42 U.S.C. § 1983

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for the scope and manner of an investigation merely because they had authority to conduct it.

David v. Baker · filed 2005-04-14

Along these same lines, the fact that Defendants had the lawful authority to initiate an investigation and testify before the city council in response to Plaintiffs’ complaints does not entitle Defendants to qualified immunity regarding the extent of the investigation and the manner in which it was conducted.

In a § 1983 suit, sheriff’s deputies making an arrest satisfy the discretionary-function threshold for qualified immunity.

Schultz v. Hall · filed 2005-04-15

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Deputies Bringmans and Teieh-ner were engaged in a discretionary function during the events at issue in this case, since making an arrest is within the official duties of a sheriffs deputy.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when they obtain a search warrant through material lies in an affidavit that violate established rights.

Baldwin v. Placer County · filed 2005-04-18

The plaintiffs’ established civil rights were violated by presentation of the false affidavit. Liston, 120 F.3d at 972-73. Qualified immunity was rightly denied.

State officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 may assert qualified immunity.

McFall v. Bednar · filed 2005-04-19

Because Mr. Bednar is a state official being sued in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his assertion of the qualified immunity defense is proper.

A plaintiff must satisfy both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis to overcome that defense in a Section 1983 claim.

Griffin v. Troy State University · filed 2005-04-20

Again, it is their burden to satisfy both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis. Based on the Griffins’ failure to challenge the second prong, we affirm the district court’s grant of qualified immunity.

A general constitutional rule that applies with obvious clarity can defeat an officer’s qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim without a factually similar precedent.

Harris v. Coweta County, Georgia · filed 2005-04-20

Thus, where a general constitutional rule applies with “obvious clarity” to a particular case, factually similar decisional law is not required to defeat a claim of qualified immunity.

A government-contracted psychiatrist affiliated with a private firm is not categorically entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability.

Dumont v. Goodheart · filed 2005-04-20

Although qualified immunity is not categorically available to Dr. Goodheart, he “may be able to assert an affirmative good faith defense” to liability under § 1983.

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims unless their conduct violates clearly established federal rights.

Young v. Scales · filed 2005-04-21

The defense of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for damages in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provided their conduct does not violate clearly established federal constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Thus, Officer Young was entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim.

Officers are protected by qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would not have understood that their conduct was unlawful in the circumstances.

Moore v. Carpenter · filed 2005-04-21

Because it would not be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted here, officers Carpenter and Ward are protected by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects officers from § 1983 liability when clearly established law would not have told a reasonable officer that their involvement in a private repossession amounted to state action.

Moore v. Kenneth Carpenter, in His Individual and Official Capacity City of Poplar Bluff Joe Ward · filed 2005-04-21

The officers'were required to make a close decision in the midst of a repossession fracas and could not have determined they were becoming so entangled in Jackson’s private self-help remedy that they could be held liable under § 1983.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the facts show a violation of a clearly established Fourth Amendment right.

Turmon v. Jordan · filed 2005-04-25

Because the facts alleged show that Jordan violated Turmon’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from seizures carried out by excessive force and because that right was clearly established at the time, Jordan is not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the officer violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Turmon v. Charles Jordan, Individually, and Red Roof Inns, Incorporated · filed 2005-04-25

Because Jordan violated Turmoris Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures and because that right was clearly established on March 10, 2001, Jordan is not entitled to qualified immunity on the illegal seizure claim.

An officer cannot claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit when clearly established law prohibited the alleged search.

Denver Justice & Peace Committee, Inc. v. City of Golden · filed 2005-04-26

Officer Ortiz therefore cannot prevail on his defense of qualified immunity on the basis of the circumstances he has averred.

An officer sued under § 1983 cannot claim qualified immunity for a pat-down search when clearly established law prohibited the frisk without reasonable, individualized suspicion.

Denver Justice And Peace Committee, Inc. v. City Of Golden · filed 2005-04-26

We hold that the law was sufficiently clear at the time Ortiz conducted the pat-down search of Espinosa that Ortiz may not claim qualified immunity.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their actions are objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

McNeal v. Burlington Factory · filed 2005-04-27

In view of the evidence, Officers Montgomery and Mack are entitled to summary judgment because their actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged facts establish a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.

Luna v. Thurien · filed 2005-04-27

Because the facts construed in Luna’s favor establish a violation of Lima’s clearly established rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, Thurien is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 claim when the complaint alleges deprivation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Williams v. Vidmar · filed 2005-04-28

When government officials assert qualified immunity as a basis for dismissing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right, and if so, then determine “whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” ... Williams has sufficiently alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right to Equal Protection of the law. As to the second prong, at the time of these events it was clearly established that discrimination against a person based on that person’s religion is unconstitutional. The Court is not now called upon to assess whether such a violation actually took place here; that comes later in this litigation. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity is denied.

Qualified immunity shields a defendant from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

Short v. Oaks Correctional Facility · filed 2005-04-29

Upon assessing the Defendants-Appellees’ conduct under the standards of qualified immunity, we reach the same conclusion. ... Having carefully considered the record on appeal, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we find that the Plaintiff-Appellant failed to show that a constitutional violation against Cross occurred.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when a factual dispute remains over whether the officer used objectively unreasonable force.

Polk v. Hopkins · filed 2005-04-29

As Polk has succeeded in establishing a fact issue as to whether Hopkins used such an objectively unreasonable amount of force, Hopkins must be denied qualified immunity on Polk’s excessive-force claim.

Officers sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity for enforcing a presumptively valid state statute when they lack fair notice of its unconstitutionality.

Vives v. The City Of New York · filed 2005-04-29

On the basis of the foregoing, we hold that defendants did not have fair notice of section 240.30(1)'s purported unconstitutionality and that the District Court erred in denying Detectives Li and Lu qualified immunity on that ground.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 excessive force claim when a reasonable officer could believe the force used did not violate a clearly established federal right.

Swindell v. NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF ENVIRON. CON. · filed 2005-05-02

Therefore, Roderick is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs' § 1983 excessive force and state law battery claims, and accordingly, his motion for summary judgment as to Counts III and IV of the Complaint is granted.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established and a reasonable officer could have believed the conduct lawful.

Burnett v. Bottoms · filed 2005-05-02

Plaintiff having failed to prove that her First Amendment rights under the facts of this case were clearly established, the individual police officers are entitled to qualified immunity since a reasonable official could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful.

A qualified immunity defense to a § 1983 claim may be denied at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.

Tropical Aviation Ground Svcs. v. Jenne · filed 2005-05-02

Sierra filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint based on qualified immunity. The district court denied Sierra’s motion, and this appeal followed. The district court did not err in denying Sierra’s motion to dismiss.

A § 1983 claim against a sheriff’s employee for a warrantless search of commercial premises may proceed past a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity.

Tropical Aviation Ground Services, Inc. v. Jenne · filed 2005-05-02

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Tropical Aviation brought suit against Sierra, alleging a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Sierra filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint based on qualified immunity. ... The district court did not err in denying Sierra’s motion to dismiss.

An officer may receive qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when the officer could reasonably believe the force did not violate a clearly established federal right.

Swindell v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation · filed 2005-05-02

Therefore, Roderick is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 excessive force and state law battery claims, and accordingly, his motion for summary judgment as to Counts III and IV of the Complaint is granted.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when existing precedent would not have put a reasonable officer on notice that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Blanford v. Sacramento County · filed 2005-05-05

It follows that the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity. Even if we have misjudged the constitutional issue, neither Supreme Court nor circuit precedent in existence as of November 13, 2000 would have put a reasonable officer in the deputies’ position on notice that using deadly force in the particular circumstances would violate his Fourth Amendment rights.

Qualified immunity is unavailable on a § 1983 gender discrimination claim when a genuine factual dispute remains about intentional discrimination.

Peterson v. Scott County · filed 2005-05-06

Peterson has raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the intentional gender discrimination; qualified immunity should not be granted to the defendants.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim on a record showing that an official intentionally withheld an inmate’s legal mail for over a year in violation of a clearly established right of court access.

Simkins v. Bruce · filed 2005-05-09

For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Plaintiff has standing to assert a claim for violation of his right of access to the courts, and that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on the arguments currently advanced and evidence currently of record.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim is evaluated through a three-step inquiry addressing a constitutional violation, a clearly established right, and objective unreasonableness.

Sample v. Bailey · filed 2005-05-09

Thus, we conclude that the Feathers three-step approach correctly encompasses the Supreme Court’s approach to qualified immunity claims and serves to ensure government officials the proper protection from civil suit under the law.

An officer lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when no reasonable officer in the same position could believe there was probable cause to arrest.

Gaines v. Brewer · filed 2005-05-09

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Gaines, we conclude a reasonable officer in Brewer’s position could not reasonably believe there was probable cause to arrest Gaines.

In a § 1983 suit, the first step of the qualified immunity inquiry asks whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff establish a constitutional violation.

Sample v. Bailey · filed 2005-05-09

The first step in the qualified immunity analysis is to determine whether based on the facts as alleged by Sample, a constitutional violation has occurred.

An officer sued under § 1983 for false arrest is entitled to qualified immunity when the officer had arguable probable cause to believe an offense occurred.

Migut v. Flynn · filed 2005-05-13

The issue in this case is whether, considering the facts as set forth in the complaint, Deputy Flynn had at least arguable probable cause to believe that Migut was violating § 934.03(1)(a) when Migut taped their conversation. We conclude that he did.

Prison officials may receive qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the evidence does not show deliberate indifference to an inmate’s safety.

Johnson v. Martinez · filed 2005-05-13

The district court properly determined on remand that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, ... (qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights).

A defendant may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 retaliation claim when the evidence, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, does not show retaliatory conduct.

Lister v. King · filed 2005-05-13

The district court properly granted summary judgment to King on qualified immunity grounds because the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to Lister, does not show King’s disciplinary report was written in retaliation for Lister filing grievances.

Section 1983 provides qualified immunity to an officer when the law at the time did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct was unconstitutional.

Burr v. Hasbrouck Heights Police Department · filed 2005-05-17

“If the law at the time did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct would violate the Constitution, the officer should not be subject to liability or, indeed, even the burdens of litigation.” Id. Netelkos was entitled to qualified immunity on the warrantless entry claim.

In a § 1983 suit, disputed facts about an officer's conduct preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Rogerson v. Fitzpatrick · filed 2005-05-17

Likewise, this Court has concluded that when ruling on the defense of qualified immunity, we must: ... Summary judgment is not appropriate if there are disputed questions of fact concerning the officer's conduct. ... Here, because we conclude that there are disputed questions of fact concerning the officer's conduct, we hold that summary judgment was not appropriate.

In a § 1983 action, asserting qualified immunity does not preserve a separate defense that a grand jury’s intervention broke the chain of causation.

Scribner v. Dillard · filed 2005-05-20

We reject the defendants’ argument that their claim of qualified immunity was sufficient to inform the court, and Scribner, of the defense they now assert. Qualified immunity is separate and distinct from a defense based upon the intervening act of a neutral intermediary.

In a § 1983 suit, an officer acting within discretionary authority is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

Davis v. Bim Lowers · filed 2005-05-23

Here, no one disputes that Defendants were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority by arresting Davis and transporting him to the jail. The burden then shifts to Davis to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate. The threshold inquiry is whether Davis’s allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation. Id. We conclude that Davis has not shown a constitutional violation.

Officials sued for damages under Section 1983 may receive qualified immunity when their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Midkiff v. Adams Cnty Reg Water · filed 2005-05-24

The above analysis demonstrates that no constitutional or statutory violation occurred, let alone one that was clearly established or one of which a reasonable person should have known. The District Court did not err in dismissing Ast on the basis of qualified immunity.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when no statutory or constitutional violation occurred.

Brian Midkiff Monica Midkiff v. Adams County Regional Water District · filed 2005-05-24

The above analysis demonstrates that no constitutional or statutory violation occurred, let alone one that was clearly, established or one of which -a reasonable person should have known. The District Court did not err in dismissing Ast on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer sued individually when the complaint alleges no violation of a constitutional right.

Tague v. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission · filed 2005-05-25

Accordingly, Gier is entitled to qualified immunity from Tague’s claims under the Commerce Clause.

Section 1983 claims against individual school board members are barred by qualified immunity when the procedural due process requirements for a long-term suspension were not clearly established.

Richards v. Williamstown Sch. Bd. · filed 2005-05-25

There are no Vermont cases on point, and the United States Supreme Court has not ruled upon what process is due in long-term suspension hearings, so this Court cannot say that the school board members reasonably should have known about the level of process due. As such, the individual Defendants are immune from suit.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state officials in their individual capacities, while qualified immunity may bar damages liability and does not bar declaratory or injunctive relief.

George-Khouri Family v. OH Dept Liquor · filed 2005-05-26

Moreover, qualified immunity protects officials from liability only in their individual capacities and only from damages - not from declaratory or injunctive relief.

Qualified immunity may shield individual officers from liability under § 1983, but it does not protect municipalities.

Jimenez v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2005-06-02

Indeed, the protection afforded by qualified immunity applies only to individuals, such as the officers herein, and not to municipalities.

A defendant in a § 1983 equal-protection retaliation claim is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a clearly established right to be free from retaliation under the Equal Protection Clause.

Clark v. State of Alabama · filed 2005-06-02

Similarly, because Clark only asserted in her amended complaint an equal-protection claim under § 1983, the district court did not err in concluding that Clark failed to allege a “clearly established statutory or constitutional right” and that qualified immunity was warranted, see Ratliff, 62 F.3d at 340.

Qualified immunity can bar a Section 1983 claim against an officer even when a constitutional violation is assumed.

Lee v. Hefner · filed 2005-06-07

Even if a constitutional violation had occurred, Hefner was entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity on the pleadings when the complaint alleges retaliation for exercising procedural due process rights and the right was clearly established.

Richard v. Perkins · filed 2005-06-13

Because the Court has found that plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation, it must decide whether, at the time of the alleged violation, that right was so clearly established that a reasonable person would have known that the conduct violated that right. ... On this record, the Court concludes that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields officers from damages under § 1983 when they reasonably believe their conduct does not violate clearly established law.

Dziekan v. Gaynor · filed 2005-06-13

Thus, qualified immunity shields law enforcement officers from suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless their actions violate clearly-established rights of which an objectively reasonable person would have known. ... Accordingly, defendant Gaynor was objectively reasonable in his belief that his actions would not violate clearly established law. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of defendants is also appropriate on this alternative ground.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiffs raise a factual dispute about whether a reasonable official would have understood that the conduct violated their rights.

Martinez-Baez v. Rey-Hernandez · filed 2005-06-14

Lastly, we find that Plaintiffs have, at a minimum, controverted Defendants’ allegations that an objectively reasonable government actor, performing discretionary functions, would not have understood that their conduct violated Plaintiffs’ statutory or constitutional rights. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity is DENIED.

In a § 1983 excessive force claim, an officer is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when material facts remain disputed about whether the force was reasonable.

Nauman v. BUGADO · filed 2005-06-17

Defendant Paul Bugado’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, because material issues of fact remain as to whether the handcuffing of Plaintiff was reasonable. ... Thus, as to Defendant Bugado’s argument that qualified immunity applies, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when a reasonable official would not have known that the conduct violated a constitutional right.

Margaret L. Hosty, Jeni S. Porche, and Steven P. Barba v. Patricia Carter, and Governors State University · filed 2005-06-20

Public officials need not predict, at their financial peril, how constitutional uncertainties will be resolved. Disputes about both law and fact make it inappropriate to say that any reasonable person in Dean Carter’s position in November 2000 had to know that the demand for review before the University would pay the Innovator’s printing bills violated the first amendment. She therefore is entitled to qualified immunity from liability in damages.

An officer who increases and misrepresents a known danger may face § 1983 liability without qualified immunity when the violated right was clearly established.

Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield · filed 2005-06-22

We conclude that Shields unreasonably violated Kennedy’s clearly established constitutional right. Under the state-created danger doctrine, a police officer may be liable for actions that create or augment known or obvious dangers. Here, Shields’s actions both increased and misrepresented the risk Plaintiff faced. Under Grubbs, increasing and misrepresenting a known risk may give rise to § 1983 liability. This doctrine was clearly established by the time the events of this case took place.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the alleged conduct violates clearly established law governing deadly force.

Finks v. City of North Las Vegas · filed 2005-06-22

For the reasons stated above, this court has jurisdiction over and AFFIRMS the district court’s determinations that, for purposes of applying qualified immunity, Bailey’s alleged conduct violated Finks, Jr.’s constitutional rights and was governed by clearly established law.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact that their use of force was excessive.

Brown v. Mazuka · filed 2005-06-22

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on qualified immunity grounds because Brown failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants’ use of force to restore discipline and transport Brown from administrative segregation to the shower area was excessive.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 claim when, on the plaintiff's version of the facts, the officer violated a clearly established right by increasing and misrepresenting a known danger.

Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield · filed 2005-06-23

Resolving all factual disputes in her favor, we conclude that Kennedy has met this burden. Consequently, we hold that Shields is not entitled to have his motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects a doctor from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show that a reasonable doctor would clearly recognize a substantial risk of serious harm.

Lopez v. Tell · filed 2005-06-23

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on the grounds of qualified immunity because Lopez failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it would be clear to a reasonable doctor under the circumstances that a delay in Lopez’s scalp surgery would pose a substantial risk of serious harm.

Section 1983 claims against state officials may be barred by qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Wrench Transportation Services, Inc. v. Bradley · filed 2005-06-27

Qualified immunity shields state officials performing discretionary functions from suit for damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable officer would have known.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to an official whose conduct violated a right clearly established at the time.

Sowards v. TN · filed 2000-02-08

Because the law was so clearly established that he could not reasonably take political considerations into account when terminating Sowards, Guider is not entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity for Sowards’s political association claim.

Social workers sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Roe v. TX Dept Protc & Regu · filed 2002-07-17

We answer the first prong of the Siegert test by concluding that Strickland did violate Jackie’s Fourth Amendment rights, but, moving to the second part of that test, we determine that those rights were not clearly established on July 10, 1999, so Strickland is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim does not require a prior case addressing the precise conduct if officers had fair warning that it was unlawful.

Austin v. Harrison County TX · filed 2003-04-25

Defendants’ contention that no case has specifically proscribed the withholding of medical treatment for boot camp attendees reads the right too narrowly; officers need only have “fair warning” that their conduct is unlawful.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the scope of the asserted First Amendment protection was sufficiently uncertain at the time of their conduct.

Hoffman v. Baltimore Police Dept. · filed 2005-06-29

At the time of the alleged conduct at issue in this count, the scope of the First Amendment protection is sufficiently uncertain in this context so as to entitle Defendants to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity cannot be granted at summary judgment when factual disputes remain about whether the official reasonably knew the challenged action violated a constitutional right.

Valdizán v. Rivera-Hernandez · filed 2005-07-01

There being issues of fact regarding the existence of political discriminatory animus and as to whether Rivera, as a reasonable officer, knew or reasonably should have known that the challenged action violated the constitutional right at issue, the Court may not grant, at this moment, qualified immunity protection.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the challenged conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Sanders v. Parrish · filed 2005-07-01

Therefore, we hold that the Law Enforcement Officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of Sanders in executing the search warrant at issue in this case. We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the Law Enforcement Officers.

A defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim at summary judgment when material facts remain about whether a reasonable official would have understood her conduct to violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Plaza-Torres v. Rey · filed 2005-07-05

With these contested facts in mind, we find that Co-defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity: (i) Plaintiff has alleged a constitutionally protected right to be free from sexual harassment; (ii) Plaintiff has also, at a minimum, controverted Co-defendant Garcia-Figueroa’s allegations that her right to be free from sexual harassment was clearly established at the time of the facts alleged in the complaint; and (iii) Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact as to whether an objectively reasonable government actor, performing discretionary functions, would have understood her conduct to violate Plaintiffs rights under Title VII.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show a constitutional violation.

Jarriett v. Wilson · filed 2005-07-07

He therefore cannot meet his burden of showing that a constitutional violation occurred. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity,9 and the district court’s grant of summary judgment was appropriate.

In a § 1983 suit, when officials act within their discretionary authority, the plaintiff bears the burden of overcoming qualified immunity.

Jarriett v. Wilson · filed 2005-07-07

In the present case, Jarriett does not dispute that the defendants were acting within their authority as correctional facility officers, so the burden shifts to Jarriett to overcome the qualified immunity defense.

Officers have qualified immunity from § 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims when they had probable or arguable probable cause to arrest.

Bradley v. Village of Greenwood Lake · filed 2005-07-13

The existence of probable cause, or arguable probable cause, gives government officials an absolute defense to such claims and affords the arresting officers qualified immunity from litigation.

Qualified immunity can dispose of a § 1983 claim against prison officials when the plaintiff offers no evidence that they acted with wantonness or deliberate indifference.

MacLeod v. Kern · filed 2005-07-15

Plaintiff's claims against the DOC defendants are also dismissible on the ground of qualified immunity because the plaintiff offers no evidence that they acted with "wantonness” or “deliberate indifference” as required by case law.

Qualified immunity may be denied on a § 1983 home-search claim when the evidence disputes whether officers searched the home and they offer no legal justification for doing so.

Onie Ward v. Moore · filed 2005-07-18

The defendants’ affidavits denying that they had searched her home were controverted by the allegations in Ward’s verified complaint that Officers Moore and Collins had searched her home, including her bedroom, the area under her bed, her closets, and her dresser drawers. The defendants offered no legal justification for searching the residence. Accordingly, the district court was right to deny Officers Moore and Collins qualified immunity on Ward’s claim regarding their search of her home.

An official sued under § 1983 has no qualified immunity for violating clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Garland Independent School District v. Wilks · filed 1987-04-13

While under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), an official has no qualified immunity when he or she has violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” there is no evidence of this type of willful violation in this case.

A defendant is shielded from civil liability under § 1983 by qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Steinberg v. Thomas · filed 1987-05-05

The law on whether Steinberg’s speech was a matter of public concern was not clearly established in September of 1982 when Thomas fired Steinberg.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages action protects an officer when a reasonably competent officer could have concluded that probable cause supported the warrant application.

Cahill v. Montgomery County · filed 1987-07-16

In other words, an officer of reasonable competence could have objectively and reasonably concluded from these facts that probable cause existed.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when it was objectively reasonable to believe probable cause existed.

McLaurin v. NEW ROCHELLE POLICE OFFICERS · filed 2005-07-20

Because it was objectively reasonable for Officer Moretti to believe that probable cause existed to arrest plaintiff, Officer Moretti is entitled to qualified immunity.

Individuals sued under Section 1983 for federal constitutional violations committed under color of state law may assert qualified immunity.

Torres v. Village of Sleepy Hollow · filed 2005-07-21

As discussed more fully below, qualified immunity is a defense afforded to individuals acting under color of state law who are sued for federal Constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when no reasonable officer could believe the arrest had arguable probable cause.

Walker v. City of Pine Bluff · filed 2005-07-21

No reasonable police officer could believe that he had arguable probable cause to arrest such an on-looker in this situation, for obstruction of governmental operations or for any other purported crime. Thus, on this summary judgment record, the district court properly denied Grace’s motion for qualified immunity protection.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their actions were reasonable in light of clearly established law.

BARLOW EX REL. MONCEBAIZ v. Owens · filed 2005-07-22

Because Defendants’ actions in investigating the neighbor’s report, detaining Moncebaiz, and then arresting him were not unreasonable in light of clearly established law, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs § 1983 claims.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 prison free-exercise claim turns on whether it was clearly established that officials needed a legitimate penological interest to substantially burden an inmate’s religious exercise, including in disciplinary segregation.

Conyers, Blake H. v. Abitz, Tom · filed 2005-07-25

The relevant inquiry is whether, at the time the defendants refused Conyers’s request, the law was clearly established that prison officials must have a legitimate penological interest before imposing a substantial burden on the free exercise of an inmate’s religion, even when that inmate is in disciplinary segre- gation.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to line officers who follow a longstanding departmental strip-search directive when a similarly situated officer would not have understood that compliance violated constitutional rights.

DeToledo v. County of Suffolk · filed 2005-07-26

Under the circumstances, it would be unreasonable to conclude that a similarly situated line officer would have believed that compliance with a long-established policy directive emanating from the leadership of the Department involved a violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights. ... Consequently, both Sinclair and Thomas are entitled to a grant of qualified immunity.

Government officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 may invoke qualified immunity from suit.

Padilla v. Mason · filed 2005-07-28

Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit available to government officials sued in their individual capacities under section 1983.

Government officers are qualifiedly immune from liability under § 1983 when a reasonable officer could believe their conduct did not violate a clearly established federal right.

Bosteder v. City of Renton · filed 2005-07-28

Because it would be objectively reasonable for an officer to glean from the McCready decisions that the Fourth Amendment was not violated in a situation very similar to the one we consider here (though we now clarify to the contrary), we hold that the individuals were qualifiedly immune from liability under § 1983 and affirm the dismissal of that claim against them.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when they violate a clearly established constitutional right through objectively unreasonable conduct.

Stidham v. Texas Commission on Private Security · filed 2005-07-28

For purposes of qualified immunity, defendants Biggs, McGlasson, Shimek, and Grumbles violated Stidham’s clearly established liberty interest in pursuing his chosen occupation without providing due process of law. For the reasons stated, their conduct was not objectively reasonable. Therefore, they are not entitled to the protection of qualified immunity, and we VACATE the district court’s grant of summary judgment and REMAND this case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

A state officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Andrews v. Fuoss · filed 2005-08-01

In summary, even when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to her claims, Andrews fails to establish that Sheriff Fuoss violated a clearly established constitutional right, and we hold that Sheriff Fuoss is entitled to qualified immunity.

A state officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Andrews v. Robert Fuoss, Individually and in His Capacity as Sheriff of Jones County, South Dakota · filed 2005-08-01

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s grant of Sheriff Fuoss’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

A caseworker is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable caseworker in the same circumstances would not understand that her conduct violated clearly established law.

Jordan v. Murphy · filed 2005-08-02

Given Williams’s reasonable reliance on the police officers, her statutory duty to investigate reports of abuse and neglect, and her statutory duty to cooperate with the police, we conclude that a reasonable case worker in Williams’s position would not have understood her actions as violating clearly established law.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the challenged conduct does not violate the Constitution.

Simasko v. County of St. Clair · filed 2005-08-03

The defendants’ actions leading to Simasko’s termination did not violate the Constitution; thus, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and the denial of summary judgment is reversed.

Section 1983 officials are entitled to qualified immunity from monetary damages when the rights their conduct allegedly violated were not clearly established.

Conley v. Town of Elkton · filed 2005-08-04

The court also concludes that even if the termination of Conley did operate to violate his First Amendment rights, Chief Pullen and the members of the Elkton Town Council are entitled to qualified immunity from monetary damages.

An officer may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the asserted right was not clearly established in the specific circumstances.

Lyons v. Xenia · filed 2005-08-04

After considering the Supreme Court’s treatment of similar qualified-immunity issues in Brosseau, we now extend qualified immunity to Officer Foubert for Lyons’ excessive-force tackling claim.

Section 1983 claims against officials in their individual capacities can survive a qualified immunity defense at the motion-to-dismiss stage when the well-pleaded allegations, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, support the claim.

Padilla Roman v. Perez · filed 2005-08-08

Defendants, Jose Hernández and Edgar González, are also being sued under section 1983 in their individual capacity. ... Having presented the applicable three pronged-test for a qualified immunity defense, and, because under a motion to dismiss standard as provided by Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court most view in the light most favorable to the plaintiff all well-pleaded factual averments, this Court finds that defendants may not at Motion to Dismiss standard be granted qualified immunity.

Officers who obtain a search warrant through material false statements are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Baldwin v. Placer County · filed 2005-08-08

The plaintiffs’ established civil rights were violated by presentation of the false affidavit. Liston, 120 F.3d at 972-73. Qualified immunity was rightly denied.

In a § 1983 qualified immunity analysis, the court first asks whether the challenged conduct violated the claimant’s rights, before asking whether those rights were clearly established.

Masek v. Bob Wills · filed 2005-08-08

We clarify that under the Saucier approach (which is not without its critics, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 125 S. Ct. 596, 600-01 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring)), the first question in a qualified immunity analysis is whether the conduct in question violated the complainant’s rights, not whether any rights allegedly violated were “clearly established.”

Qualified immunity is unavailable in a Section 1983 action when the conceded facts establish a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.

Baldwin, Dds v. Placer County · filed 2005-08-08

Placer County and several of its police officers (collectively, the County) have taken this interlocutory appeal from the district court's denial of their motion for qualified immunity in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action brought by Michael Baldwin and Georgia Chacko (the plaintiffs). On the basis of the facts conceded as undisputed by the County for purposes of this appeal, we hold that the County violated established constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and that qualified immunity was properly denied.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not shield a prison officer who knowingly disregards a substantial suicide risk in violation of a prisoner’s clearly established rights.

Schultz v. Sillman · filed 2005-08-10

Therefore, if a jury determines that Schultz demonstrated a strong likelihood of suicide, and that Sillman was aware of this likelihood but chose to disregard it, Sillman’s actions would constitute a violation of Schultz’s clearly established Eighth Amendment right to receive medical treatment for his suicidal tendencies.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff’s allegations and evidence fail to show a violation of clearly established rights.

Nickleberry v. Johnson · filed 2005-08-10

Because Nickleberry’s speculative and conclusory factual assertions and his own summary-judgment evidence do not show that Phelps-Sanders violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, we conclude that the district court erred in rejecting Phelps-Sanders’s qualified-immunity claim.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue state actors who deprive them of rights secured by federal law.

K.M. Ex Rel. D.G. v. Hyde Park Central School District · filed 2005-08-11

Claims under Section 1983 lie only against state actors — that is, persons acting under color of state law — who deprive the plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the United States Constitution or a federal law. ... Defendant Burpee is not qualifiedly immune from suit under Section 1983.

A defendant in a § 1983 damages suit can waive a pretrial qualified immunity claim by failing to appeal timely from its denial.

Littles v. Commissioner of Correction · filed 2005-08-12

We conclude that the defendants waived their pretrial qualified immunity claims by failing to appeal timely from the denial of these claims in their original summary judgment motion.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when no evidence shows that her conduct violated a constitutional right.

David v. Rich · filed 2005-08-15

The district court properly granted summary judgment for Officer Rich after determining that she was entitled to qualified immunity because no evidence established that Officer Rich’s conduct violated a constitutional right.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim unless the plaintiff shows that the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Douglas v. Condon · filed 2005-08-16

Absent a showing that Dobbs’ actions in authorizing the submission of the Motion and proposed Order to the magistrate judge violated a clearly established constitutional right, qualified immunity applies and Douglas’s suit must fail.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not shield an official from a retaliation claim when the rights at issue were clearly established at the time of the official’s conduct.

Mitchell v. Street · filed 2005-08-16

However, it is clear that both of these rights were established at the time Mayor Street acted. ... Thus, I find Defendant Mayor Street shall not be entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the right was clearly established and the officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of that right.

Bultema v. Benzie County · filed 2005-08-17

In sum, we conclude that when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Bultema, Ketz is not entitled to qualified immunity, because the constitutional right at issue was clearly established and Ketz’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of that right.

A government official seeking qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim must show that the challenged actions were taken while performing duties within the scope of the official’s authority.

Akins v. Fulton County, Georgia · filed 2005-08-17

To benefit from qualified immunity, a government official must make a threshold showing that his actions were undertaken pursuant to performance of his duties within the scope of his authority.

Government officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless their conduct violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable person would have known.

Talisa D. Pool v. Sebastian Cty., AR · filed 2005-08-18

Qualified immunity protects a government official from liability in a § 1983 claim unless his or her conduct violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.

A government official is immune from liability under § 1983 unless the official violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable person would have known.

Talisa D. Pool v. Sebastian County · filed 2005-08-18

Qualified immunity protects a government official from liability in a § 1983 claim unless his or her conduct violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when genuine factual disputes remain over whether an officer violated clearly established rights.

Goins v. City of Detroit · filed 2005-08-19

Moreover, because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Zani, in fact, engaged in conduct that would have violated Plaintiffs clearly-established Fourth Amendment rights, Zani is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings.

A police defendant is immune from a § 1983 claim if the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Mensah v. Darby Borough Police Department · filed 2005-08-19

Even assuming arguendo that Mensah could show that her claim states a violation, the Darby Police would be immune because to succeed under § 1983, the violated right must be “clearly established.” ... Mensah cannot make this showing.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that the search violated a clearly established right or that a reasonable official would have known it was unlawful.

Biby v. Bd. of Regents · filed 2005-08-22

He has also failed to make a showing sufficient to overcome appellees' defense of qualified immunity, a defense at issue in this case but not in O'Connor. He has not demonstrated that a clearly established right of his was violated by the search or that a reasonable official would have known that the inception or scope of the search would violate Biby's Fourth Amendment rights.

A plaintiff must show a violation of a clearly established right that a reasonable official would have known the conduct violated to overcome qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim.

Biby v. Board Of Regents, Of The University Of Nebraska At Lincoln · filed 2005-08-22

He has also failed to make a showing sufficient to overcome appellees' defense of qualified immunity, a defense at issue in this case but not in O'Connor. He has not demonstrated that a clearly established right of his was violated by the search or that a reasonable official would have known that the inception or scope of the search would violate Biby's Fourth Amendment rights.

Qualified immunity under Section 1983 protects an official whose conduct was objectively reasonable despite a mistaken identification.

Stewart v. District Attorney for the Eighteenth Circuit Court District for the State of Mississippi · filed 2005-08-23

Although failure to discover the single picture in one of the multiple files may indicate a slight degree of negligence, it cannot be stated that overall, the actions of the assistant district attorney were not objectively reasonable.

In a § 1983 excessive-force suit, qualified immunity requires a separate analysis from the merits, but witness evidence may affect both at summary judgment.

Woodward v. Town of Brattleboro · filed 2005-08-23

Furthermore, while the qualified immunity analysis does not duplicate the merits analysis, it may still be affected by the testimony and affidavits in question. We therefore vacate the judgment and remand to the district court for consideration of the summary judgment motion on both the merits and qualified immunity, including proper consideration of the testimony and affidavits of Ames, the Hunts, and Wilson.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim cannot be resolved on summary judgment when it turns on a disputed fact about the officers’ conduct.

Notice v. Koshes · filed 2005-08-24

Furthermore, because the question of qualified immunity, therefore, turns on a question of fact — whether the officers in fact entered the residence without knocking and announcing — it is inappropriate for resolution on summary judgment.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to parole agents at summary judgment when disputed material facts could establish that they violated clearly established rights.

Green, Michael v. Butler, Marlo · filed 2005-08-24

For the foregoing reasons, disputed issues of material fact remain and the parole agents are not, at this stage, entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

Individual defendants in a Section 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when they did not violate clearly established federal law.

Pennington v. Teufel · filed 2005-08-26

Because Plaintiffs have not alleged and cannot show that any of these Defendants violated any clearly established federal law, the Court agrees that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity barred the § 1983 claim against an officer for the first arrest.

Wheeler v. Gidley · filed 2005-08-29

Accordingly, he is entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiffs’ claim that Wheeler’s first arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when existing law did not give reasonable officers fair notice that the conduct was unconstitutional.

Cipes v. Graham · filed 2005-08-29

In the absence of any controlling caselaw bearing on similar circumstances so as to have framed this issue with sufficient precision to put reasonable law enforcement officials on notice of the constitutional infirmity of such a nighttime misdemeanor warrant execution, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued in their individual capacities under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the right they violated was not clearly established at the time.

Draper v. Logan County Public Library · filed 2005-08-29

But under the circumstances presented here, the contours of Ms. Draper’s rights were not sufficiently clear that a reasonable government official would understand that prohibiting Draper from wearing her necklace while on duty at the library violated her rights. Accordingly, neither “plainly incompetent” nor “knowingly violating the law,” Kompanik and Appling are entitled to qualified immunity, and the individual capacity suits against them must be dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for damages and injunctive relief against state actors who violate federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Angulo v. Cruz · filed 1987-08-17

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from damages and a dismissal of the claim for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 allows a person to seek damages for a constitutional rights violation committed under color of state law, subject to applicable immunity doctrines.

Reinglass v. State of Ohio · filed 1987-09-01

Finally, the court is of the opinion that, assuming the defendants, as held by the district court, have only a qualified and not an absolute immunity, there has been a total failure on the part of the plaintiff to establish any facts which if true would show that the defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right of the plaintiff of which the defendants should have known at the time that right was supposedly violated.

Qualified immunity shields public officials from § 1983 damages when the asserted right was not clearly established and they reasonably applied existing law.

Rachamim v. Ortiz · filed 2005-08-31

However, on the present record, as indicated, we agree with the district court that there was no clearly established constitutional right of the plaintiffs to a kosher diet free of all conditions for the years 1998 to 2000. Additionally, we also believe and hold that, in any event, the defendants made “a reasonable application of existing law to their own circumstances.”

Qualified immunity can shield an officer from § 1983 liability for a brief delay in releasing an arrestee while police complete routine paperwork and obtain a cuff cutter.

Wilson v. City of Boston · filed 2005-08-31

There remains the approximately thirty minutes during which the police completed routine paperwork and awaited a cuff cutter after they had reached the inescapable conclusion that there had never been a warrant for Wilson's arrest. Although the issue is close, we conclude that Dunford continued to enjoy qualified immunity during this final thirty minutes of detention.

Qualified immunity does not shield correctional officers from a § 1983 claim when existing law fairly warned them that failing to address a detainee’s known, urgent medical need was unlawful.

Bozeman v. Silas Orum, III · filed 2005-08-31

Given these circumstances, we conclude that the Officers were fairly warned by our ease law and that the Officers’ total failure to address Haggard’s medical need during the fourteen-minute period violated Haggard’s constitutional rights, which violation should have been obvious to any objectively reasonable correctional officer.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 damages claim when material facts remain disputed about a prison official’s deliberate indifference and immunity defense.

Ahearn v. Vose · filed 2005-09-02

Summary judgment should not have been granted for defendant Hall. There remains a genuine issue of material fact whether he was deliberately indifferent to the risk to the inmates’ health after May 16, 1991, so as to constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. There are also issues of fact remaining pertaining to his defense of qualified immunity. ... Insofar as the judgment dismisses the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against defendant Hall, it is reversed.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from Section 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims when a reasonable officer could have made the same judgment, even if the arrest lacked probable cause.

Zellner v. Summerlin · filed 2005-09-06

Thus, while Defendants may have acted without justifiable cause in arresting Plaintiff, the Court cannot say that their “judgment was so flawed that no reasonable officer would have made a similar choice.” ... Thus, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest and malicious prosecution charges.

Qualified immunity is unavailable to municipalities and to municipal officials sued only in their official capacities under § 1983.

Myers v. Potter · filed 2005-09-07

The qualified immunity defense is not available to municipalities or to persons acting on behalf of municipalities, such as Police Chief Joe Melton, when sued in their official capacity only.

A § 1983 defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity on the pleadings when the alleged facts support a claim that officials deliberately fabricated evidence.

McSherry v. City of Long Beach · filed 2005-09-07

The facts alleged by McSherry support a claim of deliber- ate fabrication, and thus, on the basis of the pleadings, the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional law.

Bradley v. City of Ferndale · filed 2005-09-08

A government official performing discretionary functions is entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity if his conduct does not violate constitutional standards in light of clearly established law at the time of the alleged violation. ... For the reasons stated above, defendants Simpson, White, Crouse and Thomson are entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court’s denial of these defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Bradley’s 1983 claim is REVERSED and judgment is entered in their favor on those claims.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit requires determining whether the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established at the time.

Wernsing, Jenny v. Thompson, Odell · filed 2005-09-09

For each claim we must determine (1) whether plaintiffs have alleged violation of a valid constitutional right and (2) whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct.

Officials lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 retaliation claim when clearly established law gave them fair warning that their conduct violated a private citizen’s First Amendment rights.

Bennett v. Hendrix · filed 2005-09-09

Because this Court has held since at least 1988 that it is “settled law” that the government may not retaliate against citizens for the exercise of First Amendment rights, Ga. Ass’n of Educators, 856 F.3d at 145, we hold that the defendants were on notice and had “fair warning” that retaliating against the plaintiffs for their support of the 1998 referendum would violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and, if the plaintiffs’ allegations are true, would lead to liability under § 1983.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct violates a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

Kennedy v. Ridgefield · filed 2005-09-12

Resolving all factual disputes in her favor, we conclude that Kennedy has met this burden. Consequently, we hold that Shields is not entitled to have his motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Officers lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when no reasonable officer could believe their warrantless home entry and arrest were lawful.

Breitbard v. Mitchell · filed 2005-09-14

Under the circumstances, no officer could have reasonably concluded that it was lawful to lie to plaintiff in order to gain entry into her house—without a warrant or her consent and absent exigent circumstances—and arrest her under these facts for a minor offense. ... Thus, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity and their motion for summary judgment is denied with respect to that claim.

Section 1983 does not give an officer qualified immunity from fabrication of evidence and Brady claims when the rights at issue were clearly established.

Atkins v. County of Riverside · filed 2005-09-14

Miller is not entitled to qualified immunity as to the fabrication of evidence and Brady claims.

Factual disputes about discriminatory animus can preclude resolving qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim.

Ramos-Martinez v. Negron-Fernandez · filed 2005-09-19

The Magistrate-Judge reported that “because issues of fact exist regarding possible discriminatory animus, the Court is precluded from considering the qualified immunity defense at this time.” The Court agrees.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer in their position could have believed the challenged conduct was lawful.

Burrell v. McIlroy · filed 2005-09-19

Thus, on the facts of this case, the district court did not err in finding that the detectives were entitled to qualified immunity on this issue.

Officers may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 search claim when a reasonable officer would not have known that the consent to search was involuntary.

Burrell v. Mike McIlroy Glen C. Rector, Jeff Thorpe · filed 2005-09-19

Thus, on the facts of this case, the district court did not err in finding that the detectives were entitled to qualified immunity on this issue.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the specific constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the officer’s conduct.

May v. City of Springfield · filed 2005-09-23

Emmel argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs federal law claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is predicated upon his alleged use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ... In particular, Emmel relies upon the defense of qualified immunity. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that the evidence fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the particulars of Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure through the use of excessive force had been clearly established before December 15, 2001. Therefore, it sustains the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #8), as it relates to the Plaintiffs federal law claim against Emmel.

Officials sued under § 1983 for denying a prisoner’s religious diet are not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment when a factual dispute remains about whether the restriction was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.

Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo · filed 2005-09-26

Based on my earlier opinion and my conclusion in this opinion that defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on their reasonable relation argument, I again conclude that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. The motion for summary judgment is therefore DENIED on this ground.

A defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established constitutional rights.

Ross v. City of Memphis · filed 2005-09-29

Defendant contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 claims. ... However, in light of the Court’s analysis above, the totality of the circumstances, and Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional rights, the Court finds that Defendant Gray’s actions, as alleged, were objectively unreasonable. Defendant Gray thus fails to meet his burden, and his motion for qualified immunity is DENIED.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when the arrest warrant was supported by arguable probable cause.

Brown v. J.L. Abercrombie · filed 2005-09-30

In order to be entitled to qualified immunity in this case, Abercrombie need only show that the arrest warrant was supported by arguable probable cause.

Officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim over a traffic stop if they reasonably believed probable cause or reasonable suspicion existed, even if it did not.

Holeman v. City of New London · filed 2005-09-30

Even if the totality of facts were insufficient to satisfy probable cause or reasonable suspicion, Officer Williams' belief that they were was objectively reasonable, and therefore protected by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from damages under Section 1983 unless they violate clearly established rights; material factual disputes can prevent summary judgment on that defense.

Perez v. ZAYAZ · filed 2005-10-03

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials are not liable for monetary damages in § 1983 suits unless their actions violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... It has been clearly established, however, that when there is a material dispute of fact, summary judgment cannot be ordered. ... As such, defendants’ summary judgment request on qualified immunity grounds is Denied.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim turns on whether the defendant violated a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established at the time.

Jones, Mark D. v. Wilhelm, Ron · filed 2005-10-03

Thus, following Saucier, we reaffirm that the proper standard for qualified immunity remains a two-part test which first examines whether the defendant’s alleged actions constitute a violation of constitutional rights, and then determines whether the implicated right was clearly established at the time.

Officials who knowingly disregard hiring requirements to favor political allies may be denied qualified immunity on a § 1983 First Amendment claim.

Roman v. Altieri · filed 2005-10-05

Defendants, knowing the law, purposely refused to follow the law, and, hence, qualified immunity is DENIED.

A § 1983 defendant may be denied qualified immunity when the plaintiff’s assumed-true allegations would defeat the defense.

Calvert v. Clerk of Superior Court · filed 2005-10-06

On the limited record before us, we cannot say the district court erred by concluding that, if the allegations in Calvert’s complaint are true, which we too must assume they are, Appellants’ qualified immunity defense fails.

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Tague v. Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation Commission · filed 2005-10-07

Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from liability if their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2515, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002) (citation omitted).

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show a constitutional violation.

Boldin v. Limestone County · filed 2005-10-12

Thus, because Raby did not violate Boldin’s rights under the First Amendment, Raby is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a Section 1983 claim when the officer had notice that the conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Kingdom v. City of Riviera Beach · filed 2005-10-12

After reviewing the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the district court correctly denied summary judgment to Officer Cosby because Officer Cosby had notice that his actions toward Kingdom violated her clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure.

Section 1983 shields government officials performing discretionary functions from individual liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Earle v. City of Vail · filed 2005-10-17

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when their actions do not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Officials are qualifiedly immune from § 1983 damages when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Farrow v. Stanley, et al. · filed 2005-10-20

Therefore, the right is not clearly established and defendants are qualifiedly immune from Farrow’s claim for damages.

In a § 1983 action, once a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that the defendant violated a specific constitutional right.

Mata v. Saiz · filed 2005-10-21

After a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the plaintiff in a case like this one, which alleges a violation of the Eighth Amendment, must demonstrate that the defendant’s actions violated a specific constitutional right.

Qualified immunity protects officials sued under § 1983 from suit, not merely from liability.

Janis v. Biesheuvel · filed 2005-10-25

Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit, not simply from liability.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state executive officers for conduct violating clearly established statutory or constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Adorno v. Gonzalez · filed 1987-12-31

In actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defense of qualified immunity from liability for damages is available to state executive officers performing discretionary functions, “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”