42 U.S.C. § 1983

Receiving federal financial assistance alone does not make a private university a state actor for purposes of a Section 1983 claim.

Carbana v. Cruz · filed 1984-07-09

We hold that the mere acceptance of financial assistance from the Federal Government is not enough to equate the actions of IAU with state action.

Section 1983 requires the plaintiff to show that the deprivation of the right in question was caused by a defendant acting under color of state law, or that state action is otherwise involved, including specific allegations that private defendants acted with knowledge of and pursuant to state law or in complicity with state officials.

Wright v. TRW Credit Data · filed 1984-07-24

An essential element of a claim under section 1983 is a showing that the deprivation of the right in question was caused by a defendant acting under color of state law or that "state action" is otherwise involved. ... A section 1983 action requires specific allegations of involvement by state officials or by private individuals acting with knowledge of and pursuant to state law.

A defendant is liable under section 1983 only if the alleged deprivation of federal rights is fairly attributable to the state, meaning the challenged conduct constitutes state action rather than purely private action.

Bennett L. Crowder, II v. J.K. Conlan · filed 1984-08-02

The ultimate issue in determining whether a party is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is whether the alleged infringement of federal rights is “fairly attributable to the state.”

A section 1983 claim requires state action; purely private conduct, however wrongful, is not actionable under the statute.

Price v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 1984-09-20

The essence of a § 1983 action is a showing of some “state action.” There is a significant legal difference between the deprivation of constitutional rights by the state and by “private conduct, ‘however discriminatory or wrongful,’ against which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield.”

A private citizen does not become a state actor for purposes of a Section 1983 claim merely by reporting a crime to police that the police then act on.

Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc. · filed 1984-09-25

A private citizen does not become a state actor just because he reports a crime and the police rely on his report to make an arrest.

Conduct by a nominally private actor satisfies the 'under color of state law' element of a section 1983 claim when the specific facts show a sufficient nexus between the state and the particular challenged conduct, even if the actor is not a state official for all purposes.

Roberts v. Louisiana Downs, Inc. And Vincent J. Bartimo, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Preside · filed 1984-09-24

We hold only that in the complex of facts and regulations present at this stage of the proof in this case, there is a sufficient nexus between the conduct complained of and the state to attribute the conduct to the state.

A privately employed physician does not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes merely by providing medical services to a prison inmate.

Calvert v. Sharp · filed 1984-11-09

The professional obligations and functions of a private physician establish that such a physician does not act under color of state law when providing medical services to an inmate.

A private party’s misuse of an otherwise valid state law is not state action and does not support a § 1983 claim absent a state actor or conduct fairly attributable to the state.

Dahlberg v. Becker · filed 1984-11-09

Private misuse of a state statute is precisely what plaintiff has alleged here. ... In concluding that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because there was no demonstration either of state action or a state actor, we do not mean to suggest that plaintiff is without a remedy. The incidents alleged may well support a tort action in state court. We simply conclude that the events recounted here do not provide a basis for a federal claim.

A privately funded volunteer rescue squad is not a state actor for § 1983 when government regulation, support, and officials’ participation lack a nexus to the challenged expulsion decision.

Krieger v. Bethesda-Chevy Chase Rescue Squad · filed 1984-12-17

Having considered and rejected all of plaintiff’s arguments for finding state action in this case, the Court holds that the Bethesda-Chevy Chase Rescue Squad is not the “state” for purposes of the First, Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.

A private towing operator acts under color of state law when towing for a city, but not when independently pursuing a vehicle without city request or authorization.

Weinrauch v. Park City · filed 1984-12-28

It is clear that Speers was acting for the state when he initially towed the car. ... However, the evidence is undisputed that Speers was not performing City towing services when he tried to stop Weinrauch's car and that the police had not requested or authorized his assistance. Plaintiffs failed to make any showing that Speers' authorization to collect the five dollar bail for the City extended to include the conduct complained of. Therefore, Speers' actions do not give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983.

Police officers’ passive presence solely to prevent a breach of the peace does not turn a private repossession into action under color of state law for Section 1983.

Wright v. National Bank of Stamford · filed 1985-01-02

In short, the officers were merely present throughout the entire operation with the object of preventing a breach of the peace. That exigency never realized, their presence retained its passive character and therefore fell shy of creating action under color of state law.

Section 1983 reaches interference with federal rights only when the challenged conduct is fairly attributable to the state, not merely private action.

Kay v. Bruno · filed 1985-02-26

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not reach private action, but rather “prohibits interference with federal rights under color of state law”.

A private trustee's sale under a contractual deed-of-trust power is not state action for § 1983 merely because state statutes regulate the sale or the purchaser later uses the sheriff to obtain possession.

Teran v. Citicorp Person-To-Person Financial Center · filed 1985-03-26

Turning now to the alleged § 1983 violation, the appellants contend that because SMK and Katz utilized the sheriff to secure possession of the home they had purchased at the sale pursuant to the deed of trust, state action occurred; or alternatively, that the Arizona legislature, by adopting legislation permitting the use of deeds of trust, A.R.S. §§ 33-801 to 821, has engaged in such action. For either reason they conclude the notice of sale should have been given in Spanish. We disagree. Although the statutes regulate a trustee’s sale, the power of sale is set forth in the contractual agreement. The sale is strictly private, as are the proceedings leading to it.

Section 1983 does not reach a private party's conduct unless that conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Ponce v. Basketball Federation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico · filed 1985-05-01

Because neither § 1983 nor the Fourteenth Amendment reach private actions, the key issue before us is whether the decision by the nominally private appellants to revoke Ponce’s right to play in the League constituted action which may be “fairly attributable to the State.”

A private hospital’s termination of staff privileges does not support a § 1983 claim absent conduct attributable to the state.

Carter v. Norfolk Community Hospital Association, Inc., a Virginia Corporation · filed 1985-05-08

We conclude, therefore, that the Hospital’s termination of Carter’s professional privileges did not involve state action under the Fourteenth Amendment and that Carter failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983.

A § 1983 claim requires deprivation of a federal right under color of state law, and a private insurer does not act under color of state law merely because the insured was a state employee.

Borst v. United Ben. Life Ins. Co., State of Mich. · filed 1985-05-16

To state a cause of action under section 1983, the defendants must have deprived the plaintiff of some federal right under color of state law. The insurance company was in no way acting under color of state law; it simply claimed that it was not contractually liable to the plaintiff under the policy. Just because the insured was a state employee does not make section 1983 applicable.

Section 1983 requires conduct fairly attributable to the state, so a private store does not act under color of law merely by relaying customers' report to police and taking no other part in detention.

Franklin v. Piggly Wiggly Food Southern, Inc. · filed 1985-05-31

The action taken by appellees is not attributable in any way to the State: appellees were not exercising a right or privilege created by the State, they did not follow any rule of conduct imposed by the State, nor were they persons for whom the state is responsible. ... Therefore, because there is no question of fact that appellees were not acting under color of state law, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on appellant’s civil rights claim under 42 USC § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a constitutional deprivation by a state actor, and a private person cannot be liable solely for private conduct.

Haag v. Cuyahoga County · filed 1985-07-09

In order for there to be liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the deprivation must result from the action of a state actor. A private person is not a state actor, and there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A private towing company does not become a state actor for § 1983 merely because state law creates its lien and regulates its conduct without affirmative state participation in the deprivation.

Nance B. Hinman, Individually and on Behalf of All Those Similarly Situated v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc. · filed 1985-08-15

But a mere redefinition or reordering of property rights, without anything else, is not coercion or significant encouragement in the sense intended by the Supreme Court. ... To hold that any judicial or legislative action contributing to that flux brands the private act taken pursuant to the change an act of the State would open up virtually the entire arena of private conduct to constitutional challenge.

Private conduct constitutes state action under § 1983 only when there is a close nexus between the state and the challenged conduct.

Wagner v. The Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority · filed 1985-09-06

Absent a "close" nexus between the state and defendants in this case, defendants' actions cannot be fairly characterized as "state action," therefore the district court correctly concluded that there was no state action sufficient to support a Sec. 1983 claim.

Private cable licensees’ alleged failure to comply with a municipal license’s minority-business participation requirement did not state a § 1983 claim.

Technicable Video Sys. v. Americable · filed 1985-12-10

Technicable pled a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the alternative. We hold that the plaintiff cannot state such a cause of action and affirm the dismissal of that portion of the complaint.

A private merchant does not act under color of state law during a shoplifting detention when its only connection to the state is a generally applicable detention statute and no joint state action is alleged.

Hurt v. G.C. Murphy Co. · filed 1986-01-03

In the instant action, no such joint action is asserted because the only connection the State has with the Defendant merchant is the statute.

A § 1983 complaint against private businesses fails when it alleges no state action.

Carollo-Gardner v. Diners Club · filed 1986-01-21

An equally critical deficiency in plaintiff’s pleadings is the failure to allege any State action.

Section 1983 applies only to constitutional deprivations caused by governmental action, not private conduct.

Sanders v. A.J. Canfield Co. · filed 1986-03-21

It is well established that the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 apply only where the alleged constitutional deprivation is the result of governmental action, not action by private persons.

A section 1983 plaintiff cannot recover against private defendants without showing that they acted under color of state law.

McInerney v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 1986-05-30

As for his claim against defendants Wright and Glenridge Apartments, plaintiff cannot prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless he shows that defendants acted under color of state law.

A Section 1983 complaint fails when it alleges no acts by state officials or private citizens acting under color of state law.

Elmore v. McCammon · filed 1986-07-18

Turning to Plaintiff’s Title 42 complaints, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim since he has failed to allege acts of either state officials or private citizens under color of state law.

Section 1983's under-color-of-law requirement is equivalent to the Fourteenth Amendment's state-action requirement, and private conduct may qualify when it is fairly attributable to the government.

Gallman v. Pierce · filed 1986-07-18

Claims brought pursuant to the fourteenth amendment and Section 1983 are similarly proper only against “states”. ... Courts have recognized, however, that in certain circumstances, the conduct of private actors may fairly ... be attributed to state or federal governments. ... The standards used to review the degree of “state” involvement are the same for claims brought pursuant to Section 1983, the fifth amendment and the fourteenth amendment.

A private hospital’s termination of a physician’s staff privileges through a state-mandated peer-review process is not state action under Section 1983 when the decision ultimately rests on private parties’ medical judgments under professional standards not established by the state.

Elena Ezpeleta, M.D. v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corporation, a Michigan Corporation · filed 1986-08-27

Although subject to various formulations, the “ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under section 1983 is the same question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights ‘fairly attributable to the State?’ ” ... The decision at issue here, the decision to terminate staff privileges at a private hospital, cannot be fairly attributed to the state. Only private actors are responsible for the decision to terminate Dr. Ezpeleta. It is true that the decision was made within the context of the statutorily mandated Indiana peer medical review process. This fact, however, is not enough to create section 1983 liability for decisions that “ulti-mately turn on medical judgments made by private parties according to professional standards that are not established by the state.”

A private person does not act under color of state law under § 1983 merely by impersonating a state official or engaging in heavily regulated conduct, although conspiring with government officials can make the person liable.

California Republican Party v. Mercier · filed 1986-12-22

First, masquerading as a state official is not “state action” for the purposes of § 1983. Section 1983 only covers actions involving persons who are in fact governmental officials. ... Private individuals can be sued under § 1983 when they conspire with government officials, but there is no such allegation in this case. Second, heavy state regulation of private action does not turn that action into state action.

Private counsel and court-appointed guardians or conservators do not act under color of state law merely by participating in a state conservatorship proceeding.

McClear v. Patricia F. Donaldson, David C. Anderson, Barry M. Grant, and Sandra G. Silver · filed 1987-01-28

Additionally, appellee Donaldson cannot be held accountable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 as she was functioning solely as private counsel retained by appellant's brother to institute the conservatorship proceeding and as such was not acting under the color of state law. ... Likewise, appellees Anderson's and Silver's actions in the state proceedings were done in fulfillment of their responsibilities as a court-appointed guardian ad litem and conservator respectively and therefore were not committed under the color of state law.

A private homeowners' association is not a state actor under § 1983 merely because it performs services supplementing local government or is subject to state law.

Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home Park Ass'n · filed 1987-03-04

We conclude that the association in this case does not stand in the position of a government, and that the State is not involved either directly or indirectly with the association's activities.

Federal funding, participation in detention proceedings, or partial state compensation does not by itself make a private hospital or health-care provider a state actor under Section 1983.

Brewster v. John Doe No. 1 · filed 1987-03-19

We have also held that receipt of federal funds does not transform a private hospital into a state actor, Modaber, M.D. v. Culpeper Memorial Hospital, 672 F.2d 1023 (1982). Nor will participation in detention proceedings make a health care provider a state actor. Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154 (4th Cir.1980). Finally, we reject appellant's assertion that physicians who are compensated by the state are state actors even though they earn the bulk of their compensation from private practice.

A conclusory allegation that an official acted under color of state law does not state a Section 1983 claim when the complaint does not allege use of official authority or a sufficiently close state connection to the challenged private conduct.

Manax v. McNamara · filed 1987-05-01

The conclusory allegation that Defendant McNamara was acting “under color of state law” is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983, and must therefore be dismissed. ... There is no allegation in the pleadings that Defendant McNamara’s association with the other Defendants, in referring lawsuits or in giving information to the newspaper publishers, rises to the level of state action necessary to sustain a § 1983 action.

A private hospital’s suspension of medical privileges is not state action under § 1983 absent a nexus showing that the state was responsible for that specific decision.

Stanley M. Pariser, M.D. v. Christian Health Care Systems, Inc. · filed 1987-05-13

First, we concur with the District Court’s conclusion that Pariser failed to state a claim for deprivation of property without due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the suspension of his privileges did not involve state action. ... Here, Pariser’s complaint identified no nexus between the various forms of government involvement with the hospital that it catalogued and the hospital’s decision to suspend Pariser’s privileges, and therefore its allegations, even when taken to be true, did not establish state action.

A § 1983 plaintiff must allege state action; purely private conduct does not establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the statute.

Tracy v. Ehrke · filed 1987-05-13

A review of the record indicates that the district court correctly found that plaintiff failed to allege state action, as is required to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction under Sec.1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private assailant's conduct and a state security official's failure to prevent it do not satisfy that requirement when the state did not create the threat.

Beck v. Calvillo · filed 1987-05-19

While the record supports plaintiffs’ allegations of negligence or insufficient security measures, Boan’s acts can not be deemed to be under color of state law. Nor can the inaction of Pearson be considered as creating the threat Boan posed to the deceased Beck and Rybolt. The court therefore finds that Jack Pearson’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims under section 1983 should be granted for failure to state the requisite element of “state action.”

A private purchaser at a municipal tax sale does not act under color of state law merely by buying the property at the sale or later filing a quiet-title action.

Tunstall v. Office of Judicial Support of Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County · filed 1987-06-09

Because Grace did not act under color of state law in purchasing the Massey property or in filing the quiet title action, the plaintiff did not establish a cause of action under Sec. 1983 against the company.

A § 1983 complaint against a private party must allege specific conduct by that party that proximately caused the constitutional injury.

Brower v. County of Inyo · filed 1987-06-26

For a complaint to allege a valid claim against private parties for a deprivation of protected rights under section 1983, it must allege that specific conduct by a party was a proximate cause of the section 1983 injury.

A private citizen's use of force is not actionable under § 1983 unless it occurred under color of state law.

Henderson v. Majors · filed 1987-07-20

As to the use of excessive force by citizen Patrick, we agree with the district court that Henderson has failed to show the action under color of state law necessary to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A private college's disciplinary action may be attributable to the state for § 1983 purposes when the state coerced or significantly encouraged the disciplinary policy and action.

Albert v. Carovano · filed 1987-07-21

In sum, we find the evidence adduced by the appellants sufficient, at least, to raise a substantial question as to whether the State coerced or “significantly encouraged” the colleges to take strict disciplinary action against campus disturbances.

A § 1983 claim against a private law firm fails when the alleged conduct does not constitute state action.

Simmons v. Rutherford, Crockett and Demarco, and Unknown · filed 1987-07-31

The district court properly dismissed this action as frivolous under Sec. 1915(d) in that plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief under Sec. 1983. ... The district court properly held that this case presents no diversity of citizenship, no federal question and no violation of civil rights under state action.

A private trustee’s sale under Missouri law is not state action for purposes of § 1983 because the state is not significantly involved in creating or exercising the contractual power of sale.

Mildfelt v. Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri · filed 1987-08-26

We conclude that there is no significant state involvement in the conduct of a trustee's sale and thus no state action.

A § 1983 complaint against a private defendant fails when it does not allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Headrick v. Malati Multani, Md Earl Lynn Nichols and Toledo Mental Health Center, Agent for Ohio Department of Menta · filed 1987-09-01

Defendant Nichols' dismissal is properly affirmed, moreover, because plaintiff failed to allege that he was acting under color of state law as required by Sec. 1983.

A § 1983 claim against wholly private actors is factually groundless because the statute requires state action.

Baker v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 1987-12-04

Plaintiff’s claim asserted directly under the Fourteenth Amendment, and plaintiff’s claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, were not well grounded in fact. It is axiomatic that such claims require state action, and it has been evident from the inception of this case that the defendants were wholly private actors.

A private creditor acts under color of state law when it jointly participates with state officials in seizing property through a prejudgment attachment procedure.

Watertown Equipment Company v. Norwest Bank Watertown, N.A. · filed 1987-12-23

It is clear that Norwest and Miller acted under color of state law in instituting an attachment under South Dakota law because they acted in "joint participation" with state officials in seizing Watertown Equipment's property.

Section 1983 applies only to state actors, absent extraordinary circumstances that convert private conduct into state action.

Gatlin v. Jewel Food Stores · filed 1987-12-23

Section 1983 applies only to ... state ... actors, and except under extraordinary circumstances ... that description does not fit Jewel.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private corporation providing services to another private corporation does not act under color of state law absent joint activity with the state.

Walker v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc. · filed 1988-03-10

It is required that a plaintiff make a showing that a defendant acted “under color” of state law to support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... There is no showing by Walker that J.E. Merit was participating in a joint effort of discrimination with the state. As such, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as regards the plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to § 1983 is well taken and should be granted.

Section 1983 does not make a private party a state actor merely because it gives information to the state and presses officials to act against someone.

MANAX v. McNAMARA · filed 1988-04-21

Providing information to the state and pressing for state action against an individual, without more, cannot suffice to make a private entity liable under section 1983 as a state actor.

Section 1983 does not reach the NCAA’s enforcement of eligibility rules against a private university when the challenged conduct is not attributable to the state.

McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Association · filed 1988-06-01

We therefore conclude that Parish is no longer good law and join the virtually unanimous roster of courts that have held, since the decisions in Rendell-Baker and Blum, that the NCAA is not the state or a state agency and hence does not act under color of law within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 treats a private operator of a company town as a state actor for conduct connected to its governmental functions, but not for conduct in its private capacity.

Robison v. Canterbury Village · filed 1988-06-03

The logical determinant must be whether the actions challenged as unconstitutional are performed in the exercise of the actor's governmental or public functions, rather than in the actor's private capacity.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private college does not become a state actor when it suspends students under disciplinary rules that state law requires it to adopt and file, where the state neither requires the particular suspension nor compels enforcement of the rules.

Albert v. Carovano · filed 1988-06-28

Yet nothing in either the legislation or those rules required that these appellants be suspended for occupying Buttrick Hall. Moreover, it is undisputed that the state’s role under the Henderson Act has been merely to keep on file rules submitted by colleges and universities. The state has never sought to compel schools to enforce these rules and has never even inquired about such enforcement. In these circumstances, our decisions and those of the Supreme Court preclude a finding of state action.

Section 1983’s state action requirement is not met when private parties merely invoke state legal procedures, even if a plaintiff conclusorily alleges that they conspired with a judge.

Schucker v. Terry G. Rockwood James C. Fukuhara Dewar, Romig & Rockwood, Inc. Anne D. McGowan Delay, Laredo & · filed 1988-06-29

Invoking state legal procedures does not constitute “joint participation” or “conspiracy” with state officials sufficient to satisfy section 1983’s state action requirement.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a private party’s misuse of a constitutional state statute.

Hassett v. Lemay Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1988-07-22

Such allegations, that a private party acted unlawfully with respect to a constitutional state statute, fail to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private racetrack’s independent decision to exclude reporters is not attributable to the state merely because the state regulates the track and allows it to exclude patrons.

Phone Programs Illinois, Inc. v. National Jockey Club, Inc. · filed 1988-08-02

The Parks barred the reporters on their own decision, not as the result of any rule or regulation mandating who may or may not receive access or press credentials. There is no allegation that any state official ordered or encouraged the Parks to exclude Phone Programs or any other reporters.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private hospital’s employment decisions do not become state action merely because the hospital is regulated by the state or receives public funding.

Alcena v. Raine · filed 1988-08-10

Plaintiff’s reliance on the fact the institutional defendants are regulated by the state and receive substantial public funding is, without more, woefully insufficient to impute state action to the conduct of the defendants. ... Accordingly, plaintiff’s § 1983 claims fail because he cannot make out the necessary element of state action and, consequently, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted and the complaint is dismissed as to the § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires state action; a claim against private defendants fails without it.

Mouradian v. John Hancock Companies · filed 1988-08-30

With regard to plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Magistrate found, and this court agrees, that plaintiff is unable to satisfy that statute’s “state action” requirement.

Section 1983 treats a private children's home contracted to fulfill the state's duty to care for a child as a state actor when the child's care is at issue.

McAdams v. Salem Children's Home · filed 1988-10-13

If a restaurant leasing space in a public garage is sufficiently entangled with the state to be considered a state actor, surely an individual contracting with the state to fulfill the state’s duty to provide for a child is sufficiently connected to the state to be a state actor when the care the child has received is at issue.

Section 1983 requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s challenged conduct was state action; a private academy’s discharge of a teacher does not qualify without state responsibility for that conduct.

Johnson v. Pinkerton Academy, Kenneth Johnson v. Pinkerton Academy · filed 1988-12-22

However, plaintiff initially had to realize that he was obliged to come within the confines of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and show that defendant’s objected-to conduct was, at least in part, state action. ... On this appeal we do not reach this latter finding, but hold that, in spite of a very thoughtful opinion, the court erred with respect to state action.

Section 1983 requires private defendants to be state actors or to have conspired with a state official.

ANDERSON v. MIDDLETON · filed 1989-02-24

The action was also properly dismissed against the remaining defendants as they are not state actors and Anderson has failed to establish that they conspired with a state official.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the violation resulted from state action; private conduct not attributable to a government body does not qualify.

May v. Warner Amex Cable Communications James L. Gray Virgil Reed Patricia Morrison · filed 1989-02-28

In addition, plaintiff cannot recover under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 because he cannot establish, as he must, that the violation resulted from state action. Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978). Whatever the actions of Warner Amex Cable Communications and the other defendants may have been, they were not "properly attributable" to the State of Ohio, or indeed to any governmental body.

A private person who is not a state actor and did not act in concert with state actors is not liable under § 1983.

Luca v. Pima County Adult Detention Center · filed 1989-03-10

We also note that she is not a state actor for purposes of Sec. 1983, and was not acting in concert with state actors when she accused Luca of child molesting.

Section 1983 does not cover a private hospital’s removal of a physician’s staff privileges when the decision cannot be attributed to the state.

Pinhas v. Summit Health, Ltd. Midway Hospital Medical Center the Medical Staff of Midway Hospital Medical Cente · filed 1989-07-26

The challenged action here, the removal of Pinhas’s staff privileges at Midway, cannot be attributed to the state of California. Only private actors were responsible for the decision to remove Pinhas.

Section 1983 requires state action; a claim against private defendants fails when the record contains no evidence of it.

Tadros v. Coleman · filed 1989-08-15

To the extent that that sentence can be read as stating a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — Dr. Tadros has never mentioned section 1983 in his papers — Dr. Tadros’s claim fails since there is no evidence of state action.

A private hospital does not act under color of state law under § 1983 merely because state law authorizes staff discipline and offers optional judicial review of procedural fairness.

Wong v. John Stripling, Etc. · filed 1989-08-28

The mere fact that the legislation authorizes the action taken and makes available an optional review of procedural fairness in the state court system does not constitute “state action” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires sufficient facts showing that the defendant was a state actor; a private individual’s conduct without state action is not actionable.

Coughlan v. Jim McKay Chevrolet Inc. · filed 1989-11-13

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish Defendant Sonn as a state actor. As a private individual, Defendant Sonn’s conduct is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat private store security guards as state actors merely because a state statute permits them to temporarily detain suspected shoplifters until police arrive.

Lewis v. JC Penney Co., Inc. · filed 1996-12-06

Delaware’s statute does not authorize a substitution of judgment; it merely permits stores to temporarily detain suspected shoplifters until the police can take charge at the scene. Therefore, defendants are not state actors and summary judgment will be granted for them with respect to plaintiffs section 1983 claims.

Private parties who act jointly with police in the challenged conduct may be treated as state actors under § 1983.

Shibley v. Begin · filed 1997-02-20

The court finds that allegations of such collective action sufficiently show that the alleged constitutional violations resulted from "concerted action tantamount to substituting the judgment of a private party for that of the police or allowing the private party to exercise state power." See Alexis, supra, 67 F.3d at 352. Thus, the defendants are not entitled to dismissal of Shibley's claims on the grounds of lack of state action.

Section 1983 does not treat a private investigator or insurer as a state actor merely because they provide an investigation report to local authorities.

Whalen v. Rust · filed 1997-03-31

Second, the district court did not err in finding that TIC and Rust's conduct did not constitute "state action" under section 1983, because simply providing a copy of the investigation report to local authorities does not amount to state action as "willfully participating" with a governmental actor.

Merely answering law enforcement questions about a case does not make a private person liable under § 1983.

Robert Miller, III v. Compton · filed 1997-08-12

To impose § 1983 liability on a private actor for merely answering a law enforcement official's questions regarding a case would have obvious and unfortunate consequences and has no support in precedent or common sense.

Section 1983 does not make a private provider a state actor merely because it receives state funding and is subject to state regulation.

Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Systems, Inc. · filed 1997-08-28

Crossroads does receive state funding and is subject to certain regulation by the State of Colorado. This alone, however, is not enough to find Crossroads is a state actor. ... The Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to state a cognizable § 1983 claim against Crossroads in this case under any of the tests discussed above.

Section 1983 does not treat private parties as state actors merely because they comply with state bidding regulations.

X-Men Security, Inc. v. Pataki · filed 1997-10-29

That the Private Defendants complied with DHCR bidding regulations does not transform their actions into those of the State.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private party does not become a state actor merely by litigating and winning in state court.

Bradbury v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Robert Dean and Richard Murphy · filed 1997-12-16

However, it is well established that "merely resorting to the courts and being on the wining side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or joint actor with the judge." Dennis, 449 U.S. at 28; See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). Thus Bradbury's allegations are insufficient to show that Metropolitan was acting under color of state law.

A private party is not a state actor under § 1983 on a conspiracy theory without an alleged agreement with a state official.

Davis v. Brock and Brock Ltd. Joan B. Faulkner San Bruno Police Department Palla, Chief Hedley, Chief Orsoline · filed 1997-12-17

Davis contends that Faulkner was a state actor because she conspired with Officer Orsolini to deprive Davis of his constitutional rights. This contention lacks merit because Davis did not allege any agreement between Orsolini and Faulkner.

A bare allegation that a private entity conspired with a state entity does not bring the private entity within § 1983.

Messman v. Helmke · filed 1998-01-15

Moreover, a bare allegation of a conspiracy between private and state entities is insufficient to bring the private entity within the scope of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat private conduct as state action merely because a state statute authorizes it; the statute must compel the conduct.

Jerome Waters, M. D. v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., a Florida Non-Profit Corporation · filed 1980-06-09

Unless a state statute compels a private party to act in a certain way, that party’s action will not constitute “state action” for purposes of invoking the subject matter jurisdiction of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s conduct to be fairly attributable to the state; a claim against a private business fails without allegations establishing state involvement under the applicable tests.

Toyos v. Western Auto of Puerto Rico · filed 1998-07-30

There is no allegation and/or evidence that the government of Puerto Rico encouraged or affirmatively induced, economically or otherwise, defendant’s alleged conduct. Neither is there any assertion that Western Auto has a relationship with the Puerto Rican government tantamount to a joint venture, or that the government receives financial contributions from Western Auto’s sales. Finally, nowhere in the complaint is there a claim that Western Auto assumed a responsibility that is traditionally reserved to the state. In sum, under each of the three relevant tests, plaintiff has failed to allege that his alleged damages can be fairly attributed to the federal government.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s conduct to be fairly attributable to the state.

Mitchell v. United Parcel Service · filed 1998-08-25

Based on the record before the Court, UPS’s conduct cannot be fairly attributable to the state. There are no genuine issues of material fact to be determined. Therefore, summary judgment should be granted as to Plaintiffs section 1983 claims.

A private person may be a state actor under § 1983 through a conspiracy with state actors, but the plaintiff must show that the conspiracy existed.

Williamson v. Coppinger · filed 1998-08-31

Finally, we find that Williamson failed to show that Valerie Sharp conspired with the other Defendants, making her a state actor under § 1983.

For a private party, state action under § 1983 depends on the specific conduct challenged.

Taylor v. Charter Medical Corp · filed 1998-12-09

Collateral estoppel does not bar the litigation of the state actor issue in the present suit because, although an entity may be deemed a state actor generally, in the case of a private party, the relevant question is whether the specific conduct in question constituted state action.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a purely private party that did not act under color of state law.

Brotherton v. Cleveland · filed 1999-04-14

A § 1983 plaintiff may not sue purely private parties.

Section 1983 requires proof of joint participation, an agreement, or a meeting of the minds to establish a conspiracy between private parties and the state to violate constitutional rights.

Aly v. Rocky Mtn. Holding · filed 2000-01-12

To prove a conspiracy between private parties and the state under Section 1983, the plaintiff must show a joint participation, agreement, or “meeting of the minds” to violate constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private entity whose actions are not attributable to the state.

Van Hull v. Marriott Courtyard · filed 2000-01-18

The Marriott cannot be held liable under § 1983 because it did not, as a private entity, act under the color of state law.

A private entity’s relationship with a public entity supports a § 1983 claim under the nexus/ joint action test only if that relationship involves the alleged constitutional violation.

Patrick v. Floyd Medical Center · filed 2000-01-26

We hold that, to sustain a § 1983 claim under the nexus/ joint action test, the symbiotic relationship between the public and private entities must involve the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not treat private citizens as state actors merely because they report someone to law enforcement when officers independently investigate before detaining that person.

Wakeland v. Montano · filed 2000-01-28

Merely making reports to law enforcement authorities does not constitute state action. In the situations about which plaintiff complains, the Mannicks’ complaints were followed by independent investigation by sheriff’s officers prior to their detention of plaintiff.

Section 1983 reaches a private party’s conduct only when it can fairly be attributed to the state; permission to use city streets for a festival did not satisfy the public function test where the city retained control.

Lansing v. City of Memphis Memphis Park Commission, Memphis in May International Festival, Inc. · filed 2000-02-04

These provisions indicate quite clearly that although Memphis in May had permission from the city to put its streets to special use during the time of the festival, the city retained ultimate control of the streets at all times. ... Hence, we conclude that the public function test is not met here.

A private treatment provider does not act under color of state law merely by overseeing an employee’s treatment when the state employer retains firing authority and the provider does not participate in the firing.

Duran v. New Mexico Monitored Treatment Program · filed 2000-02-24

In view of the facts that the Hospital delegated no power to the Program or Marchal to discharge Duran and neither the Program nor Marchal actually participated in firing him, we conclude that their actions cannot be characterized as state action.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations of joint action with a state actor to support a claim against private parties; conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient.

Roginsky v. Blake · filed 2000-08-11

Plaintiffs Amended Complaint offers only conclusory allegations of a conspiracy for the purposes of state action. Sufficient allegations of state action, however, are not plead in the Amended Complaint.

Section 1983 allows a jury to decide whether a private contractor acted under color of state law when evidence supports state involvement in its decision to fire employees.

Berweger v. County of Orange · filed 2000-11-08

They can, however, point to a sequence of events evidencing such a conspiracy, sufficient to allow a jury to decide whether EHG was a state actor when it fired plaintiffs.

A private party may be liable under § 1983 when it conspires with a state actor to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Tomaiolo v. Transamerica Corp. · filed 2001-02-20

However, a private party engages in state action and may be liable under § 1983 if that party conspires with a state actor to deprive a plaintiff of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 treats a private attorney as a state actor through a claimed conspiracy with a judge only when evidence supports an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of a federal right.

Hamilton v. Arnold · filed 2001-03-09

Accordingly, Hamilton has failed, despite a protracted discovery period, to provide evidence of an agreement between Attorney Arnold and Judge Rotman sufficient to warrant viewing Attorney Arnold as a state actor.

Under § 1983, a plaintiff need not show that the state participated in the challenged act when the state and private defendant have a symbiotic relationship.

Charles Crissman Wendy Crissman Christine Crissman v. Dover Downs Entertainment Inc. Dover Downs, Inc · filed 2001-06-25

When such a relationship of interdependence exists, a § 1983 plaintiff need not show state participation in the challenged activity.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party as a state actor merely because it reports someone’s activities to police.

Steele v. City of Bemidji · filed 2001-07-30

We reject Steele’s argument that the mall is a state actor insofar as it reported Steele’s activities to the police, see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (to be considered state actor, private party must have “reached an understanding” with state officials to deny civil rights and have been “willful participant in joint activity with the State”).

A § 1983 plaintiff alleging that private parties conspired with state officials must plead facts showing agreement and concerted action; conclusory allegations do not establish state action.

Smith v. D. Colorado Sears Roebuck & a & D, C.L. · filed 2001-10-10

we have held that “[w]hen a plaintiff in a § 1983 action attempts to assert the necessary ‘state action’ by implicating state officials or judges in a conspiracy with private defendants, mere conclusory allegations with no supporting factual averments are insufficient; the pleadings must specifically present facts tending to show agreement and concerted action.” ... Smith’s complaint completely fails to meet that standard. Accordingly, the conspiracy claim against Mosher and Sears is properly dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 can reach a private defendant when its challenged conduct satisfies any one of four state-action tests: exclusive public function, entwinement, nexus, or symbiotic relationship.

Logiodice v. Trustees of Maine Central Institute · filed 2001-11-08

Although this inquiry is fact-intensive, it is guided by factors that can be grouped into four basic tests, any one of which, if satisfied, provides a basis for finding that the complained-of conduct was state action for purposes of section 1983:(1) the exclusive public function test; (2) the entwinement test; (3) the nexus test; and (4) the symbiotic relationship test.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of law; a private defendant must have a sufficient connection to the state for liability to attach.

Canter v. Hardy · filed 2002-03-06

Under Section 1983, liability attaches only to a conduct occurring “under color of law.” ... Moreover, Plaintiffs have failed to establish a sufficient connection between RNI and the State to establish “state action.”

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a private developer without allegations or evidence connecting its conduct to the government closely enough to treat it as state action.

Environmental Ass'n v. Department of Planning & Natural Resources, Botany Bay Partnership, LLP · filed 2002-04-10

Given the absence of any allegation or evidence to support the notion that the Territorial Government is inextricably intertwined with the internal operations of the private developer so as to construe the private developer’s actions to be “state actions”, no constitutional infringement or civil rights violation actions can be sustained against Botany Bay. Hence, Botany Bay must be dismissed as a party defendant.

Section 1983 does not treat a private person as a state actor merely because a court appointed that person as a fiduciary.

Duboys Ex Rel. Duboys v. Bomba · filed 2002-05-02

With respect to the argument that a court appointment as a fiduciary is sufficient to endow private defendants with the character of the state, there is simply no basis in law for such a proposition. On the contrary, the law in this Circuit consistently holds that a court appointment of a private individual is not sufficient to establish state action.

A private media outlet that independently observes a government search is not liable under § 1983 when it does not act under color of law.

Brunette v. Humane Society Of Ventura County · filed 2002-08-23

Because the Media was not a state actor during the search, it cannot be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private person’s report to prosecutors as state action when prosecutors retain discretion whether to file charges.

McCord v. City of Columbus · filed 2002-09-10

Instead, there is no evidence to suggest that Defendant Goings did anything other than report certain facts to the City Attorney’s Office, which then had the discretion to file or not file charges. This fact alone does not constitute state action on behalf of Goings.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to act under color of state law; FCC regulation alone does not make a cable provider a state actor.

CSC Holdings, Inc. v. Westchester Terrace at Crisfield Condominium · filed 2002-10-21

The mere fact that CSC is regulated by the FCC does not mean that it is a state actor.

Section 1983 does not make a private party liable merely because a state commission approved its contract.

Destek Group, Inc. v. New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission · filed 2003-01-28

Similarly, here, a state commission's approval of an agreement cannot turn a private individual's act of contracting into state action for the purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a tax deed holder’s quiet title action as state action merely because a sheriff serves required notices and a county treasurer files proof of service.

Joseph A. Wittstock, III v. Mark A. Van Sile, Inc. · filed 2003-06-06

Here, we also find that the county sheriffs function in regard to a tax deed holder’s quiet title action is incidental. The county sheriffs role in serving the required notice(s) is to preserve the public peace, not to assist the tax deed holder take possession of the foreclosed property. And, the county treasurer’s role in filing a return showing proof of service by the county sheriff is purely ministerial. Consequently, there is not a sufficiently close regulatory relationship between a tax deed holder and the state to warrant attributing a tax deed holder’s action (or inaction, as in this case) to the state.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private labor union without evidence that it acted with a state actor to deprive someone of rights.

Murphy v. Board of Education of the Rochester City School District · filed 2003-07-10

... other than plaintiffs conclusory assertion that the RTA was working “in concert” with the RCSD (even while representing plaintiff in his grievances against the RCSD), there is no evidence that the RTA conspired with the RCSD to deprive plaintiff of his rights, or that the alleged conspiracy had anything to do with plaintiffs race or other protected classification. There can be no liability, therefore, under either § 1983 or § 1985.

A private entity can be liable under § 1983 for joint action with police, but merely seeking police help does not establish joint action.

Arlotta, Andrew J. v. Bradley Center · filed 2003-11-18

The Bradley Center can only be liable under § 1983 if it engaged in illegal joint action with the MPD. Malak v. Associated Physicians, Inc., 784 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1986). The Bradley Center, by seeking police help in dealing with ticket scalpers, did not engage in any joint action with the MPD to enforce the city’s ordinance.

A transfer of public park land to a private party does not necessarily shield the parties from § 1983 liability.

Chambers v. City of Frederick · filed 2003-11-25

Accordingly, the transfer of title to part of the park did not necessarily shield the Defendants from § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 claims against private developers require state action; evidence that they worked and communicated with government entities, without evidence of a conspiracy, does not establish it.

Johnson v. City of Shorewood · filed 2004-03-05

At most, the Johnsons’ evidence suggests that the United States, the Watershed District, the municipal defendants, and the private developers worked together on various development projects and communicated with each other, but this alone is insufficient to generate a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of a conspiracy. This lack of evidence also dooms for want of state action the Johnsons’ federal claims against the private developers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a private creditor liable merely for using state court attachment process to collect a debt; the creditor’s conduct must qualify as state action.

Nesglo, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. · filed 1980-12-02

With respect to 42 U.S. Section 1983 it is axiomatic that a civil rights claim thereunder, may only be prosecuted against a state officer or, by way of exception to the general rule that private parties are not covered by the statute, against private entities suffused and clothed with the trappings of official “state action” with respect to the particular acts or omissions upon which the deprivation claims rest.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private party merely for calling the police; the party must willfully collaborate with a state actor.

Johns v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2004-04-21

Williams’s call to the police does not amount to “willful collaboration” giving rise to § 1983 liability.

A private union’s alleged conspiracy with a city does not establish state action under § 1983 without evidence that they acted in concert.

Montgomery v. City of Ardmore · filed 2004-04-28

We agree with the FOP that Mr. Montgomery’s conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim. There is no evidence that the FOP acted in concert with the City.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party acting jointly with the state, but the state must be more than a passive victim of the party’s conduct.

Standardbred Owners Association v. Roosevelt Raceway Associates, L.P. · filed 1993-02-08

The district court did not err, however, in dismissing plaintiffs' cause of action seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although a private individual may act under color of state law when he is a willful participant in a joint action with the state, Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 186, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980), in order for private conduct to qualify as state action, the state must be more than a passive victim of an individual's wrongful conduct. There must be either a symbiotic relationship between the state and the defendant, such as, for example, a direct financial stake by the state in a business, or a close nexus between the state and the alleged wrongful conduct. Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 918 F.2d 1079, 1081-83 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1583, 113 L.Ed.2d 648 (1991). Plaintiffs' assertion that RRA perpetrated a fraud on the unwitting IDA refutes, rather than supports, the existence of a concert of purpose that warrants description of RRA's conduct as state action.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law; a complaint against a private party that alleges no state action fails to state a claim.

Poucher v. Intercounty Appliance Corp. · filed 2004-10-08

Thus, to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant acted under color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” ... Here, the complaint fails to allege that the defendant acted as a state actor and that it acted under color of state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.”

Section 1983 does not treat a private hospital as a state actor when it independently decides to treat a patient and police later help restrain the patient.

Carver v. Plyer · filed 2004-10-12

Turning now to the final issue raised in this appeal, we hold that St. Luke’s is not a state actor for purposes of section 1983 under any of the possible tests used to determine whether one’s conduct is attributable to the state.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against private actors who lack a connection to state action.

Sato v. Plunkett · filed 1994-03-15

Lack of service is not the only problem; some of these persons (such as James B. Burns, newly named as United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois) have no apparent connection to anything that happened to plaintiffs; others are private actors who cannot be sued under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or a Bivens theory, and who therefore appear to be outside the jurisdiction of the court.

Section 1983 requires state action; public funding and prior state ownership of a private hospital do not establish it without sufficient state involvement in the challenged decision.

Moss v. Casa Grande Community Hospital · filed 1990-01-02

After 1982 the State helped Casa Grande financially, but the Court's decision in Rendell-Baker and Blum state that government subsidies will not confer state action. Plaintiff has not shown interdependence to the extent present in Halet, where the State exerted actual control over development of the land, prohibited certain leasing practices, and received a percentage of the rents charged. Plaintiff has presented no evidence leading to the conclusion that the State in any way participated in or condoned the termination of his contract.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy when a sheriff conspires with private parties to deprive someone of property in violation of civil rights.

Kraemer v. Grant County, Herbert Hottenstein, William Baker, Betty Baker, Appeal of Mark D. Lawton · filed 1990-01-09

If Sheriff Hottenstein was in fact conspiring with the Bakers to deprive Kraemer of her property, then there would be a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Kraemer’s civil rights.

When a § 1983 claim rests on private litigants’ use of state judicial processes, state action requires an immediately enforceable state court judgment.

Dunwoody Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Dekalb County, Georgia · filed 1990-01-25

We must await an immediately enforceable state court judgment before sanctioning federal court intervention under § 1983 in a case of this sort.

Section 1983 does not reach a private hospital’s removal of a physician’s staff privileges when private parties alone made the decision and the state neither coerced nor encouraged it.

Pinhas v. Summit Health, Ltd. Midway Hospital Medical Center the Medical Staff of Midway Hospital Medical Cente · filed 1990-01-25

Because Pinhas’s removal was instrumented solely by private parties, state action is absent and his due process claim was properly dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the alleged deprivation of federal rights was state action or fairly attributable to the state; a private telephone company’s contract-based termination for nonpayment does not meet that requirement.

Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Pacific Ideas, Inc. · filed 1990-02-07

In any action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff’s initial burden is to demonstrate that the alleged infringement of federal rights is either state action or action that may be “fairly attributable to the state”. ... This court finds that Pacific’s termination was a legitimate business decision on the part of Michigan Bell and did not involve state action on the part of the M.P.S.C.

Section 1983 does not treat private bar associations’ drafting of disciplinary rules as state action merely because courts later adopt and enforce the rules.

Lawline v. American Bar Ass'n · filed 1990-05-24

Thus, both Bates and Tarkani-an definitively resolve that the alleged action by the private associations of promulgating a disciplinary code later adopted and enforced by the Illinois Supreme Court and this court is not state action.

Section 1983 can reach a private entity that regulates public access to city-owned walkways when its conduct performs a public function and its relationship with the city is symbiotic, making the conduct attributable to the state.

Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc. · filed 1990-08-27

For these reasons—namely, that defendant performs a “public function” and is involved in a “symbiotic relationship” with the City—it is fair to attribute defendant’s action to the state and, accordingly, to examine defendant’s conduct with constitutional scrutiny.

Section 1983 requires facts showing state action; a private mortgagee’s use of a state-authorized power of sale and recording of the foreclosure deed are insufficient.

Van Daam v. Chrysler First Financial Service Corp, of Rhode Island · filed 1990-09-28

A material element of any action under Section 1983 is the requirement that the defendant's conduct have amounted to "state action." ... The only event alleged here that might have involved a state official, the recording of the foreclosure deed, was a ministerial act wholly insufficient to satisfy the "state action" requirement.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil rights claim against attorneys representing private heirs in an estate settlement because they are not state actors.

Huff v. Robert B. Hensley, Gregory Y. Dunn, Patrick A. Ross · filed 1990-10-03

Although Huff asserts an unlawful deprivation of property, his civil rights claim lacks an arguable basis in law because the attorneys are not state actors for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 treats private parties’ discriminatory use of the state judicial system as state action.

Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico for the District of Arecibo · filed 1990-11-15

We therefore find that defendants’ use of the judicial system to discriminate is “state action” for purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private contractor operating regional transit services as a state actor merely because it provides those services for a public transit agency.

Thomas Ex Rel. Thomas v. Cannon · filed 1990-12-04

Cook-DuPage’s operation of regional transport services for the CTA does not make it a state actor for the purposes of § 1983, as mass transportation is not an area “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.”

Section 1983 reaches a private hospital manager’s termination of an employee when the manager operates a public hospital under contract with a public trust, because that conduct constitutes state action.

Carnes v. Parker · filed 1991-01-14

Because the relationship between the government and Baptist Health is virtually identical to that in Milo, we hold the termination of Carnes by Parker in his capacity as a supervisory employee of Baptist Health constitutes state action.

Section 1983 requires state action and does not reach purely private misconduct.

Lac Du Flambeau Band v. Stop Treaty Abuse-Wisconsin, Inc. · filed 1991-03-15

42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a showing of “state action.” The statute does not reach the actions of private parties, however improper they may be.

Section 1983 requires conduct attributable to the state; a private hospital’s receipt of federal funding and participation in a federal program do not alone make its conduct state action.

White v. Moses Taylor Hospital · filed 1991-04-09

As Blum and Hodge indicate, the simple fact that a hospital may receive federal funding and that the alleged wrongful activity may be related to a federal program is not sufficient to transform the actions of an ordinarily private entity into that of the State.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private hospital’s receipt of substantial state funding alone does not establish it.

Brown v. Our Lady of Lourdes Medical Center · filed 1991-07-15

The fact that a hospital receives substantial state funding is insufficient standing alone to find state action.

A § 1983 claim against a private citizen requires an allegation that the defendant was a state actor.

Powell v. Adams · filed 1991-07-23

The complaint further alleged that Verne Conder (who is a purely private citizen) violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which prohibits states or their agents from discriminating on the basis of sex, race, creed or color. The complaint contained no allegation that Mr. Conder was a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a private entity’s challenged personnel decision to be fairly attributable to the state; government funding and regulation alone do not establish state action.

MacDonald v. Eastern Wyoming Mental Health Center · filed 1991-08-15

However, "governmental funding and regulation of an ostensibly private organization, in the absence of other factors, is insufficient to establish governmental action." Id. at 636. Even where such regulation and funding are present, state action will not be found absent evidence of state influence, involvement, or control over the personnel decisions which are the subject of challenge.

Section 1983 requires a sufficient nexus between a private defendant and the state to satisfy its state-action element.

Miloslavsky v. Audio Engineering Society · filed 1991-08-26

Furthermore, the facts alleged in the complaint point to no constitutional violations, nor does it appear from the complaint that AES has a sufficient nexus with the state to fulfill the “state action” element required for bringing any such constitutional claim in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a federal right; a claim that private defendants conspired with state officials requires particular allegations of state involvement.

Peavey v. Polytechnic Institute of New York · filed 1991-10-17

In order to state a cognizable claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that some person acting under color of state law deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... In order to establish state involvement in a civil rights conspiracy, a plaintiff is required to allege with particularity that the public entity conspired with the private defendants to deprive plaintiff of his rights.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; insufficient allegations of a conspiracy with police do not state a claim against private defendants.

Bey v. Bridgeton Police Dept. · filed 1991-10-28

The K-Mart defendants’ motion to dismiss will also be granted. They are not state actors for purposes of section 1983, and the allegations of a conspiracy between them and the state police officers are not sufficient to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private university’s receipt of federal research and energy assistance grants, without other government involvement, does not establish it.

Davis v. Regis College, Inc. · filed 1991-12-19

Second, there is no evidence that Regis, a private university is a “state actor,” entitling Davis to bring a § 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Davis alleged that state action was triggered by Regis’ receipt of federal funds for research and energy assistance grants. However, this evidence, without other indicators of government involvement, is insufficient to establish state action.

Section 1983 does not make private citizens state actors merely because they use state incorporation procedures to exercise their right to petition.

LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher · filed 1991-12-24

However, invocation of state procedures does not make a private party a state actor. If the state does nothing to encourage a particular practice, the provision of a mechanism to exercise a right does not turn the private action into state action.

Section 1983 plaintiffs relying on a conspiracy between private parties and a state actor must plead the conspiracy with factual specificity to satisfy the state action requirement.

Hammond v. Creative Financial Planning Organization, Inc. · filed 1992-02-28

The first requirement when pursuing a Section 1983 suit is to allege that the offending conduct constitutes state action. Here, plaintiffs allege that the private parties conspired with Judge Smith, a state actor, in perpetrating the alleged violations of the plaintiffs’ rights. Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the state action requirement because they do not plead their conspiracy theory with sufficient specificity.

Section 1983 does not treat a private mental health provider as a state actor for an employment discharge based on its ties to state funding, regulation, contracts, facilities, and retirement benefits, even when those ties are considered together.

Wolotsky v. Ralph Huhn Jerome T. Kraker and Portage Path Community Mental Health Center · filed 1992-03-04

Plaintiff argues that all Portage Path’s connections with the state of Ohio taken together make it a state actor for purposes of section 1983. However, none of the circumstances of this case, considered separately or together, make Portage Path a state actor for section 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; private bar associations do not become state actors by formulating disciplinary rules adopted by courts.

Lawline v. American Bar Association · filed 1992-03-05

In order to establish a viable claim of deprivation of rights under Section 1983, plaintiffs must not only show that their constitutional rights were violated, they must also show that the defendants acted under color of state law. Here the three bar associations have not engaged in state action by formulating the disciplinary rules in question.

A private party’s use of state sanctioned private remedies does not constitute state action for purposes of § 1983.

Nicolo v. Kurz · filed 1992-03-13

Defendants’ private use of State sanctioned private remedies does not constitute State action (see, Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co., 500 US —, 111 S Ct 2077; Lugar v Edmondson Oil Co., 457 US 922, 940; Dahlberg v Becker, 748 F2d 85, 89, cert denied 470 US 1084).

Section 1983 requires a close nexus between the state and the challenged act for a private university’s degree revocation to count as state action.

Imperiale v. Hahnemann University · filed 1992-06-04

We also agree that Imperiale has shown no "close nexus" between the Commonwealth and the specific act complained of: the revocation of Imperiale's medical degree.

Section 1983 does not reach a private hospital’s employee termination when the hospital has exclusive control over personnel decisions and there is no sufficient nexus between the state and the termination.

Willis v. University Health Services, Inc. · filed 1992-07-27

There is no sufficient nexus between the state and the determination by UHS to fire Ms. Willis.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private litigant’s use of state courts does not suffice unless the litigant corrupts judicial power, but willful joint action with a state official can suffice.

McCartney v. First City Bank · filed 1992-08-21

If a state merely allows private litigants to use its courts, there is no state action within the meaning of § 1983 unless "there is corruption of judicial power by the private litigant." Earnest v. Lowentritt, 690 F.2d 1198, 1200 (5th Cir.1982). Thus, a plaintiff could prevail if he could show that the "private defendants willfully participated in a joint action with a state official." Daniel v. Ferguson, 839 F.2d 1124, 1131 (5th Cir.1988). We cannot say, therefore, that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support his allegation. The dismissal of the § 1983 claim was in error.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private ambulance operator when the public hospital authority has no sufficient nexus to the ambulance personnel’s challenged conduct.

Williams v. Richmond County, Ga. · filed 1992-08-26

There is no sufficient nexus between RCHA and the actions of UHS ambulance service personnel in this case to create § 1983 liability for UHS as a state actor.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a privately retained attorney for representing a client when the representation is not attributable to the state.

Lindsey v. Jansante · filed 1992-11-17

Applying the test to the case at bar, the Court reaches the same conclusion; defendant Walker’s representation of plaintiff did not constitute state action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private parties for an alleged due process deprivation without evidence that they conspired with state officials to cause it.

Hehemann v. City of Cincinnati · filed 1992-12-11

There simply are no facts that would bear out a colorable claim that defendant Swallen’s or defendant Westfelt in any way conspired with the City of Cincinnati to deprive the plaintiff of his Procedural Due Process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to his claim under O.R.C. § 124.34.

A private merchant is not a state actor under § 1983 when its report to police has too tenuous a connection to the later arrest and prosecution.

Wright v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. · filed 1993-02-05

In the instant case, the court finds that Montgomery Ward cannot be considered a state actor for the purpose of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, the same reasoning used by the court above is applicable here. The nexus between the defendant’s actions and the ultimate arrest and charges against the plaintiff are too tenuous upon which to predicate liability.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement is not satisfied merely because private parties misuse state voluntary commitment statutes.

Lewis v. Law-Yone · filed 1993-02-22

Lewis, therefore, cannot satisfy the state action requirement of the § 1983 analysis merely by asserting that defendants misused the Texas voluntary commitment statutes.

Section 1983 does not treat a private trade association as a state actor merely because it helps a state task force develop government policy.

Conrad v. Perales · filed 1993-04-06

The court finds that the participation of the Associations in developing MOP II alleged by plaintiffs, without more, cannot constitute state action within the meaning of § 1983.

A state liquor license alone does not make a private bar a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Comiskey v. Jftj Corporation, D/B/A Tops Bar & Grill · filed 1993-04-06

Because we conclude that Tops Bar is not a state actor on the basis of operating under a state-issued liquor license, Comis-key has failed to state a cognizable claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A private hospital's lease of public facilities does not establish state action under § 1983 when the hospital independently controls personnel and operations and bears its own expenses and liabilities.

Willis v. University Health Services, Inc., Dba University Hospital · filed 1993-06-22

Most importantly, however, the lease relinquishes RCHA of all liabilities, gives UHS sole discretion to hire and fire employees, provides that UHS is the governing body of University Hospital and medical staff, mandates that UHS maintain and repair the leased property at its own expense, requires UHS to maintain insurance, confers upon UHS the right and authority to make and enforce miles and regulations and safety considerations, and demands that UHS hold RCHA harmless from any court action. Thus, UHS and RCHA are not so intertwined in a symbiotic relationship as to satisfy the nexus/joint action test.