42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for an officer who reasonably believed that the law authorized his conduct.

Ramos v. Carbajal · filed 2007-03-31

Consequently, if Rodriguez reasonably believed that the GCAB was a polling place, or that N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-8-77, 3-8-39 and/or 1-12-4 were applicable at the time he removed Ramos from the building, he is entitled to qualified immunity. The Court does not believe it was unreasonable for Rodriguez to believe the GCAB was a polling place or that polling place laws applied to the GCAB at the time he removed Ramos from the building.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the right allegedly violated was clearly established in light of the specific circumstances the officer confronted.

Hudson v. District of Columbia · filed 2007-04-02

With due regard for the jury’s role in making credibility determinations, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court concludes that Officer Merritt is not entitled to qualified immunity from Mr. Clayton’s § 1983 claim.

Officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when a reasonable officer in their circumstances could have believed the conduct was constitutional.

Humphrey v. Mabry · filed 2007-04-02

But we also conclude that, because a reasonable officer in the shoes of the individual officer defendants, in the particular circumstances here, could have reasonably believed that his actions were constitutional, we REVERSE the denial of qualified immunity for the three individual officer defendants and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In a § 1983 suit, an officer who reasonably relies in good faith on other officers’ reports may receive qualified immunity even if the conduct is unconstitutional under the totality of the circumstances.

Humphrey v. Duane M. Mabry Kevin George and Kevin Wheeler · filed 2007-04-02

More specifically, where individual police officers, acting in good faith and in reliance on the reports of other officers, have a sufficient factual basis for believing that they are in compliance with the law, qualified immunity is warranted, notwithstanding the fact that an action may be illegal when viewed under the totality of the circumstances.

In a § 1983 action, courts must consider each officer’s conduct separately when deciding qualified immunity, even if the officers acted in unison.

Meadours Ex Rel. Estate of Meadours v. Ermel · filed 2007-04-03

The district court erred in considering the officers’ actions together, and we instruct the court to consider the officers actions separately on remand.

An officer lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when no reasonable officer could believe probable cause existed.

Freeman v. Gore · filed 2007-04-03

Accordingly, we conclude that no reasonable officer would have believed that there was probable cause to arrest Freeman, and we therefore affirm the district court’s decision to deny summary judgment on Freeman’s wrongful arrest claim.

A court may decline to consider an untimely pretrial qualified immunity motion in a Section 1983 suit when the defendant misses a reasonable deadline.

Torres v. Commonwealth of PR · filed 2007-04-04

Although we recognize the importance of defendants' rights to assert immunity defenses before trial, those rights are not sacrosanct. District courts have wide discretion to set reasonable deadlines for asserting such defenses, and they may impose condign sanctions on parties who do not comply. The sanction imposed here — effectively, disregard of a belated motion — was not an abuse of discretion.

Once an officer shows that he acted within his discretionary authority, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that qualified immunity does not apply to a § 1983 claim.

Webster v. Beary · filed 2007-04-04

Because it is undisputed that Grigsby and Ferrer were acting in the scope of their discretionary authority, the burden shifts to Webster and Castle to establish that the qualified immunity defense does not apply.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from a prisoner's legal mail privacy claim when the right was not clearly established at the time.

Booth v. King · filed 2007-04-11

Construing Booth’s legal mail claim as a First Amendment privacy right claim, we conclude that it fails on qualified immunity grounds for the same reasons set forth in Jones. ... An inmate’s right to privacy in legal mail was not clearly established when the defendants opened Booth’s mail outside of his presence in 2002-2003.

A § 1983 plaintiff can overcome qualified immunity by showing a violation of a constitutional or statutory right that was sufficiently clear to a reasonable official.

Bouggess v. Mattingly · filed 2007-04-16

A plaintiff can overcome that immunity only by showing that (1) the defendant violated his constitutional or statutory rights and (2) the right at issue was sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity for shooting a fleeing suspect when no reasonable officer could believe the suspect posed a serious risk of physical harm.

Bouggess v. Mattingly · filed 2007-04-16

Before the district court, Angela Bouggess, the administrator of Newby’s estate, raised a Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state-law tort claims. To decide this case, we need only ask whether an officer who employs deadly force against a fleeing suspect without reason to believe that the suspect is armed or otherwise poses a serious risk of physical harm is entitled to either qualified immunity or immunity under the law of Kentucky. We hold that he is entitled to neither.

Once an official establishes good faith and discretionary authority, a § 1983 plaintiff must show a violation of a clearly established right to defeat qualified immunity.

Texas Department of Criminal Justice v. Thomas · filed 2007-04-19

When a governmental official asserts the affirmative defense of qualified immunity by pleading good faith and demonstrating that his actions were within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have been aware. ... Because appellees have not proved that Pierson was deliberately indifferent to Hollimon’s condition, they have not met their burden of rebutting Pierson’s qualified-immunity defense.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when reasonable officers could have believed their conduct was lawful under the circumstances.

Colao v. Mills · filed 2007-04-19

Although the facts are in dispute regarding exactly what happened after the second search (compare Cowan ex rel. Estate of Cooper v Breen, supra at 761-763), even assuming that defendants exceeded the scope of the emergency and thus violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by remaining on his property and answering his phone, a rational jury could not find that defendants’ judgment in this regard “was so flawed that no reasonable officer would have made a similar choice” (Lennon v Miller, supra at 425).

Officials sued under § 1983 for state-created danger are entitled to qualified immunity when that theory was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Breen v. Texas A&M University · filed 2007-04-24

Applying the principles of McClendon to this case, we conclude that the state-created danger theory was not clearly established law in this circuit, with respect to the specific facts here or otherwise, by November 18, 1999, and, accordingly, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiffs' section 1983 claims.

Qualified immunity protects defendants in a § 1983 claim from liability for reasonable mistakes about whether their conduct was lawful.

Alvarado v. City of New York · filed 2007-04-26

Even though Defendants were mistaken as to whether the seized items could be considered drug paraphernalia, qualified immunity protects them from liability if that mistake was reasonable.

Qualified immunity protects officials from a § 1983 false imprisonment claim when they lack actual or constructive knowledge that a detainee is entitled to release and have no clearly established duty to discover it.

Luis Felipe Rodriguez, Jr. v. Broward Sheriff's · filed 2007-04-26

In accordance with Kelly, and based upon the allegations and evidence in the instant record, Jenne and Perez neither had actual or constructive knowledge of Rodriguez’s entitlement to release, nor did they have “a clearly established duty to ferret it out.” See Kelly, 21 F.3d at 1552. As such, they were entitled to qualified immunity from Rodriguez’s claim that they ignored his requests for release and thereby illegally detained him for seven days.

In a §1983 suit, a court reaches whether a right was clearly established only after finding a constitutional violation.

Scott v. Harris · filed 2007-04-30

If, and only if, the court finds a violation of a constitutional right, “the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established . . . in light of the specific context of the case.” Ibid.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim cannot be resolved on summary judgment when disputed facts determine whether a reasonable officer would have known his conduct violated clearly established rights.

Showalter v. North Carolina Department of Crime Control & Public Safety · filed 2007-05-01

Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court erred in determining that such rights existed, and were known to exist at the time of the events in question, thereby satisfying the first two prongs of the § 1983 test. The third prong, determining if a reasonable police officer in the position of Trooper Emmons would have known that his actions violated these established rights, is a material issue of disputed fact, and therefore must be left to the finder of fact.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their acts did not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights.

STS Management Development, Inc. v. New York State Department of Taxation & Finance · filed 2007-05-01

Moreover, the defendants’ actions are entitled to qualified immunity because it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that their acts did not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights (see Anderson v Creighton, 483 US 635, 638 [1987]; Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818 [1982]; Kaluczky v City of White Plains, 57 F3d 202, 207 [1995]).

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to an officer whose alleged conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right and was not objectively reasonable.

Long v. Morris · filed 2007-05-03

Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs excessive force claim.

Qualified immunity does not shield an official from a Section 1983 claim for firing an employee because she rejected his sexual advances; the right was clearly established.

Briggs v. Waters · filed 2007-05-04

Thus, to the extent that in firing Briggs, Waters was motivated by a desire to retaliate against her for rebuffing his sexual advances, he acted in violation of a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would know.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the federal right underlying the claim was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Hill v. Selsky · filed 2007-05-07

In addition, even if plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated, defendants would be entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. ... Plaintiff has failed to show that at the time of the events in question, there was a clearly established federal constitutional right to have a hearing officer personally interview an inmate concerning his refusal to testify under the circumstances that existed here.

Qualified immunity does not shield an individual defendant from § 1983 damages for employee retaliation when the prohibition was clearly established at the time.

Franzon v. Massena Memorial Hospital · filed 2007-05-07

As such, none of the individually named defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Once an official shows that he acted within his discretionary authority, a § 1983 plaintiff must defeat qualified immunity by showing a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Morris v. Dean · filed 2007-05-07

After the defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary authority, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity is not appropriate” by showing (1) that a constitutional violation occurred and (2) that the constitutional right was clearly established.

In a § 1983 action, an earlier denial of qualified-immunity summary judgment based on alleged facts does not bar the defendant from raising qualified immunity at trial.

Hart v. Hairston · filed 2007-05-10

These contentions are unavailing because our prior opinion for this action did not render a final judgment on the qualified-immunity issue.

In a § 1983 suit, an official’s qualified immunity plea shifts the summary judgment burden to the plaintiff to show a violation of clearly established law and a genuine fact issue about the official’s reasonableness.

Goodman v. Harris County · filed 2007-05-14

The plaintiff must then rebut the defense by establishing that the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law and that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the reasonableness of the official’s conduct.

Qualified immunity shields officials sued under Section 1983 when existing law did not give them fair warning that their conduct violated the Constitution.

Andujar v. Rodriguez · filed 2007-05-15

Thus, there was no factually similar caselaw that would have put Newcomb and Barea on notice that their conduct violated the Constitution.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Hall v. Hughes · filed 2007-05-16

The district court was correct in concluding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because Hall was not deprived of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to an officer who reasonably believes a search is lawful based on a supervisor’s assurance that the person consented.

Brock v. City of Zephyrhills · filed 2007-05-18

Kirk is entitled to qualified immunity because it was objectively reasonable for him to conclude that the search was lawful based on his supervisor’s instruction.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their discretionary conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional law.

Butler v. Alabama Department of Transportation · filed 2007-05-21

Because there appears to be no dispute that Waits and Jackson were acting within their discretionary authority, the Court proceeds directly to the question of whether Waits and Jackson violated clearly established statutory or constitutional law. The Court concludes that Waits ánd Jackson are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would not have known their conduct was unlawful.

Shapiro v. City of Glen Cove · filed 2007-05-22

The Glen Cove defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because “it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer in their position that their conduct was unlawful.”

An official sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity merely because he followed a prison regulation.

Boles v. Neet · filed 2007-05-24

W e appreciate W arden Neet’s position that he did not intend to violate Boles’s constitutional rights, but he is not immune from liability simply because he acted in accordance with prison regulations.

Qualified immunity shields a § 1983 defendant from liability for discretionary acts that do not violate clearly established federal rights.

Dockery v. Doyle · filed 2007-05-25

“Qualified immunity shields a § 1983 defendant from liability for harms arising from discretionary acts, as long as the discretionary acts do not violate clearly established federal statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Therefore, we find no error in the district court’s conclusion that Patterson is entitled to qualified immunity.

A social worker is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for removing children without a warrant when no reasonable social worker could believe they faced imminent danger of serious bodily harm.

Rogers v. County of San Joaquin · filed 2007-05-29

Thus, because a reasonable social worker would have understood that the children faced no imminent risk of serious bodily harm, as required by clearly established law, the district court erred in granting qualified immunity to Royal and denying partial summary judgment to the Rogerses.

In a § 1983 claim, qualified immunity does not protect a social worker who removes children without a warrant when any reasonable social worker would recognize the lack of imminent danger.

Rogers v. County of San Joaquin · filed 2007-05-29

The lack of exigency would have been apparent to any reasonable social worker. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in granting qualified immunity to Royal and in denying the Rogerses' motion for partial summary judgment as to Royal.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when the plaintiff fails to establish a violation of a constitutional right.

Jones v. Department of Health · filed 2007-06-04

Because Jones failed to establish any violation of a constitutional right, Wene and Jeppesen should have been granted qualified immunity and the § 1983 claims dismissed.

Qualified immunity cannot be granted on a § 1983 claim when unresolved facts prevent the court from deciding whether the alleged conduct violated clearly established law.

Lane v. City of LaFollette · filed 2007-06-06

We cannot, however, determine whether the law clearly established the illegality of Plaintiff’s termination without further factual development. Stated alternatively, the undisputed facts presently before the Court do not allow us to grant qualified immunity to Defendants as a matter of law.

Qualified immunity can shield officials sued under § 1983 from discovery when the complaint fails to overcome the defense.

Hardy v. Broward Co. Sheriff's Office · filed 2007-06-06

Because qualified immunity protects government officials from having to bear the burdens of pretrial matters such as discovery, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the complaint before discovery.

In a Section 1983 excessive-force suit, a genuine dispute over whether the officer faced a significant threat precludes summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Duke v. Cartlidge · filed 2007-06-07

If we accept that a fact issue exists as to whether Duke appeared to be assaulting Dobbins at the time Duckworth shot Duke, it is clear that such a fact issue is also material, which precludes summary judgment on qualified immunity.

In a Section 1983 action challenging a warrantless arrest, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if probable cause existed for the arrest.

Wilder v. Turner · filed 2007-06-12

When a warrantless arrest is the subject of a § 1983 action, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff.

Public officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable official in their position would have known the challenged conduct violated a constitutional right.

Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez · filed 2007-06-12

We think any reasonable official in Contreras's or Juarbe's situation would have known that the summary revocation provision in the Insurance Code is unconstitutional; therefore, qualified immunity is available to neither defendant.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Pace v. City of Palmetto · filed 2007-06-12

Therefore, based on the particular factual circumstances in which Ahler acted and the lack of “clearly established” case law, this Court concludes that Ahler is entitled to qualified immunity on Pace’s § 1983 claim.

Qualified immunity does not defeat a § 1983 retaliation claim at the pleading stage when defendants provide no basis to find the right unclear or their conduct objectively reasonable.

Varela v. Demmon · filed 2007-06-14

Significantly, they offer no explanation either as to what specific right was not “clearly established” or as to why it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer in Demmon’s position that he would violate Varela’s rights by issuing a false misbehavior report in retaliation for Varela’s constitutionally protected speech. Accordingly, there is no basis on which conclude that Demmon is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim at this stage when, viewing the facts favorably to the plaintiff, a jury could find a violation of a clearly established right.

Roberts v. Manigold · filed 2007-06-14

She is not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law at this point in the proceedings.

A plaintiff who fails to show a constitutional violation fails to overcome qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action.

Clark v. Fiske · filed 2007-06-14

Concomitantly, he fails to show the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when they could not reasonably believe they had probable cause to arrest.

Kyllingstad v. Town of Camp Verde · filed 2007-06-14

Without probable cause for Kyllingstad’s arrest, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. Accepting the jury’s version of the facts, as we must, it was objectively unreasonable of the officers to believe they had probable cause to arrest Kyllingstad.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a § 1983 claim when the officer violates clearly established rights through objectively unreasonable conduct.

Srisavath v. City of Brentwood · filed 2007-06-20

For the reasons discussed below, the district court correctly determined that Richardson violated Srisavath’s Fourth Amendment rights, that the rights involved were clearly established, and that Richardson’s conduct was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, Richardson is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A § 1983 defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff’s alleged facts show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Cate v. City of Rockwood · filed 2007-06-20

Thus, to show that a § 1983 defendant is not entitled to immunity from suit, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the facts as alleged by the plaintiff show a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) such right was clearly established.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim unless a reasonable official would have known the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Richmond v. City of Brooklyn · filed 2007-06-21

No clearly established legal standards would have put a reasonable officer on notice that, in these particular circumstances, it was objectively unreasonable to lower the handcuffed arrestee’s pants and boxer shorts to accomplish the strip search, rather than to risk loss of evidence by waiting until the arrestee was in an environment where handcuffs were not required. ... Therefore, Officer Bruce is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim must be assessed separately for each defendant.

Young v. Eslinger · filed 2007-06-21

Each Defendant is entitled to a separate analysis of the applicability of the qualified immunity doctrine to his actions.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would not have understood that the challenged conduct violated a clearly established right.

Richmond v. City of Brooklyn Center · filed 2007-06-21

We hold that a reasonable officer in the defendant's position would not have understood that the strip search of Richmond in his motel room would violate his constitutional rights. ... Therefore, Officer Bruce is entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 claim, a court reaches whether a right was clearly established for qualified immunity only if it first finds a constitutional violation.

Eric Draw Rodney Ricks v. City of Lincoln Park, William Kish, III Joseph Lavis Douglas Muncey Mohamed Nasser · filed 2007-06-21

Only if a constitutional violation has occurred should a reviewing court proceed to determine whether the constitutional right in question was so clearly established at the time of the alleged violation that a reasonable public official acting in the defendant’s position would have known that he or she was violating that right.

Qualified immunity cannot be granted on summary judgment in a § 1983 retaliation claim when disputed facts about officials’ motives and beliefs prevent a finding that their conduct was objectively reasonable.

Smith v. Central Dauphin School District · filed 2007-06-22

In light of the disputed issues of fact in this case as to Defendants’ motives and subjective beliefs, the court cannot rule as a matter of law that Defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable. Thus, Defendants will be denied qualified immunity.

A public official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable official would have known that firing an employee for speaking about perceived open meetings violations was unlawful.

Lindsey v. City of Orrick · filed 2007-06-26

In light of these cases, we hold a reasonable official would have realized it was illegal to terminate Lindsey for speaking out about the City’s perceived violations of Missouri’s sunshine law. As such, the district court correctly held Taylor is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Public officials are immune from damages under § 1983 when the law governing their conduct was not clearly established.

West v. Frank · filed 2007-06-27

With respect to the remaining defendants, although I find the publication ban to be constitutionally dubious, plaintiffs damages claim is barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity because of the great uncertainty in the law regarding prison restrictions justified by a behavior modification theory.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer who continues a detention after receiving conflicting information about arrest warrants when no clearly established law requires release.

Thermidor v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2007-07-03

In light of these facts, we do not think that the constitutional prohibitions against seizure applied with such obvious clarity that they would have compelled a reasonable officer to release Thermidor in the parking lot of the jailhouse. Accordingly, we find that the district court erred in denying qualified immunity, and we REVERSE and REMAND.

Qualified immunity shields officials from a Section 1983 suit when reasonable officials would not have understood that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Moore v. Lamarque · filed 2007-07-03

Even if prison officials violated Moore’s constitutional right to exercise, reasonable prison officials in Appellees’ position would not have understood that what they were doing violated that right, and therefore qualified immunity shields Appellees from suit in the first instance.

Qualified immunity shields individual state officials from § 1983 damages when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Finch ex rel. Moe v. New York State Office of Children & Family Services · filed 2007-07-03

As the law regarding unconstitutional delay was not clearly established, the individual State defendants cannot be held responsible for violating that law. Therefore, on the basis of qualified immunity, the claims for money damages against the individual State defendants are hereby dismissed.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit cannot claim qualified immunity based on uncertainty about medical evidence that can be assessed only after the defendant’s conduct.

Williams, David v. Liefer, John · filed 2007-07-05

In other words, because the eventual presence or absence of verifying medical evidence cannot bear on an officer’s decision to seek or deny treatment, it cannot provide a basis for immunity.

Uncertainty about whether medical evidence will later verify harm from delayed treatment does not give an officer qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Williams v. James Liefer, Brent Hoffman, and James Massey · filed 2007-07-05

Whether a delay in providing medical treatment has negatively affected a plaintiffs well-being is an assessment that is made in hindsight, so it cannot affect an officer’s initial decision to seek treatment for an inmate. In other words, because the eventual presence or absence of verifying medical evidence cannot bear on an officer’s decision to seek or deny treatment, it cannot provide a basis for immunity.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 warrant-application claim unless a reasonable officer would have known the application was so devoid of probable cause that he should not have sought the warrant.

Detroy v. City & County of Honolulu · filed 2007-07-09

Detroy failed to show that a reasonable officer in Wong’s position would have known the warrant application was so obviously devoid of probable cause that he never should have applied for the warrant.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim when the law did not clearly establish that the official’s conduct amounted to an adverse employment action.

Shockency v. Ramsey County · filed 2007-07-12

We conclude that O’Hara is entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established that the actions he took toward Moore had employment consequences serious enough to amount to adverse employment actions.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim does not bar discovery on separate claims for which the defendant cannot assert that immunity.

Alice L. Ex Rel. R.L. v. Dusek · filed 2007-07-12

To the extent that Dusek is subject to discovery requests on claims for which she does not or cannot assert qualified immunity, such discovery requests do not implicate her right to qualified immunity.

Public officials sued in their individual capacity under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Williams v. Baird · filed 2007-07-13

Qualified immunity provides a shield from liability for public officials sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in their individual capacity, so long as an official’s conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

An officer sued in his individual capacity under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that the officer’s actions were objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

McGrew v. Crum · filed 2007-07-13

Thus, with respect to any claims against Crum in his individual capacity, McGrew has failed to show that his actions were “objectively [un]reasonable in light of legal rules clearly established at the time of the incident.”

Qualified immunity does not shield police officials from a § 1983 claim for knowingly concealing exculpatory evidence available at trial when their duty to disclose it was clearly established.

Steidl v. Fermon · filed 2007-07-18

We are persuaded that the ISP Officials, and indeed all of the police officers involved in this case, had ample notice that the knowing suppression of exculpatory material that was in the files at the time of the trial violated the defendant’s constitutional rights. ... We therefore conclude that the district court correctly denied the ISP Officials’ motion for dismissal based on qualified immunity.

A defendant may raise qualified immunity against a Section 1983 claim at any time, and the district court may grant judgment on that ground when appropriate before trial.

MacArthur v. San Juan County · filed 2007-07-18

W e have consistently held, however, that “qualified immunity can be raised at any time and a district court may enter . . . judgment on that ground at any point before trial at which it is appropriate.”

Police officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for knowingly concealing exculpatory evidence available at trial when their duty to disclose it was clearly established.

Steidle, Gordon R. v. Fermon, Steven M. · filed 2007-07-18

We therefore conclude that the district court correctly denied the ISP Officials’ motion for dismissal based on qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Farmer v. Kavanagh · filed 2007-07-19

The defendants, therefore, are entitled to qualified immunity for all of the § 1983 procedural due process claims.

Police supervisors are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when reasonable officials could believe their conduct was lawful in the circumstances they faced.

Gena Duckworth etc. v. Bart Saracino etc. · filed 2007-07-19

The police superiors were entitled to qualified immunity on counts IV and V, the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.

A § 1983 plaintiff bears the burden of overcoming qualified immunity by showing a violation of a clearly established right and objectively unreasonable conduct under the law at the time.

Villanueva v. San Marcos Con Indep · filed 2007-07-19

Villanueva bears the burden of proving that Eastwood is not entitled to qualified immunity. ... In order to overcome the qualified immunity defense, Villanueva must allege that Eastwood violated a clearly established constitutional right and that her behavior was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time the incident transpired.

Qualified immunity protects officials from § 1983 liability when reasonable officials could believe their conduct was lawful in the circumstances they faced.

Duckworth v. St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2007-07-19

The police superiors were entitled to qualified immunity on counts IV and V, the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims against state officials fail at the first step of qualified immunity analysis when the plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation.

Ward v. Anderson · filed 2007-07-24

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the W ards failed to demonstrate a violation of either procedural or substantive due process and that the DFS employees are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-entry claim when apparent authority and implied consent supported their earlier entry.

Sterling-Ward v. Tujaka · filed 2007-07-25

That ruling also supports the district court’s conclusion that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to the second entry, given the apparent authority and implied consent from Saleh and Sharonda provided Defendants the first time they entered the home.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when genuine factual issues remain as to whether a reasonable officer would have believed his conduct lawful.

Ngo v. Storlie · filed 2007-07-26

Applying these principles, we agree with the district court that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether a reasonable officer faced with these circumstances would have believed that his conduct was legal.

In a Section 1983 damages claim, qualified immunity requires the court to consider whether officials violated a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established at the time.

Monroe v. AR State Univ., etc. · filed 2007-07-26

The district court must consider whether (i) Monroe has alleged the violation of a constitutional right by Hanrahan and Campbell and (ii) that right was clearly established at the time such that a reasonable person would have known that his conduct violated the law.

Qualified immunity is available to state officials facing § 1983 claims arising in a contractual setting.

Suddith v. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISS. · filed 2007-07-31

Contrary to Suddith's assertion, we find a great deal of authority that allows for qualified immunity on § 1983 claims in a contractual setting.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation or that the relevant law was clearly established.

BT v. David · filed 2007-07-31

Because B.T. has not established that his constitutional rights were violated, or that the law related to the facts of his case is clearly established in his favor, the Court finds that the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and will grant summary judgment on their behalf.

A § 1983 claim can survive a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity when the facts supporting that defense do not appear on the face of the complaint.

Fleming v. State University of New York · filed 2007-08-06

As explained above, a qualified immunity defense in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion will succeed only if the facts supporting it appear on the face of the complaint. ... At this early stage, however, and on the facts on the face of the complaint, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs Section 1983 claim against Dr. Bendo on the basis of qualified immunity must be denied.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when her conduct did not violate a constitutional right.

Norris v. Engles · filed 2007-08-09

For the reasons stated below, we conclude that Engles’s conduct did not violate a constitutional right and that she is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity defeats a § 1983 claim against an official when the facts do not show a violation of the plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional rights.

Clegg v. Arkansas Department of Correction · filed 2007-08-13

Because we have earlier found that Ms. Clegg’s discrimination claims failed due to the lack of an adverse employment action taken against her, the answer to the first question in the analysis is no. If the first question is answered in the negative, the district court’s judgment must be affirmed.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against a government official when the alleged facts do not show a violation of the plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional rights.

Clegg v. AR Dept. of Corr. · filed 2007-08-13

A qualified immunity analysis involves two questions. In this case, we first ask if the facts demonstrate that the defendants' conduct caused a violation of Ms. Clegg's statutory or constitutional rights. Tuggle v. Mangan, 348 F.3d 714, 720 (8th Cir. 2003). If the facts, viewed in a light most favorable to Ms. Clegg, are sufficient to show a violation of her statutory or constitutional rights, we then ask if the right violated was one clearly established at the time. Id. Because we have earlier found that Ms. Clegg's discrimination claims failed due to the lack of an adverse employment action taken against her, the answer to the first question in the analysis is no. If the first question is answered in the negative, the district court's judgment must be affirmed.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for allegedly intimidating a private citizen out of pursuing tax appeals when the right to petition was clearly established.

Van Deelen v. Johnson · filed 2007-08-14

W e believe M r. V an Deelen has overcome both qualified immunity hurdles. As we have already indicated, M r. Van Deelen has alleged facts from which a reasonable jury could (though need not necessarily) conclude that a violation of the First Amendment took place. And the right at issue – to petition the government for the redress of tax grievances – has been with us and clearly established since the Sons of Liberty visited Griffin’s W harf in Boston.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 deliberate indifference claim when evidence could establish a violation of a clearly established right.

Gary v. Modena · filed 2007-08-14

The contention being made in this appeal is that the court in its earlier ruling did not specifically consider whether or not these appellants’ actions could be found to have violated clearly established law and a violation of the plaintiffs constitutional rights. We find no merit in this argument.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to identify a clearly established constitutional right the defendant violated.

Scallion v. Parish of Red River · filed 2007-08-15

As discussed below, as well as essentially for the reasons stated in the district court’s detailed opinion according qualified immunity to the four defendants, summary judgment was proper. ... Scallion fails to identify a clearly-established constitutional right violated by Myers.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from § 1983 damages when the right was clearly established and a reasonable officer would have recognized that his conduct violated it.

Jennings v. Jones · filed 2007-08-17

After careful review, we conclude that the court erred in granting qualified immunity to Jones. First, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, we conclude that the record establishes that Jones violated Jennings’ constitutional right to be free of excessive force. Second, we find that this right was clearly established at the time of Jennings’ injury. Third, we conclude that a reasonable officer in Jones’ position would have believed that his actions violated Jennings’ constitutional right.

Individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a clearly established constitutional right.

Bynum v. City of Magee, Miss. · filed 2007-08-20

As plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the existence of a clearly established right, Williams and Steel are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity unless their discretionary acts violate clearly established rights.

Kilpatrick v. King · filed 2007-08-22

“Qualified immunity protects government officials from the costs of trial and the burdens of broad discovery unless their discretionary acts violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” Wilson v. Northcutt, 441 F.3d 586, 590 (8th Cir. 2006). A citizen’s right to exercise the constitutional freedoms to speak and to seek judicial relief without facing retaliation from government officials is clearly established. See id. at 592; Pendleton v. St. Louis County, 178 F.3d 1007, 1011 (8th Cir. 1999). In this case, then, the only issue is whether a reasonable jury could find that Brandt, Carter, and Wilson actually violated that right when they placed and retained Kilpatrick on the Register.

Qualified immunity does not shield a defendant from § 1983 claims against his official capacity or from claims for prospective relief.

Allen v. Kline · filed 2007-08-23

It will not, however, shield defendant from claims against his official capacity or from claims for prospective relief.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when the alleged repeated use of a stun gun on an unarmed arrestee, including after handcuffing, violated a clearly established right.

Wanbaugh v. Fields · filed 2007-08-23

We find defendants not entitled to qualified immunity. We believe the state of the law gave the officers fair warning that the alleged repeated deployment of a stun gun on an unarmed arrestee, including one time after he was handcuffed, was unconstitutional.

Section 1983 permits claims against police officers who violate constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Curley v. Klem · filed 2007-08-24

Police officers, embodying the authority of the state, are liable under § 1983 when they violate someone’s constitutional rights, unless they are protected by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect officers from a § 1983 claim when their arrest violates clearly established Fourth Amendment law.

Rodis v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2007-08-28

Rodel E. Rodis brought suit against the City and County of San Francisco, the San Francisco Police Department, the police chief, and two police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights during a February 17, 2003 arrest. ... Defendants brought an interlocutory appeal, and we affirm, finding the Defendants not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 claim when their conduct violates clearly established law.

Rodis v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2007-08-28

Further, it was clearly established at the time of the arrest that Defendants’ conduct was unlawful.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Thayer v. City of Holton · filed 2007-08-29

Defendants were not on notice that terminating plaintiff under the circumstances of this case would violate plaintiffs First Amendment rights. Therefore, we believe defendants Lanning and Mears are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages as to any First Amendment claim.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct does not violate a constitutional right.

Stokes v. Gann · filed 2007-08-29

Accordingly, we hold that Gann’s entrapment does not constitute a deprivation of liberty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gann is, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 false arrest claim against a probation officer when the arrest affidavit establishes probable cause for a probation violation.

Hyland v. Secretary, DOC · filed 2007-08-29

Given that Hyland’s arrest based on Koson’s affidavit was supported by probable cause of a probation violation, Hyland is absolutely barred by qualified immunity from asserting his § 1983 false arrest claim against Koson.

In a § 1983 excessive-force claim, an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff’s version of the facts shows that the officer shot surrendering suspects who posed no immediate danger.

Green v. Taylor · filed 2007-08-30

Because Taylor had no reason to believe that he was in imminent danger under Green’s version of the facts, as the vehicle was stopped and the suspects were attempting to surrender in compliance with Baeppler’s orders, this is a case of a violation of a clearly established right under Garner and Yates.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the right they violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Beaver v. City of Federal Way · filed 2007-08-31

Therefore, the Court finds that at the time of the arrest, a reasonable law enforcement officer might well have failed to recognize that the actions taken by defendants — specifically, the fourth and fifth tasings of Mr. Beaver — violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Under the second prong of Saucier, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect officers whose searches violate a clearly established Fourth Amendment right, including the rights of predatory offender registrants.

Doe v. LaDue · filed 2007-09-04

Based on the facts before it, the court finds that OPD officers subjected Doe to searches and seizures absent requisite probable cause. As the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable. search and seizure is a well-established right, even for predatory offender registrants, qualified immunity does not protect the defendant officers.

Qualified immunity does not protect officials from a § 1983 claim when the facts, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Preyor v. City of Ferndale · filed 2007-09-05

Accordingly, because the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff show that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Preyor’s constitutional right to receive treatment for a serious medical need, and because that right was clearly established at the time of Preyor’s death, we conclude that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 retaliation claim when the evidence permits a finding that officials knew of employees’ protected speech and voted to terminate them without meaningfully examining the stated reasons.

Cheek v. City of Edwardsville, KS · filed 2007-09-06

Defendants’ claim that the individual defendants Kelly, Broman, and Burnett are entitled to qualified immunity is also without merit.

Officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law prohibited their conduct.

Bruce v. Beary · filed 2007-09-06

As such, it was clearly established that an administrative search must be reasonable under the circumstances and may not exceed its limited scope. Therefore, we hold that the grant of qualified immunity to the officers was improvident.

A parole officer lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for compelling attendance at a religious treatment program when the law clearly established that the compulsion was unconstitutional.

Inouye v. Kemna · filed 2007-09-07

We hold, on the contrary, that the law was and is very clear, precluding qualified immunity, and on that ground reverse the district court.

A plaintiff opposing summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit must show both a violation of a constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established when the defendant acted.

Mecham v. Frazier · filed 2007-09-11

Under our case law, a plaintiff seeking to avoid summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds must satisfy a “heavy” two-part burden by showing: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s unlawful conduct.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Burella v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2007-09-13

Binding precedent nevertheless compels our conclusion that the officers’ failure to arrest her husband, or to handle her complaints more competently, did not violate her constitutional right to due process or equal protection of the law. Accordingly, we hold that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on her constitutional claims.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim is governed by the federal standard.

State, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services v. Doherty · filed 2007-09-14

Because the "defenses to a federal cause of action are defined by federal law," ... the superior court's determination that El-dridge is not entitled to qualified immunity from the Sullivans' § 1983 claims cannot be sustained.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue government officials for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Jones v. State · filed 2007-09-17

Once the defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant violated a clearly established constitutional right in order to survive summary judgment.

In a § 1983 case, a court determines whether the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation before addressing qualified immunity.

Sands v. McCormick · filed 2007-09-18

We need not reach the question of whether the district attorney’s actions fall within the scope of qualified immunity, however, because Sands has not alleged facts that amount to a constitutional violation. In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court decided that before ruling on immunity in § 1983 cases, courts should first determine whether a constitutional violation has been alleged. Id. at 201. We must decide preliminarily, therefore, whether the claims that the district attorney caused illegal arrests and violated Sands’ due process rights are valid.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-detention claim when the plaintiff cannot show improper detention resulting from a failure to disclose truly exculpatory evidence.

McLaren v. Sheriff Ron McNesby · filed 2007-09-18

We affirm the grant of qualified immunity, agreeing with the district court that McLaren cannot show improper detention as a result of a failure to disclose truly exculpatory evidence.

A factual dispute over whether an official could reasonably believe a witness knowingly gave false statements can prevent summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 action.

See v. City of Elyria · filed 2007-09-19

Because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether a reasonable official in Medders’s position would have believed that See made the statements to the FBI knowing they were false, or with reckless disregard for their truthfulness, this Court AFFIRMS the district court’s denial of summary judgment.

A violation of agency policy does not by itself forfeit an official’s qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Verret v. Alabama Department of Mental Health · filed 2007-09-20

Consequently, this Court will follow the binding precedent established by Davis and hold that Waters’ violation of policy 20-16 does not forfeit her right to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue state officials for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Inman v. Stock · filed 2007-09-20

When a plaintiff sues a state official in his or her individual capacity, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity unless his or her conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity, and the plaintiff initially must show that the defendant violated a constitutional right.

Henry v. Purnell · filed 2007-09-20

When a defendant properly asserts qualified immunity as a defense, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing that the defendant violated his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for government officials who do not violate clearly established law.

Bey v. Johnson · filed 2007-09-21

The district court also correctly found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity in civil suits when they are engaged in discretionary acts “which do not violate clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have known.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 701z (6th Cir. 2001). We engage in a two-part inquiry to determine if Johnson and Trierweiler are entitled to qualified immunity. First, Jones Bey must allege sufficient facts that the defendants’ conduct violated a constitutionally protected right. If so, then we must determine if the violated right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If no constitutional rights have been violated, the inquiry ends with step one, and the officers are entitled to immunity. Id. As noted above, the defendants did not violate Jones Bey’s constitutional rights; thus, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against officials are barred by qualified immunity when the violated constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Johnson v. Weaver · filed 2007-09-24

Assuming that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment under Randolph, qualified immunity — specifically, its “clearly established” prong— shields them from personal liability.

Qualified immunity does not shield a prison medical worker from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct could violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights and those rights were clearly established.

Jones v. Hearn · filed 2007-09-24

Thus, White was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity with respect to Jones’s Eighth Amendment claim.

Qualified immunity turns on whether officials reasonably relied on the parole roster in deciding whether a person was subject to a parole search condition.

Willis v. Mullins · filed 2007-09-25

Qualified immunity thus boils down to whether it was reasonable for Defendants to rely on the information contained in the Parole Roster in order to determine if an individual is subject to a parole search condition.

A § 1983 defendant invoking qualified immunity must show that, with the facts viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, the plaintiff has not alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Herman v. Carbon County · filed 2007-09-25

But in order to invoke qualified immunity, a defendant must prove that, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Qualified immunity protects officers in a § 1983 action when their actions matched what a reasonable officer would have done in the same circumstances.

Nero v. Baltimore County, MD · filed 2007-09-27

For this reason, and for the further reason that the actions of the defendant officers would have been the very actions taken -by any reasonable officer under the same or similar circumstances, the record establishes as a matter of law that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows people to sue government officials for violating their constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Landis v. Cardoza · filed 2007-09-28

The Officers claim they are entitled to summary judgment on Landis’s § 1983 claim based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. ... Because I have answered “yes” to each of the three parts of the qualified immunity inquiry, I hold that the Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for damages when a person acting under color of state law deprives another of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity for officials who did not violate clearly established law.

Potera-Haskins v. Gamble · filed 2007-09-28

“Government officials performing discretionary functions ... generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... All Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count I on qualified immunity grounds.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a state actor who deprives someone of a constitutional right, subject to applicable immunity doctrines.

DeFelice Ex Rel. DeFelice v. Warner · filed 2007-09-28

If the plaintiffs version of the facts is adopted, a reasonable jury could find that the defendant unreasonably seized the plaintiffs person and thus violated her Fourth Amendment rights. However, in view of the state of the law at the time of the incident, the court concludes that such conduct on the part of the defendant would not have violated a clearly established constitutional right of the plaintiff of which a reasonable person would have known. What is required is not fair warning to the defendant that his conduct was wrong or inappropriate, but fair warning that it was unconstitutional. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 730, 122 S.Ct. 2508. Therefore, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 claim on the basis of qualified immunity is being granted.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue state actors for violating federal rights, subject to qualified immunity for reasonable officials.

Blaylock v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2007-10-01

Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity here “if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed” to arrest Andre Blaylock “in light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed.”

Section 1983 allows a person to sue state actors for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Beers v. Ballard · filed 2007-10-01

W here a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that “the defendant violated one of his or her constitutional or statutory rights,” and “that the infringed right at issue was clearly established at the time of the allegedly unlaw ful activity such that a reasonable law enforcement officer would have known that his or her challenged conduct was illegal.”

Section 1983 allows a person to sue state officials for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Green v. McGinnis · filed 2007-10-01

Even if a violation could be found, however, defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity for their actions.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against people acting under state law who deprive someone of constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity for officials whose conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

O'Neal v. Cazes · filed 2007-10-01

Public officials, however, are afforded immunity from civil damages for their discretionary acts so long as their “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim where the court rejects their immunity defense.

Jones v. City of College Park, GA · filed 2007-09-28

Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity, and the Court OVERRULES their objection.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to a parole officer when clearly established law would have alerted a reasonable officer that compelling a parolee to attend religion-based treatment was unconstitutional.

Inouye v. Kemna · filed 2007-10-03

We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment, as Nanamori does not have qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to a parole officer who requires a parolee to attend a religion-based drug treatment program when the unlawfulness of that requirement was clearly established.

Inouye v. Kemna · filed 2007-10-03

Instead, his defense, accepted by the district court, is that the law on the matter was not clearly established at the time he supervised Inouye’s parole and that he, therefore, is immune from suit. We hold, on the contrary, that the law was and is very clear, precluding qualified immunity, and on that ground reverse the district court.

In a Section 1983 political dismissal claim, the Elrod-Branti exception does not provide qualified immunity when the employee held neither a confidential nor a policymaking position.

Murphy v. Cockrell · filed 2007-10-04

Therefore, we find that Cockrell is not entitled to qualified immunity under the Elrod-Branti exception.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for officers who reasonably but mistakenly believe exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry.

Thomas v. Vaughn · filed 2007-10-05

Applying our precedent, the court determined that defendants’ mistaken belief that exigent circumstances existed to enter the apartment was reasonable, and that they were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 24. W e agree with the court’s assessment.

A defendant may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the conduct does not amount to unconstitutional force.

Hale v. McLean · filed 2007-10-05

McLean’s actions in throwing the johnny sacks to wake up the inmates is not the type of force that is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” See Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d at 839, 841 (5th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, McLean was entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court’s grant of summary judgment in McLean’s favor on the excessive-force claim was not error.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts could show that an officer detained and cited someone for supporting a political candidate.

Gullick v. Ott · filed 2007-10-09

Any reasonable officer would have known in August 2006 that he could not detain someone and issue a citation to him simply because he supported a candidate the officer did not like. If plaintiff can prove at trial that is what defendant did, defendant will not be entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields an official from § 1983 liability when the official’s conduct violates no statutory or constitutional right.

Tatta v. Wright · filed 2007-10-10

The court is in accord with the finding of Judge Homer that Dr. Wright is entitled to qualified immunity as there is no statutory or constitutional violation.

A § 1983 claim may survive a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity when the facts have yet to be developed.

Berrios v. STATE UNIV. OF NEW YORK AT STONY BROOK · filed 2007-10-10

The court rules similarly with respect to the issue of qualified immunity and holds that at this early stage of the proceedings, where the facts have yet to be developed, dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity is denied.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against a public official unless the plaintiff establishes a violation of a clearly established federal right and shows that the official’s conduct was objectively unreasonable.

Spencer v. Rau · filed 2007-10-11

In order to establish the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity, a plaintiff must satisfy a two-part test: (1) under existing law, the plaintiff must allege a violation of an actual, clearly established constitutional or federal statutory right; and (2) if so, the defendant’s conduct must be objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of that conduct.

Qualified immunity protects state officials from damages in § 1983 actions when their discretionary acts do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Butler Ex Rel. Biller v. Bayer · filed 2007-10-11

In 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, qualified immunity protects state officials from civil liability for damages resulting from discretionary acts, so long as those acts do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

To defeat qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant violated a right that was clearly established at the time.

Brown v. Fisher · filed 2007-10-16

In order to defeat Weber’s qualified immunity, Brown must establish not only that Weber’s actions violated his Constitutional rights, he must also demonstrate that the right at issue (here, to be fine from an unreasonable search) was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s unlawful conduct.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer who could reasonably believe his conduct was lawful because the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Sowards v. City of Milpitas · filed 2007-10-17

The scope of protection the Fourth Amendment affords to a pretrial arrestee’s interrogation-room conversation with an attorney who is also an alibi witness has not been clearly established. ... Accordingly, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Sowards, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that a reasonable officer in Sgt. Gordon’s position could have believed that his actions were lawful.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when prior decisions gave them fair warning that their conduct was unlawful.

Hastings v. Barnes · filed 2007-10-18

Allen and Sevier provided Barnes and Davis the requisite fair warning that their conduct in this case was unlaw ful.

Qualified immunity protects officials from § 1983 damages when they act within their discretionary duties and violate no constitutional right.

Rufus J. Dickerson, Jr. v. Donald · filed 2007-10-18

Accordingly, because it is clear that the defendants were executing discretionary responsibilities and did not violate Dickerson’s rights, they were protected by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the well-pleaded allegations show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right that a reasonable official would have understood.

Garnier v. Rodriguez · filed 2007-10-22

The allegations of the complaint, taken at their well-pleaded value, sufficed to show that a clearly established constitutional right had been violated, and that a reasonable official would have understood that the challenged conduct may have violated that right. We affirm the district court's conclusion that the qualified immunity defense was not established at this early stage of the litigation.

Factual disputes requiring jury resolution can prevent a court from deciding qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim at summary judgment.

SANCHEZ v. Pereira · filed 2007-10-25

Since there are several factual issues that should be properly submitted to a jury, the court cannot at this stage decide whether defendants are eligible to receive qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity cannot be granted on a Section 1983 claim when disputed material facts prevent the court from deciding whether the officials’ conduct was unlawful.

Narvaez v. Pereira · filed 2007-10-26

Because there are issues of material fact that preclude it from reaching a determination, however, the Court must deny defendants’ request of qualified immunity at this time.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to allege a constitutional violation.

Sutterley v. Morris · filed 2007-10-29

Because Sutterley failed to allege a violation of a constitutional right, Dr. Murray is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the undisputed facts show that their force was reasonable.

Berube v. Conley · filed 2007-10-31

We find that on the undisputed facts, the officers did not use excessive force and are entitled to immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect a defendant in a Section 1983 action who knowingly denies an inmate access to treatment in violation of a clearly established right.

Finley v. Parker · filed 2007-11-01

Coupling Parker’s constitutional violation with her knowing breach of the duty to assign such sick call appointments defrocks Parker of any vestige of qualified immunity’s protective cloak.

Qualified immunity does not protect governmental entities sued under § 1983.

Stotter v. University of Texas at San Antonio · filed 2007-11-05

It is well-established that qualified immunity does not protect governmental entities sued pursuant to § 1983.

Police officers may invoke qualified immunity against a Section 1983 claim alleging a constitutional violation.

Mazloum v. District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2007-11-06

Police officers enjoy a qualified immunity from suits alleging violations of constitutional rights.

In a § 1983 suit, prison officials cannot obtain qualified immunity at summary judgment without record evidence justifying the omission of specific facts from a disciplinary notice.

Dible v. Scholl · filed 2007-11-08

As the movants for summary judgment, it was the Defendants’ responsibility to present these reasons to the district court, even if only disclosed in camera. ... Failing that, the summary judgment standard constrains us to affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.