42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action for constitutional violations by government officials, subject to qualified immunity.

Livingston v. Luken · filed 2005-10-26

Defendants-Appellants Officer Porter Eubanks, Cincinnati Police Chief Thomas Streicher, and Cincinnati City Manager John Shirey appeal the magistrate judge’s denial of their motion for judgment on the pleadings with regard to Plaintiff-Appellee Nathaniel Livingston, Jr.’s constitutional claims against them in this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... “According to the doctrine of qualified immunity, ‘government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”

Section 1983 authorizes civil actions against state actors who deprive people of constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

McSherry v. Long Beach · filed 2005-10-26

Pre-trial dismissal on qualified immunity grounds is inappropriate if the plaintiff establishes that material issues of fact exist.

Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of constitutional or statutory rights.

Patrick v. Lewis · filed 2005-10-28

Plaintiffs assert claims under section 1983 for alleged violations of Patrick’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ... Therefore, Officer Wilson is not entitled to qualified immunity for his actions on the morning of June 8.

Section 1983 claims against officials sued individually require heightened pleading when qualified immunity is raised.

St. Louis v. Sands · filed 2005-11-08

However, in § 1983 actions where government officials sued in their individual capacities have raised the defense of qualified immunity, the Eleventh Circuit has “tightened” the pleading requirements.

In a § 1983 suit, qualified immunity cannot apply when disputed facts, if true, would show that the defendants’ conduct was not objectively reasonable.

Holden v. Knight · filed 2005-11-16

When disputed issues of material fact exist, which, if true, show that the defendants’ conduct was not objectively reasonable, the defense of qualified immunity cannot apply.

A § 1983 claim may be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds at the pleading stage when the allegations cannot establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Jackson v. Schultz · filed 2005-11-18

This court may dismiss Jackson’s complaint only if it is clear that no violation of a clearly established constitutional right could be found under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations or pleadings.

A plaintiff pursuing a Section 1983 claim must plead a violation of a clearly established constitutional right once the defendant raises qualified immunity.

Jackson v. Andreas Schultz Richard Cadoura · filed 2005-11-18

But once the EMTs raise qualified immunity, Jackson must plead the violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Public officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim when a reasonable official would have known under existing law that the employee’s speech addressed matters of public concern.

Campbell v. Town of Southern Pines · filed 2005-11-21

A reasonable official in defendants’ positions would have known this under the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit law that existed at the time plaintiff was fired. Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity and their motion for reconsideration on this point will be denied.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when plaintiffs fail to show that the asserted rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged violations.

Prison Legal News, Inc. v. Simmons · filed 2005-11-22

Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show that any of the rights asserted in these eases were clearly established at the time of the alleged violations. All defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on all claims for damages.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from damages under § 1983 when the officer’s conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional or statutory right.

Coffey v. Morris · filed 2005-11-23

Accordingly, Officer Morris is entitled to qualified immunity, and the court will grant his motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields officers from damages when they could not reasonably have known their conduct violated a person’s civil rights.

Fleming v. City of Bridgeport · filed 2005-11-29

We agree with the police defendants that they reasonably could not have known that the plaintiff actually possessed the apartment on May 7 and 8,1998, because the Dixons and Terry stated that she was not a tenant. The police defendants therefore could not have known that removing the plaintiff from the apartment she actually possessed would violate her civil rights. Because federal qualified immunity applies to the police defendants’ conduct, we reject the plaintiffs federal constitutional claims.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff has not established a constitutional violation.

Lewter v. Kannensohn · filed 2005-11-29

As we found that Lewter’s First Amendment rights were not violated because she did not engage in protected speech, we also affirm the district court’s ruling that Kannensohn was entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit cannot obtain qualified immunity at summary judgment when the record does not establish that the challenged restriction on religious exercise was reasonable as a matter of law.

Boles v. Neet · filed 2005-11-30

Accordingly, at this stage of the case, this Court cannot say as a matter of law that Defendant Neet’s determination to prohibit the wearing of such items during transport was a reasonable restriction on plaintiffs free exercise of his religious practices, consistent with prison security needs, such that he is entitled to be clothed with qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer whose conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.

Byers v. City of Eunice · filed 2005-12-01

In sum, for summary-judgment purposes, Byers fails to satisfy the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis: the Detective’s conduct was not objectively unreasonable in the light of then clearly established law.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when the facts, viewed in the plaintiffs’ favor, show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Smith v. Cupp · filed 2005-12-02

However, the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, demonstrate that Dunn’s use of deadly force violated Smith’s constitutional rights. The particular right at issue was clearly established. Thus, Dunn is not entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, once a government official raises qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the official is not entitled to it.

Smith v. Williams-Ash · filed 2005-12-06

When this defense is raised, it becomes the plaintiff's burden to prove that the government official is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows people to sue state officials for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity when officials could not reasonably have known their conduct was unconstitutional.

Lumbreras v. Roberts · filed 2005-12-07

It is not clearly established under Oregon law that BOLI could have permitted Plaintiffs to continue operating under their farm labor license while it investigated the forest license discrepancies. Even if failing to split the license did violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to due process, Defendants are still entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable government official would not have know that a failure to split the license under the circumstances in this case was unconstitutional.

Section 1983 permits civil damages claims against government officials, subject to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

James v. York County Police Department · filed 2005-12-08

The District Court did not err in granting summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claims of excessive force on the basis of qualified immunity, either. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 lets a person sue a state actor who, under color of state law, deprives the person of a constitutional right.

Moreno v. Baca · filed 2005-12-08

The determination of whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity involves a two-step analysis. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In the first step we must view the record in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury in determining whether the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. If the plaintiff establishes the violation of a constitutional right, we must next consider whether that right was clearly established at the time the alleged violation occurred. Id.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives another of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Chavez v. De La Paz · filed 2005-12-08

To prevail against a qualified-immunity claim, Chavez must show: (1) his allegations state a violation of current law; and (2) the Officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in the light of the clearly-established law at the time of such conduct. ... Based solely on the well-pleaded facts in that complaint, the district court correctly denied qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could have believed the challenged conduct was lawful.

Bills v. City of Rialto · filed 2005-12-08

A reasonable officer could have believed that both probable cause and exigent circumstances existed.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a state official for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Moreno v. Baca · filed 2005-12-09

Having established that Appellants violated Moreno's constitutional rights when they conducted the suspicionless search and seizure, we must evaluate whether those rights were clearly established at the time of the incident and whether the "unlawfulness [of Appellants' conduct] was apparent in light of preexisting law." Malik v. Brown, 71 F.3d 724, 727 (9th Cir.1995).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer for a reasonable mistake about whether an offense is jailable.

State v. Rodarte · filed 2005-12-12

We agree with Justice O’Connor’s qualified immunity analysis, and we reiterate that reasonable mistakes regarding the jailability of a particular offense will not subject an officer to § 1983 liability, and thus under-enforcement will not be a major concern.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives another of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

McKinney v. Richland County Sheriff's Department Roy Livingston, Richland County Sheriff Department Sheriff of Ric · filed 2005-12-12

In order to determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, we must first determine “whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged.”

Section 1983 claims against state officials may be barred by qualified immunity unless the asserted right was clearly established.

Hardney v. Rosario · filed 2005-12-12

The district court properly denied defendant’s motion because Hardney’s right to outdoor exercise is clearly established.

In a § 1983 qualified-immunity analysis, the first stage asks whether a constitutional right was violated.

McKinney v. Richland County Sheriff · filed 2005-12-12

The question at stage one of the qualified immunity analysis is not whether the officer was reasonable, but whether a constitutional right was violated.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 damages claims against officials whose conduct was reasonable under clearly established law.

Gooden v. Crain · filed 2005-12-13

Furthermore, he is not entitled to damages because he cannot satisfy the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. At the time the lawsuit was filed, the Plaintiff did not have a right to grow a one-fourth inch beard in light of his religious beliefs under clearly established law. The actions of the Defendants in prohibiting him from wearing a one-fourth inch beard was not unreasonable in light of clearly established law.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct would not have been clear to a reasonable officer in the same situation, even if the conduct violated a constitutional right.

Spruill v. Watson · filed 2005-12-13

Therefore, even if Spruill had made out a constitutional violation on Watson’s part, Watson is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when they could reasonably believe their conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Brown v. Castro · filed 2005-12-13

The district court properly determined that the defendants involved in incidents alleged to have occurred on September 18, 2000, December 13, 2000 and November 1, 2001 were entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants presented evidence that, at the time of these incidents, Brown was not wearing a vest, and did not provide a medical history document (referred to as a “ehrono”), either of which would have identified him as having a disability or mobility issues. Accordingly, defendants could have reasonably believed that their conduct in requiring Brown to get down during alarm sessions and punishing him for not following commands did not violate Brown’s rights.

Section 1983 claims against an official are subject to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional rights were not clearly established.

Helmer v. Middaugh · filed 2005-12-15

Amendment would also have been futile for the related reason that, because the constitutional claims were not clearly established, defendant Lisi was entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer may be denied qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim for failing to intervene in an unlawful arrest because that duty was clearly established.

Lepone-Dempsey v. Carroll County Comm. · filed 2005-12-16

However, given our holding in Jackson–that a claim of excessive force predicated on the unlawfulness of an arrest is subsumed into an unlawful arrest claim–we do not believe the district court erred in concluding that a duty to intervene in an unlawful arrest was clearly established.

Qualified immunity shields officials performing discretionary functions from § 1983 damages liability unless their conduct violates a clearly established right.

Steigmann v. DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF ILLINOIS · filed 2005-12-20

“Qualified immunity shields government officials who are performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ”

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their mistake about the law governing their conduct was reasonable.

Winchester v. Cosaineau · filed 2005-12-21

Finally, even if the Defendants were incorrect in their belief that they could enter Plaintiffs home under the circumstances stated above, I find that this mistake was reasonable given the uncertainty in the law in this area. ... Accordingly, I find that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and grant their Motion for Summary Judgment.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would know that a blanket strip-search policy violated clearly established rights.

Howes v. Chesley · filed 2005-12-21

The court concludes that a reasonable, similarly-situated official would have been aware of the First Circuit’s decision in Swain and would therefore have been on notice that the policy of strip searching every incoming inmate, regardless of suspicion, was unconstitutional.

Section 1983 defendants cannot obtain qualified immunity on summary judgment when a jury could find that they violated clearly established rights by deliberately interfering with prescribed medical care.

Prewitt v. Roos · filed 2005-12-22

Rex Allen Prewitt appeals from the district court’s order granting summary judgment and dismissing his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on account of the defendants’ qualified immunity. ... Moreover, the defendants violated law that was clearly established at the time of the alleged deliberate indifference. ... We conclude that a reasonable jury could find that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to serious needs for pain medication and pillows.

A § 1983 defendant may raise qualified immunity in a post-trial motion despite not raising it before trial or submitting it to the jury.

Pitt v. District of Columbia · filed 2005-12-23

The Court does not agree with plaintiffs either that the defendants have waived the right to raise the defense of qualified immunity on their post-trial motion or that, in the end, the differing formulations of the standards for reasonable good faith belief at common law and for qualified immunity make a difference.

Section 1983 claims against officials in their individual capacities can be barred by qualified immunity.

Burgest v. Colquitt County, Georgia · filed 2005-12-23

We also agree with the district court’s reasoning that summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to all claims was appropriate, based on its conclusions that: (1) Colquitt County is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Burgest’s and Walker’s § 1983 claims, as Burgest and Walker failed to show that the County employed a policy or custom that caused constitutional harm; (2) Lanier, Whittington, Bryant, Copeland, and Grim are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from the § 1983 claims brought against them in their official capacities; (3) Lanier, Bryant, Copeland, and Grim are entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claims brought against them in their individual capacities; and (4) Lanier, Whittington, Bryant, Copeland, and Grim are entitled to official immunity from the state law claims brought against them; (5) Colquitt County is entitled to sovereign immunity from the state law claims brought against them; and (5) Burgest and Walker failed to establish their claims under §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for an officer who had arguable probable cause to arrest, even if actual probable cause was absent.

Whitner v. Rick Moore · filed 2005-12-23

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity if there was even “arguable” probable cause to arrest the defendant, regardless of whether the facts later establish that probable cause did not exist.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 claim at summary judgment when clearly established law gave fair warning that the alleged use of deadly force was unlawful.

Harris v. Coweta County, Georgia · filed 2005-12-23

For the foregoing reasons, a jury could conclude that Scott unreasonably used deadly force to seize Harris by ramming him off the road under the instant circumstances, and we find no reversible error in the denial of qualified immunity to Scott at this stage in this case.

When a defendant raises qualified immunity against a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant violated a constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established at the time.

Perez v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City · filed 2005-12-27

When a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established at the time of conduct.

A defendant in a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation suit is not entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage when the alleged facts, if proved, would defeat that defense.

De Litta v. Village of Mamaroneck · filed 2005-12-28

With respect to the plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the defendant argues that the complaint fails to allege that the plaintiff was retaliated against for speaking on a matter of public concern. ... Because the plaintiffs right to be free from First Amendment retaliation was clearly established at the time this alleged conduct took place, the plaintiff has thus alleged facts which, if proven, would defeat Flynn’s assertion that he enjoys qualified immunity with respect to the retaliation claim.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their mistaken belief that probable cause supported a search warrant was reasonable.

Armstrong v. City of Melvindale · filed 2006-01-06

Defendants wrongly believed that probable cause supported the warrant, but their mistake was not so unreasonable as to deny them qualified immunity.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when sufficiently specific precedent did not clearly establish the asserted right at the time of the conduct.

McKee v. Hart · filed 2006-01-06

Accordingly, because of the dearth of precedent of sufficient specificity (and factual similarity to this case) regarding a public employee’s First Amendment right to be free from retaliatory harassment by his or her employer at the time of Sattele’s conduct, we cannot say that the constitutional right Jones alleged Sattele violated was clearly established. Sattele is therefore entitled to qualified immunity under the second, as well as the first, prong of our Saucier analysis.

Qualified immunity shields officials from § 1983 damages unless they violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Bruton v. Paesani · filed 2006-01-06

Officials are not liable for monetary damages unless they have violated a constitutional right and that right is clearly established, meaning “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”

For a § 1983 claim alleging a constitutional violation with an intent element, qualified immunity requires an inquiry into the defendant’s mental state.

Muzquiz v. Clackamas County · filed 2006-01-06

Where the underlying alleged constitutional violation has an intent element, however, deciding whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity necessarily involves inquiring into mental state.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when, on the plaintiff’s version of disputed facts, no reasonable officer applying clearly established law would have acted as the defendant did.

Saliby v. Kendzierski · filed 2006-01-09

Based upon Saliby’s version of the facts, no reasonable officer, acting in accord with clearly established law, would have taken Saliby into custody. ... Therefore, Kendzierski’s motion for summary judgment on Saliby’s Fourth Amendment claims must be denied.

A § 1983 claim against a police officer fails at the first qualified-immunity step if the facts viewed most favorably to the claimant show no constitutional violation.

Wertish v. Norman D. Krueger, in His Individual Capacity · filed 2006-01-09

In determining whether a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim, we first consider whether the facts alleged, construed in the light most favorable to the party asserting the claim, show that the officer violated a constitutional right. ... In these circumstances, we conclude that summary judgment dismissing Wertish’s § 1983 excessive force claim must be affirmed because the facts construed most favorably to that claim show that no constitutional right was violated.

Public officials sued for damages under Section 1983 may assert qualified immunity, but officers cannot obtain summary judgment on that defense when they should have known their use of deadly force was unconstitutional.

Mumm v. Mornson · filed 2006-01-10

Qualified immunity is a defense available to public officials sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Because the officers should have known that the prerequisites for the constitutional use of deadly force had not been met, we hold that they are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds as to Mornson’s Fourth Amendment claim.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for revoking a license without a prior hearing when they fail to show an emergency or a reasonable belief that one existed.

GINORIO v. Contreras · filed 2006-01-10

Furthermore, defendants have been unable to establish by any evidence now on the record that an emergency situation existed, or that at least they reasonably believed it existed, at the time of the order that could justify a pre-hearing deprivation. Without such a showing, the Court must find that, at this stage in the proceedings, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Individual officials may receive qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Maldonado v. City of Altus, OK. · filed 2006-01-11

Plaintiffs have not called to our attention, nor have we found, any cases from either the Supreme Court or this circuit establishing the right to speak a foreign language in the workplace. ... Thus, we affirm the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the individual defendants on Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when a reasonable official could have believed the conduct lawful.

Olmeda v. Ortiz-Quinones · filed 2006-01-12

Qualified immunity doctrine protects government officers and employees from suit on federal claims for damages where, in the circumstances, a reasonable official could have believed his conduct was lawful. ... On such a spectrum, Olmeda's case is not close: she is not federally protected against political discrimination and the federal damage claims are barred by qualified immunity.

Police officers are immune from damages under Section 1983 when their objectively reasonable conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Keane v. Artz · filed 2006-01-12

Police officers are entitled to immunity from civil damages if “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Thus, Artz’s conduct was objectively reasonable, and he is immune from section 1983 liability.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when a genuine factual dispute remains about whether the officer acted objectively reasonably.

Purtell v. Mason · filed 2006-01-17

When determining whether qualified immunity shields a police officer from a Section 1983 action, the Court undertakes a two-part inquiry. ... Based on this evidence, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Mason acted in an objectively reasonable manner when he asked Jeffrey Purtell to take down the tombstones based on the circumstances he confronted on November 6, 2002. As such, the Court denies Officer Mason’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Purtell’s First Amendment claim.

Officials sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity for disrupting familial integrity when their action rests on a reasonable suspicion of danger to a child.

K.D., a Minor v. County of Crow Wing · filed 2006-01-18

We have repeatedly held that when a state official takes an action that would otherwise disrupt familial integrity he or she is entitled to qualified immunity if the action is properly founded upon a reasonable suspicion of child abuse. ... However, the government’s ability to immediately intervene in the interest of minor children cannot be so constrained. In cases in which continued parental custody poses an imminent threat to the child’s health or welfare, emergency removal of children without a court order is constitutionally permitted.

In a § 1983 claim involving a child’s removal from parental custody, qualified immunity turns on whether a reasonable officer could believe the removal was lawful based on the information available, regardless of the officer’s subjective intent.

K.D., a Minor, Through His Mother, Michelle Deason Michelle Deason, Individually v. County of Crow Wing Andy Galles City · filed 2006-01-18

However, the question facing us is not the officers’ subjective intent, but rather whether a reasonable officer could believe the removal of K.D. to be lawful in light of the information they possessed.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established law.

Wright v. Dixon · filed 2006-01-19

That is far from what occurred here, and defendants’ actions therefore did not violate clearly established law, nor should they have believed that they had done so.

In a § 1983 false arrest claim, an officer with arguable probable cause for the arrest is entitled to qualified immunity.

Carroll v. Henry County, Ga. · filed 2006-01-23

However, in the context of qualified immunity from a section 1983 claim, the police officer need not have actual probable cause but need only to have “arguable probable cause.” ... In the instant case, Officer Reid had arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. Carroll because Mr. Carroll failed to obey his direction to pull over.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a Section 1983 claim when the law did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct was unlawful.

Tallman v. Elizabethtown Police Department · filed 2006-01-23

Furthermore, even if Bland’s actions had violated Lee’s Fourth Amendment rights, the right in question was not clearly established so as to preclude the application of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against public officers are barred by qualified immunity when discretionary acts do not violate clearly established rights.

Morris v. Jackson · filed 2006-01-25

Therefore, Morris’s decision to retain the books and CDs is protected by qualified immunity and cannot serve as the basis for Morris’s lawsuit.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when the record presents a triable issue that their conduct violated clearly established constitutional law.

Turner v. Dammon · filed 1988-05-03

We hold that on this record Dammon and Edwards are not entitled to qualified immunity and that an issue of triable fact as to these defendants’ violation of settled Fourth Amendment principles appears to have been presented.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless they personally acted in a manner that clearly violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

ESTATE OF · filed 1988-05-17

And unless the individual defendants personally acted in a manner that clearly violated the murder victim's constitutional rights, these defendants are clothed with qualified immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2735-38, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment in a § 1983 damages action when the plaintiffs present sufficient evidence of a violation of clearly established rights.

Estate of Conners ex rel. Meredith v. O'Connor · filed 1988-05-17

We find that the plaintiffs have presented evidence sufficient to preclude summary judgment based upon qualified immunity.

A court granting qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim must identify which defendants are immune and explain why.

Blankenship v. Kerr County, Texas, Carl E. Biermann and Cliff Greeson · filed 1989-09-15

Blankenship correctly contends that the district court should not have held the defendants to be qualifiedly immune. The court did not specify which defendants were immune or why they were immune, and instead merely reaffirmed a prior unexplained ruling. We therefore reverse the court’s holding with respect to this issue.

Qualified immunity protects public officials from personal liability under § 1983 unless their conduct violates a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Hinshaw v. LOPFI · filed 2006-01-30

Qualified immunity protects public officials from personal liability under § 1983 when "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (internal marks omitted).

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their conduct did not violate a constitutional right.

Hinshaw v. Smith · filed 2006-01-30

Because there was no First Amendment violation, the individual Board member defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and LOPFI is entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claim against it premised on the First Amendment.

In a § 1983 qualified immunity case, the jury determines objective reasonableness when that question depends on disputed facts.

Trujillo v. Large · filed 2006-02-01

The issue before us is whether Detective Large was entitled to a jury instruction on qualified immunity which directed the jury to decide the objective reasonableness of Detective Large’s conduct. Here, as in Maestas, the qualified immunity analysis “hinges upon whose version of the facts are believed.” Maestas, 351 F.3d at 1009. Consequently, the district court correctly had the jury determine the disputed material facts on the reasonableness element of the qualified immunity analysis. See id. at 1009-10. The court did not err in giving the challenged jury instruction.

Individual defendants in a § 1983 action have qualified immunity unless their conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Murphy v. Gardner · filed 2006-02-01

In an action under § 1983, individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless it is demonstrated that their alleged conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person in their positions would have known.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the officer’s conduct.

Lafavors v. Ken Jenne · filed 2006-02-02

We agree with the district court that, even if a constitutional violation did occur, Olarte is entitled to qualified immunity. ... Assuming that being bitten by a police dog while resisting arrest violates a constitutional right, Lafavors cannot show that this right was clearly established at the time of his arrest.

Section 1983 claims against officers sued individually are subject to qualified immunity when the law did not clearly warn that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional.

Walker v. Prieto · filed 2006-02-03

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendant Prieto is entitled to qualified immunity as to Count I of the Second Amended Complaint.

Qualified immunity shields officers from § 1983 liability when the right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the violation.

Clark-Murphy Ex Rel. Estate of Clark v. Foreback · filed 2006-02-06

At issue in this § 1983 action is whether the district court properly denied qualified immunity to 15 Michigan corrections officers on duty at various points during the isolation, dehydration and eventual death of inmate Jeffrey Clark. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Clark-Murphy (the representative of Clark’s estate), we affirm the denial of qualified immunity as to 11 of the employees and reverse it as to 4 of them (Andy Dyer, Kristine Wakefield, Rina Becher and JoAnn Friedt).

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Dias v. Elique · filed 2006-02-06

Therefore, the district court did not err in holding that the Supervisors are entitled to qualified immunity on these claims.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff has not shown that the asserted constitutional right was clearly established.

Brian Dias William Mason, Sr. v. Jose Elique Michael Murray University and Community College System of Nevada University · filed 2006-02-06

In any event, even if we were to assume that the Supervisors violated Appellants’ due process rights, they would still be entitled to qualified immunity because Appellants have not demonstrated that such a right was clearly established.

Qualified immunity bars an individual-capacity § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Farrell Ex Rel. Farrell v. Transylvania County Board of Education · filed 2006-02-07

Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs properly pled its claim for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs’ allegations, nonetheless, fail to establish any conduct by Haehnel that violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in denying Haehnel’s motion to dismiss the claims asserted against her under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in her individual capacity.

In a § 1983 claim, the court decides qualified immunity as a question of law, but the jury decides disputed facts on which immunity depends.

Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth · filed 2006-02-08

Although qualified immunity is a question of law determined by the Court, when qualified immunity depends on disputed issues of fact, those issues must be determined by the jury.

Section 1983 defendants cannot establish qualified immunity through reliance on a state statute they failed to follow.

Roska v. Sneddon · filed 2006-02-09

Because Defendants failed to comply with the statute on which they base their qualified immunity claim, Defendants’ conduct was not objectively reasonable.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct was objectively reasonable, even if the rights they violated were clearly established.

Sueiro Vázquez v. De La Rosa · filed 2006-02-10

Therefore, whether or not the Court deems plaintiffs’ rights to be clearly established in the specific context of this case, the outcome of the immunity inquiry would still be the same because defendants inexorably meet the third requirement for qualified immunity to apply, that is, objectively reasonable conduct by defendant officers resulting in plaintiffs’ termination of employment. Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 excessive force claim when, on the plaintiff's version of the facts, he had fair notice that shooting a fleeing suspect who posed no immediate threat was unlawful.

Sigley v. City of Parma Heights · filed 2006-02-10

Accepting these facts as true, Mockler would have fair notice that shooting Davis in the back when he did not pose an immediate threat to other officers was unlawful. ... Accordingly, based- upon the facts taken in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Mockler is not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

In a § 1983 action challenging a warrantless arrest or seizure, an officer has qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Cortez v. Mccauley · filed 2006-02-10

Therefore, when a warrantless arrest or a seizure is the subject of a § 1983 action, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest or detain the plaintiff.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff has not shown a violation of constitutional rights.

in Re: Stacy K. Boone, P.A. and Cardiologists of Lubbock, P.A. · filed 2006-02-14

Therefore, the defendants were entitled to claim qualified immunity.

A § 1983 plaintiff must show that the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established to overcome qualified immunity.

Moore v. Guthrie · filed 2006-02-22

Therefore, we cannot say that it was clearly established that Chief Guthrie and the City of Evans violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right to bodily integrity by requiring him to wear his riot helmet during training.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when they reasonably could have believed their conduct was constitutional under the law at the time.

Murray v. Arizona Department of Corrections · filed 2006-02-22

In granting summary judgment to defendants Stewart and Marshall, the district court properly concluded that, prior to the district court’s decision in Canadian Coalition Against the Death Penalty v. Ryan, 269 F.Supp.2d 1199, 1203 (D.Ariz. 2003), defendants reasonably could have believed that the prison’s internet policy was constitutional. Accordingly, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to Count Two of Murray’s amended complaint.

Officials acting within their discretionary authority have qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when the asserted right was not clearly established in the specific context.

Avalon Carriage Service Inc. v. City of St. Augustine · filed 2006-02-23

Even assuming the existence of a constitutional violation, the Court does not find the right to be clearly established when it is viewed in light of the specific context of this case. ... As a result, the Court therefore finds that qualified immunity applies.

Public officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for discharging an employee from a non-trust position because of political affiliation when that prohibition was clearly established.

Lopez-Sanchez v. Vergara-Agostini · filed 2006-02-24

The defendants are not entitled to prevail on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity since it was clearly established in 2002 that discharging someone based upon political affiliation from a position other than trust violated plaintiffs constitutional rights.

In a § 1983 suit, a court cannot resolve genuine factual disputes when deciding qualified immunity on summary judgment.

Mcclellan v. Smith · filed 2006-02-24

The District Court generally failed to heed the rule that resolution of genuine factual issues is inappropriate on motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim when the officer had arguable probable cause to file the criminal charge.

Jaegly v. Couch · filed 2006-02-24

Couch thus had arguable probable cause to file a felony complaint charging Jaegly with first degree criminal contempt, and he is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer who knowingly falsifies evidence to support an arrest is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Cook v. Hill · filed 2006-02-27

We noted that “the prohibition on falsification or omission of evidence, knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth, was firmly established as of 1986, in the context of information supplied to support a warrant for arrest.” Id. at 1298. Thus, an officer who has engaged in such behavior is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 equal protection claim when the conduct violates a clearly established right.

Patterson v. Balsamico · filed 2006-02-27

Balsamico would not have been entitled to qualified immunity in any event, because Patterson's equal protection claim arising out of that incident involved "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

Qualified immunity protects an official from § 1983 liability unless the official violated a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Henderson v. Munn · filed 2006-02-28

Qualified immunity protects a government official from liability in a section 1983 action unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.

An officer who intentionally retaliates against protected speech is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when no objectively reasonable officer would think the conduct lawful.

Russo v. City of Hartford · filed 2006-03-02

In light of the jury’s liability finding on the section 1983 claims against Croughwell, the jury had to have found that Croughwell acted with intent to discriminate against Russo for his exercise of his First Amendment Rights. No objectively reasonable officer would think that such motivated action was lawful. The court therefore finds Croughwell is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields officers from § 1983 liability when the right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Clark-Murphy v. Foreback · filed 2006-03-02

At issue in this § 1983 action is whether the district court properly denied qualified immunity to 15 Michigan corrections officers on duty at various points during the isolation, dehydration and eventual death of inmate Jeffrey Clark. ... Second, qualified immunity prevents the officers from being held liable for constitutional violations if the right at issue was not "clearly established" at the time of the violation.

Qualified immunity does not shield an official from a § 1983 claim when no reasonable official could have believed the alleged conduct was lawful.

Rick Plemmons v. Roberts · filed 2006-03-03

We further hold, given the facts as we must take them, that no reasonable official could have thought the failure to summon immediate medical help for Plemmons was lawful.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have known that delaying necessary emergency medical care violated an inmate’s clearly established rights.

Rick Plemmons v. J.T. Roberts, Pulaski County Sheriff the County of Pulaski, Missouri Ronald Jones Michael Gibbens · filed 2006-03-03

Given the facts as we must take them, we conclude any reasonable officer would have known that a delay in providing prompt, appropriate medical care to Plemmons constituted an Eighth Amendment violation.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect municipalities or municipal employees, according to this court.

Caraballo v. Roman Hernandez · filed 1990-09-07

The doctrine of qualified immunity, however, protects only state or local government officials: its protection does not extend to municipalities or municipal employees. ... Defendants all being employees of the Municipality of San Sebastián, the doctrine of qualified immunity can afford them no solace.

Prison officials have qualified immunity from damages under Section 1983 for interference with a prisoner’s outgoing mail when the claim is based only on negligence.

McBride v. Zant · filed 1992-05-06

In Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555 (98 SC 855, 55 LE2d 24) (1978), another case brought under 42 USC § 1983, it was held that officials who had interfered with a prisoner’s outgoing mail in violation of his constitutional rights were entitled to qualified immunity from liability under which they could not be held liable for damages where the claim for relief is, as here, based only on negligence. Consequently, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint in Case No. A92A0041.

Defendants in a § 1983 damages action are entitled to qualified immunity when the rights allegedly violated were not clearly established at the time.

Crosetto v. Heffernan · filed 1992-10-22

The Magistrate is of the opinion that Defendants violated no clearly established First Amendment rights. The alleged constitutional rights that Plaintiffs allege were violated were not clearly established prior to the State Bar’s suspension of the mandatory bar rule on July 1, 1988. ... Accordingly, the Magistrate recommends that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity be granted.

Section 1983 provides qualified immunity to public officials whose conduct does not violate clearly established federal rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Brown v. Ashton · filed 1992-11-17

This is so because, as the Supreme Court explained in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), public officials are shielded from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for any alleged violations of federal constitutional or statutory law “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

An officer may be denied qualified immunity in a § 1983 action on the facts alleged.

Kennedy Ex Rel. Gorton v. City of Ridgefield · filed 2006-03-06

We disagree, and affirm the district court’s determination that, on the facts alleged, Shields is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for an alleged home search and seizure when the need for a warrant was clearly established at the time.

Sabin v. Miller · filed 2006-03-07

It was clearly established on October 2, 2002, that Sabin had a legitimate expectation of privacy in her home entitling her to Fourth Amendment protection, and that Defendants needed a warrant to intrude on her privacy interest in her home as they allegedly did on October 2. ... Accordingly, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Sabin, the Court holds that Defendants Chavez and Miller are not entitled to qualified immunity on Sabin’s Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim.

An officer may be denied qualified immunity in a § 1983 action on the facts alleged.

Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield · filed 2006-03-07

Defendant Noel Shields appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment based on his assertion of qualified immunity against Plaintiff Kimberly Kennedy's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. He argues that his conduct did not violate Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights. We disagree, and affirm the district court's determination that, on the facts alleged, Shields is not entitled to qualified immunity.

In § 1983 First Amendment claims, qualified immunity protects officers when the asserted right was not clearly established by obviously applicable principles or closely analogous precedent.

Egolf v. Witmer · filed 2006-03-09

Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights were violated, I nonetheless conclude that the Troopers are protected by qualified immunity. In First Amendment claims brought under § 1983, courts have generally found the law to be “clearly established” only in those circumstances: 1) where the “relevant principles” of First Amendment law “apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question”; or 2) where a “closely analogous case” holds the conduct unconstitutional and no “reasonable official could have distinguished” it.

A defendant in a § 1983 damages action is not entitled to qualified immunity when the violated right was clearly established and a reasonable official would understand that the conduct was unlawful.

Frederick v. Morse · filed 2006-03-09

Thus, having determined that the “facts alleged show [Morse’s] conduct violated a constitutional right,” that “the right was clearly established,” and that “it would be clear to a reasonable [principal] that [her] conduct was unlawful in the situation [she] confronted,” we hold that defendant Morse is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged facts show an arrest without probable cause under an invalid warrant and objectively unreasonable conduct.

McCutchen v. Tipton County · filed 2006-03-10

As explained above, Plaintiffs allegations, construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, show that the officers arrested Plaintiff without probable cause pursuant to an invalid warrant. ... Accordingly, the defendant officers are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield a § 1983 defendant when the evidence, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, supports denying the defense.

Rigdon v. The State of Georgia Board · filed 2006-03-10

In its July 25 order, the court, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Rigdon (as it was required to do), explained at length (at pages 20-25) why Ford is not entitled to qualified immunity. We find no error in the court’s explanation and therefore affirm its ruling.

Section 1983 defendants may receive qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established or it was objectively reasonable to think their conduct was lawful.

Svitlik v. O'LEARY · filed 2006-03-11

A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from liability for violating a person’s constitutional right if the particular right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct, or it was objectively reasonable for the officer to think the conduct was lawful.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when facts could establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and that conduct violates clearly established law.

Kimbell v. Clayton County, Georgia · filed 2006-03-14

In this case, we agree with the district court’s finding that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to Kassandra Kimbell’s serious medical needs.1 McDaniel, 886 F.2d at 313. Additionally, we agree with the district court’s finding that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is a violation of clearly established law. See Behrens, 516 U.S. at 313, 116 S. Ct. at 842. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying the defendants’ motions for summary judgment based on qualified and official immunity.

Section 1983 claims against individual state officers are subject to qualified immunity.

Aaron C. v. New Mexico Human Services Department · filed 2006-03-17

The district court dismissed Appellant’s claims against individual state officers on grounds of qualified immunity. ... For substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court in its orders of May 5, 2004, and December 29, 2004, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claims.

An official of a nonprofit athletic association treated as a state actor may claim qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit.

Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n · filed 2006-03-17

We find that qualified immunity is available to officials such as Carter.

Qualified immunity may shield doctors in a § 1983 action when they followed state law and could reasonably believe their actions lawful.

Wilson v. Dravis · filed 2006-03-17

The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on qualified immunity grounds because the doctors, who followed Oregon state law before administering Wilson’s medication, could have reasonably believed that their actions did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 claims against individual defendants when plaintiffs fail to show a violation of clearly established law.

Baumeister v. New Mexico Commission for the Blind · filed 2006-03-20

Third, the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. Plaintiffs did not address Defendants’ arguments regarding two bases for the § 1983 claims, and have wholly failed to state a claim of violation of clearly established law which shocks the conscience for their remaining cause of action.

Qualified immunity shields a government official from § 1983 damages when the conduct did not violate clearly established federal rights.

Bradley v. James · filed 2006-03-20

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense which shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Chief James is thus entitled to summary judgment on the merits of this claim and on grounds of qualified immunity.

An officer sued under § 1983 for false arrest is entitled to qualified immunity when an objectively reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Paullin v. City of Loxley, AL · filed 2006-03-20

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity where the officer had “arguable probable cause”: where an objectively reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as Mitchum could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Paullin. ... Mitchum is entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest claim.

An official’s claim that local law gave them no authority to take the alleged unconstitutional action is not a qualified immunity defense to a § 1983 claim.

Torres v. Zegarelli · filed 2006-03-22

As such, Zegarelli and DeFeo’s lack of authority argument does not invoke the qualified immunity defense.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when existing law would not make the alleged constitutional violation clear to an objectively reasonable official.

Rodriguez v. Lamarque · filed 2006-03-23

However, there is no question that LaMarque is entitled to qualified immunity because Allen, Lopez, and May do not clearly establish that a deprivation of outdoor exercise for the period endured by Rodriguez, without adverse medical effects, is substantial for Eighth Amendment purposes.

The officers are entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim.

Woodlen v. Jimenez · filed 2006-03-28

Thus, the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a Section 1983 suit, a prior appellate ruling denying qualified immunity controls on remand when defendants present no new evidence relevant to immunity.

Bollinger v. Oregon · filed 2006-03-28

Since, in the posture presented to us, this qualified immunity question is a purely legal one, and Bollinger I held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity, that holding controls this appeal as law of the case. Although on remand, defendants produced evidence in support of their motion for summary judgment, no evidence relevant to qualified immunity was presented, so that the law of the case is still applicable.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when exigent circumstances make their warrantless entry constitutionally reasonable.

Causey v. Bay City · filed 2006-03-29

The officers in this case reasonably suspected that immediate police action was necessary to ascertain whether someone inside the house was in peril, and therefore the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity for warrantless entries justified by exigent circumstances.

Choice L. Causey Henretta Denise Bradley v. City of Bay City John May Thomas Pletzke, Joseph E. Doyle Eric Sporman Ken S · filed 2006-03-29

Because exigent circumstances justified the entries, we reverse the order of the district court denying the officers qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 action, the court decides whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity under a given set of facts.

Helsabeck v. Fabyanic · filed 2006-03-30

In Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2005), we held that the question of a defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity under a particular set of facts must be decided by the court, not by the jury. The district court in the present case therefore committed error when it submitted the qualified immunity interrogatory to the jury.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when genuine issues of material fact remain.

Chasse v. Opal McCraney · filed 2006-03-30

Summary judgment is properly denied if there are genuine issues of material fact as to an asserted qualified immunity defense.

In a § 1983 suit, defendants cannot obtain qualified immunity on summary judgment through unfocused arguments that fail to establish the remaining elements of the defense.

Doherty v. Delaware · filed 2006-03-31

However, the next two elements of the qualified immunity analysis cannot be met by defendants’ unfocused arguments. Thus, the court must deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 claim when their alleged conduct violated a clearly established right.

ESTATE OF KOULTA v. City of Centerline · filed 2006-03-31

The facts presented do not merely allege a constitutional violation, but pursuant to Saucier and Higgason, supra, indicate that Koulta’s rights were clearly established at the time of his death.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from a prisoner retaliation claim when the prohibition against retaliatory punishment is clearly established.

Remeidio v. Woodford · filed 2006-04-05

The defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for this claim, because “the prohibition against retaliatory punishment is ‘clearly established law1 in the Ninth Circuit, for qualified immunity purposes.” Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir.1995) (citation omitted).

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when existing law did not give a reasonable officer fair notice that the force was unlawful.

Jimenez v. City of Costa Mesa · filed 2006-04-05

However, Officer Le is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this claim. In light of Tony Maae’s initial resistance, his lack of serious injury, and the fact he was not yet handcuffed when punched and thus posed at least a minimal threat, we cannot conclude that a reasonable officer would have had “fair notice” under existing caselaw that “the force employed was unlawful, and that any mistake to the contrary would have been unreasonable.”

Governmental actors performing discretionary acts are qualifiedly immune from a § 1983 claim when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Van Emrik v. Chemung County Department of Social Services · filed 1993-07-08

In the Federal realm, governmental actors who engage in discretionary actions are qualifiedly immune from liability in a suit based on 42 USC § 1983 if it can be established that their actions did not " 'violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known’ ” (Robison v Via, 821 F2d 913, 920, quoting Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818; see, Defore v Premore, 1992 US Dist LEXIS 5833, 1992 WL 88043, ND NY, Apr. 27, 1992, Munson, J.).

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 excessive-force claim is assessed under the law in effect when the officers acted.

Murphy v. Johnson · filed 1996-02-15

The conduct of the officers must therefore be evaluated under the standard for excessive force existing at the time of the incident.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 damages against prison officials who reasonably believed their restrictions on religious meals were lawful at the time.

Rasheed v. Commissioner of Correction · filed 2006-04-07

In Ahmad v. Department of Correction, post 479 (2006), we determined that qualified immunity was proper where prison officials acted to limit the alternative meals available to Muslim inmates (pork-free and vegetarian) on the reasonable belief that such limitations were lawful at the time. The issues and the time period in question in that case and this, are sufficiently similar for us to conclude that entry of summary judgment for the defendants here would have been proper on qualified immunity grounds.

Qualified immunity protects officials from § 1983 damages when their conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Ahmad v. Department of Correction · filed 2006-04-07

For a right to be clearly established, the unlawfulness of the defendants’ conduct must be “apparent” based on then existing law. ... Consequently, the defendants are entitled to the protections of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Nance v. New Orleans & Baton Rouge Steamship Pilots' Ass'n · filed 2006-04-10

For the reasons that follow, the Board has qualified immunity; therefore, we need not address the other claimed immunity. ... For the two-step qualified-immunity analysis, we must first determine whether, under current law, “‘a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged’”. ... Pursuant to our review of such evidence, the § 1983 due-process and equal-protection claims fail for the following reasons.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when they reasonably believe there is probable cause for an arrest.

Olagues v. Kousharian · filed 2006-04-10

The district court properly concluded that these appellees were entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that they reasonably believed there was probable cause for Olagues’ arrest.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against jail officials whose response to inmate safety risks was arguably reasonable.

Moore v. Cullman County Commission · filed 2006-04-13

But we need not determine the reasonableness of Roden’s and Buegler’s actions because, if their response to the risks was even arguably reasonable, they are entitled to qualified immunity barring the § 1983 claim against them.

In a § 1983 claim, a State court considering qualified immunity may decide whether the asserted right was clearly established before resolving a difficult, unsettled constitutional question.

Nelson v. Salem State College · filed 2006-04-13

In this case, we conclude that the judge appropriately exercised her discretion by first deciding that, at the time of the defendants’ conduct, any constitutional right the plaintiff could claim had been violated was not clearly established.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when the circumstances do not support finding that a reasonable officer would recognize a disputed eviction as unlawful.

Higgins v. Penobscot County Sheriff's Department · filed 2006-04-14

In these circumstances, Tibbetts' decision to disbelieve Higgins and to defuse the situation by asking him to leave under threat of citation for trespass was neither plainly incompetent nor involved a deliberate violation of the law.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect officers who make a warrantless home arrest without consent or exigent circumstances when clearly established law would have told a reasonable officer the entry was unlawful.

Bashir v. Rockdale County, Georgia · filed 2006-04-14

We conclude that, under the law existing at the time, it was clearly established the deputies’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. A reasonable law enforcement officer faced with these circumstances would have known he could not enter the home and arrest Bashir without a warrant, exigent circumstances, or consent. ... Accordingly, Deputy Davis and the unnamed deputies are not entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court erred in granting summary judgment in their favor on Bashir’s unlawful arrest claim.

An official sued under Section 1983 may be denied qualified immunity even without a prior case involving materially similar facts if the right was clearly established.

Miller, James E. v. Jones, Arthur L. · filed 2006-04-17

For a right to be clearly established, however, we need not have a prior case that is founded on materially similar facts; officials may still be on notice in “novel factual circumstances.”

An official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim for a retaliatory transfer when prior precedent gave him clear notice that the transfer was unlawful.

James E. Miller, Jr. v. Arthur L. Jones, Police Chief · filed 2006-04-17

Finally, should former Chief of Police Jones have needed personal notice that the retaliatory transfer of public employees for speech protected by the First Amendment is subject to suit under § 1983, he need only look to our holding in Octavio Delgado v. Police Chief Arthur Jones and Deputy Chief Monica Ray, 282 F.3d 511, Mar. 8, 2002, decided against the appellant himself in the same month during which the merger was first proposed.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 arrest claim when the officer reasonably believes probable cause exists.

Georgeon v. City of San Diego · filed 2006-04-17

Because Adams reasonably believed that she had probable cause to arrest Georgeon under these circumstances, the district court properly concluded that she was entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Way v. County of Venture · filed 2006-04-19

This said, a reasonable official in the position of Brooks and Hanson would not have understood that following the jail’s policy violated Way’s rights because the unconstitutionality of the search they conducted was not clearly established at the time.

Officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have understood that their conduct violated clearly established rights at the time.

Way v. County of Ventura Robert Brooks Karen Hanson, and Robert Ortiez, Ventura Police Officer · filed 2006-04-20

This said, a reasonable official in the position of Brooks and Hanson would not have understood that following the jail’s policy violated Way’s rights because the unconstitutionality of the search they conducted was not clearly established at the time.

School board officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable official should have known their conduct violated clearly established rights.

Brannan v. Amato · filed 2006-04-24

It seems fair to conclude that objectively reasonable school board officials should have known that they were acting in disregard of clearly established law and the public schools regulations. Moreover, the objective unreasonableness of the school board officials is supported by the record.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 retaliation claim when the defendants’ claimed lack of retaliatory intent remains disputed.

Carr v. Whittenburg · filed 2006-04-28

Because the Court declines to grant sum-maiy judgment for the Defendants on the grounds that they acted without retaliatory intent, the Court also declines to grant the Defendants summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.

A § 1983 damages claim may survive a qualified-immunity motion to dismiss when the record is too undeveloped to resolve the defense.

Torisky Ex Rel. Torisky v. Schweiker · filed 2006-04-28

We will affirm the order of the District Court denying the motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity, however, so that the matter of immunity can be determined on the basis of a more fully developed record.

Section 1983 officers may receive qualified immunity for a reasonable mistaken entry, but factual disputes about a continued search and detention can preclude summary judgment on immunity.

Harman v. Pollock · filed 2006-05-02

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to defendants as to the plaintiffs’ claim of an unreasonable entry into 44 ½ West 2700 South. Because we conclude that there are material factual disputes about when the officers should have realized they were at a separate residence not encompassed by the warrant, we REVERSE and REMAND the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the officers with respect to the plaintiffs’ claims of an unlawful search and seizure.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official could have believed that no further hearing was necessary.

Anderson v. Recore · filed 2006-05-04

Hence, we conclude that an officer could reasonably have believed that the TRC lacked discretion and that no further hearing was necessary. Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

A state official has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the statutory right at issue was not clearly established to a reasonable official.

Missouri Protection & Advocacy Services v. Missouri Department of Mental Health · filed 2006-05-10

Relying on PAMII’s plain language and then-Judge, now-Associate Justice, Alito’s decision for the Third Circuit in Pennsylvania Protection & Advocacy, Inc. v. Houstoun, 228 F.3d 423, 427-28 (3d Cir. 2000), we affirm the district court1 and hold (1) PAMII preempts Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.035.4, and (2) given the legal uncertainty before Schuffman at the time he concluded Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.035.4 was not preempted, Schuffman is entitled to qualified immunity from Missouri Protection and Advocacy Services’s (MOPAS) suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Qualified immunity protects a state official from a Section 1983 claim unless the official violated a clearly established federal right that a reasonable person in the official's position would have known.

Missouri Protection & Advocacy Services v. Missouri Department Of Mental Health · filed 2006-05-10

A state official like Schuffman is protected by qualified immunity from a section 1983 claim "unless [his] alleged conduct violated clearly established federal constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable person in [his] position[ ] would have known." ... In sum, we hold MOPAS's PAMII-based statutory right to the requested peer review report was not clearly established such that a reasonable person in Schuffman's position at the time would have known following Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.035(4) and not disclosing the report violated 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(4)(A).

Qualified immunity is available to officials sued personally under § 1983, but unavailable to government entities or officials sued in their official capacities.

Ridpath v. Board of Governors Marshall University · filed 2006-05-11

Qualified immunity may be invoked by a government official sued in his personal, or individual, capacity. See Graham, 473 U.S. 159 at 165-67. This defense is not available in an official-capacity suit brought against a government entity or a government officer as that entity’s agent.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

Borello, Ronald T. v. Allison, Richard · filed 2006-05-11

Defendants therefore are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 prisoner safety claim, a prison official’s response to a known risk must be reasonable to support qualified immunity; taking some action alone is insufficient.

Borello v. Richard Allison, Lisa Gales, John Liefer, and John Inman · filed 2006-05-11

We emphasize that a prison official is not entitled to qualified immunity simply because 'he or she takes any action in response to a risk of harm to an inmate— that response must be reasonable.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on a prisoner’s retaliation claim when the alleged job transfers do not amount to a constitutional violation.

Morris v. Powell · filed 2006-05-15

These defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the job transfer claim because there is no cognizable constitutional violation.

State officials sued under § 1983 may assert qualified immunity, and a plaintiff must identify a clearly established right and allege facts showing its violation to proceed.

Francisco v. Long · filed 1997-12-31

Federal courts have recognized a qualified immunity defense for federal officials sued under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and for state officials sued under § 1983. ... In other words, once the qualified immunity defense is raised, the plaintiff has the burden of identifying a clearly established right, of which a reasonable person would have known, and alleging facts showing the defendant violated that right. ... Because Appellants could not come forward with sufficient facts or allegations to show violations of clearly established law, they are not entitled to subject Defendants to the burdens of an evidentiary hearing, discovery, or trial.