42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 lets public housing tenants enforce the Brooke Amendment’s rent ceiling, including by challenging utility allowances that cause excessive rent.

Haywood v. Chicago Housing Authority · filed 2016-09-28

And the foregoing discussion shows that the regime governing rent for purposes of the Brooke Amendment has not materially changed since Wright was decided—which means that § 1983 confers on Plaintiffs a private right of action under the Brooke Amendment to enforce the statutory rent ceiling and, in particular, to challenge CHA’s determination of their utility allowances.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private parties merely for following a state rule governing their interactions with someone.

Duffy v. George · filed 2016-09-30

However, § 1983 liability cannot extend to the Defendants for simply “relying on some state rule governing their interactions [with Duffy].”

Section 1983 does not treat a private party as a state actor merely for invoking unchallenged state post-judgment execution procedures, even in bad faith.

Partin v. Davis · filed 2017-01-13

We thus conclude that Davis’s invocation of unchallenged Tennessee post-judgment execution procedures—whether or not in bad faith—does not amount to state action under § 1983 as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not make private physicians state actors merely because they diagnose and report suspected child abuse as required by state law.

Blythe v. Schlievert · filed 2017-03-28

I conclude that the allegations in the complaint fail adequately to plead that defendant doctors Tiffany A. Lisk, Susan P. Tourner, Jamie L. Dargart, and John Gregory Rosenthal were state actors. They are entitled to dismissal on that basis alone.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a newspaper and its writer when the complaint alleges no basis for liability under the statute.

Norton v. City of Whiteville · filed 2017-08-31

The district court correctly concluded that Norton failed to allege a basis for § 1983 liability against these Defendants.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party only when its conduct can be attributed to the state; reporting information to and assisting law enforcement alone does not make the party a state actor.

Cox v. Duke Energy · filed 2017-11-20

At bottom, there is no evidence that Duke Energy had the requisite relationship to the Sheriff’s Office so as to convert its conduct into state action, see DeBauche, 191 F.3d at 506–07, and the district court correctly concluded therefore that Fleming failed to state a claim against Duke Energy and its vice president under § 1983.

A private hospital does not become a state actor under § 1983 merely by detaining a patient pursuant to New York’s Mental Hygiene Law.

Amid v. Chase · filed 2017-11-22

In short, McGugan directly forecloses Amid’s attempt to argue that Glen Cove was a “state actor” for purposes of § 1983, and the district court correctly dismissed this claim.

Section 1983 requires a two-part inquiry to determine whether a private person's conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

In re Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co. Mktg. & Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig. · filed 2017-12-21

Whether the conduct may in fact be "fairly attributed" to the state requires a two-part inquiry.

Section 1983 does not make a court-appointed private attorney a state actor merely because of the appointment.

Tierney v. Town of Framingham · filed 2018-02-13

However, the mere fact that private attorneys were appointed to represent civil litigants or criminal defendants does not implicate state action. ... Accordingly, there is no valid section 1983 claim against the private attorney defendants.

Section 1983 allows a private party to be treated as a state actor only in limited circumstances involving state coercion, an exclusively public function, or joint participation with the state.

Giles v. Crime Stoppers of Birmingham Ala. · filed 2018-04-27

Crime Stoppers is not a state actor and Giles has not argued any facts that would support a finding that it fell under one of the three circumstances that would, for § 1983, allow it to be viewed as such. Therefore, Crime Stopper is not a proper defendant for a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 treats a privately employed jail nurse as a state actor when he provides inmate medical care or performs inmate control, even without a direct contract with the government.

Roberson v. Walker · filed 2018-07-31

Defendant Whitehead's lack-of-privity argument has no basis in the precedent of the Eleventh Circuit. ... In either case, Defendant Whitehead's activities are functions that are "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state."

Section 1983 permits liability for a private party only when the party willfully participates in joint activity with the state or its agents.

Johnson v. McQuistion · filed 2018-11-14

A private party may be held liable under § 1983 only if that party is a “willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.” Gibson v. Regions Fin. Corp., 557 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir, 2009).

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private person when that person acts jointly with state officials, receives significant aid from them, or otherwise engages in conduct chargeable to the state.

Counce v. Wolting · filed 2019-01-09

“[T]o hold a private individual liable under § 1983, it must be shown that the private person was jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or that the private individual’s conduct is in some other way chargeable to the State.”

Section 1983 does not make a private person liable merely for filing false police reports.

Spiegel v. McClintic · filed 2019-02-14

So the mere act of filing false police reports is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a private social media company does not become one merely by hosting a school board’s page and moderating its comments.

Davison v. Facebook, Inc. · filed 2019-02-26

But "a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires that the defendant be fairly said to be a state actor." ... Under these circumstances, Facebook cannot be deemed a state actor.

Section 1983 generally does not allow claims against private parties that do not act under color of state law.

Genao v. Saint Pauls Church · filed 2019-05-03

As Defendant Saint Paul’s Churchis a private entity, Plaintiff cannot statea claim against it, or its members,under § 1983.

A private actor may face a section 1983 claim when jointly participating with a state actor in denying constitutional rights.

Webster v. St Bernard's Hospital · filed 2019-05-17

Further, his pleadings do not indicate that any state actor was involved and do not suggest any meeting of the minds or joint activity between defendants and a state actor. Accordingly, Webster has failed to state a section 1983 claim against defendants.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on private parties because a defendant must act under color of state law.

Genao v. St. Nicholas Housing Development · filed 2019-05-22

As Defendants are a private individual and a private entity, Plaintiff cannot state § 1983 claims against them.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to be a state actor; using state-court proceedings and obtaining court orders alone does not suffice.

Karen C. Yeh Ho v. Sabocik · filed 2019-05-24

Specifically, although Yeh Ho’s constitutional due-process rights are enforceable through § 1983, the complaint gives no basis to conclude that Sabocik and Boyes could be considered “state actors” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private contractor only when the challenged conduct can be attributed to the state, such as when state officials coerce or participate in the contractor’s decision.

Snodgrass-King Pediatric v. DentaQuest USA Ins. Co. · filed 2019-06-11

Snodgrass presented no evidence that TennCare was involved in or coerced the actual decision-making process to exclude Snodgrass in 2013.

Section 1983 does not treat a private operator of public-access cable channels as a state actor merely because it opens the channels to others’ speech.

Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck · filed 2019-06-17

A private entity such as MNN who opens its property for speech by others is not transformed by that fact alone into a state actor.

Section 1983 generally does not permit claims against private parties unless they acted under color of state law.

Cole v. Empire City Casino/MGM · filed 2019-07-08

As Defendants Citibank, and MGM Empire City Casino are private entities or private parties who are not alleged to work for any state or other government body, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against these defendants under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private corporation to allege that it acted under color of state law.

Hunter v. Two Unknown Named Kootenai County Deputy Sheriffs · filed 2019-08-09

The Court first notes that Mr. Hunter cannot state a claim for relief under § 1983 against Walmart, Inc. Walmart is a private corporation, and Mr. Hunter’s Amended Complaint does not allege that Walmart is in any way a state actor.

Section 1983 can reach a private corporation that conspires with a state actor to violate constitutional rights, but the complaint must plausibly allege the conspiracy.

McFadden v. Apple Inc. · filed 2019-08-26

Here, McFadden alleges a deprivation of his constitutional rights by Apple, a private corporation not a state actor. Liability could attach if, as McFadden has alleged, Apple conspired with a state actor.

Section 1983 claims against private parties require action under color of state law, and a defendant must be personally involved in the alleged deprivation.

Perso v. Perso · filed 2019-09-13

Moreover, even if the Court had subject matter to adjudicate this complaint, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Jessica, Garrett, Montefusco, and Parisi are implausible because each of these individuals is a private party who does not act under color of state law. ... Accordingly, given the absence of any personal involvement by Garrett, together with the fact that none of these individuals act under color of state law, plaintiff’s claims against Jessica, Garrett, Montefusco, and Parisi are implausible and fail for this additional reason.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant’s challenged conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Schwab v. Kobach · filed 2019-09-25

And, they allege no additional facts establishing how a factfinder fairly could attribute the conduct of these defendants to the state of Kansas. Thus, the court dismisses plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against defendants KVC, Pathways, CASA, St. Francis, Ms. Boyd, Ms. Price, Ms. Posson, Ms. Johnson, and PMHS.

Section 1983 requires facts supporting a plausible inference that a private defendant acted under color of state law or conspired with state actors.

Mason v. Siebert · filed 2019-09-26

The plaintiff has not alleged facts in her complaint or opposition brief sufficient to give rise to a plausible inference that her siblings, her family members, or Mark Siefring were state actors or unlawfully conspired with state actors.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant engaged in state action; alleging that an employee worked in private security is insufficient.

Pollet v. Costco Whole Salers · filed 2019-09-30

The Complaint does not plead sufficient factual allegations to support a reasonable inference that either Defendant or John Doe 3 was engaged in state action under the public function test.

A private party acts under color of law for § 1983 purposes when it conspires or acts jointly with state actors to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Hegwood, Jr. v. Meijer, Inc · filed 2019-09-30

Because Hegwood adduces no evidence to support his contention that Meijer or any agent improperly acted in concert with Stefano or the Berwyn police, there is no basis to find that Meijer engaged in state action.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant’s conduct is fairly attributable to the state; conclusory allegations of collusion do not suffice.

Taylor v. Sedgwick County Board of Commissioners · filed 2019-09-30

The Complaint alleges no facts that, if proved as true, could support a “fairly attributable to the state” finding. The court thus dismisses plaintiff’s § 1983 claims (Counts I–III) asserted against Ms. Slater.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that each defendant acted under color of state law; private parties generally are not liable without state action.

Sottile v. Freeman · filed 2019-10-04

The Court must also dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under § 1983 against Defendants Freeman and May because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing that either of these defendants has acted as a state actor when violating Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits treating private people who jointly participate with officers in an arrest as state actors.

Allen v. St Helena Police Department · filed 2019-10-08

Although Mr. Bodner and Mr. Monroy apparently were private citizens, the allegations that they took part in tackling and subduing Mr. Allen during the arrest are sufficient, with liberal construction, to treat them as state actors under the joint action test, which “is met where private persons are ‘willful participant[s] in joint activity with the State or its agents’ that effects a constitutional deprivation.” Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1997).

A private party is subject to Section 1983 only when its conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Irvin v. The Fort Sill National Bank · filed 2019-10-15

The Court therefore concludes that Defendant’s actions were not taken “under color of state law.” Consequently, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires evidence that private defendants acted jointly with state officials to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Ledford v. Williams · filed 2019-11-05

The Defendants moving for summary judgment are not government actors or state officials or entities. Therefore, unless there is evidence from which a jury could conclude that they reached an understanding with state officials to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights and were willful participants in joint activity with those officials, Plaintiff’s constitutional claims cannot proceed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private defendants whose actions are not fairly attributable to the state.

Johnson v. IMA Medical Research · filed 2019-11-15

As Defendants are private parties who do not work for any state or other government body, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against these defendants under § 1983.

A private entity can be liable under Section 1983 when it exercises delegated state power traditionally associated with sovereignty, such as eminent domain.

Pole Green Development Company v. Columbia Gas Transmission · filed 2019-11-18

When a “private entity” exercises “some power delegated to it by the State which is traditionally associated with sovereignty, such as eminent domain,” Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974), the entity becomes a state actor subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 2000). ... Consequently, Pole Green’s factual assertions failed to establish CGT’s status as a state actor, thus dooming its claims for unlawful taking and inverse condemnation.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s conduct to be fairly attributable to the state; an alleged relationship with state actors must be sufficiently close to make the conduct governmental action.

Kornse v. Aceto · filed 2019-11-19

Here, the Plaintiff has made no allegations that these private actors had sufficiently close relationships with state actors such that the Court could conclude that they were engaged in governmental action.

Section 1983 claims against private parties require plausible allegations that they acted jointly with the state or its agents.

Atherton v. Sofitel Hotels and Resorts · filed 2019-11-25

Here, the Complaint fails to state a Section 1983 claim against defendants Demarert, Johnson, LeMarie, Brolan, Burguren, or Kaiser Permanente Securitas – Head of Security, who are all private persons employed by private companies. Atherton’s allegation that the private and government defendants’ actions are “intertwined with” another private actor, Raymond K. Tromba “of IBM,” dkt. 1 at 2, 12, fails to plausibly allege any joint action with the state or its agents.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on private parties unless they acted under color of state law.

Johnson v. Cuomo · filed 2019-11-26

Plaintiff fails to allege any facts suggesting that any of the private parties he names should be held liable under § 1983. Plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory claims against all of the private defendants named must therefore be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits claims against private parties only when their conduct amounts to state action.

SAUERS v. OAK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LP. · filed 2019-12-06

Private individuals may be held liable under § 1983 but only if they engage in state action in the course of violating a right secured by the Constitution. ... Nor does Mr. Sauers sufficiently allege that there was such a close nexus between the Township and the action taken by the private Defendants such that their actions should be considered state action.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on private parties who do not act under color of state law.

Wearing v. Gregory · filed 2019-12-19

As Defendants Gregory, Nwoso, Vega, and Mosheyev are private parties who do not work for any state or other government body, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against these defendants under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not give a prisoner a private right of action to challenge how a prison system spends government funds through an equal protection claim.

Collins v. Schubert · filed 2019-12-23

Finally, to the extent Collins brings an equal protection claim regarding how taxpayer or government money is spent by TDCJ, § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment do not afford him a private right of action to pursue such a claim.

Section 1983 can reach a private person’s conduct when it qualifies as state action, but an automobile accident between private citizens does not, by itself, qualify.

(PS) Starr v. Gonzalez · filed 2020-01-09

To be clear, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the act of a private individual can amount to state action under certain circumstances. See Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445 (9th Cir. 2002) (outlining four potential tests: (1) the public function test, (2) the joint action test, (3) the state compulsion test, or (4) the governmental nexus test). However, plaintiff’s allegation of an automobile accident between private citizens, which also implicates private businesses, does not appear to fit within any of these exceptions.

A victim or witness does not become a state actor subject to suit under § 1983 merely by giving a statement to law enforcement.

NABI v. ABRAMS · filed 2020-01-09

Plaintiff’s claim that a victim or witness, by providing a statement to law enforcement, is converted into a state actor subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot prevail.

A private party may be liable under § 1983 when it acts jointly with police officers, and plausible allegations of joint action can survive dismissal.

Webber v. Deck · filed 2020-01-13

In the second amended complaint, Webber alleges facts, which taken in the light most favorable to him, support his theory that certain unidentified Trump Campaign staff members, along with Doucette and Deck, worked jointly with the Manchester police to remove him from the No Labels event. Although minimally sufficient, his allegations are enough to avoid dismissal of the § 1983 claims against the Campaign Defendants at this stage.

Private corporations are not liable under § 1983 without allegations that they acted jointly with state officials to violate federal rights.

Rogers v. Doctor · filed 2020-01-14

Here, Plaintiff does not allege the two Defendant corporations came to any understanding with any state actors to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. As a result, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a § 1983 claim against these two Defendant corporations.

A private lawyer who merely represents a client in a traditional adversarial role is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Committe v. Miller Nash Graham & Dunn LLP · filed 2020-01-23

Here, the complaint and attached exhibit reveal that defendants merely represented their client in the traditional adversarial role. Thus, plaintiff unsupported conclusions are inadequate to state a claim under § 1983 against defendants.

Section 1983 does not make private individuals state actors merely because they report someone to the police or cooperate with a criminal investigation.

BUTLER v. DJINDJIEV · filed 2020-01-23

Even if Ziemba and Koch reported Butler to the police or cooperated with the police in connection with the criminal proceeding against Butler, that conduct does not convert them into state actors for purposes of § 1983. ... Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Butler’s claims against Ziemba and Koch because they are not state actors.

Section 1983 does not generally permit a claim against a private defense attorney absent facts showing action under color of state law.

Debellis v. Andrew Nash and James Flynn · filed 2020-02-13

As Defendant Gurwitch is a private party who does not work for any state or other government body, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against him under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires conduct fairly attributable to the state; a claim against private medical providers fails without facts showing state action.

Churchill v. Amin Family Medical Center · filed 2020-03-02

In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege conduct on the part of any Defendant that is fairly attributable to the state. The Court, therefore, finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a federal § 1983 claim against Defendants.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s conduct to be fairly attributable to the state.

Smith v. Kim · filed 2020-03-10

But there are no allegations in the Complaint from which this Court may reasonably infer that any alleged conduct attributed to Defendants satisfies one or more of the above- described tests necessary to render their conduct fairly attributable to the State of Ohio. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim against Defendants and this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private entity only when its conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Rappe v. Unknown Train Conductor · filed 2020-03-11

A private actor may be sued under § 1983 only if the private actor’s conduct is “fairly attributable to the state.” ... Even construing Plaintiff’s complaint liberally, however, the Court cannot plausibly infer that Union Pacific is a state actor.

A private demolition contractor is not liable under Section 1983 merely because it performed work under a municipal contract; its conduct must qualify as state action.

Cordts v. Griffis · filed 2020-03-16

The Bush defendants’ role in the demolition is insufficient to make them state actors. Therefore, the Court will grant their motion for summary judgment on Counts III through VI of the complaint.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private citizen merely for petitioning a court and obtaining a harassment restraining order.

Fredin v. Street · filed 2020-03-17

The fact that she successfully obtained the HRO issued by the Ramsey County District Court does not demonstrate the type of conduct necessary to otherwise confer § 1983 liability on a private citizen.

A private party’s conduct must have a sufficiently close connection to the state to support liability under § 1983; giving law enforcement access to an account alone does not establish that connection.

Corley v. Vance · filed 2020-03-20

This plainly does not adequately allege that Backpage.com acted as a “willful participant in joint activity” with these Government Defendants, nor that this private action bears such a close nexus with the State that it may fairly be attributed to the State.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party when allegations plausibly show joint action with state officers or significant state encouragement of the challenged conduct.

Chilcoat v. San Juan County · filed 2020-03-30

Chilcoat has sufficiently alleged facts showing encouragement and involvement back and forth between Odell and San Juan County to support a claim against him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s conduct to be fairly attributable to the state; a false arrest claim fails without alleged coordination between the private defendant and state actors.

Newell v. Apple Inc. · filed 2020-04-01

Absent some allegation of coordination between Apple and the state actors involved in his arrest, Newell’s claim against Apple under § 1983 fails.

Section 1983 does not cover a private physician’s conduct unless the physician acts under color of state law.

Harrison v. Christiansen · filed 2020-04-07

Purely private conduct, no matter how wrongful, injurious, fraudulent, or discriminatory, is not actionable under § 1983 or the Fourteenth Amendment.

A private defendant is liable under § 1983 only if its conduct is fairly attributable to the state; a government contract or conclusory conspiracy allegations do not establish state action.

Marble v. Snyder · filed 2020-04-10

Plaintiffs’ complaint does not allege facts to show that McLaren, LAN, or VNA are state actors for any purposes under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A private defendant’s conduct must qualify as state action to support a § 1983 claim; evidence of interdependence or a meeting of the minds with state officials can establish that connection.

Pikaluk v. Horseshoe Entertainment, L.P., et · filed 2020-04-16

But even without evidence of an independent investigation, summary judgment on Pikaluk’s § 1983 claim was still proper because of the lack of evidence of any “interdependence” or “meeting of the minds” between the state officials and the Horseshoe Defendants.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private party’s report to law enforcement, without facts showing joint action with officials, does not meet that requirement.

Barnett v. Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable · filed 2020-04-20

The complaint contains no factual allegations to support a plausible inference that the AG’s office acted under Defendants’ influence beyond their being a source of information.

A private rehabilitation facility does not become a state actor under Section 1983 merely because a court ordered a patient to stay there.

Vaughn v. Phoenix House New York · filed 2020-04-22

The fact that Vaughn remained at Phoenix House is insufficient to state a Section 1983 claim because Phoenix House is a private entity that cannot be said to have engaged in state action.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on private parties who do not act under color of state law.

Patterson v. Patterson · filed 2020-04-23

As Defendant Shawn Patterson is a private party who does not work for any state or other government body, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against this defendant under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a claim against a private party only when its conduct can be attributed to the state.

Carver v. Houchens Food Group, Inc. · filed 2020-04-24

There are limited circumstances in which a private party can be sued under § 1983, but none appear applicable to Carver’s allegations.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant’s conduct is attributable to the state; conclusory allegations of a conspiracy with state actors do not suffice.

Schwab v. Kobach · filed 2020-04-28

Plaintiffs have pleaded no facts capable of supporting a rational finding that there was a meeting of the minds, the defendants formed an agreement, or that they engaged in a general conspiracy. And, plaintiffs allege no other facts establishing how a factfinder fairly could attribute the conduct of the state of Kansas to the Allisons. Thus, the court dismisses plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against defendants Anthony and Michelle Allison.

Section 1983 permits claims against private parties only when their conduct qualifies as state action.

Wiley v. V A of Birmingham · filed 2020-04-29

Wiley has not alleged facts indicating that any of these three tests have been satisfied with respect to the alleged actions of Alabama Power, Priority Veteran, Skowronek, and Young.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against private parties without allegations that they conspired or acted jointly with a state actor.

Jimenez v. Grand Sierra Resort · filed 2020-05-06

Furthermore, Judge Baldwin found that Plaintiff failed to state a colorable claim against Defendants who are private parties and who Plaintiff has not alleged conspired or entered joint action with a state actor. ... The Court agrees with Judge Baldwin.

A private party’s misuse of a state procedure does not establish state action under § 1983 when the State unknowingly accepts the result.

Yates v. Washington Federation of State Employees, AFSCME Council 28, AFL-CIO · filed 2020-06-12

Instead, she claims that the State passed a statute with insufficient safeguards against its own violation and unknowingly accepted an allegedly forged signature. This is not the kind of government “aid” that courts have required to constitute state action by private parties. Yates’s § 1983 claims against WFSE fail as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private actor absent joint action with the state or its agents.

Padin v. J.P. · filed 2020-06-12

Because he is a private actor, he cannot be sued for a violation of Section 1983 absent joint action with the state or its agents, which Padin does not allege.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private attorney without facts showing state action or a plausible conspiracy with state actors.

Markham v. Bezinque · filed 2020-06-18

Again, Plaintiff has not set forth any allegations that give rise to Bezinque’s liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a private attorney. Plaintiff’s claim that Bezinque participated in a conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights is vague and conclusory.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s conduct to be attributable to the state; calling the sheriff alone does not make a private person a state actor.

Bonnette v. Dick · filed 2020-06-22

The mere fact that the Neighbor Defendants called the Fresno County Sheriff’s Department does not make them state actors, particularly where, as here, Plaintiffs have failed to allege joint action or conspiracy as discussed further above. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a cognizable claim under section 1983 against the Neighbor Defendants.

Section 1983 generally does not permit claims against private parties because a defendant must act under color of state law.

Carroll v. Pollard · filed 2020-06-25

Private parties generally cannot ... be held liable under Section 1983.

A private actor’s receipt of police assistance does not, by itself, make the actor’s conduct state action under § 1983.

Meadows v. United Services, Inc. · filed 2020-06-26

First, though Meadows does assert that two police officers accompanied the United Services employees who came to his home to conduct a welfare check, the mere fact that a private actor received police assistance is not sufficient to transform that private actor’s conduct into state action for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 does not make a private contractor a state actor merely because the contractor works for a city.

Graham-Johnson v. City of Albany · filed 2020-07-09

Thus, without more, the contract between Reeves and the City does not allow a plausible inference that Reeves was a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Darby II v. United Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2020-07-14

Therefore, the Complaint fails to state a Section 1983 claim against United Auto Insurance Company.

Section 1983 requires allegations showing that a private attorney acted jointly with state officials; conclusory conspiracy allegations do not suffice.

Castaneda v. State of CA · filed 2020-07-15

Mr. Castaneda fails to allege facts showing that the private attorneys are state actors. ... Mr. Castaneda’s allegations fail to show that Mr. Conway engaged in a conspiracy with agents or employees of the state court to violate Mr. Castaneda’s constitutional rights, or were otherwise in such a position of interdependence so as to be considered joint participants.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a private attorney is not a state actor merely by representing a class.

Caldwell v. Sutton · filed 2020-07-20

Mr. Caldwell fails to state a claim under Section 1983 because Ms. Sutton is a private actor, not a state actor.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on foster parents for restricting a parent’s contact with a child unless their conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Rickman v. Osterman · filed 2020-08-04

While a somewhat close call, the Court ultimately agrees with Judge Johnston’s determination that the Van Vulkensburgs’ conduct failed to amount to governmental action.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private physician when the complaint adequately alleges that the physician acted under color of state law.

Mills v. Rogers · filed 2020-08-04

In the instant case, viewing the compliant in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that Plaintiff adequately alleges that Defendant Pujara is a state actor. The Court, therefore, will deny Defendant Pujara’s motion to dismiss on state action grounds.

A § 1983 claim against a private company must plausibly allege that it was a state actor and that its conduct caused the alleged harm.

Sears v. Jefferson County Detention Center · filed 2020-08-10

In short, Plaintiff’s allegations in his complaint fail to plausibly show he is entitled to relief against Defendant Aramark, e.g., that Defendant Aramark is a state actor and that Defendant Aramark subjects Plaintiff to exposure to the coronavirus at the jail.

A § 1983 claim against a private landlord requires allegations connecting the landlord’s conduct to state action.

Hamilton v. 1209 Village Walk Trust LLC · filed 2020-08-18

Here, Plaintiff brings Section 1983 claims against his landlord, Defendant 1209 Village Walk Trust, LLC, who is a private party. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant is in joint action with the state, that it was delegated a public function by the state, that it is involved in governmental policy, or that it is otherwise managed or controlled by the state.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private institution to allege facts showing state action; employer liability also requires a policy that caused the alleged violation.

Kilayko-Gullas v. East End Temple · filed 2020-08-20

But she alleges no facts suggesting that the security guard or the institution itself was acting as a state actor when the security guard prohibited her from entering the temple. And even if the security guard was acting as a state actor, Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that the security guard prohibited her from entering the temple due to a policy of his employer, which the Court assumes, for the purpose of this order, is the East End Temple. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

A private company contracted to provide food to prisoners can be a state actor under § 1983.

Spurling v. Trinity Services Group Inc. · filed 2020-04-14

Although the Court does not agree with Trinity’s position that it cannot be deemed a state actor in the alleged circumstances (see, e.g., Horn v. Hunt, Case No. 2: 15-CV-220, 2015 WL 5873290, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 8, 2015) (holding that private food service company hired by Ohio prisons could be a state actor under § 1983)), the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege any plausible claim against Trinity under § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not allow claims against private organizations or individuals who do not act under color of state law.

Jones v. Thomas · filed 2020-08-27

As Defendant VOA is a private non-profit organization, and Defendants Thomas and Tauarez are private parties who do not work for any state or other government body, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against these defendants under § 1983.

Section 1983 treats a private citizen who files criminal charges as a state actor when the citizen performs a public prosecutorial function or acts closely with prosecutors.

MANGO v. City of Columbus · filed 2020-09-03

Ms. Mango alleges that Michael himself filed the criminal charges in her case, a quintessential government act. That distinction is a significant one, and it is determinative in the context of the public function test. The relationship between Michael and the City Attorney’s Office was also sufficiently close, and their actions so intertwined, that, even if Michael was not himself performing a public function, his actions were attributable to the state for purposes of the nexus test. Therefore, Michael is a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 treats a private provider of court-authorized ankle monitoring for pretrial defendants as a state actor because pretrial supervision is a traditionally governmental function.

Meade v. Bonin · filed 2020-09-04

Accordingly, the Court finds that ETOH is a state actor when it provides ankle monitoring services to criminal defendants because monitoring pretrial defendants is a “fundamentally governmental function” that is “traditionally reserved to the state.”

Private physicians may be treated as state actors under § 1983 when their alleged conduct in concert with law enforcement supports a plausible claim of state action.

Simkins v. McIntosh · filed 2020-09-08

In the Court’s view, construing the allegations of the Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, accepting its allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, see Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, 695 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2012), Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim that Dr. Jenkins and Dr. Marien should be deemed “state actors” for purposes of 8 1983.

Section 1983 reaches a private party only when its conduct is fairly attributable to the state; unsupported allegations of a conspiracy with officials do not establish state action.

QUIAH v. THE DEVEREUX FOUNDATION, INC. · filed 2020-09-22

The Third Amended Complaint simply lacks sufficient allegations to show that Devereux was engaged in a conspiracy with the governmental Defendants, and I therefore find that there is no state action on the part of Devereux. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Devereux must be dismissed accordingly.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private person willfully collaborated with the state toward an unlawful goal to establish state action under a joint action theory.

Singh v. City of New York · filed 2020-09-24

Because Plaintiff has only alleged that Defendant Mar provided fabricated evidence to the TLC and has not alleged any willful collaboration between the TLC and Mar to achieve any unlawful goal, Plaintiff fails to show that Defendant Mar was a state actor.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on private parties who do not act for a state or other government body.

Richardson v. Duane Reade Corporation · filed 2020-09-24

The Court declines to recharacterize Plaintiff’s claims against Duane Reade and its employees as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because private parties are generally not liable under the statute.

A private contractor that supplies inmate meals under a state contract can be a state actor subject to Section 1983.

Tankesly Jr v. Aramark Services, Inc. · filed 2020-09-28

Plaintiff has also adequately alleged that Aramark is a state actor and thus a proper Section 1983 defendant because it performs the traditional state function of supplying inmate meals, pursuant to a 2016 contract with the State of Tennessee.

Section 1983 generally does not reach private individuals or businesses unless their conduct amounts to state action.

(PS) Tanksley v. Debbie · filed 2020-09-29

Although plaintiff asserts a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such a claim generally does not lie against a private individual or business entity that does not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 generally does not permit claims against private parties who do not work for a state or other government body.

Nacer v. Shea · filed 2020-09-29

Because Shea and Acosta are private parties who do not work for any state or other government body, Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against these defendants.

Section 1983 requires the alleged deprivation to be committed under color of state law; private landlords are not liable without facts connecting their conduct to the state.

Mullikin v. California Square 1 Apartments · filed 2020-10-05

Plaintiff, therefore, fails to satisfy the requirement that the allegedly unconstitutional acts were committed by a person acting under color of state law and fails to state a § 1983 claim against Defendants.

Section 1983 generally does not make private institutions liable unless they act under color of state law.

Kilayko-Gullas v. East End Temple · filed 2020-10-26

Private parties are generally not state actors, and are therefore not usually liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party only when its actions are fairly attributable to the state.

Donald v. Jackson · filed 2020-10-27

Donald does not allege how the actions of Kellogg Company could be attributed to the state and thus does not state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party only when its conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Holder v. AT&T Services, Inc. · filed 2020-10-28

But Plaintiff makes no allegations that AT&T’s conduct was attributable to the state in any way, so she cannot hold AT&T liable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires specific facts linking private defendants to a state actor through joint activity, conspiracy, or another theory.

Perkins v. Rome Memorial Hospital · filed 2020-11-05

Because Plaintiff has not pled specific facts to plausibly link Defendants to a state actor Via joint activity, conspiracy, or any other theory, his Section 1983 claim must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to qualify as a state actor; store loss prevention and reporting a suspected crime to police, without more, do not satisfy the public function, state compulsion, or nexus tests.

Powell v. City of Radcliff, Kentucky · filed 2020-11-13

Thus, the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to support a claim that Rural King and Jackson are state actors under the public function, the state compulsion, or the nexus test. As a result, Powell has failed to state a Section 1983 claim against Rural King and Jackson.

Section 1983 permits claims against private individuals only when their conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Bledsoe v. Schlachtenhaufen · filed 2020-11-16

Appellant did not allege facts that support finding Schlachtenhaufen is a state actor under any of these tests.

Section 1983 requires a private party’s conduct to be attributable to the state; defending and settling a lawsuit does not establish that connection.

Phillips v. Wal-Mart · filed 2020-12-02

In this case, Wal-Mart is a private corporation, not a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a private corporation’s conduct to be fairly attributable to the state.

Macklin v. Dollar General · filed 2020-12-03

Simply put, a Dollar General store is not a state actor. Plaintiff fails to allege that Dollar General or its cashier acted under color of state law, and Plaintiff also fails to show that Dollar General acted with or received aid from state officials.

Private parties do not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes merely by using state eviction procedures.

LIVINGSTONE v. HADDON POINT MANAGER, LLC · filed 2020-12-07

These allegations show nothing more than Defendants “mere invocation of state legal procedures”—conduct which is insufficient as a matter of law to establish the existence of a conspiracy.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law; a conclusory allegation of conspiracy with state officials is insufficient.

BHIMNATHWALA v. NEW JERSEY STATE JUDICIARY, FAMILY DIVISION · filed 2020-12-09

Because Plaintiff has not shown that Shah is a state actor, he cannot proceed with a section 1983 claim against her.

A private party’s use of state court process to obtain a judgment does not by itself make it a state actor under section 1983.

Gustino v. Stoneybrook West Master Association, Inc. · filed 2021-01-04

Thus, the district court did not err in finding that the association was not a state actor under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to have willfully participated in joint activity with a state actor.

West v. Sullivan · filed 2021-01-15

Because West did not allege that Kelsey was a willful participant in joint activity with a state actor, West failed to state a § 1983 claim against Kelsey.

Section 1983 does not treat a political party’s internal election of officers as action under color of state law merely because its central committee also performs governmental duties.

Federspiel v. Ohio Republican Party State Central Committee · filed 1994-11-10

While some of the actions they take when elected, may be interpreted as “state action,” that does not make everything they do nor the process of their election “state action.” More specifically, the fact that the Central Committee fills vacancies has nothing to do with the Plaintiffs’ complaint of alleged improprieties in the election of Party officers. Intra-party elections of officers is not “state action.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private person for joint action with state actors only when the plaintiff shows their agreement and concerted action to deprive the plaintiff of civil rights.

Rubin v. Smith · filed 1996-03-20

“Where a private individual is a defendant in a section 1983 action, there must be a showing that the private party and the state actor jointly deprived plaintiff of her civil rights.” ... Consequently, the court finds and rules that a conspiracy has not been established.

Section 1983 does not treat private attorneys or litigants as state actors merely because they use state procedures to file and pursue a civil lawsuit.

Parker v. Wiser · filed 1996-03-29

Accordingly, this court finds that defendants’ conduct of merely serving a summons and complaint in the underlying state court action, filing a lis pen-dens notice and noticing depositions does not implicate a § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 does not make a private citizen a state actor merely for reporting suspected criminal activity to police, even if an arrest and prosecution follow.

Daniel J. Roche Et Ux. Valerie Roche v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company · filed 1996-04-16

Indeed, to the extent that the' appellant’s thesis implies that a private citizen who articulates his suspicions to the police may, without more, be held liable as a state actor under § 1983 for an ensuing arrest and prosecution if probable cause is lacking, we unequivocally reject it.

A private locksmith hired and paid by a private party is not a state actor under § 1983 merely because police are present, where police neither hire nor direct the locksmith.

Merriman v. Town of Colonie · filed 1996-07-03

Here, however, the Locksmith is a private company whose employee, Mr. Lee, was hired and paid by Michael Diaz, a private party. Although the police were present at the scene, they did not hire Locksmith. In addition, there is no dispute that the police did not direct the Locksmith to take any action regarding the lock. Defendant Locksmith’s motion is granted on this ground.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private group when a sufficient nexus between the state and the challenged conduct makes that conduct state action.

Sheridan v. Intern. Broth. Electrical Workers, Local 455 · filed 1996-09-05

As the Union concedes, at least in certain circumstances, private individuals or groups may be held to answer for constitutional violations pursuant to Section 1983 where there is a sufficient “nexus” between the state and the challenged action. ... In sum, there is clearly a sufficient nexus between the state and MMWEC to find state action in the present matter.

Section 1983 provides a way for prisoners to pursue civil rights claims concerning access to the courts.

Marshall v. Harvanek · filed 2018-12-10

For example, reasonable jurists would not debate whether the district court properly disregarded Marshall’s access to the courts arguments because those are civil rights complaints Marshall can pursue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 covers a claim that a person acting under color of state law violated the plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights.

Courthouse News Services v. Brown · filed 2018-11-13

This action falls within the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: plain- tiff CNS claims that its federal constitutional rights are being violated by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for alleged violations of federal constitutional rights by an entity exercising authority under state law.

Weisshaus v. Port Authority of New York · filed 2012-09-20

In this case, with respect to his constitutional claims, Weisshaus’s challenge to the Port Authority’s actions is that, while exercising its state law authority to regulate toll rates, the Port Authority violated his federal constitutional rights, which is precisely the type of claim for which § 1983 provides a remedy.

Section 1983 covers a prisoner's claim that state prison officials violated constitutional rights by restricting outgoing mail.

Nolan v. Fitzpatrick · filed 1971-05-03

The claim falls within 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and the plaintiffs have exhausted such administrative remedies as they may have under state law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of other rights but creates no independent substantive rights.

Mele v. Christopher · filed 1998-07-07

Plaintiffs, however, overlook the fact that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a purely remedial statute that creates no independent, .substantive rights.

Section 1983 provides a way to enforce federal rights but does not itself create substantive rights.

Johnson v. Wing · filed 1998-07-09

This claim is dismissed because § 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights but merely provides a method of vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”

Section 1983 provides a separate cause of action for deprivation of rights under color of law, distinct from a conspiracy claim under section 1985.

Tracy v. Robbins · filed 1966-04-13

Certainly *113if plaintiffs are pleading conspiracy, and it is in no other way evident, such would constitute a separate cause of action from a claim of deprivation of rights under color of law under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not create a right of action for a lawyer claiming defamation from a bar association's evaluation and publication of judicial qualifications.

Gorman v. Lukowsky · filed 1970-07-30

Accepting the factual averments of the complaint as true and reading them in a light most favorable to plaintiff-appellant, we agree with the District Judge that the complaint does not state a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act. This suit is essentially an action for libel and not for deprivation of civil rights. ... We hold that this type of activity by a Bar Association or its officers and committees does not give a defeated or discredited lawyer any right of action under the Civil Rights statute.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to bring constitutional-rights claims without exhausting state-court remedies, but ordinary keeplock discipline and separate short disciplinary punishments do not state a claim unless motivated by protected beliefs or litigation.

Sczerbaty v. Oswald · filed 1972-03-29

Though the plaintiff has not exhausted his State Court remedies, claims of denial of constitutional rights under § 1983 may, nevertheless, be brought in this Court. ... These claims, as well as the claim based on the “keeplock” discipline do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983. ... Because the questions of motivation discussed cannot be determined, however, without the taking of evidence, the motion to dismiss the amended complaint is denied.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for inmates to seek relief for violations of their constitutional due process rights in parole-review proceedings.

Wagner v. Gilligan · filed 1977-01-25

The right to parole review cannot be arbitrarily vitiated without depriving inmates of a liberty interest in violation of Due Process. This Court finds that plaintiffs’ claims are cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows damages actions for unlawful arrest and detention, does not make defamation claims cognizable absent a federally protected right, and does not require exhaustion of state judicial remedies.

Zurek v. Woodbury · filed 1978-03-17

It is well-settled that an action for unlawful arrest and detention may be brought under 42 U.SiC. § 1983 as it represents an unconstitutional deprivation under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. ... A defamation claim does not implicate any federally protected right and is therefore not cognizable under the Civil Rights Act. ... It is well-settled that state judicial remedies need not be exhausted before bringing a civil rights action.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a Social Security Act claim that does not involve equal or civil rights.

Baranauckas v. Blum · filed 1979-12-21

The Social Security Act gives rise to no cause of action for plaintiffs to rely on. The Act does not involve “equal” or “civil” rights within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), (4) and does not involve 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for a bidder’s due-process and equal-protection violations arising from arbitrary or unequal application of governmental bidding rules, including claims against a municipality acting through official policy and a private entity acting in concert with a state actor.

Three Rivers Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 1980-11-12

The above laws and regulations constitute the “existing rules or understandings” from which the property interest, if present, is created and its dimensions defined. ... Simply stated, that interest was the right of the lowest responsible bidder in full compliance with the specifications to be awarded the contract once the city in fact decided to make an award. The due process to which one possessing the protected interest was entitled was the non-arbitrary exercise by the city of its discretion in making the award. ... Those allegations of unequal application of the otherwise facially neutral bidding provisions clearly state a § 1983 claim for denial of equal protection. ... State law and the Home Rule Charter obviously are not the sole repository of the city’s official policy. ... where a private entity acts in concert with a state actor, the former is also subject to liability under § 1983.

For a § 1983 claim alleging a politically motivated public-employment demotion, the cause of action accrues when the employee receives official notice and knows of the illegal motive.

Navarro v. Chardón · filed 1980-11-14

The plaintiff instituted this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, and by virtue of this Court’s pendant jurisdiction under local law, 18 LPRA §§ 211, 214, 249e, alleging a work demotion based on political considerations. ... We find that a cause of action for a demotion in public employment for political motives accrues when the employee is given such official notice and he is aware of the illegal motives behind such action.

Title VII’s policymaking-position exemption does not carry over to bar discrimination and retaliation claims under § 1983.

Cronovich v. Dunn · filed 1983-10-11

As to whether the Title VII exemption for policy making positions is to be read into 42 U.S.C. § 1983, I have twice considered this question and twice decided there is no carryover.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights and serves only as a vehicle for enforcing rights supplied by the federal Constitution and laws.

Lynn v. Smith · filed 1985-08-13

It is clear that § 1983 does not provide any substantive rights, but serves only to ensure that there exists a vehicle for bringing an action for violations of the federal Constitution and laws.

Section 1983 provides claims for false arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution.

Sullivan v. Marshall · filed 1985-09-09

John Sullivan has stated viable claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, the use of excessive force and malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 does not provide an action for failure to give Miranda warnings; the remedy is exclusion of compelled self-incrimination.

Warren v. City of Lincoln, Nebraska James Breen Sandra L. Myers and David M. Beggs · filed 1989-01-04

Thus, the remedy for a Miranda violation is the exclusion from evidence of any compelled self-incrimination, not a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for verbal harassment or abuse by prison officers standing alone.

Alnutt v. Cleary · filed 1996-01-08

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for every common law tort and a civil rights suit is not designed to rectify harassment or verbal abuse.

Section 1983 claims based on an arrest for protected speech do not require the plaintiff to challenge the constitutionality of the underlying ordinance.

John Sandul, Robert Sandul, and Devona Sandul v. Timothy Larion, Sgt. Robert Stevenson, and Sgt. Lawrence Little · filed 1997-07-23

While the Livonia ordinances are presumptively valid as they have not been challenged, Sandul’s § 1983 claims are unaffected by his failure to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinances.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Szymanski v. Benton · filed 2008-08-14

Even if Mr. Szymanski is correct, the allegation that Corporal Birkle violated a prison rule does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983, “which establishes a cause of action only for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.”

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution and laws; private persons may be liable through conspiracy with a state official, while judges have absolute immunity for acts performed in their judicial duties.

Weaver v. Haworth · filed 1975-11-25

The judicial immunity doctrine applies in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Said immunity is absolute even though the judge may act with malice. ... The conduct complained of in the Complaint on its face might appear to be outside the scope of said Defendant’s judicial duties or authority, but in such event said Defendant would not be acting under color of state law and the first essential element to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would not be present. ... Plaintiff correctly states the rule that a private person can only be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to a conspiracy with a state official acting under color of state law. ... The Complaint therefore fails to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as to any Defendant.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for allegations that do not state a civil-rights claim, and judicial officers acting in their judicial capacities are immune from damages or equitable relief.

Queen v. Efird · filed 1981-01-27

Although plaintiff Tieaded that document as a complaint under section 1983, the document does not set out a civil claim of any sort. ... Under ordinary principles of judicial immunity, it would appear that the defendants, judicial officers acting in their judicial capacities, should not be held liable for damages or equitable relief for the transgressions alleged.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives a citizen of constitutional or statutory rights, but conclusory allegations may be inadequate and judicial immunity may bar relief.

New York v. Wood · filed 1966-02-15

Petitioner has also failed to allege any gi’ounds for relief under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides that any “person who, tinder color of any statute * * * of any State * * * subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States * * * to the deprivation of any rights * * * secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law * * This claim was neither briefed nor argued and petitioner’s conclusory statements as to the denial of his constitutional rights are wholly inadequate, Walle v. Dallett, 136 F.Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y.1955), particularly when considered in light of the broad judicial immunity available under this section. Saier v. State Bar of Michigan, 293 F.2d 756, 761 (6th Cir. 1961).

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a suable person, while allegations against individual state officials may state a claim for relief.

Williford v. People of the State of California · filed 1965-12-03

In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-192, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, it was held that a municipal corporation is not a "person" subject to suit within the meaning of R.S.1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A municipal corporation is but a political subdivision of a state, and if a state's political subdivisions are not "persons" under the statute, then neither is the state. See, also, Charlton v. City of Hialeah, 5 Cir., 188 F.2d 421, 422-423. The district court therefore did not err in granting the Rule 12(b) (6) motion as to the defendant state. ... Concerning the personal defendants, the allegations of fact state a claim under the Civil Rights Act, on which relief can be granted. See Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733, 12 L.Ed.2d 1030. The district court therefore erred in granting the Rule 12(b) (6) motion as to those defendants.

Section 1983 does not permit a plaintiff to proceed against individual state judges for conduct protected by judicial immunity.

Lenske v. Sercombe · filed 1967-04-17

Moreover, the plaintiff cannot proceed against the individual Judges under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not abolish the established immunity of judges for acts performed within their judicial role.

Gilland v. Hyder · filed 1967-05-03

The fixing by the defendant of the plaintiff’s term in the penitentiary was a judicial function of the defendant. T. C.A. § 40-2704. “ * * * The immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role is * * * well-established, and [courts will] presume that Congress would have specifically [abolished this settled principle of law in enacting 42 U. S.C. § 1983] had it wished to abolish the doctrine. * * * ” Pierson v. Ray (1967), 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 295 (headnote 5).

Section 1983 does not immunize judicial personnel from damages suits for ministerial acts.

Norwood v. Solomon · filed 1977-05-11

In McCray v. State of Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972), however, the court analyzed the concept of judicial immunity with reference to judicial personnel and concluded that such immunity will not be granted where the action complained of is ministerial. The claim made in McCray was identical to the one herein and the court concluded that judicial immunity did not apply. This Court agrees with the reasoning in McCray and concludes that defendant is not immune under the circumstances herein.

Section 1983 does not provide damages against a judge for judicial acts performed within the judge’s jurisdiction, even when jurisdictional issues involve factual disputes or debatable questions of law.

Fanale v. Sheehy · filed 1967-11-09

The Court there held that a judge is immune from suit under the Civil Rights Act when he acts “within his jurisdiction” or “within the judicial role.” ... Even if the justice of the peace was in error in resolving these questions of jurisdiction, he is not liable under the Civil Rights Act. Where jurisdiction depends on the resolution of factual issues or involves debatable questions of law judges do not lose their immunity.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state or local law that deprives a person of federally secured rights, and it does not abolish common-law judicial immunity for judges acting within their jurisdiction.

Jemzura v. Belden · filed 1968-02-16

There are two essential elements requisite to a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act: (1) that the conduct complained of must have been done by some person acting under color of state or local law; and (2) that such conduct deprived plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States. ... Common law immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872), was not abolished by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which makes liable “every person” who under color of law deprives another person of his civil rights.

Section 1983 does not abolish the settled common-law immunity of judges and related judicial officers for acts performed within their judicial functions.

Sullivan v. Kelleher · filed 1968-12-24

The inclusion of opprobrious epithets, such as alleging that the judicial officer acted maliciously or corruptly, adds nothing of legal consequence to the complaint, Bradley v. Fisher, supra 13 Wall 351, reaffirmed, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), wherein the Court held that the settled common law principle of judicial immunity was not abolished by § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on judges for acts taken in their judicial capacity.

United States ex rel. Hansuer v. Commonwealth · filed 1968-12-30

In addition, aside from the merits of whether petitioner is entitled to the documents he requests, construing this petition as a civil rights action, it is clearly established that judges are immune from liability under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not abolish established common-law judicial immunity for acts within the judicial role.

Wilhelm v. Turner · filed 1970-06-30

We do not believe that this settled principle of law was abolished by § 1983, which makes liable `every person' who under color of law deprives another person of his civil rights.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit against a judge for acts performed in the judge’s judicial capacity.

Carpenter v. Oldham · filed 1970-06-30

Under the doctrine of judicial immunity, a judge acting in his judicial capacity, is immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 for acts performed in that capacity.

Section 1983 can apply to prison doctors and other private individuals when they act under color of state law and deprive someone of a federal right.

United States Ex Rel. Ingram v. Montgomery County Prison Board · filed 1974-01-22

However, the Statute clearly states “Every person” and not “Every Official.” Whether someone is an official or not is irrelevant; the only issue is whether or not such person acts under color of state law and deprives another of a Federal right.

A judge has absolute judicial immunity from Section 1983 damages liability for acts performed in a judicial capacity.

Green v. Camilla Maraio and Angelo J. Ingrassia · filed 1983-11-07

A judge defending against a section 1983 action is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages liability for acts performed in his judicial capacity.

Judicial immunity bars a § 1983 damages action unless the judge acted nonjudicially or in the clear absence of all subject-matter jurisdiction.

Ross v. Arnold · filed 1983-12-22

The immunity conferred by this rule is forfeited only when the judge in question acts in a nonjudicial capacity or in the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter.