42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private homeless shelter for alleged constitutional or civil rights violations.

Syville v. City of New York · filed 2020-05-28

The Blake Avenue Shelter is operated by a non-profit organization, SUS, and is therefore considered a private actor not subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for plaintiff’s alleged constitutional or civil rights violations.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private hospital employee acted under color of state law before the employee can be held liable.

CASTILLO v. THE CITY OF ALLENTOWN · filed 2020-05-28

As before, Castillo once again does not allege sufficient facts to support an inference that these Defendants — who are private employees of a local hospital — are state actors subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires plausible allegations that the defendant acted under color of law; alleged fraud by private parties in state court does not establish state action.

Perlmutter v. Varone · filed 2020-06-01

Although the Court cannot discern how Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights have conceivably been violated, it need not reach this question because the Amended Complaint also fails to make plausible that Defendants engaged in state action.

Section 1983 does not permit a constitutional claim against a newspaper that is not a state actor.

Miller v. Workman · filed 2020-06-03

Even if Plaintiff’s allegations supported such, he cannot bring a constitutional claim against the Mayfield Messenger because a newspaper is not a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor or to act under color of state law.

Jackson v. Citi Trends, Inc. · filed 2020-06-05

Viewing plaintiffs’ complaint in the light most favorable to them, Cititrends, a private retail establishment, is not a state actor and was not acting under the color of state law. Accordingly, any claim brought by plaintiffs against Cititrends pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including their Fourth Amendment claim, must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act on behalf of the state; a private journalist with no connection to the government is not subject to suit under it.

Bledsoe v. Schlachtenhaufen · filed 2020-06-05

Because Defendant is not a state actor, Plaintiff cannot maintain a suit against him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat attorneys representing a criminal defendant as state actors merely because they provide that representation.

Campusano-Tejeda v. Savitz · filed 2020-06-08

As attorneys who represented Plaintiff in his criminal case, Shah and Holey are not state actors for purposes of § 1983.

A Section 1983 claim requires the defendant to be a state actor.

CONKLIN v. BUTLER COUNTY PRISON ADMINISTRATION · filed 2020-06-16

First, the Court agrees with and adopts the R&R’s conclusion that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Rabbi Vogel is a state actor for the purposes of Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and First Amendment claims.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a private person who merely files a police complaint is not a proper defendant.

Alvarez v. Yakima Police Department · filed 2020-06-18

Based on the plain facts of Plaintiff’s Complaint, Ms. Meraz is not a state actor and is therefore not a proper defendant.

Section 1983 does not make a private citizen liable merely for furnishing information to law enforcement.

Jackson v. Beswick · filed 2020-06-18

Furnishing information to law enforcement does not, then, render a private citizen liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 applies only to violations of federal law by state actors.

Lyndon v. United States of America · filed 2020-06-19

That is, § 1983 applies only to violation of federal law by a state actor.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an advisory lawyer who was not acting as a state actor.

Bey v. Boedecker · filed 2020-06-22

First, “Advisory Lawyer” Brian Schaf is not subject to § 1983 liability because he was not acting as a state actor during the events recited in the amended complaint.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

SHORTER v. PRINCETON RESOURCE ASSOCIATES, INC. · filed 2020-06-22

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim fails because Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to establish that Defendants were operating under the color of state law for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires conduct attributable to the state; state licensure alone does not make a private party a state actor.

Banks v. Gates Hudson & Associates, Inc. · filed 2020-06-23

Accordingly, the state’s licensure of the Gates Hudson Defendants does not convert the Gates Hudson Defendants into state actors for purposes of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; private process servers pursuing private interests are not state actors merely because they submit an affidavit of service.

Berry v. Severit · filed 2020-06-23

Severit and ProVest were not acting “under color of” state law when they made misrepresentations in the Affidavit of Service.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private actors to allege facts showing their conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Whitfield v. University Hospitals St. John Medical Center · filed 2020-06-23

The plaintiff's complaint fails to allege facts meeting any of these three tests. Accordingly, her complaint fails to allege a plausible federal claim against the defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private party does not become liable merely by invoking state procedures.

STRADER v. US BANK · filed 2020-06-24

Such a claim is not viable against a private individual or entity, even if the private party invoked state procedures.

Section 1983 generally does not permit claims against private parties because a defendant must act under color of state law.

Carroll v. Toele · filed 2020-06-25

Private parties generally cannot ... be held liable under Section 1983.

Court appointment and court approval of a private guardian’s decisions do not, by themselves, make the guardian a state actor under § 1983.

SHERMOT v. BUCCI · filed 2020-06-30

However, the fact that the ARC Guardians were appointed by the state court to serve as Shermot’s guardian and appear to have resorted to the state court for approval of certain decisions, presumably pursuant to state statues, see 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5501 et seq., does not equate to a conclusion that the ARC Guardians are state actors.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against members of a defense team who are not state actors.

Corley v. Wittner · filed 2020-07-01

The federal civil rights claims against the members of Corley's defense team failed because they were not state actors.

Section 1983 requires state action to hold private defendants liable.

Smith v. Woods · filed 2020-07-02

To the extent Plaintiff brings a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,185 Plaintiff has not shown state action as required under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private defense attorney whose conduct is not state action.

Choice v. Osborne · filed 2020-07-07

The conduct of private actors, such as John C. Osborne, defense attorney, does not constitute state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private attorneys for their work as counsel to show that their conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Vaughn v. Markey · filed 2020-07-07

Since Vaughn sued Appellees for actions taken in their roles as private attorneys, he must point to some action that is “fairly attributable” to the state. See Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir. 1999). Vaughn has not done so.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor for a constitutional claim to proceed.

Bryant v. Van Slambrook · filed 2020-07-09

After review, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s thorough analysis and finds that Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment claim is subject to dismissal because the protections offered by the Sixth Amendment extend to criminal actions and do not apply to Plaintiff's foreclosure action; that Plaintiff's Ninth Amendment claim is subject to dismissal because the Ninth Amendment has not been interpreted as securing constitutional rights for purposes of making a constitutional claim; that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Slambrook are subject to dismissal on the basis of judicial immunity; that Plaintiff's constitutional claims against Defendants Home Investment III, L.P.; Thomas A. Shook; Susan S. White; and Elizabeth Shuffler Moore are subject to dismissal because these Defendants are not state actors for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; that Plaintiff's assertion that he is exempt from the foreclosure laws because he is a Moor is without merit; that any “split-the-note” argument is unavailing; that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes this Court from hearing an appeal of Plaintiff's state court foreclosure action; and that the Younger abstention doctrine also bars this Court from interfering with any pending state court proceedings to the extent they are ongoing.

Section 1983 does not make a legal aid organization a state actor merely because a court appointed it to represent a criminal defendant.

O'Kane v. New York State Department of Correctional Service · filed 2020-07-10

But the Legal Aid Society is a private entity that does not work for any state or other government body; its court-appointment does not convert its conduct into state action. As it is not a state actor, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against the Legal Aid Society under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a state actor, and a private attorney may qualify by conspiring with a state official if the plaintiff sufficiently alleges that conspiracy.

Fleming v. Warren · filed 2020-07-13

While a private party may qualify as a state actor if he or she conspires with a state official, see id., the Plaintiffs did not raise sufficient allegations to state a § 1983 claim under this theory. Thus, the District Court did not err in dismissing the Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.

A private university does not act under color of state law for § 1983 merely because it receives government funds conditioned on compliance with anti-discrimination laws.

Heineke v. Santa Clara University · filed 2020-07-20

In sum, we conclude that receipt of federal and state funds conditioned on compliance with anti-discrimination laws is insufficient to convert private conduct into state action.

Section 1983 requires facts sufficient to show that a defendant was a state actor.

James Briscoe, III v. Madrid · filed 2020-07-20

The district court properly dismissed Briscoe’s § 1983 claims against Madrid because Briscoe failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Madrid was a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a defendant is a state actor.

Hussell v. Boggs · filed 2020-07-22

Nothing in this objection shows that Butch and Betsy Hill are state actors suable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against public defenders and defense attorneys because they are not state actors.

Briggs, Dean v. Oliveria, Marcel · filed 2020-07-28

Plaintiff cannot bring a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant because public defenders and defense attorneys are not “state actors” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private defendant may be liable when facts show a mutual understanding or conspiracy with law enforcement.

Downs v. Red Brick Management, LLC · filed 2020-07-28

Specifically, the Defendants are not state actors and Plaintiff did not allege any facts sufficient to hold them liable under § 1983, or to establish a mutual understanding or conspiracy between the Defendants and law enforcement officials.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law; state regulation and public funding alone do not establish state action.

ROE v. THE ARC MERCER · filed 2020-07-29

Plaintiff, accordingly, fails to plead that Defendant is a state actor for the purposes of Plaintiff's § 1983 claim, and the Court must dismiss this claim.

Section 1983 requires governmental action for a constitutional claim.

Santiago v. 1199 SEIU and Triboro Center · filed 2020-07-29

A plaintiff pressing claims for violations of constitutional rights under § 1983 or Bivens is therefore required to show governmental action.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a private defendant to allege facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Williams v. Detroit, City of · filed 2020-07-30

In sum, because Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to show that Olympia acted under the color of state law, the constitutional claims against it must be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits suit only when the defendant’s conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Baytops v. Slominski · filed 2020-08-05

These Defendants are not state actors and thus they are not subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private emergency medical providers whose treatment is not attributable to the state.

Wyatt, as Administratrix of the Estate of India T. Cummings v. County of Erie · filed 2020-08-05

Here, the UEMS defendants do not qualify as state actors under any of these three tests.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private school or its chief executive officer when neither is a public actor.

Jones v. St. Augustine High School, Inc. · filed 2020-08-06

Neither St. Augustine nor Charles is a public actor.

A § 1983 claim against a doctor requires an allegation that the doctor was a state actor.

Johnson v. Daugherty · filed 2020-08-10

Plaintiff’s allegation that Dr. Young’s office waited 29 days to schedule surgery does not state a deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Young because Plaintiff does not allege that Dr. Young was a state actor.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor or to have a sufficiently close relationship with state actors for the conduct to count as governmental action.

Davis v. Lonardo · filed 2020-08-10

The Plaintiff has made no allegation that the named Defendants have a sufficiently close relationship with state actors such that the Court could conclude that they are engaged in governmental action.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private employer’s receipt of municipal bonds and tax incentives does not establish state action.

Jaiyeola v. Garmin International, Inc. · filed 2020-08-12

In his complaint, or otherwise, Plaintiff fails to show that Defendant is acting under the color of state law, and his Section 1983 claim fails as a matter of law.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant qualifies as a state actor before the defendant can be held liable.

Tasfay v. Ramos · filed 2020-08-12

On these facts, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Acacia violated the FHA, or violated their constitutional rights, or that Acacia qualifies as a state actor that could be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not allow a claim against a private attorney, even if court-appointed, without facts showing that the attorney acted under color of state law.

Herbert v. Ginty · filed 2020-08-14

LaBuda is not considered a state actor, even if he is court-appointed. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against LaBuda under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private attorney is generally not a state actor, even if court-appointed.

Correa v. Ginty · filed 2020-08-14

LaBuda is not considered a state actor, even if he is court-appointed. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against LaBuda under § 1983.

A private attorney is not a state actor under § 1983 merely because the attorney is court-appointed.

Vogel v. Ginty · filed 2020-08-14

LaBuda is not considered a state actor, even if he is court-appointed. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against LaBuda under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private doctor or hospital as a state actor merely because the doctor reports suspected child abuse and the state relies on the medical findings.

Hayes v. Narang · filed 2020-08-18

Fundamentally, the nexus between Dr. Narang’s medical diagnosis and Lewis’ investigation is insufficient to support a finding of state action.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on private criminal defense attorneys or legal services organizations unless they act in concert with the state.

Singleton v. The People of the State of New York · filed 2020-08-20

Private parties are therefore not generally liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a union that did not act jointly with the state in deducting union dues.

Polk v. Yee · filed 2020-08-24

Accordingly, SEIU is not a state actor under § 1983, and all three of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against it, claims one, two and three, must be DISMISSED.

Section 1983 does not treat a private hospital or its employees as state actors solely because state law authorizes a short-term involuntary hold.

Carroll v. Schrader · filed 2020-08-25

Nothing in the objections shows that the magistrate judge erred by finding that the allegations fail to show state action by the Medical Defendants. It is well established that Colorado’s grant of authority for a short-term involuntary hold in a private hospital is insufficient to establish that the hospital or its employees are state actors.

Section 1983 requires state action; private parties do not meet that requirement merely by appearing and winning in court or acting on their own initiative.

Thomas v. Martin-Gibbons · filed 2020-08-25

Neither theory is sufficient to show state action on their part, and, accordingly, all claims brought under § 1983 are dismissed against these defendants.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity to allege facts showing that its challenged actions are attributable to the state.

Jones v. Banks · filed 2020-08-26

But the complaint fails to show that these defendants qualify as state actors who may be held liable under § 1983.

A private insurer is liable under § 1983 only if its challenged conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Peterec-Tolino v. Ace American Insurance Co. · filed 2020-08-28

Plaintiff makes no plausible allegation that Ace American Insurance Company’s actions, in providing insurance payments to Plaintiff for a work-related injury and seeking recovery for such payments, are attributable to the state. Thus, this defendant also cannot be liable under § 1983 for violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires facts supporting liability, including a basis for treating a private bank as a state actor.

Logan v. The Bank of New York Mellon Corp · filed 2020-08-31

The Bank of New York Mellon is not a state or federal official. Drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff, these facts do not support a § 1983 claim or a Bivens claim and it is patently obvious Plaintiff could not prevail based on the facts alleged.

Section 1983 permits claims against private individuals only when their conduct is fairly attributable to the state; incarceration alone does not make an inmate a state actor.

Buckley v. Montgomery · filed 2020-09-04

Only those defendants whose actions are “fairly attributable to the State” may be sued under § 1983. ... Montgomery and Roberts are not state actors merely because they are incarcerated, and Buckley does not allege how their actions can otherwise be attributed to the state.

Section 1983 requires allegations that the defendant was a state actor.

Lloyd v. Pokorny · filed 2020-09-08

Next, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because this statute requires the defendant to be a “state actor.”

Section 1983 requires state action; a private union does not become a state actor merely because the state processes dues deductions under voluntary agreements.

Belgau v. Inslee · filed 2020-09-16

Their claim against the union fails under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for lack of state action, a threshold requirement.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against private family members or lawyers who are not state actors.

Heffley v. Steele · filed 2020-09-17

Neither Heffley’s wife, her parents, or the various lawyers named as defendants, were state actors amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private company is not liable unless its conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Belcher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc · filed 2020-09-18

Mr. Belcher has not pled the essential elements of a Section 1983 claim because Walmart is not a state actor.

Section 1983 claims against private actors require a state nexus.

Khalid v. Microsoft Corporation · filed 2020-09-21

Plaintiff repeats many of the arguments raised in his earlier motion for reconsideration, including: (1) Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution affords him special rights as an inventor; (2) inventors comprise a protected class for purposes of claims under Section 1985; (3) a Section 1983 claim against private actors does not require a state nexus; and (4) Microsoft’s alleged patent-grabbing scheme amounts to forced labor or attempted forced labor. Dkt. #39 at 7-16. The Court considered and rejected these same arguments in its November 21, 2019 order denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. See Dkt. #28 at 4-8. It need not reexamine these arguments and incorporates by reference the analysis set forth in its previous order as to these claims.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that private hospital or nursing-home staff acted as state actors before they can be held liable.

Gibson v. Unknown Male patients & Social Workers, Doctors, Administrators, Nurses etc of Lawrence Nursing · filed 2020-09-21

Plaintiff has alleged no facts showing that Mt. Sinai or Lawrence staff members acted as state actors. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims under § 1983 against Mt. Sinai and Lawrence staff members for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation caused by a state actor; a claim against defendants who are not state actors fails.

Cornell v. Fox News Network · filed 2020-09-22

Defendants are not state actors, and a Section 1983 claim without state actors fails as a matter of law.

A § 1983 claim against a private union requires state action; alleged forgery of a dues authorization does not make the union’s conduct attributable to the state.

Wright v. Service Employees International Union Local 503 · filed 2020-09-28

For there to be state action under §1983, both prongs must be satisfied.

Section 1983 does not make a union liable for dues deductions under a private membership agreement when the state’s role does not make the union a state actor.

Cash Schiewe v. Service Employees International Union Local 503 · filed 2020-09-28

Because private dues agreements do not trigger state action and independent constitutional scrutiny, this Court dismisses Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against SEIU 503.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law; a private citizen who is not a state actor cannot be sued under it.

Ram v. Lay · filed 2020-09-29

Scott Lay is not subject to suit under § 1983. ... Lay is not a state actor.

Section 1983 requires plausible allegations that the defendant acted under color of state law; a private rehabilitation center is not liable without state action.

Wyatt v. Woods on French Creek · filed 2020-09-29

The plaintiff’s complaint does not allege, or contain allegations plausibly suggesting, that the defendant engaged in state action for purposes of a claim under § 1983 regarding his medical care.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a private citizen who is not a state actor.

Johnson v. Depriest · filed 2020-09-30

She is a private citizen, not a state actor.

Section 1983 generally does not permit claims against private parties unless circumstances make them state actors.

Jones v. Jarnigan · filed 2020-10-01

Next, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim against the Citizen Tribune, as absent extenuating circumstances, private parties are not “state actors” subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant was a state actor.

Henderson v. Town of Greenwood · filed 2020-10-08

In this case, Plaintiffs have failed to allege or state any facts to show that FDSI was a state actor. Hence, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief pursuant to § 1983, and this claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.

Section 1983’s state action requirement is not satisfied when a public employer merely deducts union dues under a private agreement.

Labarrere v. University Professional and Technical Employees (UPTE) · filed 2020-10-09

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims fail to satisfy the first prong requiring the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that a defendant acted under color of state law; private conduct ordinarily does not qualify.

Scott v. Thompson · filed 2020-10-13

Section 1983 actions can be asserted only against state actors, or, in very particular circumstances, against private actors acting under color of law. ... Plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly showing that the private person and entity he has named in his Complaint were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation of state action to support an equal protection claim against a private union or its officials.

Malcolm v. Association of Supervisors and Administrators of Rochester · filed 2020-10-14

Ms. Malcolm does not plausibly allege that ASAR or its officials are “state actors” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the New York Constitution, see Malcolm v. Honeoye Falls-Lima Educ. Ass’n, 678 F. Supp. 2d 100, 107 (W.D.N.Y. 2010), nor does she allege any theory of “entwinement” that might render them liable, see Grogan, 768 F.3d at 268–69.

Private parties who do not qualify as state actors cannot be sued under § 1983.

Peterec-Tolino v. Ace American Insurance Co. · filed 2020-10-16

Finally, Plaintiff’s proposed TAC does not provide any basis for reconsidering the Court’s determination in the order of dismissal that the WCB enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity and the remaining defendants are private parties not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private university’s investigation is not attributable to the state without evidence connecting it to the state.

Ma v. Densmore · filed 2020-10-19

As was the case in his previous motion for a TRO, Mr. Ma has failed to identify a state actor. ... Mr. Ma has not shown why a private investigation conducted by a private university may be fairly attributed to the state.

Section 1983 requires state involvement; representing a defendant as private counsel in state criminal proceedings does not, by itself, satisfy that requirement.

Debellis v. Andrew Nash and James Flynn · filed 2020-10-20

The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against a different criminal defense attorney because the representation of a defendant by private counsel in state criminal proceedings does not constitute the degree of state involvement or interference necessary to establish a claim under § 1983. See Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981)). Plaintiff’s claims against Sanchez are dismissed for the same reasons.

Section 1983 does not treat a bank and its employee as state actors merely because they report conduct to police and participate in the investigation.

SAUNDERS v. BB&T BANK · filed 2020-10-20

Accordingly, Adams and BB&T’s reporting of Saunders’s conduct and participation in the related police investigation does not render them state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a lawyer performing the traditional role of criminal defense counsel is not a state actor.

Nikoloff v. Ziliak · filed 2020-10-23

But § 1983 reaches only those “who deprive[] an individual of federally guaranteed rights ‘under color’ of state law,” Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012) (quoting § 1983), and a lawyer is not a state actor when he—like Ziliak here—performs his traditional role as counsel to a defendant in a criminal case.

Section 1983 reaches a private contractor’s decision when the government significantly encourages it so that the decision is attributable to the state.

Hayes v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 2020-10-27

IXP, a private contractor for the MBTA, was Hayes’ direct employer and argues that therefore it cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which reaches only state action. ... Accordingly, the Court rules that IXP was a state actor with respect to its firing of Hayes.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against private parties whose conduct is not attributable to the state.

Baytops v. Morrison · filed 2020-10-28

First, Plaintiff's claims against defendants Morrison, Riddle, Thompson, the Alpena County local news, and its sponsors must be dismissed because they are private individuals and entities, not state actors subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; harm arising from a private union membership agreement does not satisfy that requirement.

Wolf v. Shaw · filed 2020-10-29

In short, Wolf cannot show state action, a threshold requirement under Section 1983.

Alleging that a humane society employs a Pennsylvania humane investigation officer sufficiently pleads state action under § 1983.

SMITH v. WASHINGTON AREA HUMANE SOCIETY · filed 2020-10-29

Plaintiffs have pled that WAHS is a nonprofit organization that employs a humane investigation officer pursuant to 22 Pa. C.S.A. § 3701. This is sufficient to maintain a claim against WAHS as a state actor under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendants were state actors.

Peden v. Democratic National Committee · filed 2020-10-30

Here, as Defendants correctly argue, Peden fails to allege the Defendants are state actors.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private defendant must be a state actor or have a sufficiently close relationship with state actors for its conduct to qualify.

Allen v. Deel · filed 2020-11-02

Even accepting as true Allen’s allegations in the Complaint, he has not alleged state action, and thus the court cannot afford relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor.

Carroll v. McAllister · filed 2020-11-02

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against fellow patient Jesse N. must be dismissed because Jesse N. is not alleged to be a state actor.

A union does not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes when the alleged harm stems from its unauthorized dues agreement with an employee rather than a state statute or policy.

Zielinski v. Service Employees International Union Local 503 · filed 2020-11-02

Thus, as in Belgau, the source of the alleged constitutional harm is not a State statute or policy but the particular private agreement between the union and Plaintiff. ... Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims therefore fail the first prong of the state action test.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege facts showing that a defendant was a state actor.

Hettinga v. Garcia · filed 2020-11-03

The district court properly dismissed Hettinga’s claim against defendant Theresa Loumena because Hettinga failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Loumena was a state actor.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against federal defendants who are not state actors.

Perkins v. Commissioner of the United States Food and Drug Administration · filed 2020-11-06

As noted, defendants are federal, not state actors. As such, they are not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a criminal defense attorney for performing the traditional work of defense counsel because the attorney is not a state actor.

GONZALEZ v. REICHLEY · filed 2020-11-09

Gonzalez’s claims against his former criminal defense attorney are based on his performance as Gonzalez’s defense counsel, but the law is settled that criminal defense attorneys are not state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires allegations that the defendant acted under color of state law; insufficient allegations that crisis team members were state actors do not state an actionable claim.

PLOURDE v. NORTHERN LIGHT ACADIA HOSPITAL · filed 2020-11-12

However, the Magistrate Judge has not recommended dismissal based on Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992) but rather due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction—specifically, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Mr. Plourde has not sufficiently alleged that members of the “Maine State Crisis Team” are state actors and therefore he has not asserted an actionable § 1983 claim within the Court’s federal question jurisdiction. ... Mr. Plourde’s proposed amended complaint has not alleged anything new to change the Court’s conclusion, and thus the Court concludes this motion to amend the complaint is futile.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private defendants to show that they acted as state actors.

Hunt v. Walmart Store Inc. · filed 2020-11-12

First, as described above, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the Walmart Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Hunt’s federal claims because Hunt failed to show they were state actors. ... Accordingly, the Court will adopt the R&R with respect to Hunt’s federal claims against the Walmart Defendants.

Section 1983 claims against private defendants require allegations of government conduct.

Young v. Lake Royale Property Owners Association · filed 2020-11-12

Here, the magistrate judge recommends dismissal of plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, construed as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against private entities and individuals named as defendants for failure to allege government conduct and against defendant Franklin County Department of Social Services as facially implausible. ... Therefore, the court hereby ADOPTS the recommendation of the magistrate judge as its own.

Section 1983 requires state action; federal funding alone does not make a private organization a state actor.

Jeffrey A. Sexton, Limited Guardian of A.M. v. Virginia Council of Churches, Inc. · filed 2020-11-13

The fact that CWS and VCC receive funds from the federal government does not transform either private entity into a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a Legal Aid attorney acting as private counsel is not a state actor.

Kirkland v. New York State Division of Parole · filed 2020-11-13

Because Defendant Focarile is a private party who does not qualify as a state actor, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Defendant Focarile under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; private parties are generally not liable without state action.

Mortimer v. Grodsky · filed 2020-11-13

The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims under § 1983 against those private defendants for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private person whose alleged conduct does not make that person a state actor.

WHITAKER-JONES v. TULL · filed 2020-11-13

This is insufficient to make him liable as a state actor under § 1983.

A private party is subject to suit under § 1983 only when it qualifies as a state actor.

Y. Driessen v. University of Miami School of Law Children & Youth Law Clinic · filed 2020-11-16

Driessen therefore failed to show the University was subject to suit under § 1983, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing her claims against the University as frivolous.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff bringing a constitutional claim to name a state actor as a defendant.

Miles v. Proctor and Gamble Manufacturing Company · filed 2020-11-18

Specifically, this Court found that Plaintiff relied upon unknown statutes to support his claims and that he attempted to raise constitutional claims but did not name state or federal actors as defendants as required for claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). ... Even though Plaintiff proceeds pro se, and his Amended Complaint is liberally construed, it is deficient for the reasons discussed in this Court’s analysis when it dismissed the original complaint.

Section 1983 permits claims against private actors who conspire or act in concert with state actors, but the complaint must allege facts supporting that connection.

Rivas v. Cook · filed 2020-11-19

However, non-state actors may be liable under Section 1983 when they have conspired or acted in concert with state actors to deprive a person of his civil rights. ... Plaintiff’s bare allegations fail to provide sufficient facts to establish a claim that Jim Cook was a member of any alleged conspiracy or that he acted in concert with the state actors.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private physician without facts showing a close connection between her challenged conduct and state action.

Chisolm-Mitchell v. Advantage Care Physician · filed 2020-11-19

Private actors are not proper parties to §1983 suits when they do not act under the color of state law. ... Here, the Amended Complaint contains no facts suggesting such a nexus between Defendant Ahmed and the NYPD or New York City.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on private actors because it provides relief for deprivations of constitutional rights by state actors.

Brockington v. Kimbrell's Furniture of Florence · filed 2020-11-19

“Ordinarily, private actors are not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because the statute only provides relief for deprivations of constitutional rights by state actors.”

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; an unsupported allegation of conspiracy with government entities does not establish state action by a private law firm.

Nieves v. Andrew F. Plasse & Associates, LLC · filed 2020-11-20

Because Defendant Andrew F. Plasse & Associates, LLC, is a private party not acting under color of state law, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Defendant under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that a state actor violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Ortega v. Samaritan Village Myrtle Ave. Men's Shelter · filed 2020-11-23

As to plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim, he has not alleged that any state actor violated his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires state action; private mental health providers do not become state actors merely by advising police who make the confinement decision.

Coppola v. The Town of Plattekill · filed 2020-11-24

But that decision was ultimately law enforcement’s, not Access’, to make. ... Because the statute empowers only law enforcement to act, the Court rejects Plaintiff's contention that there was the requisite “joint activity” here. The Access Defendants’ expression of an opinion is therefore not “fairly attributable to the state.” ... Because the Court finds the Access Defendants are not state actors, it grants them summary judgment and denies Plaintiff's cross-motion on this issue.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a private healthcare provider does not become one merely by following state guidelines without state coercion or influence.

Ajjahnon v. St Josephs University Medical · filed 2020-11-27

However, a § 1983 claim may only be brought against “a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.”

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a privately employed defendant acted under color of state law; working at a public school under a contract does not alone establish state action.

DS v. Rochester City School District · filed 2020-11-30

Defendant Tarragrossa is a private party, employed by the Center for Youth and not by the RCSD, as acknowledged in Plaintiffs’ complaint. ... As such, she is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 provides relief for deprivations of constitutional rights by state actors, not for private conduct.

Brockington v. Lowe's Home Improvement · filed 2020-11-30

Although Plaintiff alleges deprivations of her constitutional rights and invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see ECF No. 11 at p. 7, her amended complaint does not present a federal question because § 1983 “only provides relief for deprivations of constitutional rights by state actors.”

Section 1983 requires facts supporting an inference that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Prince v. Trinity Hospital · filed 2020-12-02

Plaintiff has not provided a factual basis which would allow the Court to infer Dr. Fierce was a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation that a private newspaper or its employees acted under color of state law.

SIMMONS v. FANO · filed 2020-12-02

Here, the Defendants are a private newspaper and two of its employees. There is no plausible suggestion in the Complaint that they are state actors. Accordingly, any § 1983 claims against them fail.

Section 1983 requires plausible allegations of state action; a private attorney’s claimed past employment with a judge does not establish a conspiracy with state actors.

MYNATT v. WALL · filed 2020-12-04

Without plausibly alleging state action on his § 1983 claims, Mr. Mynatt's complaint must still be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private entity’s conduct must be attributable to a particular state.

MATRIX DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BOARDS OF PHARMACY · filed 2020-12-04

First, both fail because § 1983 claims require state action. Sprauve v. W. Indian Co., 799 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 2015). For the reasons stated above, NABP and OptumRx are not state actors.

Section 1983 applies to alleged violations by state actors, not federal actors.

McKee v. Social Security Administration · filed 2020-12-07

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims fail because that section is intended for alleged violations by state actors, not federal actors.

Public defenders and private attorneys do not act under color of state law when representing a defendant and therefore are not liable under § 1983.

STEELE v. CASEY · filed 2020-12-08

Moreover, neither public defenders nor private attorneys are state actors liable under § 1983 because they are not persons acting under the color of law.

Section 1983 does not make a private guardian a state actor merely because a state court appointed it.

SHERMOT v. BUCCI · filed 2020-12-08

Shermot also has not plausibly alleged that ARC is a state actor subject to liability under § 1983. ... As explained in the Court’s June 30, 2020 Memorandum with respect to ARC employees, the fact that the ARC was appointed by the state court to serve as Shermot’s guardian does not equate to a conclusion that ARC is a state actor.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that each defendant acted under color of state law; private parties generally are not liable.

Bralich v. Fox News Network, LLC · filed 2020-12-09

A claim for relief under § 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties are therefore not generally liable under the statute.

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Robinson v. Turbo Tax · filed 2020-12-11

In addition, no plausible inference arises that the defendants Plaintiff named are state actors for purposes of § 1983 or Bivens.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a person acting under state authority; it does not cover a federal agency acting under federal authority.

PAUL v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS · filed 2020-12-14

Claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. ... Mr. Paul does not allege that he was wronged by a "person," much less a person acting under state—as opposed to federal—authority. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against court-appointed defense counsel for ineffective assistance because counsel is not a state actor.

Hernandez v. Gonzalez · filed 2020-12-15

Hernandez’s claims against Ricardo N. Gonzalez for ineffective assistance of counsel cannot support a damages suit under section 1983 because the attorney is not a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a private hospital’s challenged conduct to qualify as state action.

SANABRIA v. ST. LUKES HOSPITAL (SACRED HEART CAMPUS) · filed 2020-12-15

St. Luke’s is a private hospital, and nothing alleged in the Amended Complaint can be plausibly viewed as state action.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor for a constitutional claim to proceed.

Robert Nemeth, Jr. v. Office of the Clerk of the Sup · filed 2020-12-16

Nemeth’s constitutional claims against the Law Offices of Stephen A. Varano and Hausman were also properly dismissed because nothing in Nemeth’s complaint suggests that either defendant is a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; private healthcare providers’ independent diagnoses do not become state action merely because they follow state statutory guidelines.

Ajjahnon v. St Josephs University Medical · filed 2020-12-28

The healthcare providers named in this action are private actors and the diagnoses—even though they may have been done with the aid of state statutory guidelines—were made independently of any state coercion or influence.

Defense attorneys and legal aid organizations performing traditional defense counsel functions are not state actors for purposes of Section 1983.

London v. Nassau County District Attorney's Office · filed 2020-12-28

Because Garber and the Legal Aid Society of Nassau County are not state actors, and Plaintiff seeks to challenge the traditional functions of counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding, these Section 1983 claims are not plausible.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a defendant acted under color of state law; private conduct alone is outside its reach.

Gause v. Claude · filed 2021-01-04

Here, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Claude and Kalba are implausible because neither individual is alleged to be a state actor.

Section 1983 requires allegations that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Hernandez v. Hernandez · filed 2021-01-05

There are no allegations in the amended complaint, however, that defendant Daniel Hernandez is a state actor for purposes of Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private witness’s cooperation with police does not make the witness a state actor without facts supporting joint action or a conspiracy.

PINKNEY v. MEADVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2021-01-05

Further, an Equal Protection Clause claim, and claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 in general, are viable only whete the challenged conduct constitutes “state action.” ... Accordingly, Pinkney’s equal protection claim against the Allegheny Defendants fails because their challenged conduct was not state action.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a fellow inmate whose conduct is not attributable to the state.

Schall v. Neuvill · filed 2021-01-07

As an initial matter, the Court finds that the plaintiff’s claims against defendant Christopher Senior, a fellow inmate at the jail, must be dismissed because he is a private individual, not a state actor subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts supporting an inference that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Engel v. Mercy Hospital Festus · filed 2021-01-08

While plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he alleges no facts permitting the inference that Mercy Hospital and its employees and various entities are state actors.

Section 1983 requires a basis for alleging that the defendant is a state actor who violated a constitutional or federal statutory right.

Tasaka v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2021-01-11

Accordingly, Tasaka cannot bring a § 1983 claim against a defendant unless there is some basis for alleging that the defendant is a state actor who violated her Constitutional or federal statutory rights.

Section 1983 permits a federal due process claim against a defendant only if the defendant acted as a state actor.

McLean v. 800 DC LLC · filed 2021-01-13

To the extent that McLean also sought to bring federal due process claims against 800 DC, such an action is available only against a state actor pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and McLean has never suggested that allegations to suggest that 800 DC, a private LLC, is a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private individual whose conduct is not attributable to the state.

Yoder v. Stevenson · filed 2021-01-13

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims against defendant Stillwell must be dismissed because he is a private individual, not a state actor subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 liability requires a state actor; a private party may qualify by willfully participating in joint activity with the state or its agents.

Obregon v. Capital Quarries Company, Inc. · filed 2021-01-15

Specifically, we conclude that Obregon and Waters failed to establish a constitutional claim, because there was no indication that CQ was a state actor or participated in joint activity with a state actor. See Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2001) (only state actors can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; private party who willfully participates in joint activity with state or its agents is considered state actor).

Section 1983 requires the alleged deprivation to be committed under color of state law; a private company is not liable merely for allowing others to hack an account.

Engel v. Facebook · filed 2021-01-15

Plaintiff's allegation that Facebook allowed people to hack his account does not state a § 1983 claim because Facebook is a private company, not a state actor.

Section 1983 does not reach a private insurer’s conduct merely because the insurer is heavily regulated by the state.

Avent v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2021-01-19

In this case, Progressive is not a state actor within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not permit claims against private defendants who do not act under color of state law.

Moskovits v. Bank of America N.A. · filed 2021-01-20

As Defendants Calvin Grigsby, Roger Bernstein, Schoeman Updike Kaufman & Berger, LLP, Beth Kaufman, and Silvia Larizza are private actors who do not work for any state or other government body, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against these defendants under § 1983.

A private lessee does not become a state actor under § 1983 merely by leasing and rehabilitating government property.

Pasadena Republican Club v. Western Justice Center · filed 2021-01-25

We reject the Club’s assertions and hold that WJC is not a state actor for purposes of the Club’s constitutional claims. Neither the circumstances under which WJC rehabilitated the building and acquired the lease, nor the terms of the lease itself, convert WJC into a state actor.

A court-appointed defense attorney performing traditional counsel duties is not a state actor subject to Section 1983 liability.

Hardy-Graham v. Southampton Police Department · filed 2021-01-25

Accordingly, because Powers is not a state actor, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against her are not plausible, compelling their DISMISSAL pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a bank is not a state actor without facts connecting its conduct to the state.

Harris v. Citizens Bank · filed 2021-01-25

To establish a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must assert a person acting under color of state law deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting Citizens Bank can be considered a state actor to sustain a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

A claim against a private hospital under § 1983 requires facts supporting an inference of state action.

Engel v. Office of the Prosecuting Attorney for Jefferson County · filed 2021-01-26

Having thoroughly reviewed the complaint, the Court concludes there are no facts permitting the inference of state action on the part of Mercy Hospital, as necessary to state a claim against it under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party only when its conduct is attributable to the state.

Ramos v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. · filed 2021-01-26

Here, Plaintiff sues Tyson and private, individual employees thereof. However, only “state actors” may be held liable under section 1983. ... Plaintiff makes no allegations that Tyson or its employees were performing functions reserved to or created by the state. Therefore, Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on attorneys who are not state actors.

Giles v. Fitzgerald · filed 2021-01-26

Finally, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Knappen, Roulan, Young, Fitzgerald, and Rood in their official capacities are dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend because Defendant Knappen is entitled to prosecutorial immunity; Defendants Roulan and Young are not state actors and are not subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability; and monetary damages against Defendants Fitzgerald and Rood in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 reaches state actors; alleged cooperation with a federal agent alone does not make a private hospital’s conduct actionable under the section.

SHUKLA v. UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA HEALTH SYSTEMS · filed 2021-01-26

Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s claim that CHS cooperated with Rohde as a federal agent is not cognizable under Section 1983, which provides an individual the right to sue state actors and those acting “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against private security guards when their conduct qualifies as state action through concert with police or agreed police procedures, particularly where state law authorizes merchants to detain suspected shoplifters.

El Fundi v. Deroche · filed 1980-06-23

Moreover, we hold that state action is present when private security guards act in concert with police officers or pursuant to customary procedures agreed to by police departments, particularly when a state statute authorizes merchants to detain suspected shoplifters.

Section 1983’s color of state law requirement is not met merely because a private security guard is licensed by the state and investigates and reports suspected crime while working.

Chiles v. Crooks · filed 1989-02-01

Therefore, the court must conclude that Crooks did not act under color of state law simply because: (1) he was licensed under the Act; and (2) he investigated and reported criminal behavior while on the job.

Section 1983 does not cover a private security guard’s use of force unless the guard acted under color of state law.

Rogers v. Tyrone Anderson, (Previously Filed as John Doe), in Re: Leonard Rogers, Petition for Writ of Mandamus. · filed 1992-07-15

Because Anderson was not shown to be a state actor, any force he may have used would not be a constitutional violation cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private security guard as acting under color of state law merely because he provides security on public property under a government contract; limited guard duties that are not traditionally exclusive state functions do not make him a state actor.

Wade v. Oscar Byles and T Force Security, Inc. · filed 1996-05-13

We therefore find that Byles’ function as a lobby security guard with the aforementioned limited powers is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state. The fact that Byles performed his duties on public property, or for the public’s benefit, does not make him a state actor.

Private store security guards do not act under color of state law under § 1983 merely because a municipal officer is present during an apprehension.

Josey v. Filene's, Inc. · filed 2002-02-06

The mere presence of a municipal officer in the apprehension does not constitute state action. Therefore, the court grants the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats a private security officer who exercises state-delegated police powers, such as arrest authority, as acting under color of state law.

Romanski v. Detroit Entertainment, L.L.C. · filed 2003-05-28

Therefore, there is nothing inconsistent with what the Sixth Circuit stated in Chapman, and this Court’s holding that the individual Defendant security officers are state actors: a security guard that is merely exercising common law rights, such as detaining individuals who are suspected of theft, is not a state actor; a security guard that exercises authority that is traditionally reserved to the State, however, such as the power to arrest, is a state actor acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983’s public function test does not treat a private security guard’s limited power to arrest or detain a customer on the employer’s premises as state action without additional factors such as full police powers or government supervision.

Smith v. Detroit Entertainment L.L.C. · filed 2004-09-23

Absent at least some of the additional factors that were present in Payton, such as the grant of full police powers, direct supervision by government law enforcement officials, or the obligation to comply with the rules and regulations governing regular police officers, the Court does not believe that a security guard’s limited power to arrest or detain a business invitee on his employer’s premises satisfies the “public function” test of state action.

Under § 1983, unlicensed casino security guards who lack state-delegated police powers do not act under color of state law when detaining patrons.

Lindsey v. Detroit Entertainment, Llc · filed 2007-05-01

Because Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that Defendant's security personnel were licensed under Mich. Comp. Laws § 338.1079, they cannot show that Defendant engaged in action attributable to the state.

Section 1983 does not treat ordinary private security work, including a trespass arrest, as a public function reserved exclusively to the state.

Strahan v. AT&T Mobility LLC · filed 2017-09-13

Mere performance of basic private-security functions, without more, does not implicate an exclusive public function. ... Therefore, under the public-function test, defendant was not a state actor.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private security guard whose conduct is not fairly attributable to the state.

Masri v. New York Presbyterian Hospital · filed 2019-06-06

Because the alleged conduct by Cruz cannot be deemed fairly attributable to the state, he did not act under color of state law and is not subject to Section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires plausible allegations that a private security guard acted under color of state law, either through state authority or joint activity with police.

Coleman v. City of New York · filed 2020-02-25

In sum, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that the Security Guard Defendants were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 generally does not treat private security guards as state actors without facts connecting their conduct to the state.

Hobbs v. Department of Transportation NYC · filed 2020-03-06

Generally, private security guards are not state actors under § 1983. ... Plaintiff does not allege facts suggesting that the security guard was a state actor or explaining how the security guard violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.