42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims require sufficient allegations of a defendant’s personal involvement.

Green v. Davis · filed 2022-02-16

Importantly, Plaintiff fails to address the substantive portions of Judge Mitchell’s Report—Plaintiff’s failure to sufficiently plead Defendants’ personal involvement or the analysis concerning supervisory liability. ... Accordingly, the Court hereby ADOPTS the Report of the Magistrate Judge (Docket No. 32) as the opinion of the District Court.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation; supervisory authority alone does not establish liability.

Johnson v. Westville Correctional Facility · filed 2022-02-18

“An individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation.” ... No policy, inaction, or action is alleged to be attributable to Warden Galipeau outside of his authority as warden. This is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in a constitutional violation; a supervisor cannot be held liable solely for a subordinate’s conduct.

Estate of Laliah Swayzer v. Witkowiak · filed 2022-03-04

But §1983 liability requires personal involvement and cannot be based on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of their supervisory role; liability requires personal involvement in the alleged deprivation.

Calderson v. Wexford Medical Services · filed 2022-03-04

Section 1983 does not authorize respondeat superior or “supervisory liability.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a defendant was personally involved in the deprivation or responsible for a policy or custom that caused it.

Navarro v. Salazar · filed 2022-03-07

To state a section 1983 claim against a defendant, a plaintiff must allege the defendant was personally involved in the actions complained of or is responsible for the policy or custom giving rise to the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on state officials; individual liability requires personal involvement in the deprivation.

Lloyd v. Jefferies · filed 2022-03-23

There is no respondeat superior under § 1983. If state prison officials are named, they must be named in their individual capacities, and Plaintiff must allege that the official personally participated in the deprivation or was deliberately reckless as to the misconduct of subordinates or was aware and condoned, acquiesced, or turned a blind eye to it.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement; a mere failure to act or supervise an employee does not establish individual liability.

Bishop v. Chambers · filed 2022-03-23

And an allegation of a mere failure to act or the failure to properly supervise an employee is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation that a defendant was personally involved in the challenged conduct; supervisory position alone does not establish liability.

Johnson v. Radtke · filed 2022-03-28

Although they sue Kevin Carr, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections, and Sarah Cooper, the Administrator of the Division of Adult Institutions, the Court cannot reasonably infer from Plaintiffs’ allegations that these individuals were personally involved in creating or ignoring the complained of conditions.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; a supervisory role alone is insufficient.

Johnson v. Owens · filed 2022-03-30

The first of these statements merely demonstrates that Annucci and Miller played a supervisory role and is far from sufficient to demonstrate personal involvement.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of rights; failing to resolve a complaint about other officials’ conduct is insufficient.

Johnson v. Bouldin · filed 2022-03-30

But as Plaintiff does not allege that either of these Defendants was personally involved in any violation of his constitutional rights and instead alleges only that these Defendants failed to resolve his complaint about Defendants Bouldin and Patterson’s actions, he fails to state a claim for violation of Equal Protection as to Defendants Warden Phillips and Sgt. Barnette.

Section 1983 requires each defendant’s personal participation in a constitutional violation; a supervisor may be liable for participating in or directing it, or for knowing of it and failing to prevent it.

Mueller v. Ackley · filed 2022-04-05

Liability under § 1983 arises upon a showing of personal participation by each defendant, and a supervisor – such as a superintendent – is not liable for the constitutional violations of employees unless the supervisor “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Allen v. Asbell · filed 2022-04-06

In addition, the mere fact that a defendant was a supervisor is insufficient to establish liability because the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisor liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 USC §1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged rights violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Ezell v. Hininger · filed 2022-04-11

Plaintiff must show that a defendant personally participated in the alleged civil rights violation. Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996). Supervisory status is not sufficient to support liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires each defendant’s own actions to be tied to a constitutional violation; supervisory status or handling grievances alone is insufficient.

Shields v. Blewett · filed 2022-04-18

Furthermore, Plaintiff fails adequately to allege that each named defendant, through his or her own individual actions, violated his constitutional rights. Indeed, Plaintiff’s claims against several defendants appear to be predicated solely on their role as a supervisor or on the manner in which they handled Plaintiff’s grievances or grievance appeals. Such claims, without more, are not enough to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 requires each defendant’s personal participation in the deprivation of rights; there is no respondeat superior liability.

(PC) Turnage v. Unknown · filed 2022-04-20

There is no respondeat superior liability, and each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. ... Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation; supervisors are liable for their own acts, not vicariously for their subordinates’ acts.

BIDDLE v. PERTORIUS · filed 2022-04-20

"Liability under § 1983 is direct rather than vicarious; supervisors are responsible for their own acts but not for those of subordinates, or for failing to ensure that subordinates carry out their tasks correctly." ... Neither complaint includes any allegations that these defendants have been personally responsible for or involved in harming Mr. Biddle or depriving him of medical care.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in a rights violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Hernandez-Hernandez v. Blewett · filed 2022-04-22

However, it is well established that there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045, and plaintiff’s reference to Blewett as Wagner’s ‘boss’ is insufficient to establish the kind of personal participation required on a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; supervisory responsibility alone is insufficient.

Chambers v. Holcomb · filed 2022-04-28

To be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defendant must have been personally involved in the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 imposes individual liability only when the defendant caused the alleged constitutional deprivation; a supervisory role alone is insufficient.

Custer v. Eddlemon · filed 2022-05-03

Section 1983 does not allow actions against individuals just for their supervisory role of others. Individual liability under § 1983 can only be based upon a finding that the defendant caused the deprivation alleged.

Section 1983 requires each defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; a supervisor’s position alone does not create liability.

Panchigar v. Delaware Department of Correction Commissioner · filed 2022-05-05

Claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 require a showing that each defendant was personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing. ... There are no such allegations. Therefore, the claims against Hudson, May and Goedemuz will be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires allegations that each government official was personally involved in the claimed constitutional injury; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Munoz v. Bradbury · filed 2022-05-06

When bringing a suit under section 1983 against government officials, plaintiffs may not rely on theories of respondeat superior. ... Thus, the Court must grant Hawley’s motion to dismiss without prejudice for failure to state a claim against her.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for individual liability; supervising employees who caused a constitutional violation is insufficient.

Taylor v. Gladieux · filed 2022-05-12

There is no supervisory liability under § 1983, which means a plaintiff must explain how the defendant had a part in the alleged constitutional violation beyond simply supervising the employees at fault.

Section 1983 requires personal responsibility; a warden is not liable merely because he supervises the officials involved or receives a complaint after the fact.

Evans v. Neal · filed 2022-05-12

Nor can the Warden be held liable simply because he supervises Ms. Garrison and Ms. White.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged wrong; a supervisor is not liable solely because of their position.

Horton v. Mayes · filed 2022-05-12

To the extent Mr. Horton is trying to sue Warden Hyatte for damages due to his finger being severed, he can’t do so because he hasn’t alleged that Warden Hyatte had any involvement in the matter.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct; supervisory responsibility alone does not establish liability.

Magby v. Fender · filed 2022-05-13

To hold an individual defendant liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “personal involvement” in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation; supervisory status or responses to grievances alone do not establish liability.

M.C. Romig v. Wetzel · filed 2022-05-23

In the present matter, Romig’s petition does not allege any facts to substantiate the personal involvement of Wetzel, Brittain, or Moore with respect to the handling of Romig’s mail. Brittain and Moore are identified as individuals who responded to Romig’s grievance, and Wetzel is not described in the petition for review as having any involvement in this matter. These individuals may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrong; supervisory status alone does not establish individual liability.

TAYLOR v. NEPOLEAN · filed 2022-05-27

To establish individual liability under § 1983, “[a] defendant must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; supervisory authority alone does not establish liability.

WHOLAVER v. WETZEL · filed 2022-06-07

Because his complaint does not allege the personal involvement of any named defendant and relies only on the defendants’ supervisory powers over their employees, Mr. Wholaver’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires each defendant’s own conduct to support liability; supervisory duties alone do not suffice.

LeClaire v. Parish · filed 2022-06-13

Plaintiff does not link any specific conduct by Parish to his injuries nor the violations of his rights. As explained above, Parish’s oversight responsibilities establish at most vicarious liability, which is not available in a civil rights complaint under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires specific facts showing a defendant’s personal involvement; conclusory allegations of supervisory responsibility do not state a claim.

Thompson 604059 v. Washington · filed 2022-06-14

Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege each defendant’s personal involvement; supervisors are not liable merely because subordinates acted unlawfully.

Acuna v. Pollard · filed 2022-06-17

Acuna alleges only that Pollard and Moseley negligently failed to ensure the protocols put in place were followed by subordinates. He fails to allege specific facts to show either Pollard or Moseley knew of unconstitutional conditions and culpable actions of individual subordinates.

Section 1983 requires a supervisory official’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Douglas v. Annucci · filed 2022-06-27

Plaintiff has not shown that any such defendant was actually involved in the decision to transfer him to Elmira, or in the decision to require him to leave Elmira’s protective custody area each day and walk through general population to receive his medications.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the deprivation of rights and does not impose respondeat superior liability.

(PC) Asberry v. Biter · filed 2022-06-28

There is no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983, and the defendant is only liable for his own misconduct.

A § 1983 claim against a supervisor requires facts showing personal involvement in or a causal connection to the alleged constitutional violation; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Floyd v. Dillmann · filed 2022-07-13

Plaintiff’s final § 1983 claim—supervisory liability—contains a hair more factual content as to Defendant London, but not enough to meet the Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard. ... Here, Plaintiff fails to specify— individually, factually, and in a non-conclusory fashion—how London was involved in or causally connected to any constitutional violations. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint, as it stands, fails to state a claim against London.

Section 1983 requires each official’s own conduct to support personal liability; a supervisory role alone is insufficient.

M.D. v. State of Nebraska · filed 2022-07-22

It is important to add that, “[a]s § 1983 liability for damages for a federal constitutional tort is personal, each defendant’s conduct must be independently assessed.” Davis v. White, 794 F.3d 1008, 1013 (8th Cir. 2015). ... Plaintiffs have alleged only each Defendant’s supervisory or managerial role, Filing 16 at ¶¶ 21–24, but that is not enough.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege each defendant’s own conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights; supervisory responsibility alone does not establish liability.

Johnson v. Haynes · filed 2022-07-25

A §1983 plaintiff must allege a defendant's own conduct violated the plaintiff's civil rights and cannot establish liability on the basis of supervisory responsibility alone.

Section 1983 requires facts showing the defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Nottingham v. Attorney General Pennsylvania · filed 2022-07-27

We agree with the District Court that Nottingham’s complaint was insufficient to state a civil-rights claim against the Attorney General. As noted in the District Court, the Attorney General “does not supervise and oversee the work of local county prosecutors, local police, state police, or judges,” ECF No. 49 at 11 (footnotes omitted), and Nottingham has not otherwise sufficiently alleged that Shapiro was personally involved in any of the decisions made by the various actors involved in Nottingham’s repeated interactions with the criminal justice system.

Section 1983 damages claims require each defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation; supervisory status or denial of a grievance after the violation is insufficient.

Rosa v. Cook · filed 2022-07-28

“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under §1983, as there is no respondeat superior liability in §1983 cases[.]” ... Accordingly, all claims asserted against Warden Hannah in her individual capacity for monetary damages are DISMISSED, without prejudice, for lack of personal involvement.

Section 1983 requires each defendant’s personal participation in a constitutional violation; a supervisor may be liable for participating in, directing, or knowingly failing to prevent it.

Evans v. Gower · filed 2022-08-10

Liability under § 1983 arises upon a showing of personal participation by each defendant, and a supervisor is not liable for the constitutional violations of employees unless the supervisor “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). ... As such, Defendants’ motion is granted as to Plaintiff’s Third Claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement and does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors.

Kelly v. Ippel · filed 2022-02-18

Two more defendants, regional medical directors, were not personally involved in Kelly’s care and could not be vicariously liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; supervisory position alone does not establish liability.

Norman v. City of New York · filed 2022-08-12

Here, Plaintiff has made no showing that Commissioner Shea was personally involved in the towing incident. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Section 1983 claim against Commissioner Shea fails as a matter of law, and summary judgment is granted to Commissioner Shea as to this claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; a claim cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Perez v. Huneycutt · filed 2022-08-16

As such, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in actions brought under § 1983. ... However, the Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants John Doe appears to be based on respondeat superior and is dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; a supervisor is not liable solely because an employee violated someone’s rights.

Kendrick v. Marthakis · filed 2022-08-22

For a defendant to be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he or she must have been personally involved in the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires proof that each defendant was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation; supervisory rank alone does not establish liability.

Baltas v. Maiga · filed 2022-08-24

To “hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official without relying on a special test for supervisory liability.” ... The present record raises at least an inference that former Commissioner Cook, then-Deputy Commissioner Quiros, and Director Maiga all had some involvement in Baltas’ transfer to Virginia.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; an individual defendant must be personally at fault.

Davis, III v. Parsons · filed 2022-08-31

Thus, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an official’s personal involvement in the deprivation; a supervisor’s position alone does not establish liability.

Johnson v. Illinois Department Of Corrections · filed 2022-09-06

In order to be liable under Section 1983, an official must be personally involved in the deprivation.

Section 1983 requires each defendant’s personal participation; a supervisor is liable only if the supervisor participated in or directed a violation, or knew of it and failed to prevent it.

Dobbs v. O'Donnell · filed 2022-09-09

Finally, plaintiff does not allege that the named defendants – O’Donnell and Peterson – were personally involved in the alleged surveillance or the violation of his rights. Plaintiff is advised that liability under § 1983 arises upon a showing of personal participation by each defendant, and a supervisor is not liable for the constitutional violations of employees unless the supervisor “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Section 1983 requires personal participation in the claimed violation and does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for a subordinate’s acts.

Mahammend v. Watts · filed 2022-09-12

To sustain a constitutional challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mahammend must allege personal participation in the claimed violation; respondeat superior liability is not available. ... Watts is entitled to dismissal of the Complaint against her on this basis alone.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged violation; a supervisory role alone is insufficient.

Bell v. Houser · filed 2022-09-14

We will accordingly dismiss the complaint for Bell’s failure to allege defendants’ personal involvement.

A warden cannot be held individually liable under § 1983 without evidence of personal involvement or facts establishing supervisory or bystander liability.

Singleton v. SCDC · filed 2022-09-14

The Magistrate Judge also correctly determined that Defendant Warden Joyner is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendant Warden Joyner his personal capacity. Plaintiff did not provide any allegations or present any evidence that showed Defendant Warden Joyner had any personal involvement in the alleged use of excessive force. Plaintiff also failed to show facts to establish supervisor or bystander liability.

Section 1983 requires personal responsibility; a prison warden cannot be held liable for damages solely because of his position.

Merriweather v. Hyatte · filed 2022-09-16

If Mr. Merriweather is trying to hold the Warden responsible for all of these discrete incidents, liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is based on personal responsibility, and the Warden cannot be held liable for damages solely because he is the top official at the prison.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations linking a defendant’s own conduct to the alleged rights deprivation; awareness of other officials’ conduct alone is insufficient.

Flourney v. Does 1-15 · filed 2022-09-27

Plaintiff, in his FAC, once again seeks to hold a prison official, in this case Defendant Miranda, liable simply because Plaintiff told him that other prison officials were not enforcing Covid protection protocols, but without any factual allegations that Miranda had the authority or ability to require the protocols to be enforced, any personal participation in the lack of enforcement, or any causal link to Plaintiff’s injury.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal participation in the alleged constitutional deprivation; supervisory status alone does not create vicarious liability.

Wood v. Washburn · filed 2022-09-30

“Liability under § 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.” Chavez v. Peters, No. 2:16-cv-02225-MO, 2019 WL 922237, at *7 (D. Or. Feb. 25, 2019) (quoting Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Vicarious liability is inapplicable to a § 1983 suit—plaintiffs must plead that each defendant’s individual actions has violated the Constitution.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege an individual defendant’s direct personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation; supervisory status alone is insufficient.

Perez v. Carrion · filed 2022-10-04

To state a claim under Section 1983 against an individual defendant, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that individual defendant’s direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires personal participation in an alleged constitutional deprivation; supervision alone does not establish liability.

Rivera v. JCI · filed 2022-10-05

Section 1983 liability attaches only to those who personally participate in the alleged constitutional deprivations. Accordingly, no liability flows from a defendant’s mere supervision of others who may have committed wrongful acts. ... Without any factual averments making plausible their individual participation in any alleged constitutional deprivations, Hill and Gang must be dismissed from the action, albeit without prejudice.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Chambers v. Toulon · filed 2022-10-20

Thus, in the absence of any alleged personal involvement by any Sheriff Toulon, plaintiff has not set forth a plausible Section 1983 claim against him and such claim is thus dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b).

Section 1983 requires facts showing a defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Rivera v. Babka · filed 2022-10-25

Therefore, Ms. Rivera has failed to allege any facts sufficient to show that any of the Defendants were personally involved in any constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation and does not impose collective or supervisory liability.

Dicosimo v. Green Lake County Jail · filed 2022-10-25

Section 1983 does not create collective or vicarious responsibility.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability; a claim against an individual defendant requires personal participation in the alleged deprivation.

Miller v. McFadden · filed 2022-10-31

Plaintiff, however, alleges no personal participation by Defendants McFadden or LNU and there is no vicarious liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation to pursue an individual-capacity claim against that supervisor.

McQuaid v. Wetzel · filed 2022-11-02

However, outside of the Monell context, the claims for violation of Ingle’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in Count I asserted against the Supervisory Defendants without personal involvement are not legally tenable.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim is tolled while a prisoner completes the administrative grievance process.

Gardner v. Wexford Health Source · filed 2020-09-28

That is incorrect – the statute of limitations in a § 1983 case is tolled while the plaintiff completes the administrative grievance process.

The limitations period for an incarcerated plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is tolled while the plaintiff exhausts available administrative remedies.

Martinez v. Nueces County Sheriff's Office/Jail · filed 2020-01-13

When a civil rights suit is brought by an incarcerated person, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that the claimant is exhausting their available administrative remedies.

A § 1983 harassment claim may be untimely even when the corresponding Title VII claim is timely.

Magnusson v. County of Suffolk · filed 2017-05-11

We also agree that that the Plaintiff’s claims that are premised on sexual orientation harassment are timely under Title VII and untimely under § 1983.

Allegations of fraudulent concealment do not make a § 1983 claim timely without evidence of misconduct or another basis for timeliness.

Michaud v. Perreault · filed 2000-12-12

But his allegations and the materials he submitted in support thereof do not show any misconduct by the courts or any other basis for finding his claims to be timely.

Michigan’s incarceration tolling statute can extend the time to bring a Section 1983 claim.

Smith v. John Mangum, Officer Jimmy Keck, Officer City of Detroit · filed 1989-10-04

Upon consideration, we conclude that the district court's judgment must be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. Applying Higley, 835 F.2d at 626, the district court decided that applying the Michigan tolling statute to preserve Smith's Sec. 1983 cause of action for the period during which he was incarcerated would be counterproductive to the federal policy favoring the disposition of Sec. 1983 claims as promptly as possible. In Hardin, however, the Supreme Court recently overruled Higley and held that applying Michigan's tolling statute for incarceration is not inconsistent with the federal policies underlying Sec. 1983 claims. Thus, Smith's suit may not be untimely as he is still incarcerated.

Section 1983 claims use the relevant state's limitations period because § 1983 provides no limitations period, with the applicable period selected based on the essential nature of the allegations.

Boshell v. Alabama Mental Health Board · filed 1973-02-16

Since § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, reference must be made to the limitation periods prescribed by the state in which the litigation arose. ... The essential nature of the allegations contained in the complaint determine which state limitation period will govern. ... Under the circumstances of this case the lower court correctly applied Alabama’s one year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state statute of limitations, and state tolling rules govern whether that limitations period is tolled.

Ammlung v. City of Chester · filed 1973-03-14

Since there is no federal statute of limitations governing civil rights claims brought under Section 1983, the federal courts have consistently applied the relevant state statute of limitations. ... We conclude that state tolling provisions govern the tolling of the state statute of limitations in federal civil rights claims, and in the absence of an applicable Pennsylvania tolling provision, we further conclude that this action is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions borrow the forum state's limitations period, including applicable state-law tolling rules for imprisonment.

Ortiz v. J. Edwin Lavallee, as Agents of the State of New York · filed 1971-03-25

William Ortiz, an inmate of Clinton State Prison, Dannemora, New York, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissing without a hearing his complaint brought under Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), on the ground that his claims were barred by the applicable state statute of limitations. ... We conclude that the district court erred in failing to apply the tolling provisions of CPLR § 208, and that appellant’s suit was not time barred.

Section 1983 uses the statute of limitations for the most closely analogous state-law cause of action, provided that rule is consistent with the Constitution and federal law.

DeVargas v. STATE EX REL. NM DEPT. OF CORR. · filed 1982-02-22

Under Section 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute of limitations applicable is that which applies to the most closely analogous cause of action under state law. In Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980), the Supreme Court of the United States clearly stated that lower federal courts must look to and apply the state statute of limitations governing the state cause of action provided by state law which is most closely analogous to Section 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and which is not inconsistent with the Constitution and Laws of the United States.

Section 1983 borrows the statute of limitations for the most closely analogous cause of action under state law.

DeVargas v. State ex rel. New Mexico Department of Corrections · filed 1982-02-22

Under Section 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute of limitations applicable is that which applies to the most closely analogous cause of action under state law.

Because § 1983 has no federal statute of limitations, courts apply the most analogous state statute of limitations.

Nathan Rodgers Construction & Realty Corp. v. City of Saraland, Alabama, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1982-02-23

Because there is no federal statute of limitations covering § 1983 actions the “more analogous” state statute is applied.

For a § 1983 claim arising from an employee's discharge, the limitations period begins when the employee receives advance notice of termination.

Holden v. Commission Against Discrimination of Massachusetts · filed 1982-02-17

For statute of limitations purposes, the date of the wrong is the date of the advance notice of termination in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the action.

Silverman v. McGuire · filed 1982-02-26

A claim under § 1983 accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is- the basis of his action.

For a § 1983 action against a municipality, state law supplies the applicable statute of limitations, and the claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of the action.

Stewart v. City of Northport · filed 1983-01-28

It is well established that in a § 1983 action, the courts must look to state law for the applicable statute of limitations. ... The standard governing accrual of a cause of action under § 1983 is when a plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.”

Section 1983 claims are governed here by a two-year statute of limitations.

Minority Police Officers Ass'n v. City of South Bend · filed 1983-01-31

Accordingly, this Court will apply a two year statute of limitations to this case on all claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and will not consider any claims for alleged discrimination occurring prior to November 23, 1979.

Section 1983 claims borrow the most applicable state statute of limitations when § 1983 supplies no filing period; a claim characterized as malicious prosecution is subject to Iowa’s two-year period.

Gale Hearold Johnson v. Dailey · filed 1973-05-17

First, since neither 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 42 U.S.C. § 1985 define the time within which suits thereunder must be brought, we must look to the most applicable Iowa statute of limitations to determine whether this action is barred. ... Since this action may be properly characterized as one in the nature of malicious prosecution it is therefore barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims brought in Puerto Rico are subject to a one-year limitations period borrowed from its personal injury law.

Garcia v. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority · filed 2002-07-12

Therefore, we apply the one-year prescriptive period to Plaintiffs’ section 1983 action.

Section 1983 actions borrow a state’s limitations period and tolling rules unless those rules would defeat the statute’s goals.

Pearl v. City of Long Beach · filed 2002-07-15

The Supreme Court has instructed that in section 1983 actions, we borrow not only a state’s limitations period but also its “tolling rules,” Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484-86, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980); see Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 381-82 (2d Cir.1983), unless applying the state’s tolling rules “would defeat the goals of the federal statute at issue,” Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539, 109 S.Ct. 1998, 104 L.Ed.2d 582 (1989).

Section 1983 claims use the state's general or residual personal injury limitations period, which is three years in New York.

Pearl v. The City Of Long Beach · filed 2002-07-15

In section 1983 actions, the applicable limitations period is found in the "general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions," Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989), and the parties agree that in this case that period is three years, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (McKinney 1990).

Section 1983 claims in Texas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Brown v. Unknown Cardiologist · filed 2002-07-25

His claims arising before January 24, 1998, are time- barred under the two-year Texas statute of limitations applicable to this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, so courts determine the time limit under state law.

Hoyesen v. Armstrong, No. Cv 99-459273 (Jul. 25, 2002) · filed 2002-07-25

The plaintiff purports to bring his claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , which does not contain its own statute of limitations. Therefore the time limitations must be determined by state statutes.

A California § 1983 action is time-barred if filed more than one year after the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.

Loran v. Lockyer · filed 2002-07-29

The district court properly dismissed this action as time-barred because Loran did not file it until April 13, 2001, more than one year after he first knew, or should have known, of his injury.

Section 1983 claims use the relevant state statute of limitations, which is two years in Colorado.

Evans v. Supreme Court · filed 2002-07-30

Civil rights claims are time barred by the relevant state statute of limitations. ... In this case it is two years.

A § 1983 claim arising from an adjustment board’s review of a railway employee’s termination must be filed within the RLA’s two-year period for seeking review of the board’s decision.

Colletti v. N.J. Transit Corp. · filed 2002-07-31

Because Colletti’s claims arose from the review of his employment termination by the Board, he was required to file for review of the Board’s decision and assert his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in accordance with the two year time limit mandated by 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (r).

Federal law governs when a § 1983 claim accrues; a retaliation claim based on discharge accrues when the employment is terminated.

HITT v. CONNELL · filed 2002-07-31

While Texas's two-year statute of limitations applied to Hitt's constitutional injury claims, Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir.2001), the date a § 1983 claim accrues is governed by federal, not state law. ... Hitt was injured, and his cause of action accrued, when his employment was terminated on March 5, 1997.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year statute of limitations.

Licari, Ralph J. v. City of Chicago · filed 2002-08-01

A two year statute of limita- tions applies to section 1983 claims in Illinois.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Montgomery v. State of Louisiana · filed 2002-08-02

Because claims made under § 1983 are not subject to a specific federal statute of limitations, we borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

A Section 1983 claim arising from events at a Tennessee county jail is subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Franklin v. Henson · filed 2002-08-02

However, Franklin did not file his current complaint until September of 2000, and any claim arising from his prior incarceration would be barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising in Tennessee have a one-year limitations period, and state tolling principles govern their timeliness.

McMillan v. Crunk · filed 2002-08-06

State statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to determine the timeliness of claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The one-year statute of limitations period contained in Term. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(l) applies to civil rights claims arising in Tennessee.

Section 1983 claims in Puerto Rico use the one-year personal injury limitations period, while federal law governs when the claim accrues.

Empress Hotel Inc. v. Rico · filed 2002-08-09

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not set forth a limitations period for claims brought thereunder. While federal law governs the date of accrual of the cause of action, federal courts borrow the limitations period and tolling doctrine from state law. ... Under Puerto Rico law, the applicable limitations period for personal injury actions — and, consequently, for plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim — is one year.

Section 1983 has no limitations period of its own, so courts look to analogous state law for one.

Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island · filed 2002-08-20

Because § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, the Court must examine state law for a limitations period analogous to the constitutional wrong asserted.

Section 1983 actions arising in Ohio must be filed within two years after they accrue.

Johnson v. University Hospital of Cleveland · filed 2002-08-22

Johnson’s cause of action accrued on May 2, 1996. She had until May 2, 1998, to file her § 1983 action.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.

Raz v. LSU Med Ctr Sport · filed 2002-09-09

Because there is no specified federal statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits, federal courts borrow the forum state’s general personal injury period.

Section 1983 claims filed in Illinois are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Malone v. Ryan · filed 2002-09-13

Therefore, all § 1983 claims filed in Illinois are subject to the two-year statute of limitations in 735 ILCS § 5/13-202.

Section 1983 claims brought in Ohio have a two-year limitations period.

Greene v. Fairfield County Sheriff · filed 2002-09-16

The statute of limitations for a cause of action brought under § 1983 in Ohio is two years.

A Section 1983 claim does not receive California’s imprisonment tolling if the plaintiff was not incarcerated when the claim accrued.

Phillips v. State · filed 2002-09-19

The district court properly determined that Phillips was not entitled to tolling pursuant to Califorma Code of Civil Procedure § 352.1 because he was not incarcerated at the time his cause of action accrued.

A § 1983 claim subject to a one-year limitations period is time-barred unless the plaintiff establishes a proper ground for tolling.

Brown v. Schwartz · filed 2002-09-20

The district court correctly dismissed Brown’s First Amended Complaint because it was time-barred and he failed to establish any proper ground for tolling of the one-year statute of limitations.

The limitations period for a prisoner’s § 1983 claim is tolled while the prisoner pursues administrative remedies.

Aldridge v. Gill · filed 2002-09-24

Any applicable statute of limitations is tolled during the time the prisoner pursues administrative remedies.

Section 1983 actions filed in Illinois have a two-year limitations period.

King v. City of Galesburg · filed 2002-09-27

Plaintiffs lost in most respects, however, for an antecedent reason: the statute of limitations for actions in Illinois under § 1983 is two years, see Ashafa v. Chicago, 146 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir.1998), and the children’s complaint was filed more than two years after the last acts of which they complain.

Section 1983 claims in Texas use a two-year personal-injury limitations period, and federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Williams v. Lopez · filed 2002-10-01

This litigation is governed by the Texas personal injury limitations period, which is two years, and federal law determines when the cause of action accrued.

Section 1983 claims filed in New York are subject to the three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Shabtai v. City of New York · filed 2002-10-10

We agree with the district court, for substantially the reasons set forth in its memorandum decision and order, that Shabtai’s claim was barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations on personal injury claims in New York.

Section 1983 claims use the state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Lipschultz v. Logan Assistance Corp. · filed 2002-10-21

A federal court should apply the state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 action filed in federal district court commences for limitations purposes when the complaint is filed.

Michael Sain Ryan White Lori J. Sain, Personally and as Next Friend for Crystal Sain v. City of Bend Buck Church Tom Pin · filed 2002-10-29

We now join our sister circuits and hold that Rule 3 provides the tolling rule for a borrowed state statute of limitations in § 1983 actions. That is, we hold that a § 1983 action is commenced in federal district court for purposes of the statute of limitations when the complaint is filed.

Neutral policies that give present effect to time-barred discrimination do not restart the limitations period for a § 1983 claim.

City of Hialeah, Florida v. Rojas · filed 2002-11-08

As in Title VII cases, neutral policies that give present effect to time-barred discriminatory conduct do not create a continuing violation which renews the limitations period.

Section 1983 claims brought in Puerto Rico use the one-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Torres v. Velez · filed 2002-11-26

Therefore, we apply the one-year prescriptive period to Plaintiffs’ section 1983 action.

In Louisiana, § 1983 claims must be brought within one year.

Pecan Acres Ltd I v. City of Lake Charles · filed 2002-12-03

Under Louisiana law, §1983 claims must be brought within one year. ... Thus, Pecan Acres’s § 1983 claims are time-barred.

Section 1983 claims use state limitations periods; in Louisiana, the one-year period for tort actions applies unless a statutory exception applies.

Ss v. State Ex Rel. Dept. of Social Servic. · filed 2002-12-04

Likewise, prescription for § 1983 actions is determined by state limitations statutes, in determining the timeliness of a claim under civil rights provisions. Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Bd., 594 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.1979); McCoy v. City of Monroe, 32,521 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/8/99), 747 So.2d 1234; writ denied, 00-1280 (La.3/30/01), 788 So.2d 441. Accordingly, such actions are also subject to the one year prescriptive period contained in LA. CIV.CODE ANN. art. 3492 unless plaintiffs can show an exception established by legislation.

Section 1983 claims in Connecticut are subject to the three-year limitations period in General Statutes § 52-577; a factual dispute about a defendant’s conduct within that period can preclude summary judgment.

Lewczyk v. Connecticut Dph, No. Cv 00-0596677 (Dec. 10, 2002) · filed 2002-12-10

"[T]he three year statute of limitations contained in General Statutes § 52-577 has been held as the operative statute of limitations in a § 1983 action." ... The parties agree that in order to satisfy the three-year statute of limitations applicable to each claim against Henry, the plaintiff is required to show that Henry took adverse employment action against him after February 2, 1997. ... There remain genuine issues of material fact as to the role that Henry played in the plaintiff's termination. Accordingly, the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to counts five, six and seven is denied.

Section 1983 claims in Texas are governed by the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Malone v. Dallas City Mgr Off · filed 2002-12-11

“The statute of limitations for a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is determined by the general statute of limitations governing personal injuries in the forum state.” ... In Texas, personal injury actions are subject to a two-year limitations period. ... The district court did not err by applying the two-year limitation period instead of the four-year period in dismissing Malone’s constitutional claims.

Section 1983 claims arising in Oregon have a two-year limitations period.

Castillo v. Grogan · filed 2002-12-11

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in Oregon is two years.

A § 1983 excessive-force claim arising from a December 1991 arrest was time-barred when filed in April 2000.

Schwartz v. Johnson · filed 2002-12-11

Robert Deane Schwartz appeals pro se the district court’s judgment dismissing as time-barred his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging defendants used excessive force during his December 1991 arrest. ... The district court properly dismissed Schwartz’s action because all of the allegations stem from incidents on December 22, 1991, and Schwartz did not file his complaint until April 28, 2000.

In California, the limitations period for a § 1983 action is not tolled for alleged mental disability when the plaintiff can transact business and understand the nature and effects of his acts.

Barber v. Municipality of Los Angeles · filed 2002-12-12

The district court properly concluded that limitations period should not be tolled because Barber’s prosecution of the underlying action shows that he was capable of transacting business and understanding the nature and effects of his acts despite his alleged mental disability.

Section 1983 claims arising in Washington are time-barred when filed more than three years after the alleged injury, absent tolling.

Howard v. Lehman · filed 2002-12-12

The district court properly dismissed Howard’s claims against Clark County Jail and Columbia River Mental Health Services and their employees as time-barred because Howard’s complaint alleges only misdiagnoses or forced administration of medications that occurred more than three years before Howard filed his complaint.

Section 1983 claims brought in Kansas have a two-year statute of limitations.

Delatorre v. Minner · filed 2002-12-13

Thus, any action brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 or 1983 in Kansas is subject to a two-year statute of limitation.

For § 1983 claims, federal law determines when the limitations period begins to run.

Cantor Fitzgerald Inc. v. Lutnick · filed 2002-12-16

It is appropriate to use federal rules to determine when the limitations period begins to run for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the cause of action is created by federal law.

Section 1983 claims in Texas use the state's two-year personal injury limitations period.

Childers v. City of Arlington TX · filed 2002-12-17

In determining the limitations period for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, the applicable period is governed by state law, which in this case, is the two-year Texas personal injury limitations period.

Section 1983 claims use state statutes of limitations and tolling principles to determine timeliness.

Elrod v. Hawry · filed 2002-12-18

State statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to determine the timeliness of claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims filed in Illinois are subject to a two-year limitations period, and a claim filed six years after release from prison is untimely.

Chatmon v. Easton · filed 2002-12-18

Even if tolling could apply, however, Chatmon’s claim would still be untimely. He was released from prison in 1995 and did not sue until 2001-this delay is well beyond the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Texas are subject to the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Perry v. Sanders · filed 2002-12-27

The dismissal without prejudice in Perry’s case is tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice, because a new § 1983 complaint by Perry would be barred by the applicable two-year Texas statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 1983 claims filed in Indiana are subject to the state's two-year personal injury statute of limitations.

Parks v. Madison County · filed 2002-12-31

We do not address all of those issues, however, because we conclude that Parks's action was barred by the relevant statute of limitations. ... In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), the United States Supreme Court determined that, in § 1988 actions, courts should apply the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury lawsuits filed in that state. In Indiana, that period of limitations is two years.

In California, a section 1983 claim must be filed within one year of accrual, and pursuing a Government Claims Act claim does not toll that period.

McMahon v. Albany Unified School District · filed 2002-12-31

Likewise, McMahon’s federal claim was not tolled while he pursued remedies under the Claims Act. Because he failed to assert his cause of action under section 1983 within one year of the date of his arrest, the claim is time-barred.

A § 1983 claim challenging revocation of an officially recognized property interest accrues when the government formally revokes that interest.

Norton v. Town of Islip · filed 2003-01-02

Rather, Plaintiffs injury-the termination of his nonconforming use, occurred when the Town officially revoked his nonconforming use by issuing a C/O to that effect in 1997. Plaintiff filed this suit in 1998, well within the applicable statute of limitations.

In Section 1983 actions, state law determines whether incarceration suspends the statute of limitations.

White v. Zerangue · filed 2003-01-02

In actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state law determines whether the statute of limitations is suspended because the plaintiff is incarcerated.

Section 1983 claims in this jurisdiction have a three-year limitations period.

Hampton Bays Connections, Inc. v. Duffy · filed 2003-01-02

The defendants correctly state that the statute of limitations for an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when brought in federal court, is three years.

A timely § 1983 complaint in Puerto Rico tolls the limitations period for the duration of the case as to jointly liable defendants later added on the same claims.

Rivera v. Alvarado · filed 2003-01-09

A judicial claim, that is, the filing of a timely complaint, will toll the statute of limitations for the entire duration of the case, regardless of its outcome. In this case, Pubill’s timely filing of her initial complaint tolled the statute of limitations as to all joint tortfeasors, whether named or unnamed. Any subsequent amendments to the complaint adding joint tortfeasors and alleging the same claims filed against the original defendants are consequently not time barred.

A three-year limitations period applies to § 1983 claims arising from the alleged arrest-related misconduct.

Peralta v. Leavitt · filed 2003-01-16

Because the applicable statute of limitations is three years, the Court concluded that the Complaint was untimely. ... We find the opinion of the District Court to be thorough and accurate.

In Indiana, claims under § 1983 have a two-year statute of limitations.

Parrillo v. Reilly · filed 2003-01-16

That is too late — in Indiana a two-year statute of limitations applies to claims brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims use the applicable state limitations period, while federal law determines when a claim accrues.

Webb v. Calhoun · filed 2003-01-31

In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil-rights lawsuit, state law supplies the limitations period while federal law determines when a civil rights action accrues.

A Section 1983 claim based on an alleged property entry is barred if filed after the applicable limitations period.

Townsend v. Emrick · filed 2003-02-03

Any entry onto Townsend’s property after September 28, 1999, was with Townsend’s permission pursuant to the terms of an Agreed Judgment Entry in the state court zoning violations case and any claims based upon the alleged entry onto his property before September 28, 1999, are time-barred.

Section 1983 assault claims arising in Michigan are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Ziegler v. Michigan · filed 2003-02-06

Ziegler’s claim of assault by a prison employee in 1994 was barred by the three-year statute of limitations on such actions arising in Michigan.

Section 1983 claims in Illinois have a two-year limitations period.

Clark, James v. City of Braidwood · filed 2003-02-07

The limitations period for § 1983 cases in Illinois is two years.

A § 1983 claim arising in Colorado is subject to a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims; a later federal complaint cannot relate back to a separate state-court filing.

Johnston v. Young · filed 2003-02-12

Mr. Johnston concedes his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is subject to Colorado’s two-year statute of limitations period for personal injury. ... Mr. Johnston seeks to have his federal complaint “relate back” to his state filing, thereby making it timely. Such a unique application of the “relation back” doctrine, for which Mr. Johnston offers no authority, violates a fair reading of F ED . R. C IV . P. 15( C ) and offends accepted principles of federal-state comity.

An EEOC or Puerto Rico Anti-Discrimination Unit charge does not toll the limitations period for a § 1983 claim.

Cintron v. Gonzalez · filed 2003-02-19

This Court has clearly held that “the EEOC has no jurisdiction over claims brought pursuant to § 1983, and thus, a charge filed with the EEOC or Puerto Rico Anti-Discrimination Unit cannot serve to toll the limitations period for a § 1983 claim.”

Section 1983 claims in Texas use the two-year personal injury limitations period, while federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Gonzalez v. Prasifka · filed 2003-02-19

This litigation is governed by the Texas personal injury limitations period, which is two years, and federal law determines when the cause of action accrues.

In California, a section 1983 action is time-barred when filed more than one year after the applicable tolling period expires.

Frutos v. Howe · filed 2003-02-20

The district court did not err by dismissing as time-barred Frutos’ section 1983 action against the prison official defendants because Frutos filed suit almost four years after his claims accrued, and more than one year after the tolling period expired.

Section 1983 civil rights claims in Illinois are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Norville v. Dell Corp. · filed 2003-02-26

Second, to the extent that the Norvilles’ complaint alleges that McKiness used excessive force against Mr. Norville, that claim is barred, as the district court held, by the applicable two-year statute of limitations for civil rights claims in Illinois.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Lovett v. Walter S. Ray, Chairman, Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles · filed 2003-02-28

“Federal courts apply their forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 claims use the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Adams v. Town of Burrillville Ex Rel. Mainville · filed 2003-03-03

In addition, Plaintiffs’ constitutional deprivation claims are also subject to a three year statute of limitations because § 1983 claims are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which in this case is three years under § 9-1-14(b).

Section 1983 claims in California were subject to the state's one-year statute of limitations.

In re George · filed 2003-03-06

Application of California's one-year statute of limitations to the debtors' § 1983 claim was proper.

A § 1983 plaintiff relying on a continuing violation to overcome a limitations bar must plead an ongoing policy and timely acts in furtherance of it by each defendant.

Pratts v. Coombe · filed 2003-03-07

Further, because Pratts’ pursuit of a continuing violation claim requires him to plead both an ongoing policy of deliberate indifference and “some non-time-barred acts taken in furtherance of that policy,” Harris v. City of N.Y, 186 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir.1999), he must be able to allege as to each defendant named, facts evidencing deliberate indifference after January 10,1999.

A § 1983 claim accrues when related criminal charges are dismissed if the ensuing appeal leaves no pending criminal proceeding with which the civil action could conflict.

Stanley Trzebuckowski Lecue, Inc. v. City of Cleveland Lauren C. Moore · filed 2003-03-07

There was no underlying criminal proceeding during the course of the state appellate litigation that could have caused the federal court to render a decision in the § 1983 action in conflict with findings in a pending criminal matter. Therefore, the statute of limitations on Trzebuckowski’s § 1983 claim began to run on September 12,1995, the date the municipal court dismissed the charges against him.

Section 1983 actions are barred when the applicable statute of limitations has expired.

Jones v. Angelone · filed 2003-03-13

We conclude, however, that the magistrate judge correctly found Jones’ action barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising in Oklahoma are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Leonoff v. Hindeman · filed 2003-03-14

To the extent that Petitioner had any remaining claims over which the court had jurisdiction, the court ruled that (5) the judges who are parties to the lawsuit have absolute judicial immunity for their judicial actions and (6) Petitioner’s civil rights claims based on actions taken between 1988 and 1990 are barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to federal civil rights claims brought in Oklahoma. ... Therefore, for substantially the same reasons set forth in the district court’s February 8, 2002 order, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s complaint with prejudice.

California’s limitations and prisoner tolling rules gave the prisoner three years after exhausting prison grievances to file his section 1983 claim.

Ruff v. Gomes · filed 2003-03-18

Here, Ruff alleged that he exhausted prison grievance procedures on March 3, 1995. Under California law, he had three years from that date to file his section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims are barred when filed after the applicable limitations period.

Young v. Quatermass · filed 2003-03-19

The magistrate judge properly determined that Young’s claims relating to citations he received prior to September 7, 1997, are barred by the statute of limitations.

A § 1983 action arising from alleged conduct in California was time-barred when filed nearly nine years later.

Dunn v. Noe · filed 2003-03-19

The district court properly dismissed Dunn’s action as time-barred because all of the allegations stem from incidents occuring on or about March 12, 1993, and Dunn did not file his complaint until January 3, 2002.

Section 1983 claims based on a stop and arrest in New Jersey have a two-year limitations period that begins on the date of those acts.

Wilson v. Healy · filed 2003-03-26

The statute of limitations for Wilson’s § 1983 claim against the Howell defendants based on Healy and Dreher’s actions began to run on February 18, 1994 and, as found by the District Court, is two years, pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A14-2.

Section 1983 claims arising in Tennessee are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Hurst v. Warren · filed 2003-04-02

First, the statute of limitations barred any claim that arose before July 1999 because the statute of limitations for actions arising in Tennessee and brought under the federal civil rights statutes is one year.