42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 claim against a private labor union requires evidence of action under color of state law, which the union's own policies, usages, and customs alone do not establish.

Gomez v. Laborers Local Union 220 Mike Curry, Business Manager · filed 1993-07-13

Gomez alleged in his complaint that the defendants, a labor union and some of its members, "acted pursuant to firmly established and adopted policy, usage, and custom of [the union]." Gomez introduced no evidence that the defendants acted under color of state law. Summary judgment was therefore appropriate on Gomez's § 1983 claim.

Merely alleging that a prosecutor induced a private citizen to file a criminal complaint is insufficient to attribute the citizen's conduct to the state under Section 1983 without significant state encouragement making that choice legally the state's own.

Darulis v. City of Akron Thomas Dicaudo John Gilbride Darrell Venable · filed 1993-08-11

Section 1983 governs only constitutional wrongs committed by a state. What a private citizen such as Venable does cannot be attributed to the state unless the state exercises "such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that in law the choice of the private actor is deemed to be that of the state." Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir.1992). The plaintiff's allegation does not rise to that level.

Section 1983 does not reach a private government contractor’s voluntary drug testing and dismissal of employees when the public agency neither requires nor controls those decisions.

Atkinson v. B.C.C. Associates, Inc. · filed 1993-08-12

An action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be maintained unless the challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person acting under color of state law. ... BCC is a private company performing work for a public agency, and BCC’s voluntary decisions to test plaintiff for drug use and then fire her do not qualify as state action under any of the tests.

A private attorney and the attorney's law firm are not state actors subject to liability under § 1983 for legal malpractice.

Polyak v. Thomas Stack Henry Henry & Stack · filed 1993-08-17

Neither Mr. Stack nor his law firm is a "state actor" as required under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A private prison telephone provider acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when the state dictates the contract terms and receives commissions or requires the challenged telephone practice.

Griffin-El v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. · filed 1993-09-27

With respect to plaintiff's first count regarding commissions, MCI was a "state actor" because MCI and the State of Missouri had a symbiotic relationship. ... Here the state dictated the terms of the contract and then fiscally profitted from the commissions. ... MCI is also a state actor under Count II, but the undersigned reaches this conclusion through the "close nexus" and "state compulsion" state action tests. ... In the case at hand the MDOC mandated that the prisoners be "branded." This is not a case where the telephone services vendor initiated the branding practice on its own. MCI had no choice under the contract. Plaintiff's cause of action therefore sufficiently establishes the nexis or compulsion necessary to establish state action under Count II.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private parties who report suspected criminal activity when law enforcement officers exercise independent judgment.

Smith v. Walsh · filed 1993-09-29

Private parties who report suspected criminal activity to law enforcement officials exercising independent judgment are not held liable under § 1983. ... The fact that Followwill filed a complaint with the McClain County Sheriffs office, contacted the Cleveland County Sheriffs Office about the trailer and was present when the deputies were investigating his claim does not indicate that he was acting in concert with a state actor.

Section 1983 requires defendants to act under color of state law, and a private university's decision to discontinue a sports program does not support recovery without evidence of state action.

Gonyo v. Drake University · filed 1993-10-07

Thus, the plaintiffs cannot recover under a section 1983 claim unless the defendants were acting under color of state law. None of the facts presented at the preliminary injunction hearing suggest that Drake or defendants Ferrari and King were in any way acting under color of state law or carrying out “state action” in conducting the affairs of Drake University, including the decision to abolish wrestling.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private lobbyist for efforts to secure legislation when the lobbyist was not acting under color of state law.

Lajoie v. Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations · filed 1993-10-12

Finally, to the extent that the claim relies upon the lobbying efforts of defendant Levin, who lobbied on behalf of the Connecticut State Sheriffs Association for the passage of Public Act 92-61, it must be dismissed inasmuch as Levin is a private individual who was not acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private defendants who did not act under color of state law.

Olsen v. Lane · filed 1993-10-13

As the defendants in this case have responded, and this Court affirms, they cannot be held liable under this section because their business is a private entity which did not act under color of state law. Thus, the plaintiff would not be able to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Private landowners do not act under color of state law merely by petitioning county commissioners to vacate roads and successfully persuading them to do so, without evidence of improper collusion.

Fry v. Board of County Commissioners of Baca · filed 1993-10-14

Here, there was no evidence of improper collusion to show that the landowners improperly "acted under state law" to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. The evidence only shows "that the landowner defendants opposed the opening of a roadway on their property, petitioned the board to vacate the designated road along the section lines," and that they were successful in persuading two of the commissioners to vote in favor of their petition. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly found that "the fact that the position supported by the landowner defendants ultimately prevailed does not give right to a claim that a collusive or joint agreement was reached with the commissioners, or even a suspicion that there was a collusive or joint agreement reached with the commissioners."

Section 1983's requirement of action under color of state law is not satisfied by a private party's use of federal courts to enforce a contract, even when those courts apply state law.

Texaco Refining and Marketing Inc. v. Davis · filed 1993-10-21

A federal court may apply a state law, but it does not act under color of state law. ... Texaco did not pursue its claim in state court. No state action was involved in this case. The section 1983 claim of Davis fails as a matter of law.

Under § 1983, private actors do not act under color of state law merely by seeking relief in state court, and conclusory allegations of conspiracy with a city attorney do not establish state action.

John McGuire Regent International v. Levin · filed 1993-11-08

First, private actors do not become state actors merely by resorting to the state courts for relief. ... Appellants' conclusory allegations that the private defendants conspired with a Colfax city attorney are not sufficient to satisfy the tests for determining whether a private individual has acted under color of state law.

Private landowners do not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 merely by petitioning county commissioners and successfully persuading them to vacate a road, without evidence of improper collusion or a joint agreement.

Fry v. Board Of County Commissioners Of Baca · filed 1993-11-15

Here, there was no evidence of improper collusion to show that the landowners improperly "acted under state law" to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. The evidence only shows "that the landowner defendants opposed the opening of a roadway on their property, petitioned the board to vacate the designated road along the section lines," and that they were successful in persuading two of the commissioners to vote in favor of their petition. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly found that "the fact that the position supported by the landowner defendants ultimately prevailed does not give right to a claim that a collusive or joint agreement was reached with the commissioners, or even a suspicion that there was a collusive or joint agreement reached with the commissioners."

Section 1983 does not subject a private prison design and construction company to suit absent action under color of state law.

Torcasio v. Edward W. Murray, Director G.L. Bass, Deputy Warden, and Vosbeck/dmjm · filed 1993-11-15

Vosbeck, a private company, was not a "person" acting "under the color of state law" within the meaning of Sec. 1983. Accordingly, it was not subject to suit under that statute.

An insurance company's decision whether to pay a claim is not state action under Section 1983 absent a supported conspiracy with a state actor.

Bowling v. Ohio Casualty Group of Insurance Companies · filed 1993-12-07

Without a conspiracy between the police officer or the city he serves and the other defendants, there is no state action. In order to be subject to suit under Sec. 1983, the defendants' conduct must be fairly attributable to the state. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982). Plaintiff's grievance is that Lamb's damage was compensated whereas his was not. An insurance company's decision whether or not to pay a claim is not conduct "fairly attributable" to the state.

Section 1983 does not treat private doctors as state actors merely because state law denies a remedy for their negligent provision of fetal screening information.

Flickinger v. Wanczyk · filed 1994-01-25

Thus, the Pennsylvania legislature’s decision to deny judicial relief to recipients of negligent information does not convert negligent doctors into state actors.

For a private citizen’s arrest, substantial cooperation with a police officer can create a genuine factual issue about whether the citizen acted under color of state law for § 1983.

Fraser v. County of Maui · filed 1994-06-07

From this evidence, a jury could find that Loo and Fires-tine engaged in substantial cooperative action to arrest Plaintiff, and therefore the Court holds that a genuine issue of fact exists with regard to the state actor inquiry.

A private union’s negligent grievance handling does not state a § 1983 claim absent allegations that it acted jointly with the city to deny constitutional rights.

Wexler v. City of Chicago, Caesar Blanco, Individually and as District Officer, Cortez Trotter, Individually and a · filed 1994-06-16

Accordingly, because Wexler has alleged only negligence on the part of the Union and has failed to allege that the Union and the City "reached an understanding" to deny Wexler his constitutional rights, we affirm the dismissal of the Sec. 1983 claims against the Union.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private citizens who merely complain to authorities, absent evidence they were deputized or jointly participated with officials.

Goehring v. Wright · filed 1994-07-20

Here, the record is devoid of evidence that defendants Wright and Robledo were deputized or otherwise jointly engaged with local authorities in prosecuting plaintiff. Instead, the evidence strongly suggests that these defendants were acting merely as private citizens in complaining to local authorities about plaintiffs alleged activities. Therefore, Wright and Robledo are entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to the state action doctrine on plaintiffs section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 reaches a private hospital’s involuntary commitment of a patient under state-delegated authority because the commitment decision constitutes state action.

Snyder v. Albany Medical Center Hospital · filed 1994-07-28

As noted in Rubenstein v Benedictine Hosp. (supra, at 404), in New York at least, "the involuntary commitment decision is one that would satisfy either the 'public function’ or the 'close nexus’ test” for determining whether a particular activity constitutes "state action”. Denial of defendant’s motion was accordingly fully justified.

A private party does not act under color of state law for § 1983 merely by relying on police assistance; joint action requires evidence of an agreement or shared unconstitutional goal.

Velaire v. City of Schenectady, NY · filed 1994-09-30

Such conclusory allegations and naked assertions are insufficient to show joint or conspiratorial action between a state actor and a private defendant.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private party requires specific facts showing agreement and concerted action with state officials.

Gressley v. Deutsch · filed 1994-10-05

At a minimum, this case law requires that Plaintiffs Amended Complaint allege specific facts showing agreement and concerted action between Defendants Deutsch and Roark or the Board of Trustees.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private attorneys representing an opposing party when they do not act under color of state law.

Buchanan v. Suzanne Lee Buchanan Thomas A. Gish Douglas Breck Marsh Lester H. Stewart · filed 1994-12-06

Finally, Douglas Marsh and Thomas Gish, who served as private attorneys for Suzanne Buchanan, did not act under color of state law and did not violate Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a private litigant a state actor merely for filing suit and seeking a temporary injunction.

Tompkins v. Cyr · filed 1995-02-17

A litigant does not “act under color of state law” by merely filing a lawsuit and seeking a temporary injunction.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private attorney can be liable for conspiring with a judge to deprive someone of a constitutional right, but allegations of a conspiracy solely with private clients do not suffice.

Callahan v. Louis E. Simmons, Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit Court of Wayne County, and Kathy Vogt · filed 1995-02-23

Nevertheless, Callahan must allege state action in order to claim a violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Although Vogt is not a state actor, if she conspired with Judge Simmons to deprive Callahan of a constitutional right, she would be liable under Sec. 1983, for "[p]rivate persons jointly engaged with state officials in a deprivation of civil rights are acting under color of law for purposes of Sec. 1983." Hooks, 771 F.2d at 943 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982)). Callahan, however, alleges only that Vogt conspired with the Alexanders; she alleges no facts to support a conspiracy between the judge and Vogt to deprive the plaintiff of her civil rights.

A volunteer fire company acts under color of state law for § 1983 when a municipality appoints it to perform fire protection, substantially funds it, and is closely intertwined with it.

Mark v. Borough of Hatboro · filed 1995-04-28

It is apparent, then, that the Borough and Enterprise are intertwined to a great extent, that Enterprise depends in large part on the municipality for funding, and that through the granting of benefits and the appointing of Enterprise as a "duly appointed fire company," the Borough actively encourages it to perform a municipal duty. In the circumstances, we hold that Enterprise is a state actor for purposes of this case.

Section 1983 provides no claim against a private citizen absent a valid conspiracy claim involving federal or state officials.

Green v. Seymour · filed 1995-07-11

In the absence of any valid claim of a conspiracy among federal or state officials, there is no basis for a claim under Sec. 1983 against Mr. Seymour, a private citizen.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private cable operator if it acted jointly with state officials; without evidence of those officials’ participation, the claim fails.

Glendora v. Cablevision Systems Corp. · filed 1995-07-19

If joint action between state officials and Cablevision is established, state action may be present. ... Absent evidence of the actual existence and participation of these unnamed Nassau County officials, however, that portion of the Amended Complaint founded on Section 1983 will have to be dismissed.

A private party can be a state actor under § 1983 by conspiring with a state official or becoming so closely related to the state that its actions are attributable to the state.

Ziegler v. Indian River County · filed 1995-08-14

Ziegler's claims against Riverfront Groves and' Daniel Richey are not precluded by their status as private parties. A person becomes a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability by conspiring with a state official or by "becoming so closely related to the State that the person’s actions can be said to be those of the State itself." Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 708 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 938, 112 S.Ct. 1479, 1480, 117 L.Ed.2d 622 (1992).

A state-licensed family care provider can act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes when her alleged role in a resident’s involuntary commitment is sufficiently connected to the State.

Hagen v. Town of Riverhead · filed 1995-09-18

On the basis of Rubenstein (supra) and the authorities cited therein, we hold that defendant Smith engaged in State action in her alleged conduct.

Section 1983 does not make private litigants state actors merely because they pursue eviction in state court; liability requires action under color of state law.

Eidson v. Arenas · filed 1995-11-29

Thus, because Defendants are private actors who have not acted under color of state law, this Court finds that Plaintiff cannot hold Defendants liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private party merely for invoking state legal procedures that are not alleged to be constitutionally suspect.

Osipova v. Dinkins · filed 1995-12-07

Where, as here, a private party merely invokes state legal procedures not alleged to be constitutionally suspect, no cognizable claim under § 1983 arises.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to act under color of state law; selling a product to police and training officers, without evidence of joint participation in the alleged deprivation, does not make the seller a state actor.

Murphy v. Cuomo · filed 1996-02-02

After reviewing the record, the Court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that defendant Zare was a state actor involved in the alleged deprivation of plaintiffs rights. In sum, plaintiff has offered absolutely no evidence that Zarc conspired with the New York State Police to conduct an illegal experiment whereby officers would subject innocent and unwitting citizens to CAP-STUN in order to study the spray’s effects.

Section 1983 does not make a private physician liable merely because police transport or detain a person following the physician’s certification for emergency mental health evaluation.

Pino v. E.P. Higgs, Curt Faust, Marcella Wolf, Jim Naranjo, Harlan Weiss, Pablo Hernandez · filed 1996-02-05

A private physician who certifies a person for purposes of § 43-l-10(A) is not subject to § 1983 liability simply because a state police officer responds by transporting or detaining that person.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid recipients to enforce EPSDT provisions that unambiguously confer individual rights.

Oklahoma Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics v. Fogarty · filed 2005-03-22

As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court subsequently held that, in order for a statute to be individually enforceable under § 1983, the statutory language at issue must unambiguously confer a right. ... The Court concludes that the EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid Act unambiguously confer rights upon the class members in this case.

Section 1983 generally does not cover private parties because they do not act under color of state law.

Annan-Yartey v. Star Protection Agency, Inc. · filed 2005-04-04

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Annan-Yartey’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his rights to equal protection and due process because the defendants are private parties.

Section 1983 does not treat a private entity as a state actor merely because it cooperates with a city.

Lansing v. Memphis · filed 2000-02-04

Although a common sense perusal of this list might suggest that Memphis in May and the city cooperated in the presentation of Memphis in May events, mere cooperation simply does not rise to the level of merger required for a finding of state action.

Section 1983 gives neither Medicaid recipients nor providers a private right to challenge California’s compliance with Medicaid § 30(A).

Clayworth v. Bonta · filed 2005-08-02

The legal issue here has been resolved by Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir.2005), filed this date, in which we held ... that neither Medicaid recipients nor providers have a private right to challenge California’s compliance with Medicaid provision § 30(A) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private litigant as a state actor merely because it wins a lawsuit and the judge credits its evidence.

Hansen v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. · filed 2006-01-12

Hansen contends that she demonstrated joint action because the state court judge who issued a writ of possession for the subject documents credited a declaration submitted by PMG despite Hansen’s assertion that the declaration was untrue. This contention is unavailing. “[Mjerely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge.” Dennis, 449 U.S. at 28, 101 S.Ct. 183.

Section 1983 reaches a private person only when that person's conduct is fairly attributable to the state; cooperation with investigators alone does not suffice.

Meuse v. Stults · filed 2006-03-22

In sum, Stults cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless her conduct can be fairly attributed to the state. ... Mere cooperation with state investigators, without more, does not meet the state action standard.

Section 1983 requires a private party alleged to have acted under color of law to have been jointly engaged with a state official; misleading an official does not establish a joint plan.

Tornheim v. Eason · filed 2006-04-04

In order to conclude that a private party had been “jointly engaged” with a state official, a plaintiff must show that the private party’s actions had been the product of a plan, prearrangement, or conspiracy with a state official to deprive the plaintiff of “any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,” or had been a custom or policy of the private party and state official to deprive persons of any such right. Alexis v. McDonald’s Rests. of Mass., Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 351-52 (1st Cir.1995). Because Tornheim claims that defendants Feder and Spindel submitted to Sheriff Eason an affidavit misrepresenting Tornheim’s actions—in essence, tricking the Sheriff—it cannot be said that there had been a meeting of the minds between the private and state actors such that they had been “jointly engaged” in a plan to deprive Tornheim of any rights.

A private attorney retained by a receiver is not a state actor under § 1983 without a sufficient nexus to state defendants.

Schultz v. Ashcroft · filed 2006-04-05

From our review of the summary judgment materials, it is clear that Schultz failed to establish a sufficient nexus between Deery, who was not present during execution of the Injunction, and the state defendants. Accordingly, the district court did not err by concluding that Deery, a private attorney, was not a state actor and therefore was entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a store or its employees when their conduct cannot be treated as action under color of state law.

Prowisor v. Bon-Ton, Inc. · filed 2006-04-06

Therefore, because this Court finds that Bon-Ton and its employees cannot be considered to be state actors or to have acted under color of state law, plaintiffs § 1983 claims against Bon-Ton are dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private person when the alleged constitutional deprivation is fairly attributable to the state, including when intentionally false statements to police cause an arrest.

Weintraub v. Board of Education · filed 2006-04-28

However, when the alleged constitutional deprivation may be “fairly attributed” to the state, a private party may be held liable as a state actor under § 1983. ... If a victim makes false statements to the police, with the intent to have an innocent person arrested in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, she may not only be held accountable for false imprisonment under state tort law, but under federal law, for invoking the state’s power to intentionally violate a citizen’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 claims against private defendants require evidence that they willfully participated with the state or its agents in the activity that deprived the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Jensen v. Sweet Home One Care Facility · filed 2006-05-18

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Jensen’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the Sweet Home defendants because he did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether those defendants were willful participants with the state or its agents in an activity that deprived him of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not reach a privately retained attorney acting in a professional capacity without acting under color of state law.

Myers v. Couchara · filed 1970-05-19

Under the law of this Circuit, attorneys, as private individuals acting in a professional capacity, are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 because they do not act under color of state law.

A private attorney filing a quiet-title action for a client is not a state actor under § 1983 when none of the conditions for treating a private party as a state actor is met.

Wilson v. Bush · filed 2006-09-08

In this case Bush was acting as attorney for a private party when he filed a quiet-title action on behalf of his client. None of the three conditions required to hold private parties liable as state actors is met, and Bush is not a state actor, as required for an action filed pursuant to § 1983.

Private security guards do not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes merely by detaining and removing a suspected trespasser; the plaintiff must show state action under the public function or nexus test.

Durante v. Fairlane Town Center · filed 2006-10-18

Durante has failed to offer any evidence that the FTC defendants acted under color of state law, either under the public function or nexus tests. Accordingly, summary judgment stands on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against them.

A private lawyer’s resort to court on behalf of a client does not, without more, make the lawyer a state actor under § 1983.

Marcello v. Maine · filed 2006-10-24

Keeping in mind that the law does not deem a lawyer’s resort to court on behalf of a client, without more, to constitute state action, the Complaint fails to satisfy any of the Ponce criteria on either the 2001-05 or 2006 allegations. ... Therefore, the Court concludes that FRR is not a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires governmental involvement in the named defendant’s conduct; a private organization’s conduct does not support a claim when that involvement has ended before suit.

King v. Little League Baseball, Inc. · filed 1974-10-30

The posture of the case at the time suit was commenced, as pleaded in the complaint, demonstrates that plaintiffs did not state a cause of action against the named defendants, for which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a private party a state actor merely for giving false information to police; substantial cooperation with police is required.

Annan-Yartey v. Honolulu Police Department · filed 2007-01-24

As stated above, in the instant case, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to demonstrate the substantial cooperation between police and Defendants that would make them state actors, such that they caused his arrest. Nor do the Defendants’ allegedly deliberately false statement to police make them state actors liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 treats a private party as a state actor only when the state coerced or significantly encouraged the conduct, the party performed a function traditionally exclusive to the state, or the state became a joint participant.

Jenkins v. Lennar Corporation · filed 2007-02-08

A private party is viewed as a “state actor” for § 1983 purposes only if one of the following three conditions is met: (1) the state coerced or significantly encouraged the alleged unconstitutional action; (2) the private parties performed a public function that was traditionally the state’s exclusive prerogative; or (3) the state became a joint participant because it insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the private parties. Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, the defendants are all private parties, and Jenkins did not allege any facts that would establish that any of the parties met any of the conditions to be considered a state actor.

Section 1983 does not treat a private litigant’s misuse of a state statute or rule as state action.

Field Auto City, Inc. v. General Motors Corp. · filed 2007-02-26

Simply put, the misuse by private litigants of a state statute or rule does not constitute state action for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 gives a party a private right of action for violations of its constitutional rights.

Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Jay Rising Harrold Reid Timothy Blanksvard · filed 2007-02-28

Of course the Community has a private right of action to sue for violations of its Constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 claim against foster parents may proceed if the complaint adequately alleges that they acted under color of state law or willfully participated with state actors.

Safouane v. Fleck · filed 2007-03-30

We hold that the district court erred in dismissing the Safouanes’ claims against the foster parents for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Upon remand, the district court should permit the Safouanes to attempt to amend their complaint to allege facts, if such exist, that would demonstrate that the foster parents were state actors under federal law, or private parties who willfully participated with state actors.

Under § 1983, a private party does not become a state actor merely by invoking or following unchallenged state procedures, even in bad faith.

Revis v. Meldrum · filed 2007-04-19

Again, simply invoking or following unchallenged state procedures, even if done in bad faith, does not render the private-party defendants state actors, and this court has confined the Lugar “joint action” test to challenged prejudgment attachment procedures.

Private defendants may be liable under § 1983 for acting with a state official, but unsupported allegations of an agreement do not establish state action.

Sun v. Girardot · filed 2007-05-04

In this case, Sun has provided no evidence that Defendants were involved in a conspiracy or agreement with Judge Ott so as to convert their alleged conduct into state action subject to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 provides a private action to enforce rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) when those standards are violated.

Spry v. Thompson · filed 2007-05-21

We do not see a sound basis for distinguishing Watson, and conclude that if there is a violation in this ease of the statutory standards, then the plaintiffs in this case have a private right of action enforceable under section 1983.

A private party’s initiation of state court proceedings does not, by itself, constitute state action for a Section 1983 claim.

Louisville Area Inter-Faith Committee for United Farm Workers v. Nottingham Liquors, Ltd. · filed 1976-09-29

Even if Younger-Huffman doctrine fails to support the dismissal of plaintiffs’ damage claim against Nottingham, we find no error in the dismissal because plaintiffs have failed to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Nottingham. We do not view Nottingham’s initiation of the state proceedings to be state action.

A § 1983 claim against a private person requires a basis for treating that person as a state actor; state compulsion can provide that basis.

Nelson v. Cauley · filed 2007-08-03

He has not established that Myrick’s actions were the result of compulsion from the State that would render her a “state actor” for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for seeking relief for violations of the Constitution and laws, but a treaty must confer an unambiguously enforceable right to support a § 1983 cause of action.

Cornejo v. County of San Diego · filed 2007-09-24

We therefore agree with the district court that Cornejo cannot state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a private employer’s termination decisions merely because it entered a government-approved tax-abatement agreement; the decisions must be fairly attributable to the state.

Campbell v. PMI Food Equip · filed 2007-12-14

Nor does the Workers’ Amended Complaint allege a nexus between the government and PMI’s challenged conduct. For the foregoing reasons, the district court properly dismissed the Workers’ § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires more than a private party’s reliance on a state statute to treat that party as a state actor.

Alberto San, Inc. v. Consejo De Titulares Del Condominio San Alberto · filed 2008-03-28

In the end, all plaintiff can point to is the existence of a statute, but that alone is not enough. ... Since nothing more was or could be alleged here, the district court was correct that plaintiff failed to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil action when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution and federal laws.

Cooper v. Molko · filed 1981-02-03

In sum, the Court holds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged state action in violation of § 1983 to sustain a cause of action against Defendant police officers, and further that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an agreement between the private parties and the state actors to sustain a § 1983 cause of action against the private parties as well.

A merchant is not a state actor under § 1983 when an officer independently decides to pursue and apprehend a suspected shoplifter.

Barkley v. Dillard Department Stores Inc. · filed 2008-05-02

Taking all of these facts into account, Barkley has failed to present sufficient evidence that Dillard’s was a state actor. Although Dillard’s notified Wilkinson of the shoplifter, Wilkinson made an independent decision to chase after and attempt to apprehend the suspect.

Private citizens’ offer to fund an ordinance’s defense, even when accepted by a local government, does not necessarily create the state action required for a § 1983 claim.

Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids · filed 2008-05-20

We conclude that the offer by private citizens to fund the defense of an ordinance, and acceptance by a local governing body, does not necessarily establish a symbiotic relationship for purposes of a § 1983 claim.

Private citizens’ advocacy for legislation alone does not create the symbiotic relationship with government needed to treat their conduct as state action under § 1983.

Sensations Inc v. City of Grand Rapids · filed 2008-05-20

As a categorical matter, the cooperative relationship between Grand Rapids and the Non-City Defendants-Appellees that arose solely as a result of the citizens’ non-monetary mobilization in support of the Ordinance could not rise to the level of a “symbiotic relationship” as defined in Chapman.

A private defendant’s conduct is not state action under Section 1983 without allegations connecting the deprivation or the defendant’s conduct to the state.

Lindsey v. Bowlin · filed 2008-06-06

Here, plaintiff does not allege that state rules of conduct created the deprivation or that defendant acted in concert with state officials or engaged in conduct otherwise chargeable to the state. Accordingly, his allegations do not state a claim for relief under Section 1983.

A private entity can be a state actor under § 1983 when it is entwined with a public agency and its employees perform the challenged conduct in a state-assigned capacity.

Thompson v. Davidson Transit Organization · filed 2008-06-25

Mr. Thompson has shown a significant degree of entwinement between MTA and DTO and has shown that DTO employees were acting in their state-assigned capacity when engaging in the challenged conduct. Mr. Thompson has satisfied the nexus test, establishing that DTO is a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 can impose liability on a private entity when its conduct qualifies as state action.

Villegas v. City of Gilroy · filed 2008-09-03

Under familiar principles, even a private entity can, in certain circumstances, be subject to liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires more than public funding and state employees on an advisory committee to treat a private entity’s conduct as state action.

Molnar v. Care House · filed 2008-09-05

Far more than public funding and service by state employees on an advisory committee is required to establish a sufficiently close nexus between the government and the private party’s conduct to trigger the § 1983 symbiotic relationship/nexus test.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party when evidence of joint action with a government official supports treating that party as a state actor.

Brown v. CAMDEN COUNTY, GA. · filed 2008-10-15

In short, Brown has submitted some evidence that suggests that Purcell and Byerly may have been engaged in a joint undertaking to make Brown pay invoices not yet due to Purcell, on pain of an indefinite incarceration. This satisfies the joint nexus test, and is sufficient to withstand summary judgment.

Section 1983 does not make private parties state actors merely because they invoke state legal procedures; they must exercise state power or act jointly with state officials.

Carlson v. Roetzel & Andress · filed 2008-12-04

On the undisputed facts, none of the Defendants is, as a matter of law, a state actor under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make private parties state actors merely because they invoke state procedures that the state agency independently controls.

Carlson v. Roetzel & Andress · filed 2008-12-04

Since the Defendants’ “mere invocation of state legal procedures” is not state action, Lugar provides no support for Carlson’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not make a private citizen a state actor merely for filing a civil action or initiating civil commitment proceedings.

Johnson v. Dowd · filed 2008-12-15

A private citizen does not become a state actor simply “by filing a private civil action, even where authorized by state statutes” or “by initiating civil commitment procedures against another person.”

Section 1983 requires a complaint against private defendants to allege facts showing they were jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action.

Mirch v. Beesely · filed 2009-03-05

The district court properly determined that Mirch’s first amended complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim against defendants Beesely and Peck. ... (to establish state action under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege facts showing that “[pjrivate persons were jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action.”

Retained counsel does not act under color of state law when representing a client and therefore is not subject to a § 1983 claim for that conduct.

Edwards v. Rich · filed 2009-03-31

Because “[t]he conduct of retained counsel does not rise to the level of state action within the meaning of § 1983[,]” Lemmons v. Law Firm of Morris and Morris, 39 F.3d 264, 266 (10th Cir. 1994), Ms. Edwards has failed to state a § 1983 claim against Mr. Rich.

A Section 1983 claim against a private entity requires that its challenged conduct be fairly attributable to the state.

Mckeesport Hospital v. The Accreditation Council For Graduate Medical Education · filed 1994-05-17

To succeed on the merits of its Section 1983 due process claim, the Hospital must therefore show that the action of the ACGME, a private entity, is "fairly attributable" to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Section 1983 does not cover a private company’s conduct merely because the company receives government funding or is regulated by the state; the challenged conduct must be connected to the state.

Bethel v. Jendoco Construction Corp. · filed 1978-01-16

In short, even taking as true Bethel’s “funding” and “regulation” allegations, his complaint is nevertheless insufficient to bring the defendant companies’ conduct within the purview of § 1983.

Section 1983 creates a private cause of action for constitutional violations.

Riley v. Ambach · filed 1980-07-01

The function of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to create a private cause of action for constitutional violations, ... and jurisdiction over such claims is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against private parties who are neither government actors nor in conspiracy with government actors.

van Leeuwen v. United States · filed 1989-02-23

... 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the bank, its attorneys, or the van Leeuwens’ attorney, because none was a government actor or in conspiracy with a government actor, ... Upon careful review, we agree with the district court’s conclusions as set forth in its well-reasoned opinion.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private repossessor to reach a jury when police involvement could support a finding that the repossessor acted jointly with the state.

Albertorio-Santiago v. Reliable Financial Services · filed 2009-05-04

A jury could also find that when the officers intervened with Feliciano, they did so •in order to prevent him from resisting repossession. What is more, the fact that the police officers escorted Correa away from plaintiffs’ house after the repossession and took Santiago’s car to police headquarters could also lead to the conclusion that the police and Correa acted in concert to effectuate the repossession. Though .this appears to be a borderline case, the court, in an abundance of caution, has decided to submit the case to the jury as required by Rule 56.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private party’s conduct is attributable to the state; an unsupported allegation of acting in concert with state officials does not suffice.

Gritton v. Disponett · filed 2009-05-27

The conspiracy allegation also fails to satisfy the nexus test because Gritton does not allege facts that establish a sufficiently close relationship between the state and the Party so as to attribute the Party’s actions to the state.

A private party does not satisfy Section 1983’s state-action requirement without evidence of concerted action with state officials.

Edwards & Associates, Inc. v. Black & Veatch, L.L.P. · filed 2000-02-07

Accordingly, the joint action test is not satisfied and plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the requisite “state action” for purposes of their section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private individual who did not act under color of state law.

Moldowan v. City of Warren · filed 2009-07-23

In addition to being inadequately pled, see supra Part IV.C.6, we also hold that Moldowan cannot maintain an action under § 1983 against Fournier because she is not a “state actor” and did not act “under color of law.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private security manager when the complaint fails to allege an arrangement under which a state officer substituted the manager’s judgment for his own in making arrests.

Pugh v. Downs · filed 2009-07-27

Under the guidance of Lugar and Cruz, Defendant Dougherty was not a state actor because Plaintiff failed to allege a preexisting arrangement whereby the discretionary judgment of Defendant Onick employed in effectuating arrests of casino patrons would be substituted with that of Defendant Dougherty.

A merchant is not a state actor under § 1983 when an officer independently investigates suspected shoplifting instead of arresting a customer solely on the merchant’s accusation.

Morris v. Dillard Dept Stores · filed 2002-01-25

Under White, Hernandez, and Bartholomew, therefore, Dillard’s is not a state actor for the purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not make a private person liable merely for giving information to police, answering questions about a crime, or testifying at trial.

Moldowan v. Fournier · filed 2009-08-18

Providing information to the police, responding to questions about a crime, and offering witness testimony at a criminal trial does not expose a private individual to liability for actions taken “under color of law.”

A private creditor’s mere filing of a foreclosure action does not satisfy Section 1983’s state-action requirement.

Zebrowski v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2009-09-17

Thus, Jordan requires more than Defendant’s mere act of filing for an adequately pled Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 generally excludes private defendants unless their challenged conduct has a sufficiently close nexus to the State to count as state action.

White v. Monarch Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2009-09-28

Private actors and institutions generally are not proper defendants to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, because they do not act under color of state law. ... Here, White fails to state a claim against the private defendants because her allegations of a nexus between the private defendants and the State are vague and conclusory, and fail to demonstrate that the actions of the defendants should be treated as state action.

Section 1983 allows foster parents to enforce their Title IV-E right to foster care maintenance payments.

C.H. v. Payne · filed 2010-01-26

Thus, at least for purposes of ruling on Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, we conclude that a cause of action to enforce of this entitlement by foster parents is available under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a private right of action for violations of federal law by those acting under the color of state law.

Pickett v. Nunn · filed 2010-02-24

Section 1983 permits a private right of action for violations of federal law by those acting under the color of state law.

A private party may be liable under § 1983 when allegations of joint action with state officials plausibly establish that the party acted under color of state law.

Young v. Suffolk County · filed 2010-04-09

Viewing all the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party, the Court concludes that plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to support a plausible claim that, at the time of the actions alleged by plaintiff, the Young defendants and Quatela were state actors subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against private defendants who are not state actors and did not act in concert with state actors.

Megna Ex Rel. Megna v. Food & Drug Administration · filed 2010-05-18

Upon a de novo review of the record, Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008), we conclude that the district court properly determined that no claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can exist against the Schering-Plough defendants because they are not state actors and did not act in concert with state actors.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party that conspires with state officials, but cooperation with a prosecutor alone does not establish a conspiracy.

Jackim v. City of Brookyln · filed 2010-05-25

Simply cooperating with a prosecutor during a criminal case is not sufficient to show conspiracy.

Section 1983 permits claims against private parties when they act under color of state law, including by performing functions traditionally reserved to the state.

J.L. v. Murphy · filed 2010-06-21

As an initial matter, at this stage of the litigation and based upon Plaintiffs theory of the case, she has shown that Diamond State acted under “color of state law” in regard to her § 1983 claims. Private parties can only be held liable under § 1983 when they have acted under color of state law.

Private parties may be liable under § 1983 when they act in concert with state officials to deprive someone of federal rights.

Smith v. Delaware · filed 2010-06-25

Specifically, one could find that Brasberger or Elliott or both acted in concert with DFS by providing DFS false, inaccurate, and misleading information during the course of DFS’ investigation of the Smith home, information which caused DFS to take action that had the consequence of infringing Plaintiffs’ civil rights.

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation that a private defendant reached an understanding with public officials to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Fredrickson v. Proviso Township · filed 2010-09-23

Accordingly, to survive Serpico’s motion to dismiss, the complaint must provide a plausible basis for claiming that Serpieo “reached an understanding” with public officials to deprive him of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s conduct to be attributable to the state; unsupported allegations of state compulsion do not satisfy that requirement.

Anderson v. COUNTY OF HAMILTON · filed 2011-03-14

Plaintiff has presented no facially plausible evidence to show that Ms. Scherr acted under state compulsion. Thus, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the state was “so intimately involved in the challenged private conduct” that Ms. Scherr’s actions could be classified as state action for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 provides a private cause of action for violations of constitutional rights.

Rivas v. Martin · filed 2011-03-18

Rather, Rivas is stating a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal statute that clearly provides for a private cause of action for violation of constitutional rights.

Private security guards are liable under § 1983 only if they act under color of state law or willingly act jointly with state officials; merely following an official’s order does not establish state action.

Benta v. Bryan · filed 2011-03-31

Accordingly, they can only be liable under §1983 if they were acting under color of state law or “jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action.” ... The defendants therefore stopped Bryan from going on stage solely because the Chief of Security ordered/asked them to do so. That is simply not sufficient to establish state action.

Section 1983 requires facts showing joint action with the state before a private party can be held liable for invoking local zoning procedures.

Missere v. Gross · filed 2011-03-31

Even accepting these allegations as true, as a matter of law most do not amount to the “joint action” necessary for the Storm King Defendants to be held liable under § 1983.

A private person may act under color of state law for § 1983 when she agrees with state officials to help deprive someone of constitutional rights.

McFadyen v. Duke University · filed 2011-03-31

Although Levicy was not employed by the City, Plaintiffs’ allege that she shared the goal of violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and that she agreed with Nifong, Gottlieb, and Himan to provide the false evidence to them as part of this agreement. These allegations are sufficient to give notice as to how she is alleged to have participated in the conspiracy, and are sufficient to allege action “under color of state law” at this stage in the case.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the federal statute allegedly violated confers an individual federal right before relief is available.

Hawkins v. COUNTY OF BENT, COLO. · filed 2011-07-06

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that the FNHRA does not unambiguously create a private right enforceable through a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 provides a private right of action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives another of constitutional or federal rights.

Estock v. City of Westfield · filed 2011-07-26

“Section 1983 supplies a private right of action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution or by federal law.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private actors to allege joint activity with state actors or a conspiracy involving overt acts.

Lynch v. Southampton Animal Shelter Foundation Inc. · filed 2011-07-29

To successfully state a claim against the Foundation Defendants, who are private actors, under section 1983, the Plaintiff must sufficiently allege either: (1) the existence of joint activity by the Town Defendants and the Foundation Defendants or (2) that the Town Defendants and the Foundation Defendants conspired to retaliate against the Plaintiff and took overt acts in furtherance of that goal.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid providers and beneficiaries to sue to enforce the procedural rights conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A).

Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic v. Toumpas · filed 2012-03-02

Likewise, applying the Gonzaga factors, I find that the hospital and beneficiary plaintiffs may, consistent with Congressional intent, assert private causes of action seeking enforcement of the procedural rights afforded them under Section (13)(A).

Section 1983 does not treat a private litigant as acting under color of state law merely because the litigant obtained a state court order and used legal process to enforce it.

Shuler v. Swatek · filed 2012-04-10

However, this contention is insufficient to state a violation of § 1983, because “one who has obtained a state court order or judgment is not engaged in state action merely because [he] used the state court legal process.”

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a nonprofit pooled trustee to enforce the Medicaid Act’s pooled-trust provision.

Center for Special Needs Trust Administration, Inc. v. Olson · filed 2012-04-16

Because the Blessing test is met and Congress has not foreclosed section 1983 enforcement of the Medicaid Act, the Center has a cause of action under section 1983.

A private party does not act under color of state law merely by reporting a crime to the police.

Kristy Downing v. Life Time Fitness, Inc. · filed 2012-05-18

Reporting a crime to the police does not expose a private party to liability under § 1983.

A private defendant accused of conspiring with state officials under § 1983 must have willfully participated with them and shared an understanding of the unlawful objective.

Crawford v. VAN BUREN COUNTY, ARK. · filed 2012-05-21

Because a section 1983 claim applies to state action, and the defendants are private citizens, Crawford “must establish not only that a private actor caused a deprivation of constitutional rights, but that the private actor willfully participated with state officials and reached a mutual understanding concerning the unlawful objective of a conspiracy.”

Section 1983 requires allegations of state action to support a claim against private defendants.

Downs v. Baca · filed 2012-05-24

The district court properly dismissed Downs’s claims for unlawful seizure, false imprisonment, and false charges arising from his placement in administrative segregation pending an extortion investigation because Downs failed to allege a protected liberty interest or state action by the private defendants.

Section 1983 provides a private right of action to enforce the one-person, one-vote principle in local school board elections.

Adamson v. Clayton County Elections & Registration Board · filed 2012-07-13

Accordingly, because Clayton County BOE members are chosen from separate districts, the State of Georgia must establish BOE districts that have substantially equal numbers of voters to comply with the one-person, one-vote principle, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a private right of action to ensure compliance.

Section 1983 permits a Medicaid recipient to enforce the federal right created by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A).

Bontrager v. Indiana Family & Social Services Administration · filed 2012-09-26

Accordingly, Bontrager has an enforceable federal right capable of redress through § 1983, and her claim may proceed.

A § 1983 claim against private attorneys requires plausible facts showing that they acted jointly with a state official; an unsupported allegation of conspiracy does not suffice.

Poel v. Webber · filed 2012-09-29

Having reviewed Dr. Poel’s proposed Amended Complaint and the additional factual allegations found in his objections, the Court agrees that permitting the amendment would be futile. None of the changes in the proposed Amended Complaint, even if they were augmented with facts in Dr. Poel’s Objections, would present a plausible § 1983 claim. Such a complaint would again fail to put forth any evidence of a conspiracy between Judge Robles and the private attorneys.

Section 1983 reaches a private child placement agency only when its challenged conduct is fairly attributable to the state; a financial incentive to minimize costs alone does not establish state compulsion.

Chanel Hall v. Dixon · filed 2012-10-01

Conduct by a private entity is not subject to suit under § 1983 unless the private entities’ allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the state. ... Hall’s mere allegation that Lutheran had financial incentives to minimize its costs in providing its services does not demonstrate that TDFPS provided significant encouragement for Lutheran to abdicate its responsibilities under the contract to properly screen potential placements for foster children and to monitor those placements.

A private doctor does not become a state actor under § 1983 merely by providing medical information and opinions to a child protective agency.

Estiverne ex rel. Estiverne v. Esernio-Jenssen · filed 2012-12-14

Dr. Jenssen’s cooperation in the ACS investigation, by providing medical information and opinion, does not transform her into a state actor.

Section 1983 does not cover merely private conduct.

Johnson v. Regions Mortgage · filed 2013-01-10

Moreover, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for leave to amend because the proposed amended complaint does not allege any violations of federal statutes, and it fails to state a claim for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it alleges only private conduct.

A private venue that contracts with police officers is not a state actor under § 1983 when the officers retain their independent judgment.

Cahill ex rel. L.C. v. Live Nation · filed 2013-01-31

We therefore determine that there are no facts upon which Appellant can demonstrate that Live Nation is a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party as a state actor merely because the party invokes state authority.

Glotfelty v. Karas · filed 2013-02-15

A private party does not act under color of law simply by invoking state authority.

Section 1983 does not make a private party liable merely for reporting suspected improper billing to a state agency.

Anghel v. New York State Department of Health · filed 2013-05-29

Accordingly, the fact that the United Defendants reported the Plaintiff to POLEP because of improper billing forms does not provide a basis for liability under Section 1983.

A private creditor does not act under color of state law for § 1983 merely by using a state foreclosure statute, without joint action with or coercion or significant encouragement by the state.

Grapentine v. Pawtucket Credit Union · filed 2013-06-17

Here, Ms. Grapentine’s complaint does not allege that there was ‘joint action’ taken, only that PCU acted in accordance with R.I. General Laws § 34-11-22, a state statute governing the statutory power of sale of real property. This assertion does not satisfy the “joint action/nexus test.” ... There is no such evidence or allegation in the complaint of coercion or significant encouragement by the State. Consequently, Ms. Grapentine has failed to state a § 1983 claim and therefore this statute cannot serve as a basis for federal jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not treat a private lawyer as a state actor merely because she represents government defendants while performing a lawyer’s traditional functions.

Aldrich v. Ruano · filed 2013-06-24

Similarly, the fact that she represented governmental defendants does not make her a state actor. It is well-settled that a lawyer (even a court-appointed one) does not act under the color of state law in performing a lawyer’s traditional function as counsel to a party.

Section 1983 allows a claim against a private entity when the plaintiff plausibly alleges that it acted under color of state law.

Borrell v. Bloomsburg University · filed 2013-06-28

Consistent with these allegations and considering the Amended Complaint in its entirety, Borrell pleads sufficient facts that Geisinger acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 lets Medicaid providers enforce the payment rights created by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb).

California Association of Rura v. Maxwell-Jolly · filed 2013-07-05

Thus, we now join several of our sister circuits in holding that Medicaid providers have a private right of action to bring a § 1983 claim to enforce 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb).

Section 1983 allows Medicaid providers to enforce the payment rights granted by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb).

California Ass'n of Rural Health Clinics v. Douglas · filed 2013-07-05

Thus, we now join several of our sister circuits in holding that Medicaid providers have a private right of action to bring a § 1983 claim to enforce 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb).

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to be a state actor or to have acted jointly with the state.

Lyles v. Hughes · filed 2013-08-01

Missing from the complaint are factual allegations to show that these defendants are agents of or acted jointly with the District of Columbia.

Section 1983 lets Medicaid providers sue to enforce the rights created by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb).

California Association of Rura v. Maxwell-Jolly · filed 2013-09-17

Thus, we now join several of our sister circuits in holding that Medicaid providers have a private right of action to bring a § 1983 claim to enforce 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb).

Section 1983 does not treat a private party as a state actor merely because it asks police to remove protesters.

Rodriguez v. Winski · filed 2013-09-26

In any event, summoning police or requesting that police take action to disperse OWS protestors simply does not suffice to constitute joint action or to convert the private party into a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a claim against private parties to allege facts showing that they conspired with state actors to deprive the plaintiff of rights.

Eddie Rencher, Jr. v. Bannister · filed 2013-10-23

The district court properly dismissed Rencher’s § 1983 claim against private parties Scott Graham and MBI, Inc. because Rencher failed to allege facts showing that these defendants conspired with state actors to deprive him of his rights.

Section 1983 does not permit an individual to enforce FERPA's provisions when FERPA provides no private right of action.

Fresno Unified School District v. K.U. · filed 2013-10-28

Whether directly or as part of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an individual may not bring suit to enforce the provisions of FERPA.

Section 1983 does not treat private litigants as state actors merely because they successfully litigate in state court.

Davis v. Self · filed 2013-11-19

Their successful attempts to litigate these issues in Alabama state court do not somehow transform these private individuals into state actors.

Section 1983 does not treat private attorneys as state actors solely because they are attorneys.

Mikhail v. Kahn · filed 2014-01-13

Mr. Mikhail cannot, therefore, satisfy the state action requirement necessary to bring his § 1983 claims against the defendant attorneys solely because they are attorneys.

Section 1983 does not treat private defendants as state actors based on conduct that predates the appointment of the receiver with whom they allegedly acted jointly.

Estate of Jackson ex rel. Jackson-Platts v. Sandnes · filed 2014-02-03

Plainly, any allegations describing conduct by the private Defendants prior to the appointment of the Receiver cannot constitute state action for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a constitutional claim against a private actor fails.

Daniel G. Lilley Law Office v. Flynn · filed 2014-05-05

As Flynn is asserting a breach of privacy claim pursuant to the Maine and U.S. Constitutions and§ 1983 against Lilley, a private actor, his claim fails.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private defendants to allege facts connecting the challenged conduct to state action.

Basile v. Levittown United Teachers · filed 2014-05-06

Plaintiff does not allude to any state actor participating in the Fund’s alleged employment decisions nor does she allege any specific municipal action or policy that influenced the Fund in demoting and thereafter terminating Plaintiff’s position.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private insurer does not become a state actor merely because state law requires drivers to carry insurance.

Guinn v. Farmers Insurance Co. · filed 2014-06-09

No such nexus exists here. Because Farmers is a private insurer rather than a state actor, Plaintiff does not have a federal claim that can support § 1331 jurisdiction.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s joint action with state officials to relate to the specific constitutional deprivation alleged.

Brokers' Choice of America, Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc. · filed 2014-07-09

Since government action is critical to a due process claim, BCA was required to allege how the Alabama officials took joint action with Dateline, not only in planning the search and seizure of BCA’s seminar, but also in the editorial process leading to the statements aired on the program.

Section 1983 permits claims against private actors based on a conspiracy with government actors only when the complaint pleads facts tending to show agreement and concerted action.

Peel v. Joint Commission, State Survey Oklahoma Department of Health · filed 2014-08-12

We hold that Peel’s conspiracy allegations do not satisfy the plausibility standard. “[W]hen a plaintiff attempts to assert the state action required for a § 1983 claim against private actors based on a conspiracy with government actors, mere conclusory allegations with no supporting factual averments are insufficient. Rather, the plaintiff must specifically plead facts tending to show agreement and concerted action.” Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1073 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). Peel’s complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to plausibly suggest any conspiracy. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of all non-state actors: FMC, NST, and their employees.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law, which may be established through state compulsion, public function, or nexus/joint action.

Kohler v. Garlets · filed 2014-08-22

A private party may be considered a state actor for purposes of § 1983 only in the “rare circumstances” that one of three tests is satisfied: the state compulsion test, the public function test, or the nexus/joint action test. See Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001). Although Mr. Kohler correctly identifies these tests in his brief, his complaint fails to allege any facts that could support a § 1983 claim against any of the defendants.

Section 1983 treats a private security contractor as a state actor when it jointly conducts searches with a public school as part of a longstanding working relationship.

Herrera v. Santa Fe Public Schools · filed 2014-08-29

The Court concludes that ASI New Mexico is a state actor.

A private person may be liable under § 1983 for conspiring or acting in concert with a state actor, but conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Lavergne v. Turk · filed 2014-10-27

Here, the district court correctly determined that Lavergne’s complaint failed to allege that the defendants conspired with a state actor. Although Lavergne alleged that the defendants printed false statements about him, he failed to allege specific facts to show an agreement between the defendants and the police, or any other state actor, to commit an illegal act. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it dismissed Lavergne’s § 1983 claims against the defendants for failure to state a claim.

A bare allegation that a private party conspired with a state actor is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim.

Chaney v. Races and Aces · filed 2014-11-04

This bare allegation of conspiracy is insufficient to state a Section 1983 claim.

A private litigant’s effort to enforce a state court contempt judgment does not, by itself, establish the state action required for a § 1983 claim.

Matta v. Rouse · filed 2014-12-05

Santos is a private litigant seeking to enforce a contempt judgment against Matta, but if he engaged in “joint action” with the state court then he could be considered as acting under color of state law. ... For these reasons, Matta fails to state a viable claim of violation of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil rights claim against OneWest because it is a private entity.

Thomason v. One West Bank · filed 2014-12-16

The magistrate judge determined that, to the extent Mr. Thomason attempted to raise a civil rights claim under § 1983, he could not do so because OneWest was a private entity. ... We affirm the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of Mr. Thomason’s § 1983 claims for alleged violations of HAMP and HAFA for the reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s initial R&R.

Section 1983 ordinarily does not treat a bank’s use of a state foreclosure process as action under color of state law.

Swope v. Northumberland National Bank · filed 2015-07-30

Accordingly, we decline Swope’s invitation to turn his garden variety sheriff’s sale into a § 1983 claim, and we instead join the number of courts that have held that a bank’s use of a state foreclosure process will not ordinarily constitute a § 1983 violation.

A private person who willfully acts jointly with a state officer can be treated as a state actor for § 1983 liability.

Brantley v. Wysocki · filed 2015-10-30

A private individual becomes a state actor for purposes of § 1983 conspiracy liability if he or she is a “willful participant in joint activity with the state or its agents.” ... Brantley adduced evidence from which a jury could find private citizen Burrows willfully participated in joint activity with Corporal Wysocki.

Section 1983 requires conduct attributable to the state; federal funding, health services, internal investigations, and collaboration with a state agency did not make the private hospital or its employees state actors here.

Cabi v. Boston Children's Hospital · filed 2016-02-12

In sum, because there is no plausible showing that Defendants’ conduct can be attributed to the state, Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims must be dismissed.

A private attorney’s alleged conspiracy with state officers does not support a § 1983 claim when the conspiracy allegations are implausible, vague, and conclusory.

Bhardwaj v. Pathak · filed 2016-09-02

His remaining claims fail because his allegations are highly implausible, vague, and conclusory as to the existence of a conspiracy. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”); Simmons, 318 F.3d at 1161 (conclusory allegations of a private attorney's conspiracy with state officers are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the attorney).

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim against a private party when the party acts under color of state law or conspires with state actors to violate constitutional rights.

Hendrickson v. Cervone · filed 2016-09-26

Here, the district court did not err by dismissing the § 1983 civil conspiracy claims against the Rockses because Plaintiff failed to allege facts showing that they should be considered state actors, or that they conspired with state actors to violate his constitutional rights.