42 U.S.C. § 1983

Judicial immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief under § 1983 against a judicial officer acting in a judicial capacity.

Pulliam v. Allen · filed 1984-05-14

Our own experience is fully consistent with the common law’s rejection of a rule of judicial immunity from prospective relief.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not abrogate common-law judicial and prosecutorial immunity because Congress did not specifically provide for the abolition of those settled immunities when it enacted the statute.

Filan v. Martin · filed 1984-07-12

As for the Civil Rights Act, Congress would have specifically so provided if it intended to abolish such settled rules of law as judicial and prosecutorial immunity.

Quasi-judicial officials receive absolute immunity in § 1983 actions for acts involving judge-like discretion, but only qualified immunity for purely ministerial acts.

Powell v. Nigro · filed 1985-01-16

While indeed performing a judicial function, the Committee members are entitled to absolute immunity for those acts where they exercise judge-like discretion, not when they perform a purely ministerial act.

A court-appointed receiver has judicial immunity from § 1983 liability for conduct within the scope of the receiver’s court-conferred authority.

Property Management & Investments, Inc. v. Lewis · filed 1985-02-08

Appellant contends, however, that the district court erred in determining that the activities alleged in the complaint were within the scope of the authority granted to Spencer. We reject appellant’s contention.

Judges have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages liability for acts performed in their judicial capacities.

Thurston v. Robison · filed 1985-02-22

The courts have consistently adhered to the rule that judges defending against § 1983 actions enjoy absolute immunity from damages liability , for acts performed in their judicial capacities.

A judge remains absolutely immune from § 1983 damages for judicial acts even when the alleged harm resulted from bribery or conspiracy.

Holloway v. Judge Dee Brown Walker, Judge Dee Brown Walker · filed 1985-07-18

Thus, where the alleged harm, though resulting from a bribe or conspiracy, was inflicted by acts to which absolute immunity would apply, the complaint is insufficient to avoid judicial immunity.

Judges are immune from § 1983 civil liability for acts performed in their judicial capacities.

Sherman v. Babbitt · filed 1985-10-03

Judges are immune from civil liability in section 1983 actions for acts performed in their judicial capacities.

A judge has absolute immunity from § 1983 damages liability for demoting and dismissing a probation officer when those personnel decisions are judicial acts within the judge's authority.

Forrester v. Judge Howard Lee White · filed 1986-06-05

To summarize, we hold that the defendant’s decisions to demote and dismiss the plaintiff were judicial acts performed within the scope of his authority.

Section 1983 liability requires a defendant to possess power under state law and misuse that power to violate federal constitutional rights.

Christian v. Belcher · filed 1989-10-23

Thus, before a defendant may be held liable under section 1983, that defendant must first possess power by virtue of state law, then misuse that power in a way that violates federal constitutional rights.

Under § 1983, judges are immune from damages for judicial acts, and a county circuit court is not a person subject to suit.

Polyak v. Jim T. Hamilton, Individually and in His Judicial Capacity as Circuit Judge Circuit Court of Lawrence · filed 1993-08-17

Under Sec. 1983, judges are immune from damages for judicial acts, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), and a county circuit court is not a "person" as required by Sec. 1983. Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 418 (6th Cir.1988).

Section 1983 claims against private parties fail without allegations of state action or governmental deprivation of a constitutional right, and judicial immunity bars damages claims against a family court commissioner.

Durbin v. Colleen S. Durbin Larry Alan Lehmbecker Harry Slusher, Family Court Commissioner · filed 1993-11-19

First, the claims against Durbin's ex-wife and her attorney failed to state a claim because Durbin did not allege state action, or a governmental deprivation of a constitutional right. ... Second, the district court properly dismissed Durbin's damage claims against Commissioner Slusher because the claims were barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity, see Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court, Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir.), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040 (1988).

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives someone of federally protected rights.

Njaka v. Wright County · filed 2008-05-27

Section 1983 provides for liability in an action at law against any person who, under color of State law, deprives any citizen “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by” federal law.

Section 1983 permits claims for damages and some injunctive relief, but does not allow a plaintiff to seek criminal prosecution or suspension of a medical license.

Draper v. United States · filed 2020-12-09

Plaintiff is advised while he can seek monetary damages and some injunctive relief such as medical care, he cannot seek criminal prosecution or suspension of a medical license in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize a court to order a defendant’s employment terminated.

Jackson v. Wicking · filed 2020-11-23

Finally, the Court notes that the complaint’s only request for relief from any defendant is the request for Wicking’s employment to be terminated. ... The Court does not have the authority to grant this relief under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide an order sentencing a plaintiff to time served.

DICKERSON v. CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY · filed 2020-07-29

Injunctive relief sentencing Plaintiff to “time served” is not an available remedy under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief that can include expunging a prison conduct report.

Jones v. Russell · filed 2015-12-09

Indeed, federal courts have expunged conduct reports in other Section 1983 cases. E.g., Ware v. Heyne, 575 F.2d 593, 596 (7th Cir.1978) (upholding district court decision to expunge bad conduct report obtained in violation of prisoner’s constitutional rights). Défendants have shown no reason why this court’s authority to issue injunc-tive relief does hot include the authority to expunge a conduct report.

Section 1983 claims may proceed for injunctive relief or nominal or punitive damages even when a prisoner cannot recover compensatory damages without showing physical injury.

Alex v. Stalder · filed 2007-04-27

However, he may be entitled to injunctive relief, see Harper, 174 F.3d at 719, and nominal or punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits relief for political or national origin discrimination even when the plaintiff lacks a property interest in the position from which he was removed.

Figueroa v. Saldana · filed 1986-10-10

Therefore, even though plaintiff has no property interest in the position, he is entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action and remedy for deprivation of federally protected rights, but it does not itself confer subject-matter jurisdiction.

Lake Lansing Special Assessment Protest Ass'n v. Ingham County Board of Commissioners · filed 1980-04-16

Section 1983 of Title 42 creates a cause of action for deprivation of federally protected rights. It is a “civil action authorized by law” over which District Courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. ... It is clear that Section 1983 does not confer jurisdiction at all and, therefore, is not authority that the Court has original jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s action.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for improper interstate extradition when the violation also breaches the minimum requirements of the federal extradition clause and statute.

Brown v. Nutsch · filed 1980-04-18

We hold that section 1983 provides a remedy for improper extradition in violation of the extradition clause and statute. ... We do not hold that section 1983 provides a remedy for every violation of state statutes implementing the constitutional clause and federal statute. Only those violations of state statutes which also violate the minimal requirements of the constitutional clause and the federal statute give rise to a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 provides a federal civil-rights remedy for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal laws, but not for rights created solely by state law.

Saunders v. Cahill · filed 1973-05-17

It is clear that if the plaintiffs have a right to information concerning vacancies filled by temporary appointees and the right to apply for promotion to such vacancies, these rights are derived solely from the law of Illinois. The plaintiffs rights are not rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The alleged deprivation of plaintiffs’ state created rights is not the proper subject of a claim for relief under 42 U. S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not displace equitable principles of comity and federalism that ordinarily bar a federal injunction against a state's administration of its criminal laws absent compelling circumstances.

Harrington v. Arceneaux · filed 1973-03-22

Insofar as petitioner is seeking an injunction under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq., the same considerations advanced above prevail.

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a person liable for damages, and negligent or mistaken medical diagnosis alone is not a constitutional deprivation absent abuse, mistreatment, or denial of essential medical attention.

Cradle v. Superintendent, Correctional Field Unit 7 · filed 1973-04-02

Even if an institutional physician has been negligent or mistaken in his diagnosis, such an error would not raise a constitutional issue cognizable in a § 1983 action in the absence of some evidence of abuse, mistreatment or denial of essential medical attention. ... As to the alleged lack of success of that care, it does not constitute a constitutional deprivation over which this court has jurisdiction. ... The State of Virginia cannot be held liable for damages in such a case as this, as it is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a person to seek damages for a constitutional violation by state officials acting under state authority.

Kilaru v. Watts · filed 1973-02-05

I believe that the complaint adequately states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is not rendered moot because the plaintiff has since become a citizen, and is not tainted by laches.

Section 1983 supports a civil tort action for damages when state officials violate a person's civil rights, including through illegal incarceration.

Speaks v. Pittsylvania County · filed 1973-02-20

Therefore, between April 22, 1968 and September 5, 1968 the plaintiff was illegally incarcerated in Virginia, and his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were violated. ... Although this case concerns the rights of a person convicted of crimes, it is none the less a civil tort action and damages must be proved and determined in the same manner as they are for any other tort case. ... Therefore, the court finds that while a wrong was done, no damage was sustained. ... Therefore, this court awards the plaintiff damages in the amount of one dollar.

Section 1983 damages remedies are subject to common-law defenses, and an officer's conduct is judged by the common-law reasonableness of the officer's belief.

Rodriguez v. Jones · filed 1973-02-06

The remedy under Section 1983 is, therefore, subject to defenses which are valid at common law. Consequently, in line with these well-established precedents we appraise the officers’ conduct in forcibly entering the private dwelling of appellants against the background of tort liability to determine if damages are allowable under Section 1983. In so doing, we find that the test to be applied is the common law criterion of reasonableness of belief on the part of the officers.

Section 1983 creates a congressional exception to the federal anti-injunction statute, permitting federal courts to enjoin future state-court proceedings.

Boraas v. The Village of Belle Terre, an Incorporated Municipality · filed 1973-04-05

... and that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutes a congressionally carved out exception to the anti-injunction statute.

Section 1983 does not permit money-damages claims against state judges acting within the apparent scope of their judicial duties.

Blouin v. Dembitz · filed 1973-03-30

The defendant Family Court Judges here are acting solely in their capacity as Judges of a state court, and within the apparent scope of their judicial duties. As such they are immune from civil rights actions for money damages, which are sought here. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967).

Section 1983 does not immunize a judge from suit when the requested relief concerns recordkeeping rather than the exercise of a judicial function, although a judge exercising a judicial function is not liable under § 1983 for damages.

Bilick v. Dudley · filed 1973-03-30

A judge exercising his judicial function is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, at least for damages. ... But in the present case, the relief to be granted against the Administrative Judge and the Chief Clerk of the Criminal Court will have no effect upon the exercise of the judicial function. ... Where, as here, there is no interference with any real judicial function, there is no immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims for damages against public officials even though comparable damages actions were unavailable at common law.

Buss v. Douglas · filed 1973-03-27

The present action is brought, not with common law underpinnings, but as a direct result of a statute permitting in derogation of the common law claims for damages against public officials.

Section 1983 permits state courts to hear claims when exclusive federal jurisdiction has not been granted and authorizes damages, nominal damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and other appropriate relief.

International Prisoners' Union v. Rizzo · filed 1973-04-02

Although state courts have rarely exercised jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims, they are not precluded from doing so wherever exclusive jurisdiction is neither expressly or impliedly granted to the federal courts. See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136, 23 L.Ed. 833 (1876); Here the state court assumed Section 1983 jurisdiction and granted relief under it. ... The relief available under Section 1983 is extensive and varied. A plaintiff is entitled to recover damages if he can prove that the conduct was performed under color of state law and denied him his constitutional rights. See, e. g., Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962). Nominal damages are available regardless of whether actual damages have been proved. See, e. g., Washington v. Official Court Stenographer, 251 F.Supp. 945 (E.D.Pa.1966). Moreover, injunctive relief is available under Section 1983. Plaintiff is entitled, of course, to declaratory or other such relief as is appropriate. Pursuant to its Section 1983 jurisdiction, the Court of Common Pleas was empowered to grant any appropriate relief under the statute.

Section 1983 provides a federal civil-rights remedy against a state official, allowing the court to hear the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.

Yanito v. Barber · filed 1972-09-20

We determine that the court has jurisdiction of the cause pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support an injunction against a pending state prosecution absent unusual circumstances involving irreparable harm.

People v. Barnard · filed 1965-03-16

As for the alternative civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an injunction against the state prosecution, the motion to dismiss must also be granted. The petition seeks relief -from this court’s acting as a court of equity. However, it has long been established that a federal court of equity will not enjoin state prosecutions except in unusual cases where irreparable harm will otherwise result. Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 46 S.Ct. 492, 70 L.Ed. 927 (1926). For example, Jehovah’s Witnesses were not entitled to an injunction to restrain prosecution of plaintiffs for violation of allegedly unconstitutional ordinances interfering with plaintiffs’ religious liberties, where there was no showing of irreparable injury, and there was no reason to believe that state courts would not protect plaintiffs’ rights. Whisler v. City of West Plains, Mo., 137 F.2d 938 (CCA 8, 1943). In the instant case, there has been no allegation that irreparable harm will result from state prosecution, and in view of the fact that petitioners have already been acquitted in Ann Arbor Municipal Court on a misdemeanor charge of obstructing the public way growing out of the same incident, there is no reason to believe that the atmosphere in Ann Arbor is so prejudicial to petitioners that the State court will not protect their rights.

Section 1983 relief is not barred because the plaintiff failed to first pursue an available state or local remedy.

Anderson v. Town of Forest Park, Oklahoma · filed 1965-03-24

The Court concludes that although the plaintiff and the intervenors did not appeal the action of the Town Clerk denying them building permits to the Board of Trustees, the failure to appeal does not defeat their right to relief in this Court under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy only for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution or federal laws, so a violation of a state arraignment statute alone is insufficient.

Bradford v. Lefkowitz · filed 1965-04-29

The Civil Rights Act protects only rights secured by the Constitution and statutes of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was not intended to incorporate every violation of a state right nor to provide preemption of such rights in a federal remedy. ... It is clear, therefore, that the claim for alleged false imprisonment for the pre-arraignment period is not such a claim as is contemplated under the federal statute.

Section 1983 permits a federal civil action for deprivation of constitutional rights based on an arbitrary state property-tax assessment when the plaintiff lacks an adequate state remedy.

Hornbeak v. Hamm · filed 1968-04-10

It is my firm conviction that such arbitrariness on the part of the State authorities (and upon the present submission it is conceded that the plaintiff has no State remedy) in the assessment of real estate for purposes of taxation by the State of Alabama is, if the appropriate complaint and allegations are made under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, cognizable in a federal district court as a “civil action for deprivation of rights” and jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(3) “to redress the deprivation.”

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a deprivation of rights arising solely under state law.

Gentry v. Howard · filed 1968-04-30

Violation of rights which stem solely from a relationship of a citizen to his state or a right derived solely from state law is not protected by the Federal Constitution or the federal statutes. The right to become a candidate for state office is an incident to state citizenship rather than national citizenship.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for a party individually injured by a deprivation of a constitutional right, not for abstract rights or public wrongs whose impact is shared by the public.

Barr v. Chatman · filed 1968-07-05

We do not believe that this alleged dilution of the right to vote, if it be a dilution at all, sets forth an injury eognizable under section 1983. ... 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that liability must run “to the party injured.” The plaintiffs’ complaint, therefore, seeks relief which is beyond the scope of the statute.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal remedy for a claim centered on pecuniary property rights, and it preserves common-law immunity for a court-appointed receiver acting under a lawful court order.

Bradford Audio Corporation v. Edward Pious, Individually and as Purported Receiver of Bradford Audio Corporation · filed 1968-03-29

With regard to the applicability of § 1983 it may be said that in spite of its broad language it was not intended to turn every defeat or denial of a claimed state right into a federal right with a federal remedy. ... To qualify under § 1983 the right sought to be enforced must in the main be one incapable of pecuniary evaluation, such as personal liberty, unrelated to and not dependent upon an invasion or deprivation of property interests. ... Section 1983 is not in derogation of common law immunities. ... A court appointed receiver is a quasi-judicial officer within the protection of the immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a prosecutor for acts performed within the prosecutor’s judicial or quasi-judicial role.

Friedman v. Younger · filed 1968-03-27

It is the rule in this Circuit that a prosecuting attorney is immune from suit under the Federal Civil Rights Act for acts occurring within his “judicial or quasi-judicial role.”

Section 1983 creates a general federal equity remedy but does not, by itself, authorize a federal court to enjoin pending state-court proceedings in violation of § 2283.

MacHesky v. Bizzell · filed 1968-08-13

§ 1983, on the other hand, represents a grant of general equity jurisdiction, which, without more, cannot be said to supplant, even implicitly, the venerable principles of judicial abstention and comity embodied in § 2283. ... Thus, we are constrained to hold that to recognize § 1983 as an exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute would be incorrect statutory interpretation as well as an unwarranted disregard of the judicially-fashioned principles of comity and abstention, as codified in § 2283.

Section 1983 uses the applicable state wrongful-death statute rather than creating an independent wrongful-death action, but it permits potential recovery of punitive damages for a wilful tort committed under color of official position.

Ambrose v. Wheatley · filed 1971-02-12

By virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 utilizes the state wrongful death statute; it does not provide for any wrongful death action itself. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 407 (C.A.5, 1961), cert. den. 368 U.S. 921, 82 S.Ct. 243, 7 L.Ed.2d 136 (1961). However, § 1983 does allow the recovery of punitive damages, even though such damages are not recoverable under state law, because of a Federal common law right to recover punitive damages for a wilful tort done under color of official position. Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 562, 6 S.Ct. 501, 26 L.Ed. 729 (1886). Thus the invocation of § 1983 only added a potential recovery of punitive damages to the plaintiff’s claim.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional violations by state officials, and official immunity does not automatically bar compensatory-damages suits under the statute.

Dale v. Hahn · filed 1971-02-19

We hold that plaintiff has stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 ... Even if New York law does grant defendants immunity this would not be binding on a federal court in an action brought under § 1983. Rather the court must determine under the facts presented whether the policy of liability reflected in the Act requires that the local rule of immunity be overridden, or whether under the circumstances the local rule must be followed to avoid too great an interference with the efficient operation of state government. ... However, in balancing the competing considerations, we follow this court’s previous counsel that “the defense of official immunity should be applied sparingly in suits brought under § 1983.” ... we do hold that the defendants are not immune from suit for compensatory damages to the extent that they have expended plaintiff’s assets.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional deprivations caused by persons acting under state authority, not for wrongful acts by private citizens without state involvement.

Kerrigan v. Boucher · filed 1971-02-24

To bring this case within the reach of § 1983, the plaintiff has alleged that “in causing to be taken and detainéd and in refusing to return the said items, the Defendants have acted under color of law pursuant to § 49-68. * * * ” I cannot agree. In order for the acts complained of to be “under color of any statute, * * * of any State * * *” so as to give rise to a cause of action under § 1983, there must be some state involvement in those acts. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Section 1983 safeguards constitutional rights from infringement only by persons who act under some state authority, not from infringement by private citizens who commit wrongful acts, no matter how willful and malicious they may be. Spampinato v. M. Breger & Co., 270 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 944, 80 S.Ct. 409, 4 L.Ed.2d 363, reh. denied, 361 U.S. 973, 80 S.Ct. 597, 4 L.Ed.2d 553 (1960).

Section 1983 does not authorize an injunction interfering with a state-court proceeding.

Drexler v. Walters · filed 1968-09-23

Further, the great weight of authority holds that the Civil Rights Act upon which plaintiff bases his claim for relief, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, does not authorize an injunction interfering with a state court proceeding.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit against a bar association acting as part of the judicial process because the association is absolutely immune from suit.

Dacey v. NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS'ASSOCIATION · filed 1968-10-11

Since fear of lawsuits for damages would seriously hamper the Association in making determinations whether or not to institue proceedings to stop what is believed to be the unauthorized practice of law, there is every reason to find that on principle the Association is immune from such suits as that at bar.

Section 1983 punitive-damages remedies are governed by federal common law rather than local variations that would reduce the recovery.

Caperci v. Earl P. Huntoon, Jr. · filed 1968-11-12

However, we believe, on balance, that the remedial purpose of the Act is better served by not permitting local variations allowing diminution of the amount of recovery. Rather, we will look to federal common law.

Section 1983 does not authorize damages suits against state parole officials for acts performed in quasi-judicial or discretionary governmental functions.

Silver v. Dickson · filed 1968-12-13

In our opinion the members of the California Adult Authority and other state officials are, while employed in the processing of applications for parole, performing quasi-judicial functions. They therefore have immunity from suits for damages under the Civil Rights Act, just as do other public employees engaged in the performance of quasi-judicial duties.

An action under § 1983 for damages cannot proceed against a governor for acts within the sphere of executive activity because the governor has immunity.

Kirker v. Moore · filed 1970-01-12

Finally, in regard to the alleged liability of the defendants in their individual capacity for damages in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the recent Fifth Circuit opinion in Martone v. McKeithen, 413 F.2d 1373 (1969) stated the law clearly and succinctly: ... “A. The Governor of the State has immunity from damage suits for acts within the sphere of executive activity. ...” ... In the light of the foregoing observations, it is my conclusion that the complaint herein fails to state a claim against the defendants, either individually or in their respective official capacities, upon which relief could appropriately be granted, and I further conclude that this Court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter.

Section 1983 provides a damages action when officials acting under local law deprive a person of constitutional rights.

Hudson v. Kenneth L. Hardy, United States, Intervenor · filed 1970-02-12

If true, these allegations make out a claim for money damages under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 (1964).

Section 1983 expressly authorizes a federal court to enjoin pending state criminal proceedings within the meaning of the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

Strasser v. Doorley · filed 1970-02-25

The court has read the many decisions dealing with this issue and without laboring to set out what so many others have so well discussed, the court holds that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an "express authorization" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 for the reasons stated in Landry v. Daley, 288 F.Supp. 200, 221-225 (N.D. Ill.1968).

Section 1983 does not create an exception to § 2283's prohibition on injunctions against pending criminal prosecutions.

Polk v. Ellington · filed 1970-03-05

In Brooks v. Briley, 274 F.Supp. 538, 552 (M.D.Tenn.1967), a decision by a three-judge court on which Chief Judge Phillips of this Circuit sat, it was held that § 1983 creates no exception to the proscription in § 2283 of injunctions against pending prosecutions and that therefore a pending criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined. There has been no holding by our Court of Appeals itself on this question, and therefore we conclude that Brooks v. Briley accurately states the law of this Circuit at this time.

Section 1983 does not provide an exception to the federal anti-injunction statute for state-court condemnation proceedings involving property rights; the court viewed the exception as arising in overbreadth and free-expression cases.

Joiner v. City of Dallas · filed 1971-01-11

Plaintiffs would contend that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an express exception to § 2283; however, this exception has developed in the context of overbreadth and free expression, circumstances not present in this action.

Section 1983 does not make equitable relief automatic, even if it is treated as an exception to the federal bar on enjoining state-court proceedings.

Hartke v. Roudebush · filed 1971-03-22

However, it is true that whether one takes the view of the Third Circuit as expressed in Cooper that Section 1983 constitutes a specific exception to Section 2283, or whether one takes the view we have adopted that notwithstanding Section 2283 a state court proceeding may be enjoined where special circumstances justify such relief, it does not follow that equitable relief will automatically be granted.

Section 1983's damages remedy applies only to defendants who qualify as a "person" under the statute; on this record, only Chancellor Wyllie was likely to qualify among the remaining defendants.

Derby v. University of Wisconsin · filed 1971-04-14

Because the members of the Board of Regents appear to have acted only in a representative capacity, it is unlikely that the action against them for damages in their individual capacities could be sustained; of the remaining defendants, only Chancellor Wyllie is likely to be a “person” within the meaning of that term as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and under Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). See Abel v. Gousha, 313 F.Supp. 1030 (E.D.Wis.1970). It is clear, however, that equitable relief may be sought from all of the named defendants. See Henson v. City of St. Francis, supra.

Section 1983 does not create an across-the-board exception to the federal anti-injunction statute's bar on injunctions against ongoing state-court proceedings.

Major v. Ferdon · filed 1971-02-25

This rationale applies equally to § 1983 as to other suits, and, in the absence of specific language in that statute taking suits brought thereunder outside the purview of § 2283, this Court will follow those of its predecessors who have held that the Civil Rights Act provides no across the board exception to the dictates of the anti-injunction provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

Section 1983 can provide an exception to § 2283's general prohibition on federal injunctions against state-court proceedings in appropriate First Amendment cases.

Pederson v. Breier · filed 1971-05-25

In certain appropriate First Amendment cases, I am of the view that Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can and does constitute an exception to the general prohibition contained in § 2283.

Section 1983 treats a state board as a “person” when declaratory relief is sought against it.

Lee v. The Board of Regents of State Colleges · filed 1971-05-04

For the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the board is a “person” where declaratory relief is sought.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against unfounded or even malicious claims or suits in state courts.

Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc., a Non-Profit Florida Condominium Corporation v. Herbert Buchwald, Individually and as · filed 1979-05-17

As for appellant’s claim that the very process of litigating in state courts “chills” their right to pursue antitrust actions in federal courts, the Civil Rights Acts do not provide a remedy against unfounded or even malicious claims or suits in state courts.

Section 1983 provides a procedural cause of action or remedy for rights secured by the Constitution or laws, but it does not itself create or protect substantive rights.

Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization · filed 1979-05-14

Even if claimants are correct in asserting that § 1983 provides a cause of action for all federal statutory claims, it remains true that one cannot go into court and claim a “violation of § 1983” — -for § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything.

Section 1983 cannot be used to assert rights created by the ADEA because the ADEA's remedial provisions are exclusive.

Bleakley v. Jekyll Island-State Park Authority · filed 1982-03-12

Pretermitting the question of whether compensatory and punitive relief can be granted under section 1983 when the statute is invoked to remedy only substantive statutory violations, the Court holds that a section 1983 action cannot be brought for violations of the ADEA. ... This Court thinks that the remedial provisions of the ADEA are exclusive, and the rights created by the ADEA may not be asserted within the remedial framework of section 1983.

Section 1983 actions seeking money damages are not exempt from Younger abstention merely because they seek damages rather than injunctive relief.

Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Palos Park · filed 1982-03-18

We reject the argument that the propriety of § 1983 actions may be determined solely on the basis of the relief sought, i.e., that actions for money damages may go forward while actions for injunctive relief may not.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against a prosecutor for actions taken in initiating a prosecution or presenting the State's case.

Siano v. Justices of Massachusetts · filed 1983-02-04

When initiating a prosecution and presenting the state’s case, a prosecutor is absolutely immune from a civil suit for damages under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a private remedy for violations of the FWPCA when the FWPCA itself forecloses private enforcement.

Allegheny County Sanitary Authority v. United States Environmental Protection Agency · filed 1983-02-17

Because the FWPCA forecloses a private cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the remaining portion of Count 3 which alleges that the state defendants have deprived ALCOSAN of rights secured by the FWPCA in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 will be dismissed.

A § 1983 claim for negligent deprivation of property fails when adequate state remedies satisfy procedural due process.

Groves v. Cox · filed 1983-03-16

Virginia’s tort remedies provide plaintiff the opportunity for a fair hearing, notwithstanding the possibility that defendants’ invocation of sovereign immunity will preclude plaintiff from securing relief. Thus, though the Court concludes that invocation of sovereign immunity to bar relief to potentially all prisoners claiming deprivation of property would largely vitiate the purpose of the hearing, the Court is constrained to find that Virginia’s tort remedies satisfy procedural due process. Because adequate state remedies exist to adjudicate plaintiff’s claim, plaintiff has failed to state a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for the deprivation of constitutional rights but does not itself create substantive rights.

Hart v. Ferris State College · filed 1983-03-08

Standing alone, § 1983 does not provide any substantive rights at all; it only gives a remedy.

Section 1983 permits damages for constitutional violations under color of state law, including unlawful searches and seizures, but does not provide a state prisoner with release from or reduction of confinement.

Slayton v. David Willingham, Larry Hignight, Bill Cully, City of Ardmore, Oklahoma · filed 1984-01-27

The trial court erred in holding that Mr. Slayton’s only remedy for the illegal search and arrest claims was to apply for habeas corpus. Although section 1983 cannot be invoked by a state prisoner for a release from or reduction of his confinement, it is an appropriate remedy for a claim for money damages for a violation of any constitutional right under color of state law, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), including unconstitutional searches and seizures.

Section 1983 permits damages, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and other appropriate relief in state or federal court for alleged constitutional violations by prison officials acting under color of state law.

Africa v. Horn · filed 1997-09-30

Further, Africa has other adequate remedy for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights under the First and Eighth Amendments. For example, Africa may seek damages, or declaratory, injunctive or other appropriate relief in an action filed in a state or federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the prison officials denied his constitutional rights under the color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for injuries stemming from a constitutional or federal law violation.

Isham v. Hart · filed 1993-06-07

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for every injury but only those stemming from a constitutional or federal law violation.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violating § 1988 because § 1988 is procedural, not substantive.

Redd v. Lambert · filed 1981-09-17

Since § 1988 is merely procedural and not substantive, plaintiffs’ claim that it constitutes a “law” for the violation of which § 1983 provides a remedy must fail.

Section 1983 permits a court to issue relief that remedies past constitutional violations and bars future violations.

Eagle v. Koch · filed 1979-05-02

In § 1983 actions the court should issue a decree that will so far as possible remedy past violations as well as bar violations in the future.

Section 1983 authorizes federal district courts to award damages and injunctive relief but does not substitute for habeas corpus relief.

Tate v. Werner · filed 1975-05-16

The powers of a federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 extend to damages and injunctive relief. The Civil Rights Act is not a substitute for habeas corpus relief.

Section 1983 broadly authorizes actions at law, suits in equity, and other proper proceedings to redress deprivation of rights, and a defendant’s status as a state governor does not limit the available remedy.

Jackson v. Ogilvie · filed 1970-05-06

We conclude that it is not limited in its choice of an appropriate remedy by the fact that defendant is the Governor of a state. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 broadly authorizes an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress of the deprivation of rights suffered by plaintiffs.

Section 1983 authorizes reinstatement and back pay, reduced by interim earnings, as remedies for a public employee's unlawful termination.

Ramsey v. Hopkins · filed 1971-08-31

In this case, which involves the termination of the employment of a public employee in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the District Judge ordered the employee reinstated, but failed to order payment of back wages properly owing to him, 320 F.Supp. 477. In our view, reinstatement of the employee was correct, but failure to award back pay was error. See Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District, 5 Cir., 1970, 427 F.2d 319, 324, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991, 91 S.Ct. 451, 27 L.Ed.2d 439; Smith v. Board of Education of Morrilton Sch. Dist. No. 32, 8 Cir., 1966, 365 F.2d 770, 784 (Blackmun, J.); Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 4 Cir., 1966, 360 F.2d 577, 581. The cause is remanded to the District Court for assessment of the back wages owing to the appellant, diminished by his earnings, if any, during the period of his dismissal, and the modification of the judgment accordingly.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek money damages as well as injunctive relief, and a prisoner's transfer does not necessarily moot the claim.

Richey v. Walter H. Wilkins, Warden, Attica State Prison, and Paul D. McGinnis Commissioner of Correction · filed 1964-07-21

It is beyond question that a plaintiff suing under the Civil Rights Act may seek money damages as well as injunctive relief, and a right to such damages of course cannot be conditioned upon the plaintiff’s being, at the time he brings suit, in a situation where he is subject to further invasions of his rights. Although appellant, in a complaint which had all the earmarks of a pleading drawn up by one unfamiliar with the law, did not expressly ask for money damages, he did request “redress to [sic] the above said religious persecution, and that plaintiff have such other and further relief as justice requires.” We think it just under the special circumstances of this ease to construe this particular appellant’s pleadings more liberally than we would normally construe pleadings of this sort and to rule that appellant’s petition did contain a request for the money damages for which provision is made under the Civil Rights Act. Such being the case, appellant was entitled to an adjudication of the allegations contained in his complaint notwithstanding his transfer to a different prison. Moreover, as the court in Pierce v. LaVallee, supra, expressly stated, even where a complaint such as appellant’s seeks injunctive relief a transfer of prisons does not render the action moot, because of the chance that the complaining prisoner might be returned to his original place of imprisonment. 293 F.2d at 234.

Section 1983 does not justify injunctive collateral relief against a state conviction when adequate state and federal habeas remedies are available.

Hill v. Nelson · filed 1967-08-24

Moreover, insofar as petitioners are seeking the injunction under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq., the same considerations advanced above, especially those in Van Buskirk v. Wilkinson, supra, prevail. ... The principles and reasoning cited above seem persuasive to this Court. In light of the detailed statutory habeas corpus scheme (28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq.) as well as adequate and available state post-conviction remedies, which are designed and enforced to secure by collateral remedy the very relief which petitioners are herein seeking by their prayer for declaratory and injunctive relief, each alleged constitutional right of a petitioner and member of his class is assured of effective vindication if valid. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that there is no equitable justification or necessity in these circumstances calling for the attempted resort to the equitable remedies sought herein by petitioners. ... Accordingly, having determined that petitioners have not shown a basis for equitable injunctive relief, the application for a three-judge court is denied, as is the application for injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Act. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the application for injunctive relief is granted for want of equity, in this Court’s considered exercise of its equity jurisdiction.

Section 1983 protects state prisoners and permits them to bring actions for constitutional deprivations, including claims seeking injunctive relief.

Phipps v. McGinnis · filed 1970-03-20

Furthermore, that state prisoners fall within the protection of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and may bring an action under the Civil Rights Act is established, Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733, 12 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1964); Wright v. McMann, supra; Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F.Supp. 674 (N.D.Cal.1966); and a district court has power to grant injunctive relief where there has been a deprivation of civil rights, Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961).

Section 1983 claims for damages and return of confiscated property remain viable even when a prisoner's request for injunctive relief concerning jail conditions is moot.

Culp v. William Martin, U.S. Marshal · filed 1973-01-10

Their claims for damages resulting from these conditions, and for the return of their confiscated property, are still viable, however. ... The district court is directed to consider further the applicants’ claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows students suspended without due process to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against the school district, school board, and involved administrators, and damages against participating individual officials; good faith is a defense to damages but not equitable relief.

Strickland v. Inlow · filed 1973-10-18

If they are given such a suspension without the benefit of due process, they may bring a Sec. 1983 action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the school district, the school board and those administrators involved in the decision. They may also bring an action for damages against the individual members of the board and the administrators of the school system who participated in the decision. Good faith is a defense in damage actions, but not in actions for equitable relief.

Section 1983 permits claims for money damages and appropriate equitable relief for deprivation of in-prison procedural due process, even when habeas corpus is the sole remedy for restoring good-time credits or parole eligibility.

Gregory v. Fred Wyse, Warden, Colorado State Penitentiary, Reverend John David Conti v. Fred Wyse, Warden, Col · filed 1975-03-11

But this jurisdictional limitation in no way affects the availability of § 1983 to grant money damages and appropriate equitable relief for the deprivation of in-prison procedural due process.

Section 1983 does not provide an appropriate substitute for habeas corpus injunctive relief when state remedies have not been sought or exhausted, but a damages claim remains viable after the plaintiff leaves state custody.

Lepre v. Butler · filed 1975-04-11

In any event to the extent that the sought after injunctive relief was a substitute for relief by way of habeas corpus, a § 1983 civil rights action is inappropriate, especially where State remedies have neither been sought nor exhausted. However, the damage cause of action remains alive, even though plaintiff no longer remains in State custody.

Section 1983 provides no further relief for an untenured teacher whose contract salary was paid and whose discharge did not stigmatize a liberty interest.

Ball v. Board of Trustees of the Kerrville Independent School District · filed 1978-11-20

No other or further redress at the hands of the Board of Trustees or its individual members may be had under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or under any accepted concept of federal constitutional rights.

Section 1983 cannot be used as a substitute for coram nobis to challenge a completed state criminal judgment.

Bohn v. New York · filed 1979-01-30

Therefore, the civil rights law cannot be-a substitute for coram nobis, any more than it is for habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not make the plaintiff’s requested transfer or removal of state officials available as injunctive relief.

Maxton v. Johnson · filed 1980-01-17

As earlier observed, the plaintiff seeks alternative injunctive relief that is not available under § 1983, and his somewhat desultory request for damages is not supported by his own equivocal statements of the facts concerning meals and showers while he was on lockup.

Section 1983 authorizes actions at law seeking monetary redress for wrongs committed.

Wilkerson v. City of Placentia · filed 1981-04-07

Actions under the so-called Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) are properly actions at law seeking monetary redress for wrongs committed.

Section 1983 permits legal and equitable relief for civil-rights violations committed by a person acting under color of state law, but equitable relief does not include back pay payable from a state treasury when the Eleventh Amendment bars that monetary award.

Gibbons v. Bond · filed 1981-09-01

Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Acts provides legal and equitable relief for individuals whose constitutional and other civil rights have been violated by a person acting under the color of state law. ... Equitable relief under Section 1983 does not encompass an award of back pay to plaintiffs Gibbons and Moynihan.

Section 1983 does not authorize a federal court to restore good-time credits as relief in an action under the statute.

Jacobson v. Coughlin · filed 1981-10-08

This Court is not empowered to order a restoration of plaintiff’s good time credits in the context of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; accordingly, plaintiff’s prayer for relief is denied to that extent.

In § 1983 actions for an intentional police battery, common-law distinctions permitting general damages for dignitary injury must inform the compensatory-damages award.

Elizabeth A. Brandon and James D. Muse, Cross-Appellants v. Robert J. Allen, Defendant-Cross-Appellee, E. Winslow Chapma · filed 1983-10-11

We agree with the Tenth and Eighth Circuits that there is a qualitative and quantitative difference between injury suffered as a result of a wrong for which the common law did not allow general damages and an injury resulting from an intentional battery by a police officer. This common law distinction must continue to play a role in the awarding of compensatory damages in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against individual defendants even when the same constitutional violation also supports a Title VII claim.

Rolfe v. State of Ariz. · filed 1983-11-16

The plaintiff is entitled to request punitive damages from individuals under the § 1983 claim. ... Such damages may be awarded under § 1983 even though the claimed constitutional violation also involves a Title VII claim.

A wrongfully terminated employee loses the right to reinstatement under § 1983 when the former position is independently abolished or altered.

Ledew v. School Board · filed 1984-01-09

It follows that where the position of a wrongfully terminated employee is subsequently abolished or altered based on independent administrative considerations, that employee loses the right to be reinstated to his or her former position as it existed at the time of termination.

Punitive damages may be awarded in § 1983 cases to punish or deter intentional violations of constitutional rights.

Longoria v. Wilson · filed 1984-04-23

Punitive damages may be awarded in § 1983 cases to deter or punish certain intentional violations of constitutional rights.

Compensatory damages for a § 1983 dismissal based on protected First Amendment activity may include lost income, injury to professional reputation, and mental suffering.

Hinkle v. Christensen · filed 1984-05-02

The measure of damages for dismissal on account of protected First Amendment activity includes all injuries compensable under the district court's general instructions on damages, which covered both First Amendment and procedural due process claims, i.e., loss of income from the date of termination, losses arising from damage to professional reputation, and mental pain and suffering.

A § 1983 claim for compensatory and punitive damages is a legal claim carrying a right to jury trial, even when joined with equitable claims for back pay and reinstatement.

Laskaris v. Thornburgh · filed 1984-05-18

Thus, although the request for back pay under section 1983 seeks only equitable relief, Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1115, 1122-23 (3d Cir.1980), a claim for compensatory and punitive damages is a legal claim entitling the plaintiff to a jury trial.

Damages recoverable under Section 1983 for a procedural due process violation include compensation for proven emotional distress, and a plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages for the deprivation even without proof of actual injury.

Daniels v. Woodbury County · filed 1984-09-10

These considerations are proper in awarding damages under § 1983. ... Plaintiffs are entitled to nominal damages for the deprivation of procedural due process even in the absence of proof of actual injury.

Mental and emotional distress caused by a procedural due-process violation is compensable under § 1983 only when the plaintiff proves that injury actually occurred.

Davis v. Mansfield Metropolitan Housing Authority · filed 1984-12-28

Damage for mental and emotional distress caused by deprivation of procedural due process is not compensable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 unless the plaintiffs have actually proven that such injury occurred.

When proper post-termination procedures cure a constitutionally defective pretermination process, § 1983 damages are limited to the period between dismissal and the curative hearing.

Wheeler v. Mental Health And Mental Retardation Authority Of Harris County · filed 1985-02-11

When, however, a constitutionally infirm pretermination procedure is cured by proper post-termination procedures, damages can be awarded only during the period between dismissal and the date of the post-termination procedures.

A Section 1983 reinstatement order may be satisfied with a comparable position when the employee's former position is unavailable.

Barnes v. Bosley · filed 1985-12-17

It is the law in this circuit that an employer may comply with an order to reinstate a wrongfully discharged employee whose position at time of discharge is currently unavailable by placing the employee in a comparable or similar position.

In a § 1983 procedural-due-process action, a public employee with a property right to continued employment may receive reinstatement and back pay until the employer provides the required cause hearing.

Skeets v. Johnson · filed 1986-12-18

We therefore hold that because Skeets had a property right to continued employment until his "cause" hearing, the district court was correct in awarding him reinstatement and backpay until a proper hearing is held.

A compensatory-damages claim under § 1983 for violation of the Constitution or federal law survives dismissal when the plaintiffs could prove facts entitling them to that relief.

Board of Education v. Diamond · filed 1986-12-19

They rely upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Applying the pleading standard of ... we cannot say that they could not prove a set of facts upon which compensatory damage relief could be granted for violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States. We hold no more at this stage of the case.

Emotional distress, humiliation, personal indignity, and dejection caused by a constitutional violation are compensable actual injuries under § 1983 even without proof of mental or physical deterioration.

Davenport v. DeRobertis · filed 1987-01-30

Plaintiffs testified that they suffered emotional distress, humiliation, personal indignity, and dejection as a result of the denial of adequate out-of-cell exercise and showers. The jury was entitled to believe them. These effects are compensable actual injury under § 1983. ... Isolation in solitary confinement can cause compensable emotional damages even where there is no evidence that it caused mental or physical deterioration.

Punitive damages are available against an individual § 1983 defendant who acts with reckless or callous disregard of the plaintiff’s rights; actual malicious intent is unnecessary.

Sabrina Fields v. City of Omaha, Douglas County, Nebraska, a Municipal Corporation, & Vytautas MacKevicius · filed 1987-02-09

Punitive damages are available against an individual defendant in a § 1983 action. ... The standard is whether the defendant acted with “reckless or callous disregard of” the plaintiff’s rights; actual malicious intent is not required.

Punitive damages are never available under § 1983 from a municipal defendant.

Carroll v. City of Prattville · filed 1987-02-19

However, in no event, are punitive damages available under § 1983 from a municipal defendant.

Punitive damages under § 1983 are appropriate when the defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Washington v. Kirksey · filed 1987-03-02

Punitive damages are appropriate under Sec. 1983 when a defendant's conduct was "motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves a reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others."

A permanent injunction is an available form of equitable relief in a § 1983 action.

Marin Piazza v. Roque · filed 1987-05-20

In an action brought under Section 1983, equitable relief in the form of a permanent injunction is proper.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief restoring a public employee’s duties when political discrimination causes a continuing constitutional injury.

De Jesús v. Alvarado · filed 1987-06-02

Plaintiffs injuries will continue until this course of conduct is halted. ... The Court shall enter judgment ordering, adjudging, and decreeing that defendants cease and desist from reassigning plaintiff based on her political affiliation and restoring plaintiff to her proper post in the civil service.

Section 1983 does not provide release from custody as injunctive relief to a state prisoner.

Alstatt v. Smith · filed 1991-10-01

The injunctive relief sought by Alstatt, i.e., release from custody, is not available through an action filed pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 provides both money damages and equitable relief to redress constitutional violations by state actors.

Central Wyoming Law Associates, P.C. v. Denhardt · filed 1993-10-28

This statute clearly and unequivocally provides for money damages, a remedy at law, as well as equitable relief, in order to redress alleged constitutional violations by state actors.

A prisoner may seek relief under § 1983 when the claim does not challenge the fact or duration of confinement or seek immediate or speedier release.

Atkinson v. Holloway · filed 1996-09-19

Therefore, because Mr. Atkinson is not “challeng[ing] the fact or duration of his confinement [or] seek[ing] immediate or speedier release,” Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2369 (1994), the district court was correct in treating the action as a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for restoration of good-time credits, which must be pursued through habeas corpus, but permits claims seeking relief other than immediate or speedier release.

Jesse Lumpkin, AKA Jesse Lumpkins v. Wilkinson · filed 1996-12-04

We note initially that Lumpkin's claim for restoration of good-time credits is not cognizable under § 1983, but must be pursued in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973). The claims for alleged equal protection and due process violations are actionable under § 1983, because Lumpkin "is seeking something other than immediate or more speedy release."

Section 1983 permits relief for harms caused by a detainer, but dismissal of the detainer must be sought through habeas corpus.

Gearheart v. Wallace · filed 1997-04-24

Plaintiff requests that the detainer against her be dismissed. It is clear that this may only be done through a writ of habeas corpus. ... However, plaintiff may seek other relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against a state instrumentality or its board because the instrumentality is not a person under the section, but allows injunctive relief against state entities.

Tepley v. Public Employees Retirement Ass'n · filed 1997-08-07

Section 24-51-201, C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10B) states that PERA is an instrumentality of the state. Therefore, it is not a “person” under § 1983, and thus, a claim for damages will not lie against it or its Board. ... Although state entities may not be sued for monetary damages arising from alleged conduct which deprives a plaintiff of his or her civil rights, they may be sued for injunc-tive relief.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner challenging a parole denial to seek declaratory and monetary relief, but not immediate release from confinement.

United States Ex Rel. McCalvin v. Irving · filed 1980-12-03

The granting of this request for relief is foreclosed under Preiser. ... The court may therefore proceed to adjudicate the plaintiff’s claims to the extent that he requests declaratory judgments and monetary relief.

Section 1983 does not support compensatory or declaratory relief for these challenges to a parole denial, but allows prospective injunctive relief concerning the parole process.

Garfield v. James W. Nielsen John Gillis Carol Bently Steven Baker Ronald Koenig Manual Guaderrama C. Brown Ted Ric · filed 1998-03-17

Garfield's claims for compensatory and declaratory relief are not cognizable under § 1983. ... Garfield's claim for prospective injunctive relief, however, should be allowed to proceed under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide release from confinement as a remedy.

Long v. Hancock · filed 1986-11-10

This relief is unavailable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a request for an edict directed at all Commonwealth public defenders.

White v. Pennsylvania · filed 2008-01-30

Finally, to the extent that White was asking the District Court to issue an edict to all Commonwealth public defenders, such a request is clearly not cognizable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 allows an ongoing federal case to enforce prior constitutional prison orders and restore good time lost through unconstitutional disciplinary proceedings.

Guthrie v. Evans · filed 1981-12-31

Here, in contrast, there is already an ongoing case properly brought in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which has produced numerous orders concerning the operation of the prison, generally, and the disciplinary system, specifically. Thus, the issue is not whether the state should be given an initial opportunity to see that its disciplinary procedures are constitutionally adequate, but whether the Court’s duly entered orders are being complied with.

Section 1983 permits a suit seeking to enjoin the prospective application of a state statute that remains in effect, including its application to people who may be affected in the future.

Sero v. Oswald · filed 1972-10-25

Here, plaintiffs seek to enjoin the full prospective application of a statute which is currently in effect, not just for those in custody but for those who might be affected by its provisions hereafter. Thus, this suit is even more clearly a suit properly brought under § 1983 than was Gesicki.

Section 1983 does not provide release from prison; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Vasquez v. Dwyer · filed 2010-04-22

Vasquez also requested release from prison if his arrest warrant was not produced. This relief is not available in a civil rights action under § 1983 and must be sought via a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide relief in the form of criminal charges against defendants, termination of their employment, or payment of their salaries to the plaintiff.

Matthews v. Villella · filed 2010-05-21

He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights by staff members at SCI Waymart. ... We agree with the District Court that Matthews’ requests for criminal charges to be brought against the defendants, for their termination, and for their salaries to be paid to him are improper requests for relief.

Section 1983 permits civil rights plaintiffs to seek declaratory or injunctive relief as well as damages.

Naves v. Bigelow · filed 2014-04-30

A civil rights action pursuant to § 1983 typically seeks damages, but also may seek declaratory or injunctive relief. ... The proceedings instituted by Mr. Naves are identified by him as a petition, but in reality are a hybrid which includes a civil rights action not seeking damages but, as we construe it, seeking equitable relief.

Section 1983 does not provide release from an unauthorized sentence as a remedy.

Peyton v. Edmund Brown, Jr. · filed 2014-08-20

While such immunity does not extend to actions for prospective injunctive relief, Peyton’s claim is barred because the relief he seeks—release from an unauthorized sentence—is not available under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief in the form of general accountability, tooth repair, therapeutic assistance, or restoration of parental rights.

Wesley v. Fritzges · filed 2019-11-15

He is advised that these desired outcomes are not available forms of relief in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not authorize a court to order the termination of a defendant’s employment.

Marcum v. Gaddis · filed 2019-12-12

Plaintiff also seeks the termination of Defendants’ employment. The Court does not have the authority to grant this type of relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim for monetary relief, while immediate release from state custody must be sought through habeas corpus.

PONDS v. PA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE · filed 2020-01-30

On January 7, 2020, Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that this Court dismiss Ponds’ complaint without prejudice, as he requests both monetary relief—which is appropriate in a § 1983 action—and his immediate release from state custody, which is appropriately sought in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. ... Upon review of the record, the Court finds no error—clear or otherwise—in Magistrate Judge Carlson’s conclusion that the differing forms of relief that Ponds seeks cannot be contained in a single complaint.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to compel criminal prosecution or obtain a deed correction that would require a federal court to overturn a state court judgment.

DAVISTON v. WIKE · filed 2020-03-09

Accordingly, because the relief Daviston seeks is not available to a § 1983 plaintiff under the circumstances presented by his claim, it is not plausible and must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Section 1983 does not provide compassionate release from a Delaware prison sentence; that relief must be sought in Delaware courts.

McNeill v. Snow · filed 2020-04-06

This Court cannot provide the relief Plaintiff seeks. His remedy for a compassionate release lies in the Delaware Courts.

Section 1983 cannot be used to attack pending criminal charges or obtain release from confinement.

Lowery v. Vinson · filed 2020-04-13

Although the status of his criminal case relevant to his Section 1983 claims is not clear, he cannot use Section 1983 to attack pending criminal charges or seek release from confinement. This relief is unavailable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits money damages and injunctive relief, but not termination of defendants’ employment or expungement of a criminal record.

Ezebuiroh v. Doe 1 · filed 2020-05-12

Although money damages and injunctive relief are available under Section 1983, termination of the defendants and expungement of Plaintiff’s criminal record are not. These latter two requests for relief are considered dismissed from this action.

Section 1983 provides a way to challenge prison conditions and seek injunctive relief, but it does not provide release from prison.

Fahr v. Arizona, State of · filed 2020-07-07

The Court notes that challenges to conditions of confinement, threats to safety or health based on inmate population density, exposure to the COVID-19 virus, lack of medical testing and medical staff, or unsanitary conditions are properly raised in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Although release from prison is not an available remedy in a civil rights action, other types of injunctive relief are available, such as enjoining unconstitutional conduct or requiring compliance with protective measures.

Section 1983 does not provide termination of an employee as a remedy.

Stout v. Haight · filed 2020-08-24

Stout is advised that termination of employees is not a form of relief available under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek damages.

Harris v. Phelps County Jail · filed 2020-10-28

Damages are an acceptable form of relief in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide relief to review evidence, obtain a writ of habeas corpus, or dismiss pending criminal charges.

Beard v. Falls · filed 2020-12-07

Additionally, none of the relief Plaintiff seeks is available through a § 1983 case.

Section 1983 permits an excessive-force claim to proceed when success would not invalidate related criminal charges, but it cannot be used to dismiss charges or vacate convictions.

Jacobs v. Prey · filed 2020-12-18

As such, Jacobs may proceed with this case because, even if he prevails, his success will not demonstrate the invalidity of the underlying charges and/or conviction. However, the only relief available to Jacobs is money damages and declaratory relief. The injunctive relief Jacob seeks—dismissal of all charges and vacating of all convictions—is not available. Jacobs cannot use this case to collaterally attack the charges against him or any subsequent convictions.

Section 1983 does not provide release from prison as a remedy.

Diaz v. Nicholson · filed 2021-01-26

seeks relief (release from prison) which is not legally available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... After carefully reviewing the relevant papers, the Court ACCEPTS the R.&R. and ADOPTS the recommendations and reasoning set forth therein.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a prisoner's grievance arising from prison officials' regulatory supervision absent a showing of unmistakable abuse.

Aragon v. R. A. Wathen and C. A. Young · filed 1965-12-06

This appeal is from dismissal of a complaint asserting a claim under the Civil Rights Acts. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. ... The District Court properly dismissed the action. Appellant’s grievance is not of such quality as will support a claim for relief under the Civil Rights Acts. It appears to arise from exercise of regulatory supervision which, absent a showing of unmistakable abuse, must rest within the discretion of prison officials.

Section 1983 does not provide a constitutional remedy for mere negligence by prison guards or physicians without more.

Fearon v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 1974-09-11

The law is clear on the issues raised by petitioner and mere negligence, without more, by prison guards and physicians does not support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Since petitioner has only alleged facts that show possible negligence on the part of the prison guards and physicians, the complaint does not state a claim of constitutional dimension and the court grants respondent’s motion for summary judgment and accordingly dismisses petitioner’s complaint.

A prison warden may be liable under § 1983 for policy decisions creating unconstitutional conditions, and a complaint survives dismissal by alleging the warden’s direct involvement in the decision.

Martin v. Sargent · filed 1985-12-20

A prison warden can be held liable for policy decisions which create unconstitutional conditions. ... In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a prisoner need not plead more than that the warden was directly involved in the decision.

Section 1983 allows a deliberate indifference claim against a prison official even if the official is not a medical provider.

Unitt v. Spencer · filed 2020-03-09

That Pelletier is not a medical provider does not itself insulate her from a section 1983 claim alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Section 1983 enforces rights granted by the Constitution or federal law; a plaintiff without standing to assert an underlying constitutional right cannot pursue a Section 1983 claim based on it.

MA LEG PARTNERS 1 v. City of Dallas · filed 2020-03-04

It is a procedural enforcement that safeguards rights granted under the Constitution or substantive federal law. As MA LEG lacks standing for any of its constitutional arguments, there can be no standing for a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits a claim that an unconstitutional criminal law infringed substantive constitutional rights.

Smith v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2019-05-16

They claim the unconstitutional laws infringed their substantive rights. Thus they allege constitutional injuries cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a specific, articulable constitutional or federally protected right and does not provide relief for violations of state law alone.

State of Missouri Ex Rel. Minnie E. T. Gore, Jennye Robinson v. R. Dean Wochner, M.D. · filed 1980-05-08

In order for appellants to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a specific and articulable constitutional right must have been transgressed and a cognizable claim for relief must be stated on the face of the pleading. ... Rights which derive solely from state law, however, cannot be the subject of a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ... Only when a violation of state law results in an infringement of a federally protected right can a cause of action be said to exist.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest to support a due process claim.

Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club · filed 1980-04-14

We hold that, under the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, Rodic had no liberty or property interest in attending races at Thistledown on which to base a due process claim under § 1983. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case with directions to dismiss the complaint. We do not reach the questions whether Thistledown acted under color of state law in expelling Rodic and whether the Racing Commission has jurisdiction to review the validity of the sanction.

Section 1983 makes a state official liable when the official’s actions naturally cause the deprivation of a federally protected right.

United States Ex Rel. Jones v. Rundle · filed 1973-05-10

Applying the common law standard appropriate in Section 1983 cases, that one is liable for the natural consequences of his actions, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), we hold that defendant Alfred T. Rundle is liable to the plaintiff for the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 can potentially reach persistent legislative inaction when it has become a settled state practice with the force of law, but it protects only rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial Administration v. Commonwealth · filed 1973-03-30

Looking at the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the instances where relief has been granted under them against state officials, the court cannot say there may never be a situation where persistent legislative inaction, by withholding the manpower and facilities necessary to enable the judiciary to function promptly and fairly to administer justice in the courts, would not be found to be such a settled practice as to have the force of law for the purposes of relief under section 1983. ... Even if this court could find that the legislative inaction complained of here was within the scope of section 1983, that section protects only rights, privileges, aud immunities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not apply to a claim based on a right that is not a constitutional right.

Gregory v. Page · filed 1968-08-16

The Court is satisfied that this Complaint is completely without foundation in law because (1) the right asserted is not a constitutional right and therefore not within the contemplation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (2) the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the relief requested.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for relief to people deprived of their constitutional rights.

Hill Ex Rel. Lang v. Lewis · filed 1971-02-12

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for relief of those who have been deprived of their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state authority, subject to applicable immunity defenses.

J. W. Lynch v. Joe E. Johnson, Iii, George B. Goodykoontz and Estel Senn · filed 1970-01-08

Absent the legal defense relied on by the District Judge, we feel that the above recital from appellant’s complaint states a cause of action for conspiracy to deprive appellant of his freedom without due process of law, and for depriving him of same in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).

Section 1983 permits liability for unreasonable and unnecessary police force used against a person in custody when it violates due process.

Curtis Collum, Cross-Appellee v. Frank A. Butler, James Hand, and James Wooten, Cross-Appellants · filed 1970-01-20

The defendants urge that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We disagree. The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, permitted the jury to find that plaintiff was beaten after he was taken into custody. We think the record further shows that the jury could find that the force used by the officers was unreasonable and unnecessary to restrain the plaintiff thus violating his constitutional right of due process.

Section 1983 does not require specific intent to violate constitutional rights.

Allison v. Lawrence E. Wilson, Warden · filed 1970-12-29

Under identical circumstances, we have held that such a complaint states a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Specific intent to violate constitutional rights is not a necessary element under Section 1983, see Monroe v. Pape, 1961, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, and William v. Field, 9 Cir., 1969, 416 F.2d 483, 485.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that federally protected rights were violated.

Hanvey v. Warren Pinto, Superintendent of the New Jersey State Prison Farm · filed 1971-05-07

While it is essential to prove in any action • brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that federally protected rights have been violated, this court cannot eon-elude that the transfer of an inmate of a state prison from one wing to another and the consequent change of prison jobs involved any federally protected rights.