42 U.S.C. § 1983

Officers sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity for an overbroad search warrant when they reasonably rely on its approval by a prosecutor and judge.

Millender v. County of L.A. · filed 2009-05-06

Accordingly, Detective Messersch- midt and Sergeant Lawrence are entitled to qualified immu- nity for the overbreadth of the warrant under the second prong of the Saucier test.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Kennedy v. Lehman · filed 2009-05-06

Thus, Kennedy’s First Amendment claim arising from alleged retaliation was plainly not “clearly established” at the time the Individual Defendants committed their alleged wrongdoing.

A supervisor found liable under § 1983 for intentional gender discrimination or for condoning it is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Olsen v. County of Nassau · filed 2009-05-07

Applying the standards discussed above to the within action, the Court concludes that Atchison is not entitled to qualified immunity. ... The jury herein found Atchison liable for intentional discrimination as well as condoning or permitting intentional discrimination to occur.

A § 1983 plaintiff can defeat a motion to dismiss on qualified-immunity grounds by sufficiently alleging that the individual defendants intended to harm him.

Coletta v. the City of North Bay Village · filed 1997-04-11

For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff can meet this burden by alleging that the individual defendants’ actions violated clearly established constitutional law, or that the individual defendants’ objective intent was to harm the plaintiff, regardless of the state of the law at the time of the conduct. ... Accordingly, as to the issue of qualified immunity, the Court denies the motion to dismiss Counts II and III without prejudice to the filing of a proper summary judgment motion on this issue.

Qualified immunity may be denied to a police officer sued under § 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional stop and arrest.

Lyons v. Newsome · filed 1997-04-29

Having reviewed the parties’ submissions on appeal, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying qualified immunity on the facts of this case.

Disputed material facts can prevent summary judgment on a § 1983 claim and its qualified immunity defense.

Holland v. O'BRYANT · filed 1997-05-01

It would be premature to grant summary judgment for either party at this time with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This is a fact driven case and a number of significant facts remain in dispute. ... Defendants Gibson and O’Bryant have stated that they might exercise their right to appeal this court’s denial of their right to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when their actions in seeking a search warrant are objectively reasonable.

Robertson v. City of Beckley · filed 1997-05-07

Here, the officers interviewed a confidential informant, with whom they had worked and who had provided credible information in the past, corroborated the information the informant through surveillance, and then obtained a search warrant from a magistrate. The Court holds these actions satisfy the requirements of objective reasonableness on which qualified immunity rests.

Qualified immunity protects officials from § 1983 damages when their actions are objectively reasonable, even if the information they relied on proves wrong.

Mcpherson v. Kelsey · filed 1997-10-01

Under the circumstances, a reasonable official in Sowle's position would have entertained sufficient suspicion to justify a search. The fact that the officer's information turned out to be erroneous is not a reason for holding Sowle liable; the question, to repeat, is the reasonableness of his actions. We conclude that his actions were reasonable and that Sowle was entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 damages claim when the officers’ lack of authority to enter the plaintiff’s apartment was clearly established.

Guzman v. Bonnstetter · filed 2009-05-13

In the present case, we think there is no question that the search was illegal and there is no issue of qualified immu- nity—that is, no issue that somehow the fact that the officers did not have a right to enter Guzman’s apartment was not clearly established.

In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff bears the burden of overcoming an official’s qualified immunity defense.

Wyatt v. Smith · filed 2009-05-13

“Once a public official raises the defense of qualified immunity, the burden rests on the plaintiff to rebut it.” ... He has failed to show that he met his burden to overcome the defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects individual school board members when a reasonable member could have believed the challenged action lawful because the asserted right was not clearly established.

Cole v. Buchanan County School Board · filed 2009-05-14

Because the conduct complained of did not violate a clearly established right, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for dismissal of the action against the individual Board members.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have known their conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Bellamy v. Wells · filed 2009-05-15

Because, in the light most favorable to Bellamy, a reasonable officer would have known that the conduct at issue violated Bellamy’s Sixth Amendment rights and the intended introduction of his statements would violate his Fifth Amendment rights, Defendants do not have qualified immunity.

A § 1983 plaintiff must overcome qualified immunity by showing a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established when the defendant acted.

Hindbaugh v. Washita County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2009-05-18

Regarding the district court’s Fourth Amendment ruling, to overcome the defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must establish that the defendants’ actions violated a constitutional right and that the right was clearly established at the time of the actions. ... Accordingly, Mr. Hindbaugh cannot overcome defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Tobin v. Washington · filed 2009-05-18

Instead, exercising the discretion the Supreme Court permitted in Pearson v. Callahan, — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818-21, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009), we uphold the district court’s determination that any asserted due process violation was not a “clearly established” constitutional right, see id. at 816.

In a § 1983 suit, the plaintiff bears the burden of defeating a properly raised qualified immunity defense.

Collier v. Montgomery · filed 2009-05-20

Although nominally an affirmative defense, the plaintiff has the burden to negate the assertion of qualified immunity once properly raised.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Decoria v. County of Jefferson · filed 2009-05-20

We conclude that the alleged constitutional right at issue here was not “clearly established” in 2005, and that Titland is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Fields v. Prater · filed 2009-05-21

Because, however, it was not clearly established under existing law at the time of the hiring decision that the action taken was unconstitutional, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when clearly established law permits force only when needed.

Seals v. Mitchell · filed 2009-05-26

Further, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established at the time that “force is only justified when there is a need for force.” Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 481.

An official sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Tibbetts v. Kulongoski · filed 2009-05-29

Because the relevant parameters of a Fourteenth Amendment right to a name-clearing hearing were not clear at the time of the allegedly stigmatizing statements, we conclude that a reasonable official in the Governor’s position would not have been aware of his alleged obligation to provide Plaintiffs name-clearing hearings. We therefore reverse the district court and hold that Governor Kulongoski is entitled to qualified immunity in this suit.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects officials from damages when their sentence calculation reflects an objectively reasonable mistake under unsettled law.

Arthurs v. Beard · filed 2009-05-29

Given the plain language of the Parole Act, their mistake in this regard does not appear to have been an unreasonable one and therefore should not serve to strip them of qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim if a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Hardesty v. City of Ecorse · filed 2009-06-01

Under the circumstances present in this case, a reasonable officer could have believed that he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for fleeing and eluding and that his actions were lawful. Therefore, even if Plaintiff could show an absence of probable cause, Officer Barkman is still entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff shows a violation of a clearly established right and material facts remain disputed.

Montgomery v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2009-06-05

Thus, Plaintiff has satisfied the heavy two-part burden to avoid summary judgment based on qualified immunity. I further find that the Defendants have failed to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit if reasonable officials could differ on whether the officer’s actions were lawful.

Wren v. Towe · filed 1997-12-30

If reasonable public officials could differ on the legality of a defendant's actions, the defendant is entitled to immunity from suit.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted procedural due process right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Parrish v. Mallenger · filed 1998-01-07

In our view, the subsequent actions of the Iowa Supreme Court and the Iowa Legislature to clarify state law, and our subsequent decision in Mahers v. Halford, make it clear that the extent to which Parrish was entitled to predeprivation notice and hearing was far from clearly established in April 1991. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Nix and Mallinger are entitled to qualified immunity from Henry Parrish’s damage claims.

Section 1983 does not shield an official through qualified immunity when the alleged conduct violates a clearly established right and no special circumstances excuse the official’s failure to follow the law.

Buckley v. Loeffelholz · filed 1998-01-21

In sum, we agree with the district court that Loeffelholz was not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity on Buckley’s due process and Eighth Amendment claims.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when the official’s disputed motive is essential to the claim.

Rich v. Montpelier Supervisory District · filed 1998-01-23

Under these circumstances, we cannot accept defendant’s version of the facts at face value and dismiss plaintiff’s claim on immunity grounds.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages action does not require a prior decision involving the identical conduct; courts assess whether the right was clearly established.

LaBounty v. Coughlin · filed 1998-02-13

With these warnings in mind, we find- that the district court erred in describing the right at issue as “the right to be free from crumbling asbestos.”

Officers retain qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their failure to disclose exculpatory evidence is not sufficiently egregious to strip that immunity.

Ahlers v. Schebil · filed 1998-02-18

Therefore, although the Court holds that Defendants failed to turn over some Brady material before the probable cause determination, their conduct was not so egregious as to deeloak them of their qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields officers from damages under Section 1983 when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

McGarvey v. Biswell · filed 1998-02-20

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants are shielded from Plaintiffs’ fourth amendment claims by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields a public official from § 1983 damages when a reasonable official could have believed the challenged conduct lawful.

Stanley v. Cooper · filed 1998-03-10

For all of these reasons, defendant Linda Cooper is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs § 1983 claims.

A school official who knowingly fails to provide required pretermination process may be denied qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Samuel v. Morris Holmes, Maudelle Davis-Cade, J. Berengher Brechtel, Gail Moore Glapion, Carolyn Green Ford and C · filed 1998-03-31

Given these facts, we cannot say that the court erred in refusing to grant Holmes qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the complaint sufficiently alleges a violation of clearly established rights and the factual record is incomplete.

Prager v. LaFAVER · filed 1998-04-10

The court finds that the complaint in this case properly states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of plaintiff’s free speech interest, and that it is premature, in the absence of a more complete factual record, to grant qualified immunity to this claim on the basis of the' pleadings.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 due process claim when evidence permits a jury to infer that officers intended to help a private actor harm the plaintiff.

Hemphill v. Harold Schott, Nyc Police Officer Thomas Dimuro, Nyc Police Officer · filed 1998-04-10

We hold, however, that Hemphill’s claim against the Officers under the Due Process Clause should survive a claim of qualified immunity.

A private contractor performing a government administrative task for profit under limited direct supervision cannot assert qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Ace Beverage Co. v. Lockheed Information Management Services · filed 1998-05-20

This interlocutory appeal raises the question whether a private contractor acting under color of state law is entitled to qualified immunity from an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We answer in the negative on the authority of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Richardson v. McKnight, — U.S. --, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997).

Public officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct was objectively reasonable under the law at the time.

Texas Ex Rel. Board of Regents of the University of Texas System v. Walker · filed 1998-05-28

Consequently, the Regents’ and Low’s actions in terminating Walker either were not unconstitutional or were not objectively unreasonable in light of the law as it existed at the time of ... Walker’s firing. The district court properly granted qualified immunity.

State officials sued in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages if they acted in good faith and did not violate clearly established rights.

State Dept. of Public Safety v. Sexton · filed 1998-06-12

In their individual capacities, Sgt. Luther and Ms. McGinty were entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 if their actions were undertaken in good faith and did not violate clearly established rights.

Section 1983 affords state officials qualified immunity when a reasonable official in their position would not have known that their conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

MD Minority Contract v. Kassoff · filed 1998-06-15

The specific rights allegedly violated--those to be free from pur- poseful racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts (42 U.S.C. § 1981) and from intentional violation, under color of state law, of the right to equal protection under the law (42 U.S.C. § 1983) --are clearly established. ... We conclude that reasonable persons in the state Defendants' posi- tion would not have known that their actions violated any clearly established constitutional rights of the Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the state Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Arresting officers have qualified immunity from § 1983 false arrest liability when a reasonable officer could believe probable cause existed.

Marrs v. Boles · filed 1998-07-15

Because the court finds probable cause existed to arrest Marrs on the driving under the influence charge and on the disorderly conduct charge, it is unnecessary to discuss the evidence relating to child endangerment. The doctrine of qualified immunity insulates defendants from liability. Summary judgment must be granted in their favor.

Prison officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct violated no clearly established procedural right.

Horne v. Coughlin · filed 1998-07-27

All the time Horne served in the SHU was pursuant to a disciplinary sentence that did not violate any clearly established procedural right. Defendants accordingly are entitled to qualified immunity. We affirm the dismissal of Horne’s claim.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity.

Club Retro LLC v. Hilton · filed 2009-06-08

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims seeking damages from defendants in their individual capacities are subject to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.

State officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 have qualified immunity when no controlling circuit or Supreme Court decision clearly establishes that their conduct is unconstitutional.

Belanger v. Blum · filed 2009-06-10

In the absence of any controlling circuit or Supreme Court decision establishing the unconstitutionality of the state defendants’ actions, they are immune from suit in their individual capacities.

Qualified immunity warrants judgment for a defendant on a Section 1983 claim when the facts do not show a violation of the asserted constitutional right.

Estate of Omayra Sob v. City of Jersey City · filed 2009-06-16

The District Court erred in denying summary judgment based on qualified immunity for Nalbach, Wolleon, and Younger. Accordingly, we will vacate the portion of the order of the District Court denying Appellants’ motion for summary judgment and remand this case to the District Court with instructions to enter judgment in their favor on the Estate’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against state officials who violate constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity when the rights were not clearly established.

Walker v. King County · filed 2009-06-18

Qualified immunity protects state governmental officials from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “ ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ”

Section 1983 affords a social worker qualified immunity when she reasonably believes her conduct is lawful under clearly established law, even if it violates constitutional rights.

Springer v. Placer County · filed 2009-06-18

Because it was reasonable for Morris to believe in the circumstances presented in this case that her decision to take Christian into protective custody without a warrant was lawful, she is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a state actor for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Friedman v. Boucher · filed 2009-06-23

Because Friedman’s rights were clearly established at the time that Defendants took the sample, the Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows a person to seek relief from officials who, under color of state law, deprive the person of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Barnes v. Henderson · filed 2009-06-23

In addition, Henderson would be entitled to qualified immunity from liability on this claim, as it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his conduct did not violate plaintiffs rights.

Section 1983 permits claims against public officials for constitutional violations committed under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity.

Gidley et al. v. Oliveri · filed 2009-06-25

The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the booking-and-summons of Gidley did not implicate a clearly established Fourth Amendment right such that a reasonable police officer would have understood that the procedure violated i t .

Section 1983 permits claims against state actors for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity.

Rome v. Guillory · filed 2009-06-25

To overcome Defendants’ qualified immunity defense 2 to Rome’s § 1983 claim that he was arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Rome must make a showing of no probable cause. ... Because the record raises no genuine issue concerning the conclusion that Defendants had probable cause to arrest Rome, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Rome’s § 1983 and state law claims.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue someone acting under color of state law for violating the person's constitutional rights.

Lockett v. NEW ORLEANS CITY · filed 2009-06-26

In sum, the Court finds that Lockett has failed to show a constitutional violation in his allegations of excessive force, and thus has failed to meet the first prong of the Saucier/Pearson test. As such, the MP Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Lockett’s excessive force claims.

Section 1983 permits money damages claims for federal-rights violations, subject to qualified immunity.

Hunsberger v. Wood · filed 2009-06-29

Because plaintiffs seek money damages, they must overcome defendant’s qualified immunity. ... Because we conclude that defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment, we need not proceed to ask whether the alleged right was clearly established. ... Wood’s actions were reasonable and he therefore deserves immunity from money damages.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for a person deprived of federal rights by someone acting under color of state law.

Garcia-Rubiera v. Calderon · filed 2009-06-30

Plaintiffs additionally claim that the district court erred in finding that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiffs' claims for compensatory damages against the Defendants in their personal capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... To determine qualified immunity, we have "typically applied . . . a three part test in which we inquire:" ... We identify no error in the district court's analysis, and see no reason to revisit anything we previously determined in Flores Galarza. ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court with respect to its grant of qualified immunity to Defendants.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for damages when a state official, acting under color of state law, violates federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Barnes v. County of Placer · filed 2009-06-30

Turning to the conduct of Defendants Emily Hill and Deputy Rick Harroun in this case, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because their decision to place M.X. and R.X. in protective custody without first obtaining a warrant and keep them in custody until the Placer County Juvenile Court ordered their release did not violate clearly established law.

Government officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have known that their conduct violated clearly established rights.

Seamons v. Snow · filed 1998-09-09

Accordingly, pursuant to U.S. v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997), the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, both as a matter of law and as a matter of fact.

Qualified immunity under § 1983 applies to damages claims but is unavailable against claims for declaratory or injunctive relief.

Dorwart v. Caraway · filed 1998-11-12

Qualified immunity is a defense to damages liability; it is not available in actions for declaratory or injunctive relief.

In a § 1983 excessive-force action, factual disputes about whether an officer’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable can preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Leghart Ex Rel. Leghart v. Hauk · filed 1998-11-23

Although Hauk maintains that he was in fear of imminent serious bodily injury or death as a result of Leghart’s actions, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs and resolving any factual disputes in their favor, the Court finds that outstanding issues of material fact exist as to the Mazda’s movement and whether Hauk had alternative means of safe escape available to him. ... Thus, the Court concludes that Hauk’s Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment on grounds of qualified immunity with respect to the Fourth Amendment claim against him must be denied.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unreasonable detention claim when the pleadings allege a violation of a clearly established right and conduct that was not objectively reasonable.

Heitschmidt v. City of Houston · filed 1998-11-23

We conclude the officers are not entitled, on the basis of the pleadings, to qualified immunity with respect to Heitschmidt's unreasonable detention claim.

Officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity on the pleadings when the alleged detention violates a clearly established right and their conduct is objectively unreasonable.

Heitschmidt v. The City of Houston · filed 1998-12-16

We conclude the officers are not entitled, on the basis of the pleadings, to qualified immunity with respect to Heitschmidt’s unreasonable detention claim.

A § 1983 claim can survive dismissal on qualified immunity grounds when the complaint alleges that officials denied a clearly established right to meaningful procedures before depriving a person of a protected job interest.

Levenstein v. Bernard Salafsky, Patricia A. Gill, and David C. Broski, in Their Individual Capacities · filed 1998-12-16

At this stage, therefore, Levenstein has alleged enough to survive dismissal of his procedural due process claims on qualified immunity grounds.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when they could not reasonably have known that their specific conduct violated a clearly established right.

Lewis v. Bruce D. Cowen, Roland H. Lange, and William v. Hickey, Individually · filed 1999-01-15

We conclude that the plaintiff did not engage in protected speech under the Pickering test and that, in any event, the defendants enjoy qualified immunity from plaintiffs' § 1983 action based on the First Amendment.

Section 1983 damages claims against prison officials are subject to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Lee v. Waters · filed 1999-02-04

The record therefore supports the grant of dismissal to the defendants on Mr. Lee’s due process claim on the grounds of qualified immunity.

Police officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the evidence could establish a violation of clearly established rights against unreasonable seizures or excessive force.

Johnston v. City of Bloomington · filed 1999-03-12

Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's finding that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on those claims.

Police officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the evidence permits a finding of excessive force and the right was clearly established.

No. 97-4396 · filed 1999-03-12

We also agree that, at the time of the incident, it was clearly established law that a person had the right to be free from unreasonable seizures and excessive force. ... Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's finding that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on those claims.

In a § 1983 improper-arrest claim, qualified immunity can rest on arguable probable cause even when actual probable cause is absent.

Guidry v. Harp's Food Stores, Inc. · filed 1999-03-24

Therefore, an officers’ acts may be viewed as reasonable so long as the officer is not plainly incompetent or knowingly violating the law, and probable cause need only be arguable, not probable cause in fact. Appellant’s state law claims would not be subject to the same analysis used by the federal court in determining Jones’s entidement to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects prison guards from a Section 1983 claim when their response to an altercation is objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Bennett v. Collins · filed 1999-04-21

Accordingly, the determination that the defendants were qualifiedly immune from suit on Bennett’s claim was not erroneous.

Officers may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for a mistaken-identity arrest made under a facially valid warrant.

Joye v. Richland County · filed 1999-04-22

In light of these cases, the Court can only conclude, as a matter of law, that Clemens and Davis are not liable to plaintiff under § 1983 because his claim fails on the merits and, alternatively, because they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Public officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established to a reasonable official under the circumstances.

Henderson v. Simms · filed 1999-05-14

For the reasons stated, an Order will be entered separately, granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, as the present case is barred by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield government officials who coerce entry into a home without a warrant or an established exception, because the prohibition was clearly established.

Calabretta v. Floyd · filed 1999-08-26

The principle that government officials cannot coerce entry into people’s houses without a search warrant or applicability of an established exception to the requirement of a search warrant is so well established that any reasonable officer would know it.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Stevens v. Trumbull County Sheriffs' Department · filed 1999-09-01

Summary judgment on the equal protection claim in Count One is GRANTED in part with respect to Defendant Norman Olson in his individual capacity based on qualified immunity, and DENIED in part with respect to Defendants Trumbull County Sheriffs Department and Trumbull County 911.

In a Section 1983 suit, a court may allow discovery limited to qualified immunity when facts needed to decide that defense are unknown and within the defendant’s possession.

Morgan v. Gusman · filed 2009-07-01

At this stage in the litigation, crucial facts necessary to resolve the issue of qualified immunity are unknown. Therefore, consistent with Schultea, we VACATE the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and REMAND for discovery limited to that issue.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 claim when their conduct violates a clearly established right.

Howard v. Kansas City Police Department · filed 2009-07-02

Because none of the mitigating factors present in Price were involved in this case, the Officers had fair warning that their use of force was not objectively reasonable. As such, the Officers’ conduct violated a clearly established right.

Factual disputes over a defendant’s allegedly retaliatory motive can preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 action.

Kantamanto v. King · filed 2009-07-02

The factual disputes in the record preclude any decision with respect to qualified immunity at this stage in the litigation. Accordingly, the Court denies defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of qualified immunity with respect to C.O. North.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials are barred by qualified immunity when the officials had objectively reasonable grounds to believe their conduct was lawful.

Pratt v. Hogan · filed 2009-07-06

However questionable the facts demonstrate a violation of plaintiffs constitutional right from being subject to adverse consequences should he decline to consent to the challenged portions of his treatment program, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and are immune from civil damages liability because defendants had objectively reasonable grounds to believe that their conduct was lawful.

Public school teachers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when they maliciously restrain a child for hours in violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

H.H. Ex Rel. H.F. v. Moffett · filed 2009-07-07

Because we have found that, on the facts taken in the light most favorable to Appellees, the Appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law, and because Appellants have raised no other question of error on the part of the district court, we affirm and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Officials sued under § 1983 cannot claim qualified immunity when the right they violated was sufficiently clear at the time of their conduct.

Narducci v. Moore · filed 2009-07-09

We agree with those circuits that at the time of the recording in this case, it was sufficiently clear that government employees enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace to preclude qualified immunity.

Officers cannot claim qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when their objectively unreasonable actions create the risk that leads to deadly force.

Bletz Ex Rel. Estate of Bletz v. Gribble · filed 2009-07-10

Defendants cannot claim the protection of qualified immunity when their own objectively unreasonable actions created the very risk that generated the eventual use of deadly force.

In a § 1983 suit, asserting qualified immunity at summary judgment shifts to the plaintiff the burden to show a violation of a clearly established right.

Riggins v. Goodman · filed 2009-07-10

When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must clear two hurdles in order to defeat the defendant’s motion. The plaintiff must demonstrate on the facts alleged both that the defendant violated his constitutional or statutory rights, and that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged unlawful activity.

Defendants in a Section 1983 suit are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct was not unreasonable under clearly established law.

Barnes v. Pierce · filed 2009-07-10

Therefore, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this First Amendment claim.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their probable-cause determination was objectively reasonable at the time.

Noy v. Travis · filed 2009-07-13

Because such a determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable at the time it was made, we hold that the district court did not err in ruling that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive force claim when a genuine factual dispute remains about the officers’ use of force.

Goffney v. Sauceda · filed 2009-07-13

Goffney has raised a genuine issue of fact that excessive force was used following his arrest. Summary judgment on this question and the related issue of qualified immunity was improper.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when no clearly established constitutional right was violated.

Morgan v. Bubar · filed 2009-07-14

Because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether a constitutionally protected property interest or a constitutionally cognizable equal protection right has been clearly violated, we conclude that Carini and Castronova are entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 equal protection suit is not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the evidence could show that he kept an employee on medical leave because she was pregnant.

Dimino v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1999-09-14

Accordingly, Long is not entitled to qualified immunity from Dimino’s equal protection claim and defendants’ motion for summary judgment on that claim with regard to Long is denied.

Qualified immunity does not shield prison officials from § 1983 damages when no reasonable official would have considered their conduct lawful under clearly established law.

Palmer v. Johnson · filed 1999-10-19

We therefore hold that no error of law has been demonstrated in the denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and in that respect the denial of defendants’ motion is AFFIRMED.

Officers sued under § 1983 for an arrest without probable cause are entitled to qualified immunity if they reasonably believed they had probable cause, even if they were mistaken.

Womack v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors · filed 1999-10-19

Thus, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity only if they arrested Womack with the objectively reasonable belief that they had probable cause to do so – even if they were mistaken.

Public officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when they violate clearly established rights and their conduct was not objectively reasonable.

Jackson v. Mann · filed 1999-11-05

The prison officials are not entitled to qualified immunity. When the prison officials denied Jackson’s requests for a kosher diet, it was clearly established that: (1) “prison officials must provide a prisoner a diet that is consistent with his religious scruples,” Bass, 976 F.2d at 99; and (2) the Free Exercise Clause affords protection to religious beliefs which are “sincerely held,” Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157. ... Because these rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation, ... and because the prison officials offer no reason to conclude that their acts were “objectively reasonable,” the prison officials are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not give officers qualified immunity for intentionally violating clearly established rights protected by Miranda, even if their training endorsed the conduct.

California Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts · filed 1999-11-08

Accepting the facts as presented by McNally and Bey, as we must on summary judgment, see Behrens, 516 U.S. at 312-13, 116 S.Ct. 834, we conclude that the district court correctly ruled that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.

Prison officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage when disputed facts prevent a finding that their alleged exposure of inmates to dangerous levels of second-hand smoke was objectively reasonable.

Warren v. Keane · filed 1999-11-16

However, at this stage of the litigation defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from these claims, and plaintiffs may proceed with their action.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their actions were objectively reasonable, even if they violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Rexford Kipps, Carol Kipps and Kyle Kipps v. James Caillier, Ray Authement, Nelson J. Schexnayder, Jr., and Nelson Stokl · filed 1999-12-06

Because we find that defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Kipps’s 1983 claim on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields officers from § 1983 liability when the controlling precedent covers their use of force.

Richards v. Ferrebee · filed 1999-12-08

The district court determined that the troopers were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. ... We agree with the district court that Elliott controls here, the appel- lant having failed to sufficiently distinguish its applicability to the facts of this case.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields · filed 1999-12-13

The court finds that Keith has qualified immunity against Sparing’s claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Officers who intentionally misstate facts to obtain a search warrant cannot claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit when they could not reasonably believe their conduct was lawful.

Sythe v. City of Eureka · filed 2000-01-28

The officers could not have objectively believed the warrant was issued upon probable cause. Reasonable law enforcement officers would not decide to seek a warrant based on the evidence in the videotape. They could not have reasonably believed their conduct to be lawful. Qualified immunity is not available to these officers as a defense to Plaintiffs suit.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit when reasonably competent officers could disagree about whether probable cause existed.

Martinez v. Simonetti · filed 2000-02-04

We therefore find that the district court erred in concluding that a rational jury could fail to find their behavior objectively reasonable; accordingly, Sergeant McCauley, Captain Rosa and Assistant Chief Simonetti are entitled to immunity from suit in this action.

Section 1983 defendants may receive qualified immunity when the law governing the alleged constitutional violation was not clearly established.

Kaspar v. City of Hobbs · filed 2000-03-28

Given the holding of Thomas, and the fact that neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit has directly addressed the authority of a non-resident caretaker under circumstances similar to those of the instant case, there is a question, however slight, regarding whether the law is clearly established on this issue. Therefore, only under the facts as presented by Defendants, I will extend the benefit of the doubt to Defendants Durham and Lamb and grant qualified immunity to the officers as to their search of the common areas of Plaintiffs premises, to include the living room and kitchen.

Police officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity for shooting a person they reasonably perceive to be armed and an imminent threat.

Bertha BOYD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Matthew BAEPPLER; David Wilsman, Defendants-Appellants · filed 2000-06-06

Therefore, we REVERSE the denial of summary judgment for both officers Baep-pler and Wilsman and find as fact that Boyd, as perceived by reasonable police officers in the circumstances presented here, was armed and remained an imminent threat and a danger until he finally dropped his weapon after officer Baeppler fired his last shots.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when the evidence, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, shows that they acted in an objectively unreasonable manner.

Corder v. Denver, City & Co. · filed 2000-08-31

This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Corder, leads this court to conclude that the officers acted in an objectively unreasonable manner. We therefore affirm the district court’s order denying the officers’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity for obtaining a search warrant when they reasonably could have believed probable cause supported it.

Mena v. City of Simi Valley · filed 2000-09-22

Accordingly, we hold as a matter of law that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to the claim that the search warrant for 1363 Patricia Avenue was overbroad.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment in a § 1983 excessive-force claim when disputed facts could show that officers struck an inmate after he was subdued and stopped resisting.

Giles v. Kearney · filed 2009-07-15

Because Giles testified that he was kicked and punched while fully restrained on the ground, after he ceased to resist, Giles alleges conduct in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights that a reasonable officer would have known was a violation under the circumstances, and we will reverse the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the three correctional officers in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 permits suits against state actors for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity.

Gause v. Diguglielmo · filed 2009-07-15

Therefore, the District Court properly held that qualified immunity shielded the Commonwealth Defendants from this claim.

Section 1983 damages claims are subject to qualified immunity for reasonable officials.

Koch v. Lockyer · filed 2009-07-15

While the compulsory DNA collection violated Koch’s Fourth Amendment rights, Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity against damages.

Qualified immunity does not protect officials from a § 1983 claim when their conduct violated a right that was clearly established at the time.

Myers v. James · filed 2009-07-16

Loretta James and Travis Saulsberry appeal from the district court’s order denying them qualified immunity with regard to Lorri Myers’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging she was strip searched at the LeFlore County Detention Center (LCDC). Because this circuit’s law concerning strip searches was clearly established at the time of the search, we affirm the district court’s decision.

Qualified immunity bars individual-capacity damages under § 1983 when the plaintiff cannot show that the asserted constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the officials’ conduct.

Parkhurst v. Lampert · filed 2009-07-16

As we have distinguished Cook on a number of bases, we conclude that he has failed to meet his burden to show that any constitutional right to the delivery of his newsletters in the manner that he sent them was clearly established at the time of defendants’ conduct.

Qualified immunity protects prison officers from a § 1983 safety claim when a reasonable officer would not have known the cell placement exposed the prisoner to a substantial risk of serious harm.

Ruiz v. Sotelo · filed 2009-07-20

Under the recently decided case of Pearson v. Callahan, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 808, 813, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009), we need not address Ruiz’s first claim if we uphold the district court’s qualified immunity ruling, and we do so here. ... Considering this context, we conclude that a reasonable prison official would not have known that he was subjecting Ruiz to a substantial risk of serious harm.

Government officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right.

Booth v. State of Maryland · filed 2009-07-21

Accordingly, this Court concludes that Warden Peguese was entitled to qualified immunity because Booth has not alleged conduct that constitutes a violation of any clearly established right.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Waeschle v. Dragovic · filed 2009-07-22

For that reason, Dragovic is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are shielded by qualified immunity when a reasonable official could have believed their conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Pearson v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-07-23

But even assuming that plaintiff had alleged a cognizable constitutional violation, the Court concludes that the individual defendants would nonetheless be shielded by qualified immunity because, based on the facts alleged in the complaint and for the reasons discussed more fully below, a reasonable official in defendants’ situation could have believed that his or her conduct did not violate plaintiffs constitutional rights.

Section 1983 claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Stein v. County of Nassau · filed 2009-07-23

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” ... Therefore, in refusing to honor Mrs. Stein’s status as Mr. Stein’s health care agent, the Individual Defendants did not violate any “clearly established law,” and are thus entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when it was objectively reasonable to believe the conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Estrada v. Torres · filed 2009-07-24

Because given the undisputed facts of this case “it was ‘objectively reasonable’ for [Officer Torres] to believe his conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right,” Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiffs claim of excessive force.

Qualified immunity protects officers from a Section 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when they reasonably believe probable cause exists based on the facts known at the time of arrest.

Land v. Trinity Mother · filed 2000-11-01

The Court concludes that qualified and official immunity protect Officers Gray and Hammontree from prosecution as a matter of law.

A §1983 damages claim against officials fails when the record lacks facts showing they intentionally deprived the plaintiff of a clearly established constitutional right they reasonably should have known.

Protonotarios v. Duggan · filed 2000-11-15

Finally, even had any evidence been submitted to raise an issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff had been deprived of a fair hearing, there have been no facts asserted to raise an issue of material fact as to whether any of the defendants intentionally deprived the plaintiff of any clearly established constitutional rights of which they should reasonably have been aware. ... On the basis of this record, there is no substantial likelihood that plaintiff can elicit any facts which would provide a basis for monetary recovery under §1983 against any of the defendants.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the governing standard was not clearly established by Supreme Court or circuit precedent at the time of their conduct.

Shipp v. McMahon · filed 2000-12-05

Accordingly, we hold that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the standard we pronounced above was not clearly established by the Supreme Court nor our circuit prior to our opinion today.

Qualified immunity under § 1983 does not shield an officer from damages merely because applying settled law to the facts is uncertain.

McNair, Victor R. v. Coffey, Sean · filed 2000-12-08

To say that a public official is not exposed to damages even when all legal issues were authoritatively resolved before the conduct occurred would be to make a substantial change in the scope of liability under 42 U.S.C. sec.1983.

Officers sued under Section 1983 for false arrest have qualified immunity when they had at least arguable probable cause to make the arrest.

Smithson v. Aldrich · filed 2000-12-21

Thus, the officers in this case had, at least, arguable probable cause to conclude that Smithson had violated the city’s sound ordinance. Accordingly, we conclude that Brown, Westemeyer, McBride, and Richardson are entitled to qualified immunity on appellees’ Fourth Amendment false arrest claim.

Section 1983 officers are entitled to qualified immunity when the constitutional right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Butera v. District of Columbia · filed 2001-01-09

For these reasons, we hold that the District of Columbia and the four officers were entitled to summary judgment on both Eric and Terry's Butera's s 1983 claims. The officers were entitled to qualified immunity regarding Eric Butera's constitutional claim; further, Terry Butera did not have a constitutional right to the companionship of her adult son.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time.

Fuller, James E. v. Dillon, Linda A. · filed 2001-01-10

It is also important to understand that when reviewing decisions based on qualified immunity, we must determine whether the defendant’s actions were objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time of their actions.

State officials sued personally under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct violates no clearly established right.

Kraft v. Adams · filed 2001-01-23

We agree that the defendants could not be sued in their individual capacities in this case, because individually, they were entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when they leave tight handcuffs on an arrestee after learning of a wrist condition and the handcuffs cause injury.

Johnson v. City of Ecorse · filed 2001-03-29

Officers Smith and Herring are, therefore, not entitled to qualified immunity to the extent that Mr. Cross’s claim for excessive force rests on their applying, and leaving on, tight handcuffs.

Public officials have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 retaliation claim when they could reasonably believe the same employment action would have occurred without the protected speech.

Gonzales v. Dallas County Texas · filed 2001-05-04

Therefore, Castillo and Kirby are entitled to qualified immunity from suit, and the district court should have granted summary judgment to the defendants on that basis with respect to the First Amendment retaliation claim, which is the only claim before us in this appeal.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 arrest claim when a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Wills v. Denlinger · filed 2001-05-29

Based on the fact that plaintiffs arrived at the same time the buyer was expected and the informant’s statements that she had been paid and that plaintiffs “could be” the buyers, we conclude that a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed. ... Accordingly, the officers here are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can be denied in a § 1983 damages suit alleging retaliation for a government employee’s speech.

Koziol v. Hanna · filed 2001-05-31

For substantially the reasons set forth in the district court’s opinion, see Koziol v. Hanna, 107 F.Supp.2d 170, 182 (N.D.N.Y. 2000), the order denying qualified immunity is hereby AFFIRMED.

A plaintiff must show that an official violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right to overcome qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim.

Holloman v. Walker County Board of Education · filed 2001-06-04

Once a governmental actor interposes the defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff, in order to overcome it, must demonstrate that the defendant’s actions “violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

An official sued personally under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff has not shown a constitutional deprivation or the asserted right was not clearly established.

Starlight Sugar, Inc. v. Soto · filed 2001-06-11

We hold that Starlight/PanAm's Equal Protection Clause challenge to Secretary Soto's enforcement of Market Regulation No. 13 fails at the first step of the analysis, demonstrating the actual deprivation of a constitutional right, and that Soto is accordingly protected by the defense of qualified immunity.

A public officer acting within discretionary authority is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim if no constitutional violation occurred or the right was not clearly established.

Hardy v. J. Walter Wood, Jr. · filed 2009-07-28

The district court concluded that ... Defendant Wood was entitled to qualified immunity on these claims because Hardy had not presented any evidence that Wood had violated Hardy’s First Amendment or due process rights in terminating him. See Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a public officer acting within his discretionary authority is entitled to qualified immunity if the district court concludes either that there was no constitutional violation or that the constitutional right allegedly violated was not clearly established). We agree.

Section 1983 defendants cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when material factual disputes determine whether they violated a clearly established right.

Manasco v. Rogers · filed 2009-07-29

These factual disputes preclude summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity because they are crucial to determining whether Compoly and Ferguson violated the duty they owed Manasco under Youngberg. Accordingly, we must vacate the district court’s order granting those two defendants summary judgment on their claim of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official could believe their response to a known suicide risk was not deliberately indifferent.

Gregoire v. Weber · filed 2000-12-29

However, since the only indication of risk was one phone call from Moran saying Bouska was going to kill himself, and that she wanted to assure Bouska she would not prevent him from seeing his children, we cannot characterize Joffer's subsequent actions as deliberately indifferent. ... Accordingly, we reverse the district court on the issue of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can support summary judgment against a Section 1983 claim.

Jones v. Fountain · filed 2001-05-18

...so, we find no reversible error of law or fact in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 detention claim when the detention does not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Sanchez v. Canales · filed 2009-07-30

The sole question on appeal is, assuming the Plaintiffs were detained during a legal search of their home, was the detention a violation of their clearly established constitutional rights? We conclude it was not and therefore reverse and remand.

State officials are entitled to qualified immunity from personal-capacity claims under § 1983 when their conduct is not plainly incompetent and does not knowingly violate the law.

Sonnier v. Crain · filed 2009-07-30

Defendant McHodgkins and Carmichael are entitled to qualified immunity from suit in their personal capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because their action towards Plaintiff were not “plainly incompetent” and Defendants did not “knowingly violate the law.”

A prison official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the law did not clearly establish that the challenged conduct was unconstitutional.

Ashker v. Schwarzenegger · filed 2009-07-30

We therefore hold that a reasonable officer in McGrath’s position could have believed that the policy was lawful. ... McGrath is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when a reasonable jury could find that he violated a clearly established right.

Baird v. Renbarger · filed 2009-08-03

We conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Renbarger violated the plaintiffs’ clearly established right to be free from excessive force when he seized and held them by pointing his firearm at them when there was no hint of danger. As a result, Renbarger is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A contract jail physician may assert qualified immunity against a § 1983 claim.

Estate of Henson v. Wichita County, Tex. · filed 2009-08-04

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Dr. Bolin is entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity even though he is a contract physician.

Qualified immunity does not shield a prison official from a Section 1983 claim when, on the plaintiff’s account of the facts, the official ignored a serious medical need in violation of clearly established law.

Chapman v. State of Mississippi · filed 2009-08-04

Price has not demonstrated an entitlement to qualified immunity under these facts.

A sheriff is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable official in her position would understand that the alleged conduct violated clearly established rights.

Whaley v. Valdez · filed 2009-08-06

Implicit in the district court’s determination that a factual dispute existed regarding Sheriff Valdez’s personal involvement in forcing Whaley to sleep on a concrete floor, denying him sufficient quantities of healthy food, denying him prescribed medications, and denying him treatment for knee and stomach problems during his four months of confinement which defeated qualified immunity is the legal conclusion that a reasonable official in the sheriff’s position would understand that her conduct violated Whaley’s clearly established rights. ... Accordingly, Sheriff Valdez has not shown that the district court erred in determining that she was not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against government officials may be subject to qualified immunity, and summary judgment is improper when disputed facts could show a violation of clearly established rights.

Wesley Caruthers, Jr. v. McCawley · filed 2009-08-06

The district court did not err in denying summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

Qualified immunity protects officials from § 1983 liability when the plaintiff cannot show a violation of a constitutional right.

Johnson v. McNeil · filed 2009-08-07

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Rummel and Haskins on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against an officer when the asserted right to pre-deprivation notice was not clearly established at the time of the officer’s conduct.

Mueller v. Auker · filed 2009-08-10

Detective Rogers has successfully shown he is entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that he violated Eric Mueller’s constitutional right to pre-deprivation notice. It was not clearly established at the time that he removed Taige from her parents’ custody that he was required to give Eric Mueller notice of his decision.

Officials sued individually under § 1983 cannot claim qualified immunity for violations of clearly established constitutional rights.

Hussein v. City of Perrysburg · filed 2009-08-10

Thielen and Klag cannot, therefore, rely on the defense of qualified immunity to shield themselves from liabilities for any of the Husseins’ remaining allegations of constitutional violations.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity for using force that a reasonable officer would know violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Luster v. Ledbetter · filed 2009-08-10

A reasonable police officer would therefore know that striking a cuffed, compliant individual with sufficient force to fracture his jaw serves no legitimate law-enforcement purpose and amounts to a violation of the constitutional right to be free from excessive force. Thus, Officer Renfroe is not entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Luster’s claim of excessive force.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials in their individual capacity are subject to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Dean v. Blumenthal · filed 2009-08-11

In sum, Blumenthal is entitled to qualified immunity from Dean’s claims for damages because a right to receive campaign contributions was not clearly established when the Attorney General’s challenged practice was in effect.

Qualified immunity does not shield an official from a § 1983 claim if the official violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

Hamilton v. Eleby · filed 2009-08-12

It does not apply if the official violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the violation.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when clearly established law made their conduct objectively unreasonable.

Carter v. City of Yonkers · filed 2009-08-13

The law in this regard was clearly established and it was not objectively reasonable for Appellants to conclude otherwise. ... We thus conclude that Appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars an individual-capacity § 1983 claim against a medical examiner when the claimed property right in body parts retained for forensic examination was not clearly established.

Waeschle v. Dragovic · filed 2009-08-14

In sum, Michigan law regarding the rights of the next of kin in their relative’s body parts removed for forensic examination during an autopsy is at best equivocal. ... For that reason, Dragovic is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against child welfare workers who reasonably believed their handling of a dependency hearing complied with clearly established due process law.

Bayer v. Monroe County Children and Youth Services · filed 2009-08-14

Even if we assume that plaintiffs had a constitutional right to a post-deprivation hearing within 72 hours and that this right was clearly established at the relevant time, we consider it objectively reasonable for defendants to have believed, under the law existing at the time, that their particular conduct in this case was lawful and in keeping with this right. ... For the foregoing reasons, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims.

A § 1983 claim against officials in their individual capacities survives dismissal on qualified immunity grounds when the complaint alleges a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Felder v. Allen · filed 2009-08-14

Because Felder has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, the trial court’s dismissal of his § 1983 claims against the defendants in their individual capacities was error.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for denying segregated inmates all out-of-cell exercise for six months when established law made the deprivation unlawful.

Delaney v. George Detella, Glenn Malone, Christopher Hughes, Eugene McAdory Clarence Wright, Donald Burns, and Davi · filed 2001-07-09

On this record, Judge Coar was right to deny the qualified immunity plea of all defendants.

In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff opposing qualified immunity must show that the official violated a constitutional right and that the governing law was clearly established at the time.

DeSpain v. Uphoff · filed 2001-07-10

To do this, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right and (2) the law governing the conduct was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the facts known at the time of arrest could reasonably support probable cause.

Jefferson v. Witt · filed 2001-08-24

The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma is REVERSED and REMANDED for entry of judgment in favor of Corporal Witt on the issue of qualified immunity and for other proceedings consistent with this order.

An officer sued under § 1983 for acts within his discretionary authority is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

O'Donnell v. Derrig · filed 2009-08-18

It is undisputed that Derrig was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the alleged wrongful acts occurred. The burden, therefore, shifted to O’Donnell to show that Derrig violated her clearly established constitutional rights.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the challenged conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional law.

Swanson v. Town of Mountain View, Colo. · filed 2009-08-19

For the following reasons we REVERSE, concluding that the Mountain View police officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer who unreasonably relies on a medical assessment based on incorrect information despite knowing facts that signal a detainee’s serious medical need.

McRaven v. Sanders · filed 2009-08-20

Given McMurrian’s knowledge of the drugs McFarland consumed and his physical state — facts that should have triggered special concern — it was unreasonable to rely on a medical assessment grounded on incorrect information. In combination, these three facts preclude qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect a jail official who unreasonably relies on a medical assessment based on incorrect information about a detainee’s condition.

McRaven v. McMurrian · filed 2009-08-20

Given McMurrian’s knowledge of the drugs McFarland consumed and his physical state — facts that should have triggered special concern — it was unreasonable to rely on a medical assessment grounded on incorrect information. In combination, these three facts preclude qualified immunity.

Public officials sued individually under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless their conduct violates clearly established law.

Tunnell v. Crosby · filed 2009-08-24

This is so because the motions to dismiss plainly must be granted anyway based on qualified immunity. ... Thus a public officer or employee may be held individually liable only if his conduct violates clearly established law. ... The defendants thus have qualified immunity.