42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury limitations period, while federal law determines when that period begins to run.

Lovett v. Walter S. Ray, Chairman, Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles · filed 2003-04-14

“Federal courts apply their forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. Federal law determines when the statute of limitations begins to run.

Section 1983 actions filed in Connecticut are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Lyon v. Jones · filed 2003-04-23

“When a [section] 1983 action is filed in the District of Connecticut, it is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.” ... Lyon filed her complaint in this action on April 2, 2001. Therefore, her claim based on the 1991 failure to promote is barred.

A § 1983 claim is untimely when filed after the applicable limitations period despite the plaintiff’s notice of the alleged injury.

Do Little Corp. v. Township of Bristol · filed 2003-04-25

The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in concluding that Do Little Corp.’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Bristol Township, the members of the Bristol Township Council and various other defendants are time barred by the statute of limitations. Because we agree with the District Court that Do Little Corp.’s action was not timely filed, we will affirm.

Equitable estoppel does not save a § 1983 claim from a limitations bar when the plaintiff cannot show that the defendant’s deception caused the delay.

Mannella v. County of Allegheny · filed 2003-05-08

We therefore conclude that it would not be appropriate to apply equitable estoppel to save Mannella’s § 1983 claim from the statute of limitations bar.

Section 1983 claims in Indiana are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Boyd v. Anderson · filed 2003-05-09

The Indiana statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions is the two-year period found in Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4.

Section 1983 claims may be dismissed when they are time-barred.

Whitehorn v. Federal Communications Commission · filed 2003-05-14

Likewise, the district court properly dismissed as time-barred Whitehorn’s 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims pertaining to the transfer of the radio licenses.

In Wisconsin, § 1983 claims have a six-year statute of limitations.

Barry Aviation, Inc. v. Land O'Lakes Municipal Airport Commission · filed 2003-05-14

Civil rights claims brought under § 1983 have a six-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions brought in New York have a three-year limitations period drawn from the state's general personal injury statute of limitations.

Lee v. Donnaruma · filed 2003-05-15

The claim is time-barred since Lee did not file his Section 1983 action until April 7, 1997, outside of the three-year statute of limitations derived from the general personal injury statute of limitations that is applied to Section 1983 actions brought in New York.

Section 1983 actions in Louisiana use the state's one-year tort prescriptive period.

Tilmon v. Prator · filed 2003-05-16

This one-year period is the borrowed statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions in Louisiana.

Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania have a two-year statute of limitations.

Lindquist v. Buckingham Township · filed 2003-05-16

In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years, and thus the statute of limitations for a civil rights cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is also two years.

A § 1983 complaint filed more than two years after the alleged denial of court access is untimely under Texas’s limitations period.

Perry v. Johnson · filed 2003-05-19

Perry alleged that he had been denied access to the courts in May 1997 but his complaint was not filed until October 1999. His complaint was thus untimely.

Section 1983 claims under Washington law have a three-year statute of limitations.

Nelson v. County of Kittitas · filed 2003-05-20

The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants based on the statute of limitations. See RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir.2002) (noting that the statute of limitations for section 1983 claims under Washington law is three years).

Section 1983 actions in Alaska are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Valdez v. City of Anchorage · filed 2003-05-20

Juan Valdez appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging unlawful search and seizure. ... The district court properly dismissed Valdez’s action as barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

A § 1983 claim arising in Oklahoma has a two-year limitations period and accrues when the plaintiff knows of the alleged injury.

DuBuc v. State of Oklahoma · filed 2003-05-29

We agree with the district court that Dubuc’s constitutional claim was time barred, that no Oklahoma tolling provision applies, and that the date upon which his materials were seized was the date his claim accrued.

Section 1983 claims brought in Illinois have a two-year limitations period.

Garner v. Cullinan · filed 2003-05-29

Counsel staked all on a belief that plaintiffs have five years to commence § 1983 litigation in Illinois. Yet the limit is two years.

Section 1983 claims borrow the most appropriate statute of limitations from the forum state.

Vaughn v. Frame · filed 2000-02-15

Because there is no ... federal statute of limitations governing § 1983 actions, federal courts borrow the most appropriate statute of limitations from the forum state in which the action is brought.

Section 1983 claims filed in Michigan use a three-year limitations period, which is tolled while an earlier action dismissed without prejudice is pending on appeal.

Kalasho v. City of Eastpointe · filed 2003-06-02

The personal injury statute of limitations in Michigan establishes the statutory period for actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in that state, see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), and the pertinent statute of limitations in Michigan is three years. ... Tolling under Michigan law extends to periods in which a dismissal without prejudice is pending on appeal.

Federal law determines when a Section 1983 claim accrues, while state personal injury law supplies the limitations period.

MacNamara v. Hess · filed 2003-06-10

Although state law sets the applicable limitations period, federal law dictates when a Section 1983 action accrues (Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120,126 (3d Cir. 1998)).

Prisoners’ § 1983 actions have a one-year limitations period that may be tolled for two years.

Smith v. California Department of Corrections · filed 2003-06-17

The district court properly dismissed Smith’s action as untimely because he filed it more than three years after his claims accrued. See id. at 1189 (explaining prisoners’ section 1983 actions’ one-year statute of limitations period may be tolled for two years).

Section 1983 claims in California were subject to a one-year limitations period at the time.

Hunter v. Gates · filed 2003-06-17

At ah relevant times, the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in California was one year.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury on which it is based.

Jonker v. Kelley · filed 2003-06-18

In the First Circuit, this means that “a section 1983 claim accrues at the moment the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury that is the basis for the claim.” Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2001). Here, in the court’s estimation, that moment had to have been on July 18, 1998, when Plaintiff realized that her car had been seized.

Section 1983 claims brought in Arizona must be filed within two years of when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.

McCulley v. City of Tucson · filed 2003-06-19

Dennis David McCulley appeals pro se the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the Tucson Police Department violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act, when police officers shot him after he threatened them with a knife. ... Because McCulley failed to file his action within two years of when he knew or should have known of his injuries, the district court properly dismissed his action as time-barred.

Section 1983’s limitations period is not tolled under the cited Hawaii statutes merely because the plaintiff is incarcerated.

Villanueva v. Ross · filed 2003-06-23

Villanueva contends the district court should have tolled the statute of limitations pursuant to Haw.Rev.Stat. §§ 657-13, 657-34 because he is incarcerated. We disagree.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. The County Of Santa Barbara · filed 2003-06-25

The applicable statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims use state statutes of limitations and tolling principles to determine timeliness.

Gray v. City of Jackson · filed 2003-06-25

State statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to determine the timeliness of claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio have a two-year statute of limitations.

Tackett v. Marion County Fair Board · filed 2003-06-26

The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in Ohio is two years.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal injury limitations period, which is one year in Puerto Rico.

Ruiz-Sulsona v. University of Puerto Rico · filed 2003-07-03

In cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we apply the forum state's statute of limitations period for personal injury actions, which in Puerto Rico is one year.

Section 1983 actions use the personal injury limitations period of the state where the alleged violation occurred.

Snowton v. Presbyterian Hospital, Inc. · filed 2003-07-07

Actions under § 1983 are subject to the statute of limitations for personal injury in effect in the state where the alleged violations occurred.

A § 1983 claim that is time barred in state court remains time barred after removal to federal court.

O'Carolan v. Puryear · filed 2003-07-07

Because O’Carolan’s claim is time barred in state court, Hainsler v. Mainka, 807 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1991), it is also time barred here.

Section 1983 actions use the state’s limitations period for personal injury claims.

Slade v. Baca · filed 2003-07-08

The statute of limitations period for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is determined by the state’s law for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 claims in Indiana use the state’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Lovett v. Seniff · filed 2003-07-16

Because there is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 actions, courts apply the most appropriate state statute of limitations. Section 1983 claims are considered as personal injury claims for purposes of determining the applicable state statute of limitations. ... The Indiana statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions is the two-year period found in Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4.

Section 1983 actions use the limitations period of the state where the cause of action arose.

Anderson v. Keeling · filed 2003-07-23

There is no federal statute of limitations relating to § 1983 actions. See Crosswhite v. Brown, 424 F.2d 495, 496 (10th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). The limitations period is to be determined according to the laws of the state in which the cause of action arose.

The limitations period for a Section 1983 action is not tolled under Heck when no criminal charges are pending against the plaintiff.

Gilliam v. Napa County · filed 2003-07-25

Furthermore, the statute of limitations in Gilliam’s section 1983 action is not tolled by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) because there are no criminal charges pending against Gilliam.

A statute of limitations defense to a Section 1983 claim should not be struck before the court can determine when the claimant knew or had reason to know of the harm.

Canadian St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians Ex Rel. Francis v. New York · filed 2003-07-28

That uncertainty directly benefits the Power Authority and indirectly benefits the other defendants because it follows that it would be premature for the court to strike the statute of limitations defense as it pertains to the section 1983 causes of action.

Section 1983 claims filed in Michigan are subject to a three-year limitation period.

Owens v. Naylor · filed 2003-07-31

A civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is subject to a three-year limitation period in Michigan.

A § 1983 claim is subject to Iowa’s personal injury limitations period, which begins when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the alleged wrongful act.

Richmond v. Clinton Cty. · filed 2003-08-01

This accrual rule applies to Richmond's inverse condemnation and emotional distress claims, both of which are state law claims, as well as to his equal protection claim that he filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).

Section 1983 claims in California have a one-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff learns or should have learned the basis for the claim.

Snowton v. Samuel Merritt Hospital · filed 2003-08-01

Cal. Civ. Proc. § 340(3) sets a one year statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claims. The year begins from the date plaintiff learns, or should have learned, of the basis for the claim.

For § 1983 claims governed by Colorado’s two-year limitations period, a plaintiff claiming delayed awareness of injury must offer evidence supporting that claim to survive summary judgment.

Gilmore v. Carlson · filed 2003-08-08

In opposing summary judgment, Mr. Gilmore bore the burden of offering evidence tending to demonstrate that he was mentally compromised to the point of being unaware of his injuries until at least two years before filing suit.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim runs from accrual; an asserted continuation of the violation does not necessarily make a late complaint timely.

Skufca v. Ervin · filed 2003-08-08

Plaintiffs claims accrued no later than January 2000, see McCune v. City of Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 905 (6th Cir. 1988), and plaintiff did not mail his complaint until May 24, 2001, well after the limitations period expired in January 2001. Plaintiffs contention that his complaint is timely because defendants’ violations of his civil rights continued until his transfer from the McNairy County Jail on May 26, 2000, is unavailing.

Section 1983 claims in Florida are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

Chappell v. Rich · filed 2003-08-11

Florida's four-year statute of limitations applies to such claims of deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 claims brought in Utah are subject to the state’s four-year statute of limitations for general personal injury actions.

Buck v. Utah Labor Commission · filed 2003-08-12

The district court correctly determined that Utah’s four-year statute of limitations for general personal injury actions applies to plaintiff’s § 1983 and § 1985 claims.

A § 1983 facial challenge to an ordinance is untimely when the applicable limitations period has run after the plaintiff became aware of the ordinance’s effect.

Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. City of San Jose · filed 2003-08-18

The Court finds that the character of the Ordinance remained unchanged since the requirement that 1985 be used as the base year was not altered by the Urgency Ordinance. Accordingly, MHC was aware of the effect of the Ordinance well before it asserted this untimely claim in federal court. The facial claim is not only untimely, it is also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as previously discussed.

A dismissal of a Section 1983 complaint without prejudice operates as a dismissal with prejudice when the limitations period would bar refiling.

Ostrander v. Dennis · filed 2003-08-19

Although the district court dismissed Ostrander’s complaint without prejudice, that dismissal operates as one with prejudice, because the statute of limitations would bar re-prosecution of this lawsuit.

A § 1983 claim arising in Washington is untimely if filed more than three years after accrual without a supported basis for tolling or estoppel.

Plush v. Smitty · filed 2003-08-21

Cyrus N. Plush, a Washington state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s judgment dismissing as time-barred his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging juvenile detention center employees used excessive force against him. ... The district court properly dismissed Plush’s action as untimely because he filed it more than three years after the claims accrued. ... Plush’s contention that the statute of limitations should have been tolled during his various periods of incarceration lacks merit, because he failed to present evidence supporting equitable tolling or estoppel.

Section 1983 claims are subject to an applicable two-year statute of limitations in this case.

Danforth v. Celebrezze · filed 2003-09-04

First, the district court correctly concluded that the bulk of plaintiffs claims plainly fall outside the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 civil rights actions arising in Tennessee have a one-year limitations period.

Kendrick v. Irwin · filed 2003-09-10

In addition to this insufficiency, Kendrick has also failed to establish a cognizable action under § 1983. ... Assuming that Kendrick was unaware of the termination of his parental rights until 1998, he had one year to file a civil rights action from this date. ... As Kendrick’s civil rights claim is time barred, he has failed to establish a cognizable action as required by Rule 27.

Section 1983 claims filed in Louisiana have a one-year limitations period.

Rivera v. Baton Rouge City Police Department · filed 2003-09-17

The applicable limitations (prescriptive period) for a § 1983 claim in Louisiana is one year.

Section 1983 actions use the state personal injury statute of limitations.

Bomer v. Bass · filed 2003-09-18

For all § 1983 actions, federal courts apply the state personal injury statute of limitations.

In Texas, a § 1983 complaint must be filed within two years of the alleged civil-rights violations.

McMillan v. Yellow Cab · filed 2003-09-19

Thus, McMillan had two years, until 1988, to file a timely 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against the defendants for alleged violations of his civil rights.

In Puerto Rico, filing an EEOC charge does not toll the limitations period for a Section 1983 claim because the EEOC lacks jurisdiction over that claim.

Iravedra v. Public Building Authority · filed 2003-09-23

Because the EEOC had no jurisdiction over the alleged violation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights under Section 1983, the Court finds that Plaintiffs filing of charges with the EEOC cannot serve as an extrajudicial claim capable of tolling the limitations period of her Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio are subject to a two-year statute of limitations; claims are barred when the challenged actions occurred more than two years before filing and could have been discovered in time.

Banks v. City of Whitehall · filed 2003-09-24

None of the defendants' actions which the plaintiffs complain of occurred within two years of the filing of this lawsuit, nor were the plaintiffs prevented from timely discovering any actions of the defendants that could conceivably be redressed by a lawsuit brought under section 1983. Because this action is wholly barred by the applicable statute of limitations, we need not reach any of the alternative bases upon which the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants.

A one-year limitations period applies to a Section 1983 claim governed by California law before the 2003 amendment.

Doe v. Mann · filed 2003-09-29

The statute of limitations for this section 1983 claim is one year.

A § 1983 claim was time barred when it accrued at least four years before filing.

Rondoe Reece Wright v. Loeffelholz · filed 2003-10-07

Upon careful review of the record, we conclude dismissal was proper because Wright’s claims, which accrued at least four years prior to initiation of this action, were barred by the applicable statute of ...limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the state limitations period for general personal injury claims.

McCall v. Board of Commissioners of County of Shawnee · filed 2003-10-10

State statutes of limitations applicable to general personal injury claims supply the limitations periods for § 1983 claims.

Ignorance of the law does not toll the limitations period for a Section 1983 action.

Bell v. City of Baton Rouge · filed 2003-10-10

Furthermore, ignorance of the law does not toll the limitations period.

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Williams v. Shields · filed 2003-10-16

Under Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985), the applicable state statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims in Tennessee are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Stewart v. Memphis Housing Authority · filed 2003-10-17

The rest of Plaintiffs claims are subject to one year statutes of limitations. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 4 — 21—311(d) (2003) (Tennessee Human Rights Act claims must be filed within one year after discriminatory practice ceases); TenmCode Ann. § 28-3-104(a) (2003) (under Tennessee law, § 1983 claims and personal tort actions subject to one year statute of limitations); George v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 252 F.Supp.2d 599, 607 (W.D.Tenn.2003) (same).

A § 1983 action is time-barred when filed more than one year after the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.

Romer v. County of Yuba · filed 2003-10-17

The district court properly dismissed the action as time-barred because Romer filed it more than one year after he first knew, or should have known, of his injury.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own and borrows the forum state’s general personal-injury limitations period.

Brown v. Pool · filed 2003-10-20

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a statute of limitations, it “borrows” a statute of limitations from the forum state’s general personal-injury limitations period.

Section 1983 claims filed in Ohio have a two-year statute of limitations.

Beach v. Ohio · filed 2003-10-21

For civil rights suits filed in Ohio under § 1983, the statute of limitations is two years.

Section 1983 actions in Illinois are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Grissette v. Ramsey · filed 2003-10-23

First, actions under § 1983 are subject to a two-year statute of limitations in Illinois.

In Virginia, § 1983 claims are subject to the two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Billups v. Lofton · filed 2003-10-24

We find that Billups’s § 1983 claim is barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Virginia.

Section 1983 claims filed in Michigan have a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the act causing the injury.

Hawkins v. Spitters · filed 2003-10-24

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. ... Contrary to Hawkins’s argument, his cause of action accrued on January 31, 1997.

In North Carolina, Section 1983 claims have a three-year limitations period.

Spencer v. Town of Chapel Hill · filed 2003-10-28

Spencer’s Section 1983 claim is also subject to a three-year limitations period.

Section 1983 claims borrow the state limitations period, which is tolled while a prisoner completes mandatory administrative exhaustion.

Tilmon v. Prator · filed 2003-10-30

Federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations to govern claims brought under Section 1983. ... Thus, while awaiting the conclusion of the administrative grievance process, the prescriptive period is tolled.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York have a three-year limitations period under the state's residual personal injury statute.

Scott v. Gardner · filed 2003-10-31

The statute of limitations for civil rights actions commenced in New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the residual personal injury statute of NY. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) which provides that actions must be commenced within three years.

A § 1983 action brought in Pennsylvania has a two-year limitations period.

Thorpe v. Grillo · filed 2003-10-31

The appropriate limitation period for a § 1983 action brought in Pennsylvania is the two-year limitation provided by 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations.

Eddings v. City of Jefferson · filed 2003-11-20

The district court also properly concluded that applicable statutes of limitations barred Eddings’s remaining claims against the City and its officers.

Section 1983 claims based on discrete acts remain time-barred even when those acts relate to timely claims.

Henley v. Tullahoma City School System · filed 2003-12-05

In a § 1983 case, discrete acts (as opposed to allegations of a hostile environment) are not actionable if time-barred, even when they are related to acts that are not time-barred.

Section 1983 claims in Virginia that accrued more than two years before the complaint was filed are time-barred.

Jones v. Brent · filed 2003-12-08

Gregory R. Jones appeals the district court’s order dismissing without prejudice his complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. ... We also find that the district court properly denied relief on Jones’ claims that accrued more than two years before he filed his complaint. See Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-243 (Michie 2000).

Section 1983 civil rights actions in Texas have a two-year limitations period.

Guillory v. City of Houston · filed 2003-12-09

The relevant limitations period for Guillory’s civil rights action is two years.

Section 1983 claims in Utah are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

Womble v. Salt Lake City Corp. · filed 2003-12-11

On December 27, 2001, Maurice Womble filed suit against various Utah state agencies and officials alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. ... The statute of limitations applicable to Mr. Womble’s claims is four years.

In the District of Columbia, a § 1983 failure-to-promote claim is timely when the promotion decision occurs within the three-year limitations period.

Singletary v. District of Columbia · filed 2003-12-16

It is thus undis- puted that the adverse action taken against Singletary in 1991 fell within the three-year limitations period. Hence, the court’s implicit holding that the 1991 claim was untimely was incorrect.

Section 1983 claims in Massachusetts use the state personal injury limitations period and the state rule excluding the accrual date when calculating that period.

Poy v. Boutselis · filed 2003-12-22

We thus hold that in determining the accrual and limitations period of a § 1983 claim, we borrow Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A as well as Mass. R. Civ. P. 6(a).

Section 1983 actions filed in Oregon use the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Bollinger v. Oregon State Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision · filed 2003-12-22

The statute of limitations for filing a § 1983 action is determined by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... Under Oregon law, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York have a three-year limitations period.

Perez v. County of Nassau · filed 2003-12-23

In New York, the applicable statute of limitations for section 1983 actions is three years.

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Garvin v. Philadelphia · filed 2003-12-31

Claims such as Garvin’s brought under section 1983 are subject to state statutes of limitations governing personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims are subject to state statutes of limitations for personal injury actions.

Garvin v. City of Philadelphia Police Officer John Doe · filed 2003-12-31

Claims such as Garvin’s brought under section 1983 are subject to state statutes of limitations governing personal injury actions.

Equitable tolling of the limitations period for a § 1983 claim requires reasonable diligence; plaintiffs who could have used timely discovery to identify unnamed officers do not qualify.

Hines v. City of Chicago · filed 2004-01-21

The doctrine of equitable tolling allows a plaintiff to file a claim after the statute of limitations has expired, but only if she was unable to do so earlier despite the exercise of “reasonable diligence.” ... The district court dismissed the claim against the officers, concluding that the plaintiffs had not been reasonably diligent. We agree.

Section 1983 claims arising in Indiana use the state’s two-year personal-injury limitations period.

Holly v. Anton · filed 2004-01-22

In Indiana, the limitations period for personal injury, and thus § 1983 claims, is two years.

A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows that the acts causing the injury occurred.

Watson v. Wayne County · filed 2004-01-26

Accepting Watson’s allegations as true, his claims accrued in December 1990 because he knew that the acts providing the basis of his injuries had occurred. ... Even if it is assumed that Watson was incarcerated from December 1990 through April 1, 1994, and was entitled to tolling under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5851, he had only until April 1, 1995, to challenge his arrest, questioning, and confinement under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims accruing more than two years before suit are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Howard v. Smith · filed 2004-01-28

Howard’s claims accruing more than two years before he filed suit are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions brought in New York have a three-year statute of limitations derived from New York’s general personal injury statute of limitations.

Griswold v. Morgan · filed 2004-01-28

A three-year statute of limitations, derived from New York’s general personal injury statute of limitations, is applied to § 1983 actions brought in New York.

Section 1983 claims use the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the alleged violation occurred.

Shaw v. Simmons · filed 2004-02-02

It is well established that claims sought under § 1983 are subject to the statute of limitations for personal injury in effect in the state where the alleged violations occurred.

Section 1983 actions filed in Tennessee are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Scruggs v. Jones · filed 2004-02-03

Upon review, we conclude that this complaint was properly dismissed as barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to civil rights actions filed in Tennessee.

Colorado law governs tolling of the limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Colorado.

Rueb v. Morales · filed 2004-02-04

Colorado law governs the tolling issue in this § 1983 case.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state personal injury statute of limitations.

Marsh v. Rich · filed 2004-02-04

For all § 1983 actions, federal courts apply the state personal injury statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's personal injury limitations period, which is two years in Oklahoma.

Pittsburg County Rural Water District No. 7 v. City Of Mcalester · filed 2004-02-06

We have noted that "§ 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions," and that therefore "the forum state's personal injury statute of limitations should be applied to all § 1983 claims." Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750 (10th Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court found, and the parties do not dispute, that a two-year statute of limitations applies to the § 1983 action, since that is the limitations period under Oklahoma law for a personal injury cause of action. See Aplt's App. at 1100 n. 3; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 95. The original complaint in this case was filed on March 25, 1997. Thus, unless there is an applicable exception, all claims that accrued prior to March 25, 1995, are time-barred.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York are subject to a three-year limitations period borrowed from the state’s general personal injury law.

Didden v. Village of Port Chester · filed 2004-02-10

In New York, § 1983 claims are subject to the New York State’s 3-year statute of limitations governing general personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims are governed by state prescription law.

Drury v. United States Army Corps of Engineers · filed 2004-02-12

Both the state tort claims and the § 1983 claim are governed by state prescription law.

Section 1983 claims brought in Maryland are subject to a three-year limitations period whether they allege an equal protection or due process violation.

Jolivet v. Elkins · filed 1974-12-17

Whether an equal protection or a due process claim is alleged in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Maryland three-year statute of limitations is applicable.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York have a three-year limitations period and accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Clissuras v. City University of New York · filed 2004-02-19

The statute of limitations for causes of action brought pursuant to §§ 1983 and 1985 in New York is three years, ... and a claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of [her] action.”

A California § 1983 action filed more than one year after prison grievance exhaustion was untimely under the then-applicable one-year limitations period.

Ross v. Olivarez · filed 2004-02-24

The district court properly concluded that the current action was untimely because it was filed more than one year after Ross exhausted his prison grievance procedures. See Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (California’s one-year statute of limitations period governs section 1983 claims).

Section 1983 actions in Nevada are subject to a two-year limitations period measured from accrual.

Stevenson v. Evans · filed 2004-02-24

The district court properly determined that Stevenson’s section 1983 action was time-barred because he filed his complaint more than two years after the action accrued.

Section 1983 claims arising in Texas are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Bansal v. Lamar University · filed 2004-02-25

This claim arises within the two-year limitations period for claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other federal statutes.

Section 1983 claims use the limitations period for analogous state law causes of action.

Assegai v. Bloomfield Board of Education · filed 2004-03-04

To determine the applicable period of limitation for a claim brought under Section 1983, the court must look to the statute of limitations provided by analogous state law causes of action.

A Section 1983 complaint barred by the applicable statute of limitations cannot be amended to add individually named defendants when that amendment would be futile.

Gayden v. Baltimore City Police Department · filed 2004-03-11

Because we find no basis to overturn the district court’s conclusion that Gayden’s suit was barred by the running of the applicable statute of limitations, we agree with the court that an amendment to the complaint to add individually-named defendants would have been futile.

The limitations period governing a § 1983 action applies to claims, not to evidence of earlier events supporting a timely claim.

Stuebig v. Hammel · filed 1977-10-19

There are two fallacies in defendants’ argument: First, the limitations period applies to claims and not supporting evidence; secondly, the question is not as defendants would have it whether the action was tolled but rather the issue is when the action accrued.

A § 1983 claim is barred when it is filed after the applicable limitations period expires.

Marr v. Holden · filed 2004-03-19

Here, all the actions of which Mr. Marr complained occurred prior to June 1997. We agree with the district court that all applicable statute of limitations expired prior to the date he brought suit in 2003.

A Section 1983 complaint may be dismissed when it is barred by the statute of limitations.

Hughley v. Basham · filed 2004-03-23

Mario N. Hughley appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as barred by the statute of limitations. We have reviewed the parties’ briefs and joint appendix and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Wilson v. City of Fountain Valley · filed 2004-03-23

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, a federal court must borrow the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims in the forum state.

Concealment of wrongful acts does not delay accrual of a Section 1983 claim if the plaintiff knows of the harm.

Rivera v. Governor of New York · filed 2004-03-23

Even if these assertions are taken as true, these claims must be dismissed, because a conspiracy to conceal wrongful acts does not delay the accrual of a Section 1983 cause of action if the harm is known.

Section 1983 claims filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations are subject to dismissal.

Diaz v. Visitacion-Lewis · filed 2004-03-29

The district court correctly concluded that Diaz’s §§ 1983 and 1985 claims were properly dismissed as the first complaint, Diaz v. Visitacion-Lewis, was filed well beyond the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 uses the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations because it has no express limitations period.

Wallace v. City of Chicago · filed 2004-03-30

Section 1983 does not expressly provide a statute of limitations period and thus the federal courts are required to adopt the forum state’s statute of limitations period for personal injury claims.

Section 1983 civil rights actions use the state limitations period for personal injury actions; in Tennessee, that period is one year.

Foster v. State · filed 2004-04-14

According to federal and state law, “[I]n all actions brought under 1983 alleging a violation of civil rights or personal injuries, the state statute of limitations governing actions for personal injuries is to be applied.”

Section 1983 claims in Illinois are subject to a two-year limitations period, which begins to run no later than the date of arrest and confinement for claims arising from that arrest.

Prince v. Campbell · filed 2004-04-14

Furthermore, these claims are time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations governing § 1983 actions, which began to run, at the latest, on the date of Ms. Prince’s arrest and confinement, July 17, 2001.

Section 1983 claims borrow the limitations period for an analogous state cause of action when federal law supplies none.

Moore v. El Paso County, Texas, T. Udell Moore, Etc. · filed 1981-11-05

Moore brought the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. Where, as in this case, Congress has not established a statute of limitations or a body of tolling rules for a federally created cause of action, federal courts have “borrowed” the state law of limitations governing an analogous cause of action.

Section 1983 claims brought in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Hason v. Office of Professional Medical Conduct · filed 2004-04-19

Plaintiffs sole remaining claim, the fourth cause of action, is asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and alleges violation of his substantive due process rights. This cause of action is subject to a three-year statute of limitations period in New York.

Section 1983 borrows the applicable state statute of limitations because its 1996 amendment did not create a new cause of action.

Thompson v. City of Shasta Lake · filed 2004-04-27

That amendment, however, merely limits relief against a specified group of defendants, not relevant to the instant litigation, and does not fundamentally alter the statute or create a new cause of action. For that reason, I conclude, § 1983 incorporates the applicable statute of limitations of the state in which the cause of action arose.

Section 1983 actions filed in New York have a three-year limitations period.

Davidson v. Conway · filed 2004-04-27

These claims are being brought after the expiration of the three-year limitations period for filing an action ... under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in New York, ... and there is nothing in the plaintiffs affirmation to show or suggest that the claims somehow relate back to the date of the original complaint within the meaning of Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

In Ohio, § 1983 claims have a two-year statute of limitations.

Black-Hosang v. State · filed 2004-04-28

In Ohio, the statute of limitations for filing § 1983 claims is two years.

Section 1983 actions are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Colombo v. S.C. Department of Social Services · filed 2004-05-13

Actions brought pursuant to Section 1983 are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 civil rights claims filed in Illinois have a two-year limitations period.

Callico v. City of Belleville · filed 2004-05-25

There is a two-year statute of limitations in Illinois for civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Wiley v. City of Chicago, 361 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2004) , and a one-year limit for tort claims against a municipal entity, see 745 ILCS 10/8-101(a). So even if we were able to identify claims that the district court improperly dismissed under Rooker-Feldman, those claims would nevertheless be time-barred, and thus subject to dismissal with prejudice.

Section 1983 claims in Kansas use the two-year limitations period for actions involving injury to the rights of another.

Hamilton v. The City of Overland Park, Kansas the City of Kansas City, Kansas Norman Justice and W. Bozarts · filed 1984-03-30

For the reasons set out in Garcia, we hold that the Kansas two-year statute is the most appropriate limitations period.

Section 1983 claims in Kansas are subject to the two-year limitations period for actions involving injury to the rights of another.

Pike v. City of Mission, Kansas · filed 1984-03-30

We concluded as a matter of federal law that all section 1983 claims should be characterized as actions for injury to the rights of another. See id. at 650-651. Under Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 60-513(a)(4) (1976), "[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated" must be brought within two years. For the reasons set out in Garcia, we hold that the Kansas two-year statute is the most appropriate limitations period.

Section 1983 claims in federal court use the applicable state statute of limitations and tolling rules.

Centro Médico Del Turabo, Inc. v. De Melecio · filed 2004-05-28

It is well-settled law that state-law statute of limitations governs suits in federal courts arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know that constitutional rights were violated.

Hileman v. Maze · filed 2004-06-04

A § 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights have been violated.”

Section 1983 uses the forum state's personal injury statute of limitations for civil rights actions.

Maldonado v. Tony Harris, in His Capacity as Acting Director of the California Department of Transportation · filed 2004-06-04

In determining the proper statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we look to the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the forum state.

Section 1983 actions covered by Oregon’s 1977 amendments are subject to the state’s two-year statute of limitations.

Nored v. Blehm · filed 1984-10-02

The legislative history expresses the intent of the Oregon Legislature to amend Or.Rev.Stat. 30.-265(1) to insure that the two-year statute of limitations applied to section 1983 actions. ... Such intent must be honored.

Section 1983 actions brought in federal court in Tennessee are governed by Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations.

Rowe v. Board of Education of the City of Chattanooga, James H. Huestess and James D. Mc Cullough · filed 1985-01-15

An action under section 1983 brought in a United States District Court in Tennessee is governed by Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 due process claims in North Carolina have a three-year limitations period and accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the alleged injury.

Ocean Acres Limited Partnership v. Dare County Board of Health · filed 1983-05-12

We affirm the district court's conclusions, 514 F.Supp. 1117, that there are no genuine issues of material fact in regard to the inverse condemnation claim and that the due process claims are barred by the North Carolina three year statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... We find that the due process claims accrued when plaintiff knew of or had reason to know of the alleged injury which is the basis of its action.

For a § 1983 action, the applicable limitations period is the state period for tort actions seeking damages for personal injuries.

Knoll v. Springfield Township School District · filed 1985-05-24

Applying this statute to the facts before us, see 699 F.2d at 139, 145-46, appellant's Sec. 1983 action is not time-barred.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois are subject to the applicable limitations period, and a shorter period announced later does not apply retroactively when the plaintiff relied on the prior rule.

Moore v. Floro · filed 1985-07-23

In sum, upon consideration of the Chevron Oil factors, the court holds that Wilson v. Garcia should not be applied retroactively in this case.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the applicable state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Gobla v. Crestwood School District · filed 1985-09-19

Thus, the court is not bound to choose only the particular limitations period advanced by the parties. Rather, the court chooses the applicable period after appropriate analysis, once the issue has been raised.

Section 1983 claims use state tolling rules unless those rules conflict with the federal policy underlying § 1983.

Torres v. Padilla · filed 1985-10-29

First, 42 USC § 1988 mandates that state tolling rules must be applied to § 1983 claims, Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484-85, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1979); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 1994, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978), unless the state rules are inconsistent with the federal policy underlying, § 1983, Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 485-86, 100 S.Ct. at 1795, 1796.

Section 1983 claims in Kentucky are subject to the one-year personal injury limitations period, which the court applied retroactively.

Frisby v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyle County · filed 1986-04-04

We nevertheless conclude that the one-year personal injury limitation should be applicable in this situation and the trial court correctly dismissed her claim.

Section 1983 claims are treated as personal injury actions when determining the applicable statute of limitations.

Delo D. Brock, Jr. v. State of Tennessee, Russell C. Hinson, and Don W. Poole · filed 1986-05-07

The district court correctly concluded that Sec. 1983 actions are properly characterized as personal injury actions for purposes of determining the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions in Minnesota have a two-year limitations period, but that period does not apply retroactively when a plaintiff reasonably relied on prior precedent and filed within a reasonable time after the shorter period was adopted.

James W. v. Dakota County · filed 1986-05-29

Accordingly, it is settled law in this district that the statute of limitations in a section 1983 action is two years. ... Retroactive application of Wilson where plaintiff relied on clear past precedent in delaying suit would be manifestly unjust. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that plaintiff’s claim was filed within a reasonable period of time following Cook.

Section 1983 actions use the most closely analogous state statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Andujar v. Rogowski · filed 1986-12-09

Section 1983 actions are governed by the most closely analogous state statute of limitations for personal injuries.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico use the state tort statute of limitations, with state equitable tolling law applying unless inconsistent with federal policy.

Jaime Ramirez Morales, Etc. v. Isidoro Rosa Viera, Etc. · filed 1987-03-25

Since plaintiffs have not argued that Puerto Rico tolling law is inconsistent with the purposes of sections 1983, 1985 or 1986, we presume that the district court properly looked to Puerto Rico law for circumstances justifying tolling of the statute of limitations.

A Section 1983 claim may be brought to seek relief for a deprivation of federal rights, and it must be filed within the applicable limitations period.

Dugan v. Ball State University · filed 1987-04-06

Thus, we hold that Dugan’s section 1983 claim regarding the denial of promotion was not time-barred.

Section 1983 claims in New York are subject to a three-year limitations period based on the state's general personal injury statute.

Tom U.U. Okure v. Javan Owens and Daniel G. Lessard · filed 1987-04-06

We agree with the district court, and with the plaintiff, that the proper limitation to apply to all section 1983 claims in New York is three years, based on the state’s general personal injury statute, N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 1983 claims are subject to a statute of limitations, and a later retaliatory act may be treated as a separate claim from an earlier act.

Lendo v. Garrett County Board of Education and Jerome J. Ryscavage and Luther D. Parrack, Jr., Principal, Southern G · filed 1987-06-19

We hold that, while Len-do’s first allegation is barred by the statute of limitations, the second is not.

For a § 1983 claim, the limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the civil-rights violation.

Olding v. Casey · filed 1987-06-26

Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ claims accrued on the date that they discovered or should have discovered the violation of their civil rights.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the applicable state statute of limitations, and claims accruing more than three years before filing are barred in North Carolina.

Jones v. Hodge · filed 1987-07-07

The court agrees with the magistrate that, with regard to deprivations suffered more than three years before he filed his claim, the plaintiff is barred from obtaining relief.

Section 1983 claims in North Dakota are subject to a two year statute of limitations for intentional torts.

Kessel v. Schaff · filed 1987-08-12

Consequently the two year statute of limitation founded at North Dakota Century Code section 28-01-18 applies to Kessel’s 1983 action.

Incarceration alone does not toll the Kentucky statute of limitations applicable to a § 1983 action.

Holland v. George Wilson, Al C. Parke, James E. Castle, R.G. Hendricks, C. Ramey, S. Talbott, and J.W. Travis · filed 1988-02-05

We further conclude under current and prevailing precedent that the incarceration of the plaintiff during this five year period did not serve to toll the running of the applicable Kentucky statute of limitations. See Higley v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 835 F.2d 623 (6th Cir.1987). Pursuant to Higley, incarceration alone simply will no longer serve as a basis to toll the running of the Kentucky statute of limitations as such would be contrary to federal policy considerations underlying 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 suits arising in Kentucky are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

French v. Ted W. Evans, Chief of Police, Frankfort, Kentucky, Stephen Dorcy, General Manager, Holiday In · filed 1988-05-25

The timeliness of all Sec. 1983 suits that arise out of Kentucky shall be determined under the one-year statute of limitations contained in Ky.Rev.Stat. Sec. 413.140(1)(a).

For a Missouri § 1983 claim still timely when Wilson was decided, the five-year personal injury limitations period applies retroactively.

Nitcher v. Newton County Jail · filed 1988-05-31

Applying the principles gleaned from the Eighth Circuit cases discussed above, we hold that Wilson should be applied retroactively to plaintiff’s claim in the instant case. The last day of plaintiff’s alleged confinement in the Newton County jail was June 23, 1982. Wilson was decided April 17, 1985, at a time when plaintiff still had over two months left to sue under Missouri’s three-year limitation, § 516.130(1). Consequently, plaintiff’s claim was not time-barred when Wilson was decided.

Pursuing CETA administrative remedies does not toll the limitations period for a Section 1983 claim when exhaustion of those remedies is not required.

Black v. Broward Employment · filed 1988-06-10

The issue in this case is whether the plaintiff's pursuit of administrative remedies operated to toll the running of the statute of limitations in her subsequent 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action. Because we find that it did not, we affirm the district court's dismissal on grounds that the statute of limitations had run.

Section 1983 claims use state statutes of limitations to determine whether they are timely.

Smith v. Swisher · filed 1989-09-27

For the purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, state statutes of limitations apply to determine the timeliness of the claims.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state statute of limitations.

Wimbley v. Norris · filed 1990-01-26

For the purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, state statutes of limitations apply to determine the timeliness of the claims.

Section 1983 claims based on events in Washington are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Garden v. Hawley · filed 2004-06-17

The district court properly concluded that all of Garden’s claims based on events occurring prior to December 26, 1998 — namely, the first investigation and Garden’s demotion from lieutenant to patrol deputy — were time-barred by Washington’s three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Louisiana are subject to a one-year limitations period, and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving interruption or suspension of that period.

Toga Society, Inc. v. Lee · filed 2004-06-18

Facially, all constitutional claims arising under § 1983 arising prior to October 24, 2002 are prescribed. Thus, plaintiff bears the burden of proving interruption or suspension of prescription.