42 U.S.C. § 1983

Officers sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity for property damage during a warrant search when a reasonable officer would not have known the conduct was unnecessarily destructive.

Cook v. Gibbons · filed 2009-01-20

Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions for the district court to grant summary judgment to appellants based on qualified immunity.

Officers sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Pearson v. Callahan · filed 2009-01-21

Because the unlawfulness of the officers’ conduct in this case was not clearly established, petitioners are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the complaint does not allege a constitutional violation.

Davis v. Carter · filed 2009-01-23

In this school setting case, the complaint’s allegations of deliberate indifference, without more, do not rise to the conscience-shocking level required for a constitutional violation. ... The defendant coaches are entitled to qualified immunity under the facts of this case.

Qualified immunity does not shield a defendant from a § 1983 claim when the evidence shows conduct that violated clearly established law.

Bertl v. City of Westland · filed 2009-02-02

Bertl has provided enough evidence to show that Thomas’ conduct violated clearly established law, and the unlawfulness of those actions would be apparent to a reasonable official.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when enforcing a statute without fair warning that their conduct violates a clearly established right.

Cowart v. Deputy Armando Enrique · filed 2009-02-04

We find that the district court erred in failing to grant the Deputies’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the basis of qualified immunity. ... The Deputies enforced a statute as it was enacted and therefore had no “fair warning” that strict adherence to the Florida statutes would have them run afoul of the Constitution.

Section 1983 does not shield a prison officer through qualified immunity when the officer unreasonably withholds meals in violation of a clearly established right.

Foster v. Runnels · filed 2009-02-05

Furthermore, Cole’s conduct was not reasonable because she took no other action to ensure that her obligation to provide Foster with meals was met. Consequently, she is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can bar § 1983 claims against individual state officers.

O'Dwyer v. Department of Transportation & Development · filed 2009-02-05

The district court dismissed O’Dwyer’s § 1983 claims against individual state officers, on qualified immunity grounds, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ... This court rejected O’Dwyer’s § 1983 arguments, in connection with the present case, in Appeal No. 06-30840. ... We do so again.

A prison official who repeatedly denies an inmate meals without a safety justification is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the right to adequate food is clearly established.

Foster v. Runnels · filed 2009-02-05

For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Cole is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars individual-capacity § 1983 claims against officers whose conduct was objectively reasonable and did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

CLOANINGER EX REL. EST. OF CLOANINGER v. McDevitt · filed 2009-02-09

Thus, qualified immunity bars Cloaninger’s suit against Parlier and Lo individually and summary judgment was properly awarded.

Section 1983 excessive-force claims may proceed against an officer when disputed facts prevent a determination that qualified immunity applies.

Sulfridge v. Huff · filed 2009-02-09

Because genuine issues of material fact as to Officer Huff’s qualified immunity claim exist, we affirm the district court’s decision.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Butler v. City of Sacramento · filed 2009-02-11

Assuming, without deciding, that Perez violated Butler’s Fourth Amendment rights by continuing to detain her after completing the search of her vehicle, this right was not clearly established in 2005, and Perez is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their mistaken belief that probable cause existed was objectively reasonable.

Reid v. City of Beverly Hills · filed 2009-02-13

Accordingly, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity based on their objectively reasonable, albeit mistaken, belief that there was probable cause.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from § 1983 damages when a reasonable officer could have believed the use of force was lawful.

Arrington v. Ramsey · filed 2009-02-16

Norris’ decision to use force under the circumstances is shielded by his qualified immunity defense because the Court finds that based on the facts as outlined below, a reasonable officer confronting the same circumstances could have reasonably believed that the use of force, including deadly force, was necessary.

A § 1983 plaintiff overcomes qualified immunity at summary judgment by showing facts supporting a constitutional violation of a right clearly established at the time.

Dominguez v. Correctional Medical Services · filed 2009-02-17

As applied to this case, Dominguez’s right to adequate medical care has long been clearly established. Therefore, we conclude that Dominguez has satisfied both requirements for overcoming Fletcher’s qualified immunity defense.

A prison nurse is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 medical-care claim when the plaintiff shows a constitutional violation of a clearly established right.

Dominguez v. Corr Medical Servs · filed 2009-02-17

As applied to this case, Dominguez’s right to adequate medical care has long been clearly established. Therefore, we conclude that Dominguez has satisfied both requirements for overcoming Fletcher’s qualified immunity defense.

Qualified immunity can shield an officer from a § 1983 false arrest claim when the officer joins an arrest already underway and reasonably believes the first officer had probable cause.

Hogue v. City of Fort Wayne · filed 2009-02-23

A reasonable police officer who witnessed Officer Rarey assert physical control over Hogue while escorting him toward the exit of the store (Trial Tr. 138), and then saw Officer Rarey fall to the ground twice and Hogue also go down, could believe that Officer Rarey was acting on probable cause and therefore step in to assist him to effectuate the arrest. ... In sum, qualified immunity protects Officer Harrison from liability, and therefore summary judgment will be GRANTED in his favor with respect to the § 1983 claim of false imprisonment or false arrest.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim at summary judgment when the facts viewed in the plaintiff’s favor show a violation of a clearly established right.

Evans v. City of Etowah, Tennessee · filed 2009-02-23

Under these facts, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when the plaintiff shows no constitutional violation.

BHGDN, LLC v. Minnesota · filed 2009-02-24

As noted above, BHGDN has not shown that any constitutional violations occurred. Therefore, Hugoson and Ernest are entitled to qualified immunity on BHGDN’s § 1983 claims and the court grants their motion to dismiss.

An officer is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit when a genuine factual dispute remains over whether the officer violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Drogosch v. Metcalf · filed 2009-02-25

A law enforcement officer’s key defense to a § 1983 action is encapsulated in the concept of qualified immunity. ... In sum, Drogosch has carried his burden of demonstrating that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Agent Metcalf violated Drogoseh’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to a prompt judicial determination of probable cause following his warrantless arrest. The district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Metcalf was therefore free of error.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against an official in her personal capacity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Poirier v. Massachusetts Department of Correction · filed 2009-02-27

Second, we also affirm the district court's dismissal of Poirier's claim against Commissioner Dennehy for damages under § 1983. Even if we had concluded that Poirier had stated a claim for violation of her right to intimate association, she would not be entitled to seek damages against Dennehy in her personal capacity because such a right was not "clearly established" at the time of the purported violation.

In a § 1983 claim for excessive force under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff can overcome qualified immunity by showing a constitutional violation without separately showing that the right was clearly established.

Fennell v. Gilstrap · filed 2009-02-27

For claims of excessive force in violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, however, a plaintiff can overcome a defense of qualified immunity by showing only the first prong, that his Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim when the law did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Hanson v. Dane County · filed 2009-03-03

However, I conclude that defendant Wittmann is entitled to qualified immunity on that claim because the law was not clearly established that plaintiff was “in custody” during questioning.

A § 1983 defendant is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff provides no admissible evidence of the alleged constitutional violation.

Burgest v. United States · filed 2009-03-03

Burgest has failed to provide any admissible evidence of the constitutional violation he alleges. West is therefore entitled to qualified immunity, and summary judgment was appropriate.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the officer violates a clearly established right and acts objectively unreasonably.

Doucet v. City of Bunkie · filed 2009-03-04

It could have reached that conclusion notwithstanding defendants’ qualified immunity defense because it determined, on the basis of the facts before it, both that Sanders’ conduct deprived Doucet of rights that were clearly established, and that his conduct was objectively unreasonable. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). That determination was correct.

Officials sued under § 1983 in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged facts do not establish a constitutional violation.

Robertson v. Elliott · filed 2009-03-06

The district court erred by failing to grant summary judgment to Pennington and Elliott on those claims for which qualified immunity is an available defense, namely, the § 1983 claims asserted against them in their individual capacities.

In a § 1983 claim, once defendants properly support a qualified immunity motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must produce evidence that their actions violated clearly established federal law.

Retzlaff v. De La VINA · filed 2009-03-04

As defendants have asserted their entitlement to qualified immunity in a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the burden was on Retzlaff to come forward with summary judgment evidence sufficient to sustain a determination that defendants’ actions violated clearly established federal law.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of federal rights.

Cooper v. Petray · filed 1988-08-16

“[Ojfficials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from suit as long as their conduct does not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ”

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their mistaken belief that probable cause existed was reasonable and the arrest was not clearly established as unlawful.

Rodis v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2009-03-09

Although the arrest was unfortunate, we cannot say that the Defendants’ belief that it was fake was plainly incompetent. The arrest, therefore, was not clearly established as unlawful.

Section 1983 permits claims against public officials, subject to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Bergeron v. Cabral · filed 2009-03-09

Qualified immunity is a judge-made construct that broadly protects public officials from the threat of litigation arising out of their performance of discretionary functions.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 retaliation claim when, taking the employee’s facts as true, officials could not reasonably believe their conduct was lawful.

Bardzik v. County of Orange · filed 2009-03-11

Likewise, for purposes of the qualified immunity analysis, this Court must presume that Bardzik was not a policymaker and that the Orange County Defendants were aware of this. Therefore, it would not be reasonable for the Defendants to believe their conduct was lawful.

Section 1983 claims against municipal officers are subject to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla. · filed 2009-03-11

Qualified immunity protects municipal officers from liability in § 1983 actions as long “as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Government officials sued under Section 1983 for discretionary acts have qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Panozzo v. Rhoads · filed 1989-05-10

Nonetheless, regardless of whether such conduct constitutes a due process violation, qualified immunity shields defendants from liability.

Officers cannot claim qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability when no reasonable officer could believe there was probable cause for the arrest.

Fonte v. Collins · filed 1989-05-16

Accordingly, under the objective test established in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, Defendants may not avail themselves of qualified immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields officers from an unlawful-arrest claim when a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed under the law at the time.

Gorra v. Floyd Hanson, Patrick Chase, Minnesota State Highway Patrol, an Agency or Division of the State of M · filed 1989-07-24

Because the law had not been construed at the time of the arrest, and because the troopers’ interpretation was not inconsistent with common understanding, we cannot say that the troopers’ interpretation of the statute was unreasonable. Accordingly, Hanson and Chase are entitled to be shielded from liability under the defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields police officers from damages for an arrest when officers of reasonable competence could disagree about whether probable cause existed.

Simkunas v. Tardi · filed 1989-08-31

Accordingly, this court finds that Hickory Hills Police officers Michael Tardi and Robert Troy are to be afforded qualified immunity from liability with regards Count I of this Complaint.

A police officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when reliance on a search warrant was objectively reasonable after consulting a prosecutor and obtaining a judge’s approval.

Ortiz v. Robert C. Van Auken, and Wayne C. Spencer · filed 1989-10-27

Therefore, Spencer is entitled to qualified immunity as a defense to this action.

In a § 1983 action, once officials show they acted within their discretionary authority, the plaintiff must show that their conduct violated clearly established statutory or constitutional law to overcome qualified immunity.

Hudgins v. City of Ashburn · filed 1989-12-13

Once defendants-appellants have shown that their alleged unlawful action was within their discretionary authority, the burden shifts to plaintiff Hudgins to demonstrate lack of good faith or that defendants-appellants’ action violated clearly established statutory or constitutional law.

An officer sued under § 1983 for obtaining a search warrant has qualified immunity unless the application so lacks indications of probable cause that belief in it would be unreasonable.

Johnson v. Walton · filed 2009-03-13

Here, the Leon exception therefore applies and Officer Walton is entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim may require a fuller factual record to determine whether a reasonable official would have known the conduct violated clearly established rights.

Newell v. Runnels · filed 2009-03-13

Whether a reasonable State’s Attorney should have known that firing Plaintiffs would violate their First Amendment rights to free speech needs to be considered on a more developed record. Neither this Court nor the Court of Special Appeals have provided particularized guidance concerning the alleged specific conduct at issue here or its potential impact on an office like Newell’s with only 10 employees. Accordingly, the judgment of the intermediate appellate court reversing summary judgment in favor of Newell on the § 1983 claim in Count I is affirmed.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects foster care workers who reasonably carry out a Family Court placement order.

Orlik Ex Rel. Orlik v. Dutchess County · filed 2009-03-16

We find that Tilton and Woolsey are entitled to qualified immunity because it was objectively reasonable for them to oversee Jared’s foster care placement.

A school official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 retaliation claim when the prohibition on the alleged conduct was clearly established and no reasonable official could believe the conduct was lawful.

Putaro v. Carlynton School District · filed 2009-03-16

Panza is not entitled to qualified immunity. The law has been clearly established for a lengthy period of time that school officials may not retaliate against the filing of a grievance and no reasonable person in Panza’s position could believe that retaliating against Putaro by refusing to hire him was appropriate conduct.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to allege deprivation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Ashfaq v. Anderson · filed 2009-03-16

Because Dr. Ashfaq has failed to allege a deprivation of a clearly established constitutional right, Dr. Anderson is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, Dr. Ashfaq’s § 1983 claim should be and hereby is DISMISSED.

Section 1983 permits damages suits against government officials unless qualified immunity applies because the official did not violate clearly established rights.

Faghri v. University of Connecticut · filed 2009-03-20

“[Qualified immunity ... shields a government official acting in an official capacity from suit for damages under § 1983 unless the official violated clearly established rights of which an objectively reasonable official would have known.”

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim when a genuine factual dispute remains over whether the officer acted objectively reasonably.

Leventhal v. Schaffer · filed 2009-03-24

Because the court finds that the evidence shows a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Schaffer is entitled to qualified immunity, the court finds that defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be denied as to the qualified immunity issue.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a Section 1983 claim when the facts alleged do not permit the court to decide the defense at that stage.

Chen v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-03-25

Nor may the Court conclude that Officer Ha is entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings.

Police officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment unless they establish that the defense applies as a matter of law.

Fonte v. Collins · filed 1990-03-15

The defendants, Portland, Maine, police officers, were sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly violating the fourth amendment rights of the plaintiff by arresting him without probable cause. Because the officers have not shown that they are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law, we affirm.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a government official for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Allen v. Higgins · filed 1990-06-13

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed to the extent that it finds that Groose is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 lets a person sue someone acting under color of state law for depriving them of a federal right, subject to applicable defenses such as qualified immunity.

Young v. Michael C. Barrett, John Rosson, City of Clarksville, Tennessee, and Montgomery County, Tennessee · filed 1990-08-27

Therefore, we hold that the district court correctly concluded that Barrett forfeited any claim to the defense of qualified immunity on Young's search and seizure claim.

Section 1983 permits suits against state actors who deprive people of federal constitutional or statutory rights, subject to qualified immunity when the violated right was not clearly established.

Keller v. Frink · filed 1990-09-28

Police officers are shielded from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the right they are alleged to have violated was not clearly established at the time of the incident.

Section 1983 damages claims may be barred by qualified immunity when the constitutional right was not clearly established.

Nunez-Soto v. Carlos Alvarado, Etc. · filed 1990-12-26

Consequently, defendants enjoy qualified immunity and are entitled to judgment on plaintiffs claim for damages.

In a § 1983 action, qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that defendants must plead, and failing to plead it may waive the defense.

Moore v. Morgan · filed 1991-02-07

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to personal liability that the defendant has the burden of pleading. ... In this case, because Morgan and the commissioners never raised this affirmative defense, we hold that it was waived.

Section 1983 claims against government officials may be barred by qualified immunity when reasonable officers could disagree about probable cause.

Simkunas v. Michael Tardi and Robert Troy · filed 1991-05-03

Having uncovered sufficient evidence to establish probable cause, Officers Tardi and Troy had “no constitutional obligation to conduct any further investigation in the hopes of uncovering potentially exculpatory evidence.” ... They were entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, and summary judgment on this basis was therefore appropriate.

Section 1983 allows suits for constitutional deprivations by persons acting under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity for officials whose conduct was objectively reasonable.

O. George Specht, Jr. And June B. Specht v. Roger Jensen, Doug Martin, and Don Owens · filed 1991-06-13

Furthermore, after carefully evaluating the undisputed facts of the case, the Specht I panel concluded that defendants' claim of objective reasonableness was not supported by the undisputed facts in the record. 832 F.2d at 1525. Such a finding clearly defeated any assertion of qualified immunity, be it on a motion j.n.o.v. or a pretrial motion for summary judgment.

Section 1983 claims against officials are barred by qualified immunity when their conduct is objectively reasonable.

Torchinsky v. Siwinski · filed 1991-08-09

Under these circumstances, Siwinski acted with objective reasonableness and is thus entitled to immunity from appellants’ § 1983 claim against him.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement for individual liability and permits municipal officers to invoke qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Van Dunk v. St. Lawrence · filed 2009-03-26

Additionally, the Defendants have asserted a defense of qualified immunity. Under this doctrine, municipal officers are free from liability if they show either that their actions “did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known, or that it was objectively reasonable to believe that their acts did not violate these clearly established rights.” ... As a result, qualified immunity applies to each of the individual Defendants. Since the individual Defendants would not have been on notice that their actions would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate, and is granted.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person who, under color of state or District of Columbia law, deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution and laws.

Chen v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-03-26

Nor may the Court conclude that Officer Ha is entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings.

Section 1983 claims for civil damages may be barred by qualified immunity when governmental actors do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Chaklos v. Stevens · filed 2009-03-30

Governmental actors performing discretionary functions enjoy qualified immunity and are “shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 allows a person to sue someone acting under color of state law for depriving them of a federal right, subject to qualified immunity.

Chaklos, Richard v. Stevens, Kathleen · filed 2009-03-30

Without deciding whether this amounts to a constitutional violation, we hold that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the law does not make clear that their action was unconstitutional.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim when the officer creates probable cause by rendering a person unable to leave.

Goddard v. Kelley · filed 2009-03-31

Similarly, no reasonable police officer would believe that he could create the probable cause that led to plaintiffs arrest for trespassing. Accordingly, the doctrine of qualified immunity does not apply to the circumstances of this case.

Qualified immunity protects a public official from an individual-capacity section 1983 claim when the official could reasonably believe the conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Williams v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIV. · filed 2009-03-31

Accordingly, we further conclude that the district court did not err in determining that Maturi has qualified immunity in regard to appellant’s section 1983 counts against Maturi in his individual capacity.

Officials sued for damages under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established under pre-existing law.

Hill v. Washington State Department of Corrections · filed 2009-03-31

The Court concludes that Defendants Vail, Pacholke, and Roberts are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to all of Plaintiffs’ claims for damages, fees, and costs for Defendants’ enforcement of both the pre-revised DOC Policy and the current DOC Policy. Although Plaintiffs argue that a reasonable person would know that enforcing the DOC Policy violates a clearly established constitutional right, they fail to show that the DOC Policy, in light of pre-existing law, violates any right guaranteed by the Constitution.

In a § 1983 claim against an official acting within discretionary authority, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that qualified immunity is inappropriate.

Ogletree v. City of Auburn · filed 2009-03-31

As the burden is on Plaintiffs to show that the individual Defendants are not entitled to the defense, the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to defeat Defendants’ properly-supported motion seeking summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. Summary judgment, therefore, is due to be entered in the individual Defendants’ favor on the § 1983 equal protection claims on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 arrest claim may be denied at summary judgment when the plaintiff-favorable record does not establish an objectively reasonable mistake by the officers.

Ruiz v. Lebanon County · filed 2009-03-31

It follows that we are unable to hold that the District Court erred as a matter of law in denying qualified immunity to the officers at this stage of the proceedings. Nothing that we hold will preclude, however, the factfinder from deciding that the officers’ actions were objectively reasonable based on facts shown at a later point in this matter.

State officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 have qualified immunity for actions taken in good faith.

Anderson v. Stevas · filed 1985-12-05

If, on the other hand, the state defendants are being sued in their individual capacities, they are entitled to a qualified immunity for actions taken in good faith.

A police officer loses qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the warrant application is so lacking in indications of probable cause that believing probable cause exists is unreasonable.

Sacco v. High Country Independent Press, Inc. · filed 1995-05-19

Under Malley, the shield of qualified immunity is lost where the warrant application is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause" that it is unreasonable to believe that probable cause exists.

A public officer is protected by qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim unless the allegedly violated right was sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand the conduct violated it.

Hamilton Ex Rel. Hamilton v. Cannon · filed 1996-04-19

To overcome the qualified immunity defense, the contours of the right allegedly violated must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he was doing violates that right.

In a § 1983 claim, qualified immunity does not protect an official when the unlawfulness of the alleged conduct was apparent, even without a prior case addressing the specific conduct.

Jones v. Hunt · filed 2005-06-14

To defeat a claim of qualified immunity, plaintiffs need not point to a prior holding that the specific conduct at issue is unlawful; rather, the unlawfulness of the alleged action must have been apparent.

A supervisor who acquiesces in an unconstitutional arrest and prolongs the detention for an improper purpose may be denied qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Pompano v. City of Hermosa Beach · filed 2008-04-17

Based upon those determinations, qualified immunity would not be available to Jones.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when a reasonable investigation establishes probable cause for the arrest.

Barfield v. Louisiana Ex Rel. Louisiana Department of Justice · filed 2009-04-03

Because Widmer’s reasonable investigation of Barfield established probable cause to arrest her, Widmer is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by qualified immunity when the alleged right was not clearly established.

Radillo v. Fugioka · filed 2009-04-03

The district court properly determined that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Radillo’s First Amendment claim because the right that Radillo alleges was violated was not clearly established at the time of the incident in 2003.

Section 1983 claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows a violation of clearly established law.

Hostetler v. Green · filed 2009-04-15

When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a violation of clearly established law.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the law would not have made the unlawfulness of their conduct clear to a reasonable official.

McSpadden v. Wolfe · filed 2009-04-21

Thus, because “it would not have been clear to a reasonable [official] what the law required under the facts alleged [by Appellant], [Appellees are] entitled to qualified immunity.” Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776 (2004).

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff shows neither a constitutional violation nor conduct that was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

Ratcliff v. Moore · filed 2009-04-24

Furthermore, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because Plaintiff has not shown either a constitutional violation nor that what Defendants did was “objectively unreasonable” in light of clearly established law.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 retaliation claim when the employee’s right was clearly established at the time, assuming disputed facts are resolved in the employee’s favor.

Robinson v. York · filed 2009-04-27

Therefore, at the time defendants acted in 2005 and 2006, both the constitutional protection of employee speech and a First Amendment cause of action for retaliation against protected speech were clearly established and potentially applicable to Defendants’ conduct.

Section 1983 claims against school officials are barred by qualified immunity when the asserted right to protection from private actors was not clearly established at the time.

Doe Ex Rel. Magee v. Covington County School District Ex Rel. Board of Education · filed 2009-04-27

Accordingly, even if a constitutional right to governmental protection inhered in the public school context, that right was not clearly established during the time period in which Doe was victimized. As a result, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and the federal and constitutional claims against them should be dismissed with prejudice.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when they neither knew nor reasonably should have known their actions would violate constitutional rights.

Peterson v. Davis · filed 1982-11-26

In view of all the surrounding circumstances of this case, the defendants did not know, nor should they reasonably have known, that the actions they took would violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Section 1983 qualified immunity is decided by the court and must be raised by the final opportunity for a directed verdict.

Lewis v. Kendrick · filed 1991-04-26

Possibly the officers intended this to be a request for an instruction on qualified immunity. The question of immunity is for the court. ... It is not silently reserved. The last opportunity to raise it is by motion for directed verdict.

Section 1983 claims against prison disciplinary hearing officers are subject to qualified immunity when the officer could reasonably believe the conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Zavaro v. Thomas A. Coughlin, Iii, C.R. Homrighouse · filed 1992-07-31

“The doctrine of qualified immunity serves to shield public officials ... from liability in § 1983 actions ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ... In sum, Captain Homrighouse could not have reasonably believed that his conduct did not violate Zavaro’s constitutional rights, and Homrighouse’s defense of qualified immunity was properly rejected by the district court.”

An officer sued under Section 1983 is protected by qualified immunity when seeking an arrest warrant was objectively reasonable.

Hoffman v. Reali · filed 1992-08-27

Essentially for the same reasons set forth in the district court, we conclude that Reali’s conduct was objectively reasonable and that he was protected by qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right.

Knight v. Davies · filed 1992-09-17

Further, given the above discussion regarding plaintiffs failure to establish any deliberate disregard of plaintiff’s medical condition, to any extent plaintiff seeks to recover damages against the remaining state defendants in their individual capacities, the court finds these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity.

Reynolds v. Condie · filed 1992-12-14

These actions of defendant were stated to violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988. Therefore plaintiffs sought an injunction enjoining defendant from changing their duties or salaries. The district court dismissed the action on the ground that defendant has qualified immunity under Thulen v. Bausman, 930 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir.1991), certiorari denied, 112 S.Ct. 1262. We agree and therefore affirm.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a state or local official for violating constitutional rights under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity.

Valencia v. Wiggins · filed 1993-01-18

Concluding that the district court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, we find the jail official not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits damages actions for rights violations, subject to qualified immunity when an officer reasonably believes the arrest was lawful.

James M. O'Neill and the Store at Oak Beach, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, Ronald Tolkin and James Hassan · filed 1993-02-16

Where, as here, in a § 1983 action for damages based on malicious prosecution, an arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity if “(a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.”

Qualified immunity is unavailable to officials sued in their official capacities under § 1983.

Leaf v. Freeman · filed 1993-04-27

We hold that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of respondents on the basis of qualified immunity because that defense is unavailable to officials in an official-capacity suit.

To overcome qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendants violated a clearly established right and that a reasonable officer would have known the conduct violated that right.

Bonilla v. City of San Diego · filed 1993-04-29

To overcome the qualified immunity defense, plaintiff must establish first that the defendants' actions violated a clearly established right of which a reasonable officer would have been aware, and second, that a reasonable officer would have known that his actions violated that clearly established right.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established under the circumstances they faced.

Estate of Sinthasomphone v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1993-11-23

If, in the face of all the information the state actors had, Joshua De-Shaney enjoyed no constitutional right to protection, I cannot conclude that it is clearly established that Sinthasomphone had such a right. The officers are entitled to a qualified immunity. Summary judgment dismissing the due process claim against them is GRANTED.

Law enforcement officers have qualified immunity from suit in Section 1983 actions.

Davis v. DiPino · filed 1994-02-23

Law enforcement officers have a judicially created qualified “immunity from suit” in 1983 actions.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim when it was not clearly established that the official’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Shadburne v. Dalkon Shield Trust · filed 1994-05-19

The Court has carefully reviewed the recommendation concerning qualified immunity and concludes that it is proper. ... Under the facts of this case, defendant is clearly entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity supported by defendants’ good-faith affidavits can warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim.

Schoone v. Olsen · filed 1977-02-11

The second count of the complaint alleges a violation of the plaintiffs’ rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants claim a qualified immunity under this claim of a civil rights violation. Upon the “good faith” affidavits of the defendants, I am required to grant summary judgment as to this count pursuant to Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975).

Parole officers sued for damages under § 1983 may present a good faith immunity defense to the jury when the evidence supports it.

Dennis M. Wolfel, Cross-Appellant v. Nick Sanborn, Cross-Appellees · filed 1977-05-02

We conclude that defendants were entitled to have their good faith defense submitted to the jury and that the district court erred in finding that defendants’ reliance on the unwritten policy of the Parole Authority was unreasonable.

Qualified immunity can shield prison officials from § 1983 damages liability.

Wycoff v. Brewer · filed 1978-03-23

We think, however, that the defendants in this case are shielded from liability for damages by the qualified executive privilege recognized in Procunier v. Navarette, supra.

Qualified immunity can bar § 1983 damages against prison officials.

McAlister v. Robinson · filed 1978-03-30

The plaintiffs also claim they are entitled to damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Procunier et al. v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S.Ct. 855, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978) this court holds that they are not so entitled.

An official’s subjective good faith alone does not establish qualified immunity from § 1983 liability.

Perez v. Dr. Ismael Rodriguez Bou, Miguel Perez v. University of Puerto Rico · filed 1978-05-05

Subjective good faith in one’s conduct is not sufficient to protect an official from civil rights liability.

In § 1983 damages actions, police officers have a good faith defense when they believe the force was necessary and lawful and have reasonable grounds for both beliefs.

Leslie Landrum, Special Administratrix of the Estate of Roy Lee Landrum, Deceased v. John Moats and Robert J. Rockwell · filed 1978-05-30

If police officers (1) believe that a certain amount of force is necessary to make an arrest, (2) believe that use of that amount of force is lawful under the circumstances, and (3) have reasonable grounds for each of the foregoing beliefs, then they are entitled to the defense of good faith even if the use of force turns out, ex post, to have been illegal or excessive.

Officials who fail to establish qualified immunity from § 1983 damages may be liable for compensatory damages.

Wren v. Jones · filed 1978-08-21

They have been unable to establish any basis for qualified immunity. They must be held liable for compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees.

Private defendants who use a state distraint procedure repeatedly declared unconstitutional do not receive qualified immunity from § 1983 damages.

Luria Bros. & Co., Inc. v. Allen · filed 1979-04-12

Keeping in mind that the relevant standard here is “knew or reasonably should have known," (emphasis added), this Court deems that when a provision of a state statute has been repeatedly declared unconstitutional it is reasonable for a private individual to believe that if he engages in procedures set up by said provisions, his actions are in all likelihood going to violate another’s constitutional rights. ... For these reasons, the Court holds that defendants in the action do not fall within the category of qualified immunity to damages in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 actions.

School officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted rights were not clearly established and there is no evidence of malicious intent.

Valadez v. Graham · filed 1979-06-18

In the present case, even if it were found that defendants’ actions have violated plaintiffs’ constitutional or statutory rights, defendants could not be held liable in damages because first, the constitutional and statutory rights were not so clearly established at the time in the context of special educational programs that defendants can be held to a knowledge of the violation, and secondly, there is absolutely no evidence, or even the allegation, that defendants’ actions were taken with any malicious intent.

State officials may assert qualified immunity against § 1983 damages when they could not reasonably have predicted that their conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Fujiwara v. Clark · filed 1979-08-10

In light of the various applications of the Mt. Healthy standard, defendants could not be expected to have predicted with any certainty whether their conduct would violate plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Thus, under Procunier, the immunity defense is available to defendants under the first part of the Wood v. Strickland rule and defendants are entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of objective good faith.

Section 1983 permits a civil action against a law enforcement officer for excessive force, subject to qualified immunity when the officer could reasonably have believed the conduct was lawful under clearly established law.

Mendoza v. Sherman Block, Los Angeles County · filed 1994-05-31

We therefore hold that the deputies’ use of the police dog is subject to excessive force analysis, and that this law is clearly established for purposes of determining whether the officers have qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for damages against persons who, under color of state law, deprive another of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Reynolds v. Hale · filed 1994-06-16

The first issue is whether Defendants Hale and Hunter enjoy qualified immunity from the Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim that she was arrested without probable cause. “[Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Applying the Harlow analysis, the Court must first determine whether Defendants Hale and Hunter violated any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights belonging to Mary Reynolds. ... The Court concludes Defendants Hale and Hunter are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim that she was arrested without probable cause, and on the related claim Defendants caused a criminal “warrant” to issue against her on the basis of a false statement.

Section 1983 damages claims may be barred by qualified immunity.

Van Deusen v. Parker Evatt Sammie D. Brown Martha Wannamaker Ronnie A. Grate · filed 1994-06-20

The district court properly awarded summary judgment to appellees on this claim because the prison officials are protected against such damages here by their qualified immunity from suit under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 claims against public officials are barred by qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Greiner v. City of Champlin · filed 1994-07-05

The district court correctly held the officers were protected from the plaintiffs' section 1983 claims by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Mangieri v. Clifton · filed 1994-08-24

"Probable cause is a defense to a § 1983 claim based on an alleged false arrest."

Section 1983 claims against government officials may be barred by qualified immunity when the constitutional right was not clearly established.

Defore v. Premore · filed 1994-10-06

Thus, the court holds as a matter of law that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law is hereby granted.

Section 1983 claims against state officials are subject to qualified immunity when the officials did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Giano v. Kelly · filed 1994-11-16

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields state officials from liability where they did not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Wright, 21 F.3d at 500 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). ... Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Giano’s tenth cause of action based on collateral estoppel and qualified immunity is denied.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity for government officials.

Cofield v. Randolph County Commission · filed 1994-12-30

Applying the fact specific test of Horsley to the matter before it, the court finds that Deputy Sheriff Ricky Hancock is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a damages action against persons acting under color of state law for deprivation of federal rights.

Feasel v. Willis · filed 1995-03-09

It is, further Ordered Lubbock County is not as a matter of law under the present record entitled to Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity, and the lawsuit for damages as stated by the Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is permitted to proceed against Lubbock County the political entity, and its named officials only in their official governmental capacity.

Section 1983 claims against government officials in their individual capacities can be barred by qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

D'aguanno v. Gallagher · filed 1995-03-29

Government actors performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil trials for money damages and may not be held liable in their individual capacity "if their conduct violates no 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' "

Section 1983 claims against government employees may be subject to qualified immunity for discretionary conduct that violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Walden v. City of Seattle · filed 1995-04-03

In an action under § 1983, government employees, including police officers, are afforded qualified immunity under federal law unless, in the performance of discretionary duties, their conduct violated " 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ”

Section 1983 does not immunize county supervisors from suit when they act in bad faith intending to deprive plaintiffs of constitutional rights.

Blodgett v. County of Santa Cruz · filed 1981-09-23

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity as enunciated in Scheuer and Woods, the Supervisors are not entitled to immunity from suit if their actions were taken in bad faith with the intention of depriving plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 affords state officials qualified immunity when a reasonable official could have believed the challenged conduct was lawful in light of clearly established law.

Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley · filed 1995-11-30

Because we concluded above that Doody’s and the other DSOD officials’ actions were reasonable, the officials are entitled to the protection of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants may receive qualified immunity when they reasonably rely on another officer’s information in continuing a detention.

Irvin Ex Rel. Mitchell v. Kaczmaryn · filed 1996-01-23

Thus, qualified immunity protects Kaczmaryn and Van Dien from liability for their continuation of the plaintiffs’ seizure.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when genuine issues of material fact remain about that defense.

Hoffman v. Lehman · filed 1996-01-23

The court cannot conclude based upon the record so far developed that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from an individual-capacity § 1983 claim when controlling law did not clearly establish that the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right.

Arrington v. Dickerson · filed 1996-01-31

Because neither the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court of the United States, nor the Supreme Court of Alabama have considered facts and circumstances which are closely analogous to those in the case at bar, the court finds that it is not clearly established that Gilmore’s conduct constituted a First Amendment violation. Accordingly, the court finds that Gilmore is entitled to qualified immunity as to the § 1983 claim asserted against him in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 right-of-access claims based on 23 days of segregated confinement are barred by qualified immunity under the applicable circuit precedent.

Walker v. Mahoney · filed 1996-02-09

Further, in light of the Second Circuit’s decision in Jones, any alleged right-of-access claim stemming from the plaintiffs segregated confinement would be overcome by a qualified immunity defense.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against a prison official for denying yard access during a seventy-day segregation when the right was not clearly established at the time.

Thomas v. Ramos · filed 1996-02-21

Even if the conditions of segregation were sufficiently serious, and Ramos acted with the requisite intent to implicate the Eighth Amendment, see Farmer v. Brennan, — U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), we hold that the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

School officials cannot claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim merely because they were confused about disciplinary procedures when they knew or should have known their actions violated students’ due process rights.

Darby v. Schoo · filed 1982-07-07

Such confusion, however, is insufficient to allow an entitlement to qualified immunity to these Defendants.

Individual township supervisors and a township solicitor are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims; the township and its board are not.

Glassman v. Township of Falls · filed 1982-07-13

In addition, the individual defendants, the Solicitor and the Supervisors, are entitled to a qualified immunity which is not enjoyed by the Board or the Township.

State officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity from damages when their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Calloway v. Fauver · filed 1982-08-02

Applying the Harlow rule, it is apparent that each of the defendants is entitled to rely upon the defense of a qualified immunity. The conduct of none of them violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

State officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to the same qualified immunity accorded to presidential aides under Harlow v. Fitzgerald.

Wolfel v. Nick Sanborn · filed 1982-10-20

We construe the remand order of the Supreme Court to mean that State officials are entitled to the same qualified immunity in an action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as was accorded to aides of the President in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra.

State officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the law they violated was not clearly established at the time they acted.

Hixon v. Durbin · filed 1983-03-31

Under the circumstances presented, I am unable to conclude that the defendants violated “clearly established” law. ... The qualified immunity defense should be applied so as to protect an official’s freedom to exercise his independent judgment on a question of this sort unless and until his views are rejected by a court.

Qualified immunity does not protect officials from § 1983 damages when the law governing their conduct was clearly established and they could be expected to know it.

Fujiwara v. Charles G. Clark, Etc. · filed 1983-04-01

The law governing the conduct of Appellees was then clearly established by Mt. Healthy, and Appellees could have been expected to be familiar with it. Under the standards laid down in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. at 2739, knowledge of the law is attributable to Appellees, and qualified immunity as matter of law does not exist under the facts of this case.

Qualified immunity defeats a § 1983 damages claim when unsettled due process law gave officials no reason to know their conduct violated constitutional rights and they lacked malicious intent.

Harper v. Kemp · filed 1988-01-25

As recognized by the Magistrate, since the law governing the requirements of due process in cases such as this one is unsettled, it cannot be said that Defendants knew or should have known that their action, taken within the sphere of their official responsibility, would have been violative of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Moreover, since the evidence showed that Defendants did not maliciously intend to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights, the defense of qualified immunity was available to them.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the facts supporting the search warrant establish probable cause.

Harden v. Peck · filed 1988-04-11

Applying the standard set forth in Malley to this case, we have no doubt that Peck is entitled to qualified immunity. The factual allegations in Peck’s Affidavit clearly are sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that Harden had sold and was still in the possession of cocaine.

A public official acting within the scope of discretionary authority is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the plaintiff fails to show a material factual dispute about conduct violating clearly established law.

Ed Rich v. Dollar · filed 1988-04-15

Consequently, we are compelled under Harlow, Mitchell, and our precedent to hold as a matter of law that appellant Dollar is shielded from appellee Rich’s § 1983 claim for damages by the qualified immunity to which he is entitled as a public official acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Maine v. Oklahoma Department · filed 1997-09-30

Moreover, we agree with the district court that, even if we assume for the purpose of argument that plaintiff had proven a cognizable § 1983 claim, she failed to demonstrate that the due process rights at issue were so clearly established in June 1993 that reasonable officials in defendants’ situation would have understood their conduct violated those rights. See Liebson, 73 F.3d at 277-78. Thus, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when their conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law and the information they possessed.

Wagner v. Bay City Texas · filed 2000-09-27

But our qualified-immunity inquiry requires us to determine whether the officers’ actions were objectively unreasonable, in light of clearly-established law at the time, and in light of the information the officers possessed. ... Thus, those actions were objectively reasonable in the context of this dangerous situation that Gutierrez created, and we therefore reverse the denial of summary judgment on the excessive-force claim.

For a § 1983 claim, conflicting decisions from other circuits alone do not establish a qualified immunity defense when the right is clearly established in the Fifth Circuit.

Desormeaux v. Savoie · filed 2002-08-02

Savoie is incorrect; the divergent views of the other courts of appeals do not affect established law in this circuit, and a public official cannot use them, standing alone, to establish the qualified immunity defense.

A § 1983 plaintiff facing a public official’s qualified immunity defense must plead specific conduct supporting a constitutional violation, rather than rely on conclusory allegations.

Burge v. Stalder · filed 2002-12-09

In the face of the assertion by a defendant public official of the defense of qualified im- munity, a § 1983 plaintiff must comply with a heightened pleading standard.

An officer has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false-arrest claim involving a warrant if a reasonable officer could conclude that the warrant should issue.

Smith v. Brock · filed 2003-03-18

Where there is a warrant for an arrestee, an officer enjoys immunity from suit ... for false arrest so long as a reasonable officer could conclude that a warrant should issue.

Police officers are immune from damages under § 1983 when probable cause to arrest is at least arguable.

Kauch v. City of Cranston · filed 2003-03-25

On the contrary, the “[p]olice are afforded immunity [from § 1983 actions for damages] ‘so long as the presence of probable cause [to arrest] is at least arguable.’” Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 53 (1st Cir. 1999) (emphasis added; citation omitted).

In a § 1983 claim, an officer receives qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation, without reaching whether the right was clearly established.

Weaver v. Shadoan · filed 2003-08-13

Because Plaintiff did not satisfy the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, we need not address whether the right was clearly established. The district court is thereby reversed on the issue of qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim.

Qualified immunity can shield prison officials from liability on some § 1983 legal-mail claims.

Sallier v. Brooks · filed 2003-09-18

For the reasons set out below, we further conclude that the correspondence in 11 of the 20 claims did not implicate constitutionally-protected legal mail rights, that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on six of the remaining nine claims, and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on the final three claims.

In a § 1983 action, an officer whose conduct was objectively reasonable under the circumstances is entitled to qualified immunity.

Davis v. McLennan County Jail · filed 2006-05-15

Davis has not shown that the district court erred in determining that Wollard’s actions were objectively reasonable under the ... circumstances and that he was entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Herbert Lee Hathcock, Jr. v. Cohen · filed 2008-07-23

If no constitutional right has been violated, our inquiry ends and the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 affords an officer qualified immunity when a warrant application contains enough indicia of probable cause for a reasonable officer to believe the warrant is valid.

Johnson v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2009-03-13

Furthermore, the Leon standard guides the determination of whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity from § ... 1983 liability. Officers lose their shield of qualified immu- nity “[o]nly where the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability for violations of non-federal law, and an officer does not lose qualified immunity by violating department protocol.

Pasco Ex Rel. Pasco v. Knoblauch · filed 2009-04-28

Violations of non-federal laws cannot form a basis for liability under § 1983, and qualified immunity is not lost because an officer violates department protocol.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for officers when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Veneklase v. City of Fargo · filed 1996-03-06

We therefore conclude that the defendant officials are entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Town officials may invoke qualified immunity against individual-capacity § 1983 claims.

Landry v. Mier · filed 1996-04-11

This Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Swartwood’s conclusion that the individual defendants are entitled to invoke the protection afforded by the qualified immunity doctrine and that, therefore, summary judgment should enter in their favor on all civil rights claims against them in their individual capacities.

A municipality cannot claim qualified immunity under § 1983 based on its officials’ good faith.

Forsch v. City of Kent · filed 1996-04-15

We reverse Judge McCutcheon’s ruling on reconsideration that the City enjoyed qualified immunity based on the good faith of the individual officials who made the decision to proceed with the seizures here at issue.

An officer enforcing a statute is protected from § 1983 damages by qualified immunity when the statute’s unconstitutionality was not clearly established at the time.

Putnam v. Davies · filed 1996-09-26

Accordingly, the Court holds that Defendant Turner is immune from liability for damages resulting from the due process violations to which he subjected Plaintiff. Defendant Turner was acting in accordance with a statute that not only had never been held unconstitutional, but in fact had been upheld by an Ohio court.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer who reasonably but mistakenly concludes that probable cause exists.

Clark v. Palmer · filed 1996-10-03

The defense of qualified immunity shields law enforcement officials "who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present." Anderson v . Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).

Qualified immunity can shield an official from § 1983 damages when the complaint alleges neither malice nor action contrary to clearly established law.

Mandelstam v. City of South Miami · filed 1996-10-23

The two-count complaint sought damages for inverse condemnation and violation of the Mandelstams' due process rights pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... However, a review of the Mandelstams' complaint demonstrates they did not allege either malice or action contrary to the law. ... In sum, McCann's conduct, as alleged by the Mandelstams, was conduct for which qualified immunity generally applies.

Officers are shielded from liability under § 1983 by qualified immunity when their use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Wicker v. City of Galveston · filed 1996-10-24

Thus, because there are no genuine issues of fact material to the Court’s qualified immunity determination, the Court concludes that the Officers are shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Municipalities cannot claim qualified immunity as a defense to liability under § 1983.

Kirley v. Williams · filed 2009-05-05

Moreover, the doctrine of qualified immunity is unavailable to municipalities such as Appellee City of Erie.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 arrest claim when they reasonably believe the evidence establishes probable cause.

Collins v. City of Sacramento · filed 2009-05-05

Regardless, summary judgment was appropriate on the basis that the police officers were entitled to qualified immunity, acting on the reasonable belief that they had probable cause to arrest Collins on the basis of all the evidence recovered in the search.

Officers sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity for an overbroad warrant when they reasonably rely on its approval by a prosecutor and judge.

Millender v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2009-05-06

We reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity because we conclude that the officers were entitled to immunity under the second prong of the test set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), as they reasonably relied on the approval of the warrant by a deputy district attorney and a judge.

In a § 1983 wrongful-arrest suit, officers have qualified immunity if a reasonable officer would not have known the arrest was unconstitutional, even if the protective order had been vacated.

Martin v. Russell · filed 2009-05-06

Furthermore, and in the alternative, even if there had been an order vacating the order of protection and it had been filed, we think that a reasonable officer would not have known that arresting Mr. Martin was unconstitutional.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials in their individual capacities are subject to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.

Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton · filed 2009-05-06

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims seeking damages from defendants in their individual capacities are subject to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.