42 U.S.C. § 1983

Government officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Peters v. Crank · filed 2009-08-28

To the that extent Peters’s petitions can be construed to allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 5 against any of the defendants, qualified immunity is immunity from suit available to government officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983. ... Appellees’ alleged failure to investigate Peters’s complaints regarding stolen property or file charges on those complaints did not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional law or right.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 knock-and-announce claim when a reasonable officer could have suspected that announcing entry would be dangerous.

Whittier Ex Rel. Estate of Diotaiuto v. Bruna · filed 2009-08-31

In this case, we conclude Bruna and Visners are entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer could have had reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing his presence would have been dangerous under the circumstances facing the SWAT team.

Officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 knock-and-announce claim when a reasonable officer could have suspected that announcing their presence would be dangerous.

Whittier Ex Rel. Estate of Diotaiuto v. Goldstein · filed 2009-08-31

In this case, we conclude Goldstein and Palacio are entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer could have had reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing his presence would have been dangerous under the circumstances facing the SWAT team.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from a Section 1983 knock-and-announce claim when a reasonable officer could have suspected that announcing entry would be dangerous.

Whittier v. Kobayashi · filed 2009-08-31

In sum, we conclude Kobayashi is entitled to qualified immunity on Whittier’s knock-and-announce claim.

Qualified immunity is analyzed the same way for claims against county officers under Section 1983 and claims against federal officers under Bivens.

Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County · filed 2002-03-13

While the Ramirezes sued the federal officers under Bivens and the county officers under section 1983, "the qualified immunity analysis is identical under either.”

Section 1983 allows qualified immunity for an official sued individually when the right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Anobile v. Pelligrino · filed 2002-03-15

The doctrine of qualified immunity provides immunity to government officials sued in their individual capacity in any of three situations: (1) if the conduct at issue is not prohibited by federal law; (2) even if the conduct was prohibited, if the plaintiff's right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct; or (3) if the defendant's conduct was objectively legally reasonable in light of clearly established law. ... We therefore hold that Joel Leveson is entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that the challenged discharge was unlawful.

Friedman v. Bishop · filed 2002-04-08

Therefore, because Friedman, 59 S.W.3d at 878, held that Armstrong had the final authority, with the approval of the fiscal court, to remove county employees, not only were the defendants entitled to qualified immunity, but there was also no cause of action for the discharge, because it was authorized by law.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer could believe the challenged conduct was lawful.

Pickens v. Miller · filed 2002-07-10

As discussed previously above, the uncontested facts of this case could lead a reasonable officer to believe that impounding the motorcycle was lawful. The Court therefore finds that Officer Faulk is qualifiedly immune from Plaintiffs § 1983 claim.

Qualified immunity bars damages under § 1983 when a reasonable official could believe that efforts to correct an unconstitutional program were sufficient.

Nusbaum v. Terrangi · filed 2002-07-19

This court may not be satisfied that the Program is in compliance, however, a reasonable officer could believe that their efforts were sufficient. ... For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of good faith qualified immunity is GRANTED. Thus, plaintiffs are not entitled to damages.

A public official cannot obtain qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage when the plaintiff may establish that the official violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Gallaher v. Goldsmith · filed 2002-07-26

Therefore, on this motion to dismiss, the mayor cannot use qualified immunity to shield himself from Gallaher’s § 1983 claim.

Public officials have qualified immunity from section 1983 liability when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Soto v. Bzdel · filed 2002-07-26

For the reasons which follow, the court finds that a federal constitutional claim has been properly alleged by Plaintiff, but agrees with Defendants that they are qualifiedly immune from Plaintiffs section 1983 causes of action.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when the unlawfulness of the force would have been clear to a reasonable officer.

Martinez v. New Mexico Department of Public Safety · filed 2002-07-29

We do not hold that Trooper Boyd unequivocably violated the Fourth Amendment, merely that he is not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

Police officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when, on the plaintiff’s supported version of the facts, they arrest without probable cause and use excessive force.

Barron v. Livingston · filed 2002-08-13

Upon consideration, we will affirm the magistrate judge’s decision and order because defendants Livingston and Eikenberry are not entitled to qualified immunity under the facts taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff.

A supervisor sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage when sufficiently detailed allegations show that he knew of a subordinate’s sexual harassment and took no remedial action.

Palisano v. City of Clearwater · filed 2002-08-14

The Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts in support of her unlawful sexual harassment claim to overcome the defense of qualified immunity.

Individual defendants in a § 1983 suit are not entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would have known the alleged conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Nicol v. Auburn-Washburn USD 437 · filed 2002-11-01

Under the facts alleged here, the court finds that a reasonable officer in defendant Targett’s position should have known that the use of excessive force in response to a student’s non-compliant actions would violate well-known constitutional principles. Accordingly, the court finds the individual defendants against whom plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim is alleged are not qualifiedly immune.

An officer sued individually under § 1983 cannot obtain qualified immunity when every objectively reasonable officer would know the conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights, even without factually similar precedent.

Vinyard v. Wilson · filed 2002-11-14

Although the “obvious clarity” standard is often difficult to meet, we conclude that the law in 1998 was clearly established that Stanfield’s conduct, as Vinyard describes it, during the jail ride violated an arrestee’s constitutional rights. Considering Vinyard’s version of the events, no factually-particularized, preexisting case law was necessary for it to be very obvious to every objectively reasonable officer facing Stanfield’s situation that Stanfield’s conduct during the jail ride violated Vinyard’s constitutional right to be free of the excessive use of force.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to an officer who could not reasonably believe probable cause supported the arrest warrant.

Kearse v. McBee · filed 2002-11-22

We do not agree with the district court, however, that Moffett showed he reasonably believed probable cause existed for Kearse’s arrest warrant to issue and, thus, that he was entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity unless the official’s conduct violates clearly established law.

Smoak v. Hall · filed 2009-09-02

When Hall shot the dog, Smoak stood up, crying out, ‘You shot my dog, you shot my dog!” Despite the fact that both Bush and Andrews had hold of the handcuffed Smoak, that Trooper Phann had hold of Smoak’s step-son, Brandon, and that the two Cookeville officers had guns at the ready, Bush contends that he thought it was necessary to slam Smoak to the ground, i.e., that this use of force was, at most, a reasonable mistake. We disagree. Having reviewed the evidence, including the video, we find this use of force clearly unreasonable. Bush has not established that he was entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for denying a requested post-termination name-clearing hearing after publicly making stigmatizing charges.

Rush v. Perryman · filed 2009-09-03

Rush’s right to a post-termination name-clearing hearing was clearly established. The district court did not err in denying the Board members’ summary judgment motion on qualified immunity grounds.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy against a person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of a federal right, subject to qualified immunity.

St. John v. McColley · filed 2009-09-08

Because both New Mexico law and the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unjustified seizure were clearly established, and a reasonable officer is presumed to know clearly established law, see, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727, qualified immunity does not protect Defendants.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a government employee for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Friedman v. Boucher · filed 2009-09-08

Friedman brought suit against Boucher and Luzaich (“Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the ground that they violated his Fourth Amendment rights by taking the sample. ... To determine whether a government employee is entitled to qualified immunity, we use a two-part test.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for constitutional violations committed under color of state law, subject here to qualified immunity limits.

Wright v. City of Salisbury, Mo. · filed 2009-09-10

The individual Defendants argue that even if Plaintiff has an actionable claim under § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation, they are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Based on this authority, this Court concludes that the individual Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's First Amendment claim.

Section 1983 claims against officials may be barred by qualified immunity.

Smith v. Bender · filed 2009-09-11

Third, the judge ... determined that the doctrine of qualified immunity barred Mr. Smith’s claims against defendants Suthers and Haines. ... Because Mr. Smith has utterly failed to convince us that any of the district judge’s rulings are erroneous, we affirm the dismissal of Mr. Smith’s claims and the denial of his recusal motion for the reasons set forth in the district judge’s opinion and final order.

The court affirmed denial of qualified immunity to an officer sued under § 1983 over an arrest for allegedly lying to police.

Darbisi v. Town of Monroe · filed 2002-12-16

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, defendant Jay Torreso appeals the determination of the District Court that defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity in connection with his arrest of plaintiff Christopher Darbisi for allegedly lying to a police officer. ... We affirm the judgment of the District Court with respect to qualified immunity substantially for the reasons stated in its opinion entered on January 14, 2002.

The defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 malicious prosecution claim even if the plaintiffs made out a prima facie case.

Phillips ex rel. Phillips v. DeAngelis · filed 2009-09-15

We also agree with the District Court’s holding, uncontested by plaintiffs, that “even if the plaintiffs made out a prima facie case of malicious prosecution ... defendants would be entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.”

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 procedural due process claim when they reasonably believed their conduct was lawful.

Jarovits v. Monroe County Children & Youth Services · filed 2009-09-21

Focusing on the second prong — whether it was objectively reasonable for Appellants to have believed that they acted lawfully under the circumstances they confronted in this case — we conclude that Appellants are entitled to qualified immunity from Appellees’ procedural due process claim.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Mayrides v. Delaware County Commissioners · filed 2009-09-24

As discussed above, the Delaware Defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings on the federal substantive due process and equal protection claims because of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim does not follow merely because courts have not agreed on the precise standard governing the asserted right.

Harris v. City of Circleville · filed 2009-10-02

A defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity simply because the courts have not “agreed upon the precise formulation of the [applicable] standard.”

Section 1983 permits liability claims against government officials, subject to qualified immunity unless they violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services · filed 2009-10-02

Qualified immunity may protect government officials from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but not if their conduct violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

A defendant in a § 1983 action is not entitled to qualified immunity when the facts show a violation of a clearly established right.

Weatherford v. Taylor · filed 2009-10-05

Weatherford’s estate filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Taylor and other defendants. In this interlocutory appeal from an order denying summary judgment, we must decide whether the district court erred in ruling that Taylor is not entitled to qualified immunity. We affirm.

An officer has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim when a reasonable belief that a judge directed the arrest gives the officer arguable probable cause.

Droz v. McCadden · filed 2009-10-07

Based on the stipulated facts, as a matter of law, McCadden reasonably believed Herder instructed him to arrest Droz. This belief was sufficient to establish arguable probable cause for the arrest. McCadden is therefore entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest charge.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a Section 1983 claim based on unduly tight handcuffing when the right was clearly established and the evidence supports the claim.

Morrison v. Board of Trustees of Green Tp. · filed 2009-10-08

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unduly tight or excessively forceful handcuffing during the course of a seizure. ... This right was “clearly established” for qualified immunity purposes at the time of Amanda’s seizure on October 30, 2002.

A defendant facing a Section 1983 claim has qualified immunity at summary judgment unless the evidence would allow a reasonable juror to find a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Morrison v. Board of Trustees of Green Township · filed 2009-10-08

A defendant enjoys qualified immunity on summary judgment unless the facts alleged and the evidence produced, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable juror to find that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) the right was clearly established. See Jones v. City of ... Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).

A plaintiff cannot overcome qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages claim against officials in their individual capacities without establishing a constitutional violation.

James v. Gonzalez · filed 2009-10-08

The district court correctly found that Appellant has therefore failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights and has not overcome Appellees’ qualified immunity defense.

Qualified immunity provides a complete defense to a § 1983 claim when an officer had an objectively reasonable belief that his actions were justified under the circumstances.

Aczel v. Labonia · filed 2009-10-09

Then, on the subject of qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s federal civil rights claims, the court properly instructed the jury, in accord with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), and without objection from Plaintiff, to the effect that a defendant had an absolute defense to liability if, at the time of his interaction with Plaintiff, the defendant had an objectively reasonable belief that his actions were justified under the circumstances.

Section 1983 claims against an officer can survive qualified immunity at summary judgment when factual disputes permit a jury to find a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.

HARAPAT v. Vigil · filed 2009-10-13

Moreover, the facts presented are sufficient to meet the two-part test to defeat qualified immunity because Harapat has established enough genuine issues of fact that a reasonable jury could find that Vigil violated Harapat’s constitutional rights and, moreover, that the constitutional rights that were violated were clearly established, and the facts are sufficient that a reasonable jury could determine that Vigil’s actions were not the actions of an objectively reasonable individual.

Section 1983 officers have qualified immunity from a claim based on an alleged right to periodic review of restraints when that right was not clearly established.

Dumpson v. McGinnis · filed 2009-10-13

The district court also did not err in holding that Dumpson’s alleged right to a periodic review of defendants’ decision to restrain him was not clearly established.

Government officials have qualified immunity from individual-capacity § 1983 claims when the right allegedly violated was not sufficiently clear to make their conduct objectively unreasonable.

Watts v. City of Jackson · filed 2009-10-14

The Court therefore finds that the contours of the subject rights are not sufficiently clear and that the individual defendants did not act with objective unreasonableness. Defendants enjoy qualified immunity from the § 1983 claims brought against them in their individual capacities.

Qualified immunity does not shield an official from a Section 1983 claim when the right was clearly established and a jury could find that the official made a stigmatizing statement in connection with the plaintiff’s termination.

Abdul-Salaam v. LOBO-WADLEY · filed 2009-10-14

Thus, because Abdul-Salaam had a constitutional right that was well-established and because a reasonable juror could conclude that Lobo-Wadley made a stigmatizing statement in connection with his termination, she is not entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when existing law gave fair warning that the alleged use of force was unconstitutional.

Howell v. Sheriff of Palm Beach County · filed 2009-10-15

Although the use of pepper spray is often “a very reasonable alternative to escalating a physical struggle with an arrestee,” id. at 1348, the district court did not err in concluding that there was a genuine issue of material fact about whether that use of force was excessive under the particular facts the plaintiffs alleged in this case. Therefore, at this point in the proceedings, Dougan is not entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when his conduct is objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Manis v. Lawson · filed 2009-10-16

Therefore, Zemlik’s actions were objectively reasonable under clearly established law, and he is entitled to qualified immunity.

A Section 1983 plaintiff opposing summary judgment on qualified immunity must show both a violation of a constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established.

Fisher v. City of Las Cruces · filed 2009-10-19

When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must clear two hurdles in order to defeat the defendant’s motion. The plaintiff must demonstrate that on the facts alleged the defendant violated his or her constitutional or statutory rights. In addition, the plaintiff must show that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged unlawful activity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim when the governing law was not clear enough for a reasonable official to know the conduct was unlawful.

Fifield v. Eaton · filed 2009-10-20

Even if Fifield’s allegations did state valid Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment claims, I find that the law governing the constitutionality of sex offender programs like the one confronted here is not sufficiently clear or uniform for Fifield to prevail, because the unsettled nature of the governing law entitles the defendant to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity on a warrantless-arrest claim when a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Berglund v. Pottawatomie County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2009-10-22

“[W]hen a warrantless arrest or seizure is the subject of a § 1983 action, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest or detain the plaintiff.” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1120. On these facts, it is clear that a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Ms. Berglund. Thus, the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from a Section 1983 damages claim when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Davis v. Prince George's County, MD · filed 2009-10-23

In this case, we find that "it is plain that [the] constitutional right" postulated by Davis "is not clearly established."

A defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Bowling v. Rector · filed 2009-10-26

Because Rector’s alleged conduct in exceeding the scope of the search warrant violated Bowling’s clearly established right under the Fourth Amendment, the district court correctly concluded that Rector was not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Thus, as to Bowling’s § 1983 claim that Rector violated his constitutional rights by exceeding the scope of the search warrant, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Rector’s summary judgment motion.

Qualified immunity does not shield prison officials from a Section 1983 claim when they knowingly leave an inmate in a cell with a hazardous pest infestation despite clearly established law.

Benshoof v. Layton · filed 2009-10-27

In light of this precedent, we conclude that the constitutional prohibition against allowing an inmate to remain in a cell rendered hazardous by pervasive infestations of pests was clearly established in December 2007. ... The district court’s denial of qualified immunity to defendants-appellants on Benshoof’s Eighth Amendment claims is AFFIRMED.

A § 1983 defendant cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when disputed facts prevent the court from determining whether the defendant acted objectively reasonably.

Rosen v. City of New York · filed 2009-10-28

As discussed above, there are too many unresolved factual disputes for the Court to determine that Defendants have satisfied their burden of proving that Hlatky’s actions were objectively reasonable. Therefore, the Court must deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the issue of qualified immunity.

An officer sued individually under § 1983 may be entitled to qualified immunity on a constitutional claim.

Norment v. Newton County Sheriff's Departm · filed 2009-10-30

He implicitly acknowledges, and we agree, that under these facts, Deputy Howard is entitled to qualified immunity on the constitutional claim and official immunity on the state law claims.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when they reasonably believe their discretionary actions are lawful.

Norse v. City of Santa Cruz · filed 2009-11-03

Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity where they reasonably believe their actions to be lawful.

In a § 1983 excessive force claim, a genuine dispute of material fact precludes summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Bridges v. Yeager · filed 2009-11-03

We have held that “summary judgment motions may not be granted on any excessive force claims under § 1983 for which any genuine issue of material fact remains—regardless of whether the potential grant would arise from qualified immunity or from a showing that the officer merely had not committed a constitutional violation.” ... The district court erred in granting summary judgment on the excessive force claim at this stage of the proceedings.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a free association claim when the asserted right is not clearly established.

Rutherford v. Katonah-Lewisboro School District · filed 2009-11-03

But, even if the Tenth Circuit is correct, and the associational right here at issue need not touch on a matter of public concern, individual defendants Roelle and Benedict are entitled to qualified immunity, because the law establishing that right is far from well-settled in this Circuit.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim at summary judgment when the evidence permits a jury to find that no reasonable officer could have believed probable cause or exigent circumstances justified entering a home and seizing its occupants.

Thompson v. ANOKA-HENNEPIN EAST METRO NARCOTICS · filed 2009-11-03

Further, a reasonable juror could conclude, on the record before it, that no reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause or exigent circumstances existed to justify the entrance into Plaintiffs’ house and Plaintiffs’ seizure. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have submitted sufficient evidence to overcome the individual officers’ assertions of qualified immunity and thus to survive summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ claim for unlawful arrest, unlawful entry, and false imprisonment.

A plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 claim need not anticipate a qualified immunity defense in the complaint.

Giardina v. Lawrence · filed 2009-11-03

It is true that the complaint did not include allegations that addressed the likely qualified immunity defense. However, a plaintiff need not anticipate the defense in the complaint.

In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must show both a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established to overcome qualified immunity.

Chappell v. City of Cleveland · filed 2009-11-04

Plaintiff must show both that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to her, a constitutional right was violated and that the right was clearly established at the time of the violation.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 excessive force claim when the plaintiff sufficiently shows a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Reynolds v. Guerra · filed 2009-11-04

The Court finds that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs excessive force claim. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a clearly established constitutional violation.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 excessive force claim at summary judgment when the plaintiff’s account, if believed, shows a violation of clearly established law.

Rhoads v. Miller · filed 2009-11-05

Mr. Rhoads alleges that his injuries resulted from a beating rendered without resistence or provocation. If believed by the jury, the events he describes are sufficient to support a claim of violation of clearly established law under Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-96 (1989), and this court’s precedent.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim over an added charge when the original arrest was supported by probable cause and the person remained in custody.

Angeline v. City of Hoover Alabama · filed 2009-11-05

Because probable cause to arrest Angeline for driving under the influence was sufficient to subsequently charge Angeline for possession of controlled substances, we find Officers Holder and Monosky are entitled to qualified immunity on Angeline’s claim for false arrest for possession of controlled substances.

Section 1983 qualified immunity requires consideration of the specific scope and nature of each defendant’s immunity claim; cursory treatment of that defense warrants remand.

Distiso v. Town of Wolcott · filed 2009-11-05

We believe remand is appropriate here to permit the district court in the first instance to address the specific scope and nature of the Defendants’ qualified immunity claim.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Jones v. Byrnes · filed 2009-11-09

In the alternative, even if the officers’ actions did rise to the level of violating Jones’s constitutional rights, it was not clearly established at the time of the incident that actions of that sort crossed the constitutional line.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct violates a clearly established right that a reasonable officer would have known.

Smith v. Kansas City, Missouri Police Department · filed 2009-11-09

“In a § 1983 action, state actors may be entitled to qualified immunity.” ... The district court properly denied qualified immunity to Malek.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless the evidence supports a violation of a clearly established constitutional right that a reasonable officer would have known about.

Rohrbough v. Hall · filed 2009-11-09

Officer Hall is entitled to qualified immunity unless the evidence viewed favorably to Mr. Rohrbough supports a finding that Officer Hall’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and that constitutional right was so “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation that a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct was unlawful.

State actors sued under Section 1983 may claim qualified immunity, but it does not shield conduct that violates clearly established rights.

Smith v. Officer Troy Taff · filed 2009-11-09

“In a § 1983 action, state actors may be entitled to qualified immunity.” ... The district court properly denied qualified immunity to Malek.

Section 1983 defendants sued for damages in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Rivera v. Tim Reisch, etc. · filed 2009-11-09

Putting aside the question whether Rivera alleged a violation of a constitutional right, see Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009) (courts are permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which prong of qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of circumstances of particular case), we conclude that any constitutional right she possessed to different treatment was not so clearly established that a reasonable person in defendants’ position would have known that his actions violated her constitutional right in this case, see Krout, 2009 WL 3172180, at *4 (de novo review); Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 2008) (court must determine whether facts, construed in light most favorable to plaintiff, establish violation of constitutional right, and whether right was clearly established).

Qualified immunity protects government officials from § 1983 liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Nance v. Sammis · filed 2009-11-10

Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability under § 1983 when their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Since the surrounding factual circumstances are in dispute, material questions of fact prevent granting summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

An officer sued under Section 1983 cannot claim qualified immunity for a warrantless in-home arrest based on a state statute that merely expresses a preference for arrest.

Denton v. Rievley · filed 2009-11-13

We, therefore, do not think an interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-619 to permit warrantless in-home arrests is objectively reasonable in light of long-standing Supreme Court precedent holding that such arrests violate the Fourth Amendment.

Individual officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 equal protection and conspiracy claims when they did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Corey Airport Services, Inc. v. DeCosta · filed 2009-11-16

The Defendants did not violate a clearly established constitutional right and are therefore protected by qualified immunity from both the equal protection claim and the conspiracy claim.

Qualified immunity can bar a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim arising from an officer’s mistaken use of force.

Torres v. City of Madera · filed 2009-11-18

The court finds that, at a minimum, Defendant Noriega is entitled to qualified immunity for her mistaken shooting of Torres, and as such Defendants are entitled to summary adjudication on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim.

In a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff seeking to overcome an officer’s qualified immunity must show a violation of a federal right that was clearly established when the officer acted.

Croom v. Balkwill · filed 2009-11-18

It is undisputed that on August 20, 2004, Defendants Graham, Bybee, and Legg were acting within their discretionary authority as law enforcement officers. [Dkt. 2], Therefore, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when they could reasonably believe their conduct was lawful under clearly established law.

Robert L. Pavone & Valerie v. Pavone v. Linda Puglisi · filed 2009-11-19

With regard to Plaintiffs’ due process claim, we conclude that the district court properly held that Defendants’ behavior in terminating Mr. Pavone’s 207-c benefits without a pre-deprivation hearing was objectively reasonable.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity unless their conduct violates clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Haldeman v. Golden · filed 2009-11-23

Qualified immunity protects § 1983 defendants from civil liability unless their conduct violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

An official sued under § 1983 has qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Szymecki v. Houck · filed 2009-11-24

Here, the district court concluded that Szymecki’s asserted First Amendment right to record police activities on public property was not clearly established in this circuit at the time of the alleged conduct. We have thoroughly reviewed the record and the relevant legal authorities and we agree.

A state officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would not have understood the challenged conduct to violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Phillips v. Hust · filed 2009-12-02

In light of the Supreme Court’s flexible rules for pro se filings, which do not require and perhaps do not even permit comb-binding, we have no difficulty concluding that Hust is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield a public official from a § 1983 race or sex discrimination claim when the evidence supports a constitutional violation and the right was clearly established.

Wimbley v. Cashion · filed 2009-12-03

Taken in the light most favorable to Wimbley, Cashion’s conduct violated her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Cashion is not entitled to qualified immunity under part one of the Saucier inquiry. ... There is no question that Wimbley’s right to be free from racial or sex discrimination was well-established at the time of her termination.

A § 1983 plaintiff who does not challenge qualified immunity on appeal and concedes that the asserted right was not clearly established cannot overturn the official’s immunity ruling.

Reyes v. Weslaco Independent School Dis, et · filed 2009-12-03

He makes no argument with respect to qualified immunity. Additionally, he openly concedes that his claim is not supported by clearly established law and asks us to extend a First Amendment right in this case to provide him the relief he seeks. Accordingly, we find no basis to reverse the district court’s conclusion that Rivera is entitled to qualified immunity.

A Section 1983 plaintiff need not anticipate a qualified immunity defense in the complaint.

Giardina v. Lawrence · filed 2009-12-07

It is true that the complaint did not include specific allegations that addressed the likely qualified immunity defense. However, a plaintiff need not anticipate the defense in the complaint.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the evidence does not show reckless disregard for the truth in a warrant application.

Barton v. Curtis · filed 2009-12-08

While we now know that the Florida court’s order became invalid as a result of Barton’s objection, the Territorial Court record available to Curtis did not disclose this fact, and nothing in the record before us suggests that Curtis had “obvious reasons to doubt the truth of [the assertions]” in his warrant application. ... We therefore agree with the District Court that Curtis is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer cannot obtain qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim by relying on a policy that did not authorize the challenged conduct.

Bass v. Goodwill · filed 2009-12-09

Therefore, the unwritten policy, by Officer Goodwill’s own formulation, did not authorize his conduct, and he is not entitled to qualified immunity because he relied upon it.

Officials sued in their official capacities cannot assert qualified immunity against a Section 1983 damages claim.

GUZMAN-VARGAS v. Calderon · filed 2009-12-09

Officials sued in their official capacities may not take advantage of a qualified immunity defense. ... The Court, therefore, considers defendants’ eligibility for the defense only in the context of claims brought against them in their individual capacities.

A social worker sued under § 1983 lacks qualified immunity for an alleged misrepresentation used to obtain a child-removal order when the right against judicial deception was clearly established.

Greene v. Camreta · filed 2009-12-10

Camreta is not entitled to qualified immunity as to the false representation claim, as the Greenes’ right to be free from judicial deception in securing the removal order was clearly established at the time of Camreta’s alleged misrepresentations to the court.

In a Section 1983 suit, an officer who raises qualified immunity on summary judgment is entitled to judgment if the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

DelMonico v. Capito · filed 2009-12-14

Plaintiff has failed to show that the defendant officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. The district court therefore properly granted summary judgment to the defendants on his claims on the basis of qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when an officer in the same position could reasonably have believed probable cause supported the arrest under the law at the time.

Herrera v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2009-12-14

Because an officer in O’Brien’s position could have reasonably concluded that probable cause existed to arrest Herrera for violating N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-6-1(D)(1), the district court properly held that O’Brien was entitled to qualified immunity from Herrera’s § 1983 claims.

A school supervisor may be denied qualified immunity from a Section 1983 student sexual abuse claim when material factual disputes concern the supervisor’s knowledge, deliberate indifference, and causation.

Guillory v. Thomas · filed 2009-12-14

We also hold that the factual disputes identified in the district court’s opinion are material. Therefore, Dr. Thomas is not as a matter of law entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity from damages when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Holmes v. Haugen · filed 2009-12-15

Here, even if it could be said that the correctional officers retaliated against Holmes, the discipline at issue arose out of Holmes’s decision to question the correctional officers’s interpretation of a prison policy. Accordingly, the defendants-appellees are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

Section 1983 does not give a social worker qualified immunity for taking a child into custody without specific, articulable evidence of imminent danger.

Robinson v. TRIPLER ARMY MEDICAL CENTER · filed 2009-12-16

Adopting the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, this Court finds that Plourde is not entitled to qualified immunity because he did not have specific, articulable evidence that provided reasonable cause to believe that Kewai was in imminent danger of abuse before he took custody of Kewai.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official in their position could have believed the challenged conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Mosher Ex Rel. Estate of Mosher v. Nelson · filed 2009-12-17

A reasonable official in Nelson’s place, given the circumstances and the legal standard, could have believed that allowing the practice to continue would not lead to events that would violate a patient’s rights. Therefore, Nelson is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Bonilla v. United States · filed 2009-12-17

These defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because there is no holding in the applicable jurisprudence dictating that their sweep violated clearly established law governing the permissible scope of such a search.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when factual disputes prevent the court from deciding whether officials violated clearly established rights.

Dorothy King, R.N. and Patricia Battle, R.N., et al. v. Betts · filed 2009-12-18

Any determination for the purpose of summary judgment that Appellees’ actions were reasonable would be premature as factual disputes remain concerning what the conduct was. Because of these disputes, summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity was inappropriate.

Qualified immunity protects officials from § 1983 damages claims when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Akins v. Epperly · filed 2009-12-18

Qualified immunity requires a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. ... Akins thus has not established that Trammell and Vaughan were guilty of more than mere negligence, which is insufficient to establish a claim of conscience-shocking conduct. ... Because Trammell’s and Vaughan’s involvement occurred after Akins’s arrest, Akins cannot maintain a Fourth Amendment claim against them.

Qualified immunity protects government officials from § 1983 damages unless they violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Akins v. Vaughan · filed 2009-12-18

Qualified immunity protects governmental officials from liability for civil damages if they have not violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

In a § 1983 suit against public officials, a court may require a Rule 7(a) reply with specific facts to address a qualified immunity defense before ruling on a motion to dismiss.

Carty v. TX Dept of Pub Sfty · filed 2009-12-21

Under Rule 8, a plaintiff suing a public official under § 1983 must file a short and plain statement of his claim for relief, a statement that rests on more than conclusions alone. ... Because greater factual specificity in plaintiff’s allegations might assist in resolving the qualified immunity issue early in the proceedings, the district court erred in not requiring plaintiff to file a reply under Rule 7(a) before ruling on defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Government officials sued under § 1983 in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Decker v. Dunbar · filed 2009-12-21

Because Decker has not established that Appellees’ conduct violated any constitutional right, Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity for claims brought against them in their individual capacities.

In a § 1983 action, qualified immunity may be submitted to a jury only when disputed material facts affect the immunity decision.

Gonzales v. Duran · filed 2009-12-22

This was certainly error as to the Fourth Amendment claim because no factual disputes dispositive of the qualified immunity inquiry existed.

Qualified immunity does not shield an individual defendant from a § 1983 political-discrimination claim when the reason for the employee’s termination remains a disputed material fact.

Costa-Urena v. Segarra · filed 2009-12-22

The reason for the plaintiffs' termination is a disputed issue of material fact. Under such circumstances, a grant of qualified immunity is inappropriate.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts could establish a violation of clearly established rights.

Harrison v. J. Sample · filed 2009-12-22

Furthermore, it would be clear to a reasonable officer that delaying access to medical treatment in a medical emergency is unlawful. ... Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the evidence does not raise a triable issue that the defendant violated a constitutional right.

Duarte v. Bevan · filed 2009-12-22

Therefore, the district court properly held that Bevan was entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant facing a § 1983 claim is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when the only evidence implicating him is inadmissible hearsay.

Miller v. Harrison County MS · filed 2009-12-23

Miller's deposition testimony is the only evidence the district court cites that implicates Gaston in Miller's alleged harm. ... As this evidence is clearly inadmissible, the district court committed manifest error in denying Gaston summary judgment on his claim of qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct violated the plaintiffs’ rights.

Ambrose v. Coffey · filed 2009-12-24

Because the law was not clearly established, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity to the extent that plaintiffs’ claims rely on MUAs being lawful.

Qualified immunity cannot support dismissal of a § 1983 claim when it rests solely on an erroneous finding that the complaint fails to allege a constitutional violation.

Smith v. Smith · filed 2009-12-28

Furthermore, because the district court premised both the grant of the motion to dismiss and qualified immunity on its finding that Smith failed to allege deliberate indifference in his complaint, the immunity analysis was prematurely con- cluded on the erroneous basis that Smith did not plead facts sufficient to indicate Nurse Smith had deliberate indifference to his medical need. As the district court provided no addi- tional reasoning to support qualified immunity, we reverse that holding as well.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when, on the plaintiff’s version of the facts, the force violates a clearly established Fourth Amendment right.

Bryan v. McPherson · filed 2009-12-28

Bryan filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Officer McPherson appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. We affirm the district court because, viewing the circumstances in the light most favorable to Bryan, Officer McPherson’s use of the taser was unconstitutionally excessive and a violation of Bryan’s clearly established rights.

Officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the rule invoked against them was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Pethtel v. West Virginia State Police · filed 2009-12-31

At that time, the Waterman rule was not clearly established law in this circuit.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 claims against child-protection caseworkers when their actions are objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Cornejo v. Bell · filed 2010-01-04

The caseworker defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s § 1983 claims because their actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

In a § 1983 suit, qualified immunity depends on whether the defendant violated a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established; the court may address either question first.

Mingus v. Butler · filed 2010-01-05

Whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity depends upon whether the plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated and whether those rights were clearly established. ... This Court may exercise its “sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” ... We conclude that Mingus’s constitutional rights were not violated.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when they could reasonably believe their conduct did not violate the Constitution.

Schulte v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2010-01-05

We agree with the district court that, under the circumstances, Mejia and Holtz could have reasonably believed in light of all the circumstances that they confronted that their conduct did not violate the Constitution. ... The officers are thus entitled to qualified immunity, and we need not address whether Schulte has alleged sufficient facts to make out a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

An official sued individually under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the official was not personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.

Strinni v. Mehlville Fire Protection Dist. · filed 2010-01-06

Therefore, Chief Silvernail, in his individual capacity, is entitled to qualified immunity as he was not personally involved in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct that is the basis of Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims.

A jailer who knows of a detainee’s serious medical risk and fails to obtain prompt care may face a personal-participation claim under § 1983 despite a qualified immunity defense.

Harper v. Lawrence County, Ala. · filed 2010-01-06

Thus, Plaintiff properly stated “personal participation” section 1983 claims for deliberate indifference against Reed and Robinson, and the district court was right to deny those Defendants qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have known that the challenged conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Hammonds v. Martel · filed 2010-01-07

Thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground of qualified immunity.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the established facts show no constitutional violation.

Brown v. Acting Director of Metro Dade Correctional · filed 2010-01-07

Accordingly, no constitutional violation occurred, and Weston is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields officers from § 1983 liability unless they violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Dagdagan v. City of Vallejo · filed 2010-01-07

Further, each Defendant filed a cross motion for summary judgment, arguing the defense of qualified immunity precludes liability for Plaintiffs claims under the Fourth Amendment. ... For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED and DENIED in part and Defendants’ motions are DENIED. ... However, if the alleged conduct did violate such a right, then the court must determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged unlawful action. A right is clearly established if a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.

Officials sued for damages under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established and their conduct was reasonable.

Chism v. Washington Ex Rel. Washington State Patrol · filed 2010-01-08

Assuming, without deciding, there was a constitutional violation, Defendants Gardner and Sager are entitled to qualified immunity because the parameters of the particular constitutional right at issue (Fourth Amendment in the context of an Internet child pornography investigation) were not “clearly established” at the time of their alleged misconduct, and therefore, they reasonably believed they had probable cause to seek and obtain the warrants at issue.

Section 1983 allows qualified immunity for a state official when the right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Barragan v. Landry · filed 2010-01-08

After a careful de novo review of the record, the briefs, and arguments of the parties, we conclude that Landry is entitled to qualified immunity because the contours of the rights at issue in this case were not clearly established at the time of the actions.

Police officers sued under § 1983 have only qualified immunity, which does not shield them when they had fair warning that racially discriminatory policing violated equal protection.

Elliot-Park v. Manglona · filed 2010-01-12

Unlike prosecutors, who enjoy absolute immunity, police officers are entitled only to qualified immunity in section 1983 cases. ... The three officers thus had a more than fair warning that failure to investigate and arrest Babauta because of race violated equal protection.

Officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would not have known that the challenged conduct violated a clearly established right.

Mattos v. Agarano · filed 2010-01-12

Even if we thought that the officers used excessive force, it would not have been clear to any reasonable officer on August 23, 2006, that use of a Taser in the situation they confronted was constitutionally impermissible.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show that they violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Gosline v. New Mexico Finance Authority · filed 2010-01-12

Because Mr. Gosline “failed to make a showing that [he] had a protected property interest in continued employment, [he] failed to meet [his] burden to show defendants violated a clearly established right.” Watson v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 75 F.3d 569, 578 (10th Cir. 1996). Consequently, defendants Sisneros and Duff are entitled to qualified immunity on that claim.

When an official asserts qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit, the court examines a required Rule 7(a) reply along with the complaint.

Rhodes v. Prince · filed 2010-01-12

Where, as here, a defendant asserts the affirmative defense of qualified immunity and the district court requires the plaintiff to submit a particularized reply under Rule 7(a), we examine both the complaint and the Rule 7(a) reply.

Section 1983 does not protect a government official from a damages claim when qualified immunity is unavailable.

Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez · filed 2010-01-13

Because binding Eleventh Circuit precedent holds that a citizen’s constitutional right to be free from “deadly force in a situation that clearly would not justify its use” is clearly established, see id., and because Defendant violated that right by maliciously firing ten-plus rounds at the incapacitated and non-resisting Plaintiff who no longer posed a realistic threat or flight risk, I agree with Magistrate Judge Wfliite that the Defendant is not entitled to avail himself of the protections of qualified immunity in this particular case.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state actors, subject to qualified immunity for discretionary functions performed within their authority reasonably under then-existing law.

HOOTSTEIN v. Collins · filed 2010-01-14

As noted above, all Defendants, with the exception of Defendant Rome, moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff Grandparents’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an assertion that they are entitled to qualified immunity. State actors are protected from damages under § 1983 if “they have performed discretionary functions falling within the scope of their authority and have done so in an objectively reasonable manner, measured by the state of the law at the time the conduct occurred.” Brennan, 888 F.2d at 192 (citations omitted). The qualified immunity doctrine provides defendant public officials an immunity from suit and not a mere defense to liability. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Therefore, whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity should be resolved at the earliest possible stage in litigation. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991).

Section 1983 permits a civil claim against a state actor who violates a clearly established constitutional right, subject to qualified immunity.

Wilson v. Wilkins · filed 2010-01-19

Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we agree. A reasonable officer would have known that he was not free to make sexual overtures and repeatedly touch a citizen in his control in a moving vehicle.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim at summary judgment when the record could support a finding that their use of force violated clearly established law.

Herrera v. Bernalillo County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2010-01-20

We agree with the district court that this record is insufficient for us to hold as a matter of law, at this stage in the case, that the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against a prison hearing officer when a reasonable officer could have believed the evidence satisfied the requirements for discipline.

Creech v. SCHOELLKOPH · filed 2010-01-20

Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant is protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity, since at the time of his decision a reasonable hearing officer could have considered the “some evidence” requirement to be satisfied by Plaintiffs testimony and the detailed written incident reports.

An officer sued under § 1983 for wrongful arrest is entitled to qualified immunity if the officer had arguable probable cause to arrest.

Moran v. Cameron · filed 2010-01-21

We choose to first address the second prong of the Saucier test’s two-prong inquiry and ask whether the officers’ arrest of Moran was clearly established as unconstitutional because it lacked arguable probable cause. We hold that the officers had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Moran.

A defendant may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a genuine factual dispute over whether the defendant violated a constitutional right.

Trois v. Long · filed 2010-01-21

For the claim pursuant to § 1983, Deputy Long asserts qualified immunity. ... Because Trois has not presented any evidence that the Deputy maliciously withheld ... information from the grand jury, his claim fails to create a genuine issue of material fact on whether Deputy Long’s actions violated Trois’ constitutional rights. Therefore, for that claim, summary judgment based on qualified immunity was proper.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the undisputed facts show no Fourth Amendment violation.

Wallingford v. Olson · filed 2010-01-25

We reverse the judgment of the district court and grant Deputy Olson qualified immunity from Wallingford’s excessive force claim.

Qualified immunity protects a school official from § 1983 liability when the official’s conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Mardis v. HANNIBAL PUBLIC SCHOOL DIST. · filed 2010-01-25

The Court finds the Janes is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. As discussed above, Janes's conduct did not violate Plaintiff's clearly established First Amendment rights.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff's evidence fails to establish a constitutional violation.

J.R. v. Gloria · filed 2010-01-27

We reject plaintiffs' argument and affirm the district court's holding that Gloria and Terry were entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffs failed to establish on the facts that there was a substantive due process violation.

Section 1983 claims against government officials may be dismissed when the plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation.

O'Donnell v. Simon · filed 2010-01-28

In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court mandated a two-step qualified immunity analysis — first, whether “the facts alleged show that the [official’s] conduct violated a constitutional right,” and, second, whether the right, if violated, “was clearly established.” 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). In Pearson, the Court backed away from that sequence, stating, “while the sequence set forth [in Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.” 129 S.Ct. at 818. We nonetheless begin by determining whether O’Donnell can establish a constitutional violation. Because she cannot, we need not proceed further.

Section 1983 permits a civil claim against a state official for violating federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Melgar Ex Rel. Melgar v. Greene · filed 2010-01-29

The boy’s father, Appellee Jose Melgar, sued the canine officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sued the officer and the police department under Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. ... For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Officer Greene is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s federal claim, and we remand the case with instructions to dismiss without prejudice to plaintiff’s ability to proceed with his state claim in state court.

Section 1983 permits a civil action for constitutional violations committed under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity for officials whose conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Jefferson v. Lewis · filed 2010-02-04

Government officials, including police officers, are immune from civil liability unless, in the course of performing their discretionary functions, they violate the plaintiffs clearly established constitutional rights.

Section 1983 authorizes claims against government actors who violate federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Bolmer v. Oliveira · filed 2010-02-08

Government actors have qualified immunity to § 1983 claims “‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” ... As a state actor, Oliveira is immune to Bolmer’s § 1983 substantive due process claim if (1) the reviewable facts do not make out a violation of Bolmer’s right to substantive due process, or (2) the right was not clearly established at the time of Bolmer’s commitment.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for constitutional violations by officials acting under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity unless the right was clearly established.

Bull v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2010-02-09

Moreover, we have explicitly held several times that it was clearly established that strip search policies similar to San Francisco's are unconstitutional. In Ward, we concluded that "the law was sufficiently clear in early 1981 so as to expose a public official who unreasonably authorized blanket strip searches of minor offense arrestees to civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Ward, 791 F.2d at 1332 (emphasis added). Although San Francisco's policy included arrestees charged with more serious offenses than those at issue in Ward, San Francisco's policy also applied to minor offense arrestees, such as those at issue in Ward. See also Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that by 1989, it was clearly established that it was unconstitutional to strip search a detainee arrested for a minor offense without reasonable suspicion that the individual arrestee was carrying or concealing contraband; reasonable suspicion was based on factors such as the nature of the offense, the arrestee's appearance and conduct, and the prior arrest record). Defendants argue that the large amount of documentary evidence they have produced distinguishes this case from other strip search cases. Because no other case confronted such a well-documented problem, Defendants contend, the law was not clearly established. However, the specific facts of previous cases need not be materially or fundamentally similar to the situation in question; rather, the salient question is whether the state of the law at the time gives officials fair warning that their conduct is unconstitutional. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 742, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). The fact that San Francisco documented a contraband smuggling problem does not muddy the clarity of the law. The evidence Defendants produced to the district court shows only that contraband was a significant problem in San Francisco jails generally; it does not demonstrate that persons eligible for inclusion in this class of plaintiffs contributed significantly, or even at all, to that problem. Therefore, San Francisco's policy is not different enough from policies that we have held unconstitutional to suggest that the rights violated by the policy were not clearly established. [8] Sheriff Hennessey is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits claims against government officials for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity.

Sharee Butler v. City of Sacramento · filed 2010-02-11

Perez is entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Butler, demonstrate a violation of a constitutional right and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s misconduct.

Section 1983 allows a person to seek relief for a constitutional deprivation caused by someone acting under state authority.

Evans v. Bayer · filed 2010-02-12

An official who is sued in his personal capacity may be shielded from damages by qualified immunity. ... To overcome qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) that this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. ... Therefore, the Court finds that the right in question was clearly established. Accordingly, Bayer’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to Evans’s demand for nominal damages.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity, but officials may be liable for violating clearly established constitutional rights.

Timothy Council v. Sutton · filed 2010-02-12

The doctrine of qualified immunity “shields public officials from suits against them in their individual capacities for torts committed while performing discretionary duties unless the tortious act violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.” ... Therefore, the Deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for challenging unconstitutional conduct by state actors.

Day v. ROBINWOOD WEST COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT DIST. · filed 2010-02-16

Defendant claims that it has qualified immunity from Plaintiffs' claims for nominal damages because the District's actions "did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The defense of qualified immunity, however, is not available to municipalities. Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 638, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980). Thus, the Court finds that qualified immunity is not applicable and therefore turns to the merits of Plaintiffs' claims.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who violates clearly established constitutional rights while acting under state authority.

Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati · filed 2010-02-16

Regardless of the authority Hudepohl possessed, Zucker was not “relieve[d] . . . of his responsibility to decide for himself whether to violate clearly established constitutional rights.” ... Thus, viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to Kennedy, we conclude that Zucker violated Kennedy’s constitutional rights by banning him from all City recreational property without due process of law.

Section 1983 claims may be subject to qualified immunity, and a claim for arrest without probable cause may proceed when qualified immunity is rejected because a triable issue exists.

Leventhal v. Schaffer · filed 2010-02-17

This appeal arises from an action brought pro se by William Eugene Leventhal under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA), against employees of the Iowa State Patrol, Sergeant Daniel Schaffer and Lieutenant Jeff Ritzman, arising out of Leventhal’s arrest and handcuffing for the crime of disorderly conduct during the Register’s Annual Great Bicycle Ride Across Iowa (RAGBRAI). ... Having carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm on the basis of the district court’s thorough opinion.

Section 1983 claims against government officials may be barred by qualified immunity when the alleged conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Chavez-Rodriguez v. City of Santa Fe · filed 2010-02-18

As a result, this speech is not entitled to First Amendment protection and the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against officers are subject to qualified immunity when the alleged conduct does not violate a constitutional right.

Wallace v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-02-22

The officers’ stronger argument is that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The officers’ qualified immunity defense is evaluated under the two-step analysis set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-02, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). ... Because Officers Modlin and Vogel are entitled to qualified immunity, the § 1983 claim against them (Count V) will be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims for damages against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when the official's conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Haugen v. Molly Fields · filed 2010-02-22

Qualified immunity shields a government official from suits for damages unless her official conduct violates a constitutional right that is “clearly established,” meaning it is “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what [she] is doing violates that right.”

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity, and the claimant bears the burden of showing a constitutional violation and a clearly established right.

Roska v. Sneddon · filed 2010-02-23

Once the Social Workers raised the qualified immunity defense, the Roskas “carried the burden of showing both that a constitutional violation occurred and that the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Green, 574 F.3d at 1300 (quotations omitted). ... The district court did not err in concluding the Roskas failed to meet their burden to show the children’s procedural due process rights were clearly established, a prerequisite to the denial of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against officers are subject to qualified immunity unless their conduct violates clearly established constitutional rights.

Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2010-02-24

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects the officers from personal liability under § 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established ... constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional violations by state actors, subject to qualified immunity.

Whitlock v. Brown · filed 2010-02-24

The Whitlocks sued Brown under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ... Brown is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against governmental officials may be subject to qualified immunity protecting officials performing discretionary functions from insubstantial claims.

Westerfield v. United States · filed 2010-02-24

We stress that on remand the district court may fashion a discovery order that is limited to the issue of qualified immunity, recognizing that the case law concerning qualified immunity makes clear that the doctrine exists to make certain that governmental officials who perform discretionary functions are protected from insubstantial claims; hence, the trial courts are instructed to rule on such motions at the earliest opportunity.

In a § 1983 suit, denying summary judgment because material facts are disputed does not resolve qualified immunity before trial.

Bell v. Herod · filed 2010-03-04

The qualified immunity issue was not resolved before trial. Bell’s contention to the contrary is inaccurate and therefore does not provide a basis for relief.

Qualified immunity shields a social worker from § 1983 damages for a foster care placement when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time.

Doe Ex Rel. Johnson v. South Carolina Department of Social Services · filed 2010-03-05

We affirm the grant of summary judgment, however, under the second prong of the qualified immunity inquiry. Although our precedents do not foreclose a foster child’s claim that her substantive due process right to personal safety and security ... is violated by a foster care placement made in deliberate indif- ference to a known danger, such a right was not clearly estab- lished in this circuit at the time Thompson made her placement decisions regarding Jane.

A defendant has qualified immunity from a § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim when the record indicates probable cause for the search warrant and arrest.

Murray v. Newman · filed 2010-03-05

The district court properly concluded that Newman had qualified immunity from Murray’s claim of malicious prosecution because the record indicates that there was probable cause to issue a search warrant and arrest Murray.

An officer sued under § 1983 for excessive force is not entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would have known the shooting violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Smith v. Kendall · filed 2010-03-08

A government official such as Kendall is not entitled to qualified immunity from liability for civil damages if a reasonable officer in his position would have known that his shooting of Smith would violate Smith’s constitutional right to be free from an excessive application of force. ... For the above reasons, we affirm the district court’s determination that the right in question was clearly established and dismiss the remainder of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts bear on whether officers violated a constitutional right and reasonably believed their actions were lawful.

Espinosa v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2010-03-09

In this case, the district court properly denied the summary judgment motion because there are genuine issues of fact regarding whether the officers violated Asa Sullivan’s Fourth Amendment rights. Those unresolved issues of fact are also material to a proper determination of the reasonableness of the officers’ belief in the legality of their actions.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Harris v. Ford · filed 2010-03-10

Accordingly, we hold that there was no clearly established right which Officer Ford violated in the conduct of the search of Mr. Harris’s home on October 5.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Redd v. Wright · filed 2010-03-10

The task of framing the right at issue with some precision is critical in determining whether that particular right was clearly established at the time of the defendants’ alleged violation. ... For those reasons, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Redd’s First Amendment and RLUIPA claims.