42 U.S.C. § 1983

A district court denying qualified immunity in a § 1983 action must give a reasoned decision on the immunity issue.

Newton v. Ray · filed 2007-11-08

We vacate the district court’s order and remand the case to enable the district court to "render a reasoned decision on the qualified immunity issue."

A § 1983 plaintiff can overcome qualified immunity at summary judgment by raising a genuine issue about whether defendants committed the alleged acts and stating a violation of clearly established law.

Scott v. Stone · filed 2007-11-13

To avoid a qualified immunity defense, Scott must “present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether the defendant[s] in fact committed the acts that violated the law.” See Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 386 (6th Cir. 1994). In addition, Scott must “state a claim of the violation of clearly established law.” See id. For the reasons stated above, he has done both.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that they violated his constitutional rights.

Armenta v. Rupert · filed 2007-11-13

Because Armenta failed to show that the defendants violated his constitutional rights regarding his retaliation and necessities claims, he failed to show that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity on a Section 1983 claim cannot be resolved at summary judgment when material factual disputes prevent the court from determining whether the officer violated a constitutional right or reasonably believed his conduct was lawful.

Halcomb v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2007-11-14

Summary judgment must be denied on the Section 1983 claim because the parties’ accounts of Officer Woods’ and Ms. Hal-comb’s conduct differ in several material respects that make it impossible for the Court to determine, at this stage of the proceedings, whether Officer Woods violated Ms. Halcomb’s constitutional rights or whether it was objectively reasonable for Officer Woods to believe that his conduct was lawful.

Qualified immunity protects nurses sued under § 1983 when their compliance with prison medication policy was objectively reasonable, despite a physician’s prescription for daily medication.

Moreland v. Roscko · filed 2007-11-14

Moreland’s sole assertion that a physician prescribed the medical treatment of the administration of a daily medication does not render objectively unreasonable the nurses’ compliance with prison policy requiring that inmates be standing to receive their medication, with their cell lights on and their identification available. The district court did not err in its determination that the nurses were entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for using deadly force when clearly established law forbids its use under the circumstances.

Massasoit v. Carter · filed 2007-11-15

Under these facts, which we reiterate are in the light most favorable to Tomeny and Phelps, Butler’s actions were (1) neither reasonable because he had insufficient justification for his use of deadly force, (2) nor protected by qualified immunity because, at the time of the shootings, it was clearly established that the use of deadly force was not justified under these facts.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity unless the violated constitutional right was clearly established.

Massi v. Flynn · filed 2007-11-16

Our jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine is limited to whether, as a matter of law, Flynn is entitled to qualified immunity “either because the law was not clearly established or because, on the facts assumed for the purposes of appeal, the defendants’ conduct did not constitute a violation of a constitutional right.”

Section 1983 provides a civil action for damages against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Anderson Ex Rel. Cain v. Perkins · filed 2007-11-20

However, even if the court were to assume for the sake of argument that restraints were used on Ms. Anderson, as plaintiff contends, she still could not overcome Sheriff Perkins’ qualified immunity, for there is no proof of any sort tending to show that Sheriff Perkins was aware of any use of restraints on Ms. Anderson.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of a constitutional right, subject to qualified immunity.

Maul v. Logan County Board of County C · filed 2007-11-23

The court also held that Bondurant and Webb were entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffs failed to carry their burden to show that defendants had violated a constitutional right. ... Applying the standards set out above, we affirm the district court’s thorough, careful, and accurate order granting summary judgment to the City defendants for the reasons stated in its memorandum opinion and order dated October 4, 2006.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against persons acting under color of state law who abridge constitutional or federal rights, subject to qualified immunity for officials.

Boyd v. District of Columbia · filed 2007-11-26

In evaluating a § 1983 claim to which a defendant has raised the qualified immunity defense, the court must follow a two-pronged analysis. ... First, as a threshold matter, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right. ... Second, the court must decide whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s action.

Section 1983 permits a civil action against state actors, subject to qualified immunity.

Goldstein v. Perryman · filed 2007-11-26

Darryl Lee Goldstein appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Officer Perryman and Officer Preheim in Goldstein’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. ... Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment for the defendants on the ground of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue state officials for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Nagy v. Mone, et al. · filed 2007-11-28

In Counts III and IV of her amended complaint, Nagy alleges generally that the officers deprived her of constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, without specifically identifying which rights were violated. ... In this case, an objectively reasonable official would not have understood that defendants’ conduct violated Nagy’s clearly established constitutional rights. ... For the reasons stated above, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits a civil action against state officials who violate federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Young v. Selk · filed 2007-11-28

Qualified immunity protects state officials from civil liability for actions that do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for deprivation of federal constitutional rights under color of state law.

Bias v. Moynihan · filed 2007-11-28

Because the undisputed facts, taken in the light most favorable to Ms. Bias, demonstrate that a reasonable officer could have concluded that detaining Ms. Bias did not violate her federal constitutional rights, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Ms. Bias’s § 1983 claim in favor of Officer Moynihan.

Section 1983 permits a civil action against an officer for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Flores v. JC Penney Corp. · filed 2007-11-28

Additionally, a reasonable officer would have recognized that his or her conduct violated those rights under the circumstances faced, and in light of the law that existed at that time. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (describing the second prong of the two-prong qualified immunity inquiry to determine whether the constitutional right was “clearly established”). At the time of incident, both Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court law were clear that a police officer could not prolong a valid Terry stop without additional reasonable suspicion to do so. See Luckett, 484 F.2d at 90-91; Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Shephard’s initial investigation indicated that Antonio Flores and Galeana were not involved in the thefts and did not reveal any particularized, objective factors suggesting that Flores’s wife, aunt, or children may have been involved in the theft. Given these circumstances, Shephard should have known that he lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop. Thus, Shephard is not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

Section 1983 provides a civil damages action for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity for officials' discretionary actions.

Fleming v. City of Bridgeport · filed 2007-12-04

The plaintiff next contends that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the municipal defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution. We disagree. Under federal law, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from “civil damages liability” for their discretionary actions “as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.”

Section 1983 permits civil rights claims against public officials, subject to qualified immunity for discretionary functions unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Layland v. Stevens · filed 2007-12-04

Qualified immunity shields public officials from suit on § 1983 civil rights claims when they are performing discretionary functions unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a state actor for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity for officials.

White v. Gerardot · filed 2007-12-05

Sallenger and McKenna thus counsel that, where the appellant’s arguments rely on disputed facts, this court has jurisdiction only if the legal arguments for qualified immunity do not depend on, or are separable from, disputed facts.

Section 1983 authorizes a civil damages action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of constitutional rights.

Munday v. Johnson · filed 2007-12-05

“When a warrantless arrest is the subject of a § 1983 action, the arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to make the arrest.”

Section 1983 claims may be subject to qualified immunity, requiring courts to assess constitutional violations and whether the right was clearly established.

Jones v. Hernandez · filed 2007-12-06

When defendants in a § 1983 suit assert qualified immunity, the court must determine whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the evidence shows that the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and if so, “whether the law clearly established that the officer's conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the case.”

Qualified immunity supports summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the officer’s conduct violates no constitutional right.

McNeil v. Anderson · filed 2007-12-07

His conduct was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. As a consequence, McNeil’s claim of excessive force cannot survive summary judgment proceedings. ... We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity when the governing law was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Odom v. Kolender · filed 2007-12-10

Even if Odom could show defendant participated in a violation of his constitutional rights after he was placed in the general population of the jail, the district court properly concluded defendant was entitled to qualified immunity because the law regarding placement of civil detainees within the jail was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Wesolowski v. Sullivan · filed 2007-12-11

Plaintiff has pointed to no authority, nor has the Court found any, which had clearly established at the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit that plaintiff had a First Amendment right to possess the materials in question. ... Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on this ground as well.

Officers facing a § 1983 false arrest claim are entitled to qualified immunity when they had arguable probable cause to arrest.

Little v. Massari · filed 2007-12-12

Moreover, at the very least, defendants here had “arguable” probable cause and are thus entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right.

Massaro v. Town of Trumbull · filed 2007-12-13

Although that push may have resulted in Massaro’s head contusion, there is no clearly established rule prohibiting police officers from pushing a person to the ground when that person has failed to comply with orders to surrender and the officers have the objective of taking that person into custody as safely as possible. The defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer may receive qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim based on brief handcuffing and a push during an investigative detention.

Segura v. Hobby Lobby, Inc. · filed 2007-12-17

In sum, we find that the district court erred in denying Officer Jones’s qualified immunity summary judgment motion with respect to Ms. Segura’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force claim as to both the handcuffing and the push.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their conduct does not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Shero v. City of Grove, Okl. · filed 2007-12-17

As there was no constitutional violation, ... the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the City employees was appropriate.

Qualified immunity bars damages against defendants in a Section 1983 action but does not bar equitable relief.

Masel v. Mansavage · filed 2007-12-17

This provides defendants with immunity from plaintiffs request for damages but qualified immunity does not apply to claims for equitable relief.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged facts fail to establish a constitutional violation.

Nicarry v. Cannaday · filed 2007-12-19

Because the facts as alleged by Nicarry failed to establish a Fourth Amendment violation, the district court correctly concluded that Cannaday is entitled to qualified immunity and properly granted Cannaday summary judgment.

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 claim against an official when the plaintiff cannot establish that the official violated her constitutional rights.

Jones v. Wichita State University · filed 2007-12-20

Plaintiff cannot establish that Dotson deliberately ignored her allegations. As matter of law plaintiff cannot establish that Dotson violated her constitutional rights, and he is therefore entitled to qualified immunity on her claim.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim at summary judgment when clearly established rights were violated and the officer has not shown an objectively reasonable belief that the conduct was lawful.

Gilles v. Repicky · filed 2007-12-21

As the law was clearly established that Gilles had a constitutional right to be free from arrest without probable cause, as well as a constitutional right to be free from unreasonably prolonged or intrusive investigative detention, and Repicky has not demonstrated that it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his conduct did not violate these rights, he is not entitled to the protection of qualified immunity at summary judgment.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff cannot establish a violation of her constitutional rights.

Jones v. Wichita State University · filed 2007-12-21

Plaintiff cannot establish that Dotson ignored her allegations or violated her constitutional rights. See id. Dotson therefore is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when no reasonable officer could believe probable cause supported the arrest.

Gilles v. Repicky · filed 2007-12-21

No reasonable officer could conclude that he had probable cause to arrest Gilles at that point, and accordingly Repicky is not immune from suit on this basis.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiffs have shown no constitutional violation.

Boyce v. Andrew · filed 2007-12-21

With no constitutional right upon which to base Boyce and Robinson’s § 1983 case, their Dekalb DFCS supervisors, Andrew, McMillan, and Herren, are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 excessive force claim when no reasonable officer could believe the force was justified on the plaintiff’s version of events.

Holmes v. Village of Hoffman Estates · filed 2007-12-26

However, accepting as true Holmes’s contention that he did not physically resist the officers, we cannot say that Teipel could have reasonably thought the types of gratuitous force Holmes has described were justified. No reasonable officer could have thought that it was permissible to slam Holmes’s head against the car simply because his fellow officer deemed him a “smart ass,” for example, nor could the officer have thought it proper to continually grind his knee into the face of an unresisting arrestee.

School officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct does not violate a constitutional right.

Thomas v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp. · filed 2007-12-26

School officials were entitled to qualified immunity if the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Thomas, show that Kivett’s conduct did not violate a constitutional right. ... Because Thomas pointed the court to no authority to support her claimed right to know about these academically oriented conversations when they occurred, the district court correctly concluded that the school officials were entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when no reasonable officer could think the alleged force against an unresisting arrestee was justified.

Holmes, Darius v. Village Hoffman · filed 2007-12-26

Finally, the doctrine of qualified immunity does not support the entry of summary judgment. ... However, accepting as true Holmes’s contention that he did not physically resist the officers, we cannot say that Teipel could have reasonably thought the types of gratuitous force Holmes has described were justified.

In a § 1983 action, an officer is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when material facts about deliberate or reckless false statements remain disputed.

Walczak v. San Bernardino County · filed 2007-12-26

Detective Nuss is only entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity if there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute.

An official sued under § 1983 in her individual capacity has qualified immunity when a reasonable official in her position would not have understood her conduct to violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Brickyard Holdings, Inc. v. Beaufort County · filed 2007-12-27

Accordingly, Defendant Austin enjoys qualified immunity from Plaintiffs § 1983 suit, and therefore Plaintiffs sixth cause of action fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed.

A defendant’s mere assertion of good faith does not establish qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

Hendon v. Ramsey · filed 2007-12-28

Defendants' mere assertion of good faith is insufficient to support a complete defense at this stage in the litigation.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when the conduct did not violate a constitutional right.

Williams v. Southern Illinois Riverboat/Casino Cruises, Inc. · filed 2008-01-01

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that shields government officials from liability for civil damages where their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Eberhart is entitled to qualified immunity, and summary judgment, on Count III.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 unreasonable-search claim when controlling precedent clearly established that the search was unlawful.

Brown v. Fisher · filed 2008-01-02

The law regarding the validity of a search conducted when the arrestee is being transported to a police station was “clearly established” by Lugo, decided in 1992. Thus, Weber is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity on Brown’s unreasonable search claim.

A § 1983 claim for nominal damages may be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds before the court decides whether a constitutional violation occurred.

Rowan v. Harris · filed 2008-01-04

It is abundantly clear on this record that his nominal damages claim will not survive a qualified immunity analysis. ... We are empowered in limited circumstances such as these to consider the qualified immunity question prior to deciding whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a constitutional violation.

Material factual disputes can preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim.

Droz v. Estate of Anderson · filed 2008-01-07

Finally, McCadden argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. However, the existing questions of material fact as outlined above foreclose a grant of summary judgment.

Officers may be denied qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when their alleged use of force was clearly unlawful, even without a materially similar prior case.

Hamilton v. City of Jackson · filed 2008-01-07

Thus, because the appellants used force to detain Hamilton after Hamilton had allegedly turned his back to leave the room, we disagree with the appellants that, as a matter of law, Hamilton’s right to be free from such force was not clearly established at that time.

A police chief has qualified immunity from a § 1983 failure-to-train claim when existing law gave no fair warning that he had to train borrowed officers to arrest only on probable cause.

Battiste v. Sheriff of Broward County · filed 2008-01-07

Although government officials may be liable for a failure to train subordinates under some circumstances, the plaintiff cites no case, and we have found none, that would have given an official fair warning that a police chief, faced with past unjustified arrests by his department at public protests, must train “borrowed” law enforcement officers from other jurisdictions to arrest only upon probable cause. Because Chief Timoney did not have fair warning that his failure to train borrowed officers violated the Constitution, he is entitled to qualified immunity on Count XIV as well.

An official seeking qualified immunity from a § 1983 individual-capacity claim must first show that the challenged conduct was within the official’s discretionary authority.

Al-Amin v. Smith · filed 2008-01-07

To receive qualified immunity, a government official must first establish that he was acting within his discretionary authority. ... Here, Warden Smith and Martin were acting within their discretionary authority as to inmates’ mail.

Qualified immunity may be denied in a Section 1983 excessive force action governed by the Fourth Amendment.

Stephens v. Town of Butler Alabama · filed 2008-01-08

We have reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs, and conclude the district court did not err in applying the Fourth Amendment to Stephens’ excessive force claim and denying qualified immunity to Lovette.

Section 1983 does not give officers qualified immunity at summary judgment when the plaintiff’s evidence shows they severely beat a handcuffed person who had ceased resisting, in violation of clearly established law.

Wells v. Cramer · filed 2008-01-11

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Wells, we find that the district court erred in finding that the appellees are entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage. Further, as we have explained, Wells produced sufficient evidence to show the appellees violated his Fourth Amendment rights by attesting that they severely beat him after he had been placed in handcuffs. The appellees’ conduct, as alleged by Wells, facially violates the Fourth Amendment with obvious clarity and violates clearly established law in view of our decision in Smith. Therefore, the district court erred in granting the appellees summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

In a Section 1983 claim arising from a high-speed police chase, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show an intent to harm.

Bingue v. Prunchak · filed 2008-01-15

Today we refine our Onossian analysis and hold, following the Eighth Circuit, that police officers involved in all high-speed chases are entitled ... to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the plaintiff can prove that the officer acted with a deliberate intent to harm.

Officers sued under § 1983 lack qualified immunity when they rely on a warrant whose lack of probable cause would be obvious to a reasonable officer in their position.

Krl v. Aquaro · filed 2008-01-16

We affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Hall to the extent that he relied on the January 13 warrant, which was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.

In a § 1983 action, factual disputes over consent to enter a home and arguable probable cause for an arrest can preclude summary judgment on officers’ qualified immunity.

Weissinger v. Murray · filed 2008-01-22

Having considered the briefs and the relevant parts of the record, we find no reversible error in the district court’s determination that there were factual issues to be resolved by the jury with respect to whether Weissinger gave consent to enter the house and whether there was arguable probable cause to arrest Weissinger. Summary judgment was properly denied for the reasons stated in the district court’s order dated June 27, 2007.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

Clark v. Edmunds · filed 2008-01-23

We therefore conclude that Plaintiff has not shown the violation of a constitutional right and that the sheriff is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects officers from a § 1983 claim when they reasonably misunderstand the governing law, even if their conduct violates a clearly established right.

Lee v. Carlson · filed 2008-01-24

In evaluating whether the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged constitutional violation, the district court correctly held that “even if the violated right is clearly established, ‘[q]ualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted.” R., Doc. 59 at 13 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004)).

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts about the plaintiff’s resistance are critical to whether the officer reasonably believed his use of force was lawful.

Brooks v. Siegler · filed 2008-01-25

Here, the court finds that summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is inappropriate. There are issues of material fact in this case, in particular the amount and nature of Brooks’ resistance to Seigler, that are critical to determining whether Siegler was operating under a reasonable belief as to what level of force he was permitted to employ.

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims if their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Greene v. Knight · filed 2008-01-29

Government officials who perform discretionary functions are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, which shields them from suit as well as liability for civil damages, if their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit asks whether the defendant violated a clearly established federal constitutional right.

Matis v. Johnson · filed 2008-01-30

The test for qualified immunity asks whether the defendant violated a federal constitutional right on the facts alleged and whether the right was clearly established.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the facts, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, show that an officer shot an unarmed fleeing person who posed no threat.

Moore v. Indehar · filed 2008-02-01

Thus, a reasonable officer would have known shooting Moore was a violation of Moore’s constitutional rights; as such, a right to be free from the use of excessive force in Moore’s situation was clearly established. ... Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity and remand for further proceedings.

Qualified immunity entitles a police officer to dismissal of a § 1983 action if the officer’s conduct does not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Moore v. Indehar · filed 2008-02-01

However, under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a police officer is entitled to dismissal of such an action if his “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Sanders v. City of Minneapolis, 474 F.3d 523, 526 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

A public official performing discretionary duties may raise qualified immunity against a § 1983 claim.

Vicari v. Ysleta Independent School District · filed 2008-02-04

In sum, the Court concludes Miller is eligible to raise the defense of qualified immunity with regard to Vicari’s § 1983 claim against him.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the arrest did not violate clearly established law, even if a jury could find that probable cause was lacking.

John v. Younquist · filed 2008-02-04

Even if a reasonable jury might conclude the officer lacked probable cause, the arrest was not contrary to any clearly established law, so the officer was entitled to qualified immunity from a jury trial.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 trial when the challenged arrest did not violate clearly established law.

John v. City of El Monte · filed 2008-02-05

Even if a reasonable jury might conclude the officer lacked probable cause, the arrest was not contrary to any clearly established law, so the officer was entitled to qualified immunity from a jury trial.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 damages claim when the record fails to establish that it shields the defendants.

Brewer v. Kamas · filed 2008-02-07

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that this Court accepts Judge Foschio’s Report and Recommendation (Docket No. 43) in its entirety, including the authorities cited and the reasons given therein. ... Here, the record before the court fails to establish that qualified immunity shields Defendants from the instant litigation.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established rights.

Valigura v. Mendoza · filed 2008-02-07

Additionally, the contours of these rights were sufficiently clear at the time of the alleged deprivation.16 Accordingly, we reject appellants’ argument that their actions were objectively reasonable.

Section 1983 officers are not entitled to qualified immunity when they had fair warning that their alleged conduct violated constitutional rights.

Campbell v. Lynch · filed 2008-02-07

Appellants had fair warning their alleged conduct violated appellee’s constitutional rights, and they are not entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity for a home search that violates clearly established law requiring exigent circumstances or another exception to the warrant requirement.

Holloway v. Vargas · filed 2008-02-08

The Court also finds that the law was clearly established that without exigent circumstances, or some other applicable exception to the warrant requirement, Officer Vargas could not conduct a search of the Holloway’s home. Here, Officer Vargas needed to have formed a reasonable belief that there was an immediate need to protect the lives of those inside the Holloway residence or others from serious or threatened injury. Instead, Officer Vargas relied only upon the presence of an armed person in front of the residence to justify the intrusion. The Court finds that Officer Vargas is not entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that he unlawfully searched the Holloway’s residence.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Pettus v. McGinnis · filed 2008-02-11

I conclude, however, that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. Even if plaintiffs act of testifying at Charles’s disciplinary hearing constituted protected activity under the First Amendment, the law in this circuit was unclear in that regard at the time of the events giving rise to this action.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit when the plaintiff fails to establish a violation of clearly established law.

Wilson v. Gallardo · filed 2008-02-12

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from suit under § 1983 unless the plaintiff makes specific allegations that the officials violated clearly established law. ... Absent a showing of causation, Wilson has failed to establish that Officer Gallardo violated his constitutional rights. See id.; Morin, 77 F.3d at 120. He has concomitantly failed to establish error in the MJ’s finding that Officer Gallardo was entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims are barred by qualified immunity when the alleged conduct did not violate a constitutional right.

Ingle v. Yelton · filed 2008-02-14

Because no constitutional violation occurred, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment.

Section 1983 authorizes a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution and federal law.

Bergeron v. Cabral · filed 2008-02-14

Finally, Cabral asserts a defense of qualified immunity. ... Qualified immunity attaches to discretionary conduct of government officials that “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Plaintiffs’ loss of their commissions as a result of their refusal to support the Sheriffs election campaign adequately states a deprivation of a constitutional right: the right to be free from political discrimination. ... It is simply not credible for Cabral to argue that a reasonable official in her position would not have understood that punishment of a rank-and-file employee for the refusal to lend political support to her campaign would give rise to liability.

Section 1983 claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity, which requires a constitutional violation of a clearly established right.

Bell v. City of Cleveland · filed 2008-02-19

The Supreme Court directs that the plaintiff must establish two factors to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity from suit: 1) that the facts as alleged show a violation of a constitutional right, and 2) that the right violated was clearly established.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity for defendants whose actions were objectively reasonable.

Gray v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2008-02-19

In any event, because the warrant application was not facially invalid, the defendants’ actions of seeking legal advice from the District Attorney’s Office and presenting their findings to a local judge in support of a search warrant application entitle them to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against officers can be barred by qualified immunity when the alleged conduct did not violate a constitutional right.

Bradford v. Wiggins · filed 2008-02-20

To establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment in a Section 1983 action, the claimant must demonstrate “both that a ‘seizure’ occurred and that the sei zure was ‘unreasonable.’ ” ... Having concluded that any seizure that occurred was reasonable and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment, we need not address the second Saucier question to determine qualified immunity— whether the constitutional right was clearly established. ... The answer to the threshold inquiry — that a constitutional right was not violated — is enough to conclude that the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity from the seizure, detention, and contact claims.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim must be assessed in light of each officer’s individual role.

Dorsey v. Barber · filed 2008-02-21

Second, in evaluating Begin’s entitlement to qualified immunity, the court failed to consider his role in the encounter individually.

Public officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when they could not reasonably have expected their conduct to violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Abdur-Raqiyb v. ERIE COUNTY MEDICAL CENTER · filed 2008-02-21

Defendants would be entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity in any event. ... Given the potential seriousness of his condition, defendants could not reasonably have been expected to think that their actions might have violated plaintiffs First Amendment rights.

In a § 1983 claim against prison officials, qualified immunity turns on whether the alleged facts show a constitutional violation and whether the right was clearly established.

Monceaux v. Batson · filed 2008-02-21

In determining whether qualified immunity is available, we use a two-step inquiry: (1) “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right,” and (2) was the right clearly established within the context of the case?5 We note at the outset that defendants concede that the right to adequate medical care while imprisoned was a clearly established constitutional right at the time of Monceaux’s injury.

Qualified immunity does not shield a state crime lab technician from a § 1983 claim for deliberately creating a misleading and scientifically inaccurate serology report when a reasonable technician would have understood that the conduct violated due process.

Brown v. Miller · filed 2008-02-27

We therefore hold that the deliberate or knowing creation of a misleading and scientifically inaccurate serology report amounts to a violation of a defendant’s due process rights, and that a reasonable laboratory technician in 1984 would have understood that those actions violated those rights. The district court did not err in denying qualified immunity on this theory.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer could believe the challenged stop was lawful under the circumstances.

Lopez v. Bartlett · filed 2008-02-28

Even if we were to conclude that reasonable suspicion for the stop did not exist and a constitutional violation occurred, Bartlett is entitled to qualified immunity because it would not have been “clear to a reasonable officer that [the] conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). In the specific context of the facts of the case at bar, a reasonable officer could have believed, based on the totality of the circumstances, that reasonable suspicion existed.

Qualified immunity is available for constitutional claims against officials brought under § 1983.

Ward v. Barnes · filed 2008-02-29

Although the Sterling Defendants request summary judgment on all counts as to McCul-ley and Tannenbaum on the basis of qualified immunity, that immunity is only articulated, and available, for constitutional claims asserted against them via 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against officers are subject to qualified immunity when the law did not give a reasonable officer fair and clear warning that the conduct was unlawful.

Bates v. Harvey · filed 2008-03-04

Because the contours of the exigent circumstances exception were not sufficiently clear, prior to this case, to give a reasonable officer fair and clear warning that a warrantless entry and search such as this one was not justified, Deputy Harvey is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when, on the plaintiff’s version of the facts, their conduct violated a clearly established right.

Floyd v. City of Detroit · filed 2008-03-06

Based upon the facts as construed in the light most favorable to Floyd, we conclude that his right to be free from such excessive force was clearly established on the date in question. Neither officer is therefore entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Qualified immunity does not protect a prison guard who falsely labels an inmate a snitch when a reasonable guard would know that doing so violates the inmate’s right to protection from harm.

Irving v. Dormire · filed 2008-03-07

Thus, we hold that a reasonable prison guard in Brigance’s position would have known that to label Irving a snitch would violate his constitutional right to protection from harm. Accordingly, the district court properly denied qualified immunity to Brigance on this aspect of Irving’s case.

A prison guard sued under Section 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity for falsely labeling an inmate a snitch when a reasonable guard would have known that doing so violated the inmate’s right to protection from harm.

Irving v. Cressey · filed 2008-03-07

Thus, we hold that a reasonable prison guard in Brigance’s position would have known that to label Irving a snitch would violate his constitutional right to protection from harm. Accordingly, the district court properly denied qualified immunity to Brigance on this aspect of Irving’s case.

A § 1983 plaintiff opposing qualified immunity must show that the defendant violated a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established at the time.

Turner v. Houseman · filed 2008-03-10

To overcome Houseman’s assertion of the qualified immunity defense, Turner must show that the acts complained of violated a constitutional or statutory right, and that the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.

A plaintiff overcomes qualified immunity in a § 1983 action by showing that the defendant violated a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established at the time.

Burgess v. Houseman · filed 2008-03-10

To overcome Houseman’s assertion of the qualified immunity defense, plaintiff must show that the acts complained of violated a constitutional or statutory right, and that the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.

In a § 1983 action, qualified immunity turns on whether the pleaded facts show a constitutional violation and whether the right was clearly established.

Gann v. Cline · filed 2008-03-11

Thus, to determine whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity, we first consider whether the plaintiff’s factual allegations show that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and if they do, we examine whether the right was clearly established. ... We address each of these contentions in turn and conclude that Mr. Rinehart is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when he did not violate a constitutional right.

Lindsey v. Brady · filed 2008-03-11

In addition, defendant is entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity because he did not violate a constitutional right.

A defendant cannot obtain qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim as a matter of law when material facts needed to decide the immunity defense remain disputed.

Garcia v. Brown · filed 2008-03-11

Because Brown is not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law and there are disputed issues of material fact that must be resolved in order to adjudicate his immunity defense, the District Court’s order is not an appealable “final decision” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the alleged use of deadly force was clearly unreasonable and the officer had fair warning that it violated constitutional rights.

Scheuerman v. City of Huntsville AL · filed 2008-03-12

Appellant’s alleged use of deadly force was clearly unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances, and Appellant had fair warning his conduct violated Appellee’s constitutional rights. Thus, Appellant is not entitled to qualified immunity from Appellee’s excessive force claim.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit when the complaint fails to show that their conduct violated clearly established rights.

Town of Southwest Ranches v. Kalam · filed 2008-03-12

As Kalam’s complaint fails to show that the town officials’ conduct violated his rights in light of clearly established law, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

Defendants in a Section 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the incident.

Carter v. O'malley · filed 2008-03-12

Although the district court failed to apply the two-step test outlined in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), it correctly determined that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. ... However, the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances alleged was not clearly established at the time of the incident involving Carter.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

STEFANIK v. Reno · filed 2008-03-13

Plaintiffs complaint raises no bonafide constitutional claims, defendants would enjoy qualified immunity even if such constitutional claims were offered, and Plaintiffs state law and common law claims lack any arguable legal or factual basis.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when no reasonable officer would have believed the conduct was constitutional under clearly established law.

Bernhard v. City of Ontario · filed 2008-03-13

Because we find that Schneider’s conduct violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights, we next consider whether those rights were clearly established in 1996. We hold that, as of 1996, no reasonable officer would have believed that Schneider’s conduct was constitutional.

In a § 1983 excessive force claim, factual disputes about the reasonableness of the force can require a trial before qualified immunity is decided.

Chelios, James v. Heavener, Lindsey · filed 2008-03-21

This case similarly is susceptible to additional factual development on both sides before a conclusion can be reached as to whether Sergeant Heavener’s use of force was plainly excessive.

Section 1983 defendants retain qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to allege facts showing a violation of a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

State Ex Rel. Wilhoit v. Seay · filed 2008-03-24

Wood, therefore, has failed to allege facts that adequately prove that Jones and Walker lost their qualified immunity by violating a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Anderson v. Burge · filed 2008-03-26

Moreover, even if a violation of plaintiffs rights could be found, defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. ... Given the treatment afforded to plaintiff, including the provision of a special diet (albeit one not to plaintiffs liking), it was plainly objectively reasonable for defendants to believe that their actions did not violate plaintiffs constitutional rights.

Qualified immunity does not protect an official from a § 1983 claim when the official’s inaction, viewed on the plaintiff’s supported allegations, was objectively unreasonable.

Baker v. Bowles · filed 2008-03-26

Taking these allegations as true, such inaction on the part of the Sheriff is objectively unreasonable. The denial of summary judgment is AFFIRMED.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to officers who enforce an ordinance a reasonable officer could believe constitutional, even if a court later invalidates it.

Thomas v. City of Talent · filed 2008-03-26

The district court correctly concluded that Talent police officials were entitled to qualified immunity regarding Thomas’s claim that he was unreasonably stopped and issued a citation because, even though an Oregon state court later ruled that the city ordinance was invalid, a reasonable officer could have believed that the ordinance was constitutional.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to officers who make reasonable efforts to identify the correct house before executing a search warrant, even if they mistakenly enter the wrong home.

Rogers v. Hooper · filed 2008-03-27

The key to us is that the officers made reasonable efforts, though obviously insufficient ones, to identify the correct house. We agree they were entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity when material facts bearing on that defense remain disputed.

Aczel v. Labonia · filed 2008-03-27

Given the trial record, and the district court’s decision to reject aspects of the verdict, the district court properly declined to conclude that Labonia was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

When qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim turns on an official’s subjective intent, the official must first show objective reasonableness; the plaintiff must then identify specific evidence of improper motive to avoid summary judgment.

Hernandez v. Conde · filed 2008-03-31

Where, as here, the existence of a violation of the clearly established law depends on the government official’s subjective intent, the Court applies a two-step analysis. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of the objective reasonableness of the challenged conduct. ... If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of objecfive reasonableness of his or her conduct, the plaintiff may avoid summary judgment only by pointing to specific evidence that the official s actions were improperly motivated.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation.

Cotton v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-03-31

The court concludes that no constitutional violation occurred, and so it grants the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity as to the plaintiffs § 1983 claim.

An official sued under Section 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity for firing an employee because of protected speech.

Charles v. Grief · filed 2008-03-31

Terminating an employee for engaging in protected speech, of which Charles accuses Grief, is an objectively unreasonable violation of such an employee’s First Amendment rights.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when no reasonable officer could believe there was probable cause for the arrest.

Shipman v. Hamilton · filed 2008-04-01

The district court did not err in denying Hamilton’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Under the facts as they are presented to us, no reasonable officer could have believed that he had probable cause to arrest Shipman for obstructing service of process after she affirmatively assisted the officers by pointing out the location of Handsbury, the person to be served.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to an officer when no reasonable officer could believe the arrest was lawful under the facts viewed in the plaintiff’s favor.

Shipman, Karen Y. v. Hamilton, Eric · filed 2008-04-01

In sum, the district court did not err in denying Hamil- ton’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Under these facts, a reasonable officer would not have believed that he had grounds to arrest Shipman, the only registered nurse on duty that night.

In a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff can defeat summary judgment based on qualified immunity by offering particularized evidence of an improper motive.

Huth v. Haslun · filed 2008-04-03

Thus, to defeat Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff must proffer particularized evidence supporting a claim that Defendants acted with an improper motive. Plaintiff has done so by demonstrating “circumstances suggesting in a substantial fashion that [she] has been singled out.” ... Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is thus denied.

A public employee sued under § 1983 for failing to intervene is entitled to qualified immunity when the underlying constitutional violation was not clearly established and the employee lacked fair warning.

Strong v. Wisconsin · filed 2008-04-04

Because plaintiffs due process claim against defendant Vítense is legally uncertain, I cannot conclude that defendant Valley had fair warning that her failure to intervene to stop Vítense would violate the Constitution. Accordingly, I conclude that defendant Valley is entitled to qualified immunity and I will grant her motion for summary judgment.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 arrest claim when arguable probable cause supports the arrest.

Amrine v. Brooks · filed 2008-04-08

Because Amrine’s arrest was supported by arguable probable cause, Brooks and Hemeyer are entitled to the protection of qualified immunity on this claim.

Officials sued under § 1983 for an allegedly unlawful arrest are entitled to qualified immunity when they had arguable probable cause.

Amrine v. Hemeyer · filed 2008-04-08

Because Amrine's arrest was supported by arguable probable cause, Brooks and Hemeyer are entitled to the protection of qualified immunity on this claim.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff’s allegations fail to establish a constitutional violation.

Murray v. Earle · filed 2008-04-11

Because Murray fails to allege conduct establishing a violation of a constitutional right, we proceed no further than the first step. ... Therefore, Defendants-Appellants are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 excessive-force suit, qualified immunity does not protect an officer when clearly established law would have told a reasonable officer that the use of deadly force was unlawful.

Tubar v. Clift · filed 2008-04-11

Finally, we are unpersuaded by Clift’s argument that the law was not clearly established at the time of the shooting such that a reasonable officer would have known that his actions were unlawful. We agree with the district court that our decision in Acosta v. City and County of San Francisco, 83 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.1996), clearly established Tubar’s right not to be shot in a car that posed no immediate danger to the police officer or others.

Section 1983 claims against police officers are subject to qualified immunity when the officer’s conduct does not violate a constitutional right.

Jewett, Terrance v. Anders, Dale · filed 2008-04-11

Officer Anders therefore is entitled to qualified immunity as to ... Mr. Jewett’s claims of unlawful arrest and deprivation of liberty.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a state official for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Cameron v. TN · filed 2008-04-16

Moreover, we apply a “two-step test for determining whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity.” Sowards, 203 F.3d at 438. The plaintiff must establish, first, that a state official violated a constitutionally-protected right and, second, that the right was clearly established at the time of the violation such that the defendant official should reasonably have known that the conduct in question was unconstitutional. See id.

Section 1983 claims for money damages against state prison officials are subject to a limited immunity.

Hurley v. Ward · filed 1978-06-09

As state prison officials, the defendants enjoy a limited immunity from liability for money damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against officials for deprivation of federal rights, subject to qualified good-faith immunity for non-malicious official actions.

Sherer v. Waier · filed 1978-06-12

Second, defendants possess a qualified good-faith immunity from liability for damages under § 1983, based upon common law tradition and strong public policy that such officers should be protected from tort liability arising under state law for all good-faith, non-malicious actions taken in order to fulfill their official duties.

Section 1983 creates a federal civil action for damages against public officials who, under color of state law, deprive a person of constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Smith v. Robinson · filed 1978-09-06

Defendants, by reason of their status as public officials, already enjoy the very substantial benefits of qualified immunity from damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the general federal civil rights statute.

A § 1983 complaint against a public official acting in an official capacity must allege specific facts showing bad faith or why qualified immunity does not apply.

Gomez v. Toledo · filed 1979-08-07

Where, as here, a public official is being sued for action taken in his official capacity, it is assumed that he wears a cloak of qualified immunity and the complaint must allege and specify facts that show bad faith or state why in this particular case the cloak was shed.

Qualified immunity can shield an official from personal damages liability under § 1983 when the official acted in good faith without violating rights clearly established at the time.

Atcherson v. Siebenmann · filed 1979-09-13

Assuming without deciding that Judge Siebenmann acted as an administrator and not in his judicial capacity, we hold that he established a qualified immunity defense to damages liability.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state officials, subject to qualified immunity for official actions taken in good faith.

Ross v. Meagan · filed 1981-01-16

The two remaining appellees, Detective Meagan and former Governor Shapp, are entitled to a qualified immunity for official actions taken in good faith.

Section 1983 provides a federal civil rights remedy, subject to qualified public officials’ good faith defense to damages liability.

Jaworski v. Schmidt · filed 1982-07-19

Public officials who enjoy qualified immunity may assert their good faith as a complete defense to damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damage claims against public officials may be barred by qualified immunity when the officials acted within discretionary authority and did not violate clearly established law.

Saldana v. Antonio Garza and Ricardo Olvera · filed 1982-09-07

It is axiomatic that public officials whose positions entail the exercise of discretion enjoy the special protections of a qualified immunity from personal liability in § 1983 damage actions.

Section 1983 allows a government official sued under it to assert qualified or good faith immunity.

Green v. White · filed 1982-11-17

A government official such as White who is subject to a section 1983 suit may plead as an affirmative defense a qualified or good faith immunity from suit.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of federal rights and permits damages claims against state officials, subject to qualified immunity.

Trejo v. Perez · filed 1982-12-13

In Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 534 (5th Cir.1980), we stated that a police officer may defend a § 1983 action with proof that “he acted with a good faith belief that his actions were within his lawful authority,” and “reasonable grounds existed for this belief.” ... Questions regarding the legal uncertainty of the underlying offense are to be decided by the trial judge. If the trial judge decides that the legality of the underlying offense at the time of the arrest was not settled, as it should have here, the only jury issue would be framed as the objective immunity standard of Harlow v. Fitzgerald. It would not differ in application from the objective probable cause test for validity of a warrantless arrest.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials are subject to immunity when the officials act within the scope of their duties and in good faith.

Wentz v. Klecker · filed 1983-11-16

We hold only that state officials acting within the scope of their duties and in good faith are immune from damage actions against them personally.

Section 1983 permits suits against officials acting under color of state law in their individual capacities, subject to qualified immunity.

Steve Rollins, a Minor, by Kathleen Agosta, His Mother and Next Friend v. John R. Farmer and the City of Omaha, a Munici · filed 1984-04-02

Thus, § 1983 suits against individual officials acting under the color of state law may be brought against the officials in their individual capacities subject, of course, to the defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for money damages against a state official whose conduct under color of state law deprives a person of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

McCall-Bey v. Franzen · filed 1984-05-14

Therefore, Lane is not entitled to qualified immunity and may be liable for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by qualified immunity when an official's conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Ogden Ex Rel. Estate of Ogden v. Coutny of Maui · filed 2008-04-21

Looking at both these factors, the court finds that Officer Pacheco is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue a state actor for depriving the person of a federal right, subject to qualified immunity.

York v. City of Las Cruces · filed 2008-04-22

When a warrantless arrest is the subject of a § 1983 action, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to make the arrest.

Section 1983 claims against government officials may be subject to qualified immunity.

Artiga v. Officer Richard Garcia · filed 2008-04-22

A government official who is sued under § 1983 may seek summary judgment on the ground that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants sued for constitutional violations do not lose qualified immunity merely because their conduct violated a separate statute or administrative rule.

Davis v. Scherer · filed 1984-08-16

Officials sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely because their conduct violates some statutory or administrative provision.

Police officers may assert qualified immunity in suits under § 1983.

Garmon v. Robert Foust, (Two Cases) · filed 1984-08-20

Police officers are afforded a qualified immunity from liability in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against public officials are subject to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Tubbesing v. John Fox Arnold · filed 1984-08-22

The objective standard now permits summary judgment for the official if the law was not “clearly established” at the time the challenged action occurred.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the complaint alleges a violation of a clearly established right.

Galloway v. Hadl · filed 2008-04-28

Because plaintiff has alleged the violation of his clearly established right to be free from the use of excessive force in effecting an arrest, Hadl, Hofer and Riggs are not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim and the motion to dismiss on that ground is overruled.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from § 1983 liability when the alleged constitutional rights were clearly established and a reasonable officer should have known of them.

Linares v. Jones · filed 2008-04-28

Thus, Plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of actual constitutional rights which, as shown by the foregoing precedent, were clearly established long before the events giving rise to this action and about which a reasonable officer performing his duties in 2002 should have known. The Court therefore concludes that qualified immunity does not shield Rembish from liability under § 1983.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a strip search violates clearly established law.

Archuleta v. Wagner · filed 2008-04-29

Deputy Mandelko violated this law by strip searching Ms. Archule-ta and is not entitled to qualified immunity on these facts.

In a § 1983 excessive-force claim, qualified immunity does not require a prior case with identical facts when an officer shoots a compliant suspect or fires again after the suspect is objectively incapacitated.

Graves v. Shrf · filed 2008-04-30

Under general precedents such as Garner, Zachary should have known that his use of force was excessive. It does not take a specific case for an officer to know that he cannot shoot a compliant suspect and that he cannot fire again at someone who is objec- tively “downed or incapacitated.”

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on an officer protected by qualified immunity when the officer’s conduct did not violate a constitutional right.

Anderson v. City of Tampa · filed 2008-05-01

Officer Bucher is protected by qualified immunity and entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 does not afford an officer qualified immunity for assisting a private party’s unlawful seizure of property when clearly established law gave the officer notice that the assistance was unlawful.

Price-Cornelison v. Brooks · filed 2008-05-02

Brooks was thus on notice on October 16, 2003, that he could be liable for assisting a private party’s unlawful seizure of property at the time he threatened to arrest Price-Cornelison if she returned to her home to prevent Rogers from taking Price-Cornelison’s property.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff cannot show a constitutional violation.

Fox v. Graff · filed 2008-05-06

Thus, Fox has not shown that his constitutional rights have been violated, and, therefore, the Officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

A government official facing a § 1983 claim is entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could make the same mistake about whether the conduct was lawful.

Purtell v. Mason · filed 2008-05-14

But the officer’s mistake about the scope of the plaintiffs’ constitutional right to ridicule their neighbors was one a reasonable officer might make in this situation. He was therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity for a mistaken restriction of speech if a reasonable officer could have made the same mistake.

Purtell, Jeffrey v. Mason, Bruce · filed 2008-05-14

Officer Mason’s on-the-street judgment, though mistaken, is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against an officer are subject to qualified immunity when the officer’s conduct violates no constitutional right.

Njang v. Montgomery County MD · filed 2008-05-14

We therefore agree with the district court that Officer Marchone is entitled to qualified immunity from Appellants’ claim of excessive force, and that summary judgment was appropriate.

A child welfare worker is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for searching a child under clothing at a private school without consent or another warrant exception when clearly established law gave fair warning.

Michael C. v. Gresbach · filed 2008-05-19

Considering the facts above in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, we find that a reasonable child welfare worker would have known that conducting a search of a child’s body under his clothes, on private property, without consent or the presence of any other exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, is in direct violation of the child’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches.

A child welfare worker is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when clearly established law warned that consent to interview a child did not permit a search of the child’s body.

C., Michael v. Gresbach, Dana · filed 2008-05-19

In this case, it was clearly estab- lished that the scope of consent to interview does not extend to a search of an individual’s body under Jimeno and its progeny.

A § 1983 plaintiff opposing summary judgment on qualified immunity must show both a violation of a constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established when the defendant acted.

Cordova v. Aragon · filed 2008-05-20

Plaintiff Tracey Cordova brings this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”), which provides a remedy for constitutional violations committed by individuals acting under color of state law. ... Under Tenth Circuit law, a plaintiff seeking to avoid summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds must satisfy a “heavy” two-part burden of showing that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s unlawful conduct.

Section 1983 qualified immunity bars personal-capacity damages when a reasonable official could have believed the employee’s position was subject to political dismissal.

López-Quiñones v. Puerto Rico National Guard · filed 2008-05-21

Given past precedent, we cannot say it was clearly established that Lopez, a director of a significant unit within the Puerto Rico National Guard, was insulated from political dismissal. Accordingly, while Lopez may seek injunctive relief for his termination, he may not obtain monetary relief from the individual defendants in their personal capacities.

Officers facing § 1983 claims are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established in the circumstances they faced.

Egolf v. Witmer · filed 2008-05-22

In this instance, we agree with the District Court that, regardless of whether the police violated the protesters’ First and Fourth Amendment rights, these rights were not “clearly established” in this circumstance.

An officer does not lose qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim merely because a person advancing toward her may have begun to turn as she fired.

Lehman v. Leichliter · filed 2008-05-27

The mere fact that Matthew may have changed his direction, changed his course, or simply changed his mind about advancing on Leichliter as she fired does not deprive the officer of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to officers when no objectively reasonable officer could believe the arrest was lawful under clearly established law.

Pitt v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-06-02

Accordingly, Officers Adams and Baxter are not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs claim under Section 1983.

An officer sued individually under § 1983 may assert qualified immunity against an excessive force claim.

Marshall v. West · filed 2008-06-02

A law enforcement officer may raise qualified immunity as an affirmative defense to a § 1983 individual-capacity lawsuit. ... Accordingly, West is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim that he used excessive force when he discharged his weapon.