42 U.S.C. § 1983

An age discrimination claim can serve as a legal basis for a § 1983 claim.

Young v. City Of Houston · filed 1990-07-20

Because the age discrimination claim is now revived, it can serve as a legal basis for the sec. 1983 and conspiracy claims.

An interstate corrections compact transformed into federal law by congressional consent creates rights enforceable against state officials under Section 1983.

Cameron v. Mills · filed 1986-09-15

Since congressional consent transforms the Iowa and Kansas Interstate Corrections Compact into federal law, and based upon the clear language of the Compact discussed ... plaintiff has stated a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the asserted violation by state officials of the terms of the Iowa-Kansas Interstate Corrections Compact.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of federal constitutional or statutory rights, privileges, or immunities, rather than for errors in interpreting state law alone.

Balles v. Harvey · filed 1965-12-17

This court’s function here is solely to determine whether there has been a violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore our purpose is limited to the protection of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States]”.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege facts showing deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Sanders v. Erreca · filed 1967-05-25

In order to do so, the amended complaint must allege facts which show that appellants were subjected to the deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Appellants have failed to do so.

Section 1983 is not limited to claims involving racial or religious discrimination; it covers deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws.

Scher v. Board of Education · filed 1970-04-23

Still concerning ourselves with the Civil Rights statutes we find the explicit language of § 1983 covers “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”

Section 1983 does not provide a basis for relief when denial of admission to a municipal promotional examination deprives the plaintiff of no cognizable right or privilege.

Sherman v. Behner · filed 1973-01-18

The denial to Plaintiff Sherman of admission to the promotional examination for Principal Engineer (Electrical) by the Personnel Department of the City of Pasadena in 1970, did not deprive Plaintiff Sherman of any rights or privileges cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2708, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)].

Section 1983 covers state deprivations of rights secured by federal law, including rights under the Social Security Act, even when the claim is wholly statutory.

Blue v. Clifton M. Craig, Commissioner of the North Carolina Department of Social Services · filed 1974-10-18

We accordingly have no difficulty in resolving that this action, which seeks to invalidate a state-wide regulation alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of civil rights given them by the Social Security Act, even if regarded as being wholly statutorily-based, ... qualifies under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal claim for rights created solely by state or local law.

Storment v. Hickman · filed 1974-11-04

Plaintiff’s complaint may very well have merit if filed in the appropriate state court; however, when said right to a hearing exists solely because of a local city ordinance as in the instant case, even if such a violation has in fact occurred, it would not be a deprivation of rights for which plaintiff could sue for relief in Federal Court under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983. Rights established by state or local law are not subject to a claim under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 or the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Boles v. Fox · filed 1975-09-24

Plaintiff has not made a sufficient showing that he was deprived of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States in order to withstand the motions to dismiss.

Section 1983 protects federal rights, including rights created by federal statutes, from infringement by state officials.

Gary W. v. State of La. · filed 1977-02-03

But § 1983 was enacted to protect citizens’ federal rights, whether statutorily or constitutionally defined, from infringement by state officials.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of rights secured by the Federal Constitution or federal laws, not rights provided only by a state constitution.

Morse v. Nelson · filed 1977-05-09

In addition, these counts while alleging they state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, in fact, purport to assert rights provided by our State constitution and not the Federal Constitution or laws.

Section 1983 preserves federal-court power to enforce rights created by federal statutes.

Youakim v. Miller · filed 1977-09-27

Acceptance of the DCFS argument would strip the federal courts of jurisdiction and power to enforce rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivations under color of state law of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by federal statutes as well as the Constitution.

La Raza Unida of Southern Alameda County v. Volpe · filed 1977-09-29

Accordingly, we conclude that section 1983 is available to redress deprivations under color of state law of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by federal statutes, as well as the Constitution.

Section 1983 requires a court to enforce rights secured by federal law, including rights under 29 U.S.C. § 794.

Doe v. Marshall · filed 1978-08-16

In any event, regardless of this Court’s views concerning 29 U.S.C. § 794, it is the law as enacted by the Congress of the United States, and it is this Court’s duty under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce it.

Section 1983 generally permits a plaintiff to sue to enforce federal statutory rights as well as constitutional rights.

Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School District · filed 1979-01-09

It is clear that plaintiff can generally sue to enforce federal statutory rights as well as constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not protect interests arising from a state tender-offer disclosure act that are not encompassed by the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Eure v. NVF Co. · filed 1979-09-21

The remedial and jurisdictional . statutes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3)-(4) exist primarily for the preservation of all persons’ rights conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of race. ... The impact of a state’s tender offer disclosure act upon federal concerns is not encompassed within the interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment or Section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for civil rights secured by the Constitution and federal laws, but not rights arising solely from state or local governments.

DeWalt v. Barger · filed 1980-05-27

The area for which § 1983 provides redress is not, however, restricted to those rights or interests that warrant due process protection, but includes all civil rights that are created or insured by the United States Constitution and all federal laws. ... Rights arising from the state or local governments, however, are not protected by § 1983. ... Plaintiff has failed to establish that he has been deprived of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” It follows, therefore, that plaintiff’s claims under § 1983 must be denied.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Bradt v. Honorable Shearn Smith · filed 1981-01-19

In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983, the complaint must show the deprivation of a right that is secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for deprivation of federal rights, privileges, or immunities; a violation of state law alone is insufficient.

Ybarra v. Bastian · filed 1981-06-04

Section 1983 protects against the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." Only federal rights, privileges, or immunities are protected by the section. Violations of state law alone are insufficient.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for rights secured by the Constitution or federal law, not rights secured solely by state law.

Haynes v. Wilentz · filed 1981-05-22

Thus, the right to which he complains of being deprived is a right allegedly secured by state law, not federal law, and as a consequence there is no jurisdiction here under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or on any other federal basis.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights of its own, and a claim based on a federal statute is cognizable only if that statute gives the plaintiff a substantive right, privilege, or immunity.

Jensen v. Conrad · filed 1983-07-18

The federal statutes cited by the plaintiff in her memorandum in support of her motion afforded her decedent no “rights, privileges, or immunities” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As set forth previously, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 itself creates no substantive rights, such “rights,” if any exist, must be found in the Constitution and laws of the United States.

A statutory-violation action under § 1983 requires the existence of an enforceable federal right, determined at least under the first Cort factor.

Boatowners And Tenants Association, Inc. v. Port Of Seattle · filed 1983-09-22

We hold that at least the existence of a federal right found under the analysis of the first factor in Cort, as elaborated in Fisher, is required in order to support a section 1983 action.

The EAHCA's exclusive placement-review mechanism cannot be bypassed by recasting a school-placement challenge as a § 1983 claim.

M.R. v. Milwaukee Public Schools · filed 1984-04-16

Accordingly, a challenge to a school administration’s placement decision cannot be made under the Rehabilitation Act or Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 provides a private cause of action for violations of federal statutory law by state or local officials, including a colorable challenge to a state’s abuse of discretion under the federal Medicaid statute.

Greenwald v. Axelrod (In Re Greenwald) · filed 1984-10-29

In 1980, it became clear for the first time that, as the Supreme Court put it, ... “means what it says.” It provides a private cause of action for violation of federal statutory law by state and local officials. ... Plaintiff states a colorable claim under § 1983 in alleging that defendants abused the discretion granted them pursuant to the federal Medicaid statute by refusing to allow for start-up costs incurred during the required phase-in of the nursing facility’s operations.

A violation of a federal statute that causes injury is actionable under § 1983 unless Congress foreclosed § 1983 enforcement or the statute creates no enforceable right.

Alexander v. Polk · filed 1984-12-17

Any such violation causing injury states a claim under the 1871 Civil Rights Act unless Congress itself has foreclosed enforcement of such federal statute under section 1983, or the federal statute itself does not create enforceable “rights.”

Section 1983 is unavailable when comprehensive federal environmental enforcement statutes provide the exclusive remedies for the asserted rights.

Fiore v. Kelly Run Sanitation, Inc. · filed 1985-05-30

Any potential action under ... of the Civil Rights Act is super-ceded by the comprehensive remedial enforcement scheme embodied in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ... and the Federal Solid Waste Disposal Act, ... which provide exclusive remedies.

The Education of the Handicapped Act preempts section 1983 equal-protection remedies for denial of a free appropriate public education, but section 1983 remains available for discriminatory denial of educational services beyond those the Act requires.

Council for the Hearing Impaired Long Island, Inc. v. Ambach · filed 1985-06-13

The Court noted that Congress intended that remedies under the EHA preempt parallel remedies under § 1983. It is therefore appropriate to grant summary judgment dismissing the Fourteenth Amendment § 1983 claims insofar as they challenge the alleged failure to provide a free appropriate public education. ... In the present case, plaintiffs’ claim for equal educational services is not remediable under the EHA, and therefore may be actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for the individual right to equal representation secured by Article I, Section 2.

Daggett v. Kimmelman · filed 1985-08-26

It does not follow from the absence of a statutory provision awarding attorney’s fees in apportionment cases that article I, section 2 does not secure rights cognizable under section 1983.

Not every federally created right is enforceable under § 1983.

Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside · filed 1985-09-11

Nevertheless, not all federally created rights are “enforceable” under Section 1983.

A disappointed bidder cannot maintain a Section 1983 action over a public contract unless it was deprived of a property interest or a right secured by federal law, and broadly discretionary federal procurement standards create no such protected right.

Sowell's Meats & Services, Inc. v. McSwain · filed 1986-04-11

In order for Sowell to establish standing to maintain an action under § 1983 it must show that the school officials deprived it of a property interest or a right secured by the consti ... tution and laws of the United States. ... Here, as in ... , the discretion allowed the contracting officer demonstrates a lack of a property interest or of any protected right in federal procurement procedures and indicates that judicial review of the award of a contract at the behest of a disappointed bidder is inappropriate.

Section 1983 makes a federal due-process claim cognizable but does not make accompanying state-law claims cognizable.

Misuraca v. Perales · filed 1986-05-12

However, only the petitioner’s "Fourth Claim” alleged a violation of her Federal constitutional right to due process of law, and, thus, only her "Fourth Claim” is cognizable under 42 USC § 1983.

Rights created by the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act are enforceable under section 1983.

Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue · filed 1986-06-03

In summary, we hold that the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act created a right enforceable under Section 1983, and, therefore, that the trial court did not err in awarding Section 1988 attorney’s fees to Ramah.

Medicaid patients and their health-care providers may state a Section 1983 claim to enforce statutory rights under Title XIX of the Social Security Act.

Medicare&Medicaid Gu v. State Of Oregon · filed 1986-11-03

Rather, we hold simply that statutory rights under Title XIX of the Social Security Act have been alleged in the complaint which are sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Medicaid patients and their health-care providers may state a Section 1983 claim to enforce statutory rights under Title XIX of the Social Security Act.

Coos Bay Care Center v. State · filed 1986-11-03

Rather, we hold simply that statutory rights under Title XIX of the Social Security Act have been alleged in the complaint which are sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to enforce a federal statute that supplies its own comprehensive remedial scheme.

Central MacHinery Co. v. State · filed 1986-12-12

Thus, no cause of action will lie under § 1983 where federal statutes provide their own comprehensive remedy.

The Food Stamp Act’s administrative remedies do not preclude a § 1983 class claim challenging systematic state maladministration because the Act lacks a sufficiently comprehensive enforcement scheme.

Harley v. Lyng · filed 1986-12-22

Even if the Food Stomp Act does not itself create a private right of action, plaintiffs have standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... My conclusion that no comparable enforcement scheme exists under this statute, ... is buttressed by a House Committee report in 1977 that “administrative remedies against the state ... should not be construed as abrogating in any way private causes of action against states for failure to comply with Federal statutory or regulatory requirements.” ... Accordingly, I conclude that plaintiffs have the requisite standing.

Medicaid recipients may enforce rights created by the Medicaid EPSDT program and its implementing regulations through § 1983.

New York City Coalition to End Lead Poisoning v. Koch · filed 1987-01-20

The individual plaintiffs, who are Medicaid recipients, have enforceable rights under the Medicaid program ... and its implementing regulations via 42 USC § 1983. ... Thus, the Medicaid laws and regulations relating to the EPSDT program do create a private right of action.

The Federal Airport and Airway Improvement Act’s enforcement scheme and § 2210(a) create no private right enforceable through § 1983.

Hillman Flying Service, Inc. v. City of Roanoke · filed 1987-01-21

Section 2210(a) confers no express or implied right of a kind that could serve as a basis for private action under section 1983.

Section 1983 may enforce a favorable final order under the Education of the Handicapped Act when the Act establishes the federal right but provides no mechanism to enforce that favorable administrative decision.

Robinson v. Pinderhughes · filed 1987-01-30

The statute in our case does provide an enforcement scheme when a claimant is faced with an adverse administrative decision; it does not provide, however, for enforcement of a favorable administrative decision. We are of opinion the enforcement mechanism is not sufficiently comprehensive. ... At that point, and not before, plaintiffs were entitled to rely upon § 1983. We are of opinion the dismissal of their § 1983 claim was error.

A preemption claim based only on the Supremacy Clause's allocation of power between federal and state governments does not support an action under § 1983.

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams · filed 1987-02-10

We thus come down on the side of the weight of authority that preemption of state law under the Supremacy Clause--at least if based on federal occupation of the field or conflict with federal goals--will not support an action under Sec. 1983, and will not, therefore, support a claim of attorney's fees under Sec. 1988.

A violation of the Uniform Extradition Act does not support a § 1983 claim because that state enactment is not a law of the United States.

Giano v. Martino · filed 1987-02-18

the Uniform Extradition Act is not a law of the United States, and a violation thereof does not support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The ADEA does not preclude § 1983 claims alleging independent constitutional violations rather than a substantive violation of the ADEA itself.

Price v. County of Erie · filed 1987-03-03

These causes of action are based not upon a substantive violation of the ADEA but rather upon substantive violations of the United States Constitution. ... does not preclude the claims asserted here under sections 1983 and 1985(3).

A federal statute supports a Section 1983 claim only if Congress did not foreclose private enforcement and the statute creates substantive obligations or enforceable rights; failure of either requirement defeats the claim.

Hunt v. Robeson County Department of Social Services · filed 1987-04-10

To determine whether a 1983 claim arises, courts have applied a two-pronged test: (1) whether Congress, in enacting the statute and its enforcement scheme, foreclosed private enforcement, and (2) whether the statute is the kind that creates substantive obligations or enforceable "rights" within the meaning of Section 1983. ... If a plaintiff fails either of these prongs, he has no cause of action under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim for deprivation of a Bill of Rights guarantee regardless of whether an adequate state procedure exists to vindicate that right.

Dugan v. Richard L. Brooks, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Cleveland State University Law Enforc · filed 1987-05-06

Where the claimed deprivation is of a right secured by the Bill of Rights, here by the fourth amendment, a plaintiff may maintain an action under § 1983 irrespective of whether there is an adequate state procedure for vindication of his rights.

Section 1983 supplies a tort-like remedy for deprivation of rights secured by federal law and is not limited to rights created by civil-rights legislation.

Crane v. Commissioner of Public Welfare · filed 1987-05-18

Section 1983 actions need not be based on “civil rights” legislation. ... Section 1983 creates a “species of tort liability” in favor of persons who are deprived of rights secured by Federal law.

A § 1983 claim based on the violation of a federal statute requires that the statute create enforceable rights.

Harpole v. Arkansas Department Of Human Services · filed 1987-07-15

The statute, however, must create enforceable rights.

The Supremacy Clause does not itself create a right actionable under Section 1983.

Faux-Burhans v. County Com'rs of Frederick County · filed 1987-12-17

Even if this right were infringed because of pre-emption, a concept flowing from the Constitution’s supremacy clause, there is no right of action recognized under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the supremacy clause.

Section 1983 supplies an independent cause of action for hospitals alleging that a state Medicaid agency violated federal Medicaid reimbursement requirements.

St. Tammany Parish Hospital Service District v. Department of Health & Human Resources · filed 1988-01-12

It is unnecessary to determine whether the Medicaid statutes and regulations themselves create a private cause of action for the hospitals against the DHHR as the administering state agency, for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates an independent cause of action for the defendants’ alleged conduct.

A municipality’s failure to enforce zoning restrictions does not support a Section 1983 claim absent deprivation of a federally cognizable right or interest.

Kondrat v. Barry M. Byron Melvin G. Schaefer John Zur George Kraincic · filed 1988-02-04

We further conclude that defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff failed to allege the deprivation of a right or interest cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for violations of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law, not for torts governed by state law.

Gilbert v. State of N.C. · filed 1988-03-21

We affirm the district court's dismissal, because Sec. 1983 provides a remedy only for rights secured by the Constitution or by federal law. Tucker v. Duncan, 499 F.2d 963 (4th Cir.1974). It is not a remedy for torts governed by state law such as those alleged by Mrs. Gilbert.

Section 1983 permits applicants to enforce the mandatory, self-executing Section 8 housing admission preferences against a public housing authority.

Drake v. Pierce · filed 1988-04-14

As to plaintiffs’ claims against the state defendants, the court concludes that Congress created enforceable and self-executing rights in the statutory preferences contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(l)(A) and (o )(3) and that Congress did not foreclose private enforcement of the statutory preferences. Therefore, the Everett PHA’s failure to implement the statutory preferences subjects it to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim arising from a settlement agreement rather than a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Lavapies v. Bowen · filed 1988-05-24

This claim arises under an agreement between the HHS and various organizations including the American Medical Association and not under the laws, treaties or Constitution of the United States. Similarly, jurisdiction cannot be based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a vehicle for redress of a deprivation of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a right secured by federal law; an alleged taking that does not violate the Federal Constitution cannot support a claim.

Equity Associates, Inc. v. Village of Northbrook · filed 1988-05-25

Plaintiffs lastly contend that count IV of their complaint adequately stated a cause of action for a violation of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §1983 (1982)). However, in view of our conclusion that plaintiffs’ property was not taken or damaged for public use without just compensation in violation of the United States Constitution, we must also conclude that defendants cannot state a claim under the Civil Rights Act. In the language of the Act, defendants did not subject plaintiffs to the deprivation of “any rights, privileges, or immunities” secured by the Federal Constitution and laws and thus are not liable under the Civil Rights Act to plaintiffs “in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding.”

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federally protected right; denial of tenure does not support a procedural due process claim without a protected liberty or property interest.

Beville v. South Dakota Board of Regents · filed 1988-06-08

A threshold issue in an action under § 1983 is whether the defendant’s conduct deprived the plaintiff of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” ... As Beville has raised no facts tending to show a deprivation of either a liberty interest or a property interest that would entitle him to due process protections, summary judgment is ordered in favor of the defendants on Count I of the Complaint.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a right secured by federal law or the Constitution; without such a deprivation, the claim fails.

Thomas v. Bible · filed 1988-08-10

The first inquiry in a section 1983 suit is whether a plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. If there has not been a deprivation of a federal right, plaintiff has failed to satisfy the threshold requirement for maintaining a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for alleged NLRA violations when the defendant did not directly violate the NLRA and Congress limited relief to the NLRA’s remedies.

Golden State Transit Corp., a California Corporation, D/B/A Yellow Cab of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, a Municipa · filed 1988-09-15

Since the City did not violate a provision of the NLRA, and since Congress has limited relief for such an action to the NLRA, we conclude that section 1983 damages are not available here.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for alleged violations of the Relocation Assistance Act or the Airport and Airway Improvement Act provisions at issue because neither creates an enforceable right.

Beachy v. Board of Aviation Commissioners of Kokomo · filed 1988-11-21

This Court finds that neither of the cited statutes creates a right enforceable under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of the Social Security Act even without a constitutional claim.

West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey · filed 1988-11-30

However, this court is satisfied a Social Security Act cause of action lies under section 1983 whether or not a constitutional challenge exists.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal statutes unless Congress specifically forecloses it.

Boyle v. BD. OF POLICE COM'RS OF CITY OF PORTSMOUTH · filed 1989-01-20

Congress has to specifically foreclose the 1983 remedy. ... As plaintiffs allege a violation of a federal statute through an official policy, the motion to dismiss claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is denied.

Section 1983 provides a private right of action only for deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by federal law.

Burgos v. Camareno · filed 1989-03-10

Section 1983 provides a private right of action only to those who allege that they have been deprived of rights, priveleges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on infringement of a constitutionally protected interest even when the claimant has no property interest in continued employment.

Franklin County School Board v. Page · filed 1989-03-23

But in the circumstances of this case a property interest in continued employment is not essential, as 42 U.S.C. section 1983 may be invoked upon conduct which infringes other constitutionally protected interests.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to enforce Title IV-D child support requirements because those provisions create no enforceable rights for AFDC recipients.

Wehunt v. Ledbetter · filed 1989-06-27

The first issue on appeal is whether the complaint states a cause of action against the state defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The Commissioner urges that Title IV-D of the Act does not afford plaintiff an enforceable right as defined by the Supreme Court in Pennhurst. We agree and therefore find it necessary only to discuss that issue.

Section 1983 allows health care providers to enforce rights created by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A).

Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Department of Social Services · filed 1989-07-11

We are in complete accord with the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning and determination that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) implies a private right of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a claim against state officials for violations of federal statutory or constitutional rights, but violations of state law and federal statutes that do not confer rights against those officials do not support a claim.

Lord v. Murphy · filed 1989-07-12

The court erred as a matter of law. Neither of the Maine Acts nor the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) provides grounds for a cause of action under section 1983. Section 1983 creates a cause of action against public officials acting under state law who violate federal statutes or the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 protects federally guaranteed rights, not rights arising solely under state law.

Crooks v. Maynard · filed 1989-08-04

Also, this argument presents a state law right, not a federal right. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only protects federally guaranteed rights.

Section 1983 cannot enforce a claimed right to operate an amateur radio at optimum capacity without congressional intent to create that individual federal right.

Howard v. City of Burlingame · filed 1989-08-29

However, the Court finds that there is no evidence of Congressional intent to create a federal right to operate a radio to its optimum capacity enforceable under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires an enforceable federal right; a Medicaid provision too nonspecific to impose the asserted duty cannot support a claim under it.

Cook v. Hairston · filed 1990-04-04

Plaintiffs have not established a violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Sections 1396a(a)(8) and (19) do not impose a duty on defendants to seek out an incapacitated individual who has been appointed an authorized representative and attempt to verify eligibility for benefits when the authorized representative has failed to do so. It may be that were defendants to undertake such an obligation, more individuals who are eligible for Medicaid benefits would be able to obtain same. However, Sections 1396a(a)(8) and (19) are not specific enough to support imposing such a requirement under the authority of those provisions.

Section 1983 permits an action to protect cable operators’ federal statutory immunity from local prosecution because the Cable Act’s remedies do not foreclose that action.

Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Puerto Rico · filed 1990-06-21

The defendants have not met their burden of demonstrating that Congress meant to preclude resort to § 1983 to protect the cable operator’s immunity under § 558.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of 4 U.S.C. § 111.

Hogan v. Musolf · filed 1990-07-05

Although no other appellate court has reached the question, we conclude that a violation of 4 U.S.C. sec. 111 creates a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.

Section 1983 liability for failure to protect from harm requires a violation of federal constitutional or statutory law; a violation of state law alone is insufficient.

P.C. v. McLaughlin · filed 1990-09-06

Obligations imposed by Vermont law are not relevant because liability for failure to protect from harm under § 1983 must be based on a violation of federal constitutional or statutory law, not state law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal law, not claims based solely on state law.

Colorado Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer · filed 1990-10-31

That particular claim is not properly before this court in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction in this case is limited to violations of Federal law.

Section 1983 does not support a civil rights claim based only on the administrative application of state statutes and regulations.

Hegarty v. Perales · filed 1990-12-17

Inasmuch as the real controversy in the underlying case concerns the administrative application of State statutes and regulations, there is no bona fide civil rights claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 to warrant an award of attorney’s fees (see, Matter of Kross v Perales, 156 AD2d 451; Matter of Rozier v Perales, 149 AD2d 710; Matter of Gelin v Perales, 149 AD2d 593).

Section 1983 permits health care providers to enforce their Medicaid Act right to challenge state reimbursement methods.

Kansas Health Care Ass'n v. Kansas Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services · filed 1990-12-31

Furthermore, this right is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a right secured by federal law or the federal Constitution under color of state law; a claim grounded in a state constitution alone does not qualify.

American Legion Post No. 32 v. City of Walla Walla · filed 1991-01-03

There are two prerequisites to maintaining a § 1983 action: (1) the plaintiff must prove that the defendant deprived him of his rights secured by either the constitution or the laws of the United States; and (2) the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted under color of state law. ... Second, although it initially implicated the Fourteenth Amendment in its complaint, on appeal it has grounded its argument in the Washington State Constitution, thereby failing to meet the first prong of the test. Consequently, we hold there is no basis for considering its challenge under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an alleged deprivation of a federal right; invoking its color-of-state-law language does not turn a state constitutional claim into a federal claim.

Hood v. Gary Foster and City of Carlinville · filed 1991-03-27

Nowhere on the face of his complaint does Mr. Hood make reference to the United States Constitution or to any federal laws. Although Mr. Hood's complaint uses language from section 1983, "under color of state law," he has not alleged a violation of a federal right.

Section 1983 provides no separate cause of action based solely on preemption of a local satellite antenna regulation under 47 U.S.C. § 605(b), which creates no federal right enforceable through § 1983.

Johnson v. City of Pleasanton · filed 1991-06-06

Under these circumstances and in light of the statutory and regulatory interplay, this Court finds that it would be contrary to the intent of the legislature to also provide a separate cause of action under section 1983 following a mere finding of preemption.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal statutory rights as well as constitutional rights.

Valerie J. v. Derry Cooperative School District · filed 1991-08-01

The § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of rights created solely by state law.

Rowe v. Brown · filed 1991-08-09

The trial court correctly concluded that § 1983 does not create a remedy for the violation of purely state-created rights, as its manifest purpose is to “create[] a species of liability in favor of persons deprived of their federal civil rights by those wielding state authority.”

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce FDA methadone regulations that create no rights in the plaintiffs.

Cushing v. Moore · filed 1992-01-29

Since plaintiffs cannot allege a deprivation of rights secured by the regulations, they cannot maintain an action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit to enforce Medicaid provisions that create no substantive right for recipients, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(19) and 1396d(a)(13).

Jordano ex rel. Jordano v. Steffen · filed 1992-03-11

The Court finds that Wilder is distinguishable from the instant case, and holds that neither of these statutory provisions creates a right enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not give beneficiaries of the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Act a cause of action because that Act creates no substantive rights enforceable through Section 1983.

Cabinet for Human Resources, Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Northern Kentucky Welfare Rights Association · filed 1992-03-30

Since we find that this is a situation in which Congress is suggesting instead of mandating, we find that the Association has no private right of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for conduct amounting at most to a common law trespass.

Ford v. Jay Gruwell, Vernon Poage, David Thompson, James Arnold, and Roy Martin · filed 1992-04-07

In this connection, counsel suggests that defendants' actions on July 6, 1989, in coming into the yard surrounding Ford's business premises was at most a common law trespass, which would not form the basis for a § 1983 action. We agree.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right; a violation of state law alone does not establish a claim.

Canell v. Oregon Department of Corrections B.E. Heath M. McGee S. Fox, Mail Room Officer, Oregon Department · filed 1992-05-07

In order to sustain an action under section 1983, Canell must establish that he was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right. ... Regardless of whether the defendants actually violated Oregon's state statute, this does not in and of itself establish a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against individual state commissioners whose enforcement of state law allegedly violates rights under a preemptive federal statute.

Charter Risk Retention Group Insurance v. Rolka · filed 1992-06-11

We construe the complaint as alleging that the individual defendants, acting as commissioners during the public meeting of October 17, 1991, violated plaintiff’s rights under the Act when they instituted the relevant orders to show cause. Defendant relies upon its earlier argument that no federal question is involved here, and any violation would concern plaintiff’s state rights. As indicated, the allegation of preemption involves a federal question and thus plaintiff has stated a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 imposes liability for deprivations of federal rights, not for breaches of duties arising under state tort law.

Allen v. Anderson · filed 1992-06-25

Even assuming section 719.2 did create such a duty and the statute was intended to protect a class of citizens to which Kathy Allen belonged against the particular harm which she suffered, section 1983 does not impose liability for violations of duties arising out of tort law.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right; violation of a state constitutional right alone does not support damages under it.

Grace Community Church v. Town of Bethel, No. 306994 (Jul. 16, 1992) · filed 1992-07-16

There must be a deprivation of federal rights, namely, either rights under the federal constitution or a federal statute.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal program requirement only when it creates an enforceable right; an isolated departure from a compliant state plan does not establish a claim under a regulation requiring the state to adopt that plan.

Clifton v. Michael T. Schafer, Individually and in His Official Capacity · filed 1992-07-16

However, violation of a federal statute is not by itself sufficient to support a § 1983 action. ... As § 205.10(a)(6) gives him only the right to a plan that complies with the regulation’s requirements, Clifton has no right to sue under § 1983 in this case.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of rights secured by federal law; violations of state law alone cannot support a claim.

Elizabeth Allen Ernest Allen the Elizabethen Club v. Louisville City Police Department and City of Louisville · filed 1992-07-17

First, the district court correctly determined that plaintiffs' section 1983 claim based on alleged violations of Kentucky law must fail because violations of state law cannot support a section 1983 claim. As previously stated, such a claim must be based on alleged violations of the federal Constitution or laws.

Section 1983 requires a violation of the federal Constitution or a federal statute; a violation of a state constitution alone does not support an action.

Zimmerman v. Northwestern Mut. Life · filed 1992-08-21

A § 1983 action, however, must be predicated on a violation of the federal constitution (or a federal statute).

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to enforce a prison policy that creates no rights under federal law.

Melendez v. Michael J. Cunningham, Warden, Etc. · filed 1992-09-10

To the extent that Melendez is attempting to enforce the PPD, such relief is unavailable under § 1983 which provides for a cause of action based upon a deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States. The PPD is, at most, a contract, and does not create any substantive "rights, privileges or immunities."

Section 1983 permits suit to enforce a right conferred by federal housing regulations.

Chesir v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF MILWAUKEE · filed 1992-09-14

Relying particularly on Wright and Simmons, I find that the regulation provides an enforceable right as required for a suit pursuant to section 1983.

Section 1983 addresses violations of federal law, so a violation of state law alone does not support a claim.

Jenkins v. Lane · filed 1992-11-02

Whether state officials violated state law is not material to the disposition of a claim under § 1983, which addresses violations of federal law (especially the Constitution).

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on a violation of a duty imposed by state statute.

Hunter v. Carbondale Area School District · filed 1993-01-07

However, it is certain that a violation of a duty under a state statute, by itself, in not sufficient to state a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a state agency to enforce a federal funding measure that imposes no binding obligation on that agency.

Resident Council of Allen Parkway Village v. U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban Development · filed 1993-01-12

In sum, we hold that the Plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action against HACH under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute the Plaintiffs seek to enforce—the Frost-Leland Amendment—is an appropriations measure directed at HUD, a federal agency. It does not impose a binding obligation on public housing agencies such as HACH, and therefore, it does not create federally enforceable rights within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 encompasses violations of federal statutes, including the Social Security Act.

Cleary v. Perales · filed 1993-03-04

As such, the denial of this benefit to petitioner was in violation of his rights pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, which encompasses violations of Federal statutes, including the Social Security Act (Matter of Thomasel v Perales, supra, at 568; see, Matter of Martinez v Perales, 77 NY2d 923, 925; Matter of Haussman v Kirby, 96 AD2d 244, 247).

Section 1983 creates liability only for violations of federal constitutional rights and federal statutes.

Long v. Hannigan · filed 1993-03-15

Section 1983 by its very terms creates liability only for violations of federal constitutional rights and statutes.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to compel coverage under a federal funding provision that creates no individual right and is too vague for courts to enforce.

Miller Ex Rel. Miller v. Whitburn · filed 1993-03-24

In the face of this silence, I conclude that § 1396b(i) does not give plaintiff a right to require the states to cover certain transplant procedures they have chosen not to cover. The lack of any explanation of the standards to be incorporated into the plan makes it plain that Congress did not intend to allow putative plaintiffs to sue to enforce this requirement; it also makes it impossible for the courts to do so. The requirement is far too vague and amorphous to be judicially enforceable.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for deprivations of rights protected only by state law.

Gosselin v. McGillen · filed 1993-04-15

Because Section 1983 gives no redress for deprivations of state-protected rights, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all such claims in Counts I, II, III, V and VI.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Putnam v. University of New Hampshire · filed 1994-02-04

While the plaintiff contends that the university’s actions violated the equal protection clauses of both the State and Federal Constitutions, a section 1983 action is available only for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.

Section 1983 does not let AFDC recipients enforce § 1396a(c)(1) against a state because that provision creates no enforceable right to maintain AFDC benefit levels.

Audette v. Sullivan · filed 1994-03-02

Section 1396a(c)(l) does not create a right enforceable by AFDC plaintiffs under section 1983 to impose a maintenanee-of-effort obligation on the states for the benefit of public assistance recipients.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for violations of federal rights.

Arney v. Campbell · filed 1994-03-11

Section 1983, however, expressly vindicates only federal rights.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of rights secured by federal law; a claimed right under state law alone cannot support the action.

Andrakin v. S.F. Parking & Traffic Com'n · filed 1994-05-27

Because a section 1983 action must be based on the deprivation of rights secured by federal law, see Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 624, whether Andrakin had a right to a jury trial under the California constitution or California law is irrelevant.

Section 1983 permits an employee to seek relief against a state official for abridging the employee’s NLRA collective-bargaining rights when Congress has not foreclosed that remedy.

Livadas v. Bradshaw · filed 1994-06-13

Finding no cause for special caution here, we hold that Livadas’s claim is properly brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a right secured by federal law or the federal Constitution to recover damages; a state constitutional violation alone is insufficient.

City of Houston v. Harris County Outdoor Advertising Ass'n · filed 1994-06-16

To recover damages under section 1983, appellees were required to prove that they were deprived of a right or privilege secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 allows Medicaid providers to enforce the public notice requirement in 42 C.F.R. § 447.205 when it confers a specific right and Congress has not foreclosed private enforcement.

Methodist Hospital v. Indiana Family & Social Services Administration · filed 1994-07-08

Accordingly, the public notice regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 447.205 is enforceable by Plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a cause of action for violations of federal rights; a violation of state law alone does not support a claim.

Snohomish County v. Anderson · filed 1994-10-06

This provision has been consistently interpreted to permit a cause of action only for violation of the federal constitution or other federal laws; violation of state laws will not alone support a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not enforce a claim based on a federal statute unless that statute unambiguously confers the asserted right.

Hunt v. Bartman · filed 1994-12-04

However, the court finds that because the statutory language relied upon by plaintiffs does not unambiguously confer the “rights” they have asserted in this context, plaintiffs’ “eligibility determination” claim is not enforceable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law; a claim based only on Michigan's Freedom of Information Act does not qualify.

Yeoman v. L. Thompson, Lieutenant John Short, Lieutenant · filed 1994-12-06

Yeoman cannot pursue his claim regarding his request for information pursuant to Michigan's Freedom of Information Act under Sec. 1983 as he has not alleged a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law; breach of contract and denial of visitation rights under state law alone do not support a claim.

Clonts v. Johnson · filed 1995-01-25

In addition, the Clontses cannot maintain a section 1983 action for breach of contract and wrongful denial of visitation rights under Minnesota state law because they have not shown a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Section 1983 provides relief for violations of federal law or the Constitution, but not for slander alone.

Kirkland v. Provience · filed 1995-02-02

It is important to remember that the Plaintiff has brought a § 1983 action which only entitles one to relief for violations of federal law or the U.S. Constitution. Section 1983 is not a remedy for tort allegations.

Section 1983 protects broad public interests and rights, but not private claims of right adequately protected by local laws and forums.

Gouveia v. Town of North Smithfield, 90-5475 (1995) · filed 1995-02-09

Plaintiff misconceives both the purpose and protections intended by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . That federal Act was intended to protect broad public interests and rights, and not private claims of right that are amply protected by local laws and forums.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law alone.

Simmons v. Honrath · filed 1995-03-20

Hence, Mr. Simmons’ allegation that the defendant violated state law fails to state a claim under § 1983.

A Section 1983 claim that depends solely on other federal statutory claims fails when those underlying claims fail.

Chuhran v. Walled Lake Consol. Schools · filed 1995-03-28

The Sec. 1983 claim fails too because it is predicated solely upon his IDEA, Rehabilitation, and ADA claims.

Section 1983 requires a violation of federal or constitutional rights; reliance on state law alone does not support a claim.

L.T. Tucker v. Debra S. Hembree, Clock No. 216 Teri L. Hafner · filed 1995-04-07

Lastly, Tucker's reliance on Michigan law does not support his Sec. 1983 suit, because Tucker has not first established a violation of his federal or constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a violation of federal law; a state constitutional privacy claim alone cannot support an action under it.

Flynn v. Sandahl · filed 1995-06-16

However, Flynn’s complaint was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which requires a violation of federal law.

Section 1983 requires a violation of a federal right; a violation of state law alone cannot support a claim.

Cole v. Sharp · filed 1995-08-11

To establish a claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must prove a violation of a right created by federal law. ... A violation of state law is insufficient.

Section 1983 vindicates federal rights; violations of state law, agency regulations, or state court orders alone do not state a claim.

Dandy Ebmeier v. Stump · filed 1995-12-04

Section 1983 guards and vindicates federal rights alone.

Section 1983 protects federal rights; violations of state laws, state-agency regulations, or state-court orders alone do not state a claim.

Dandy Ebmeier v. Jill Stump, Dennis S. O'brien, and Ann Stillman · filed 1995-12-04

We take this opportunity to emphasize that violations of state laws, state-agency regulations, and, more particularly, state-court orders, do not by themselves state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 guards and vindicates federal rights alone.

Section 1983 does not allow enforcement of 42 U.S.C. § 602(h) because that provision creates no enforceable right.

Stanberry v. Sherman · filed 1996-01-24

We therefore reaffirm our conclusion in Johnson v. Beye, and hold that 42 U.S.C. § 602(h) creates no right enforceable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover claims based solely on District of Columbia law without an alleged deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.

Walton v. District of Columbia · filed 1996-02-01

Nor can Walton bring his regulatory claims under § 1983, as they are based solely on District of Columbia law and do not implicate the constitution or a federal statute.

Section 1983 permits a claim for deprivation under color of state law of a right secured by Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA.

Morrow v. City of Jacksonville, Ark. · filed 1996-02-16

Deprivation of a right secured by Title VII, the ADEA, or ADA by one acting under color of state law constitutes grounds for a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a constitutional right for a malicious prosecution claim; the common law tort alone is insufficient.

Kelly v. Bencheck · filed 1996-04-10

As with a purported trespass claim, to assert a claim under section 1983, the plaintiff must allege he suffered a deprivation of a constitutional right, rather than rest on the allegation that the defendants committed the common law tort of malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 requires a violation of the Constitution or other federal law; a violation of state law alone is insufficient.

Beaty v. Lewis · filed 1996-05-06

Regardless of whether the disciplinary rules violated state law, however, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a violation of the Constitution or other federal law.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only when the provision allegedly violated creates a right intended to benefit the claimant.

Norfolk Federation of Business Districts v. Department of Housing & Urban Development · filed 1996-06-12

Count V cannot support an action under title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because § 108 of HCDA does not create any enforceable rights in the general public or individual citizens. A court’s inquiry under § 1983 examines whether the provision allegedly violated was intended to benefit the complainant.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of federal statutory rights when the statute creates enforceable rights and Congress has not foreclosed that remedy.

Marisol A. by Next Friend Forbes v. Giuliani · filed 1996-06-18

Plaintiffs may rely on § 1983 to seek redress for an alleged violation of a federal statute except “where Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself and where the statute did not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983.”

Section 1983 provides a remedy to any citizen or person deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.

Severino v. New Haven Parking Authority, No. 304378 (Jul. 25, 1996) · filed 1996-07-25

Section 1983 above clearly applies to any citizen or person subjected "to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim for violation of a state disclosure law alone; the claim must involve deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.

Broer v. Mann · filed 1996-08-05

To the extent that Broer contends that defendants are liable to him for damages for violating his privacy rights predicated upon Washington's disclosure law, Wash.Rev.Code.Ann. § 42.17.255 (1991), we affirm the district court's summary judgment because Broer has not stated a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law alone; liability requires a violation of a federal statutory or constitutional right.

Hatfield v. Richardson · filed 1996-08-08

An infraction of state law will not support a claim under § 1983, which imposes liability only for violations of rights protected by federal laws and the federal Constitution.

Section 1983 addresses violations of federal law and federally protected liberty interests, but not violations of state procedures alone.

Clapper v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections · filed 1996-09-27

However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 addresses only violations of federal law and federally protected liberty interests, not violations of state procedures.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right; a fraud claim without such a deprivation is not cognizable under it.

Furr v. Romo · filed 1996-10-10

To the extent that Furr contends that he has stated a cause of action for fraud, we conclude that this contention lacks merit because Furr has failed to state a cognizable section 1983 claim. See Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir.1991) (stating that section 1983 limits actions to claims involving deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights).

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federally protected right; alleged violations of state law alone do not support a claim.

William Snow Hume v. Michael C. Maynard Guy N. Ormes · filed 1997-03-17

Moreover, we note that Hume's purported section 1983 action was based primarily upon defendants' alleged violation of state law, an inadequate basis to support a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights and provides relief only for violations of federal rights created elsewhere by those acting under color of law.

Bozner v. Sweetwater County · filed 1997-04-09

Section 1983 itself does not create any substantive rights. It merely provides relief against those who, acting under color of law, violate federal rights created elsewhere.

Section 1983 permits a claim for damages based on IDEA or Rehabilitation Act violations only if the plaintiff states an underlying claim under those statutes.

Sellers ex rel. Sellers v. School Board of Manassas · filed 1997-04-30

In other words, to state a claim for compensatory and punitive damages under § 1983 for violations of the IDEA and § 504, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, state such a claim under the IDEA and § 504.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for deprivations of federal constitutional or statutory rights; violations of state prison procedures alone do not suffice.

Ira Lee Anderson-El, II v. Shade · filed 1997-05-01

But § 1983 provides a remedy only for the deprivation of rights secured by the federal Constitution or laws.

Section 1983 does not allow rejected applicants for Older Americans Act grants to enforce grant-selection provisions that give them no enforceable rights.

Legal Services Of Northern California, Inc. v. Arnett · filed 1997-05-28

We therefore conclude that the OAA creates no rights which are enforceable under § 1983 by LSNC.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on a federal statute only when the plaintiff asserts a violation of a federal right, rather than merely a violation of federal law.

Jeanine B. Ex Rel. Blondis v. Thompson · filed 1997-06-09

In order to assert a statutory claim under § 1983, however, a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on a federal statute only when that statute provides a private right of action.

Alexandre v. Corbett Phibbs Janet Phibbs Janet Miller Parenting Plus, Paul Kaspar Ventura County · filed 1997-06-19

Generally, in order to seek redress under § 1983, there must be a private right of action to enforce the underlying federal statute.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights, not state-law rights alone.

Sweaney v. Ada County · filed 1997-07-15

Section 1983, however, only creates a cause of action for violations of the federal “Constitution and laws.”

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights.

No. 96-35156 · filed 1997-07-15

Section 1983, however, only creates a cause of action for violations of the federal "Constitution and laws."

Section 1983 provides relief for violations of federal rights, not rights under a state constitution.

Baker v. City of Alexander City · filed 1997-08-01

However, § 1983 only provides an avenue for relief for the violation óf federal rights.

Section 1983 provides a claim for deprivation of federal rights, not for violations of state law alone.

Beckett v. Dept. of Corrections of Delaware · filed 1997-10-22

The Supreme Court has established, however, that § 1983 does not protect against violations of state law; only federally established rights are covered.

Section 1983 does not allow Medicaid recipients to enforce a transportation regulation that does not define a specific federal right conferred by Congress.

Harris v. James · filed 1997-11-06

Applying these principles to the case at hand, we conclude that the transportation regulation does not define the content of any specific right conferred upon the plaintiffs by Congress.

Section 1983 permits a Medicaid beneficiary to enforce a sufficiently defined federal right to ICF-MR services for people with conditions related to mental retardation.

Parry by and Through Parry v. Crawford · filed 1998-01-15

Determining whether a diagnosis of mental retardation is a prerequisite for qualifying for ICF-MR services does not strain judicial competence, and there is a binding obligation on the states to comply with federal mandates for categorically needy Medicaid recipients. Therefore, Parry has stated a federal right sufficient to support his § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a right, privilege or immunity secured by federal law; Public Law 280 confers no such right on Indians.

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth · filed 1980-05-06

Thus plaintiffs could not establish any right, privilege or immunity secured by a law of the United States as required by § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a university to claim deprivation of a protected right when athletic associations threaten sanctions for its compliance with federal law.

Pavey v. University of Alaska · filed 1980-06-09

Any sanctions that would be imposed by the associations as an outgrowth of the compliance of the University with such a duty would constitute a deprivation of the University’s “right to be free from interference with the performance of that duty.” ... The existence of such a right permits the University to meet the second prong of the Williams test, thereby stating a valid § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for alleged deprivations of rights under the DDABRA, EHCA, Rehabilitation Act § 504, and CMHCA.

Medley v. Ginsberg · filed 1980-06-10

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that plaintiffs may state a claim based upon section 1983 for defendants’ alleged noncompliance with the provisions of the four federal statutes in issue.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivations of federal rights, not state rights.

Estate of McLaughlin v. Town of Front Royal, Va. · filed 1998-03-10

The text of § 1983 makes clear that a cause of action under the statute concerns alleged deprivations of Federal, not State, rights: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....