indiana).

In Pennsylvania, a § 1983 claim must be commenced within two years after it accrues.

Jackson v. Nicoletti · filed 1994-12-21

A § 1983 claimant must follow section 5524’s command that “actions and proceedings must be commenced within two years” of the date on which his claim accrues.

Section 1983 civil rights claims in Pennsylvania have a two-year limitations period.

Doe v. United States Department of Health & Human Services · filed 1994-12-29

The statute of limitations on civil rights claims in Pennsylvania is two years. ... Therefore, I find that plaintiffs civil rights claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so courts borrow the forum state’s limitations period for personal injury actions.

Perez v. Police Department of New York · filed 1994-12-30

In an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which does not itself provide a statutory period of limitations, a district court must borrow the forum state’s period of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 actions brought in Utah are governed by a four-year statute of limitations under Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-12-25(3).

Sheets v. Salt Lake County · filed 1995-01-10

Instead, a four-year statute of limitations under Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-12-25(3) governs Sec. 1983 actions.

In Utah, § 1983 actions are governed by the four-year limitations period in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3).

Sheets v. Salt Lake County · filed 1995-01-10

Instead, a four-year statute of limitations under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) governs § 1983 actions.

A Section 1983 complaint is subject to an applicable statute of limitations and may be dismissed when it is time-barred.

White v. Barry · filed 1995-01-17

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) complaint. Our review of the record and the district court's opinion discloses that the court correctly found the complaint barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, we affirm the court's dismissal of the complaint on the basis that it is time-barred.

Section 1983 actions in Kentucky are subject to the tolling rules in KRS 413.180.

Ford v. Hill · filed 1995-01-18

Accordingly, the tolling rules contained in KRS 413.180 are applicable to § 1983 actions in Kentucky.

A § 1983 plaintiff must file within the applicable statute of limitations.

Oriakhi v. Warden Baltimore City Jail · filed 1995-01-19

Because the district court properly held that Appellant is not excused from bringing his case within the applicable statute of limitations, and that that limitations period expired prior to the time Appellant filed his action, we find no abuse of discretion.

Section 1983 federal constitutional claims filed in federal court in California have a one-year limitations period.

Tyson v. City of Sunnyvale · filed 1995-01-23

The limitations period for a federal constitutional claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and filed in federal court within the State of California is one year.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period and accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know that his rights were violated or his injury was inflicted.

Williams v. Peters · filed 1995-01-24

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is two years. ... Section 1983 claims “accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights have been violated,” or, when the plaintiffs injury is inflicted. ... Mr. Williams’ claim accrued no later than September, 1988.

Section 1983 damages claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period, and dismissal for failure to serve under Rule 4(m) does not trigger Illinois’s refiling tolling provision.

Matlock v. Hawkes · filed 1995-02-01

It is beyond dispute, and the parties agree, that Illinois’s two year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to this action for damages brought under section 1983. ... This Court agrees with the reasoning in Fowler, and concludes that section 217 is inapplicable to dismissals under Rule 4(m).

Section 1983 actions arising in Kentucky are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Whalen v. Alvey · filed 1995-02-01

In Kentucky, the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Ky.Rev.Stat. Sec. 413.140(1)(a) is the limitations period applicable to civil rights actions arising in Kentucky.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois are subject to a two-year statute of limitations borrowed from state law.

Palmer v. Board of Education of Community Unit School District 201-U, Will County, Illinois · filed 1995-02-03

The school discrimination claims depend on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which obtains its statute of limitations (via 42 U.S.C. § 1988) from state law. In Illinois the period is two years.

Section 1983 actions borrow the forum state’s limitations period for general personal torts; in Massachusetts, that period is three years.

Zarrilli v. Weld · filed 1995-02-09

In § 1983 actions, courts borrow the limitations period in the statute of limitations for general and personal torts in the state where the action is filed. ... Under Massachusetts law, the limitations period is three years.

Section 1983 claims based on a discharge accrue when the discharge occurs.

Uhl v. Swanstrom · filed 1995-02-21

The court concludes that Uhl’s claims pursuant to § 1983 are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Those claims, as stated on the face of the complaint, arose from Uhl’s discharge, and so accrued at the time of his discharge on June 9, 1988.

Section 1983 claims arising in New York have a three-year limitations period; an injury more than five years before filing is time-barred absent tolling or a continuing violation.

Pino v. Patrick Ryan, Deputy Superintendent of Programs, and David Barrenger, Senior Recreation Supervisor at Wash · filed 1995-02-22

A dismissal under section 1915(d) based on the statute of limitations is especially appropriate where, as in this case, the injuries complained of occurred more than five years before the filing of the complaint — well outside the applicable three-year limitations period, see Jewell v. County of Nassau, 917 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir.1990), there are no applicable tolling provisions as a matter of law, and plaintiff has alleged no facts indicating a continuous or ongoing violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state personal injury limitations period, and state law governs tolling.

Hansen v. Bremerton School Dist. No. 100-C · filed 1995-02-23

In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985), the Supreme Court held that actions brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 are governed by the relevant state's personal injury statute of limitations. Questions regarding the tolling of a statute of limitations are also governed by state law. Id. at 269. Therefore, we must apply RCW Sec. 4.16.340 to determine whether the Hansens' suit was timely filed.

Section 1983 actions generally follow the forum state’s limitations and tolling rules; under Louisiana law, dismissal for failure to serve under former Rule 4(j) annuls the tolling from filing the suit.

Hawkins v. McHugh · filed 1995-02-23

In § 1983 actions, a state statute of limitations and the coordinate tolling rules are in most cases binding rules of law which a federal court is authorized to disregard only if the state law is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. ... We hold that a dismissal under Rule 4(j) annuls the suspension of prescription where Louisiana law provides the rules of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the state personal injury limitations period; in New York, that period is three years.

Benyi v. Broome County, NY · filed 1995-03-09

The limitations period for personal injury actions under state law supplies the limitations period for 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. ... Section 214 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) provides a three-year limitation for such actions.

Section 1983 actions use the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the claim accrues.

Sanchez v. United States · filed 1995-03-10

The limitations period for a section 1983 action is governed by the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state in which the claim accrues.

Section 1983 actions borrow their statute of limitations from the state law governing analogous claims.

Welch v. Kelly · filed 1995-03-13

It is settled that federal courts turn to state law for statutes of limitations in actions, like this one, brought under the Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq. The District of Columbia law of limitations governing a cause of action analogous to Welch’s complaint is D.C.Code Ann. § 12-301(8).

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio are subject to Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations.

Scott D. Creech Terry Martin v. City of Portsmouth Lynn Grimshaw Evert Burton James Arnett Charles Horner, Jr. · filed 1995-03-20

Upon further review, we conclude that Creech's cause of action against the remaining defendants accrued on September 28, 1991. See Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir.1991); Dixon v. Anderson, 928 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir.1991); Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811, 815 (6th Cir.1989). As a result, the complaint, filed January 27, 1994, is barred by Ohio's applicable two-year statute of limitations.

A Section 1983 claim cannot avoid the limitations bar on a continuing-violation theory based solely on an unsubstantiated fear of renewed prosecution.

Lloyd D. Mitchell, Sr. And Leola Mitchell v. Charles E. Keenan, Board of Education of the City of Chicago and City of Ch · filed 1995-03-23

Without an objective fear of a reinstatement of the prosecution, there is no ongoing violation of the Mitchells’ constitutional rights; the statute of limitations, therefore, bars their claims.

Section 1983 claims brought in Mississippi are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

A-1 Ex Rel. D-2 v. Molpus · filed 1995-03-30

Therefore, the statute of limitations on § 1983 causes of action in Mississippi is now three (3) years.

A lawful act within the limitations period does not bring earlier alleged § 1983 violations within the period under a continuing deprivation theory.

Pierce v. Montgomery County Opportunity Board, Inc. · filed 1995-03-31

Because the only act of State Defendants within the statute of limitations appears to be a lawful act, it is not part of a continuing deprivation that would bring the previous, allegedly unlawful acts within the statute.

A Section 1983 claim alleging continuing torts can avoid a statute of limitations bar.

Coleman v. Miller · filed 1995-03-31

Finally, the case is not time-barred because Plaintiff alleges continuing torts.

Section 1983 claims brought in Hawaii are subject to a two-year statute of limitations under Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 657-7.

Matthews v. Giovanoni · filed 1995-04-04

The Hawaii Supreme Court has determined that under Wilson and Owens, the applicable statute of limitations for claims brought under section 1983 is two years pursuant to Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 657-7. ... We have reached the same conclusion.

For a Section 1983 claim governed by Illinois prison tolling law, escape starts the limitations period, and later recapture and imprisonment do not toll it again.

Murphy v. Justus · filed 1995-04-07

Thus, we join Dukes and Glover holding that the limitations period began to run upon Murphy's escape in September 1985 and was not tolled again by his subsequent recapture and reincarceration.

Section 1983 actions use state law limitations periods; in Arizona, the personal injury limitations period is two years.

Williams v. Jolley · filed 1995-04-10

However, state law provides the statute of limitations for Sec. 1983 actions, Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, No. 9415567, 1995 WL 94674, at 2 (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 1995) and Arizona's limitation period for personal injury actions is two years.

Section 1983 claims filed in California use the state limitations period for personal injury actions.

McCurdy v. Mary S. Sandoval, Al Lutzi, Francis J. Bardsley, Darrell Vandeveld, Gary L. Edwards, and Michael S. · filed 1995-04-13

The applicable statute of limitations for section 1983 and 1985 claims is the limitations period for personal injury causes of action under California state law.

Section 1983 claims arising in Kentucky must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Mercer v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Government Steve Catt, Detective · filed 1995-04-13

The district court properly dismissed Mercer's Sec. 1983 action against defendant Catt and the county government as time-barred because Mercer did not file her lawsuit within one year after her cause of action accrued.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state statute of limitations.

McIntire v. United States · filed 1995-04-13

For section 1983 and Bivens action purposes, the court “must look to state law to determine what statute of limitations is applicable.”

Section 1983 civil rights claims brought in California are governed by a one-year statute of limitations.

Strowski v. City of Downey · filed 1995-05-05

Civil rights claims brought in California under section 1983 are governed by a one-year statute of limitations. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 558 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, Strowski's complaint states that his vehicle was towed on October 28, 1988. Strowski filed his complaint in this action on September 14, 1993. Accordingly, Strowski's action is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions use the applicable state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Lopez v. State Compensation Fund Jim Cooper Jane Doe Cooper Virginia Zingg John Doe Zingg · filed 1995-05-22

The statute of limitations on actions brought under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983 and 1985 is governed by the applicable state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims use the limitations period of the forum state’s most analogous personal injury statute.

Brown v. District Attorney General's Office, 19th Judicial Dist. · filed 1995-05-24

The limitations period for filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is determined by looking at the most analogous personal injury statute of limitations of the state in which the complaint was filed.

A Kentucky Section 1983 complaint is untimely if filed more than one year after the plaintiff’s release from imprisonment, even assuming limitations did not begin to run until that release.

Shackleford v. Decker · filed 1995-05-25

Accordingly, even if the statute of limitations did not begin to run until such release, his complaint filed on December 2, 1991, was nevertheless barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims brought in Alabama are subject to the two-year statute of limitations in Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l).

Gorman v. Wood · filed 1995-05-26

However, according to Morrow v. Town of Littleville, 576 So.2d 210 (Ala.1991) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989), and Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985)), and Woods v. Reeves, 628 So.2d 563 (Ala.1993), the only statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims in Alabama is the two-year statute of limitations in Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-38( l ).

Section 1983 actions in Virginia have a two-year statute of limitations.

O'Kelly v. Murray · filed 1995-05-30

Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the magistrate judge, O'Kelly v. Murray, No. CA-94-397 (E.D. Va. Feb. 6, 1995); however, we modify the portion of the magistrate judge's opinion to note that the statute of limitations for Sec. 1983 actions in Virginia is two years, rather than three years as stated in the opinion.

Section 1983 false-arrest claims arising in Ohio are subject to a two-year limitations period that begins when the arrest occurs.

Mullins v. Robert Boyle Kent Forrest, Sgt. · filed 1995-05-30

Mullins's Sec. 1983 lawsuit is time-barred. Ohio's two-year statute of limitations set forth in Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Sec. 2305.10 is to be applied to civil rights claims arising in Ohio. Thomas v. Shipka, 872 F.2d 772, 772 (6th Cir. 1989); Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989) (en banc). In this case, Mullins's cause of action accrued on October 14, 1991, when the defendants arrested him for aggravated robbery.

State law determines the limitations period and tolling rules for Section 1983 actions.

Harju v. Brian Duncan, Sgt. Raymond Oberg · filed 1995-06-08

State law determines both the statute of limitations and the application of tolling provisions for 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 actions.

Section 1983 actions arising in Michigan are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Burt v. Wayne County Sheriff's Department · filed 1995-06-13

Actions under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 arising in Michigan are governed by a three year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own; in Louisiana, civil rights actions under it are subject to the one-year prescriptive period for tort actions.

Hampton v. Kroger Co. · filed 1995-06-21

The court explained that because § 1983 contains no limitation provision, the court looks to analogous state statutes for a prescriptive period, as long as the statute is not inconsistent with Federal policies. Accordingly, we conclude that to the extent Hampton's petition can be read as stating a cause of action for a civil rights violation, the action prescribed under art. 3492.

Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year limitations period under Illinois law.

Buycks-Roberson v. Citibank Federal Savings Bank · filed 1995-06-29

The statutes of limitation for all three counts require a plaintiff to file his or her action no later than two years from the date of the occurrence of the violation. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f) (Count I); 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (Count II); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III) §§ 1981 and 1982 claims must satisfy the two-year Illinois statute of limitations applicable to a "tort action for the recovery of damages for personal injuries.” See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1947, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); Kalimara v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrections, 879 F.2d 276, 276-77 (7th Cir. 1989); Lewellen v. Morley, 875 F.2d 118, 119 (7th Cir. 1989).

Section 1983 actions filed in Nevada are subject to a two-year limitations period and may be dismissed as time-barred absent adequate grounds for tolling.

Diggs v. Rogan · filed 1995-06-30

Diggs filed his complaint on March 1, 1994, more than two years after Sgt. Rogan allegedly violated his eighth amendment rights. Diggs has not alleged adequate grounds for tolling the statute of limitations. See Nev. Rev. Stat. Sec. 11.250 (Nevada's tolling statute). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Diggs's action as time-barred. See Perez v. Seevers, 869 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir. 1989).

Section 1983 actions borrow state tolling and extension rules along with the state limitations period, unless those rules are hostile to federal interests.

Otis Gosnell, Sandra Gosnell, and Supreme Supplies, Inc. v. City of Troy, Illinois · filed 1995-07-05

When absorbing a state period of limitations for § 1983 actions, federal courts take the state’s tolling and extension rules as well, unless they are hostile to federal interests.

Section 1983 civil rights actions arising in Ohio must be filed within two years after they accrue.

Lrl Properties v. Portage Metro Housing Authority · filed 1995-07-06

If this Court had not spoken on this issue, these Ohio eases might be persuasive; however this Court, sitting en banc, squarely addressed this issue in Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir.1989) (en banc), and definitively held that “the appropriate statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights actions arising in Ohio ... requires that actions ... be filed within two years after their accrual.”

Section 1983 actions use state personal-injury limitations periods.

Hall v. Dallas County Police · filed 1995-07-11

Federal courts apply state personal-injury limitations periods to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s general or residual personal injury limitations period because the federal statute specifies none.

Walker v. Masters · filed 1995-07-11

Because no specified federal statute of limitations exists for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits, federal courts borrow the forum state's general or residual personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 suits use the forum state's general or residual personal injury limitations period and applicable state tolling provisions.

Johnson v. Alford · filed 1995-07-11

In 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits, federal courts borrow the forum state's general or residual personal injury limitations period and any applicable state tolling provisions.

Section 1983 actions borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period because the section has no federal statute of limitations.

Metcalf v. Robertson · filed 1995-07-11

There is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 actions, and the federal courts borrow the forum state's general personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 claims in South Carolina are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, and claims barred by that period may be dismissed with prejudice.

Bradley v. R.D. Cantley, Jr., Magistrate Gordon B. Jenkinson Wade S. Kolb, Solicitor · filed 1995-07-18

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) complaint. ... Because the district court declined to consider the statute of limitations issue, however, we modify the Court's dismissal to dismissal with prejudice since we find some claims barred by South Carolina's three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 has no federal limitations period, so courts apply the most relevant limitations period provided by state law.

Warlick v. Wilson · filed 1995-07-18

There is no federal statute of limitation governing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 so “the appropriate limitation period is the most relevant period provided by state law.”

Section 1983 actions in Illinois are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Gordon v. Peoria School District 150, Harry Whitaker, Vicky Dobrinski, Dave Berto and A. Lou Benassi · filed 1995-07-25

The statute of limitations for a Sec. 1983 action is two years.

Section 1983 actions filed in Ohio are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.

Helmbright v. City of Martins Ferry, Ohio · filed 1995-07-26

Federal civil rights actions filed in Ohio are governed by a two year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising in Tennessee have a one-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury.

Cain v. Ricky J. Bell W. Jeff Reynolds Christine J. Bradley · filed 1995-07-31

To the extent that plaintiff's claims are cognizable under Sec. 1983, the claims are barred under the applicable statute of limitations. The one year statute of limitations provided in Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 28-3-104(a) applies to civil rights claims arising in Tennessee. See Jackson v. Richards Medical Co., 961 F.2d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff's cause of action accrued and the statute of limitations began to run when plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury that is the basis of this action.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state limitations period, but federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Siblerud v. Colorado State Bd. of Agriculture · filed 1995-08-14

While state law determines the limitations period applicable to a § 1983 claim, federal law determines when the cause of action accrued.

Section 1983 actions arising in Kentucky are governed by a one-year statute of limitations.

Walker v. Lifeskills, Inc. · filed 1995-08-18

The one-year statute of limitations set forth in Ky.Rev.Stat. Sec. 413.140(1) governs civil rights actions arising in Kentucky.

Section 1983 borrows the forum state's general or residual personal injury limitations period because it specifies no federal limitations period.

Moore v. Sherman Police Dept · filed 1995-08-22

Because no specified federal statute of limitations exists for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits, federal courts borrow the forum state's general or residual personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 claims in Alabama must be filed within two years of accrual under the state personal injury limitations period.

Parrish v. City of Opp, Alabama · filed 1995-08-25

Because this case was filed more than two years from the time the claim accrued, the court concludes that all claims by the plaintiff pursuant to § 1983 are barred by § 6-2-38(1) of the Alabama Code.

Section 1983 actions borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period because the statute provides no federal limitations period.

Marascalco v. Birdsong · filed 1995-08-28

There is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 actions, and the federal courts borrow the forum state's general personal injury limitations period.

A conclusory allegation that a Medicaid rate determination violates federal law does not make an administrative review proceeding a § 1983 claim subject to a three-year limitations period.

Concourse Nursing Home v. Perales · filed 1995-09-07

As this Court noted in Matter of Medical Arts Sanitarium v New York State Dept. of Health (184 AD2d 399, 399-400), a proceeding is not "subject to the three year limitations period set forth in CPLR 214 (5) applicable to claims brought under 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1396a (a) (13) (A) (the Boren Amendment), merely because the petition recites a conclusory allegation that the determination violates Federal Medicaid Law.”

Section 1983 actions borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period because the statute has no federal limitations period.

Branch v. Dallas Tx City of · filed 1995-09-18

Since no federal statute of limitations exists for § 1983 actions, we borrow the forum state's general personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 takings claims in California are subject to the state's one-year limitations period for personal injury and tort actions.

Pierro v. County of Sacramento · filed 1995-09-25

California's one-year statute of limitations period for personal injury and tort actions, see Cal.Civ.Proc.Code Sec. 340(3) (West 1995), applies to takings claims asserted under Secs. 1983 and 1985(3).

In Massachusetts, an inmate’s § 1983 claim arising from allegedly improper disciplinary proceedings has a three-year limitations period.

Davis v. Dubois · filed 1995-09-25

A three-year statute of limitations applies to an inmate’s §1983 claim arising from allegedly improper disciplinary proceedings.

Section 1983 uses the personal injury limitations period of the state where the complaint is filed; Kentucky applies a one-year period to civil rights claims arising there.

Holland v. John C. Runda, Former Chairman Parole Board Ron Simmons, Former Chairman Parole Board Phil Parker, Wa · filed 1995-09-27

The limitations period for filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is determined by looking at the most analogous personal injury statute of limitations of the state in which the complaint was filed. ... Kentucky's one year statute of limitations contained in Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 413.140(1)(a) (Michie 1992) applies to civil rights claims arising in Kentucky.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s analogous personal-injury limitations period; in Tennessee, that period is one year.

Scott v. John Coleman Hayes Construction John Coleman Hayes Mike Smith Robert S. Biscan & Company Jim Coleman Donald · filed 1995-10-20

The limitations period for filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is determined by looking at the most analogous personal injury statute of limitations of the state in which the complaint was filed. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). The most analogous Tennessee statute is that found at Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 28-3-104(a), which provides a one-year limitations period. See Jackson v. Richards Medical Co., 961 F.2d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 1992).

Section 1983 actions arising in New York must be filed within three years.

Brown v. Costello · filed 1995-10-31

For the reasons stated above, the court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs’ second cause of action as barred by the applicable three year statute of limitations for § 1983 causes of action.

Section 1983 claims arising in Massachusetts must be brought within three years.

Turner v. Payne · filed 1995-10-31

The applicable statute of limitations for Sec. 1983 actions arising in Massachusetts requires that such claims be brought within three years.

Section 1983 claims filed in Oklahoma are subject to a two-year limitations period borrowed from state law.

Ciszkowski v. Rector · filed 1995-11-02

The most analogous Oklahoma statute is the two-year limitation period provided in Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95 (1991) for injury to the rights of another.

Section 1983 has no federal statute of limitations, so courts borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Busick v. McGinty · filed 1995-11-07

There being no federal statute of limitations for section 1983 actions, the federal courts borrow the forum state’s general personal injury...limitations period.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim is not tolled by equitable estoppel absent a showing that the defendants prevented the plaintiff from discovering the alleged wrong.

Lindsay v. Gordon · filed 1995-11-21

We affirm the district court's sua sponte dismissal of this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as barred by the statute of limitations substantially for the reasons set forth in the order of the district court. See Lindsay v. Gordon, No. 95-CV-42 (Lead case), slip op. (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1995). We add only that there is no basis for Lindsay's claim that equitable estoppel tolled the applicable statute of limitations, because there is no showing that defendants-appellees prevented Lindsay from discovering the perjury that allegedly occurred at his criminal trial.

Section 1983 actions borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period because the statute has no federal limitations period.

Cooper v. Brookshire · filed 1995-11-22

As there is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 actions, the federal courts borrow the forum state's general personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 claims filed in Nevada use the state’s two-year residual personal-injury limitations period.

Kenneth Don Barrett, Jr. v. Moran · filed 1995-11-27

In section 1983 actions, federal courts must apply the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... In Nevada, the residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years from the date the cause of action accrues.

Section 1983 actions in Arkansas have a three-year limitations period.

White v. Garrison · filed 1995-12-01

The relevant Arkansas limitations period is three years.

Section 1983 claims arising in California had to be brought within one year of the alleged civil rights violation under the limitations period applied here.

Sutter Land & Development Company, Inc., a California Corporation v. City of Berkeley · filed 1995-12-11

All of the injuries of which Sutter complains arose from episodes that occurred more than one year before the filing of Sutter's complaint. The district court therefore properly held that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. See Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that § 1983 claims arising in California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be brought within one year of the alleged civil rights violation).

Section 1983 claims brought in Iowa are subject to the state’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Powell v. Tordoff · filed 1995-12-19

Turning to grounds for dismissal asserted by the defendants, the court finds ample authority to conclude that the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiffs’ claims pursuant §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986, is Iowa’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations, Iowa Code § 614.1(2).

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period because the section has no federal limitations period.

Cooper v. O.A. Brookshire, Sheriff of Ector County, Texas · filed 1995-12-19

As there is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 actions, the federal courts borrow the forum state's general personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 actions brought in federal court in New York have a three-year statute of limitations.

Zuccaro v. Theofan · filed 1995-12-27

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions brought in a federal court sitting in New York is three years.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s general personal injury statute of limitations.

Pedraza v. Jones · filed 1995-12-27

For section 1983 claims, federal courts apply the general personal injury statute of limitations of the forum state.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York are subject to the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214(5).

Caponigro v. White · filed 1996-01-09

Plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, while timely because subject to the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (5) ... fail to state a cause of action.

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois have a two-year limitations period; when imprisonment tolls that period, escape ends the tolling and later recapture does not restart it.

Murphy v. Burckhardt · filed 1996-01-19

Murphy's claims in this case accrued--at the latest--in June, 1985. His incarceration tolled the statute of limitations until he escaped from custody on September 13, 1985. At that time, the statute began running, and was not subsequently tolled by his recapture and imprisonment. The two year statute of limitations for Murphy's claims thus expired on September 13, 1987, nearly two years before Murphy filed the present suit.

Section 1983 claims arising in California were subject to a one-year limitations period, including claims for equitable relief.

Golden Gate Hotel Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 1996-01-23

While the plaintiff attempts to assert that its § 1983 claim cannot be time barred because it is one for injunctive relief rather than damages, we have held that the statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims originating in California, including claims for equitable relief, is one year.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations under CPLR 214.

McArthur v. Caputo · filed 1996-01-31

In any event, McArthur’s federal claims are barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989) (three-year statute of limitations of CPLR 214 governs § 1983 claims in New York).

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Levert K. Griffin v. Roger L. Smith Donald B. McFadden Judge Michael Callahan Daniel J. McGowan · filed 1996-02-05

Ohio's two year general statute of limitations contained in Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.10 is applied to civil rights claims arising in Ohio.

Section 1983 claims in Alabama are subject to the state’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations, rather than the Alabama Administrative Code deadline for IDEA appeals.

Andalusia City Board of Education v. Andress · filed 1996-02-09

The Eleventh Circuit has applied Alabama’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations, as provided in Ala.Code § 6-2-38(i), to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Similarly, the plaintiffs motion to dismiss the defendants’ counterclaims in Count II pursuant to § 1983 for failure to comply with the Alabama Administrative Code is due to be denied.

Section 1983 claims in California are subject to California tolling rules and the one year limitations period applicable here, while federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Beck v. City of Moreno Valley Norman King Paul Gill Greg Lefler · filed 1996-02-12

Richard Beck appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as barred by the statute of limitations. ... California's tolling doctrines and one year statute of limitations apply to Beck's action and federal law determines when his cause of action accrued.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations.

Reynolds v. Wolff · filed 1996-02-12

It is well established that the applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is the state statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 actions in Michigan have a three-year statute of limitations.

Cirasuola v. Westrin · filed 1996-02-16

In Michigan, the statute of limitations for section 1983 actions is three years.

For a § 1983 claim, state law supplies the limitations period, while federal law starts that period when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Ribovich v. Ribar · filed 1996-02-22

Although state law determines the length of time in which a plaintiff can bring a § 1983 claim, "federal law governs the question of when a limitations period begins to run." LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Housing Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1107 (6th Cir.1995). Under federal law, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff "knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action." Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 273 (6th Cir.1984).

Section 1983 claims filed in Arizona are subject to the two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Foley v. Lewis · filed 1996-03-04

We have applied Arizona's two-year statute of limitation for personal injury actions to section 1983 claims. ... Accordingly, the claims raised in paragraphs 18-77 of Foley's second amended complaint were brought within the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the state limitations period, but federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Rogerson v. Fitzpatrick · filed 1996-03-05

While state law determines the statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims, federal law controls the date of accrual of a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims in Connecticut are subject to a three-year limitations period, barring claims based on events more than three years before filing.

Williams v. Perry · filed 1996-03-06

The court concludes that any facts alleged in the complaint that occurred prior to June 28, 1992, three years prior to the date of the filing of the complaint, are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Idaho are subject to the two-year limitations period for personal injury actions under Idaho Code § 5-219(4).

Samuel v. Michaud · filed 1996-03-07

Congress provided no federal statute of limitation for an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Thus the court finds that the pertinent Idaho statute is Idaho Code § 5-219(4), which provides a two-year statute of limitation for actions based on personal injury. The court finds the two-year statute of limitation applicable here.

Section 1983 claims arising in California were subject to a one-year limitations period under the law then applicable.

Gabor v. Frazer · filed 1996-03-07

The applicable limitations period for the Gabors' claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988 is one year.

Section 1983 actions borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period; in Texas, that period is two years.

Griffin v. Round Rock I D S · filed 1996-03-11

For actions brought under § 1983 and Title VI, we borrow the forum state's general personal injury limitations period, which in Texas is two years.

Section 1983 claims filed in Kentucky are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Cox v. Treadway · filed 1996-03-14

The statute of limitations for appellants' claim, which is one year, expired on June 20, 1991.

Section 1983 claims in Alabama are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Jennings v. City of Huntsville · filed 1996-03-15

Jennings alleged that the defendants 1) wrongfully interfered with his personal, business, and contractual relationships; 2) “caused” Jennings to be wrongfully arrested; 3) “caused” Jennings to be falsely imprisoned; 4) tortiously invaded Jennings’s privacy by placing him in a false light; 5) slandered Jennings; 6) violated Jennings’s civil rights so as to be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 7) continuously failed to retract false and misleading statements about Jennings; 8) breached a fiduciary duty to Jennings; and 9) conspired to commit all of the above. ... Each of Jennings’s allegations is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-38, sets out the causes of action on which an action must be brought within two years after their accrual, and we find all of Jennings’s allegations come within the ambit of § 6-2-38(k) or (l).

A § 1983 claim filed in Texas is subject to the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Wright v. Carpenter · filed 1996-03-15

Gary Wright appeals from the dismissal of his civil rights complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. He contends that the statute of limitations should have been tolled while he pursued an appeal from the § 1983 action that he filed in the Amarillo Division of the Northern District of Texas. We have reviewed the record and the district court's decision and affirm for essentially the reasons set forth by the district court.

In Michigan, § 1983 claims use the statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Kramer v. Van Dyke Public Schools · filed 1996-03-19

It is well recognized that section 1983 claims are to be characterized as actions involving personal injuries for purposes of the statutory limitations period in Michigan.

Section 1983 discrimination claims based on a continuing policy or series of related acts are timely when an application of the policy or a related act occurs within the limitations period.

Newsome v. County of Santa Fe · filed 1996-03-20

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendants’ discrimination and retaliation constituted both a department-wide policy and a series of related acts taken against Plaintiff, and that some application of the policy, and one or more of the series of acts taken against Plaintiff, occurred within the statutory period. Thus, according to the continuing violations theory, Plaintiff timely filed her section 1983 claims under the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising in Kentucky are subject to a one year statute of limitations.

Long v. Emmitt L. Sparkman Helen Howard-Hughes Parole Board of the State of Kentucky Chris Gorman, Kentuc · filed 1996-03-20

Kentucky's one year statute of limitations contained in Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 313.140(1)(a) (Michie 1992) applies to civil rights claims arising in Kentucky.

Section 1983 claims in California were subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Saathoff v. E. John Whelan Charles Hulbert · filed 1996-03-21

We agree with the district court that Saathoff's claims are barred by the statutes of limitations. All of Saathoff's causes of action are subject to one year statutes of limitations. McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 672, 673-74 (9th Cir.1991) (§ 1983 and 1985 claims); 42 U.S.C. § 1986.

Section 1983 actions use the state limitations period for personal injury actions.

Stanwood v. Royster · filed 1996-03-25

The statute of limitation period applicable to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the state limitation period for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 actions borrow the state limitations period for personal injury actions; in Oklahoma, that period is two years.

Hornsby v. Mike Baker, Benjamin Chapman, Steve Whittle, and Vernon Hogue · filed 1996-03-25

Section 1983 actions are best characterized as injuries to personal rights and, accordingly, we borrow the state statute of limitations period for personal injury actions. Reynolds v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 69 F.3d 1523, 1532 n. 12 (10th Cir.1995). Such actions brought in Oklahoma are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

A Section 1983 action in Nevada is subject to a two-year limitations period, and a late complaint is time-barred absent adequate grounds for tolling.

Washington v. Miller · filed 1996-03-29

Nevada state prisoner Daniel Law appeals pro se the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against prison officials as barred by Nevada's two-year statute of limitations. ... Law filed his complaint on May 18, 1993, more than two years after defendants allegedly violated his constitutional rights. Law has not alleged adequate grounds for tolling the statute of limitations. ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Law's action as time-barred.

Section 1983 claims in Virginia are subject to the state’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Davis v. Williams · filed 1996-04-03

Davis' challenge to the DMV suspensions of his license between 1986 and 1990 was barred by Virginia's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims in Texas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Roberson v. Franklin · filed 1996-04-09

Reginald Charles Roberson appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint as frivolous. We have reviewed the record and the magistrate judge’s findings and find no error in the district court’s determination that the complaint is frivolous as it is barred by the applicable Texas two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions use the applicable state statute of limitations for personal injury actions because they have no federal limitations period.

English v. Glanz · filed 1996-04-10

Mr. English fails to comprehend the law. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that because there is no federal statute of limitations for a civil rights action (it is beyond dispute that an action based on 42 U.S.C. §1983 is a civil rights action), the time in which such an action must be filed is determined by the applicable state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims in Kansas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Wiley v. Hoang · filed 1996-04-11

Plaintiff’s pre-1989 claims are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations whether we use the January 11 filing date or the March 4 filing date.

Section 1983 claims filed in Oklahoma use the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Marshall v. Fields · filed 1996-04-16

We agree with the district court that the applicable statute of limitations is the Oklahoma statute of limitation for personal injury actions, which is two years.

A Section 1983 property seizure claim accrues when the plaintiff knows of the seizure; continued retention of the property is an effect of that act, not a continuing violation.

Johnson v. Cullen · filed 1996-04-26

Although plaintiffs were deprived of their property until it was returned to them, that was the continual ill effect of the original act of seizure. It was not a series of repetitive or ongoing violations. Consequently, the Court holds that the cause of action arising from defendants’ seizure of plaintiffs’ property accrued on the date of the alleged wrongful appropriation, or, at the latest, by March 4,1993, when both plaintiffs were aware of the defendants’ act.

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois are subject to the state’s two-year personal injury limitations period.

Horton v. Marovich · filed 1996-04-30

In Illinois, the statute of limitations applied to section 1983 actions is the personal injury statute of limitations, with a two-year limitation period.

Section 1983 claims in Iowa are subject to a two-year limitations period that runs when the plaintiff knows all the facts supporting the claim.

Hill v. State of Iowa · filed 1996-05-03

We agree Hill knew all the facts supporting his claim upon service of replevin papers in 1991 and Iowa's applicable two-year statute of limitations barred his 1996 suit.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts.

Key v. Oakland Housing Authority · filed 1996-05-03

The statute of limitations for a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) is the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury torts.

Section 1983 claims filed in New Jersey are subject to the state’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Stewart v. Rutgers · filed 1996-05-10

A Federal court sitting in the State of New Jersey applies New Jersey’s two-year limitations period to actions brought pursuant to Sections 1981 and 1983.

Section 1983 claims involving a continuing series of discriminatory acts may include related acts outside the limitations period when an identifiable related act occurred within it.

Corvetti v. Town of Lake Pleasant · filed 1996-05-16

Under Federal law, which governs the accrual of claims brought under 42 USC § 1983, courts have applied the continuing violation theory when a plaintiff experiences a continuous series of discriminatory acts (see, Cornwell v Robinson, 23 F3d 694, 703-704). ... In our view, this theory is applicable in this case as this action was commenced within three years of the last discriminatory act that was clearly related to those discriminatory acts that occurred prior to August 20, 1989. Hence, none of plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising in Michigan are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Herbert W.G. Clanton v. The People of the City of East Lansing · filed 1996-05-21

The three year statute of limitations contained in Mich.Comp.Laws § 600.5805(8) is the uniform limitations period to be applied to civil rights claims that arise in Michigan.

Section 1983 claims filed in Oklahoma have a two-year statute of limitations.

Mukes v. Ramsey · filed 1996-05-24

In Oklahoma, the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is two years.

Section 1983 actions arising in Kansas have a two-year statute of limitations.

Woodward v. Sedgwick County Jail · filed 1996-05-31

The appropriate statute of limitations for a § 1983 action arising in Kansas is two years.

A § 1983 complaint filed ten years after the cause of action accrued is time-barred.

McClain v. Department of the Navy J.T. Galbreath, Pnc, Bydir, Oic, Dispersing Officer · filed 1996-05-31

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. However, we affirm the district court's dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988) on the grounds that Appellant's complaint, filed ten years after the cause of action had accrued, is time-barred.

A § 1983 complaint filed ten years after its cause of action accrued is time-barred.

McClain v. Dept of the Navy · filed 1996-05-31

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. However, we affirm the district court's dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988) on the grounds that Appellant's complaint, filed ten years after the cause of action had accrued, is time- barred.

Section 1983 claims use the state personal injury limitations period; in South Carolina, that period is three years for claims accruing on or after April 5, 1988.

Balogh v. Schick · filed 1996-05-31

There are no federal statutes of limitation for § 1983 actions. Thus, the court must look to state law to determine the applicable time limitation period. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 49 (1984). In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985), the Supreme Court held that the state statute governing personal injury claims should be applied to all § 1983 claims. In South Carolina, for personal injury actions accruing on or after April 5, 1988, the limitations period is three years.

Section 1983 claims arising in Oklahoma have a two-year limitations period, and claims from a separate period of confinement remain timely if brought within that period.

Housley v. Burrows · filed 1996-06-04

While claims arising from plaintiff’s initial incarceration in the Washita County Jail still run afoul of the statute of limitations, claims stemming from his second stay there are within the two-year period and are not barred.

Section 1983 damages claims arising in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Gilmore-Bey v. Coughlin · filed 1996-06-05

However, plaintiffs damages claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by a three year statute of limitations. Plaintiff filed his complaint on September 21, 1993, and any claims based on events prior to September 21, 1990 are thus time-barred.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Williams v. New York City Police Department · filed 1996-06-07

The statute of limitations applicable to all § 1983 actions in New York State is three years.

A minor’s § 1983 claim remains timely under Texas minority tolling even though § 1983 borrows the state personal injury limitations period.

Downing v. Brown · filed 1996-06-11

In doing so, LISD relies on ... holding that the applicable limitations period for § 1983 claims is determined by reference to the limitations set by state law for personal injury claims. ... To the degree this defense is meritorious as to appellant’s personal claims, it would not apply to Teresa’s claims due to her disability as a minor under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.001 (Vernon Supp.1996).

Section 1983 claims in California are governed by the one-year limitations period for personal injury actions, making claims based on incidents more than a year before filing untimely.

De Long v. Mansfield · filed 1996-06-14

The district court properly dismissed these causes of action because they were barred by the statute of limitations since the incidents alleged in his complaint occurred well over a year before his complaint was filed. See Taylor v. Regents of University of California, 993 F.2d 710, 711 (9th Cir.1993) (stating that California's one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs claims brought under § 1983), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 890 (1994).

Section 1983 claims arising in California were subject to a one-year limitations period and were untimely if filed more than one year after accrual.

Hershey v. Santa Clara Valley Humane Soc. · filed 1996-06-14

Our de novo review of the entire record reveals that the district court properly dismissed Hershey's 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims because he filed the complaint more than one year after the action accrued.

Section 1983 claims brought in Georgia are subject to Georgia’s two-year personal injury limitations period.

Rozar v. Mullis · filed 1996-06-17

Finding our sister circuits persuasive as to section 2000d, we hold that Georgia's two-year personal injury limitations period applies to the claim under that provision as well as those under sections 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the action is brought.

Rozar v. Mullis · filed 1996-06-17

As to the claims brought here under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 6 and 1985, 7 precedent is clear that these are measured by the personal injury limitations period of the state.

Mental incompetence does not automatically toll the limitations period for a Section 1983 claim.

Wilborn v. Cursey · filed 1996-06-17

We are unpersuaded by Wilborn's contention that his mental incompe- tence tolled the limitations period.

Section 1983 claims filed in federal court in Pennsylvania are subject to a two year statute of limitations.

Colbert v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1996-06-27

It is well settled that § 1983 claims filed in the federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania are subject to a two year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 suits brought in Kentucky are subject to the state’s one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Highland Park Association of Businesses and Enterprises v. Abramson · filed 1996-07-03

Suits brought in Kentucky under § 1983 are therefore subject to Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations pursuant to Ky.Rev.Stat. § 413.140(1)(a).

A § 1983 complaint is constructively filed when the clerk receives it if the plaintiff later pays the filing fee or obtains leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

McDowell v. Delaware State Police John Campanella, Detective Peachey, Trooper Romanelli, Trooper Simpson, T · filed 1996-07-05

Although a complaint is not formally filed until the filing fee is paid, we deem a complaint to be constructively filed as of the date that the clerk received the complaint — as long as the plaintiff ultimately pays the filing fee or the district court grants the plaintiffs request to proceed in forma pauperis.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's general personal injury limitations period because the statute has no federal limitations period.

Koch v. Sparks · filed 1996-07-09

Because no federal statute of limitations exists for actions under § 1983, federal courts apply the forum state's general personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Joshua Hill, Inc. v. Whitemarsh Township Authority (In Re Joshua Hill, Inc.) · filed 1996-07-11

Accordingly, claims such as the instant claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Pennsylvania have been given a two-year statute of limitations pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5524(7).

Section 1983 claims are subject to a limitations period and cannot proceed after they have prescribed.

Pizzo v. Jefferson Par Sher · filed 1996-07-25

Pizzo argues the merits of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. ... From our careful review of the record and the appellate arguments, we conclude that Pizzo's claims against the defendants had prescribed before the district court's initial dismissal in 1991.

Section 1983 claims arising in Texas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

James v. Johnson · filed 1996-07-25

James' claims concern events which occurred on or after January 23, 1996, and, thus, are not presently barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions arising in Texas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

King v. Dowdy · filed 1996-07-25

The facts in his complaint indicate that the complained of incidents occurred in 1995 within the two-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions arising in Texas.

Section 1983 actions use the limitations period of the state in which the claim arises.

Logan v. City of San Diego · filed 1996-08-05

Federal courts apply the statute of limitations of the state in which the claim arises for section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Ball v. Carroll · filed 1996-08-08

The accrual period for a § 1983 claim begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.

Section 1983 claims use state limitations and tolling rules; in New Mexico, mental incapacity tolls the filing period until one year after incapacity ends, even if the claimant has a guardian.

Desert State Life Management Services v. Association of Retarded Citizens · filed 1996-08-21

Federal courts must look to the applicable state statute of limitations to determine the timeliness of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Also applicable to such claims is the provision tolling the statute of limitations for minors and incapacitated persons. ... Thus, the Court holds that section 37-1-10 does not bar the claims of incapacitated persons until one year after the termination of incapacity, even if the incapacitated persons acquire a general guardian who may legally sue on their behalf.

Section 1983 claims brought in Kansas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Moses v. Bond · filed 1996-08-22

Further, even if we liberally construed plaintiff’s complaint to allege federal constitutional claims against the ambulance service and the police officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), those claims would be barred by the applicable two-year Kansas statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising from an arrest are tolled under former California law when the plaintiff remains in continuous custody from arrest through incarceration after conviction.

Mahon v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1996-08-23

In Elliot, 25 F.3d 800, we held that section 352(a)(3) tolls the statute of limitations when a plaintiff, suing under section 1983 to recover injuries suffered during an arrest, is held in continuous custody from the time of that arrest through the period of incarceration following his conviction. Id. at 802-03. Because Mahon was in continuous custody from the time of his arrest through the period of incarceration following his conviction, section 352(a)(3) tolls the statute of limitations for Mahon's illegal search and seizure claim and his untimely probable cause hearing claim.

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois have a two-year limitations period.

Booker v. James Ward and Thomas Kelly, Chicago Police Detectives · filed 1996-08-29

The statute of limitations for section 1983 claims arising in Illinois is two years.

Illinois prisoners have two years to bring a § 1983 action.

Logan v. Gillam · filed 1996-08-30

Illinois prisoners are subject to a two-year statute of limitations for bringing § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims in New York have a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Baker v. New York City · filed 1996-09-03

There is, therefore, a three-year statute of limitations applicable to this § 1983 action. This three-year period begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which formed the basis of his action.

A § 1983 claim is barred when filed outside the applicable statute of limitations.

Frazier v. Unknown Police,et al · filed 1996-09-04

A de novo review of the pleadings and the district court’s opinion demonstrates that the district court properly granted W.A. McBee’s motion to dismiss because Frazier’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 suits arising in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations determined by state law.

Larry Cole, Also Known as Larry Hayes v. Richard D. Irvin, Louis O. Lowery, Marion Larson, in Their Individual, Personal · filed 1996-09-06

State law determines the statute of limitations for § 1983 suits; in Illinois, that period is two years.