42 U.S.C. § 1983

Government officials performing discretionary functions, including police officers, may assert qualified immunity in § 1983 suits.

Shibley v. Begin · filed 1998-03-26

Although § 1983 on its face provides for no defenses or immunities, the United States Supreme Court has held that government officials, including law enforcement officers, who perform discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from suit in civil rights actions under § 1983.

Individuals sued under § 1983 for prison conduct in 1994 are immune from an ADA-based claim because whether prisoners could bring ADA claims was then unsettled.

Grant v. Schuman · filed 1998-07-16

We have also noted the possible theory that the right to be free from discrimination may be the type of right, privilege, or immunity secured by law so that Grant may sue Cearlock under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving him of that right, privilege or immunity. See Mallett v. Wis.Div. of Vocational Rehabilitation, 130 F.3d 1245, 1251 (7th Cir.1997). We pursue this no further because the district court correctly noted the judicial uncertainty then existing whether a prisoner could have a cause of action against the prison or state under ADA. Because that question was not settled for this circuit until Crawford, supra, in 1997 and Yeskey, supra, in 1998, individual defendants would be immune from suit for conduct in 1994.

An official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff's version of the facts supports retaliation for protected speech in violation of clearly established law.

Merkle v. Upper Dublin Schl. Dist. · filed 2000-05-09

In view of our analysis that Merkle's version of the facts supports the proposition that Brown, and through him the District, maliciously prosecuted Merkle in retaliation for her protected First Amendment activities, it follows that Brown is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim unless their actions violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Mitchell v. Wagner · filed 2001-01-29

After de novo review, see Buckley v. Rogerson, 133 F.3d 1125, 1126 (8th Cir. 1998), we agree with the District Court that defendants were ... entitled to qualified immunity on the unsanitary-conditions claim, see id. at 1128 (explaining that government officials have qualified immunity from suit unless their actions violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable person would have known); Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 957-58 (8th Cir. 1994).

When a § 1983 plaintiff fails to show unconstitutional conduct, the court need not reach the second step of the qualified immunity analysis.

Thacker v. Lawrence County · filed 2006-05-17

In light of the fact that Thacker has failed to prove that the deputies engaged in unconstitutional conduct, there is no need for us to perform the second step of the qualified immunity analysis—that being “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.

A § 1983 plaintiff waives an appellate challenge to qualified immunity by failing to argue that the right was clearly established.

Ruffin v. Nicely · filed 2006-05-18

Ruffin waives this argument by failing to provide any argument or to refer to any cases. See Buziashvili v. Inman, 106 F.3d 709, 719 (6th Cir. 1997). Therefore, we have no reason to disturb the district court’s holding that the defendants in their individual capacities were entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects individual officials when the plaintiff cannot show that they violated a constitutional right.

S.S. v. Eastern Kentucky University · filed 2006-05-19

For the reasons cited above, the Court has found that Plaintiff has not produced any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find that his rights were violated, and that is in itself sufficient to end the inquiry and determine that Vance and Rini are protected by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects officials from a § 1983 due process claim when a reasonable official, relying on consistent advice that an employee lacked tenure, would not have known that termination without a hearing was unlawful.

Miller v. Administrative Office of the Courts · filed 2006-05-23

Given this information, a reasonable officer would not have clearly known that terminating Miller without the procedures required only for tenured employees was unlawful.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim when the violated right was clearly established, even without a case involving similar facts.

Burchett v. Kiefer · filed 2002-11-19

We also conclude that, under the Supreme Court's recent guidance in Hope v. Pelzer, this right was clearly established for qualified immunity purposes. In Hope, the Court made clear that a right can be clearly established even if there is no case involving "fundamentally similar" or "materially similar" facts.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a search warrant affidavit establishes probable cause even without allegedly false information.

Williams v. Ramsey · filed 2006-05-30

As the April affidavit established probable cause to conduct the searches at issue in this case even without the allegedly false information in that affidavit, the officers are entitled qualified immunity.

Police officers may receive qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim regardless of whether the seizure is characterized as an arrest or an investigative stop.

Barton v. City and County of Denver · filed 2006-06-02

The Court also accepts the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the alleged use of excessive force with'respect to the second seizúre, regardless of whether it is characterized as an arrest or investigative stop, and GRANTS that portion of the defendants’ motion.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim when undisputed facts establish probable cause for the arrest.

Bochove v. Village of Corrales · filed 2006-06-06

These undisputed facts establish probable cause for her arrest for interference with a police officer and attempted assault on a police officer. Thus, the arrest was legal and qualified immunity was also proper.

Officials sued under § 1983 for involuntary commitment have qualified immunity when they had at least arguable probable cause to believe the person was dangerous and needed involuntary care.

Vallen v. Connelly · filed 2006-06-06

We do not reach the District Court’s second, alternative holding, because we agree with the District Court that the undisputed circumstances leading up to Vallen’s re-commitment gave defendants at least arguable probable cause to conclude that he was dangerous and needed involuntary care.

In a § 1983 suit, qualified immunity requires the court to ask first whether the plaintiffs asserted a constitutional violation and, only if they did, whether the right was clearly established.

Pett v. Dudzinski · filed 2006-06-07

The initial inquiry is whether plaintiffs have asserted the violation of a constitutional right at all. Id. Only if plaintiffs have done so does it become necessary for the court to determine whether that identified right was clearly established at the relevant time. Id. Here, plaintiffs fail to establish a constitutional violation.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when there was no arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Davis v. Williams · filed 2006-06-07

In the context of a claim for false arrest, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity where that officer had “arguable probable cause,” that is, where “reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the Defendants could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest” the plaintiff. ... Under the facts as alleged by Davis, we find that there was no arguable probable cause to arrest Davis, and, therefore, we reverse.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when they reasonably believe probable cause exists, even if it does not.

Richards v. CITY OF NEW YORK 405 · filed 2006-06-15

Thus, under the circumstances, McCann and Paul had a reasonable basis for believing there was probable cause, even if such probable cause did not actually exist, and are entitled to qualified immunity in the arrest of Richards.

Prison guards are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages unless their conduct violates a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known.

Anthony v. Martinez · filed 2006-06-16

Prison guards like J. Martinez cannot be held liable for civil damages unless their conduct “violate[d] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilkerson v. Stalder, 329 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a government official protected by qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time.

Jennifer Y. Ex Rel. Harris v. Velazquez · filed 2006-06-20

Assuming, arguendo, that Velazquez did violate Jennifer’s constitutional rights, those rights were not clearly established when the relevant events in this case took place. Velazquez is thus entitled to qualified immunity from this suit.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims alleging retaliation under the Equal Protection Clause because no clearly established equal protection right to be free from retaliation exists.

Gardner v. City of Camilla, Georgia · filed 2006-06-21

Because we have held that no clearly established right exists under the Equal Protection Clause to be free from retaliation, even when we take the facts in the light most favorable to Gardner and Clayton, they cannot demonstrate that the actions of either Scott or Irwin violated a constitutional right. Accordingly, Scott and Irwin are entitled to qualified immunity as to the § 1983 retaliation claims.

Qualified immunity shields officials from damages under § 1983 unless their conduct violates a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Brittain v. William Hansen Rebecca Scott County of San Bernardino, and Brian Campbell, C0191 · filed 2006-06-22

Qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when a reasonable jury could find the force unreasonable and that unreasonableness was clearly established.

Ross v. Buck · filed 2006-06-23

Because a reasonable jury could conclude that Jess’s use of the pepper foam and other conduct was gratuitous and therefore unreasonable, see Henderson v. Munn, 439 F.3d 497, 502-03 (8th Cir. 2006) (use of mace on prostrate, restrained arrestee who posed little or no threat to safety of officers or others was not objectively reasonable), and because the unreasonableness of the alleged conduct was clearly established at the time of the incident, Ross is entitled to proceed on these claims against Officer Jess.

Qualified immunity protects a state official from a § 1983 claim when no clearly established law would have told a reasonable officer that the alleged conduct was unconstitutional.

Washington v. Harris · filed 2006-06-23

Moreover, even assuming that Deas’s behavior was sufficiently repugnant to give rise to a constitutional claim, no case law clearly establishes that such conduct violates the Constitution, and thus we cannot say that any reasonable officer would have known of it.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official could have believed their conduct lawful under clearly established law.

Gomes v. Wood · filed 2006-06-27

W e disagree with the district court’s application of Carey to these facts, but we affirm its decision for a different reason: we hold that because M s. Annes did not violate clearly established law of which a reasonable official would have known, she and the other defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Police officers are protected by qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim based on an arrest supported by probable cause.

Lyles v. Micenko · filed 2006-06-29

Since probable cause existed to arrest Ms. Lyles for assault, the Officers are protected by qualified immunity and ’ the Court grants D;C. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer who arrests someone without probable cause in violation of clearly established Fourth Amendment rights; qualified immunity does not shield that officer.

David v. District of Columbia · filed 2006-06-30

Further, Davis is not protected by qualified immunity. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing plaintiffs, Davis arrested David without probable cause and therefore unreasonably violated her clearly established Fourth Amendment rights under color of state law.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their compliance measures give them an objectively reasonable belief that their program does not violate clearly established rights.

Gray v. Johnson · filed 2006-06-30

The prison officials are also entitled to qualified immunity so long as "reasonable person[s]” in their positions would have concluded that coerced participation in the TCP, as it existed, did not violate Martin's "clearly established” rights under the Establishment Clause. ... The court finds that those steps, taken as a direct response to an opinion examining the interplay of TCP programs and the Establishment Clause, created an objectively reasonable belief on the part of program staff and prison officials that the program as it existed during Martin’s stay did not run afoul of the Establishment Clause.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts could establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Brown v. Smith · filed 2006-06-30

Accordingly, denial of Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity was proper, and we affirm the decision of the district court.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Salsbury v. City of Berkeley · filed 2006-07-03

The district court erred in denying summary judgment on Payne’s Fourth Amendment claim because Officer Meredith is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. ... However, the right at issue here is not clearly established.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when their conduct did not violate a constitutional or federal statutory right.

Hughlett v. Romer-Sensky · filed 2006-07-06

Here, the inquiry is limited to the first step, because the district court properly found that defendants did not violate any of plaintiffs constitutional or statutory rights and that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when evidence supports an officer’s use of gratuitous force in violation of a clearly established right.

Shreve v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court · filed 2006-07-07

Moreover, because Sixth Circuit case law supports Shreve’s right not to be struck and jumped on gratuitously, qualified immunity is not available for lack of a “clearly established” right.

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 claim against a public official unless the plaintiff shows a constitutional violation and a right that was clearly established at the time.

Atterberry, Jeffrey v. Sherman, Leonard · filed 2006-07-07

In order to proceed against the state actors, Atterberry must (1) adequately allege the violation of a constitu- tional right, and (2) show the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, such that a reasonable public official would have known that his conduct was unlawful.

In a § 1983 action, officers may be denied qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would have known that exigent circumstances did not justify a warrantless home entry.

Shotland v. City of Torrance · filed 2006-07-11

Based on the record before it, including all the evidence introduced by appellants, the experienced district court judge determined that a reasonable officer would have known that the intrusion was not excused by exigent circumstances. ... Based on the record in the district court and now before us, we affirm the court’s denial of appellants’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, unresolved material facts about prison officials’ qualified immunity can make summary judgment premature.

Williams v. District of Columbia · filed 2006-07-14

Further, there remain genuine issues of material fact relevant to the Individual Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity. For example, there is an issue of fact regarding whether Mr. Williams was exposed to levels of ETS sufficient to pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health, whether the Individual Defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the ETS problem at the D.C. Jail, and whether the Individual Defendants’ conduct rose to the level of deliberate indifference. In sum, the Individual Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is premature and will be denied without prejudice.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when no statute or case law clearly establishes the asserted duty.

Moss v. Mamalis · filed 2006-07-14

Furthermore, even if Jones owed some obligation to investigate the plaintiff s allegations that plaintiff was improperly placed on postrelease supervision, there is no statute or case law which clearly establishes this duty. As a result, Jones is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 false arrest claim when probable cause made the arrest objectively reasonable.

Martin v. City of Alexandria · filed 2006-07-17

Because the arrest was not objectively unreasonable, Officer Gleason is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when disputed facts could show that officers used unreasonable force against a person who did not resist.

Samuelson v. City of New Ulm · filed 2006-07-20

Based on this evidence, we hold the district court erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when the record indisputably shows that lawful considerations partly motivated their conduct and the law did not clearly establish liability.

Fry v. Hillsborough Co. School Board · filed 2006-07-20

Here, even assuming, as the district court did, that Alexander and Miles’s conduct violated Fry’s First Amendment rights, there is undisputed evidence in the record that establishes that Alexander and Miles had lawful reasons for deciding not to renew Fry’s employment contract, namely that the defendants were motivated, at least in part, by Fry’s deficient work performance and interpersonal behavior. Thus, the district court correctly determined that they were entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect officers who unreasonably ignore an inmate’s serious symptoms despite an earlier medical assessment.

Gordon v. Frantsi · filed 2006-07-21

In this case, it was unreasonable for Arends, Deschene and Frantsi to ignore Gordon's shortness of breath and chest pain because they were responsible for responding to medical emergencies and knew Gordon was on high observation. A medical assessment does not justify qualified immunity when officers ignore it.

A medical assessment does not justify qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when officers ignore it.

Gordon v. Frank · filed 2006-07-21

In this case, it was unreasonable for Arends, Deschene and Frantsi to ignore Gordon's shortness of breath and chest pain because they were responsible for responding to medical emergencies and knew Gordon was on high observation. A medical assessment does not justify qualified immunity when officers ignore it.

Qualified immunity defeats a § 1983 claim if the alleged facts do not establish a constitutional violation or the right was not clearly established at the time of injury.

Hernandez v. Conde · filed 2006-07-24

To determine whether qualified immunity serves as a defense to a § 1983 action, the court undertakes a two-step analysis. ... First, the court must determine whether the facts alleged state the violation of a constitutional right. ... And if so, the court must determine whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of injury. ... If the answer to either of these questions is “no,” then the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 action for a reasonable mistake when there is no evidence of recklessness.

Hernandez v. Conde · filed 2006-07-24

Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, Agent Conde may have mistaken the house. However, there is no evidence of improper motive or recklessness. There is also no evidence that Agent Conde entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his allegations. An officer’s reasonable but mistaken belief is entitled to qualified immunity.

Prison officials who review prisoner complaints are entitled only to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when the review process lacks judicial safeguards.

Koutnik, Joseph D. v. Brown, Lebbeus · filed 2006-07-24

For the reasons outlined in Cleavinger, Ray, Huibregtse, and Raemisch were entitled only to qualified immunity for their role in evaluating Koutnik’s complaint.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim cannot be resolved on summary judgment when material facts bearing on the defense are disputed.

Freece v. Clackamas County · filed 2006-07-25

Disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Officials lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 First Amendment claim when existing law gave them fair warning that forcing a Muslim inmate to handle pork contrary to his sincere religious beliefs was unconstitutional.

Williams v. Bitner · filed 2006-07-25

In sum, we hold that the Prison Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from Williams’s First Amendment claim. ... We therefore conclude that the state of the law at the time the violation occurred gave the Prison Officials “fair warning” that their alleged treatment of Williams was unconstitutional.

A government official sued under § 1983 may obtain qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

Warden Stephen Benton v. Hopkins · filed 2006-07-25

A government official who is sued under § 1983 may seek summary judgment on the ground that he is entitled to qualified immunity. ... We agree with the district court’s analysis of the first Saucier prong and its conclusion that, on this record, Benton did not satisfy his burden to show that the officers’ conduct violated a constitutional right. Accordingly, we affirm the entry of summary judgment.

A plaintiff opposing qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim must show that the official violated a constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established at the time.

Johnson Ex Rel. Estate of Cano v. Holmes · filed 2006-07-26

In order to defeat a qualified immunity defense, “a plaintiff must show that (1) the official violated a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the constitutional or statutory right was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred.” M imics, Inc. v. Village of A ngel Fire, 394 F.3d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Qualified immunity does not support dismissal of a § 1983 political firing claim when the record lacks enough detail to determine whether the defendants are entitled to it.

Kenney v. Charnock · filed 2006-07-26

Accordingly, as the issue of qualified immunity is before this Court on a motion to dismiss and discovery has just begun, the Court finds for the foregoing reasons that there is simply not enough clarity at this point in the litigation for the Court to determine whether Defendants are entitled to such immunity. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss and will permit the parties to proceed with discovery.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when he knew that shooting a pet violated its owners’ clearly established right against unreasonable seizures.

Andrews v. City of West Branch · filed 2006-07-27

Taking the facts in this light, we hold that ... Officer Knight knew at the time he shot Riker that he was violating the Andrewses’ clearly established right to be free from unreasonable seizures of property.

Section 1983 shields a state or local official from personal liability through qualified immunity unless the official violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Estate of Phillips v. District of Columbia · filed 2006-08-01

Qualified immunity under section 1983 shields a state or local official from personal liability unless his action violated a “clearly established statutory or constitutional right[] of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... The Firefighters have not alleged the deprivation of a clearly established constitutional right and Edwards is therefore entitled to qualified immunity from suit in his individual capacity.

Officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Estate of Bing Ex Rel. Bing v. City of Whitehall · filed 2006-08-01

Although a jury could conclude that the police used excessive force when they employed the second flashbang device, which set the house on fire, the right against this use of force was not “clearly established,” entitling the officers to immunity from this claim as well.

Section 1983 shields a state or local official from individual liability when the plaintiff has not alleged the deprivation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Estate Of Anthony Sean Phillips, Sr. · filed 2006-08-01

Qualified immunity under section 1983 shields a state or local official from personal liability unless his action violated a "clearly established statutory or constitutional right[ ] of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). ... The Firefighters have not alleged the deprivation of a clearly established constitutional right and Edwards is therefore entitled to qualified immunity from suit in his individual capacity.

Officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the asserted right was not clearly established in the circumstances they faced.

Estate Of William J. Bing · filed 2006-08-01

Although a jury could conclude that the police used excessive force when they employed the second flashbang device, which set the house on fire, the right against this use of force was not "clearly established," entitling the officers to immunity from this claim as well.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect an officer when the alleged conduct violated a clearly established right and no reasonable officer could have believed it lawful.

Garcia Ex Rel. Merino v. Brown · filed 2006-08-02

Because the facts of this case are far closer to those of Dwares than of Pena, I conclude that Officer Brown does not qualify for qualified immunity under the second prong of Harlow.

Government officials sued under § 1983 may obtain qualified immunity at the pleading stage when no facts the plaintiff could prove would undermine the objective reasonableness of their actions.

Young v. Goord · filed 2006-08-02

Because no set of facts Young could prove would undermine the objective reasonableness of defendants’ actions, the defense was properly granted as a matter of law and the amended complaint dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Pabon v. Wright · filed 2006-08-03

The concomitant right to medical information was not clearly established, however, because neither this court nor the Supreme Court had recognized such a right at that time. ... Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 individual-capacity claims against detention-center officials are subject to qualified immunity.

GLP Ex Rel. S.G. v. Nutt · filed 2006-08-04

Having carefully reviewed the record and considered the parties’ arguments, we agree with the district court that Andrews and Judge Easley were entitled to qualified immunity on the individual-capacity claims against them.

Section 1983 does not shield officers with qualified immunity from an excessive-force claim when the right was clearly established and they would reasonably have understood their conduct was unlawful.

Hyde v. Myers · filed 2006-08-07

We agree with the district court that appellants were not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive-force claim.

Section 1983 officials are entitled to qualified immunity from damages when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Smook v. Minnehaha County · filed 2006-08-09

Alternatively, assuming for the sake of argument that the district court was correct that there is no constitutional distinction between searches of juveniles in undergarments and searches of juveniles stripped of all clothing, and assuming the district court’s conclusion that all such searches without probable cause are unreasonable, we hold that Banbury and Cheever are entitled to qualified immunity from claims for damages arising from the search of Smook in 1999.

An officer is shielded from liability on a Section 1983 claim by qualified immunity when the conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Johnson v. District of Columbia · filed 2006-08-10

Accordingly, Officer Bruce is shielded from liability by qualified immunity and he is entitled to summary judgment on Officer Johnson’s § 1983 claim.

Qualified immunity can bar monetary relief against officials sued in their individual capacities under Section 1983.

Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City University of New York · filed 2006-08-11

The claims against Marlene Springer and Carol L. Jackson in their individual capacities, for monetary relief, are dismissed on grounds of qualified immunity.

For qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim, an officer responding to another officer’s radio call is judged by the information the responding officer possessed.

Siegel v. Miller · filed 2006-08-18

Thus even if Miller’s radio call was made in the absence of reasonable suspicion that Siegel had committed any crime or violation, McGinley and Dougherty’s conduct must be judged based on the facts within their knowledge after they heard the radio call.

A defendant cannot claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 retaliation claim when it was objectively unreasonable to believe the speech was unprotected and the jury found an improper retaliatory motive.

Reuland v. Hynes · filed 2006-08-21

Finally, we hold that Hynes cannot benefit from qualified immunity because it would not have been objectively reasonable for him to believe the speech was unprotected and the jury found that he acted with improper retaliatory motive.

Prison guards are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff’s alleged facts describe repeated physical abuse of a restrained prisoner.

Dingler v. Dallas County Sheriff's Office · filed 2006-08-21

Assuming ... these facts are true, we cannot say that the guards would be entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 claim when the complaint adequately alleges interference with clearly established familial association rights.

Suasnavas v. Stover · filed 2006-08-25

Confining our review to the allegations set forth in plaintiffs’ complaint, and accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true, we agree with the district court that defendants are not entitled to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint based on their qualified immunity defense.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 free-exercise claim when the challenged restrictions are constitutional.

Runningbird v. Weber · filed 2006-08-28

Thus, we agree with the district court that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the related First Amendment free-exercise claims.

In a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff opposing summary judgment on qualified immunity must show that the defendant violated a specific statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

Steffey v. Orman · filed 2006-08-30

W hen a defendant bases a motion for summary judgment on the defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s actions violated a specific statutory or constitutional right, and that “the constitutional or statutory rights the defendant allegedly violated were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.” Id.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when, on the facts viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, he knew his conduct violated a clearly established right against unreasonable seizure of property.

Andrews v. City of West Branch · filed 2006-09-01

We next consider Knight’s claim of qualified immunity. ... Taking the facts in this light, we hold that Officer Knight knew at the time he shot Riker that he was violating the Andrewses’ clearly established right to be free from unreasonable seizures of property.

Section 1983 officers are entitled to qualified immunity when they reasonably believe their conduct is lawful under the particular circumstances they face.

Cassady v. Yellowstone County Montana Sheriff Department · filed 2006-09-06

In light of this direction, we conclude that it was reasonable for the Officers to believe that their conduct was lawful in the particular circumstances that they confronted in Broadview that evening. ... The Officers are consequently entitled to qualified immunity from Cassady’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment when the record, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, does not establish arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Brown v. Aybar · filed 2006-09-07

Reading the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court cannot conclude based on this record that it was objectively reasonable for defendants to believe that probable cause existed, or that reasonable officers would disagree on whether there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff for the claimed violations where another individual admitted guilt, which admission plaintiff corroborated, and given that defendants knew plaintiff had not been working at the School around the time of the incident and had been told by plaintiff that he had no supervisory responsibilities at the School.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Kaufman, James J. v. McCaughtry, Gary R. · filed 2006-09-07

Recalling the purpose of qualified immunity, which is to shield government officials performing discretionary functions from damage liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), we conclude that the officials here have shown that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Public officials acting within their discretionary authority are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their conduct violates no constitutional right.

Wilson v. Farley · filed 2006-09-08

As discussed above, neither the DCF nor the individual defendants violated any constitutional right. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 claim when the complaint alleges that officials violated clearly established rights through objectively unreasonable conduct.

Field Day, Llc v. County Of Suffolk · filed 2006-09-12

Given the allegations contained in Field Day's Second Amended Complaint, qualified immunity is unavailable on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

A government official acting within her discretionary authority has qualified immunity from damages on a § 1983 claim if her conduct does not violate clearly established law a reasonable person would have known.

Modica v. Taylor · filed 2006-09-13

The doctrine of qualified immunity immunizes government officials acting within their discretionary authority from civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional law of which a reasonable person would have known.

Qualified immunity shields public officers from liability under § 1983, but does not protect them when the facts viewed in the plaintiff’s favor show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Pryor v. Dearborn Police Department · filed 2006-09-14

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that shields public officers from liability under § 1983. ... When considering the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, and Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can bar damages against state officials in a § 1983 action.

Cunningham v. Snyder · filed 2006-09-19

For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 101) is GRANTED. ... Defendants have moved for dismissal of Plaintiffs request for damages in Count Three of his amended complaint, asserting the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against public officials are subject to qualified immunity for discretionary actions that are objectively reasonable and do not violate clearly established rights.

Clair v. Northern Kentucky Independent Health District · filed 2006-09-19

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant health officials fail under the same due process analysis employed for the claims against the Health District, and Defendant health officials are also entitled to qualified immunity for their discretionary and reasonable actions in connection with the denial of Plaintiffs’ food service permit application.

Section 1983 affords officers qualified immunity for a search when a reasonable officer would not have known that the consent was involuntary.

Burrell v. McIlroy · filed 2006-09-19

Thus, a reasonable officer in his position would not have been on notice that Johnson’s consent was in any way involuntary. ... Thus, on the facts of this case, the district court did not err in finding that the detectives were entitled to qualified immunity on this issue.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Hubbard v. Taylor · filed 2006-09-20

It is apparent that the issue has not yet been decided in this Circuit. Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 arrest claim when a reasonable officer in the same position could have believed there was probable cause to arrest and grounds to use force.

Burrell v. Mike McIlroy Glen C. Rector Jeff Thorpe · filed 2006-09-20

Given the government’s concession that it lacked probable cause, the arrest was unconstitutional. Nonetheless, we hold that a reasonable officer in Detective Rector’s position would have believed that he had probable cause to arrest Burrell and to use force in doing so.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim cannot be resolved on summary judgment when disputed facts prevent the court from determining whether the defendants’ conduct was objectively reasonable.

Houghton v. Culver · filed 2006-09-21

Because the underlying facts here are in dispute, or at least not clear from the record before me, I cannot determine that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

An official seeking qualified immunity from a § 1983 retaliation claim must address that claim to meet his burden.

Stanley v. Carrier Mills-Stonefort School District No. 2 · filed 2006-09-21

The third sentence applies, if at all, only to plaintiffs’ claims regarding Opposite Sex Day; it has no application to her retaliation claim (Count III). As Morgan has made no argument with respect to the retaliation claim, the Court cannot find that he has met his burden with respect thereto.

An officer sued under § 1983 for involuntary hospitalization is not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment when the facts, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, do not support an objectively reasonable belief in probable cause.

Hoyer v. DiCocco · filed 2006-09-22

Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Hoyer, the Court is unable to find that there was probable cause or that it would have been objectively reasonable for DiCocco to believe that there was probable cause and denies defendant’s claim of qualified immunity, at least on summary judgment.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the evidence could establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Tubar v. Clift · filed 2006-09-22

Not only has Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to prove that Defendant Clift’s use of deadly force amounted to a constitutional violation, the right to be free of such a violation was clearly established when Plaintiff was shot on June 26, 2003, satisfying the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. ... Defendant Clift is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 false arrest claim when disputed facts determine whether the officer had arguable probable cause.

Miller v. Moynihan · filed 2006-09-25

Officer Main argues that he had probable cause to arrest Miller, or, alternatively, that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he had arguable probable cause to arrest her. For the following reasons the Court concludes that the factual predicate for probable cause or arguable probable cause is disputed and requires jury determination, making summary judgment improper.

An individual defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to allege a constitutional violation.

Kirkland v. St. Vrain Valley School District No. Re-1J · filed 2006-09-26

Because Kirkland failed to allege any constitutional violation, we conclude the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the facts known to the officer gave no reason to believe the arrest was unlawful.

Karkut v. Target Corp. · filed 2006-09-28

We agree, and alternatively hold that even if there was not probable cause as a matter of law, the Court would find qualified immunity for Officer Buckley since, based on the facts as he observed them, he had no reason to believe that his conduct was unlawful.

Qualified immunity cannot be resolved on summary judgment when disputed facts determine whether defendants treated similarly situated employees differently based on race.

Everson v. Lantz · filed 2006-09-30

Because there are genuine issues of material fact going to whether defendants treated plaintiff differently than similarly situated Caucasian and Hispanic employees, I cannot determine at this stage whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields an official from damages under § 1983 when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Franklin v. Clark · filed 2006-10-02

Accordingly, even assuming that Franklin’s due process rights were violated, such rights were not clearly established at the time of his termination. Clark therefore enjoys qualified immunity with regard to Franklin’s § 1983 claim.

In a § 1983 excessive-force claim, qualified immunity does not protect an officer who allegedly slaps a handcuffed suspect without a reasonable law-enforcement purpose when the right was clearly established.

Pigram Ex Rel. Pigram v. Chaudoin · filed 2006-10-05

On the facts as we must take them, there was simply no governmental interest in slapping Pigram after he had been handcuffed, nor could a reasonable officer have thought there was. ... Therefore, qualified immunity is not available for lack of a “clearly established” right.

In an individual-capacity § 1983 claim, qualified immunity must be assessed using evidence concerning that defendant personally.

Teri Lynn Enterprises, Inc. v. Pickell · filed 2006-10-06

The district court failed to examine the precise evidence relating to Pickell himself, as is required when a defendant is sued in his individual capacity and not in his official capacity as a policy-maker or decision-maker for Genesee County, ... but instead considered collectively all the defendants and even representatives of Vienna and the Sheriff’s Department who are not defendants as a group.

Section 1983 does not afford a prison official qualified immunity for ordering a prisoner to keep using work equipment the official has been warned and has reason to believe is unnecessarily dangerous.

Morgan v. Morgensen · filed 2006-10-06

We further hold that a prison official is not entitled to qualified immunity when he orders a prisoner to continue operating prison work equipment that the official has been warned and has reason to believe is unnecessarily dangerous.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when evidence shows that the defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law and the defendant offers no competent evidence otherwise.

Easter v. Powell · filed 2006-10-10

Because there is evidence that Powell’s conduct was not objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law, and Powell adduced no competent summary judgment evidence to show otherwise, Powell is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants may be denied qualified immunity at summary judgment when material facts about their use of force remain disputed and the governing principles were well established.

Gander v. Wood · filed 2006-10-13

For the same reason, I also deny defendants' summary judgment motion on qualified immunity grounds. The principles enunciated in Graham, supra, and its progeny, such as Deorle v. Rutherford, were well established at the time of these events.

A § 1983 plaintiff must rebut a defendant’s asserted qualified immunity defense.

Burden v. Wood · filed 2006-10-17

Since Appellee has asserted a qualified immunity defense, Appellant must refute this claim. ... Appellant has made no effort to rebut Appellee’s claim of qualified immunity. ... For substantially the same reasons set forth by the magistrate judge in her recommendation and the district court in its orders, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claims.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Mullis v. Cobb County Board of Commissioners · filed 2006-10-24

Williams was entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 qualified-immunity claim, the court first asks whether a constitutional violation occurred and, if so, whether the right was clearly established at the time.

Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin · filed 2006-10-25

First, we ask whether there was a constitutional violation. If the answer to this question is yes, we must then determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the right was clearly established and their conduct cannot be found objectively reasonable as a matter of law.

Salahuddin v. Goord · filed 2006-10-27

Qualified immunity is not appropriate at this stage because it was clearly established at the time of the alleged violations that prison officials may not substantially burden inmates’ ... right to religious exercise without some justification and because we cannot say as a matter of law that it was objectively reasonable for any defendant to believe that the facts as they stand on summary judgment showed no violation of a clearly established right.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when, on the plaintiff’s version of events, a reasonable officer would have known the force was excessive.

Graham, Lee E. v. Hildebrand, W.K. · filed 2006-10-30

Because a jury could find that a reasonable officer in Bennett’s position would have known, under the Grahams’ version of events, that dispersing pepper spray in their faces was an excessive use of force, we vacate the grant of summary judgment on the excessive-force claim as to Bennett.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from a § 1983 claim for malicious and sadistic excessive force that causes harm.

McReynolds v. Alabama Department of Youth Services · filed 2006-10-30

When the constitutional violation is excessive force in violation of the Eighth amendment, qualified immunity is an unavailable defense because the use of malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm is a clear violation of the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent.

A school official has qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim for failing to remedy student-on-student sexual harassment when that duty was not clearly established at the time.

White v. Gurnon · filed 2006-10-30

Because it was not clearly established until the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Davis that school officials could be held liable under § 1983 for failing to take action to remedy known student-on-student sexual harassment, Gumon’s motion asserting a defense of qualified immunity should have been allowed.

Section 1983 damages claims against public officials are subject to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have understood that the challenged conduct was unlawful.

Fritz v. Daly et al. · filed 2006-10-31

In this order, I merely hold that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Fritz's damage claim because his statements do not qualify as protected speech and, alternatively, because a reasonable employer would not have understood that the discipline that was imposed was unlawful.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Hernandez v. City of Hoover, AL · filed 2006-10-31

We also agree with the judgment of the district court that Mr. Hernandez has failed to establish that Officer Pugh’s actions constituted a constitutional violation. Therefore Officer Pugh is entitled to the protection of qualified immunity and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Section 1983 defendants are shielded by qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct was unconstitutional.

Milner v. Duncklee · filed 2006-11-08

Because in September 2002 it was not clearly established whether a facially valid capias authorized a home arrest, however, defendants are shielded from liability by qualified immunity.

A district court decision alone does not clearly establish a right sufficiently to defeat qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim.

Lindell, Nathaniel v. O'Donnell, Cindy · filed 2006-11-08

We have held that a decision from a district court does not have sufficient weight to establish a point of law so clearly as to defeat a qualified-immunity defense.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim requires a context-specific inquiry into whether a reasonable officer would have known the conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Leach v. Lowe · filed 2006-11-08

In sum, we affirm the denial of summary judgment on whether Leach established a constitutional violation, vacate the denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, and remand for a determination of whether, under the specifics of this case, it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the conduct at issue violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on an official for denying a land-use permit over unpaid mitigation payments when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Mongeau v. City of Marlborough · filed 2006-11-13

Given that the First Circuit has explicitly refused to decide whether such an allegation can make out a section 1983 claim, such a right is not “clearly established.” Consequently, as counterintuitive as it may seem, Reid is entitled to qualified immunity even if he required mitigation payments in order to grant a permit.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 claim when no reasonable officer familiar with search-and-seizure law could have believed their conduct lawful.

Frunz v. City of Tacoma · filed 2006-11-13

No reasonable officer familiar with the law of searches and seizures could have thought otherwise.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when the constitutional rights implicated by the alleged conduct were clearly established at the time.

Gillis, Nathan v. Litscher, Jon · filed 2006-11-14

Also, defendants have not shown that they are entitled to qualified immunity. They cannot show that in 2002, when these events occurred, it was not well-established that denial of shelter, heat, and hygiene items implicated an inmate’s constitutional rights.

Government officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity if their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Ware v. Zeller · filed 2006-11-14

Government officials acting within their discretionary authority are immune from civil liability for damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could have believed their conduct was lawful, even if that belief was mistaken.

Buchanan Ex Rel. Estate of Buchanan v. Maine · filed 2006-11-16

Even if the officers were mistaken, this was a reasonable judgment call, and they are entitled to immunity.

A school principal sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged constitutional violations were not clearly established at the time of her conduct.

Risica Ex Rel. Risica v. Dumas · filed 2006-11-17

Thus, defendant Dumas is also entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity if the constitutional violations alleged by the plaintiff were not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. The court finds that Dumas is entitled to qualified immunity on both counts.

A public official is shielded by qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the alleged conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Jenkins v. Board of Education · filed 2006-11-21

In short, absent authority holding that actions like those allegedly taken by Superintendent Evans violate a clearly established constitutional right, the Court must conclude that Evans is shielded from liability by the qualified immunity doctrine.

A Section 1983 plaintiff facing a qualified immunity defense must plead facts focused on the official’s conduct that, if proven, would show a violation of a clearly established right.

Eudy v. CITY OF RIDGELAND, MISSISSIPPI · filed 2006-11-21

Instead, the plaintiff must plead facts “specifically focusing on the conduct” of the defendant which, if proven, would demonstrate that the defendant had violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right. ... The Court finds that Eudy’s allegations are sufficient to satisfy this heightened pleading standard.

A § 1983 claim against school officials for reporting a possible school violence threat without first letting the student respond fails when no clearly established constitutional right requires that opportunity.

Pace v. Talley · filed 2006-11-21

It is clear, however, that Pace’s contentions do not establish the violation of a clearly established constitutional right on such grounds.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiffs cannot show a violation of a federal right.

Fishbein Ex Rel. Fishbein v. City of Glenwood Springs · filed 2006-11-22

If there has been no violation of a federal right, the plaintiffs cannot defeat the defendant officers’ assertion of qualified immunity.

A prison official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for ordering a prisoner to keep using equipment the official has reason to believe is unnecessarily dangerous.

Morgan v. Canady · filed 2006-11-29

We further hold that a prison official is not entitled to qualified immunity when he orders a prisoner to continue operating prison work equipment that the official has been warned and has reason to believe is unnecessarily dangerous.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when reasonable officials could differ on whether the official’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Bolton v. City of Dallas TX · filed 2006-12-07

Bolton’s claim against Benavides in his personal capacity must be dismissed based on qualified immunity, because reasonable public officials could have differed on whether discharging Bolton would violate his constitutional rights.

In a § 1983 action, defendants who raise qualified immunity in their answers do not waive the defense by failing to fully brief it in a summary judgment motion.

Anderson-Bey v. District of Columbia · filed 2006-12-11

They raised it in their answers and attempted to “reserve” it in their summary judgment motion. No doubt the failure to fully brief the defense was due in large part to the purported agreement that individual defendants would be voluntarily dismissed. The qualified immunity defense has not been waived.

A correctional officer is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 excessive force claim when testimony raises a factual dispute about whether the officer acted in bad faith.

Brown v. Lippard · filed 2006-12-12

Second, Lippard asserts that there was no evidence properly before the district court that his actions were in bad faith, and therefore that Brown did not overcome the immunity shield. ... Lippard’s argument is off point. ... The judge only had to notice that such testimony existed, because the testimony’s very existence raises an issue of fact sufficient to overcome summary judgment.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct did not violate a constitutional right; the court need not decide whether the right was clearly established.

Halsell v. Etter · filed 2006-12-15

Further, there is no need for this Court to determine whether the alleged violation involved a clearly established constitutional right, because the Officers’ actions did not amount to a constitutional violation.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim when the right was clearly established and, on the plaintiff’s version of the facts, no reasonable official could have believed the conduct was lawful.

Wilson v. Maricopa County · filed 2006-12-19

The Court concludes that Sheriff Arpaio’s interlocutory appeal is frivolous. The right at issue was clearly established at the time of Phillip Wilson’s assault, and the evidence, construed in Plaintiffs’ favor, shows that no reasonable sheriff in Defendant Arpaio’s position could have believed that his conduct was lawful.

Qualified immunity may be denied to a defendant in a § 1983 action.

Strickland v. City of Dothan, Alabama · filed 2006-12-19

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Appellant Sylvia Summers (“Summers”) appeals the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and discretionary function immunity from liability for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. ... After reviewing the record, having the benefit of oral argument, and reading the parties’ briefs, we affirm the district court’s judgment on the appeal and cross- appeal based on the district court’s well-reasoned order filed on November 8, 2005.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when arguable probable cause existed for the arrest.

Morales v. City of New York · filed 2006-12-19

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity if there is arguable probable cause, which exists if it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that there was probable cause, or if officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to the existence of probable cause. ... We agree with the district court that arguable probable cause existed in the present case.

Qualified immunity may be denied in a § 1983 action involving false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.

Strickland v. Summers · filed 2006-12-19

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Appellant Sylvia Summers (“Summers”) appeals the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and discretionary function immunity from liability for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. ... After reviewing the record, having the benefit of oral argument, and reading the parties’ briefs, we affirm the district court’s judgment on the appeal and cross-appeal based on the district court’s well-reasoned order filed on November 8, 2005.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim against a governor when the complaint alleges a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Blankenship v. Manchin · filed 2006-12-20

As Blankenship’s complaint alleges a constitutional violation of a clearly established right, qualified immunity does not attach to the Governor’s actions.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit requires an individual assessment of each prison official’s role.

Longoria v. State of Texas · filed 2006-12-21

Because the standard outlined by Farmer requires an evaluation of both subjective knowledge and objective reasonableness, the court erred in using these factual disputes as a blanket justification for denial of summary judgment to the defendants as a class, without further considering their individual roles in the disputed incidents.

In a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff facing a qualified immunity defense must allege a constitutional violation and show that the right was clearly established when the defendant acted.

Colwell v. Johnson · filed 2006-12-19

Once a defendant asserts a defense of qualified immunity, plaintiff must (1) allege facts showing a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) show that the ...right was clearly established at the time the defendant acted.

Officers sued under § 1983 in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.

Hill ex rel. Estate of Loggins v. Carroll County · filed 2006-12-28

For the reasons discussed above, Defendants Michael Spellman, Charles Jones, and David Mims’ motion to dismiss, or alternatively for summary judgment, based on qualified immunity [9-1] should be granted because even if the plaintiffs factual allegations were true, the officers behavior was objectively reasonable in light of the lack of clearly established law proscribing their method of restraining a violent suspect.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit requires the court to assess whether the alleged facts show a constitutional violation and whether the right was clearly established at the time.

Moss v. Timothy Martin, Robert Millette, and Brian Piersma · filed 2007-01-02

To defeat a qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff must satisfy two conditions: (1) the complaint must adequately allege facts that, if true, would constitute a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) the case law must be “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation, so that a reasonable public official would have known that his conduct was unlawful.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim arising from an arrest warrant when the warrant was supported by at least arguable probable cause.

Fernander v. Bonis · filed 2007-01-03

We first address Fernander's claim the trial court erred in finding that Captain Bonis was entitled to qualified immunity as to Fernander's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due process claims. ... Captain Bonis had not only arguable probable cause, but actual probable cause to seek an arrest warrant for Fernander. ... The trial court did not err in finding Captain Bonis possessed qualified immunity from suit.

Qualified immunity does not support judgment on the pleadings in a § 1983 political dismissal claim when the allegations, taken as true, show the dismissal of a nonpolicymaking employee in violation of clearly established law.

Moss, William H. v. Martin, Timothy · filed 2007-01-03

Judgment on the pleadings in favor of the IDOT defendants on the basis of qualified immunity is therefore inappropriate. The issue of whether the IDOT defendants are entitled to qualified immunity may be revisited and resolved in the district court on a more complete record.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Harveston v. Cunningham · filed 2007-01-05

Thus, because the right was not clearly established, Officer Cunningham is entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment was proper on the excessive force claim for use of the pepper spray.

School officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 may invoke qualified immunity against back pay liability.

21 Fair empl.prac.cas. 895, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,563 · filed 1975-06-25

We next consider whether the district court erred in awarding monetary relief, in the form of back pay, against the individual defendants in their individual capacities. We hold that the defense of qualified immunity applies to this case and is sustained as a matter of law.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when a reasonable officer would have known their conduct violated a clearly established Fourth Amendment right.

Sallenger, Mary v. Oakes, Brian · filed 2007-01-10

Accordingly, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when disputed facts, viewed in the plaintiff's favor, show an officer used a neck restraint on a nonthreatening arrestee in violation of a clearly established right.

Griffith v. Coburn · filed 2007-01-10

When the facts in this case are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is clear that Partee posed no threat to the officers or anyone else. It follows that the use of the neck restraint in such circumstances violates a clearly established constitutional right to be free from gratuitous violence during arrest and is obviously inconsistent with a general prohibition on excessive force.

Section 1983 does not afford officers qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would have known that their use of force violated a clearly established Fourth Amendment right.

Mary Sallenger, as the Administrator of the Estate of Andrew B. Sallenger, Deceased v. Brian Oakes, James Zimmerman, and · filed 2007-01-10

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable officer would have known that administering closed-fist punches and flashlight blows, including ones to the head, after the arrestee was handcuffed, continuing to strike him after he had stopped resisting arrest and failing to place him in the proper position after hobbling him violated the individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force.

An officer facing a Section 1983 claim is not entitled to qualified immunity for shooting an unarmed, nondangerous suspect without warning when neither the officer nor others face danger.

John Adams and Cathy Adams v. Speers · filed 2007-01-10

Accepting the Adamses' facts as true, this case falls within the obvious: the absence of warning and the lack of danger to the shooter or others distinguish the case from Cole, Smith, and Brosseau. On these facts, Officer Speers was not entitled to qualified immunity.

Non-medical prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 medical-care claim when the inmate is under the care of medical professionals.

Foreman v. Bur Prisons · filed 2007-01-16

Moreover, the non-medical prison officials - Lappin, Miner, Belefonti, Ingram, Jones, and Kitka - are entitled to qualified immunity because Foreman was under the care of medical professionals - Morales and Medina.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim does not arise merely because no prior court has held the precise conduct unlawful.

Griffith Ex Rel. Estate of Partee v. Coburn · filed 2007-01-10

The mere fact that a court has not held the particular action in question unlawful is insufficient to create immunity.

A deputy sued individually under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when his use of force does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Teddie Griffin v. George v. Runyon, Jr. · filed 2007-01-17

We agree. In addition to denying Griffin’s claim on the ground that no constitutional violation occurred, the district court could have gone on properly to hold that Runyon was entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity when the evidence permits a reasonable jury to find facts that defeat the defense.

Arlio v. Marlin J. Lively · filed 2007-01-17

As the evidence was clearly sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to adopt Arlio’s view of the facts, Lively was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his qualified immunity defense.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Carver v. City of Cincinnati · filed 2007-01-18

Therefore, the law was not clearly established at the time of the alleged constitutional violation. ... The Cincinnati police officers and EMTs are entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer who intentionally or recklessly makes material false statements or omissions to obtain a warrant without probable cause is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when that prohibition was clearly established.

Miller v. Prince George's County · filed 2007-01-22

In sum, well before the events at issue in this case, it was clearly established that a police officer could not lawfully make intentionally or recklessly false material statements or omissions in order to obtain a warrant. Accordingly, Det. Dougans is not entitled to qualified immunity, as a matter of law, on the present record.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to an officer who deliberately or recklessly makes material false statements or omissions to obtain a warrant without probable cause.

Miller v. Prince George's County, Maryland, a Body Corporate and Politic John L. Dougans · filed 2007-01-22

Accordingly, Det. Dougans is not entitled to qualified immunity, as a matter of law, on the present record.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the assumed facts could establish a violation of clearly established rights.

James Spencer Whitehead, Jr. v. Ga. Dept. of Corr. · filed 2007-01-23

Therefore, qualified immunity does not entitle the Doctors to judgment at this stage of the proceedings.

A defendant cannot obtain qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim based on an asserted reasonable belief that lacks a factual basis in the record.

Fews v. Perez · filed 2007-01-23

Finally, there is nothing in the record to indicate the basis for Perez’s belief that Fews would receive timely medical treatment upon his arrival at Corcoran. There is therefore no factual basis to support a finding that Perez’s belief was objectively reasonable.

In a § 1983 action, pleading official immunity does not give notice of a qualified immunity defense.

Metro Produce Distributors, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2007-01-24

Qualified immunity is clearly distinct from official immunity, and thus, it is not reasonable to believe that asserting one gives notice of the other.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation.

Haynes v. City of Circleville · filed 2007-01-25

Haynes is a fortiori unable to satisfy the second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis—that the constitutional right was clearly established.

Officers sued under § 1983 may assert qualified immunity when they retain discretion in enforcing protective orders.

Hudson v. Hudson · filed 2007-01-26

Because police officers retain some discretion when enforcing protective orders under the Tennessee statute, we hold that the appellants may avail themselves of the qualified immunity defense.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have known the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Johnson v. Caudill · filed 2007-02-02

In summary, we conclude that Sheriff Caudill is entitled to quali- fied immunity from Johnson’s § 1983 claims against him.