42 U.S.C. § 1983

In Ohio, Section 1983 claims have a two-year limitations period that pending union grievances do not toll.

Chance v. Mahoning County · filed 2004-06-22

We first consider whether any of the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are barred by the statute of limitations. In Ohio, the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions brought under § 1983 is two years. ... Contrary to the plaintiffs’ arguments, there is no basis for tolling the statute of limitations in this case due to the plaintiffs’ pending union grievances. It is well settled in this circuit that union grievance procedures, such as those employed by the plaintiffs in this case, do not toll the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Nevada are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Shannon v. Babb · filed 2004-06-28

The district court properly dismissed as untimely Shannon’s claim concerning unlawful withholding of his magazines because he filed his action more than two years after the claim accrued.

Section 1983 claims arising in Virginia are subject to the state's two-year personal injury limitations period.

Sabet v. Easthern Virginia Medical Authority · filed 1985-02-22

As an additional grounds for dismissal, this Court holds that the due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is barred by the statute of limitations. ... Hence, the two year limitation period laid out in Va.Code § 8.01-243(A) applies.

Section 1983 claims filed in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Farbstein v. Hicksville Public Library · filed 2004-06-30

For the purposes of the instant case, which was filed in New York, the statute of limitations for an action under Section 1983 is three years.

Section 1983 claims in Texas are subject to the state's two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Pine v. City of Midland · filed 2004-07-08

We hold that the district court did not err in its determination that equitable tolling did not apply in the instant case and, therefore, that the § 1983 claims were barred by Texas’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims use the state limitations period for personal injury actions, which is two years in Pennsylvania.

Barnes v. Rozzman · filed 2004-07-30

Finally, the statute of limitations for a claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which in Pennsylvania is two years.

Section 1983 claims challenging a Texas conviction are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Erwin v. Smith · filed 2004-08-04

Likewise, Erwin has not established that his challenges to his overturned state conviction were not barred by the applicable two-year limitations period.

Section 1983 claims filed in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Sank v. City University of New York · filed 2004-08-17

... we conclude that, because these claims were premised on events occurring in 1988 and 1990 and Sank did not file suit until January 1994, her claims were barred by the 3-year New York statute of limitations to file a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the complaint.

Bateman v. Texas Board of Pardons & Paroles · filed 2004-08-18

Bateman’s cause of action accrued on April 7, 1999, when he knew or had reason to know of the injury which formed the basis of his complaint.

Section 1983 claims in Texas have a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff has reason to know of the injury.

Johns v. O'Connell · filed 2004-08-18

The applicable limitations period is two years. ... In light of Johns’s admission that he has been attempting to obtain his trial records for four years, Johns had reason to know of the accrual of his cause of action, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that this claim was time-barred.

Section 1983 claims against a New York municipality have a three-year statute of limitations.

Bobrowsky v. Curran · filed 2004-08-24

It is well established that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims against a New York municipality is three years.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so federal courts use the analogous state limitations period.

Miskovsky v. Gray · filed 2004-08-27

Because § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitation, federal courts rely on analogous state statutes for determining the limitations period.

Section 1983 borrows the forum state's personal injury limitations period.

Sloan v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 2004-08-31

The 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim here is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. § 1983 incorporates the state’s personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 claims against defendants named in both an earlier complaint and a later complaint were preserved by Oklahoma’s savings statute.

Williams v. City of Guthrie · filed 2004-09-08

Because Mr. Williams named defendants Tucker and Fulton in both the 2000 and 2001 complaints, the savings statute applies and the claims against these defendants are not barred by the statute of limitations.

A § 1983 claim against a prison physician in Missouri is governed by the five-year general personal injury limitations period.

Kitchen v. Miller · filed 2004-09-10

Desiring to resolve a split among the circuits, the Court held that § 1983 claims are subject to a state's general tort personal injury statute. ... Accordingly, the court concludes that the relevant statute of limitations period is five years.

In Colorado, Section 1983 actions have a two-year limitations period borrowed from the state's residual statute of limitations.

Civil Service Commission v. Carney · filed 2004-09-13

In Colorado, section 1983 actions are governed by the residual statute of limitations, section 13-80-102(l)(i), 5 C.R.S. (2003), with a time period of two years.

Section 1983 actions arising in Tennessee have a one-year statute of limitations.

Howard v. Rea · filed 2004-09-17

For § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee, the statute of limitations is one year.

Section 1983 claims in Texas are governed by the state’s two-year personal injury limitations period.

Estate of Garrett v. Cherokee Water Co. · filed 2004-09-21

Plaintiffs’ §§ 1982, 1983, and 1985 claims are governed by the general Texas two-year personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 claims filed in federal court in Ohio are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Ewing v. O'Brien · filed 2004-09-21

Section 1983 claims brought in a federal court in Ohio are subject to the two-year statute of limitations period set forth in Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.10.

Section 1983 claims borrow the applicable state statute of limitations, which was two years in this case.

Payne v. Brake · filed 2004-09-23

The applicable statute of limitations for Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is imported from state law, and is two years in this case.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s tolling rules; under Nevada equitable tolling law, the limitations period was tolled during required administrative proceedings and a prior dismissed federal action.

Wisenbaker v. Farwell · filed 2004-09-29

In deciding whether to equitably toll a statute of limitations for a cause of action filed under § 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, the court applies the forum state’s tolling doctrines. ... Therefore, this Court finds that Plaintiff could present facts that would prove the timeliness of his claims, and the statute of limitations will be tolled for the 289 days during which the Plaintiff was exhausting his administrative remedies and for the time during which his prior dismissed action was pending before the previous federal district court.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own; a federal court borrows the applicable period from the forum state.

Keane v. Navarro · filed 2004-09-30

Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations. ... A federal court adjudicating a § 1983 claim borrows the applicable limitations period from the forum state.

Section 1983 claims arising in Oklahoma have a two-year statute of limitations.

Washington v. Kaiser · filed 2004-10-05

The statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims arising in Oklahoma is two years.

A Section 1983 due process claim based on actions in New York must be filed within three years of the action complained of.

Michel v. Westchester County · filed 2004-10-06

Finally (since I am constrained by plaintiffs pro se status to construe the complaint liberally), to the extent that plaintiff is challenging the actions taken by his employer (Westchester County) in 1998 and 1999 on due process grounds, he either had to file a proceeding in the New York State courts under CPLR Article 78 within 4 months of the action complained of, CPLR § 217(1), or a proceeding in this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 within 3 years of the action complained of. The last action complained of took place in August 1999, so any denial of due process claim under the United States Constitution is clearly time barred, and has been for well over two years.

In Kentucky, a § 1983 claim is subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Grand Communities, Ltd. v. Stepner · filed 2004-10-15

Because Stepner’s actions in connection with the unsuccessful annexation by the City of Union ended with a settlement in April 1999 of the two lawsuits against the City, the cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was brought by the appellants more than one year after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitation. Therefore, this count in the appellants’ complaint was also properly dismissed by the circuit court.

Section 1983 claims brought in Louisiana are subject to the one-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Lewis v. Smith · filed 2004-10-20

Lewis’s claims, which accrued at the latest by 1997, were also barred by the one-year limitations provision applicable to Louisiana personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Ferreira v. City of Pawtucket · filed 2004-10-21

It has long been established that federal courts hearing § 1983 actions apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims in Indiana use the state’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Smith v. Asghar · filed 2004-10-21

We apply Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries to Smith’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims use the state personal injury limitations period, which is two years in Indiana.

Sanders v. City of Fort Wayne · filed 1985-08-15

The Supreme Court has held that claims under § 1983 must be treated as personal injury actions for purposes of determining what state statute of limitation will apply to it. ... In Indiana, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years. ... Thus, petitioner’s claim would fail because it is time-barred.

Section 1983 claims to which North Dakota law applies use the state's six-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Carpenter v. WILLIAMS COUNTY, ND · filed 1985-09-30

North Dakota law provides a six year statute of limitations for “[a]n action for criminal conversation or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not arising upon contract, when not otherwise expressly provided.” N.D.Cent.Code § 28-01-16(5) (Supp.1983). This is the statute for personal injury action which is to be applied in section 1983 actions to which North Dakota law applies.

Section 1983 claims accruing in Texas have a two-year limitations period.

Isasi v. U.S. Gov. · filed 2004-10-26

Isasi’s June 2003 complaint — arising from events occurring in 1997 — was time-barred by every conceivable statute of limitations, including: ... and the two-year limitations period applicable to § 1983 actions accruing in Texas.

Section 1983 claims in Indiana use the state's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Hoagland v. TOWN OF CLEAR LAKE, INDIANA · filed 2004-10-28

The statute of limitations used for § 1983 claims is the statute of limitations for personal injury claims in the state where the alleged § 1983 violations took place, King v. One Unknown Fed. Corr. Officer, 201 F.3d 910, 913 (7th Cir.2000), which is two years in Indiana, Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4.

A § 1983 false arrest claim becomes actionable when success on the claim would no longer imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction, and the limitations period then runs.

Wallace v. City of Chicago · filed 2004-10-29

Wallace’s Section 1983 claim would not have been barred by Heck after the Appellate Court’s ruling because the Appellate Court remanded Wallace’s case to determine whether his confession was sufficiently attenuated from Wallace’s illegal arrest to be admissible. ... Since Wallace filed his Fourth Amendment claim more than four years after it became actionable, it is still time-barred.

Section 1983 actions brought in Virginia courts are governed by Virginia’s two-year general personal-injury limitations period.

Billups v. Carter · filed 2004-11-05

We hold that § 1983 actions brought in Virginia courts are governed by the two-year limitation prescribed by that section.

Section 1983 claims in Washington have a three-year limitations period.

Thornton v. Hill · filed 2004-11-10

All of Thornton’s claims arose from events that occurred over three years before he filed his suit, three years being the undisputed statute of limitations in Washington for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. The district court correctly held that all of those claims are barred by the statute of limitations except for the claim of malicious prosecution in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights.

Section 1983 actions in Texas are subject to the Texas statute of limitations for tort actions.

Shaw v. Harris · filed 2004-11-12

To the extent Shaw asserts claims that are not barred by Heck but which occurred prior to or contemporaneously with her conviction, such as her claim of denial of emergency medical care, such claims are barred by the Texas statute of limitations for tort actions that applies in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions.

In Illinois, a § 1983 action has a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or should have known that his constitutional rights were violated.

Bullock v. City of Chicago · filed 2004-11-16

In Illinois, the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is two years, see Licari v. City of Chicago, 298 F.3d 664, 667-68 (7th Cir.2002), and begins to accrue when the plaintiff knows or should have known that his constitutional rights have been violated, id.; Kelly v. City of Chicago, 4 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir.1993). Bullock obviously knew that the semen-stained underwear existed at least by 1994 when he learned of the DNA test results and was released from prison. Because he did not file this lawsuit until March 2001, his claim is untimely.

In New York, Section 1983 actions have a three-year limitations period.

Wallace v. NYC Dept. of Corrections · filed 2004-11-18

The three-year statute of limitations for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had long since run; thus, appellant could only have added the unnamed officials under the “relation back” provision of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c).

Section 1983 claims brought in Oregon are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Handelman v. City of Portland · filed 2004-11-18

Daniel Handelman and Peace and Justice Works (hereinafter “Handelman”) appeal the district court’s conclusion that Handelman’s claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Portland is barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Reviewing de novo, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment order.

Section 1983 actions in Puerto Rico have a one-year limitations period.

Chevere-Rodriguez v. Barnes-Pagan · filed 2004-11-19

In Puerto Rico, the limitations period applicable to section 1983 actions is one year.

In Puerto Rico, a § 1983 action has a one-year limitations period, and a deadline falling on a Sunday extends to the next business day.

Chévere-Rodríguez v. Pagán · filed 2004-11-19

In Puerto Rico, the limitations period applicable to section 1983 actions is one year. ... When the final day of a computed period of time prescribed or allowed by an applicable statute for doing an act falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period is automatically extended to the next business day.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s statute of limitations and tolling rules unless those rules conflict with the federal policy underlying the claim.

Lathan v. Vermillion · filed 2004-11-24

In § 1983 cases, we borrow the forum state’s statute of limitations and tolling rules unless they are inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action under consideration.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Stacey v. City of Hermitage · filed 2004-11-24

We agree that the Staceys’ § 1983 claims arising out of events they allege occurred before November 6, 2000 are time-barred based upon the filing of the complaint on November 6, 2002.

A Section 1983 complaint is subject to dismissal when time-barred, and leave to add defendants may be denied when the claims against them would also be time-barred.

Jackson v. City of Sikeston Police Department · filed 2004-11-30

Having carefully reviewed the record, we agree with the district court that the instant complaint is time-barred, and we also find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend because the claims against the additional defendants would have been time-barred as well.

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Terminello v. City of Passaic · filed 2004-12-13

The statute of limitations for any Section 1983 claim is determined by referring to the state statute governing actions for personal injuries.

A Section 1983 claim filed after the applicable limitations period remains time-barred when the asserted grounds for tolling are legally inadequate.

Bregant v. Vigluicci · filed 2004-12-16

The district court found that the explanations given by both plaintiffs were legally inadequate to support application of tolling and dismissed the complaint. ... Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court upon the reasoning set out by that court in its order dated September 26, 2003.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s general personal injury statute of limitations.

Bell v. City of Houston · filed 2004-12-17

In the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 context, a federal court “borrows” a statute of limitations from the forum state’s general personal-injury limitations provision.

Section 1983 claims brought in Mississippi are subject to a one-year limitations period that applies retrospectively when the Chevron factors are met.

Young v. Biggers · filed 1986-01-15

This purpose is served by applying the one-year statute of limitations to all plaintiffs, whether their claims are already in litigation or not, so long as the other Chevron factors are met.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own; courts apply the analogous state personal injury limitations period and related tolling rules.

Horace J. Washington, Sr. v. Breaux · filed 1986-02-14

Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contains no statute of limitations, the Supreme Court has determined that the analogous state law statute of limitations for personal injuries and the closely related state laws governing the tolling of the statute are applicable in such cases.

Section 1983 claims arising in North Carolina have a three-year statute of limitations.

Overman v. Stevens · filed 2004-12-20

Claims under § 1983 arising in North Carolina have a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in California were subject to the then-applicable one-year personal injury limitations period, with equitable tolling available for qualifying civil detainees.

Pedersen v. Plummer · filed 2004-12-28

Applying California’s then-applicable one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, the district court concluded that Pedersen’s claims relating to the dates in 1997, 1999, and 2000 were time-barred. The district court applied the correct statute of limitations, but erroneously failed to apply equitable tolling to Pedersen’s claims.

A § 1983 claim for reduced disability retirement benefits is barred when filed more than three years after both the statutory amendment and the first reduced payment; demand and refusal and continuing violation do not save it.

Woodard v. North Carolina Local Governmental Employees' Retirement System · filed 1993-01-05

We reverse the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that the statute of limitations had run on plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. ... In either case, the three year statute had run by the time plaintiffs instituted the action in January 1991. Neither the equitable doctrine of demand and refusal nor the continuing violation doctrine saves this cause of action.

Under Puerto Rico tolling law, a request for the return of seized property does not toll the limitations period for a § 1983 damages claim.

Jose E. Cardona Del Toro, D/B/A Tortuguero Motors v. United States of America · filed 1993-01-19

Rather, we hold that the June 5, 1989 letter seeking return of the vehicles could not toll the Bivens and § 1983 civil rights claims for damages.

A § 1983 claim accrues under federal law when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Lafont-Rivera v. Jose Soler-Zapata, Ricardo Torres Munoz, Armando Troche · filed 1993-01-20

Under federal law, a plaintiffs § 1983 cause of action accrues when s/he “knows, or has reason to know, of the injury on which the action is based.”

Section 1983 actions filed in South Dakota are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Rick L. Clark v. James Iosty, Deputy States Attorney State of South Dakota Russell Prince, Detective Sioux Falls Police · filed 1993-01-26

Plaintiff Rick L. Clark, a South Dakota prisoner, filed a complaint alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court 1 dismissed Clark's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) on the basis that Clark failed to file the action within the time period allowed by statute. See S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 15-2-15.2 (1992) (three year statute of limitations for filing federal civil rights action). The district court then denied Clark's subsequent motion for reconsideration. Clark appeals. After reviewing the record we find no error in the district court's decision and we affirm.

For § 1983 actions in Illinois, a timely complaint that misnames the intended defendant satisfies the two-year limitations period if the correct defendant is served promptly.

Diaz v. Shallbetter · filed 1993-01-28

Section 1983 actions in Illinois must be filed within two years of the injury. ... Complaints burdened by problems of nomenclature satisfy the statute of limitations in Illinois. ... If the right person receives service promptly, the complaint is timely despite the gaffe.

A § 1983 employment-termination claim accrues when the employee receives notice of termination, even if employment ends later.

Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale · filed 1993-02-03

It is well established that in cases which challenge employment termination decisions, the applicable limitations period begins to run when notice of termination was given and not on the date when employment actually terminated.

Section 1983 supplies no statute of limitations, so the most analogous state limitations period applies.

Lovelace v. O'hara · filed 1993-02-11

We note that § 1983 does not provide a statute of limitations. Therefore, the most analogous state statute of limitations has application.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York are subject to the state’s three-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Leon v. Murphy · filed 1993-03-05

New York's three-year statute of limitations for personal injuries applies to these claims, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).

A § 1983 claim arising in California is tolled for imprisonment only if the plaintiff was imprisoned when the claim accrued.

Bertram v. Five Unknown Officers · filed 1993-03-25

Under Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 352, the statute of limitations is tolled if the plaintiff is in prison when the cause of action accrues. ... Because he was not incarcerated at the time the cause of action arose, section 352 is inapplicable and does not toll his action.

Section 1983 claims in California were subject to a one-year personal injury limitations period.

Mitchell v. Ernie Kell, Mayor, City of Long Beach City of Long Beach Lawrence Binkley, Chief of Police · filed 1993-04-08

The relevant statute of limitations period for Mitchell's claims, however, is one year. See Del Percio v. Thornsley, 877 F.2d 785, 786 (9th Cir.1989) (section 1983 actions must be brought within time specified by forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury torts; relevant period under Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340(3) is one year from date of accrual).

Section 1983 claims are governed by the applicable state statute of limitations.

Sneed v. Danny Jones Brook Thompson Frank Crawford · filed 1993-04-12

The court simply restricted consideration to those events occurring on or after July 31, 1987, because all other claims were barred by the applicable state statute of limitations. This was clearly appropriate. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42 (1984) (state statute of limitations governs § 1983 actions).

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the claim arose.

Susan Hallstrom Robert Hallstrom v. City of Garden City Randy W. Snapp Sgt. Thurston Vaughn Killeen, Sheriff Mike Robert · filed 1993-04-12

The applicable statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions is the limitations period for personal injury actions in the state where the action arose.

Section 1983 actions have a three-year limitations period, and learning the full severity or medical name of an injury later does not toll it.

Martinez v. Bruce King, Adolph Siez, Jerry Griffin, John Doe I and John Doe II · filed 1993-04-15

Under Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is three years. ... Martinez' claim that he did not know the full medical terminology of his injury or the severity of his injury until 1990 does not toll the limitations period.

Section 1983 claims arising in New York have a three-year limitations period borrowed from the state’s personal injury statute of limitations.

Blankman v. County of Nassau · filed 1993-04-21

The statute of limitations for an action arising in New York pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is borrowed from New York’s general statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... Therefore, pursuant to CPLR § 214(5), the limitations period is three years.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so California’s personal injury limitations period governs Section 1983 claims arising there.

Andrisani v. Superior Court · filed 1993-05-07

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations. Consequently, the applicable statute of limitations for section 1983 claim is the limitations period for personal injury causes of action under California state law.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico have a one-year limitations period, and an ongoing violation is timely if some challenged acts occurred within that year.

Maria De Los Angeles-Sanchez v. Alvarado · filed 1993-05-07

The limitations period for a section 1983 claim is governed by the law of the forum state. ... In Puerto Rico, the applicable statute of limitations is the one-year period established for tort actions. ... A claim alleging a violation that occurs over an extended period is timely so long as some of the challenged acts fall within the statutory period. ... We conclude that Sanchez has raised sufficient questions regarding the continuation of PREPA's alleged violation to preclude summary judgment for defendants at this preliminary stage of the proceeding.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the claim is brought.

White v. Robinson · filed 1993-05-14

To determine the applicable statute of limitations for a § 1983 action, we must look at the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state in which the claim is brought.

Section 1983 actions in California have a one-year limitations period borrowed from personal injury law, and later discovery of supporting evidence does not toll that period when the plaintiff already knew of the injury.

Avdeef v. County of Orange Michael R. Capizzi · filed 1993-05-18

Thus, section 1983 actions must be brought within the time specified by the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury torts. ... In California, the applicable statute of limitations is Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340(3), which provides for a limitations period of one year from the date the cause of action accrues. ... Under these circumstances, the district court correctly found that the statute of limitations was not tolled by fraudulent concealment and that the statute had run on Avdeef's action by the time he filed his complaint on May 8, 1991.

Section 1983 claims filed in Puerto Rico have a one-year limitations period.

Cabrero v. Ruiz · filed 1993-05-24

In Puerto Rico, the statute of limitations for filing a section 1983 claim is one year.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so California’s one-year limitations period governs Section 1983 claims.

John Stanley Steffen Terry Ann Steffen v. Loyace Mauldin Steven Cooley · filed 1993-05-25

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations. Consequently, the one-year statute of limitations in California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(3) governs § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 claims in New York use a three-year personal-injury limitations period, which began here when the challenged hospital-service decision became sufficiently final.

Mussington Ex Rel. Jacobs v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center · filed 1993-06-11

Thus, applying a three-year statute of limitations ... running from August 1989, the date at which the former decision gained a significant degree of certainty and at which the latter approval was given, it is clear that plaintiffs’ Title VI and § 1983 claims are time-barred.

Section 1983 actions use the state limitations period for personal injury actions.

Ross v. Stephen T. Smith, Warden · filed 1993-06-11

In § 1983 actions, the appropriate statute of limitations is the state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims use state statutes of limitations for personal injury actions.

Groover v. County of San Diego Sheriff's Dept. · filed 1993-06-14

Actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by state statutes of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 actions borrow the forum state's personal-injury limitations period, which in California is tolled while criminal charges are pending against the plaintiff.

Cleveland Lee Harris, AKA Efil Sih v. Daryl Gates · filed 1993-07-02

In section 1983 actions, the federal courts apply the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury torts. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985); Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 408 (9th Cir.1991). In California, this period is one year. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340(3); Del Percio v. Thornsley, 877 F.2d 785, 786 (9th Cir.1989). The one-year period is tolled while criminal charges are pending against a section 1983 plaintiff. Cal.Gov't Code § 945.3; Harding v. Galceran, 889 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 951 (1991).

A state may not generally toll limitations for prisoners while withholding that benefit for claims against correctional officials when the exception burdens § 1983 actions.

Dixon v. James A. Chrans, Dick Irving, S. Jordan · filed 1993-07-29

Similarly, the clear purpose and effect of the 1987 amendment was to limit the availability of relief for claims against IDOC officials, including § 1983 claims. This burden on actions against IDOC officials is inconsistent with § 1983.

Section 1983 claims borrow the applicable state's personal-injury limitations period and accrue under federal law when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Verdon v. Consolidated Rail Corp. · filed 1993-08-12

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not give a specific statute of limitations. The Supreme Court has therefore directed courts to use the applicable state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions for § 1983 claims. ... Determination of when an action accrues under § 1983 is based on federal law. ... Federal law states that a cause of action accrues when “the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his action.” ... Thus, since he waited almost six years to the day from the date on which his cause of action accrued before bringing the present action, his § 1983 claims are clearly time-barred.

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois are governed by the state's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Ghosh v. Lindley · filed 1993-08-17

Our cases firmly establish that Sec. 1983 cases arising in Illinois are governed by the state's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, IL.REV.STAT. ch. 110, p 13-202.

Section 1983 actions are governed by the state statute of limitations for personal injury tort actions, which is three years in Montana.

Frank Boring Fitzgerald v. Montana Department of Family Services · filed 1993-08-30

Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by the state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury tort actions. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 558 (9th Cir.1987). Mont.Code Ann. § 27-2-204 sets a three year statute of limitation for personal injury tort actions.

Section 1983 actions are governed by the state's statute of limitations for personal injury.

Cameron v. Mrdcc Institute · filed 1993-11-24

There is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 actions; the state statute of limitations for personal injury applies.

A claim for relief under Section 1983 is subject to dismissal as untimely.

Barth v. Crosson · filed 1993-12-29

The court properly concluded, in ... that the claims of plaintiffs Kolakowski and Schneider are time-barred ... and that plaintiff Barth’s claim for relief under 42 USC § 1983 is also untimely ... .

Section 1983 claims have a two-year limitations period that begins when a reasonable person knows or should know the facts supporting a discrimination claim.

Asllani v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago · filed 1994-01-11

Sections 1981 and 1983 have a two-year limitations period. The statute begins to run when a reasonable person knows or should know of facts which support a charge of discrimination.

Section 1983 actions use the governing state’s personal injury statute of limitations.

Staradumsky v. West Warwick Police · filed 1994-01-13

Actions under § 1983 are subject to the governing state's personal injury statute of limitations.

A § 1983 claim arising from an allegedly unlawful discharge accrues when the wrongful acts occur, rather than when their effects are felt.

Pagliuca v. City of Boston · filed 1994-01-24

A claim under § 1983 arising out of an allegedly unlawful discharge accrues on the date of the allegedly wrongful acts, rather than on the date when the effects of those acts are felt.

A Section 1983 claim in Michigan is barred when filed after Michigan’s applicable statute of limitations expires.

Dulaney v. Wildman · filed 1994-01-24

Dulaney's complaint was barred by Michigan's applicable statute of limitations.

A § 1983 claim is not tolled under Arkansas’s concealment rule without proof that the defendant’s conduct prevented suit; a plaintiff who does not know a deputy’s name can sue a John Doe deputy.

Roberts v. Dillon · filed 1994-01-28

Section 16-56-120 does allow for tolling of the statute of limitations when the defendant has concealed himself or by other improper action has prevented the commencement of a cause of action. However, Roberts has made nothing more than cursory allegations to this effect, as the District Court found, and has shown nothing by way of proof that the defendants' misconduct prevented her from proceeding with her suit. Regardless of whether Roberts knew Dillon's identity, she presumably knew that he was an officer with the Pulaski County Sheriff's Office and could have tracked him down with relative ease. Even were she unable to ascertain his identity, she could have sued him as a "John Doe" Deputy Sheriff, thereby preserving her cause of action. She did neither of these, and, therefore, the District Court properly dismissed her Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 actions borrow the applicable state statute of limitations; this court applied South Carolina’s six-year period for injury to a person or rights.

Spires v. City of Cayce · filed 1994-01-31

In actions arising under sections 1983 and 1988, the federal court borrows the applicable state statute of limitations. ... Here, the applicable statute of limitations is six years, as specified in S.C.Code Ann.Sec. 15-3-530(5) (1976 & Supp.1992), relating to actions for injury to the person or rights of another not arising on contract or enumerated by law.

Section 1983 actions in Nevada are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Penn H. Smith v. State of Nevada Highway Patrol William Yukish, Colonel Ken Meachum Patrolman A. White, Patrolman Robert · filed 1994-02-10

The statute of limitations applicable to section 1983 actions in Nevada is two years.

In Texas, § 1983 claims are governed by the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Engelberg v. Hull-Daisetta Independent School District · filed 1994-02-10

This court agrees with their assertion that the instant claims are governed by the forum state’s general two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims use the state personal injury limitations period; in Pennsylvania, the period for a minor’s claim does not begin until the minor reaches majority.

Faison v. Sex Crimes Unit of Philadelphia · filed 1994-02-24

It is well-established that claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the state statute of limitations governing personal injury actions. ... For such claims, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the minor reaches the age of majority. ... Accordingly, these claims are not time barred since the statute of limitations has yet to commence running.

Section 1983 claims by Illinois prisoners against correctional officials remain eligible for imprisonment tolling despite the 1987 Illinois exception for claims against those officials.

Bolden v. Winkelman · filed 1994-03-03

The magistrate judge's conclusion was erroneous. Dixon v. Chrans, 986 F.2d 201 (7th Cir.1993), which was decided while Bolden's appeal was pending, 4 held that the 1987 amendment to the tolling statute could not apply to Sec. 1983 claims of prisoners against IDOC officials. ... Therefore, under Dixon, the magistrate judge's dismissal of Bolden's claim against Valleroy must be reversed.

Section 1983 claims in Indiana are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Ramirez v. J.D. Beatty · filed 1994-03-08

Even if presented in his original complaint, as he contends, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to Sec. 1983 claims had run on this claim, thereby precluding him from pursuing the claim.

Section 1983 claims in New York use CPLR § 214’s three-year limitations period, so CPLR § 215(8) does not toll them.

Bezerra v. County of Nassau · filed 1994-03-14

Because section 1983 claims are subject to the statute of limitations provided in section 214, the tolling provision in section 215(8) is inapplicable to such claims.

Section 1983 claims filed in Ohio are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Selmar Perdue, Jr. v. David W. Troutman, Sheriff John Doe Williams, Deputy · filed 1994-03-18

Perdue filed his complaint beyond the applicable two year statute of limitations period. See Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2305.10 (Anderson 1991); Dixon v. Anderson, 928 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir.1991).

California's one-year statute of limitations applies to Section 1983 claims.

Williams v. State of California · filed 1994-03-18

Appellant's allegations relating to the city council's actions or inactions in the 1970s are barred by the statute of limitations. See Taylor v. Regents of the University of California, 993 F.2d 710, 711 (9th Cir.1993) (California's one year statute applies to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claims). As the minutes of the council meetings show, appellant's uncle was present when the actions were taken, so there can be no tolling argument to prevent application of the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions in California were subject to a one-year limitations period after 1985.

Golden Gate Hotel Ass'n v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 1994-03-18

Consequently, subsequent to 1985, the limitations period for Section 1983 actions in California was reduced from three years to one.

Section 1983 claims use the state limitations period for personal injury actions; in Idaho, that period is two years.

Mason v. Tucker and Associates · filed 1994-03-24

Congress provided no federal statute of limitation for an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that, because Section 1983 actions are analogous to actions for injuries to personal rights, they are subject to the state statute of limitation for personal injury actions. ... The pertinent Idaho statute is I.C. § 5-219(4), which provides a two-year statute of limitation for actions based on personal injury. ... Like the cause of action for negligence, Mason’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 are untimely.

Section 1983 claims in Mississippi are subject to the three-year residual statute of limitations, measured from accrual of the cause of action.

Taylor v. County of Copiah · filed 1994-03-30

Because plaintiffs complaint alleges due process taking violations, equal protection violations, and discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and federal statute, the controlling statute of limitations for each of plaintiffs claims is the Mississippi residual statute of limitations found in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49. The statute of limitations provides that an action must be brought within three years of a cause of action accruing.

Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims accrue when the prosecution terminates in the accused’s favor, with the limitations period supplied by state law.

Morris v. David Ritter Brent Kolvet James Bauder Caesar's Tahoe Casino Corp. · filed 1994-03-31

While the statute of limitations period for section 1983 actions is determined by state law, federal law determines when a cause of action accrues. ... Because Morris's malicious prosecution claim did not accrue until the jury found in his favor on the attempt charge on August 23, 1989, his claim, filed within two years of that date, was timely.

Section 1983 claims in California must be filed within one year after the plaintiff knew or should have known the facts supporting the claim.

Sanford v. Ira Reiner Edward Miller John Nickols Gary W. Hutton Michael Brenner · filed 1994-04-12

Under California's applicable statute of limitations, a party has one year from the date he knew or should have known of the facts supporting a cause of action within which to commence his section 1983 or section 1985 claim.

Section 1983 actions brought in Nevada have a two-year statute of limitations.

Puett v. R.D. Carnes, Officer Mr. Paul Acuna Sgt. Mike Blandford Mr. Newton Sikes Unknown Officers One Th · filed 1994-04-13

The statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 actions brought in Nevada is two years.

Section 1983 claims in Nebraska are exempt from the municipal claim-filing requirements of § 15-840 and are subject to the four-year limitations period in § 25-207.

Bauers v. City of Lincoln · filed 1994-04-15

Additionally, we find that the firefighters’ § 1983 actions are not subject to the filing requirements of § 15-840; these actions, however, are subject to the 4-year statute of limitations set forth in § 25-207.

A continuing violation can make a Section 1983 claim timely as to all conduct within the violation, including acts outside the limitations period.

Cornwell v. Robinson · filed 1994-05-03

Where a continuing violation can be shown, the plaintiff is entitled to bring suit challenging all conduct that was a part of that violation, even conduct that occurred outside the limitations period.

Section 1983 claims arising from a continuing discriminatory practice may be timely when the last related act falls within the limitations period.

Cornwell v. Robinson · filed 1994-05-03

For the reasons below, we agree with Cornwell that defendants’ policies and conduct constituted a continuing wrong and that the original complaint was therefore not barred by the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising in Virginia are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Benko v. Grzejka · filed 1994-05-04

As to the remaining Defendants (Detective Kowalski, Councilman Grzejka, Councilman Gerson, Fire Marshal Fullem, and the Manassas City Council), Benko filed this Complaint well beyond the two-year statute of limitations applicable to Sec. 1983 claims arising in Virginia.

Section 1983 actions are subject to the state personal injury statute of limitations.

Elizabeth Roll and Lola Roll v. State of Idaho · filed 1994-05-17

The district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' Sec. 1983 claims based on searches which allegedly occurred on May 13, 14, and 16, and June 22, 1986, as barred by the statute of limitations. See Idaho Code Sec. 5-219(4); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (state personal injury statute of limitations applies to Sec. 1983 actions).

Section 1983 actions filed in Colorado federal courts are subject to Colorado’s two-year residual personal-injury statute of limitations.

Alvarez v. Frank Gunter Thomas Cooper Robert Thurlow Charles Watson Jim Cowan and Cletus Kennedy · filed 1994-05-17

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court for substantially the same reasons set forth by the magistrate judge and the district court. ... Therefore, the two year limitation period of Section 13-80-102(1)(a), (i) is applicable to all Sec. 1983 actions filed in the Colorado federal courts.

A § 1983 claim concerning unlawfully seized evidence may accrue when the evidence is used at trial, affecting whether the claim is time barred.

Cox v. G. Wayne Pike Doug Tuck · filed 1994-05-25

Cox alleges that his claim is not time barred. Because Cox's injury may not have occurred until the allegedly unlawfully seized materials were used against him, he may be correct.

Section 1983 claims brought in Connecticut are subject to the three-year limitations period in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577.

Linda Lounsbury and William R. Donaldson, Jr. v. Jack Jeffries, Lisa Charton, Richard Baez, Fran Budwitz and James Camer · filed 1994-05-27

Accordingly, Sec. 52-577 should have been applied to plaintiffs' claims under Sec. 1983. Since Sec. 52-577 provides a three-year period of limitations, plaintiffs' claims were not barred.

Section 1983 actions in Utah are not subject to a state two-year limitations period that specifically and exclusively targets those actions.

Arnold v. Duchesne County, Merv Taylor, Jerry Foote, and Clair Poulson · filed 1994-05-27

In sum, section 78-12-28(3) attempts to do that which it cannot — to unilaterally declare that the statute of limitations for section 1983 actions in Utah shall be two years. While Congress permits federal courts to borrow state limitations periods, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has authorized states to create limitations periods specifically and exclusively applicable to section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims in Connecticut are subject to the three-year limitations period in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577.

Lounsbury v. Jeffries · filed 1994-05-27

Accordingly, § 52-577 should have been applied to plaintiffs’ claims under § 1983. Since § 52-577 provides a three-year period of limitations, plaintiffs’ claims were not barred.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period; under California law, minority tolling ends when the minor dies.

Granillo v. City of San Gabriel · filed 1994-05-31

The appropriate statute of limitation for a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action is that for a personal injury action in the state in which the case is filed. ... Death ends the disability, and thus the tolling of the limitation period. See Triplett v. Williams, 74 Cal.Rptr. 594, 596 (1969). Because Mauricio died on the date the cause of action accrued, the statute's period was not tolled.

In California, a section 1983 action is subject to the one-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Caro v. Ventura County Sheriff's Dept. · filed 1994-05-31

Rudy Caro appeals pro se the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action. We agree with the district court that Caro's action is barred by the one-year limitation period prescribed in Cal.Civ.Proc.Code Sec. 340(3) (West 1994).

Section 1983 claims in California are subject to tolling under Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 352(a)(3) when the claimant remains in continuous custody from arrest through imprisonment.

Elliott v. City of Union City · filed 1994-06-01

We reverse the district court because, pursuant to Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 352(a)(3), the statute of limitations applicable to Elliott’s § 1983 action was tolled commencing at the time of his arrest and continuing through his custody.

Section 1983 actions filed in Maryland are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Davis v. Board of Physician Quality Assurance of Maryland · filed 1994-06-13

Under Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), Davis had three years within which to file a Sec. 1983 action. See Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc.Code Ann. Sec. 5-101 (Supp.1992).

Section 1983 actions use the state personal injury limitations period, while federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Bennett v. District Attorney Office Metro Police Department: Municipality · filed 1994-06-22

For statute of limitations purposes, civil rights actions are to be characterized as personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1985). Although state law determines the length of the limitations period, "federal law governs the time of accrual." Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987).

A section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Smith v. Holtz · filed 1994-06-27

Under federal law, a section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury that constitutes the basis of the action.

Section 1983 actions brought in Arkansas are subject to a three-year statute of limitations borrowed from the state’s general personal-injury law.

Camp v. Jarrel Dailey, Executive Secretary of the State Board of Barber Examiners Arkansas State Board of Barber E · filed 1994-06-28

The district court correctly determined that Camp's action was time- barred, because the harm he complains about allegedly occurred in July 1989, more than three years before he filed this suit. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280-81 (1985) (limitations period for section 1983 action governed by state's general personal-injury statute of limitations); Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (three-year limitations period in Arkansas).

Section 1983 claims use the limitations period of the most analogous state personal injury statute, which is one year in Tennessee.

Blalock v. Vicki Shoopman Tennessee Department of Human Services · filed 1994-06-29

The limitations period for filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is determined by looking at the most analogous personal injury statute of limitations of the state in which the complaint was filed. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). The most analogous Tennessee statute is that found at Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 28-3-104(a), which provides a one-year limitations period.

Section 1983 claims arising in Hawaii are subject to the two-year limitations period for personal injury actions under Hawaii law.

Parikh v. City and County of Honolulu · filed 1994-07-06

The Hawaii Supreme Court has determined that under Wilson and Owens, the applicable statute of limitations for claims brought under section 1983 is Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 657-7, the general personal injury statute of limitations. ... We have reached the same conclusion. ... Hawaii Revised Statute section 657-7 provides in relevant part: "Actions for the recovery of compensation for damage or injury to persons or property shall be instituted within two years after the cause of action accrued." ... Therefore, because Parikh's action was filed more than two years after the alleged constitutional violations occurred, the action is time-barred.

Section 1983 actions use the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

DeFrancis v. Bush · filed 1994-07-15

This court looks to state law on personal injury actions for the statute of limitations on an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 actions arising in Hawaii are governed by the state's two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Richard C.S. Ho v. Patricia Born Cedric Roldan David Goodspeed · filed 1994-07-22

The applicable statute of limitations is the state's general or residual state of limitations for personal injury actions. ... Accordingly, Ho's claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 were barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions borrow the state limitations period for personal injury claims, which is two years in Arizona.

Quihuis v. General Donald Owens · filed 1994-07-22

Congress did not establish a specific statute of limitation for Sec. 1983 actions. When a federal statute contains no limitation period, federal courts borrow the state statute of limitation governing analogous actions. Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir.1991). The appropriate state statute of limitation for Sec. 1983 actions is that for personal injury cases. Id. In Arizona, the limitation period for personal injury actions is two years.

Section 1983 borrows the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, which is one year in California.

Silas v. Roche · filed 1994-07-26

Section 1983 actions are governed by the forums state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985). In California, the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions is one year.

Section 1983 claims in Arkansas have a three-year limitations period, and imprisonment in Arkansas does not toll it.

Camp v. Clinton · filed 1994-08-05

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing as time-barred Camp's allegations of perjury at his jury trial, which occurred more than three years before he filed this action. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985) (limitations period for section 1983 action governed by state's general personal-injury statute of limitations); Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (three-year limitations period in Arkansas). Camp's imprisonment in Arkansas did not entitle him to a disability tolling of the statute of limitations. See Ark. Code Ann. Sec. 16-56-116 (Michie 1987).

Section 1983 claims, including takings claims, are governed by a single state statute of limitations; a special 60-day period in an interstate compact does not apply.

The Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, (Two Cases) · filed 1994-08-10

Obviously, the single state statute of limitations to be applied in all § 1983 actions cannot be the special 60-day period provided by the Compact. The defendants did not plead any other statute of limitations except the 60-day one. Failing to plead affirmatively any other statute of limitations, they cannot now rely on any other. No part of TSPC’s § 1983 claim is time-barred.

Section 1983 actions use the limitations period of the state where the claim arises, and state law governs tolling.

Norris D. Sanders v. Barry Delevan, Police Officer James M. Beene, and Blanch Cane · filed 1994-08-15

Federal courts apply the statute of limitations of the state in which the claim arises for 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 actions. Donoghue v. Orange County, 848 F.2d 926, 929 (9th Cir.1987). State law also determines the application of tolling doctrines.

Section 1983 claims borrow the state limitations period, but federal law determines when the period begins to run.

Ernstes v. Warner · filed 1994-08-22

Though the length of a limitation period applicable in a § 1983 claim is borrowed from state law, federal courts use federal common law to determine when the period should begin to run.

A § 1983 employment termination claim accrues when the plaintiff learns of the termination decision, and filing a union grievance does not toll the limitations period.

Yoonessi v. State University of New York · filed 1994-08-26

Here, as discussed above, plaintiff knew of SUNY’s decision to terminate him, at the latest, upon receipt of the Notice of Discipline dated August 30, 1988. His claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985 accrued at that time, and his filing of a grievance with the union did not toll the running of the statute.

Section 1983 claims in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Tenorio v. Murphy · filed 1994-09-20

Defendants correctly point out that the statute of limitations for Bivens and § 1983 claims in New York is three years.

For an Alabama § 1983 claim, escape from custody ends tolling of the limitations period for imprisonment, and later imprisonment does not toll it again.

Dukes v. Smitherman, Sheriff Austain Lavert Bibb County Commission · filed 1994-09-21

We conclude that Alabama law and equity support finding that the applicable limitations period began to run when Dukes escaped in 1980, and that his reincar-eeration did not toll the period a second time.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim is not tolled under Texas law while a prisoner voluntarily pursues administrative grievances that do not prevent timely filing.

Gartrell v. Gaylor · filed 1994-09-26

Because § 1997e presupposes the filing of an action within the limitations period, because federal law did not require plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this action, and because this court neither considered the question of whether administrative exhaustion would be appropriate in this case nor ordered the plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies in accordance with § 1997e, the pendency of plaintiffs administrative appeals did not prevent plaintiff from filing this action. Consequently, the Texas tolling rule does not provide a basis for tolling the limitations period in this case.

Section 1983 claims in Tennessee challenging an allegedly unconstitutional vehicle forfeiture use the state’s one-year personal-injury limitations period.

Hill v. State of Tenn. · filed 1994-09-28

Congress has not established a statute of limitations period for cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, the Court must apply the analogous state statute of limitations. ... Therefore, this Court finds that Plaintiffs claim is most analogous to a personal injury claim, rather than one for property damage, and that Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a) is the applicable statute.

For § 1983 child sexual abuse claims, federal law controls when the claim accrues and is guided by Wisconsin’s discovery rule.

Doe v. Ed Paukstat · filed 1994-09-29

Because they don’t, and because I have not found any precise Seventh Circuit law on the point, I conclude that federal law, on the issue of statute of limitation accrual in child sexual abuse cases, should, in cases brought in federal court, be guided by the more generous Wisconsin discovery rule.

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Cantarella v. Kuzemchak · filed 1994-09-29

Actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 are governed by state statutes of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims in Florida have a four year statute of limitations, drawn from the state’s general personal injury limitations period.

McRae v. Douglas · filed 1994-09-30

Furthermore, a four year statute of limitations applies to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim by virtue of Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989). Owens holds that where state law provides multiple statutes of limitations, a section 1983 action is governed by the general personal injury statute of limitations, which, in our state, is four years.

Section 1983 false-arrest claims accrue on the arrest date, and Pennsylvania’s two-year tort limitations period applies.

Haddock v. Christos · filed 1994-10-04

As defendants correctly point out, under the law of this circuit, a claim for false arrest accrues on the date of the arrest under the rationale that the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the violation of his civil rights as of that date. ... Although the state statute of limitations for tort actions determines the length of the limitations period, federal law governs the accrual date. ... Here, Pennsylvania’s two year statute of limitations governs.

Section 1983 actions in Texas use Texas statutes of limitation because the section has no federal limitations period.

White v. Cole · filed 1994-10-06

There is no Federal Statute of Limitation for a § 1983 civil rights action, hence Texas Statutes of Limitation are utilized.

A Section 1983 action may be filed while related criminal charges are pending, but California Government Code Section 945.3 tolls its limitations period during that time.

Logan v. City of San Diego Two Unknown Police Officers San Diego Police Department · filed 1994-10-06

While section 945.3 does not prohibit a plaintiff from bringing a section 1983 action while charges are pending against him, the tolling provision applies to toll the limitations period applicable to such an action.

Section 1983 actions borrow the state limitations period for personal injury actions; in California, the period is one year from accrual.

Valladares v. Superior Court · filed 1994-10-06

For section 1983 actions, federal courts apply the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir.1991). In California, the applicable statute is Cal.Civ.Proc.Code Sec. 340(3) which provides for a limitations period of one year from the date the cause of action accrues. ... Because Valladares' complaint was filed outside of the one year limitation period, her section 1983 action was time barred.

Section 1983 claims arising in Colorado are subject to the state’s two-year personal injury limitations period.

Workman v. Jordan · filed 1994-10-11

Congress provided no statute of limitations for actions under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. However, it is well established that state limitations periods, particularly personal injury limitation periods, are the primary guide for determining time limitations on civil rights actions. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Therefore, Colorado's two-year limitations period applies to this claim.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, which is two years in Texas.

Cooper v. Brookshire · filed 1994-10-14

Because there is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, district courts use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period. Under Texas law, the applicable personal injury limitations period is two years.

Section 1983 actions arising from acts in Indiana have a two-year limitations period, and a Fourth Amendment arrest claim accrues when the arrest occurs.

Clarence J. Franklin, Jr. v. Summers · filed 1994-10-24

The statute of limitations applicable to Sec. 1983 actions arising out of acts in Indiana is two years. ... Franklin's claim under the fourth amendment therefore accrued in 1989, when he was arrested, and is time-barred.

Section 1983 actions arising in Kansas have a two-year statute of limitations.

Gee v. Duncanson · filed 1994-11-10

The appropriate statute of limitations for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising in Kansas is two years.

Section 1983 claims filed in Arizona are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Owens v. City of Phoenix · filed 1994-11-15

Section 1983 claims are subject to our state’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, A.R.S. § 12-542(1).

Section 1983 claims brought in the District of Wyoming use Wyoming’s four-year personal injury limitations period.

Sullivan v. Bailiff · filed 1994-11-17

The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in the District of Wyoming is controlled by Wyoming’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wyo.Stat. § l-3-105(a)(iv)(C). That period is four years.

Section 1983 claims cannot be amended to add defendants after the limitations period has run when the amendment does not relate back to the original complaint.

Thandiwe v. Morgan · filed 1994-11-18

The denial of the motion to amend the complaint to name additional defendants was not an abuse of discretion, see Moore v. City of Paducah, 790 F.2d 557, 559 (6th Cir.1986) (per curiam), as the statute of limitations had run and the amendment would not have related back to the filing of the original complaint.

Section 1983 actions in Arizona use the two-year personal injury limitations period, and prisoner tolling ends when the prisoner discovers or reasonably should discover the right to sue.

Chavez v. State of Arizona, and Samuel A. Lewis, and Robles, Lt. · filed 1994-11-22

In section 1983 actions, the applicable statute of limitations is the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... Under A.R.S. Sec. 12-502, imprisonment acts as a disability until the date the prisoner discovers or with reasonable diligence should have discovered his right to sue. ... Under the two-year personal injury limitations period set forth in A.R.S. Sec. 12-542, Chavez had until March 11, 1993 to file his complaint. His section 1983 action therefore is time-barred.

Section 1983 claims arising in New York have a three-year limitations period.

Eagleston v. Guido · filed 1994-12-07

For § 1983 actions arising in New York, the statute of limitations is three years.

Section 1983 actions in Kansas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Oyler v. Finney · filed 1994-12-16

The court concludes that any claims of constitutional violations by individual state and county officials alleged in the plaintiffs complaint are barred by the Kansas two-year statute of limitations.