42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims against officers are subject to qualified immunity when the officer’s conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Trammell v. Thomason · filed 2008-06-03

Therefore, based on the facts of the instant case, the Court finds that Officer Dorough is entitled to qualified immunity on Trammell’s Section 1983 claim.

Qualified immunity protects prison officials from damages under § 1983 when their conduct did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Gilliam v. Quinlan · filed 1985-02-25

WHEREAS the defense of qualified immunity is “available to prison officials as a defense from liability for damages for actions taken in their official capacities,” ... provided the prison officials can show that “their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” ... WHEREAS the court hereby adopts the Magistrate’s findings and recommendations, ... IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.

A private party sued under § 1983 for using state attachment procedures has qualified immunity from damages when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time.

Woodring v. Jennings State Bank · filed 1985-03-01

Therefore, under Buller, the bank is entitled to qualified immunity from liability because it reasonably could not have known it was violating Mrs. Woodring’s constitutional rights.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from a Section 1983 claim when the right they allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Rubacha Ex Rel. Rubacha v. Coler · filed 1985-04-15

But defendants cannot really argue — given the June 1982 Youngberg decision and a number of earlier similar decisions at other levels— the right of a juvenile in state custody to bodily security had not been clearly established by October 1983.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Carver v. Lehman · filed 2008-06-09

We conclude, however, that this right was not clearly established at the time of the facts giving rise to this case. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of qualified immunity.

A plaintiff must show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right to overcome qualified immunity in a § 1983 action.

Leary v. Cnty · filed 2008-06-10

To overcome a qualified-immunity defense in the setting of a constitutional tort, a plaintiff must establish (1) that the defendant violated a “constitutional right” and (2) that the right “was clearly established.”

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 excessive force claim when disputed facts could show that the officer violated a clearly established right.

Belanger v. City of Hartford · filed 2008-06-19

A reasonable police officer should know that swinging a baton at an individual’s face while they are facing away from the officer without prior warning would constitute a violation of that individual’s right to be free from excessive force. In light of the aforementioned issues of material fact, Perri’s motion for summary judgment as to the section 1983 excessive force claim based on qualified immunity is DENIED.

A § 1983 defendant cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when disputed facts are material to both the claim and the immunity defense.

Johnson v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-06-20

Bruce was not entitled to qualified immunity against Johnson’s § 1983 claim at the summary judgment stage because their conflicting deposition testimony gives rise to genuine issues of fact material to both the § 1983 claim and the qualified immunity defense.

Qualified immunity may be denied at summary judgment in a § 1983 excessive-force claim when a genuine factual dispute remains over whether deadly force was reasonable.

Carlson v. Lunsford · filed 2008-06-20

The district court denied Lunsford’s motion for summary judgment, holding that ... Lunsford was not entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage. ... Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court, based upon the reasoning set out by that court in its opinion and order filed on February 8, 2007.

Qualified immunity protects officials sued under § 1983 unless their conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time.

Senu-Oke v. Jackson State University · filed 2008-06-20

Even if a constitutional right may have been violated, the official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the court finds that the official’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the state actions at issue.

Officers defending a § 1983 false arrest claim bear the burden of showing that their arrest was objectively reasonable to obtain qualified immunity.

Parsons v. City of Pontiac · filed 2008-06-24

To be entitled to qualified immunity, Detectives Martin and McKinney bear the burden of showing that their arrest of Parsons was objectively reasonable.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when no objectively reasonable officer with the same knowledge could believe arguable probable cause existed.

Ellis v. Chief of Police · filed 2008-06-24

Quite simply, we do not believe any objectively reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as Chief Wright could have believed that even arguable probable cause existed for arresting Ellis for violating Florida Statute Section 810.09 or 877.03. Having determined Chief Wright is not entitled to qualified immunity against Ellis’s claim of unlawful arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we, therefore, also conclude he is not entitled to qualified immunity against Ellis’s claim of excessive force.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officers who are entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established.

Castillo v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2008-06-24

Further, even if Castillo’s rights were violated, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established. Thus, the individual defendants are not liable under § 1983.

Qualified immunity bars money damages against officials under § 1983 but does not bar a claim for injunctive relief.

Frazier v. DiGuglielmo · filed 2008-06-25

The court therefore finds that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs First Amendment claim. His claim for money damages will be dismissed, leaving only his claim for injunctive relief.

Individual officers are protected from § 1983 damages by qualified immunity when the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Fogel v. Collins · filed 2008-06-27

We therefore hold that despite their violation of Fogel’s First Amendment rights, qualified immunity protects the individual officers from an award of damages.

In a § 1983 action, an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the officer’s failure to read readily available information before a stop was objectively unreasonable.

Phelan v. Village of Lyons · filed 2008-06-27

In sum, we cannot conclude that Officer Dyas’s failure to read the third line was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. ... On this record, we conclude that Officer Dyas was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when material factual disputes bear on whether the official reasonably believed the search was permitted.

Stancuna v. Sherman · filed 2008-06-27

Here, the court finds that summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is inappropriate. ... These issues of fact are critical to determining whether Sherman was operating under a reasonable belief as to what kind of search he was permitted to conduct.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when his mistaken belief in probable cause was unreasonable because he overlooked readily available information.

Phelan, Laura v. Village Lyons IL · filed 2008-06-27

On this record, we conclude that Officer Dyas was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

A supervisor is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when isolated reports of misconduct do not give sufficient notice of serious harm and the supervisor’s conduct is at most negligent.

A.S. ex rel. J.S. v. Reaves · filed 2008-06-27

Like the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Roseville, we conclude that Nash’s actions were at most negligent and that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Nash presented substantial evidence indicating that the previous incidents of misconduct by Reaves were not “obvious, flagrant, rampant, and of continued duration,” but were 5 isolated occurrences over a 16-year period that did not provide a basis for terminating Reaves’s employment or provide him with sufficient notice that Reaves would seriously harm A.S.

In a § 1983 excessive-force action, the reasonableness of the force and the officer’s qualified immunity are separate questions.

Rocha v. City of Austin · filed 2008-06-27

Thus, in any § 1983 case alleging a police officer’s use of excessive or lethal force, the objective reasonableness of the force used is a separate question from the immunity question whether no reasonable officer could have believed that she was not using excessive force.

Qualified immunity shields officials from § 1983 damages for discretionary acts unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

El Bey v. Roop · filed 2008-07-01

Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages stemming from their performance of discretionary functions so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Sova v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 142 F.3d 898, 902 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)).

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim against an official whose warrantless criminal search of a home’s curtilage violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.

Jacob v. Township of West Bloomfield · filed 2008-07-03

Having determined that Defendant’s intrusion upon Plaintiffs property violated Plaintiffs clearly established rights under the Fourth Amendment, we agree with the district court that Widgren provides Defendant with no valid claim of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when they did not violate clearly established rights.

Sarpy v. Town of Homer · filed 2008-07-07

Similarly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Appellees in their individual capacities because Appellees did not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Officers sued under Section 1983 for false arrest are entitled to qualified immunity if they could reasonably believe probable cause existed.

Daniels v. D'AURIZO · filed 2008-07-09

With respect to claims relating to false arrest, an arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity if: (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met. ... For the foregoing reasons, I find that there are no material issues of fact, that defendants had probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs on February 14, 2002 and further are entitled to qualified immunity against the plaintiffs’ claims, and that defendants are therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit has qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that the defendant’s conduct violated federal rights under the circumstances.

Burnette v. Taylor · filed 2008-07-10

If we are mistaken on this point, we also readily conclude that, given the circumstances, the law was not already clearly established that what any of the individuals did would violate federal law.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 excessive force claim cannot be granted as a matter of law when genuine disputes of material fact remain.

Reed v. City of Cleveland · filed 2008-07-14

Indeed, our independent review of the record demonstrates that the district court properly found that genuine issues of material fact preclude the conclusion that Officer Clark is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

A deputy sheriff is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when he reasonably could have believed probable cause existed based on the information he had at the time of arrest.

Newton v. Ray · filed 2008-07-14

The defendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion. In a well reasoned Memorandum Opinion, the court held that the defendant “reasonably could have believed that probable cause existed in light of the information he possessed at the time he arrested the plaintiff.” The plaintiff now appeals. We find no error in the district court’s reasoning, and therefore affirm.

In a § 1983 claim against an officer, a plaintiff opposing summary judgment based on qualified immunity must initially show that the officer violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

Amundsen v. Jones · filed 2008-07-15

When the defendant seeks summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, however, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that: (1) the officer’s actions violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.

Qualified immunity protects defendants from § 1983 damages liability when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Aruanno v. Spagnuolo · filed 2008-07-15

In any case, we agree with the District Court that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. ... In this case, even if we were to conclude that Aruanno had a right to refrain from disclosing his past sexual history and we have not so concluded, we could not hold that the right is clearly established under the First Amendment, and that it was one of which defendants should have been aware.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against government officials who deprive people of rights secured by the Constitution.

Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services · filed 2008-07-18

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against government officials who deprive persons of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Government officials are entitled to a dismissal “if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... “Qualified immunity is not just a defense to liability, it constitutes immunity from suit.”

Section 1983 permits damages claims against government actors, but qualified immunity protects an officer when the officer reasonably believed probable cause existed.

Rheingold v. Harrison Town Police Department · filed 2008-07-18

Because we determined that it was objectively reasonable for Parrello to believe that probable cause existed, he is immune from liability under § 1983 on the ground of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a state or local official for violating federal rights under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity when the violated right was not clearly established.

Childs v. Dekalb County, Georgia · filed 2008-07-18

The district court correctly concluded that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim.

Section 1983 permits a civil action against state actors who violate federally protected rights.

Buck v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2008-07-28

The defendants-appellants in this appeal are five individual officers (“the Officers”) who assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ § 1983 First Amendment deprivation claim. ... Because the Officers failed to raise their arguments as to the sufficiency of the evidence as to causation before the district court, we must AFFIRM the district court’s denial of summary judgment and denial of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity for officials whose conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Bias v. Woods · filed 2008-07-29

Government officials performing discretionary functions are protected from civil liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity if their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against a government official for a constitutional violation, but qualified immunity can entitle the official to summary judgment.

Peach State Recovery, Inc. v. Goodwin · filed 2008-07-30

Peach State and Miner thereafter filed the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against Goodwin, alleging false arrest in violation of Miner’s Fourth Amendment rights. ... On appeal, Peach State and Miner argue that the district court erred in finding that Goodwin was acting within his discretionary authority, that Goodwin had probable cause to arrest Miner, that there were no disputed issues of material fact to preclude an entry of summary judgment, and that Goodwin conducted a reasonable search given the circumstances. Appellants’ arguments, presented in Sections I–IV of Appellants’ initial brief, fail for the reasons clearly set forth in the district court’s well-reasoned order dated January 8, 2008. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s finding that Deputy Goodwin is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 claims for damages may be barred by qualified immunity when officials act under prison policies that are not patently unconstitutional.

Brown v. Mason · filed 2008-08-01

We affirm the district court’s grant of qualified immunity from Brown’s claims for damages. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they confiscated Brown’s photographs pursuant to official prison policies, which policies were not “patently violative of constitutional princi- pies.”

Section 1983 claims against officers in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity when the officers could not reasonably have known their conduct violated established rights.

Schneider v. OH · filed 2008-08-04

In effect, this requires that in order to hold the officers liable in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Schneider must show not only that the officers’ actions were unconstitutional, but also that they should have known at that time that they were violating Schneider’s rights.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue state actors for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Keylon v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2008-08-05

Second, the district court should have granted Ms. Keylon’s motion for judgment as a matter of law against Officer Barnard because his defense of qualified immunity fails.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for constitutional violations by officials acting under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity.

Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces · filed 2008-08-05

In the context of a § 1983 action, moreover, the officer “is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that [reasonable suspicion] existed to ... detain the plaintiff’—i.e., if the officer had “arguable reasonable suspicion.”

Section 1983 permits a damages action against a state actor for a constitutional violation, but qualified immunity can shield an official unless the right was clearly established.

Dahl v. Weber · filed 2008-08-05

For these reasons Defendant Weber is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue a state actor for violating a federal right, but qualified immunity can protect the officer from damages unless the right was clearly established.

Cabrera v. LeVierge, et al. · filed 2008-08-06

Turning to the second prong of the qualified immunity test, and applying that test to plaintiff’s version of the disputed facts, see Groh, 540 U.S. at 5 6 2 , it is plain that a prisoner’s constitutional right not to be kicked and punched while shackled was clearly established at the time. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4 (holding that prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was kicked and punched while shackled, even though his injuries required no medical attention). And, regarding the third prong of the test, an objectively reasonable correctional officer, in LeVierge’s position, would have understood that repeatedly punching and kicking a shackled inmate who posed no physical threat would violate the inmate’s clearly established constitutional right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.

Section 1983 claims against governmental officials may be subject to qualified immunity when their discretionary actions could reasonably have been consistent with the rights allegedly violated.

Newman v. Kock · filed 2008-08-06

Qualified immunity is a defense to federal law claims that shields governmental officials performing discretionary functions from liability as long as their actions could reasonably be thought to have been consistent with the rights those actions are alleged to violate.

Section 1983 permits claims against governmental officials for violating federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

William A. Newman, Ph.D. v. Nereu F. Kock, Jr., Jacky Yuk-Chow So, Dan R. Jones, and Ray M. Keck, III · filed 2008-08-06

“Qualified immunity against section 1983 claims requires proof of effectively the same elements as official immunity under Texas law.”

Section 1983 permits claims against government officials for constitutional-rights violations, subject to qualified immunity when the right was not clearly established.

Iko v. Shreve · filed 2008-08-06

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." ... The district court therefore properly denied the officers’ assertion of qualified immunity as to this claim.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Couture Ex Rel. M.C. v. Board of Education of the Albuquerque Public Schools · filed 2008-08-07

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as we must, we hold that the individual defendants did not violate M.C.’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures or his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights and are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity.

Smith v. Stafford · filed 2008-08-08

A two-step process is used to determine whether qualified immunity bars a § 1983 action. Courts first ask, "[tJaken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" If the allegations show a constitutional violation, courts then must determine whether the right allegedly violated was "clearly established," which occurs where "the contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Where either of these requirements is not met, the § 1983 claim will be barred by the official's qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims may proceed past the pleading stage when the complaint alleges a clearly established constitutional violation despite a qualified-immunity defense.

Back v. Hall · filed 2008-08-11

Just as we gauge other pleading-stage dismissals to determine only whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), so we review an assertion of qualified immunity to determine only whether the complaint “adequately alleges the commission of acts that violated clearly established law,” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); see also Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 527 (6th Cir.2002).

Section 1983 permits a person to seek relief against officials for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity.

Back v. Schrader · filed 2008-08-11

Just as we gauge other pleading-stage dismissals to determine only whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), so we review an assertion of qualified immunity to determine only whether the complaint “adequately alleges the commission of acts that violated clearly established law,” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); see also Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 527 (6th Cir. 2002). ... Measured by this yardstick, Back’s political-affiliation allegations suffice, and neither Hall nor Schrader is entitled to qualified immunity at this early stage of the case.

Section 1983 claims against officials in their individual capacities may be subject to qualified immunity.

McIntosh v. Partridge · filed 2008-08-11

To the extent McIntosh’s claim is against Partridge in his individual capacity for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Partridge is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits claims against state officials for constitutional deprivations, subject to qualified immunity.

Autery v. Davis · filed 2008-08-13

In constitutional tort cases where evidence of wrongful intent is an element of liability, a state official is entitled to qualified immunity if the record indisputably establishes that the official was in fact motivated, at least in part, by lawful considerations.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer for a malicious prosecution claim when he only supplies truthful information to a prosecutor and does not make the charging decision.

Kinkus v. Village of Yorkville · filed 2008-08-13

Since Popp supplied only truthful information to Prosecutor Thomas, he cannot be subject to a malicious prosecution claim.

Section 1983 allows damages claims against government officials for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity.

Caviness v. Johnson · filed 2008-08-14

Generally, government employees are immune from personal liability if their conduct is reasonable in light of clearly established law and the information that the employee possessed at the time of their actions. ... With regard to the claim for the destruction of his property, Caviness has cited to clearly established law which finds a violation of the Fourth Amendment can occur if property is unnecessarily and excessively destroyed during the execution of a search warrant. ... This Court concludes a jury could conclude from the facts presented that the damage to Caviness’ property during the execution of the search warrant in this case was not necessary, measured, or reasonable to effectuate the search. As a result, this Court must deny Johnson qualified immunity on this particular claim.

Section 1983 claims against social workers may be barred by qualified immunity when the constitutional right was not clearly established.

Franet v. County of Alameda Social Services Agency · filed 2008-08-14

Hintzen is entitled to qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity, for her pre-hearing conduct.

Section 1983 provides relief for deprivation of a federal right, subject to qualified immunity for public officials.

Flinn v. Elaine Gordon, Dexter Lehtinen · filed 1985-11-15

After an examination of the complaint and applicable law, we find that none of these injuries constitute the loss of a federal right and, consequently, that no relief is available under § 1983. Since Flinn cannot show the loss of any federal right, much less the loss of a “clearly established” right, he has failed to overcome Gordon’s qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a Section 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when the officer reasonably but mistakenly believes probable cause exists.

Wheeler, Michelle v. Lawson, Ronald · filed 2008-08-21

We believe that the probable cause determination here was sufficiently close that an officer reasonably could have believed that probable cause existed, even if that belief ultimately was mistaken.

Qualified immunity does not shield a sheriff from a § 1983 claim for a blanket policy of strip searching pretrial arrestees solely because they will be housed in the general jail population when that policy violates clearly established rights.

Bull v. City & County Sf · filed 2008-08-21

However, a policy of strip searching arrestees based solely on their clas- sification for housing in the general population violates the arrestees’ clearly established constitutional rights, and we thus affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to a sheriff for a policy of strip searching pre-arraignment arrestees solely because they will be housed in the general jail population when that policy violates clearly established constitutional rights.

Bull v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2008-08-22

However, a policy of strip searching arrestees based solely on their classification for housing in the general population violates the arrestees’ clearly established constitutional rights, and we thus affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.

An officer facing a § 1983 claim is entitled to qualified immunity when reasonable reliance on another officer’s information would lead an officer in the same position to believe probable cause existed.

Torres v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2008-08-25

In light of what Detective Roberts told Detective Rains after showing the six-pack to Hernandez, and in light of the undisputed fact that, of the four detectives, Detective Rains was the least involved in the investigation, we conclude as a matter of law that Detectives Rains reasonably relied on the (allegedly false) statement by Detective Roberts that Hernandez had identified Torres. Based on this conclusion, we further conclude as a matter of law that a reasonable officer in Rains’ position would have believed he had probable cause to arrest Torres. Accordingly, Detective Rains was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Prison officials have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim based on continuous cell lighting when no clearly established law prohibited comparable lighting absent evidence that they knew it caused serious harm.

Walker v. Woodford · filed 2008-08-28

These cases suffice to show that during the time Plaintiff was held at Calipatria there was no clearly established law forbidding them from keeping the equivalent of a 30 or 40 watt incandescent bulb on 24 hours daily in inmates’ cells, absence a showing they knew Plaintiff was being severely harmed.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit when the plaintiff has not shown a violation of a constitutional right.

Vicari v. Ysleta Independent School District · filed 2008-08-28

Because Vicari has not shown a violation of any constitutional right, Miller is entitled to qualified immunity from her suit.

A public official sued individually under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation.

Sanchez v. Dubois · filed 2008-09-02

Because the defendants established that “no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established,” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

An official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when it was not objectively reasonable for him to believe his conduct was lawful.

Davis v. Stratton · filed 2008-09-09

In addition, because D’Annibale knew the falsity of his claim that the Quad was private property, it was not objectively reasonable for him to believe that his action did not violate Plaintiffs rights. D’Annibale is thus not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials seeking qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim must allege that they were performing discretionary functions.

Gary v. DeKalb County Government · filed 2008-09-09

The officials argue on appeal that they were engaged in their respective discretionary functions for DeKalb County, but the officials did not allege in their motion to dismiss that they were performing discretionary functions. ... No matter how fanciful Gary’s complaint appears to be, the record does not support a finding of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can shield an officer from § 1983 liability when plaintiffs fail to identify record evidence supporting their allegations of misconduct.

Spinks v. Township of Clinton · filed 2008-09-11

While bad faith is normally a jury question, plaintiffs offer no citations to the record that might support their characterization of Clancy's conduct, as required by Rule 4:46-5(a). Plaintiffs' general references to the disks and CD is insufficient to show a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, we agree with the trial judge's ruling that Clancy enjoyed a qualified immunity from 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 liability.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when a reasonable jury could find that probable cause was objectively lacking.

Mazloum v. District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2008-09-15

Qualified immunity, then, is not available to Ramirez from the § 1983 claim premised on a jury finding that there was an unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

A plaintiff opposing qualified immunity in a § 1983 action bears the burden of showing both a constitutional violation and that the law was clearly established.

Sparks v. Rittenhouse · filed 2008-09-16

The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating both that a constitutional violation occurred and that the law was clearly established.

In a § 1983 suit, officers’ qualified immunity turns on whether the facts show a constitutional violation and whether the right was clearly established.

Henderson v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2008-09-19

To determine whether peace officers are entitled to qualified immunity, we apply a two-pronged test. ... First, we consider whether the facts alleged, viewed in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show that the officers violated a constitutional right. ... Second, we consider whether the right was clearly established. ... We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the Officers in them individual capacities.

Section 1983 officers are not entitled to qualified immunity when settled law would have put reasonable officers on notice that their conduct was unlawful.

Arce v. Blackwell · filed 2008-09-19

We have had similar cases in the past that would have put reasonable police officers on notice that their response to Arce — keeping an individual who is in a state of excited delirium restrained with his chest to the ground while applying pressure to his back and ignoring pleas that he cannot breathe — constituted excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against officials protected by qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct was unlawful.

Roman Catholic Foundation, UW-Madison, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Wisconsin System · filed 2008-09-24

Thus, while I conclude that the University may fund RCF’s unique sectarian activities when it also funds the unique activities of a wide range of secular student groups, my conclusion nudges the boundaries of clearly established law. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and I will deny plaintiffs’ demand for monetary relief pursuant to § 1983.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim if the asserted right was not clearly established when the official acted.

Carepartners LLC, Et v. Lashway · filed 2008-09-24

If the right was not clearly established at the time of the violation, the official is entitled to qualified immunity.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from damages on a Section 1983 Free Exercise claim when their conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Campbell v. Alameida · filed 2008-09-24

The district court properly determined that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from Campbell’s Free Exercise and RLUIPA claims for damages, because defendants’ conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim if the right was not clearly established when they acted.

CAREPARTNERS, LLC v. Lashway · filed 2008-09-25

If the right was not clearly established at the time of the violation, the official is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for alleged conduct that violates the clearly established prohibition on irrational or arbitrary government classifications.

Lazy Y Ranch Ltd v. Behrens · filed 2008-09-25

We view the complaint as relying on the principle that government actors may not draw irrational or arbitrary classifications. This principle is clearly established, see, e.g., Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 999 (9th Cir. 2007), so Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers have qualified immunity from Section 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims when they had arguable probable cause to arrest.

Harris v. County of Nassau · filed 2008-09-29

In addition to holding that probable cause bars the false arrest and false imprisonment claims, the court further holds that even if probable cause did not exist, there can be no question but that arguable probable cause sufficient to support qualified immunity, exists. Specifically, even if the defendant police officers were somehow mistaken as to their belief regarding probable cause, it was certainly reasonable to believe that probable cause existed. In light of the foregoing, the officers are entitled to dismissal of the Section 1983 claims for false arrest and false imprisonment.

Government officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a constitutional right.

Warren v. Goord · filed 2008-09-30

In light of the Court's finding that Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the law governing a state-created danger claim was not sufficiently clear to warn them that their conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

Estate of Oliva v. New Jersey · filed 2008-09-30

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that in 2002 the law with regard to culpability of state actors in a state-created danger case was not sufficiently clear to put Defendants on notice that their actions violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment is appropriate.

Individual defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim at summary judgment when the evidence, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, shows that they violated a clearly established constitutional right.

COREY AIRPORT SERVICES, INC. v. City of Atlanta · filed 2008-09-30

In summary, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Corey, the court holds that, though they were acting within their discretionary authority, the individual City defendants each violated Corey’s clearly established constitutional right to be treated fairly and equally during the 2002 RFP process. Accordingly, the individual City defendants are not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity at this stage of the litigation.

Genuine disputes of material fact can preclude summary judgment on a police officer’s qualified-immunity defense to a § 1983 claim.

Chappell v. City of Cleveland · filed 2008-09-30

It is this reservoir of disputed facts which, at least under current, binding Sixth Circuit precedent, counsels against a judgment granting qualified immunity to the Detectives at this stage of the proceedings. ... Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Detectives’ joint motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to Chappell’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim under § 1983 is DENIED.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

Farah v. Wellington · filed 2008-09-30

As explained in the district court’s opinion, Farah has not established a genuine issue of material fact regarding Defendants’ qualified immunity defense because he has not shown that he suffered a constitutional violation. ... Therefore, the lower court correctly granted White qualified immunity on Farah’s claim.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity for government officials.

Miller v. Clinton · filed 2008-10-01

Since Miller’s speech is unprotected, she cannot establish a First Amendment retaliation claim. That cause of action should therefore have been dismissed because Judge Saxton is entitled to qualified immunity.

In a Section 1983 suit, a plaintiff must show that the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation to overcome qualified immunity at summary judgment.

Sosa v. Hames · filed 2008-10-07

Even if the facts demonstrate a violation, the plaintiff still has the burden to show that the constitutional rights were “clearly established” at the time of the violation in order to survive summary judgment.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from damages when the right they allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time.

Gargiul v. Tompkins · filed 1986-05-14

However, a remand for trial against the Board members in their individual capacities is not required because they are entitled, as a matter of law, to a good-faith immunity defense. ... Nevertheless, we cannot say that the right to refuse examination by a physician of the opposite sex was sufficiently established in 1975 to defeat a defense of qualified immunity.

An official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 retaliation claim that states a violation of clearly established law.

O'QUINN v. Chambers County, Tex. · filed 1986-06-04

Plaintiffs claims of retaliation and intimidation under § 1983 and § 1985 state violations of clearly established law; therefore, defendant Morris is not immune from suit.

Prison officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when a reasonable officer would have known the inmate’s due process rights were clearly established.

Sourbeer v. Robinson · filed 1986-06-19

We conclude that Sourbeer's due process rights were clearly established within the meaning of Harlow and People of Three Mile Island, and that the appellant officers are liable to him for damages.

Section 1983 officials have qualified immunity from personal damages when they could reasonably believe the law did not clearly forbid their conduct.

De Abadia v. Hon. Luis Izquierdo Mora · filed 1986-06-27

For now we merely hold, finding appellants to be at least reasonable in believing the law was not clearly established, that they are entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

Officials sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity from damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

White v. Pierce County · filed 1986-08-20

Government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Having complied with the statute, the deputies are immune.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim arising from restraining a detainee for medically necessary treatment when the officer’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Meyer v. Woodward · filed 2008-10-09

In light of the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Sullivan, and the Sixth Circuit’s affirmation of Rudy, it cannot be said that Defendant Woodward’s actions violated a clearly established constitutional right. Accordingly, Defendant Woodward is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiffs claims under § 1983 that arise out of the circumstances surrounding the catheterization procedure.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment for a prison physician when disputed facts could show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a clearly established constitutional violation.

Hayes, Floyd K. v. Snyder, Donald N. · filed 2008-10-09

It has been established for decades that prison physicians violate inmates’ constitutional rights when they deliberately disregard an inmate’s serious medical condition, and only a trial can resolve the facts that are in dispute.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action is an objective defense that cannot be supported by reliance on advice of counsel.

Pritchard v. County of Erie · filed 2008-10-14

This is an objective, not a subjective, test, and reliance upon advice of counsel therefore cannot be used to support the defense of qualified immunity.

Public officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their actions did not violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Swift v. Tweddell · filed 2008-10-17

Even if a violation of plaintiffs rights could be found, defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity from liability for their actions. ... For the reasons given, I find that plaintiffs constitutional rights were not violated at all; it was therefore objectively reasonable for defendants to believe that their actions did not violate plaintiffs constitutional rights.

A sheriff seeking qualified immunity from a § 1983 detention claim must show good faith and that the detention fell within his discretionary authority.

McGee v. Carrillo · filed 2008-10-20

In the present case, the district court was correct in denying Carrillo’s Motion to Dismiss because Carrillo has failed to demonstrate that he acted in good faith and within his discretion when he incarcerated McGee after the charges against McGee were dropped.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity at summary judgment when the evidence could show that officers used force against a restrained person in violation of clearly established law.

Weigel v. Broad · filed 2008-10-21

If, however, the facts plaintiffs proffered are true and the jury draws the inferences most supportive of plaintiffs’ position, then the law was clearly established that applying pressure to Mr. Weigel’s upper back, once he was handcuffed and his legs restrained, was constitutionally unreasonable due to the significant risk of positional asphyxiation associated with such actions. ... In these circumstances, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action must raise qualified immunity before the district court in a timely fashion to preserve the defense for appeal.

Noel v. Artson · filed 2008-10-22

Our cases have been consistent on one thing: that to be preserved for appeal, the defense of qualified immunity must be raised in a timely fashion before the district court.

In a § 1983 suit, qualified immunity requires an inquiry into whether the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right and, if so, whether that right was clearly established.

Sullivan v. Allred · filed 2008-10-22

A qualified immunity defense requires a two step analysis. ... If a constitutional violation is found, the qualified immunity inquiry continues and examines whether the constitutional rights violated were clearly established to the extent that a reasonable person would be aware of those rights.

When a § 1983 defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show a constitutional violation and that the defendant’s conduct violated clearly established law at the time.

Gaston v. Ploeger · filed 2008-10-23

When a defendant in a § 1983 case has asserted qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) at the time of the incident, it was clearly established that the defendant’s conduct amounted to a constitutional violation.

Qualified immunity can support summary judgment for defendants facing Section 1983 prison conditions claims.

Lucero v. Mesa County Sheriff's Department · filed 2008-10-27

Therefore, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to defendants on Mr. Lucero’s first and third claims, based on qualified immunity, for substantially the reasons set forth by the magistrate judge and the district court.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 excessive force claim when the pleaded facts show objectively unreasonable force causing injury.

Holguin v. Lopez · filed 2008-10-28

Taking Holguin’s allegations as true, the Court concludes Hol-guin states a cognizable excessive force claim since he alleges injuries resulting from force that was seemingly excessive and objectively unreasonable in light of the circumstances. The Court, therefore, declines to dismiss the excessive force claim against Officer Robles on the basis of qualified immunity.

To avoid dismissal of a § 1983 claim on qualified immunity grounds, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had fair notice that the conduct violated clearly established federal law.

Frank Battle, Sr. v. Webb · filed 2008-10-31

Thus, to avoid dismissal on qualified immunity grounds, Battle has the burden of demonstrating that Webb-at the pertinent time and given the specific circumstances of this case-had fair notice that his conduct would violate clear federal law.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against an official when the asserted right was not clearly established to a reasonable official.

Kloch v. Kohl · filed 2008-11-03

Even if we were to conclude that Dr. Kloch properly alleged a constitutional violation, we are satisfied that Bruning is entitled to qualified immunity under the second prong of our analysis: whether the right at issue was so clearly established that a reasonable official would have known that his conduct was unconstitutional.

Government officials sued in their individual capacities under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the complaint shows their conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Bailey v. United States Marshal Service · filed 2008-11-03

Because it is clear from the face of the amended complaints that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the complaints will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Qualified immunity protects an official from § 1983 damages when the asserted right was not clearly established to a reasonable official.

Kloch v. Jon C. Bruning, etc. · filed 2008-11-03

Even if we were to conclude that Dr. Kloch properly alleged a constitutional violation, we are satisfied that Bruning is entitled to qualified immunity under the second prong of our analysis: whether the right at issue was so clearly established that a reasonable official would have known that his conduct was unconstitutional.

In a § 1983 action, officers are protected by qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Grimes v. Yoos · filed 2008-11-03

Thus, because they did not violate a clearly established constitutional right in using canine force to apprehend Grimes, the defendants are protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Arresting officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim when prosecutors control the decision to continue the case.

Gil v. County of Suffolk · filed 2008-11-06

Moreover, the arresting police officers are also entitled to qualified immunity as to the malicious prosecution claim because the matter was in the hands of the prosecutorial authorities making the decision to continue with the prosecution.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct is reasonable under the circumstances, even if its constitutionality is uncertain.

Duarte v. Begrin · filed 2008-11-06

Even if there were some doubt about the constitutionality of the entry and arrest, the officers’ conduct was reasonable under the circumstances, and they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim protects an officer who reasonably relies on another officer’s account and reasonably believes there is probable cause to arrest.

Torres v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2008-11-12

Based on this conclusion, we further conclude as a matter of law that a reasonable officer in Rains’ position would have believed he had probable cause to arrest Torres. Accordingly, Detective Rains was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Officers have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Cross v. Mokwa · filed 2008-11-14

At a minimum, it was not clearly established in 2003 that a police officer could be liable on a “prior restraint” theory for making arrests that were supported by probable cause and then conducting a reasonable search and seizure of a condemned building. For these reasons, the district court’s denial of qualified immunity from these First Amendment claims is reversed.

Section 1983 defendants performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Trinity Cross v. Joseph J. Mokwa, etc · filed 2008-11-14

Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 & n.30 (1982).

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 claim when the complaint alleges facts that could establish a violation of clearly established rights and the defense requires a factual record.

Alfaro v. Labador · filed 2008-11-14

We agree with the District Court that, based on the allegations of the complaint, the ZBA defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Defendants in a Section 1983 procedural due process claim are entitled to qualified immunity when they did not violate clearly established law.

Handte v. Hosmer · filed 2008-11-14

Even if the process afforded fell below the constitutionally required minimum, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate clearly established law.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when it was objectively reasonable to believe the arrest occurred within the officer’s jurisdiction.

Engleman v. Deputy Murray · filed 2008-11-17

Notwithstanding the historical prohibition on executing an arrest warrant outside of the arresting officer’s jurisdiction, we conclude that Deputy Murray is entitled to qualified immunity because it was objectively reasonable for an officer in Deputy Murray’s position to have believed that he was executing the arrest in Arkansas.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim based on the officer’s actions in placing a person in a police vehicle under the circumstances presented.

Vance v. Wade · filed 2008-11-17

Although we agree that Vance’s allegations are insufficient to support an excessive-force claim for handcuffing, we disagree that Wade is entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive-force claim relating to Wade’s actions in placing Vance in the back of a police vehicle.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to public officials for intentional race discrimination in public employment when the right was clearly established.

Sprinkle v. CITY OF DOUGLAS, GA · filed 2008-11-21

In this case, the rights allegedly violated by Defendants were “clearly established” at the time of their actions and, therefore, they are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim when clearly established law gave fair warning that the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment.

Shepard v. Hallandale Beach Police Dept. · filed 2008-11-25

Accordingly, because Officer Budnick violated Shepard’s clearly-established Fourth Amendment rights by arresting Shepard in his home without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances, we find that he is not entitled to qualified immunity on Shepard’s unlawful arrest claim.

An investigator facing a Section 1983 claim is entitled to qualified immunity when a corrected warrant affidavit still establishes probable cause.

Barton v. Curtis · filed 2008-11-25

Accordingly, making every reasonable inference in Barton’s favor, no reasonable jury could find facts that would lead to the conclusion that even a “corrected” version of the 2003 Affidavit lacked probable cause. Curtis is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against officials performing discretionary functions are subject to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Whitten v. Wooten · filed 2008-12-01

Qualified immunity gives government officials performing discretionary functions complete protection from individual claims brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, if their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when the record lacks facts establishing the defense as a matter of law.

Patterson v. Fuller · filed 1987-02-17

There being no facts in the record which will support a defense of qualified immunity or justification or self-defense as a matter of law, the Court cannot grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to this issue.

Public officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Mendez-Palou v. Rohena-Betancourt · filed 1987-03-10

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields a public official from liability for civil damages in a section 1983 action if, at the time of the challenged action, the statutory or constitutional right allegedly violated was not "clearly established."

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action does not apply to a claim for injunctive relief.

Jorge E. Cancel Lugo v. Carlos Alvarado, Etc. · filed 1987-05-26

Those cases were suits for damages only, unlike this case, where the plaintiff also requested injunctive relief, as to which a defense of qualified immunity is totally immaterial.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from a § 1983 claim when their alleged conduct violated clearly established rights.

Vaughn v. Ricketts · filed 1987-05-29

Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have demonstrated the existence of clearly established laws prohibiting the Defendants' alleged conduct. Consequently, the Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity fails and their Motion for Summary Judgment on that ground is denied.

A defendant facing a § 1983 claim is entitled to qualified immunity when the defendant’s conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Watts v. Runnels · filed 2008-12-02

The district court properly determined that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from Watts’ equal protection claim because defendants’ conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when disputed facts could establish that they used malicious force in violation of clearly established law.

Adams v. Bouchard · filed 2008-12-04

Having fully reviewed the record and the governing law, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 23]. ... With respect to the second part of the inquiry, it was clearly established in June 2007 that prison officials cannot inflict injury where they act, not in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. ... Therefore, it is recommended that the motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity be denied as to Defendants Bouchard and Schmidt.

Police officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity for discretionary acts unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would know.

Burkes v. Waggoner · filed 2008-12-09

That is, they are immune unless their actions “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 excessive force claims against public officials may be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds.

Price v. Engert · filed 2008-12-10

Furthermore, even if Price’s grievance had been timely filed and his administrative remedies properly exhausted, I find that his claims of excessive force must nonetheless be dismissed on the basis of the defendants’ qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects a chief judge sued individually under § 1983 for a reassignment within his discretionary authority when the complaint alleges no constitutional violation.

Spechler v. Tobin · filed 2008-12-10

Because the Court agrees that Chief Judge Tobin was acting within his discretion as the Chief Judge in reassigning former Judge Spechler to a separate division, the Court grants him qualified immunity.

A state employee who causes a constitutional violation by intentionally providing false information to police without probable cause is not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability.

Buckner v. SHETTERLEY · filed 2008-12-15

Rather, the Court’s ruling simply prevents a state employee from escaping § 1983 liability when the employee causes a constitutional violation by intentionally providing false information to police without probable cause. The jury found that Defendant Shetterley engaged in such conduct; thus, she is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

James v. Mellen · filed 2008-12-15

Accordingly, Mellen is entitled to qualified immunity and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Qualified immunity does not shield foster-care officials from a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the alleged facts show that clearly established law gave them fair warning that their failure to protect children from a known, substantial risk of harm was unconstitutional.

H.A.L. Ex Rel. Lewis v. Foltz · filed 2008-12-15

Although the injury sustained in Taylor was a beating-induced coma and the injury here is sexual abuse and although other unimportant differences exist, we accept that Taylor clearly established decisional law that applied, at the pertinent time, with obvious clarity to Defendants in this case -- assuming that the true facts are the same as those alleged -- and that Defendants had fair warning that their conduct (doing nothing to protect the children, given the circumstances) violated clear federal law. Defendants can therefore be held personally liable for the childrens’ injuries.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim is assessed from the point of view of an objectively reasonable officer.

LaFrenier v. Kinirey · filed 2008-12-16

While the court did not reach the qualified immunity defense asserted by the defendants, we note that qualified immunity turns on assessing the situation from the point of view of an objectively reasonable officer and that defendants would be entitled to immunity in any event.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from Section 1983 damages when they violate a civil detainee’s clearly established substantive due process rights.

Meyers v. Pope · filed 2008-12-16

The district court’s qualified immunity analysis was equally flawed. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or Constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Here, Meyers’s substantive due process rights were clearly established in 2002.

A defendant sued individually under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Brooks v. Stringer · filed 2008-12-18

Without making such a showing, Brooks cannot, as a matter of law, demonstrate the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, see id. at 834, and Payne, in her individual capacity, was entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer who uses significant force against a fully secured arrestee after all danger has passed is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim.

Galvez v. Bruce · filed 2008-12-18

The lesson of Slicker and Lee is that qualified immunity is not available to officers who subject arrestees to significant force after “the arrest ha[s] been fully effected, the arrestee completely secured, and all danger vitiated.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1199-1200; see also Slicker, 215 F.3d at 1233.

In a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim, the general rule against arrest without probable cause is too broad, by itself, to defeat qualified immunity.

Herrera v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2008-12-19

While it is clearly established that arrest without probable cause is a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court cannot deny qualified immunity to Officer O’Brien by applying the “clearly established law” test at this level of generality.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim must be reconsidered when the reasonableness finding supporting it is vacated.

Santiago v. Stamp · filed 2008-12-23

We therefore also vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to its conclusion that defendants have established that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when they reasonably believe they are conducting a search with valid consent.

Morales v. Boyd · filed 2008-12-23

Thus, the Officers reasonably believed that they were executing the search pursuant to valid consent and are protected by qualified immunity.

Officials have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the right to a name-clearing hearing after legally required disclosure of stigmatizing allegations was not clearly established.

Hemmah v. City of Red Wing · filed 2008-12-30

First, the Court holds that it was not clearly established that a public employee is entitled to a name-clearing hearing when the defendant employer is legally required to disclose the stigmatizing allegations against the employee.

In a § 1983 suit involving qualified immunity at summary judgment, the court first identifies the facts supported under the summary judgment standard, then asks whether a reasonable officer should have known the conduct was unlawful.

Morelli v. Webster · filed 2009-01-07

In order to ease this inherent tension, we think it wise for courts to cabin these standards and keep them logically distinct, first identifying the version of events that best comports with the summary judgment standard and then asking whether, given that set of facts, a reasonable officer should have known that his actions were unlawful.

Qualified immunity shields officials from damages under § 1983 when the asserted right was not clearly established, but does not bar injunctive relief.

Gunasekera v. Irwin · filed 2009-01-08

Our holding that a name-clearing hearing may require publicity in some circumstances was not clearly established law at the time that Irwin and Krendl acted. However, because qualified immunity does not bar injunctive relief, Gunasekera may proceed with respect to his request for a public name-clearing hearing as indicated above.

A factual dispute over whether an officer knowingly made a false identification can prevent qualified immunity on Section 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.

Pizarro v. Kasperzyk · filed 2009-01-08

If White knew that Pizarro was not the driver of the second quad, there was no probable cause to identify him as such, nor could any reasonable officer do so. As their testimony on this issue is divergent, Pizarro and White’s credibility cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, White’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Pizarro’s constitutional claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution, and GRANTED in all other respects.

Qualified immunity does not shield a Section 1983 defendant from a First Amendment retaliation claim when the alleged conduct violated clearly established protection for public employee speech.

Robinson v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2009-01-08

Therefore, at the time defendants acted in 2005 and 2006, both the constitutional protection of employee speech and a First Amendment cause of action for retaliation against protected speech were clearly established and potentially applicable to defendants’ conduct.

Section 1983 does not protect an officer through qualified immunity when the facts, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, show objectively unreasonable force that violates a clearly established Fourth Amendment right.

Valladares v. Cordero · filed 2009-01-12

Based on the standard for summary judgment, the district court correctly determined that the facts viewed in the light most favorable to James indicate that Officer Cordero’s actions were not objectively reasonable and violated James’ clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Thus, the officer was precluded from protec- tion under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Officers lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim when facts known to them establish an affirmative defense that leaves them without arguable probable cause.

Williams v. Sirmons · filed 2009-01-13

A reasonable officer would have known, given this particular set of circumstances, that Williams’ flight from the traffic stop was justified by the affirmative defense of necessity or duress. For this reason, the deputies lacked arguable – much less actual – probable cause to arrest, even though the circumstances established that Williams met all elements of the offense of fleeing or eluding a police officer. The deputies, therefore, are not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity as a matter of law for Williams’ claim that the arrest was unsupported by probable cause and the district court properly denied summary judgment on this ground.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when the undisputed facts establish arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Brienza v. Gee · filed 2009-01-13

But, the undisputed facts show that Bridwell had “arguable probable cause” to arrest Brienza on the DUI charge. Bridwell is entitled to qualified immunity, and thus summary judgment for Bridwell was appropriate.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action focuses on the legality of the official’s conduct rather than the official’s liability to the particular plaintiff.

Eng v. Cooley · filed 2009-01-14

We therefore agree with the Seventh Circuit that “the appropriate focus in a qualified immunity analysis is the legality of the conduct of the public official, not ... his liability to the ultimate plaintiff.”

Qualified immunity is unavailable to municipalities and officials sued in their official capacities under § 1983.

Eng v. County of La · filed 2009-01-14

Qualified immu- nity is not available, however, to municipalities or individuals in their official capacities.

Government officials are shielded from § 1983 damages when their conduct did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Guzzi v. Dennehy · filed 2009-01-14

Nevertheless, in regard to a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim against a government official for money damages, such an official is shielded from liability insofar as his conduct did not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Officials sued under § 1983 cannot claim qualified immunity solely because no case addresses their precise conduct when existing law made its unlawfulness apparent.

Ostlund v. Robert C. Bobb, Edward J. Cooper, City of Santa Ana · filed 1987-08-21

Therefore, Bobb and Cooper cannot use the absence of case law directly on point to shield them from liability. The unlawfulness of their conduct should have been apparent to them in light of preexisting case law.

Law enforcement defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when warrants and probable cause provide reasonable grounds for their actions.

Bemis v. Kelley · filed 1987-09-29

While the above conclusions dispose of this matter, I believe the defendants are entitled to that protection under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The facts here, especially the presence of both a state and federal search warrant and the presence of probable cause to arrest and the attendant right to seize weapons and evidence, show reasonable grounds for the belief that the defendants’ actions were necessary and taken in good faith.

In a § 1983 damages action, factual disputes can preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Eva Garrett, Individually and as Administratrix for the Estate of Linda Kay Johnson, Deceased v. Lloyd Rader and Norman · filed 1987-10-13

Because we agree with the district court that there are factual issues which preclude a determination of the question of qualified immunity as a matter of law, the Order denying the motions for summary judgment will be affirmed.

In a § 1983 suit, a court must consider all undisputed record facts when deciding a public official’s qualified immunity claim.

Whitt v. Smith · filed 1987-11-02

Therefore, a district court must carefully consider “all the undisputed facts in the record,” to determine a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity to “shield public officials ... from the burdens of trial.”

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields an officer whose warrant application was objectively reasonable, even if omitted facts would have negated probable cause.

Ogden v. District of Columbia · filed 1987-11-25

The Court concludes that defendant Manjoras enjoys qualified immunity, whether or not the arrest affidavit supports a finding of probable cause.