42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 reaches a nominally private corporation whose operations are sufficiently supported and controlled by state and city action to make it a state actor subject to constitutional restraints.

Farmer v. Moses · filed 1964-06-30

The first question to be answered is whether there is sufficient “state action” or control as to confer upon this court jurisdiction of this controversy. As plaintiffs and defendants are well aware, neither the aforementioned statutes nor the Fourteenth Amendment are aimed at essentially private conduct. ... Upon analysis of the foregoing facts, I find that the Fair Corporation and its operations are so impregnated with and supported by state and city action as to place them within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment. ... It seems inescapable, therefore, that the State and City of New York, with all propriety and by specific executive and legislative fiat, have significantly contributed, and continue so to do, to the control and operation of the 1964-1965 World’s Fair. If this be so, it follows that, at least for certain purposes, the Fair is a public or quasi-public venture and, that its officers and agents cannot ignore the constitutional rights of those members of the public who use and enjoy the Fair facilities.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for redress when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of constitutional rights, and a private corporation performing a governmental function may qualify as state action.

Everett v. Riverside Hose Company No. 4, Inc. · filed 1966-10-17

Plaintiff also bases his cause of action on 78 Stat. 246, 252 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000b and 2000d (1964). However, in view of my determination herein that he has adequately stated a cause of action under Section 1983 of said Title 42, it is unnecessary to consider the adequacy or propriety of his claims under the other abovementioned statutes. ... A membership or private corporation exercising a governmental or quasi-governmental function is not an instrument to be employed with impunity in disregard of constitutional guarantees. ... When defendant’s members vote on applicants for membership they vote as voluntary firemen, not as members of a social club, and the State is involved in their vote. ... Accordingly, it may not “by ritualistic practice, constitutional or by-law prescription, by tacit agreement among its members, or otherwise, deny a person or persons membership in its organization by reason of his race, creed, color or national origin.” ... I hold that his complaint is sufficient to withstand defendant’s motion for a judgment of dismissal on the pleadings.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party's use of a state-court forum to pursue an ordinary civil action as action under color of state law.

Stevens v. Frick · filed 1966-10-17

The only “power” presently being exercised or initiated by Miss Frick is the common “right” of commencing a civil action against another to obtain relief from real or imagined wrongs. It matters not that Miss Frick’s claims may prove to be ill-founded; our courts, both state and federal, have always been open to litigation of complaints irrespective of how baseless they eventually prove to be. Providing a forum to determine the rights and liabilities in such an action does not clothe the plaintiff with the authority of the state in the sense that Dr. Stevens suggests.3 If it did, much civil litigation between private parties in state courts would be subject to restraint by a federal court — clearly a state of affairs contemplated neither by law nor by common sense.

Section 1983 requires state action, and merely providing a forum for private litigation does not make the private litigant's conduct action under color of state law.

Stevens v. Frick · filed 1967-02-01

However, we find it unnecessary to pass on this question since Stevens has failed to show that he has a claim cognizable under the Civil Rights Act. “In cases under § 1983, ‘under color’ of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the ‘state action’ required under the Fourteenth Amendment.” United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157, 16 L.Ed. 267 (1966) (citing cases); cf. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157,161-162, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943). Such state action is lacking here. ... Thus far Pennsylvania has merely provided a forum to determine the rights of the parties. Both logic and precedent suggest that merely by holding its courts open to litigation of complaints, regardless of how baseless they eventually prove to be, Pennsylvania does not clothe persons who use its judicial processes with.the authority of the state in the sense that-Stevens suggests.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy only for conduct under color of state law; private bondsmen acting through a contractual relationship with the plaintiff are not state actors.

Thomas v. Miller · filed 1968-02-01

If plaintiff has a right of action for cruel and inhuman treatment against Miller and his bonding company, it is a state court action. This Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate his rights because Miller and Trumble and these bonding companies were acting by reason of a contractual relationship with him. That which was done by the defendants was not a state action.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law that deprives a person of federal rights, and it does not reach alleged appellate-review failures lacking invidious discrimination or actions by appointed private attorneys.

Hamrick v. Norton · filed 1970-04-17

The basic requirements of a complaint based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are: (1) that the conduct complained of was engaged in under color of state law, and (2) that such conduct subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Federal Constitution and laws. ... Assuming that a notice of appeal was filed in Hamrick’s case, and assuming that defendant Just failed to comply with K.S.A. § 62-1724 this Court concludes that such action does not amount to “invidious discrimination” which would arise to the dignity of a constitutional infraction and therefore be cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The suit against defendant Norton is likewise not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private attorneys do not act under color of state law even though they may be appointed by the state, as was Norton.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to act under color of state law; a state's provision of its courts and legal process for private disputes, without more, does not establish the required state action.

Mullarkey v. Borglum · filed 1970-07-02

The fact that the state provides the machinery and a forum for the hearing of private disputes, no matter how baseless, does not provide the necessary showing, without more, that there is the required state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.

Section 1983 reaches discriminatory conduct only when committed by a person acting under color of state law; private discrimination is not actionable under it.

Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna · filed 1970-08-13

Under Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, the full range of discriminatory conduct is proscribed if, and only if, that action is taken by a party acting under color of state law. In other words, private discrimination is not actionable under Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on judges or prosecutors for judicial or prosecutorial acts within their jurisdiction and official roles, and a private person cannot be liable without action under color of state law or a viable conspiracy with state actors.

Allen T. Guedry, Jr. v. Honorable Leon Ford, Iii, Judge, City Court of Hammond, Louisiana · filed 1970-10-05

A private person cannot be held liable under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless his wrongful action was done under color of state law or state authority. Further, a private person alleged to have conspired with a state judge and prosecuting attorney who are entitled to immunity, cannot be held liable, since he is not conspiring with persons acting under color of law “against whom [plaintiff] could state a valid claim” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a constitutional deprivation by a private party when the challenged conduct is not attributable to state action.

Darcel L. Bright v. Isenbarger · filed 1971-07-29

Count I of their complaint was based on Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983), and Count II alleged that they were deprived of a property right, arising out of the paying of their tuition, without due process of law. ... The district court observed that only “state action” is within the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment and held that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate the requisite governmental involvement. ... We find it unnecessary to decide whether state action cases not involving attacks on racial discrimination require a more demanding standard of what constitutes sufficient state involvement. In this case the state played no role in defendants’ expulsion of plaintiffs. Furthermore, as the district court pointed out, other more nebulous relationships between Indiana and this Catholic high school were insufficient to warrant attributing the expulsions of plaintiffs in any way to the actions of the state.

Section 1983 does not reach private college officials whose challenged conduct was undertaken in their private employment and duties, without state-law authority or a pretense of acting under state law.

Robinson v. Davis · filed 1971-09-08

Defendants in the instant case were not performing any duty imposed upon them by state law nor did they make any “pretense” that they were acting under state law; they were working for the College. ... We find no “state action” in the incidents complained of by the appellant.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, which can be established by substantial governmental subsidization and control of a private entity carrying out a specific governmental function.

McClellan v. University Heights, Inc. · filed 1972-02-15

Defendants argue that there is insufficient state involvement to meet the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that the action must be dismissed. ... I find that there is sufficient governmental involvement with University Heights in terms of subsidization and control and that University Heights sufficiently carries out a specific governmental function to warrant application of the Fourteenth Amendment to this landlord’s actions.

Section 1983 reaches private conduct sufficiently infused with state action to support a claim under the statute.

Male v. Crossroads Associates · filed 1972-11-10

Óur initial inquiry in this appeal must be directed at the crucial jurisdictional issue — was the conduct of Crossroads and the Bogdanoffs sufficiently infused with “state action” as to support jurisdiction of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment? ... Having conducted such an examination of the record, we conclude that the Crossroads project was pervaded with state action.

Section 1983 does not cover dismissals by a private law school when the challenged conduct is not under color of state law.

Samuel Grafton and Lyle Silversmith, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Brooklyn Law School · filed 1973-05-24

There is no need for us to consider the merits of these claims since we hold, as did the district judge, that the actions of the Law School in dismissing and refusing to reinstate the plaintiffs were not “under color of any State Law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and disciplinary actions by officials of a private university do not constitute state action without sufficient state involvement.

Blackburn v. Fisk University · filed 1971-05-28

We hold that Fisk University is not a public facility of the nature that would transform the disciplinary actions by the school officials in administrating the internal affairs of the University into “State action.”

Section 1983 covers private individuals when their challenged acts are supported by the state, and the nature of the act rather than the actor's public or private status determines whether the statute applies.

Bond v. Dentzer · filed 1973-07-25

This statute clearly draws no distinction whether the primary actor is a “state officer or agent” or a “private individual”.

Section 1983 requires discriminatory conduct to occur under color of state law; private discrimination is actionable only when the State is sufficiently involved.

Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference · filed 1973-08-16

Sections 1983 and 1985 and the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, however, do not provide protection against all discrimination; only against discrimination which occurs under color of state law. ... Accordingly, we find that there is no state action involved, that an essential element of an action brought under §§ 1983 and 1985 is therefore absent and the complaint must be dismissed.

Section 1983 reaches deprivations carried out under color of state law; purely private conduct is not state action under the statute.

Dixon v. Getz · filed 1973-09-05

A reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs will ultimately be awarded an injunction on the merits against the maintenance of the state court action on the ground that the same constitutes a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not áppear because the evidence presented in support of the application for preliminary injunction does not indicate that any of the state court plaintiffs, with the possible exception of the City of Maitland, are proceeding in the state action “under color of” law. Therefore, the state prosecution does not involve “state action” as contemplated by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966); Stevens v. Frick, 2d Cir. 1967, 372 F.2d 378. Nor does it appear that the state court action is prosecuted for the purpose or with the effect of violating any right of the plaintiffs or any of them.

Section 1983 reaches challenged conduct by a private entity only when state action significantly fosters or encourages that conduct.

Driscoll v. International Union of Operating Engineers · filed 1973-09-11

To be regulable under constitutional standards through § 1331 or § 1983, the very activity of a private entity which a plaintiff challenges must be supported by state action, Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hospital, 479 F.2d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 1973), Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968), that significantly fosters or encourages that activity.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for private conduct unless the conduct is supported by significant state involvement amounting to action under color of state law.

Carpets by the Carload, Inc. v. Warren · filed 1973-10-03

Carpets’ contention that the alleged involvement of the state attorney general in the operation of the newspapers somehow transformed the refusal of the newspapers to furnish additional credit into “state action” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is without merit. In Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Company, 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), the court held that the “under color of law” provision encompasses only such private conduct that is supported by significant state involvement. ... I conclude that the attorney general’s notification of a matter of public record and interest, absent more, does not constitute a denial of a constitutional right, let alone “state action” or a “conspiracy” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 requires state action for a claim against an ostensibly private hospital, and partial federal funding alone is insufficient to establish it.

Benjamin B. Jackson, M.D. v. Norton-Children's Hospitals, Inc., and Certain Committees and Directors Thereof · filed 1973-11-13

A number of cases support this holding and we are of the opinion that it is correct. Whenever state action has been discovered in the activities of an ostensibly private hospital something more than a partial federal funding is involved.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil-rights action against private defendants who neither wield public authority nor act under color of law.

Brownley v. Gettysburg College · filed 1973-12-14

“Plaintiff has failed to plead facts which are the bases for any civil action for an invasion of civil rights under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§1983 and 1985. The defendants have acted in a private capacity and for private interests and there is no averment that they were cloaked with public authority or acted under color of law.”

Section 1983 provides no relief for a claimed civil-rights violation arising from a private self-help repossession when no state action is alleged.

Thrasher v. First Natl. Bank of Miami · filed 1974-01-22

The amended complaint in three counts charged appellee with a violation of appellants' civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and in Count II and III with trespass and conversion of appellants' automobile. The trial court dismissed Count I because no state action was alleged entitling appellants to relief, inasmuch as this case involves a private self-help repossession. In this regard, the trial judge was correct.

Section 1983 requires both a deprivation of a constitutional right and action under color of state law; a private college's conduct is not covered absent meaningful governmental control.

Pendrell v. Chatham College · filed 1974-02-07

The two elements which must be demonstrated in order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are: (1) the deprivation of a constitutionally guaranteed right, (2) by a defendant who acted under color of state law. ... In line with the traditional principles of agency law, state action should be determined on the basis of the extent of governmental control or right to control, whether exercised or not, over the actions of the defendant. ... Thus, the Court finds that no state action exists as to Chatham College. Chatham College is not an agency of that state and the actions of its trustees, officers and faculty cannot be found to have been taken under color of state law. Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, which is equivalent to the Fourteenth Amendment's state-action requirement, and a private repossession without state process or officials does not satisfy that requirement.

Shirley v. State National Bank of Connecticut · filed 1974-02-14

The “under color of state law” provision in section 1983 is equivalent to the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. ... The seizure complained of here, on the other hand, was by a private individual without the intrusion of state process or state officials.

Section 1983 does not reach a private creditor's wage-assignment filing when the State has no significant involvement in the challenged conduct.

Bond v. Dentzer · filed 1974-03-13

In addition to finding state action within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court determined that sections 46-49 of Article 3-A of the Personal Property Law were unconstitutional on their face and as applied insofar as they provided for execution against wages by service of a wage assignment upon an employer without meaningful notice to the assignor and without an opportunity for him to be heard. They were deemed to be viola-tive of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finding no state action, we reverse. ... Here, we find no state action since there is no significant involvement of the State in the challenged conduct.

Section 1983 reaches a private hospital’s challenged conduct only when the State is sufficiently involved in that conduct.

Greco v. Orange Memorial Hospital Corporation · filed 1974-03-29

This Court is convinced that the regulation or support from the State must foster or encourage the injury complained of by Dr. Greco. In other words, there must be governmental involvement in the very activity that is being challenged. If the State is completely neutral and does not foster or encourage the hospital policy causing the plaintiff’s injury, then there is no state action. ... Therefore, there is no state action involved and the defendants were not acting under color of state law. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain this suit, and the plaintiff’s complaint is hereby dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a civil action when a defendant acting under color of state law deprives a person of rights secured by the Constitution or laws, and significant municipal involvement in a private entity’s conduct may satisfy the state-action requirement.

Fortin v. DARLINGTON LITTLE LEAGUE, INC.(AMERICAN DIV.) · filed 1974-05-15

Primarily, a cause of action under Section 1983 exists only where the plaintiff establishes both that the defendant’s action is “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State” and that such action subjects the plaintiff “to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution”. Where, as in this case, the right allegedly infringed is the right to equal protection of the law guaranteed by the' Fourteenth Amendment, the deprivation must take the form of “state action”. ... Although there was no evidence that the City of Pawtucket, by its agent, was in any way involved in the formulation of the “no girls” policy of said Darlington Little League, Inc., I find that there is “significant” state involvement in the activities of said Darlington Little League, Inc. Accordingly, I conclude that there is sufficient state involvement to confer jurisdiction upon this Court over the plaintiffs’ action under the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a constitutional or federal right under color of state law, and issuing a private coal company a strip-mining permit to enforce environmental policy is not sufficient state action to support a claim.

Watson v. Kenlick Coal Company, Inc. · filed 1974-06-21

Accordingly, we hold that the issuance of a permit to strip mine to a private coal company for the purpose of enforcing that state’s environmental policy is not such state action as would support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach actions by private university officials absent state action.

Brown v. Villanova University · filed 1974-07-31

This Court does not have jurisdiction by reason of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The action of the officials at Villanova University was not state action within the meaning of that section.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional deprivations committed under color of state law, so private conduct without sufficient state involvement is not actionable under it.

Howe v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 1974-08-12

In regard to the first contention it can simply be said that private use of state furnished services such as highways, electricity-, water, and police and fire protection does not significantly involve the state with a private institution in order to bring the private action within the scope of § 1983 or the amendments to the Constitution.

Section 1983 reaches private persons who willfully participate in joint activity with the State or its agents; a pleaded conspiracy may proceed past dismissal when facts could support that theory.

Carrasco v. Klein · filed 1974-09-03

It is well established that private persons come within the ambit of § 1983 when they are “willful participantes] in joint activity with the State or its agents.” ... But for now, the court cannot say as a matter of law that no set of facts could be proved to justify plaintiff’s conclusory allegation of a conspiracy cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for deprivation of property without due process when a private mechanic's detention under a common-law or statutory lien is not action under color of state law.

Phillips v. Money · filed 1974-09-13

Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant Money did not act under color of state law and that the state action necessary to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause is absent.

Section 1983 does not reach alleged constitutional violations by a private educational institution absent state action connected to the challenged conduct.

Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology · filed 1974-10-29

The complaint does not allege the equivalent of state action within the meaning of § 1983, as applied in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961).

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law plus deprivation of a constitutional right, and it provides no federal action for purely private conduct.

Ouzts v. Maryland National Insurance Company · filed 1974-10-29

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendants were acting under color of state law and (2) that their conduct subjected him or caused him to be subjected to a deprivation of some right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States. ... Purely private conduct, no matter how wrongful, is not within the protective orbit of section 1983. ... For such conduct the wrongdoer faces potential liability in state courts, but a federal action would not lie under section 1983.

Section 1983 reaches a private entity when state-authorized power is used to determine the scope of state-created rights, requiring compliance with Fourteenth Amendment procedural limits.

Schlein v. Milford Hospital · filed 1974-11-06

In this case, however, a private hospital, by virtue of its state licensing, has been given the authority to determine important aspects of the scope of the license required of a physician. State-authorized power is being used to determine the scope of state-created rights. ... A private entity cannot play such a pivotal role in the implementation of the State’s regulatory authority without abiding by the procedural limitations that the Fourteenth Amentment imposes upon state action. The complaint sufficiently pleads state action to resist a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 applies only to conduct under color of state law, so federal officials acting under federal law and private parties merely obeying federal law are not liable under it.

John B. Kotmair, Jr., Dba (Sole Owner of Free State Home Builders, Inc.) v. D. Gray · filed 1974-11-08

In any event, there was no action under color of state law. Rather, the IRS agents acted under federal law, and the bank employees acted as private citizens obeying the federal law. Thus, none of the defendants would be subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even had their actions not been protected.

Section 1983 applies to a private institution whose relationship with the state is sufficiently substantial that its conduct constitutes action under color of state law.

Isaacs v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF TEMPLE UNIV., ETC. · filed 1974-11-11

Temple has become, in the precise words of the Temple University-Commonwealth Act, 24 P.S. § 2510-1 et seq., “an instrumentality of the Commonwealth.” Consequently, there is no need to inquire whether officials of the Commonwealth have intervened, either directly or indirectly, in the formulation or implementation of Temple’s faculty employment practices. For the purposes of this inquiry, all of Temple’s actions, including its termination of plaintiffs’ employment, merit classification under the rubric of “state action.” ... This Court therefore has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) to hear this cause of action.

Section 1983 provides no basis for relief against purely private conduct absent state action.

Teitelbaum v. Scranton National Bank · filed 1974-11-07

Since private action, however wrongful, cannot form a basis for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Brownley v. Gettysburg College, 338 F.Supp. 725, 726 (M.D.Pa.1972), summary judgment in the defendant’s favor on plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 must be granted.

Section 1983 requires state action or action under color of state law, and a private party that merely petitions a state court for relief does not satisfy that requirement.

Firnhaber v. Sensenbrenner · filed 1974-12-04

Even if the Court were to assume that such minimal state court functioning does constitute state action for purposes of § 1983, the facts set forth here cannot sustain a finding that this defendant, who merely petitioned the state court for such relief, was himself engaging in state action or proceeding under color of state law. See Drexler v. Walters, 290 F.Supp. 150, 155 (D.Minn.1968) (plaintiff in a prior divorce action wherein the court took affirmative action against the defendant held “. . . clearly . . . not a state officer or acting under color of any statute . . . of any state”).

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional violations committed under color of state law, so it does not apply to a private college absent state action.

Pendrell v. Chatham College · filed 1974-12-05

As to those of her Constitutional claims which plaintiff wishes to bring under § 1983, plaintiff is faced with the fundamental obstacle that this Court ruled in its previous opinion that 42 U. S.C. § 1983 is inapplicable, to these defendants because Chatham College is a private institution and thus, the state action requisite of the statute cannot be met.

Section 1983 reaches private conduct only when that conduct involves state action.

David DeMATTEIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1975-02-06

A private party violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only to the extent its conduct involves state action.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and regulating a private institution does not by itself make its conduct state action.

Sokol v. University Hospital, Inc. · filed 1975-07-14

To the extent that the acts complained of are in violation -of these guidelines, they are by definition not “under color” of them. Legislation to control abuses does not render all conduct in the regulated area state action. ... A private institution is not so clothed. It is anomalous to assert that the action of a private institution has become state action because it is “under color of” a law when it is in fact violative of it.

Section 1983 covers private persons who act jointly or in concert with state officials in perpetrating prohibited acts, because such conduct is under color of state law.

Warner v. Croft · filed 1975-07-30

Private persons jointly engaged or acting in concert with State officials in the perpetration of prohibited acts are persons acting under color of State law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability for private parties who act in conjunction with state officials, even when they are not state officials themselves.

Gonzalez v. Shanker · filed 1975-07-31

It is, however, well established that private parties, who act in conjunction with state officials, can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, although they themselves are not officials of the state.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; private warehousemen’s enforcement of liens, where state involvement is merely permissive, does not support a § 1983 claim.

Brooks v. Flagg Brothers, Inc. · filed 1975-07-07

For this reason, and for the reasons detailed above, the court must conclude that plaintiffs have failed to show sufficient state involvement in the enforcement of warehousemen’s liens to confer jurisdic ... tion upon a federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3),'or to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires significant state involvement in the specific private activity challenged, and receipt of Hill-Burton funds alone is insufficient to establish state action.

Wilfred E. Watkins, M.D. v. Mercy Medical Center · filed 1975-08-01

This circuit has repeatedly held that for state involvement with a private entity to confer jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the involvement must be with the specific activity of which a party complains. ... The mere receipt of Hill-Burton funds, even coupled with the alleged tax exemptions, is not sufficient connection between the state and the private activity of which appellant complains to make out state action.

Section 1983 does not reach a private hospital's conduct when the challenged activity lacks a sufficient connection to the state.

Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hospital · filed 1975-08-26

Neither “the enjoyment by the hospital of tax exemptions, its regulation by the state and its performance of a public function” in addition to receipt of Hill-Burton funds, are proper grounds for holding that it acted under color of state law with respect to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We hold that state action or action under color of state law was not involved.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations carried out under color of state law, so purely private conduct is not covered.

Berrios v. Memorial Hospital, Inc. · filed 1975-09-29

The defendants contend that any action taken by the defendant hospital or any of the individual defendants in their respective capacities, as hospital officials, was purely private action and therefore not under color of state law and not subject to the mandate of 42 U. S.C. § 1983. ... Therefore, the question to be decided is whether the action by any defendant in terminating the plaintiff’s staff privileges at the defendant hospital was “state” action. ... By sifting through the stipulated facts and weighing the circumstances, this Court concludes that there was not such significant state action present herein so as to transform the actions of the defendant hospital from “private” to “public”. ... There are no distinguishing factors herein, other than a partial funding by various governmental bodies, to render the defendant hospital a public or state institution. Thérefore, the defendants’ motion for a summary judgment as to any claim of a denial of civil rights hereby is granted.

Section 1983 applies when a private hospital’s policy is sufficiently connected to a state statute to constitute state action.

Jane Doe, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., a Corpora · filed 1975-11-06

We hold that CAMC’s anti-abortion policy based on West Virginia’s criminal abortion statute involved the state sufficiently to constitute the policy “state action” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private entity's conduct as state action merely because the entity receives money from state and local governments.

Hollenbaugh v. Board of Trustees of Carnegie Free Library · filed 1975-12-29

The mere fact that money is received from state and local governments is not enough to make the action of the defendants state action.

Section 1983 reaches a private school when substantial state involvement makes its challenged decision state action.

Taylor v. Maryland School for the Blind · filed 1976-01-27

Several legal issues have been presented by this complaint: 1) whether the action of the Maryland School for the Blind is state action to make the School subject to the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 2) if so, whether Diana has been denied either procedural due process or substantive due process by the action of the School. ... There is sufficient state involvement with the School to constitute its decision a state action.

Section 1983 does not apply to a private party’s conduct absent state action attributable to the state.

Sament v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hospital · filed 1976-02-10

Accordingly, I conclude that Hahnemann’s nonreappointment of Dr. Sament cannot be deemed to be state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment or the civil rights statute.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law and does not cover actions by federal officials acting under federal authority or private persons without state action.

Rodriguez v. Towers Apartments, Inc. · filed 1976-05-03

Plaintiffs base the Court’s jurisdiction on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) which is clearly inappropriate. ... Since the Federal Defendants are all acting pursuant to federal statutes and regulations they are clearly not covered by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its companion jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). ... State action is a prerequisite to action under Section 1983. ... Furthermore, a private person cannot be held liable under the provisions of this section unless his action was done under color of state law or state authority. ... There is no allegation, much less proof, of state action being involved in this case as regards the Private Defendants. In fact it is uncontested that the action taken by said defendants is pursuant to Federal law or authority. It is clear therefore that the complaint fails to state a cause of action or to claim valid grounds for jurisdiction against Private Defendants.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right under color of state law; a neutral, good-faith police arrest at a private supermarket for trespass, absent racial or expressive discrimination, does not satisfy those requirements.

Curtis v. Rosso & Mastracco, Inc. · filed 1976-05-11

Defendant does not deny that its employees precipitated the plaintiff’s arrest; however, defendant avers that this involvement is insufficient to meet the requisites of state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The Court disagrees with plaintiff’s analysis of state action. ... Therefore, the proposition before the Court is whether the state action requisite of the Fourteenth Amendment is fulfilled by the plaintiff’s arrest on charges of trespass in a context not related to race or expression. The Court concludes that this question must be answered in the negative.

Section 1983 requires state action, and state regulation or involvement that does not sufficiently connect the State to a private party's challenged conduct is not enough to make that conduct actionable under the statute.

Jackson v. Associated Hosp. Serv. of Philadelphia · filed 1976-05-11

Finally, our finding that, under the facts of this case, state action requisite to sustain jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is lacking means that the conspiracy alleged here is, for jurisdictional purposes, a private one and may be challenged effectively, given plaintiffs’ jurisdictional statement, only under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).

Section 1983 requires an allegedly unconstitutional act to be performed under color of state law, so a private hospital is not liable for constitutional violations absent state action.

Holton v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center · filed 1976-06-30

However, an essential element of an action under section 1983 is that the allegedly unconstitutional act be performed under color of state law. ... Nevertheless, recent Supreme Court decisions and the great weight of authority indicate that private hospitals are not subject to suit for constitutional violations.

Section 1983 reaches challenged conduct by a private association when the conduct is sufficiently entangled with state action.

Colorado Seminary v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n · filed 1976-07-16

A more difficult question is whether the actions of the NCAA were “under color of state law.” While the courts have fairly consistently found sufficient state involvement in NCAA actions, ... recent Supreme Court decisions leave the issue not free from doubt. ... However, the Court is persuaded by the weight of precedent that there is sufficient state entanglement to invoke the protections of the fourteenth amendment.

Section 1983 requires challenged conduct by a private corporation to be attributable to the state or performed under color of state law; incorporation and authorization to do business alone are insufficient.

Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp. · filed 1976-07-30

It is the opinion of this court that the incorporating laws of state governing the creation of a private manufacturing corporation and Alabama’s laws governing the qualifications to do business in Alabama do not raise the actions of the defendant to the level of the requisite “state action” as required by both the 14th Amendment of the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; purely private conduct and federal-official conduct do not support a claim under the section.

Local No. 1 (Aca), Etc. v. Ibt, C., W. & H. · filed 1976-08-12

The law is clear beyond cavil that only the action of a state officer or of a private person acting under color of authority of a state, and not of a private party as such or of a federal official, can give rise to a cause of action under that section of the Civil Rights Act. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972). Lacking any such allegations in the complaint, Count Three had to be dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for deprivation of federally protected rights under color of state law, and a private entity's challenged conduct requires a sufficiently close nexus to the State to be treated as state action.

Dr. John R. Briscoe v. Edward J. Bock, Trustees of Deaconess Hospital, and the Evangelical Deaconess Society of St. Loui · filed 1976-08-19

Before the action in question can properly be characterized as “state action”, there must be a “sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” 419 U.S. at 351, 95 S.Ct. at 453.

A private warehouseman’s lien sale carried out under a state statute is not state action under § 1983 when state involvement is not sufficiently significant.

Melara v. Kennedy · filed 1976-10-08

We hold, then, that Kennedy’s proposed sale of Melara’s stored goods pursuant to California Commercial Code § 7210 does not constitute state action.

Section 1983 applies when a private association's conduct is sufficiently connected to state-supported institutions to constitute state action.

Regents of the University v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n · filed 1976-12-02

Federal question jurisdiction is proper and state action is involved because of the pervasive influence exercised on NCAA affairs by its numerous state-supported university members. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 applies to a private hospital’s conduct when state-authorized power is used to limit a state-created right, because that conduct constitutes state action.

Schlein v. Milford Hospital · filed 1976-12-07

Thus, state-authorized power was being used to limit a state-created right, and state action was thereby involved in the hospital’s denial of staff privileges to plaintiff. Though the ^issue is not free from doubt, I adhere to that ruling.

Section 1983 does not reach private parties absent plausible allegations that they acted in concert with state officials; incorporation under state law alone is insufficient state action.

Altimus v. Manhood Foundation, Inc. · filed 1976-12-21

The court agrees that there is no jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as against these defendants; there are simply no plausible allegations that they were acting in concert with any of the official defendants, and the mere fact that they are incorporated under the law of a state does not create sufficient state action to sustain a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims against private parties who willfully participate in joint activity with state officials, but does not reach private conduct lacking such state action.

Sanabria v. Village of Monticello · filed 1976-12-23

The claims against defendants Isidore Greenberg, Young Chul Ko and Community General Hospital founder upon the requirement of § 1983 that the complained of activities be “under color of state law.” Indeed, private parties who act in conjunction with state officials may be liable under § 1983, although they are not themselves state officials. ... The actions of non-state officials, however, “cannot comprise state action unless [such defendants] were willful participants in joint activity with the State or its agents.” ... Thus, even if Community General Hospital, Greenberg and Young failed to administer proper medical care to plaintiff, they did not do so “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the challenged civil-rights violation was committed under color of state law, and a private law school is not liable without sufficient state action or a close state-private nexus.

Krohn v. Harvard Law School · filed 1977-04-06

In order to state a cause of action in a section 1983 suit, the plaintiff must show that the alleged civil rights violation was accomplished “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage” of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. We agree with the district court that the plaintiff did not establish “state action” in this case and affirm the dismissal of plaintiff’s section 1983 cause of action. ... As a private entity, Harvard Law School is not subject to suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In order to subject the activities of private entities to a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that the acts of the state are in some way involved in the private discriminatory conduct in that they were “intended either overtly or covertly to encourage discrimination,” ... or that they affirmatively promoted the discriminatory conduct. ... Therefore, plaintiff has not stated a cause of action against the defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires more than mere state regulation of a private entity to establish state action; the challenged conduct must have a sufficiently close nexus to the State.

Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center Inc. · filed 1977-08-17

A careful reading of these two cases readily shows -that-jmore than mere regulation is necessary to constitute State action.

Section 1983 permits a sex-discrimination claim against private actors when the municipality is significantly involved so that the challenged conduct amounts to state action.

Citizens Council on Human Relations v. Buffalo Yacht Club · filed 1977-10-07

In view of the foregoing, I hold that the amended complaint alleges sufficient facts to show that the City of Buffalo has significantly involved itself with the alleged discriminatory practices of the Buffalo Yacht Club and that its conduct amounts to state action. Plaintiffs Vance and LaMarco have stated a claim of sex discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and deprivation of a federal right; its borrowed state limitations period is governed by federal accrual rules, including discovery tolling for fraud or concealment, and private actors may be liable when acting in concert with a proper state actor.

Briley v. State Of California · filed 1977-10-19

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 3 a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant was acting under color of state law at the time the acts complained of were committed, and that (2) the defendant deprived plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... Since § 1983 does not itself contain a limitations period, the federal courts look to the state statute of limitations applicable to the most similar state cause of action. ... The established rule, which we apply in this case, is that, where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud or concealment and remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence on his part, the statutory period does not begin to run until discovery of the injury. ... It is clear that defendants who were engaged in purely private conduct may be found liable under § 1983 if it is established that they have acted in concert with another party against whom a valid claim can be stated.

Section 1983 requires state action, so private discrimination is actionable only when the state has sufficiently involved itself in the discriminatory conduct.

Neeld v. American Hockey League · filed 1977-10-25

Plaintiff has not established, however, a probability of success on the merits of his section 1983 cause of action. Although plaintiff contends that the state action requirement for a section 1983 action is satisfied because eight of the nine AHL member teams play their home games in stadia owned by various municipalities, such fact alone is insufficient to establish the requisite level of state involvement necessary to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Where, as here, discrimination is rooted in private conduct, the state must have significantly involved itself with the invidious discrimination before the constitutional proscription can apply.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to deprive a person of federal rights under color of state law; merely using state judicial processes does not make a private person a state actor.

Merrick v. Merrick · filed 1977-11-16

In order to state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, defendants must have deprived plaintiff, arguably, of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States under color of state law. ... There is no authority for the proposition that a person who employs the state’s judicial processes, as has Mrs. Merrick, is thereby clothed with the state’s authority. ... Thus, Mr. Merrick’s complaint fails to state a claim under § 1983 and must be dismissed as to Mrs. Merrick.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a constitutional challenge to a private foreclosure absent sufficient state action.

Bosse v. Crowell Collier and MacMillan · filed 1977-12-06

The district court correctly dismissed this count for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of the lack of sufficient “state action.” ... The fact that Arizona’s enactment of these provisions greatly changed Arizona law in this area rather than merely codifying a preexisting common law right does not establish “state action” for purposes of the fourteenth amendment without further indicia of governmental involvement.

Section 1983 does not reach private defendants whose activities do not qualify as a public function or occur under color of state law.

Ve-Ri-Tas, Inc. v. Advertising Review Council of Metropolitan Denver, Inc. · filed 1977-12-28

We thus hold that the test of a public function has not been met. ... We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the defendants were not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not itself grant federal jurisdiction, and private litigants' use of a state forum and enforcement of court orders alone is not state action under the statute.

Orlando v. Wizel · filed 1978-01-05

It is well established that 42 U.S.C. 1983 does not contain an independent grant of jurisdiction but that 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) grants jurisdiction over all § 1983 claims. ... A state, merely by providing a forum and a means of enforcing regularly issued court orders, does not “color” the action of the private litigants with state action. ... The complaint against the parents and Rick Jackson must be dismissed for lack of state action sufficient to support jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a private hospital employee absent state action, and a state statute directed at courts that does not compel the hospital's conduct does not establish action under color of state law.

Rhodes v. Laurino · filed 1978-02-02

Moreover, it cannot be said that the state statute involved here — Dom. Rel. Law § 114 — compelled the challenged action. That statute is directed to the courts — it requires court records to be sealed, and it charges the courts with the enforcement of its provisions. It does not require a hospital to seal its records relating to the medical histories of persons who give their children up for adoption. It may be that the hospital has regulations of its own with respect to the confidentiality of medical records, but the enforcement of such regulations, absent some state action, would not give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a constitutional deprivation caused by state action, meaning action under color of state law; private conduct without significant state involvement is not actionable.

Uston v. Hilton Hotels Corp. · filed 1978-03-21

In order to predicate an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it must be demonstrated, inter alia, that the deprivation of constitutional rights, the injury complained of, was brought about by state action, that is, took place under color of state law. It is well established that private conduct without some significant state involvement is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional-rights claim against a private hospital only when the challenged act is sufficiently closely connected to the State to be fairly treated as state action.

Bach v. Mount Clemens General Hospital, Inc. · filed 1978-03-29

Thus, the question this Court must resolve is whether there is a sufficiently close connection between the state and the dismissal of Ms. Bach so that the latter may be fairly termed the action of the state. All of the factors set forth above and relied on by the plaintiff are insufficient to establish this connection. These factors merely show some general involvement of various governmental entities with an otherwise private hospital. They do not indicate any connection between any governmental entity and the activity being challenged, the dismissal of the plaintiff, which would lead the Court to conclude that the firing could be attributed to the state.

Section 1983 requires action by a State, rather than a private party, to deprive someone of constitutionally protected rights.

Jones v. Eastern Maine Medical Center · filed 1978-03-31

A cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires that a State, not a private party, act to deprive one of constitutionally protected rights.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for legal malpractice by a privately retained attorney absent state action.

Sommer v. Rankin · filed 1978-04-24

The case is, in effect, an action for legal malpractice, and is not cognizable under § 1983 since there is a total absence of state action as required by that section.

Section 1983 requires both deprivation of a federally secured right and action under color of state law, and a private act is not actionable merely because state law permits it.

Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks · filed 1978-05-15

A claim upon which relief may be granted to respondents against Flagg Brothers under § 1983 must embody at least two elements. Respondents are first bound to show that they have been deprived of a right “secured by the Constitution and the laws” of the United States. They must secondly show that Flagg Brothers deprived them of this right acting “under color of any statute” of the State of New York. ... Here, respondents allege that Flagg Brothers has deprived them of their right, secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, to be free from state deprivations of property without due process of law. Thus, they must establish not only that Flagg Brothers acted under color of the challenged statute, but also that its actions are properly attributable to the State of New York. ... We conclude that it may not. ... The District Court properly concluded that their complaints failed to state a claim for relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private hospital when its challenged conduct is sufficiently connected to government to constitute state action; Hill-Burton funding alone is insufficient.

Newsom v. Vanderbilt University · filed 1978-06-01

The question before this court is whether that “something more” exists in the instant case, and it is the opinion of the court that it does.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on a private person or corporation unless the challenged action was taken under color of state law or state authority.

Alston v. ALLEGHENY LUDLUM STEEL CORP., ETC. · filed 1978-05-02

Ordinarily, a private person or corporation cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless his or its wrongful action was done under color of state law or state authority.

Section 1983 reaches a private hospital’s involuntary confinement when the hospital performs a state-regulated public function and therefore acts under color of state law.

Ruffler v. Phelps Memorial Hospital · filed 1978-06-13

This court must agree that the requisite state action is present for, as set out in detail below, the hospital’s allegedly improper confinement of plaintiff and the nature of the statute pursuant to which it undertook that confinement establish that in the circumstances of this case the hospital was performing a “public function,” and that in the field of mental health care the State expressly depends on the use of private facilities to effectuate its public policy of providing treatment for those who need it.

Section 1983 requires a sufficiently close nexus between the State and a private entity's challenged conduct for that conduct to qualify as state action.

Spencer v. Southeast Missouri Hospital · filed 1978-07-10

It is clear that plaintiff has not established a sufficient nexus herein. There is no relationship between the refusal to perform surgery without the consent of the spouse and the state. The possibility that the hospital may be subjected to civil liability should a spouse sue for damages resulting from sterilization is not a sufficient tie. The state does not aid, encourage or approve the consent requirement. The mere possibility of civil liability does not establish significant state involvement. Receipt of public funds, tax-exempt status and state regulation of the hospital is similarly insufficient.

Section 1983 reaches private conduct only when the challenged activity is supported by state action.

Tucker v. Harley Davidson Motor Co. · filed 1978-07-12

I do not believe that the nature of the contacts between the defendant company and the state are sufficient to support the plaintiff’s claim of state action. ... Since there is no claim that the state of Wisconsin has supported or participated in the discriminatory practices allegedly engaged in by the defendant company, the plaintiff’s claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 1983 requires a complaint challenging private conduct to allege specific facts establishing that the defendants acted under color of state law; broad conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology · filed 1978-08-02

In failing to specify what underlying facts would be sufficient to support such a general allegation, we did not obviate the requirement of including the necessary factual allegations. Hence, Cohen’s repetition of broad conclusions without additional facts establishing that the defendants acted under color of state law in their discrimination against her is insufficient. Nothing more than general categorizations are to be found in the proposed amendment; a mere recitation of broad conclusory language misses the mark. As we fail to see how the proposed amendment escapes the deficiencies of its precursor, we hold that the amended complaint, like the original, fails to state a federal cause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches private conduct only when a sufficiently close nexus makes it fairly attributable to the State, with the degree of governmental influence and control over the challenged decision being determinative.

Graseck v. Mauceri · filed 1978-08-07

A prerequisite for any relief under Section 1983, of course, is that the defendant have acted under color of state law. ... State involvement in any manner in the activities of a private institution does not necessarily establish state action. ... Rather, it is the degree of government influence and control over the private entity, and in particular over the decision itself that is determinative. ... There being no official intrusion into the personnel policies of the Society, its management decision may not be attributed to the State.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations caused by state action, including qualifying conduct by private entities, but private-school aid and regulation alone do not establish state action.

Huff v. NOTRE DAME HIGH SCH. OF W. HAVEN · filed 1978-09-26

Therefore, even in the totality of the extant circumstances here there is no state action upon which 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) jurisdiction can be based and plaintiff’s action is dismissed accordingly.

Section 1983 does not provide a basis for a claim against a private institution absent state action.

Flora v. Moore · filed 1978-12-08

For example, jurisdiction may not attach under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because at all times relevant to this action Calhoun County Hospital was a private institution, thus lacking the essential ingredient of “state action” required to make out a case under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires challenged conduct to be taken under color of state law, and state approval of private discrimination supports a claim only when there is a sufficient nexus between the state action and the private discrimination.

Life Insurance Co. Of North America v. Martha Ellen Reichardt, Etc., Martha Ellen Reichardt v. Wesley J. Kinder · filed 1979-03-12

To state a claim under § 1983 the challenged action must have been taken “under color of state law.” ... Mere state action is insufficient to support a § 1983 cause of action. There must be a sufficient nexus between the state action and the private discrimination. Here the nexus is insufficient. The private carriers decided whether and to whom such policies would issue. We find insufficient state action to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action or action under color of state law for a private party to assert a constitutional cause of action against a broadcast licensee.

CENT. NY RIGHT TO LIFE v. Radio Station WIBX · filed 1979-03-19

Consequently, in this Circuit, it is now clear that F.C.C. approval of the challenged conduct is the key factor to be considered in determining whether a private party may assert a constitutional cause of action against a broadcast licensee as a result of its programming practices. The defendants in Kuczo, like the defendants in this action, can scarcely claim F.C.C. approval of the contested practices. If anything, the conduct of the defendants is expressly condemned by the personal attack rule. The Court is therefore unable to find the requisite state action upon which its subject matter jurisdiction ultimately depends.

Section 1983 requires state action, and a private university's receipt of financial assistance and tax-exempt status from the State does not alone provide a sufficient basis for § 1983 jurisdiction.

Greene v. Johns Hopkins University · filed 1979-04-11

Therefore, in agreement with the vast majority of opinions on this question and with concern that the consequences outlined by Judge Frankel be avoided, this Court holds that, even if a close nexus is not a prerequisite to a finding of state action, Johns Hopkins University’s receipt of financial assistance and a tax exempt status from the State of Maryland does not provide a sufficient basis for § 1983 jurisdiction in this case.

Section 1983 treats a successful private litigant's ability to invoke the state's full power to enforce an immediately enforceable state-court judgment as state action.

Henry v. First National Bank of Clarksdale v. Mississippi Action for Progress, Inc. · filed 1979-05-21

The crucial difference between a private party who has merely filed a civil suit in a state forum and the successful litigant who possesses an immediately enforceable state judgment is that in the latter case the full power and authority of the state can be invoked on behalf of the litigant. It is this exercise of state power that provides state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and section 1983.

Section 1983 reaches a private nonprofit's conduct when the entity is sufficiently entwined with state and local governments to satisfy the statute's under-color-of-state-law requirement.

Gilbreath v. East Arkansas Planning & Development District, Inc. · filed 1979-05-24

Where, as in the present case, a nonprofit corporation has been created by virtue of state law, the state government has provided significant financial support for the activities of the corporation, the state has delegated functions relating to the planning and delivery of public services to the corporation, the corporation has engaged in activities normally performed by governmental agencies, the corporation has worked in cooperation with various agencies or instrumentalities of state government and the supervision of the affairs of the corporation has been vested in a board of directors, the majority of which are local elected officials, the conduct of the “private” nonprofit corporation has become so entwined with governmental policies and so impregnated with a governmental character as to subject the conduct of the corporation to the institutional limitations placed upon state action. ... There is a sufficient nexus between the activities of East Arkansas Planning and Development District and state and local governments to bring the alleged discriminatory practices of the District within scrutiny under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach purely private action that is outside the scope of state action.

Jordan v. Hawaii Government Employees' Ass'n, Local 152 · filed 1979-06-21

The remaining two defendants, AFSCME and HSFL, have engaged in purely private action outside the reach of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches a private physician who exercises state-delegated detention authority because that authority constitutes state action.

Kay v. Benson · filed 1979-07-06

Contrariwise, the Court is of the opinion that New Hampshire RSA 135-B:19 and 20 taken together constitute the delegation by the legislature of the State of New Hampshire to a private individual the power of detention of a person against that person’s wishes. ... RSA 135-B:19 and 20 confer upon a physician the power to do something which he otherwise would not have the right to do as an individual. ... Thus, plaintiff has shown that Dr. Benson was clothed with state authority so substantial in nature as to render his actions virtually identical to actions traditionally taken by a State.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law, and a private bondsman acts under color of state law when knowingly and purportedly acting under a state bench warrant.

Maynard v. Kear · filed 1979-07-19

In order to establish a violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, plaintiffs must establish: 1) that defendants caused plaintiff to be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States, and 2) that defendants in so doing acted under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of a State. ... By this statute, the State of Virginia lends its authority to private bondsmen who arrest persons pursuant to a bench warrant who have failed to appear in court, thereby transmuting the private action of bondsmen into state action. ... In conclusion, by knowingly and purportedly acting under the authority of a state bench warrant, defendants Rear, Mathusa, and Broderick Bonding Agency were acting under the color of state law as required by Section 1983, the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not cover purely private action or action under color of federal authority.

In Re" Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation · filed 1979-08-14

Purely private action or action under color of federal authority does not qualify as state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires challenged conduct to qualify as state action; a public official’s use of power vested by office can satisfy that requirement even outside lawful authority, and a private entity acting in concert with the official may likewise be treated as acting under color of state law.

Phaby v. KSD-KSD-TV, INC. · filed 1979-09-28

If Percich used the power and prestige vested in him due to his office, even though acting outside the scope of his authority as granted by law, his actions would sufficiently constitute state action. ... If defendant KSD acted in concert with defendant Percich in the allegedly unlawful termination of plaintiff’s employment, its action would also be considered state action.

Section 1983 reaches conduct under color of state law and does not prohibit purely private action.

Bailey v. Boilermakers Local 667 of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers · filed 1979-11-29

There is no direct state involvement with the hiring practices of Local 667, the activity alleged to have caused the injury herein. ... Purely private action, whether discriminatory or not, is not prohibited by § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach a private witness merely because the witness testifies at a criminal trial; testimony alone is not action under color of law.

Nash v. Reedel · filed 1979-11-29

It is well settled that a witness testifying at a trial is not thereby acting under color of law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for purposeful racial discrimination under color of state law; a state agency's permit decision is state action, while private parties must be sufficiently intertwined with the state.

Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp. · filed 1979-12-21

The defendants’ third proposed ground for dismissal is the absence of state action. There is no absence of state action in this case. The plaintiffs are contesting the granting of a permit by the Texas Department of Health. That is state action, pure and simple. ... Further discovery may reveal that Southwestern Waste Management Corp. (SWW) and Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. (BFI) were not so intertwined with the state that their actions should be considered actions of the state, but that would only require dismissal against SWW and BFI. State action would still be present and a cause of action would still remain against defendant Moore, Commissioner of TDH. ... The problem is that the plaintiffs have not established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. The burden on them is to prove discriminatory purpose. ... I cannot say that the plaintiffs have established a substantial likelihood of proving that the decision to grant the permit was motivated by purposeful racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a private contractor’s surveillance work to be attributed to a police department when the contractor exercises powers delegated by the department.

Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Department · filed 2020-04-24

Accordingly, the capture and analysis of imagery data by Persistent Surveillance Systems is attributable to the Baltimore Police Department for putposes of the Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 can reach a private union that acts jointly or conspires with a state actor to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Webb v. AFSCME Council 31, Local 654 · filed 2020-02-26

Nonetheless, although unions are not state actors, if a private actor, such as the Union, conspires or acts jointly with a state actor to deprive an individual’s constitutional rights, the private actor may be subject to § 1983 liability under Seventh Circuit precedent. ... Viewing the allegations in his pro se first amended complaint liberally, Webb has not set forth any allegations that the Union or the individual defendants acted jointly or conspired with a state actor to deprive him of his rights under the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for purely private conduct.

Trimble v. Rios · filed 2019-10-31

Judge Mizell concluded Trimble did not state a claim because he brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for purely private conduct. (Doc. 9 at 5-6). Again, the Court agrees and adopts that conclusion.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a claim against a private person who allegedly prevented mail from reaching the plaintiff’s son.

Gordon v. Draper · filed 2014-06-27

Paul Gordon appeals the district court’s1 pre-service dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Bonnie Draper, a private person who has allegedly prevented Gordon’s mail from being delivered to his son, who lives with Draper. Upon de novo review, see Moore v. Sims, 200 F.3d 1170, 1171 (8th Cir. 2000), we conclude the district court properly dismissed the complaint with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) because it failed to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted for the reasons stated in Magistrate Judge Bryant’s Report and Recommendation.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against the Bangor Humane Society based on its status as a private organization.

Nickerson-Malpher v. Baldacci · filed 2008-04-25

As a private organization, Plaintiff cannot sue the Bangor Humane Society under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege and prove state action to recover for a constitutional violation, and private conduct is actionable only when it is attributable to the State.

Lemberos v. Laurel Racecourse, Inc. · filed 1980-05-22

A plaintiff must allege and prove state action if he is to recover under the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Under both tests, this Court finds and concludes on the record here that the actions of the private defendants did not constitute state action.

Section 1983 requires a claim against private persons to allege facts connecting them to state action under color of state law.

Martin v. Aubuchon · filed 1980-06-19

Moreover, the complaint contains no factual allegations connecting the Aubuchons with state action so as to satisfy the “color of state law” requirement of section 1983.

Section 1983 applies to states and to private persons or organizations acting under color of state law.

Edwards v. Maryland State Fair · filed 1980-08-12

Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which applies sanctions only to states or to private persons or organizations acting under color of state law. Thus, the first issue to be decided in this litigation is whether the defendants in promulgating and enforcing the "booth rule" were acting under color of state law. In agreement with the district court, we think that they were.

Section 1983's state-action requirement covers campus police exercising governmental powers delegated by the state, does not treat private attorneys as state actors merely because the state licenses them, and provides qualified rather than absolute immunity for a prosecutor's knowing failure to stop removal of exculpatory material.

Henderson v. Fisher · filed 1980-08-20

Therefore, the delegation of police powers, a government function, to the campus police buttresses the conclusion that the campus police act under color of state authority. ... Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be predicated solely on the state’s licensing of attorneys. ... But although the facts here present a very close question, it is difficult to characterize a prosecutor’s knowing failure to stop the removal of exculpatory material as “presenting the State’s case.” Therefore, the prosecutorial act is protected from § 1983 liability by qualified, not absolute, immunity.

Section 1983 requires state action by the defendant; a privately retained attorney’s representation does not satisfy that requirement merely because the attorney also holds a state juvenile-officer position.

Dunn v. Hackworth · filed 1980-08-27

We cannot agree that Hackworth’s mere status as a state juvenile officer, without more, transformed his representation of Dunn into state action for purposes of § 1983. ... The actions of privately retained counsel are not considered state action and therefore cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not reach private conduct absent action under color of state law, and a state-law exemption that gives private defendants no greater freedom to discriminate does not satisfy that requirement.

Larsen v. Kirkham · filed 1980-09-26

Thus, since the Utah Act provided the defendants with no more relevant freedom to discriminate than they possessed under either the common law of Utah, or under Title VII, it can not be said that the Utah Act’s exemption constitutes “state action” for the purposes of a claim under § 1983. State action there was not.

Section 1983 does not reach ordinary negligence claims against private nursing homes absent conduct under color of state law; extensive state regulation and funding alone do not establish that status.

Woods v. Lake Drive Nursing Home, Inc. · filed 1980-12-10

The inquiry must focus upon the state involvement with the challenged action but the mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of a § 1983 action. ... The nursing home receives significant governmental funding and has submitted itself to extensive governmental regulation. However, under the precedents discussed above, that is not sufficient to connect the State of Maryland with the defendants’ action so as to make the latter’s conduct attributable to the State for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party when its conduct is sufficiently intertwined with a state institution's conduct to constitute wilful participation in joint action with an agent of the state.

Lyon v. Temple University of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education · filed 1981-01-15

The complaint also sufficiently alleges a concerted action between AAUP and Temple to assert a claim for relief against AAUP under § 1983. All counts of the complaint allege joint activity. The complaint alleges AAUP has caused Temple to discriminate against male faculty members and has assisted it in doing so (¶¶ 15, 16). More specifically, AAUP has allegedly agreed with Temple on the contractual provision which gives rise to this dispute (¶ 17). Plaintiffs also allege that AAUP, pursuant to its agreement and conspiracy with defendant Temple, refused to pursue the grievances filed (¶¶ 43, 53, 63). Therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to prove, if they can, that AAUP’s activity was sufficiently intertwined with Temple’s to constitute wilful participation in joint action in concert with an agent of the state to establish liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches a privately operated institution only when its challenged conduct is fairly attributable to the state; extensive public funding, regulation, and performance of a public service do not suffice if the institution remains free to control its own affairs.

Rendell-Baker v. Sandra Kohn, Wayne Klug v. New Perspectives School, Inc. · filed 1981-02-12

The school’s funding, regulation, and function all show a relationship of close cooperation with the state. But these factors, together as well as separately, do not demonstrate that the state has so dominated the school as to make all the school’s actions, and particularly those related to personnel, attributable to the state.

Section 1983 permits a claim of state action when private defendants' sufficiently specific conspiracy with a state judge is alleged.

Albert Brucar and Ruth Brucar v. Ira Rubin, Marvin Juron, and Harry Weisberg · filed 1981-02-23

We hold, therefore, that the Brucars’ allegations of conspiracy between Judge Kogut and the defendants are sufficiently specific to state a claim of state action under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right by defendants acting under color of state law; private hospitals and physicians are not liable for internal administrative actions absent sufficient state involvement.

Feldman v. Jackson Memorial Hospital · filed 1981-03-17

Both of these elements of a § 1983 action must be alleged and proven before relief can be forthcoming. ... The defendants’ alleged willful and malicious exclusion of the plaintiff from the medical staff simply does not constitute a violation of a federal right. ... Based upon the state action allegations contained in the Amended Complaint, the private hospital and physician defendants are not subject to suit under § 1983 for their actions against the plaintiff, actions involving the administrative affairs of the hospitals.

Section 1983 reaches private-party defendants when a state court judge’s participation supplies the required state action, but it cannot be asserted against federal defendants.

Crumpacker v. Civiletti · filed 1981-05-06

This allegation is sufficient to impart to the remaining private-party defendants the state action necessary for a section 1983 claim, ... with jurisdiction vested in this Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Section 1983, however, may not be asserted against the federal defendants.

Section 1983 requires state action; conduct by a private railroad does not qualify merely because the railroad is regulated or uses a courthouse.

Bloomer Shippers Association v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company · filed 1981-07-28

Illinois Central’s forcible entry and detainer actions against some of plaintiffs do not satisfy Section 1983, for the use of a courthouse is not state action.

Section 1983 covers a private racetrack’s exclusion of a driver when state racing officials are sufficiently connected to and participate in the exclusion.

Bier v. Fleming · filed 1981-09-25

Because of this intimate involvement by the State, the Court finds Alatis’ actions of excluding Bier from racing to be state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right under color of state law, and a private litigant or attorney is liable only when the conduct qualifies as state action, such as unlawful joint activity with state actors.

Ragosta v. State of Vt. · filed 1981-12-11

In order to prevail in a section 1983 action, the plaintiff must satisfy two requirements. ... Assuming for purposes of this motion that the plaintiff has satisfied the first element, the deprivation of a constitutional right, we hold that he cannot as a matter of law satisfy the second element because he has not alleged that Langrock and Morgan engaged in unlawful behavior which qualifies as state action for purposes of section 1983. ... although litigants invoke section 1983 most commonly in suits against state officials and employees, a private citizen may also be liable for a constitutional tort if he was a “willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.”

Section 1983 requires state action, meaning a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged conduct, and a private physician's execution of an involuntary-examination certificate did not satisfy that requirement here.

Watkins v. Roche · filed 1981-12-24

Because of the existence, in this action, of those factors discussed above, which dictated a finding of no state action, the Court must conclude that there is but a weak link between the conduct of the defendant Roche and that of the state, and state action is not present. For the reasons cited above, the defendant Roche’s motion to dismiss himself from this action is granted inasmuch as state action essential for the maintenance of a section 1983 action is not present.

Section 1983 requires state action for a constitutional-rights claim, and a private property owner’s request for police assistance to remove trespassers does not itself establish state action when the plaintiffs have no underlying First Amendment right of access.

Cape Cod Nursing Home Council v. Rambling Rose Rest Home · filed 1981-12-30

Here, defendants asked for police assistance in support of what they reasonably— and rightly — believed to be their legitimate property rights. Since the plaintiffs had no right to be on the property, the police action in removing them could not in itself create such a right where none existed before. Plaintiffs are attempting to create a first amendment right of access simply from the police involvement in arresting them. This bootstrap argument would turn any arrest in support of private rights into state action, thereby eviscerating the requirement.

Section 1983 requires state involvement equivalent to Fourteenth Amendment state action, and allegations showing a private housing company and county were joint participants suffice to proceed with a claim that the policy denied the right to live with immediate family members.

Halet v. Wend Investment Co. · filed 1982-03-26

To maintain an action under the fourteenth amendment or § 1983, Halet must show state involvement. The under-color-of-state-law requirement of § 1983 is equivalent to the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment. ... The facts regarding state action provided by Halet in his opposition to the motion to dismiss in the district court and in his brief in this court, if true, establish state action. The district court abused its discretion in dismissing without leave to amend, 5 see Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 1975), and a dismissal for lack of state action in light of these facts is erroneous.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private corporation for its security guards' actions absent state action.

Chesler v. Doe · filed 1982-03-09

Stauffers, as a private corporation, cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for actions of its security guards, there being no state action.

Section 1983 requires state action, and a private store's detention of a suspected shoplifter qualifies only if there is a customary or pre-existing arrangement with the police.

Hernandez v. Schwegmann Brothers Giant Supermarkets, Inc. · filed 1982-04-22

In order to establish the requisite state action, plaintiff had to prove a “customary” or “pre-existing” arrangement between defendant and the police for detaining suspected shoplifters.

Section 1983 requires state action, and funding, tax-exempt status, and state licensing of a private nonprofit hospital do not by themselves establish state action.

Cardio-Medical Associates, Ltd v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center · filed 1982-04-13

We have determined to stand with the vast majority of Courts of Appeals and hold that the receipt of Hill-Burton construction funding, Medicare and Medicaid funds, and the existence of tax exemption, as well as state licensing requirements for non-profit hospitals, do not constitute state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law, and private parties are liable only when their conduct qualifies as state action.

Vuksta v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. · filed 1982-06-10

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff need only allege that he has been deprived of a federal right by someone acting under the color of state law. ... Without any allegation of state action by plaintiff, suit under § 1983 will not lie. ... Purely private parties who conspire with state officials are acting under color of law and are amenable to a § 1983 suit. ... Likewise, performance of a public function, significant involvement of the state in private activity, or state enforcement of agreements affecting private parties may confer “state action” upon private parties. ... Hence, we grant defendant’s motion to dismiss all claims predicated upon § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of a right secured by federal law under color of state law, but private surety companies’ bonding decisions do not satisfy the state-action requirement merely because they are regulated and their bonds support public works.

American Structures, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland · filed 1982-08-19

The role of the surety companies is extremely limited with respect to the construction of public work projects and there is no sufficiently close nexus between the awarding of contracts by local governmental authorities to the lowest bidders and the decisions of surety companies to provide bonding to contractors wishing to submit bids on publicly authorized construction contracts. Surety companies provide a valuable service to local governmental authorities. However, a position of interdependence does not exist so as to confer state action on the decisions of surety companies whether or not to provide bonding to certain contractors. For these reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be granted.

Section 1983 requires conduct causing a constitutional deprivation to be fairly attributable to the state, including sufficient involvement or aid from state officials, before private conduct is actionable.

Rizzo v. Host Services of New York, Inc. · filed 1982-08-25

Section 1983 affords a remedy against every person who, “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” subjects any person to the deprivation of “any rights” secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. ... Therefore, plaintiffs in order to succeed, must establish that defendants’ actions in allegedly holding plaintiffs were the actions of the “state.” ... In order to show this plaintiffs must demonstrate not only that defendants exercised “some right or privilege created by the state” but also that they can fairly be said to be “state” actors because they “acted together with” or “obtained significant aid from state officials.” ... But the mere response of a police officer to a citizen’s call for assistance is not enough to transmogrify the citizen’s action into that of the state. To satisfy the state action requirement plaintiffs would, as a minimum, have to prove that the police were knowingly involved in a plan to deprive plaintiffs of their rights.

Section 1983 requires a sufficient state-action component to bring private parties within its reach.

Stegeman v. Detroit Mortg. and Realty Co. · filed 1982-09-02

It is clear from even a cursory inquiry into plaintiffs’ allegations that they can not reconstruct their present complaint to plead a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private party to show that the party acted under color of state law, which is satisfied when the state is sufficiently closely connected to the challenged conduct.

Milonas ex rel. Collard v. Williams · filed 1982-09-13

When a private party, as compared to a state employee, for example, is charged with abridging rights guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States, the plaintiff, in order to prevail under Section 1983, must show that the private party was acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 does not cover a private foreclosure dispute merely because the creditor used state-court procedures; further state involvement is required.

Henry P. Earnest, Jesse Earnest, Jr., Anita Earnest McCohn and Ida Earnest v. Lowentritt · filed 1982-11-08

Thus, it is not enough that the Lowentritts utilized state court procedures to satisfy a debt owed by Jesse Earnest. Nor can the State of Louisiana be said to have compelled the defendant to bring the foreclosure action. The fact that Louisiana permitted the foreclosure and subsequent sale of the Earnest land as the execution of a judgment obtained in the private adversary proceeding is not sufficient to raise the issue of state action. The Lowentritt foreclosure on the mortgage given to him by Jesse Earnest was a purely private dispute, immune from the coverage of § 1983 lacking a showing of further state involvement.

Section 1983 requires state action to support a claim against a private entity.

Spencer v. General Tel. Co. of Pennsylvania · filed 1982-11-17

The plaintiff has failed to show the requisite state action to support a claim under the equal protection or due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the right to privacy guaranteed to him by the first, fourth and fifth amendments as made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment, or a claim under the provisions of Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, therefore, summary judgment will be granted in favor of the defendant, General Telephone Company of Pennsylvania.

Section 1983 requires challenged conduct by a private actor to be under color of state law; city licensing and regulation alone do not satisfy that requirement.

Cox v. Cablevision · filed 1982-11-22

The mere fact that a private corporation is licensed and regulated by a city does not transform that corporation’s actions into state action for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federal right through conduct fairly attributable to the state, and permits liability for a private party only when it willfully participates in joint activity with state actors.

Chicarelli v. Plymouth Garden Apartments · filed 1982-11-24

To show a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs must show that they were deprived by conduct “fairly attributable to the state” of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. ... Deprivation of a property right does -not constitute a § 1983 violation, however, unless the deprivation violates a federal right and is fairly attributable to the state. ... In sum, the touchstone of § 1983 is some custom, usage, law or procedure of the state, not the action of a private party. ... Section 1983 liability will attach to a private party where he is a willful participant in joint activity with the state or its agents.

Section 1983 requires state action—a specific nexus between state influence and the challenged action—to support a claim against a private institution.

Weise v. Syracuse University · filed 1982-12-08

Clearly a specific nexus must be present between state influences in campus life, and the actions providing the basis for suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging a private party’s conduct to show that the conduct is fairly attributable to a state actor; government funding alone does not establish that connection.

Julio C. Lopez Gerena v. Puerto Rico Legal Services, Inc. · filed 1983-01-07

Plaintiff alleges that PRLS violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by discharging him without due process in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The fourteenth amendment applies only to acts of the states, not those of private parties. ... Thus, as was similarly required for the fifth amendment claim, plaintiff must show that PRLS’s termination of him is fairly attributable to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. ... Plaintiff has presented no evidence that can lead to a ruling that PRLS is-a state actor. The only connection between PRLS and the Commonwealth is that the latter provides PRLS with some funding. As we stated above, the receipt of government funds alone is not enough to show either a nexus between PRLS and the Commonwealth, or that there is a “symbiotic relationship” between the two. Rendering legal services to the needy in civil matters is no more a traditionally exclusive public function of the Commonwealth than it is of the federal government.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of a federal right; conduct by a private entity qualifies only when the State is significantly involved in the specific challenged activity.

Chico Feminist Women's Health Center v. Butte Glenn Medical Society · filed 1983-02-23

Thus, in order to maintain an action under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) that defendant was acting ‘under color of state law’ at the time of .the acts complained of, and (2) that defendant deprived plaintiff of [a] right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or Laws of the United States.” ... Its acts will be deemed under color of state law only if the state is significantly involved with the specific hospital activity that is the subject of plaintiffs’ complaint.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private creditors or a private attorney when the challenged conduct is not action under color of state law.

Hale v. First National Bank · filed 1983-04-08

Similarly, the Plaintiff has not satisfied this first element [state action] with respect to his claim against the Bank’s attorney who, coincidentally, was the Prosecuting Attorney at the Plaintiff’s prior criminal trial in the Circuit Court of McDowell County, West Virginia, inasmuch as the Plaintiff is merely complaining of actions taken by that Defendant in his capacity as a private attorney for the Bank, as opposed to in his capacity as the Prosecuting Attorney of McDowell County, West Virginia. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes “beyond doubt” that the Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Section 1983 under any arguable construction of the complaint.

Section 1983 permits liability for private conduct taken under color of state law when the State is significantly involved; repeated police aid in a private eviction qualifies.

Robert Allen Howerton, and Roxanna Howerton v. Jess Gabica and Marjorie Gabica · filed 1983-05-10

Action taken by private individuals may be “under color of state law” where there is “significant” state involvement in the action. ... In order to determine whether the Gabicas acted under color of state law, the circumstances surrounding the private eviction must be examined in their totality. ... But the Gabicas repeatedly requested aid by the police to effect the eviction, and the police intervened at every step. We must conclude they have proceeded under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff relying on a conspiracy between private defendants and state officials to plead specific facts showing state action and agreement or concerted action.

Sooner Products Company v. Mcbride · filed 1983-05-16

When a plaintiff in a Sec. 1983 action attempts to assert the necessary "state action" by implicating state officials or judges in a conspiracy with private defendants, mere conclusory allegations with no supporting factual averments are insufficient; the pleadings must specifically present facts tending to show agreement and concerted action. Clulow v. Oklahoma, 700 F.2d 1291, 1303 (10th Cir.1983). The standard is even stricter where the state officials allegedly involved in the conspiracy are immune from suit, as are the state court judges here. Shaffer v. Cook, 634 F.2d 1259, 1260 (10th Cir.1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 2316, 68 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981); Norton v. Liddel, 620 F.2d 1375, 1380 (10th Cir.1980).

Section 1983 does not support pendent-party jurisdiction over private parties for conduct that was not taken under color of state law.

Grodjeski v. Township of Plainsboro · filed 1983-06-16

Congress has limited the scope of § 1983 to actions taken under color of state law. Thus, it would appear that Congress did not intend that parties not acting under color of state law be sued in federal court for their private actions.

Section 1983 requires injury resulting from state action, and a private attorney’s court appointment alone does not supply state action.

McCoy v. Judge Marcus D. Gordon · filed 1983-07-22

The only allegation about them that would support the state action requirement of Section 1983 is McCoy’s statement that the two “acutely and preju-dicially discriminated” against him by working “in collusion” with the other defendants. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be invoked only if the plaintiff was injured as a result of state action. The fact that Phillips was court-appointed does not supply state action.

A private defendant may act under color of state law and be liable under Section 1983 by jointly participating with state officials.

Melson v. Kroger Co. · filed 1983-11-04

With regard to the first argument, it is settled that Defendants who are not state officials may nevertheless- be liable under § 1983 if they “jointly participated” in the actions of state officials.

Receipt or use of state funds by a private economic-development corporation does not establish state action under Section 1983 without a sufficient nexus to the challenged conduct.

Biekarck v. Warren-Forest Counties Economic Opportunity Council, Inc. · filed 1983-11-23

We do not find any infusion of state funds into the project sufficient to satisfy the state action requirement of Section 1983.

A private party’s mere use of the courts, without more, is not governmental action under § 1983.

Winterland Concessions Company v. Edwin S. Trela, Jr. · filed 1984-05-17

Mere use of the courts by a private party, without more, does not constitute governmental action for purposes of § 1983 or ... Bivens.

A private party that merely contracts with a state actor, without proof it acted in concert or conspired with that state actor to violate constitutional rights, is not acting under color of state law and cannot be held liable under Section 1983.

Annunziato v. The Gan, Inc. · filed 1984-06-26

Thus, The Gan may not be held liable vicariously for any constitutional deprivation caused by the City, merely because it innocently executed a contract to purchase city property. Such action, standing alone, does not constitute any breach of duty of constitutional magnitude so as to subject The Gan to liability under § 1983.