42 U.S.C. § 1983

Officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when they could reasonably believe their conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Crosby v. Hare · filed 1996-07-19

Based on those facts, it is clear that defendants could reasonably have believed that their actions did not violate plaintiffs constitutional rights. ... I conclude, therefore, that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Qualified immunity cannot support summary judgment in a § 1983 action before reasonable discovery when material facts about the defendants’ conduct and participation remain unresolved.

Herzog v. Will · filed 1996-07-23

It is beyond question that without reasonable pretrial discovery, this case may not be resolved by the favorable grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Defendants in a § 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to prove that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Rodriguez v. Coleman · filed 1996-07-25

We conclude that the district court was not clearly erroneous in finding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because they were not deliberately indifferent to Rodriguez’s safety.

Qualified immunity can bar a Section 1983 claim against a game warden.

Carrington v. A.F. Danison, Individually · filed 1996-07-30

We affirm the order of the district court because the record reveals the warden had probable cause to issue the summons, see Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir.1974) (holding there is no cause of action for a warrantless arrest under § 1983 unless the officer lacked probable cause), and because the warden was entitled to qualified immunity.

A game warden may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim arising from a trespass summons.

Carrington v. Danison · filed 1996-07-30

We affirm the order of the district court because the record reveals the warden had probable cause to issue the summons, ... and because the warden was entitled to qualified immunity.

A school district cannot claim qualified immunity against a § 1983 suit.

Nabozny v. Mary Podlesny, William Davis, Thomas Blauert · filed 1996-07-31

The District itself clearly is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A prison security officer who intentionally forces sexual acts on an inmate is not entitled to qualified immunity from an individual-capacity § 1983 damages claim.

Mathie v. Fries · filed 1996-08-05

In this case, the Court concludes that Sergeant Fries is not entitled to immunity from the plaintiffs claims against him in his individual capacity. Fries intentionally, deliberately and sadistically sexually abused an inmate and committed sodomy on him while he was handcuffed. The Court finds that any reasonable prison Director of Security knew that to try to force unwanted and prohibited sexual acts on a powerless inmate is objectively unreasonable and in violation of the inmate’s rights.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for an administrative home inspection when the law did not clearly establish that they had to inquire further into a contractor’s authority to consent.

Montville v. Lewis · filed 1996-08-06

In light of this, the defendants reasonably could have believed that Rodriguez's requirement of further inquiry did not apply to their administrative inspection of Montville's house. That is enough, we believe, to warrant qualified immunity.

Officials in a § 1983 action may obtain summary judgment before discovery when the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of a constitutional or statutory right.

Yowell v. Jerry P. Combs Andy Dalton Jay Henges John Powell Jerry J. Presley David Hurlbut · filed 1996-08-14

Yowell further argues the district court erred in dismissing his section 1983 action prior to the completion of discovery. This claim is meritless, however, as the above discussion illustrates. Because Yowell failed to allege a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, the officials were entitled to summary judgment before discovery commenced.

Qualified immunity can shield prison officials from § 1983 liability despite their knowledge of an inmate’s violent nature.

Erskine v. Commissioner of Corrections · filed 1996-08-15

Despite their knowledge of Robinson’s violent nature, the defendants are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity for purposes of section 1983 liability.

Individual defendants in a Section 1983 action cannot receive summary judgment on qualified immunity when a genuine issue of material fact remains about their entitlement to that immunity.

Brown v. City of Santa Ana · filed 1996-08-15

In contrast, we find that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Officer Ahearn and Letizio in their individual capacities, because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Government officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have known the conduct was unlawful.

Kerr v. Catherine J. Farrey and Lloyd Lind · filed 1996-08-27

While we conclude that the facts on the summary judgment record do not support that conclusion, under Anderson we cannot say that a reasonable prison official should have known that her actions were unlawful. We conclude that Farrey and Lind were entitled to qualified immunity on Kerr’s damages claims against them and that those elaims should be dismissed on remand.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct violates no federal right.

Samuels v. Meriwether · filed 1996-08-30

Accordingly, no liability attaches to the City and City employees Garrett and Meriwether are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from § 1983 false imprisonment liability when a reasonable officer could believe probable cause to detain persists despite one witness recanting, given other positive identifications.

Rowe v. Romano · filed 1996-09-23

We therefore find that, as a matter of law, a reasonably well-trained officer could reasonably believe that probable cause existed to detain Rowe in these circumstances. Even after one of three eye-witnesses informed the police that the wrong man was in custody, the statements and positive identifications of Nieves and Toney are a sufficient basis on which an officer could reasonably find the probable cause necessary to detain Rowe. Thus, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields Rivera from liability on Rowe’s false imprisonment claim.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when existing law did not clearly establish that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Ed · filed 1996-09-23

Because we conclude that, on May 1, 1992, the law regarding school searches was not clearly established to the extent that these defendants should have known that their conduct violated constitutionally permissible norms, we need not reach the question of whether Jenkins' and McKenzie's Fourth Amendment rights were, in fact, violated.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could believe that denying an inmate’s photocopying request was lawful.

Canell v. Bradshaw · filed 1996-09-25

For these reasons, a reasonable officer could have believed that denying Appellant's photocopying request was lawful. Accordingly, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages suit cannot be resolved on summary judgment when the record leaves unresolved whether the official acted reasonably or knowingly violated the law.

Waste Management of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Shinn · filed 1996-09-27

Accordingly, it is inappropriate for this court to determine on summary judgment whether Dovey acted reasonably and without committing a knowing violation of the law.

A prison official is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages for enforcing a bulk-mail restriction when a reasonable official could have believed the restriction constitutional under the law then established.

Sheets v. Moore · filed 1996-10-04

In light of the foregoing precedent, we think that an official in defendant’s position could have reasonably concluded that PD-BCF-63.03(N)(8) was constitutional. ... For these reasons, we hold that the district court erred in holding that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 political discharge suit, a disputed employer motive can defeat summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Phillips v. Barbara S. Nielsen, in Both Her Individual and Official Capacities · filed 1996-10-18

On this summary judgment record it is difficult to reconcile the statements Nielsen authorized in her motion with the statements she made in her press release, and we are left with the conclusion that there exists a genuine issue of material fact about Nielsen's motive. ... Nielsen's alternative claim that she is entitled to qualified immunity under Elrod-Branti principles suffers the same defects.

A § 1983 plaintiff who offers no summary judgment evidence to contest an officer’s qualified immunity cannot avoid summary judgment on that ground.

Martin v. Baker · filed 1996-10-21

Martin failed to present any summary judgment evidence to support his allegation that Baker is not entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 claim based on a recklessly false warrant affidavit, qualified immunity turns on whether the affidavit was so materially false that submitting it showed reckless disregard for the truth.

Bagby v. Brondhaver · filed 1996-10-28

This prong of Franks is governed by an objective standard that is quite amenable to qualified immunity review -- whether the warrant affidavit was so materially false that defendant manifested reckless disregard for the truth in submitting it.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 claim when the officer clearly violates the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.

Washington v. Lambert · filed 1996-10-28

Because Lambert clearly violated Washington and Hicks’ Fourth Amendment rights, we affirm both the denial of qualified immunity and the grant of judgment as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer who has qualified immunity because the applicable constitutional law was unsettled at the time of the conduct.

Corbin v. City of Springfield · filed 1996-10-30

To repeat, the defendant Rooke is entitled to qualified immunity from any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the applicable constitutional law was “unsettled” as of the date of the incident.

A Section 1983 complaint against officials who may assert qualified immunity meets the heightened pleading standard when it alleges specific, concrete facts showing their improper purpose.

San Bernardino Public Employees Ass'n v. Stout · filed 1996-11-13

The complaint contains specific and concrete allegations of fact related to defendants’ subjective intent in undertaking the acts complained of, which allege that such conduct was motivated by defendants’ alleged desire to keep plaintiffs Flynn and Carey, as well as other employees under defendants’ control, from disseminating to anyone at all, including the public, the media, and the Board of Supervisors, information related to the operation of the CSD, including information related to certain defendants’ allegedly poor management skills, financial improprieties, and inappropriate sexual conduct at work. Therefore, defendants are not entitled to have plaintiffs’ complaint dismissed on the ground it does not meet the heightened pleading standard.

In a § 1983 excessive-force claim, the Fourth Amendment objective-reasonableness inquiry is the substantive inquiry for qualified immunity.

Britschge v. Harmison · filed 1996-11-14

In excessive force cases, the Fourth Amendment inquiry of objective reasonableness is the same substantive inquiry used for purposes of qualified immunity.

A police officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when sufficiently analogous precedent gave a reasonable officer notice that his conduct violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.

Radecki v. Barela · filed 1996-11-15

The 1988 case of Wood, cited in 1992 by Medina, is sufficiently analogous factually to have placed a reasonable officer in Defendant Barela’s position on notice that his command to Mr. Radecki created a danger for Mr. Radecki and his subsequent abandonment of Mr. Radecki, leaving him at the hands of a dangerous suspect, violated Mr. Radecki’s constitutional rights. ... Defendants are not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against municipal council members in their individual capacities may be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds.

Franklin Building Corp. v. City of Ocean City · filed 1996-11-18

... defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss all claims against the Council members in their individual capacities will nevertheless be granted on the basis of the defendants’ qualified immunity.

Police officers lack qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when established protections for demonstrators put them on notice that unnecessary force is prohibited.

Lamb v. City of Decatur · filed 1996-11-19

The Decatur police do not qualify for immunity. Although there are no cases specifically stating that pepper spraying demonstrators violates the Fourth Amendment, there is enough of a widespread Constitutional and judicial protection of First Amendment demonstrators to put the police on notice that unnecessary force is prohibited.

Qualified immunity shields a judge from § 1983 damages for removing or demoting a court administrator when political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for that position.

McCrea v. Zieba · filed 1996-11-19

Accordingly, the Court holds that Judge Zieba is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to his termination and demotion of Mr. McCrea as the position of Court Administrator for Domestic Relations Court falls within the Branti exception.

Qualified immunity protects public officials from § 1983 liability when their conduct is objectively reasonable under settled law, even if they are mistaken about whether it violates a constitutional right.

Veilleux v. Jeffrey Perschau, Detective for the Manchester Police Department · filed 1996-11-20

Qualified immunity protects public officials from section 1983 civil liability so long as they “acted reasonably under settled law in the circumstances.”

City officials may assert qualified immunity from a suit under § 1983.

Pelkey v. City of Presque Isle · filed 1996-11-21

As city officials, Krysiak and Coffin are entitled to assert qualified immunity from a suit pursuant to section 1983.

In a § 1983 action, officers may appeal a denial of qualified immunity when the appeal presents a legal question about undisputed conduct.

Elliott v. Leavitt · filed 1996-11-26

This appeal is properly before us under Behrens because it does not involve whether "particular conduct occurred," but rather an issue of law -- whether uncontroverted conduct represented the use of exces- sive force.

An officer sued under § 1983 for obtaining a warrant has qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have thought there was probable cause to seek it.

Smith v. Reddy · filed 1996-11-27

When an officer acts pursuant to a warrant, the pertinent question is whether the officer could have reasonably thought there was probable cause to seek the warrant.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to an officer who reasonably, though mistakenly, believes a warrant application establishes probable cause.

1996-11-27 · filed 1996-11-27

Qualified immunity is lost only if "the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable." Malley, 475 U.S. at 344-45, 106 S.Ct. at 1098. In other words, an officer is not denied qualified immunity for making a mistake, as long as that mistake is reasonable under the circumstances.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action cannot be resolved on summary judgment when disputed facts determine whether officers could reasonably believe their conduct was lawful.

Weyant v. Okst · filed 1996-12-03

The matter of whether it was reasonable for the officers to believe their actions met the standards set by those principles depends on whether one believes their version of the facts. That version is sharply disputed, and the matter of the officers’ qualified immunity therefore cannot be resolved as a matter of law.

Section 1983 uses the same constitutional standards that apply in criminal proceedings, although qualified immunity may shield an official from liability.

McMILLIAN v. JOHNSON · filed 1996-12-03

Tate is correct to the extent that he argues that an official will not always be subject to § 1983 liability for violating constitutional rights. But that is because he is protected by qualified immunity, not because constitutional standards vary depending on whether a constitutional violation is alleged in a criminal proceeding or a § 1983 action.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit does not automatically protect public officials whenever the underlying constitutional standard involves a balancing test.

Burnham v. Ianni · filed 1996-12-04

Having said this, we are quick to caution that today's holding by no means suggests that qualified immunity will protect public officials in every instance where the applicable constitutional standard involves a balancing test.

Section 1983 shields officers through qualified immunity when they reasonably believe an unannounced home entry is necessary because someone inside is in imminent peril of bodily harm.

Dickerson ex rel. Stephens v. McClellan · filed 1996-12-09

In sum, we hold that the officers were entitled to summary judgment based upon qualified immunity with regard to the unannounced entry into Dickerson’s residence because of their reasonable belief that someone inside was in imminent peril of bodily harm.

Qualified immunity can bar a § 1983 claim based on an inmate’s exposure to environmental tobacco smoke even if the inmate could otherwise establish a constitutional violation.

Stauch v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections through Taylor · filed 1996-12-09

Our review of the record reveals that, even if Stauch could make out a claim under Helling, the district court properly found that the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity may support dismissal of a § 1983 claim under Rule 12(b)(6) only when the defense is established on the face of the complaint.

Moore v. Jerad D. Gerstein, M.D. · filed 1996-12-12

It follows that, like any affirmative defense, qualified immunity may be upheld on a 12(b)(6) motion only when it is established on the face of the complaint.

In Wisconsin state court, a denial of qualified immunity in a § 1983 action is immediately appealable when it turns on a legal issue and the official timely seeks review.

Arneson v. Jezwinski · filed 1996-12-20

We therefore exercise our superintending power to direct the court of appeals to grant every petition for leave to appeal a circuit court order denying a claim of qualified immunity from a § 1983 action, if the order is based on an issue of law, such as whether the federal right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time the action was taken, and the defendant initiates the appeal within the time specified in Wis. Stat. § 808.04.

Qualified immunity does not necessarily shield a government official from a § 1983 claim when the official’s state of mind is essential to the alleged constitutional violation.

Spaulding v. Newport · filed 1996-12-23

Where, as here, however, a government official's state of mind is an essential component of the alleged constitutional violation, he or she would not necessarily be entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not bar injunctive relief in a § 1983 action.

Davidson v. Boulinger · filed 1996-12-23

Further, the complaint sought not only monetary relief but also injunctive relief, a type of remedy as to which qualified immunity is not available, see, e.g., Allen v. Coughlin, 64 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir.1995).

Section 1983 monetary relief is unavailable against an official entitled to qualified immunity because the illegality of the challenged conduct was unclear at the time.

Coady C.L. Craddick v. Duckworth · filed 1997-05-05

However, plaintiff is not entitled to monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because until Sasnett, the illegality of this regulation under the RFRA was unclear. Therefore, defendant was entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.

Before allowing even limited discovery on a § 1983 claim against an official asserting qualified immunity, a court must find that the pleadings allege facts which, if true, would overcome that defense.

Peters v. Lowrey · filed 1997-05-12

Before even limited discovery begins, however, the district court must find that the plaintiff’s pleadings assert facts which, if true, would overcome the defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity may protect government officials from § 1983 liability even when the plaintiff has shown a genuine issue of material fact.

Walker v. Schwalbe · filed 1997-05-15

Even though Walker has established a genuine issue of material fact, the defendants may be protected from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit alleging a constitutional violation that requires proof of subjective motive or intent, qualified immunity analysis considers the government official’s intent.

Walker v. Schwalbe · filed 1997-05-15

We hold, as every Circuit that has considered this issue has held, that where subjective motive or intent is a critical element of the alleged constitutional violation the intent of the government actor is relevant.

Section 1983 defendants may have qualified immunity when they reasonably believe their conduct is lawful, even if it violated constitutional rights.

Medina v. Miller · filed 1997-05-15

Even if the appellees' conduct had violated appellants' constitutional rights, the jurors were entitled to find that appellees were shielded by qualified immunity because they reasonably believed that they were acting lawfully, and the jury in fact so found.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when preexisting law did not make the unlawfulness of their conduct apparent.

Schenck v. Tana Wood Tom Rolfs Chase Riveland Evonne Edwards D. Potts Russell Al Scamahorn Warneka, Sgt. · filed 1997-05-16

Because the unlawfulness of defendants' conduct in denying Schenck's access to his "soft-cover legal reference material" was not apparent in light of the preexisting law, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield prison officials from a § 1983 claim for failing to independently assess a confidential informant’s reliability at a disciplinary hearing when that duty was clearly established.

Gomez v. Kaplan · filed 1997-05-19

On the basis of the Second Circuit’s decision in Richardson v. Selsky and the timing of that decision, I hold in the case at bar that Kaplan’s failure to make an independent assessment of the reliability of the confidential informant violated Gomez’s constitutional right to due process; and neither Kaplan nor Selsky may invoke the protection of qualified immunity with respect to the violation.

Government officials may raise qualified immunity as an affirmative defense to a Section 1983 claim against them.

Kerr v. Puckett · filed 1997-05-21

Government officials may raise qualified immunity as an affirmative defense to actions brought against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted federal right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Davidson v. Charles J. Scully, Superintendent, and Edward Bollinger, Correction Officer · filed 1997-05-22

For these reasons, and those set forth in Judge Leisure’s cogent opinion, we agree that defendants enjoy qualified immunity because “the right to send sealed mail to government agencies and the ACLU was not clearly established in 1980, when plaintiffs letters were refused exit.”

Section 1983 damages claims against officers for false arrest are subject to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could have believed the arrest lawful in light of clearly established law.

Marchesano v. City of Sacramento, Police Dept. · filed 1997-05-22

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, Officer McClatchy is shielded from a suit for damages for false arrest if a reasonable officer in her position could have believed the arrest to be lawful in light of clearly established law.

Section 1983 qualified immunity for a social worker is assessed objectively; the worker’s subjective belief about exigent circumstances does not control.

Myers v. County of Ventura · filed 1997-05-22

Tillotson's subjective belief as to whether there were, or were not, exigent circumstances does not govern the qualified immunity inquiry.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity when an officer’s conduct did not violate clearly established law at the time of the incident.

Crawford v. Collins · filed 1997-05-23

Because Crawford failed to prove that Davenport caused him any severe injury, as required by the clearly established law at the time of the incident, Davenport is qualifiedly immune from liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 officials receive qualified immunity unless the law was clearly established and a reasonable official could not have believed the conduct lawful.

Somers v. Thurman · filed 1997-05-28

Therefore, an official is denied qualified immunity only if the law was clearly established and a reasonable official could not have believed the conduct was lawful.

Government officials performing discretionary duties have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability unless they violate clearly established rights that a reasonable official would have known.

Powell v. Georgia Department of Human Resources · filed 1997-05-29

In order to strip the appellees of their qualified immunity defense, Powell must demonstrate that the appellees violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

In a § 1983 damages claim against an officer, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of showing that the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Wallace v. City of Shelby · filed 1997-05-30

The ultimate burden remains with the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to the asserted immunity.

Section 1983 defendants with qualified immunity are entitled to dismissal unless the plaintiff shows they violated clearly established law.

Bradley v. Central Naugatuck Valley, No. Cv95-0126436s (May 30, 1997) · filed 1997-05-30

There can be no dispute that the Defendants enjoy qualified immunity with respect to the claims against them as alleged in the fourth count. The Defendants lose that immunity only if the plaintiff can show a violation by the defendants of "clearly established law." If the plaintiff cannot show such a violation, the Defendants are entitled to dismissal.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim at this stage when the alleged conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Pirela v. Village of North Aurora · filed 1997-05-30

Because defendant Quist’s alleged conduct sets out a constitutional violation and because the constitutional standard was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, defendant Quist is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings.

School officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when existing law did not clearly establish that their student search violated the Fourth Amendment.

Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. Talladega City Board of Education · filed 1997-06-02

Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in this case.

For qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim in the Eleventh Circuit, only decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the highest court of the state where the conduct occurred can clearly establish the law.

Jenkins v. Talladega City Board Of Education · filed 1997-06-02

In this circuit, the law can be "clearly established" for qualified immunity purposes only by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the state where the case arose.

Government officials performing discretionary duties are shielded from § 1983 liability by qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.

Powell v. GA Dept./Human Resources · filed 1997-05-29

Accordingly, we hold that the appellees are shielded by qualified immunity, and we affirm as to this claim.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their conduct was reasonable, even if mistaken.

McKinsey v. Vernon · filed 1997-06-05

The respondents’ conduct was reasonable, even if mistaken. Therefore, summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity was appropriate in this case.

A public official acting within his discretionary authority is qualifiedly immune from a § 1983 property claim when the termination did not clearly violate established due process law.

Maxwell v. MAYOR & ALDER. OF SAVANNAH · filed 1997-06-05

It is clear in this case that Gellatly was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when he dismissed Maxwell. ... In this case, Maxwell has not met his burden of showing Gellatly’s actions clearly violated the above due process standards. ... Under these circumstances, Gellatly is immune from Maxwell’s § 1983 property claim.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged facts show they violated rights that were clearly established at the time.

Penilla v. City of Huntington Park · filed 1997-06-06

We affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the officers. Taking all material facts alleged as true, they violated clearly established rights of which a reasonable person should have known.

Section 1983’s qualified immunity defense does not preempt neutral state procedural rules that deny interlocutory appeals from its denial.

Johnson v. Fankell · filed 1997-06-09

We therefore cannot agree with petitioners that § 1983’s recognition of the defense of qualified immunity preempts a State’s consistent application of its neutral procedural rules, even when those rules deny an interlocutory appeal in this context.

In a § 1983 excessive-force suit, a plaintiff opposing an officer’s qualified immunity bears the burden of showing that no reasonable officer could have believed the suspect posed a risk of serious physical injury.

Montoute v. City of Sebring · filed 1997-06-10

To defeat Sergeant Carr's qualified immunity defense, Montoute had the burden of establishing that under the circumstances no reasonable officer could have believed that Montoute posed a risk of serious physical injury to Carr or others. He failed to carry that burden.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when they violate no clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Winburn v. Bologna · filed 1997-06-12

Since Defendants did not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity is available to individual defendants in § 1983 suits, but local governments cannot invoke it.

McCoy v. MacOn Water Authority · filed 1997-06-16

The defense of qualified immunity is available to individual defendants but not to local governments.

Section 1983 claims against officers for conduct connected with an arrest and indictment are subject to qualified immunity.

Maxwell v. Lauderdale County · filed 1997-06-19

We hold that Lauderdale County Chief Deputy Michael Vick and Deputies C.M. Vincent, Joel Walters, and T.R. Vick are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions in connection with Maxwell’s arrest and indictment.

Qualified immunity does not protect arresting officers from a § 1983 claim for denying an arrestee medical care when their conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

Nerren v. Livingston Police · filed 1997-06-20

In sum, whether Nerren's allegations are analyzed under a pretrial detainee's more general right under Bell and Valencia to be free from punishment or his more specific right to medical attention announced in Jones and Hare, Nerren has stated a claim and the Arresting Officers' conduct was objectively unreasonable.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity if, in light of clearly established law, the officer objectively could have believed the conduct was lawful.

Karluk v. Squires · filed 1997-06-20

We must determine whether, in light of clearly established principles governing an officer's conduct, he objectively could have believed his conduct was lawful. ... Accordingly, we conclude that Eastman was entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not shield prison officials with qualified immunity from liability for retaliation against an inmate’s exercise of constitutional rights when that right was clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Sullivan v. Schweikhard · filed 1997-06-24

Because an inmate’s right not to be subject to retaliatory conduct in response to the exercise of his constitutional rights was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violations, qualified immunity cannot shield these officials from § 1983 liability.

An official who personally vouches for the truth of a criminal complaint can claim only qualified immunity from § 1983 liability.

Ireland v. Gary L. Tunis, Richard Thompson, John Meiers, and Richard D. Kuhn · filed 1997-06-26

Nonetheless, when a prosecutor or other official switches from presenting the charging document to vouching personally for the truth of the contents of the document, we believe the protection afforded by absolute immunity must give way to a qualified immunity inquiry.

An officer who seeks a search warrant is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim if a reasonable officer in that position would not have applied for the warrant, even though a magistrate approved it.

Malerba v. San Bernardino County · filed 1997-06-27

However, Price cannot rely on the magistrate's acceptance of his affidavit to give him qualified immunity if a reasonable officer in his position would not have applied for a warrant in the first place.

An official’s reliance on a statute or regulation does not establish qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when evidence shows the official did not comply with it.

MIMICS, Inc. v. Village of Angel Fire · filed 2005-01-03

More importantly, Hasford’s reliance on the statue and regulations does not make his conduct objectively reasonable because there is evidence that Hasford did not comply with the terms of the statute and regulations.

Government officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless the unconstitutionality of their conduct was clearly established when they acted.

Board, Herbert L. v. Farnham, Karl · filed 2005-01-05

Stated differently, even if we conclude that the defendant’s alleged actions were improper to the point of being unconstitutional, the defendant is still entitled to qualified immunity unless the unconstitutionality of the actions was clearly established at the time of their occurrence.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the complaint does not allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Neuburger v. Thompson · filed 2005-01-05

As this is not the case to adopt that rationale, Mr. Neuburger’s complaint does not allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, and therefore the troopers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Public employees sued under § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation may receive qualified immunity when the balance between speech rights and workplace interests is close enough that their mistake about those rights is reasonable.

Sweet v. Tigard-Tualatin School District · filed 2005-01-05

However, precisely because the First Amendment balance is close, the public employee defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim, an officer has qualified immunity if the officer had arguable probable cause and therefore should not have known the arrest violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.

Benigni v. Smith · filed 2005-01-06

An officer making an arrest has qualified immunity unless the officer should have known that the arrest violated plaintiff’s clearly established rights under the Fourth Amendment, which is to say that the issue is whether there was arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Public officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their actions were objectively reasonable under clearly established law at the time.

Bizzarro v. Miranda · filed 2005-01-07

Public officials are entitled to immunity from civil liability "if their actions were objectively reasonable, as evaluated in the context of legal rules that were `clearly established' at the time." Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 132 (2d Cir.2002) (citation omitted).

Public officials defending a Section 1983 claim are entitled to qualified immunity if they could reasonably believe their conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Bizzarro v. Miranda · filed 2005-01-07

Therefore, if plaintiffs’ version of the facts reveals that the officials could reasonably have believed they were not violating plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, the district court should have granted the motion for summary judgment and we will reverse the court’s denial of that motion. A fortiori, if that version of the facts reveals that defendants did not violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights at all, the defendants are entitled to have the case dismissed.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity for an arrest when he had at least arguable probable cause.

Granito v. Tiska · filed 2005-01-07

Nevertheless, Sergeant Tiska had, at a minimum, arguable probable cause to arrest Granito, and is therefore entitled to qualified immunity from Granito’s claims.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when reasonable officers could disagree about whether their use of force during a stop was lawful.

Alexander v. Hodell · filed 2005-01-07

We agree with the district court’s conclusion that, even if the officers violated Alexander’s Fourth Amendment rights by using force sufficient to transform the stop into an arrest without probable cause, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity in a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when disputed facts could show a violation of a clearly established right.

Craighead v. Lee · filed 2005-01-10

Likewise, the record here does not conclusively establish the reasonableness of the officer’s actions. Therefore, the district court correctly held that summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is inappropriate.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim when a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Segal v. Crotty · filed 2005-01-11

At a minimum, on the pleaded and admitted facts, Bello had “arguable probable cause” to arrest plaintiff, because a similarly situated officer “could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed in light of well-established law.” ... An officer is immune to suit under § 1983 unless his judgment “was so flawed that no reasonable officer would have made a similar choice.”

A jail officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the detainee’s alleged facts could show deliberate indifference to a serious risk of assault and the right was clearly established.

Velez, David v. Johnson, Michael · filed 2005-01-13

If these allegations are true, a jury could find that Johnson acted with deliberate indifference. ... Velez has also met the second Saucier requirement that the constitutional right be clearly established. ... Just because Johnson is not immune from suit, however, does not mean that a jury will find him liable for violating Velez’s constitutional rights.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the unlawfulness of the alleged use of deadly force was clear to a reasonable officer.

Bennett v. Murphy · filed 2005-01-14

Because we conclude that the District Court erred in holding that the law regarding the use of deadly force was insufficiently clear as applied to the facts alleged by Bennett, we hold that Murphy is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a false arrest claim when a reasonable officer would not have known that the plaintiffs’ conduct lacked probable cause for arrest.

Demster v. CITY OF LENEXA, KANSAS · filed 2005-01-18

Because it is unclear whether or not Karen and Renee Demster’s actions violated the statute', a reasonable officer would not have known that he or she lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiffs for obstructing .legal process or official duty. The court, therefore, finds that Officers Trevino, Velasquez, Flack and McCor-mack are shielded by qualified immunity, and the court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss count three of plaintiffs’ complaint.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects officers when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Lunini, Joseph A. v. Grayeb, Charles V. · filed 2005-01-18

Accordingly, we must conclude that the equal protection rights alleged to have been violated in the instant case were not clearly established at the time of the incident at the High Street residence.

A prison official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when, on the prisoner’s version of disputed facts, the official’s conduct violated a clearly established right to medical care.

Tatum v. Winslow · filed 2005-01-19

Having thus failed to establish his entitlement to qualified immunity, Winslow’s appeal of summary judgment must fail.

An individual defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim when there was arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Williams v. City of New York · filed 2005-01-21

Alternatively, the District Court found that (1) because there was arguable probable cause to arrest Williams, individual defendant Detective Vivian Potter was entitled to qualified immunity, ... We agree, substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Motley in her thorough Opinion of October 23, 2003.

Defendants in a Section 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Booth v. Pence · filed 2005-01-24

Because Booth fails to show that defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right, defendants are indeed entitled to qualified immunity under the first prong of the two-part inquiry set out by Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).

A DSHS employee has qualified immunity from § 1983 damages unless the employee’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Gausvik v. Abbey · filed 2005-01-25

A DSHS employee cannot be held personally liable for damages under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action unless his conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not shield an officer when clearly established law gave notice that using substantial force without first allowing a suspect to surrender peacefully was unconstitutional.

Thornton v. City of Rapid City · filed 2005-01-26

Because under these circumstances using substantial force without first providing the suspect an opportunity to peacefully surrender is a violation of clearly established law, it was not error for the trial court to deny summary judgment on the claim for civil rights violations.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when facts material to immunity remain disputed.

Brockington v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2005-01-27

Defendant moves for summary judgment as to the remaining Counts based on the federal qualified immunity doctrine and immunity under the Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff has demonstrated that there are disputed issues of material fact that preclude a finding of immunity at this stage in the proceeding. Therefore, summary judgment is denied as to defendant Shakoor in Count I — false arrest and false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, Count II — malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, Count VII — false arrest and false imprisonment under state law, and Count VIII — malicious prosecution under state law.

Qualified immunity may be denied at summary judgment in a Section 1983 action.

Johnson v. Pearson · filed 2005-01-28

Appellants have filed an appeal of the district court’s order denying their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) action. ... Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action requires the court to consider whether the facts, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Burdette v. Butte County · filed 2005-01-28

In ruling on qualified immunity, we must consider whether, “taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, [] the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right” that is clearly established.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their actions did not violate clearly established law.

Prison Legal News v. Lehman · filed 2005-01-31

It also properly granted qualified immunity to the prison officials on this claim because their actions did not violate clearly established law.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Orellana v. Zellar · filed 2005-01-26

The district court did not err in its summary-judgment, qualified-immunity determination that Orellana had not established the violation of a clearly established constitutional right on ... either his denial-of-access-to-the-courts or retaliation claims because he failed to argue or demonstrate that his ability to pursue a “nonfrivolous,” “arguable" legal claim was hindered by the defendants’ actions.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Prison Legal News v. Lehman · filed 2005-02-01

Although the ban violates PLN's First Amendment rights, the prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity because their actions did not violate clearly established law.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to an official when an objectively reasonable official would not necessarily have understood that the conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Whalen v. Massachusetts Trial Court · filed 2005-02-04

In sum, because we believe an objectively reasonable official in the defendants’ position would not necessarily have understood that his action violated the plaintiffs rights, we hold that the district court properly granted qualified immunity to the individual defendants.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Cassidy v. Scoppetta · filed 2005-02-04

Because none of Plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional rights were violated, and, a fortiori, no “clearly established” rights were violated, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from individual liability in this matter.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 failure-to-protect claim when the alleged facts support deliberate indifference to a serious risk of inmate assault and the right was clearly established.

Velez v. Michael Johnson and Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance Corporation · filed 2005-02-11

Just because Johnson is not immune from suit, however, does not mean that a jury will find him liable for violating Velez’s constitutional rights. What it does mean is that Velez has set forth facts that, if accepted as true, support a viable deliberate indifference claim.

Qualified immunity permits summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when no reasonable jury could find the defendant’s actions objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.

Evans v. City of New York · filed 2005-02-11

Furthermore, defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissal of Evans’ due process claim on the grounds of qualified immunity because defendants have shown that “no reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, could conclude that the defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.” Ford v. Moore, 237 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001).

Section 1983 defendants may receive qualified immunity even if they violate a clearly established right, if their conduct was objectively reasonable.

Wallace v. County of Comal · filed 2005-02-14

Even if the government official’s conduct violates a clearly established right, the official is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity if his conduct was objectively reasonable.

In a § 1983 suit, once an official raises qualified immunity at summary judgment, the plaintiff must produce evidence creating a genuine factual dispute about whether the official violated a clearly established right.

Brown v. Pfaff · filed 2005-02-15

After a defendant properly raises qualified immunity in his or her defense at the summary judgment stage, the burden is on the plaintiff to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact whether defendant engaged in conduct alleged to have violated a clearly established right.

Officers facing a § 1983 claim are not entitled to summary judgment on immunity when the record does not establish that they acted in good faith.

Young v. City of Atlanta · filed 1986-04-10

Neither does the record affirmatively establish that Tucker and Ferguson are immune from any liability because they acted in good faith in arresting Plaintiff. ... Summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment § 1983 claim against the officers is therefore inappropriate.

The Harlow qualified-immunity test applies to § 1983 suits against state officials.

Cotton v. Mansour · filed 1986-04-11

The Harlow test for qualified immunity applies to suits against state officials under § 1983.

A § 1983 claim against an officer is barred by qualified immunity when the law at the time did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct violated the Constitution.

Hayenga v. Nampa School District No. 131 · filed 2005-02-17

Hayenga’s § 1983 claim against Weekes is barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity, because “the law at that time did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct would violate the Constitution.” Brosseau v. Haugen, — U.S.-,-, 125 S.Ct. 596, 599, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (per curiam); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (establishing two-pronged test that guides the sequence and substance of our progressive inquiry).

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action is available to individual defendants only when they are sued in their individual capacities.

Everson v. Board of Education · filed 2005-02-18

The defense, however, is not available to individuals who have been sued in their official capacities, so that the individual defendants-appellees are entitled to raise the qualified immunity defense only insofar as they are sued in their individual capacities.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when the facts viewed in the plaintiff’s favor show a violation of a clearly established right.

Craighead v. Lee · filed 2005-02-18

Craighead's right not to be seized by deadly force was clearly established with sufficient specificity to meet the second prong of Saucier. ... Therefore, the district court correctly held that summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is inappropriate.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for constitutional violations by state officials, subject to qualified immunity for officials whose conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Erickson v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections · filed 2005-02-22

The individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiffs § 1983 claim for monetary damages. Their motion for summary judgment as to the § 1983 claim will be granted.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity when no clearly established right was violated.

Woods v. Paradis · filed 2005-02-22

Further, because Plaintiff F. Woods has not produced any evidence to support the conclusion that “no reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed,” Defendant Paradis enjoys qualified immunity as to the § 1983 false arrest claim.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for deprivation of federal rights caused by a person acting under color of state law, subject to defenses such as qualified immunity.

Gausvik v. Abbey · filed 2005-02-23

We also hold that Gausvik's cause of action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails because the decisions to arrest and prosecute him were not made by the DSHS workers but by the police and prosecutor and thus he failed to show proximate cause. Additionally, the DSHS social workers had qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity and official-capacity immunity rules.

Purcell Ex Rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs County, GA · filed 2005-02-24

Mollie Jo Purcell brought this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on behalf of Morgan, her now deceased son. ... We conclude that the district court erred in denying Kight and White qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against government officials may be barred by qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have known the conduct violated a constitutional right.

Roddy v. James Banks · filed 2005-02-25

We also agree with the district court that defendants were nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable prison official would not have known that denying Roddy the Nation books violated the First Amendment.

Section 1983 lets a person sue state actors for violating federal constitutional rights, subject to doctrines such as qualified immunity.

Lunini v. Grayeb · filed 2005-03-04

Under Mitchell and its progeny, we may review the latter determination but not the former since, if the rule of law on which Lunini relies was not clearly established at the time of appellants' alleged misconduct, this Court may grant the police officers qualified immunity and dispose of Lunini's equal protection claims without "resolv[ing] any factual disagreements."

Section 1983 claims against government officials are barred by qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Mcvay v. Sisters Of Mercy Health System · filed 2005-03-04

We hold, taking the facts alleged in the light most favorable to McVay, that there was no constitutional violation. ... Because we find that the facts alleged, viewed in the light most favorable to McVay, do not establish a constitutional violation, we need not proceed with the remainder of the qualified immunity analysis. The district court's grant of summary judgment to Sears was proper. ... Since we have found that Sears' actions were not unconstitutional, McVay cannot make a prima facie case against the City under section 1983. Thus, the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City was proper.

Section 1983 permits claims against officers subject to qualified immunity, which is decided through a two-step analysis.

Moreno v. Baca · filed 2005-03-07

The determination of whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity involves a two-step analysis. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).

Section 1983 allows a person to bring a civil action against a state actor who, under color of state law, deprives the person of constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Moreno v. Baca · filed 2005-03-07

Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriffs Sean Banks and Thomas Garcia (“Appellants”) appeal from the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity in a § 1983 action brought by plaintiff Richard Moreno. Moreno alleges that Appellants, acting under color of state law, deprived him of his constitutional rights when they arrested and searched him without cause. We affirm.

Qualified immunity may be denied at the pleading stage of a § 1983 action even though later factual development may support the defense.

Velez v. Levy · filed 2005-03-11

Though Levy is not, as a matter of law, entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings, a factual basis for qualified immunity may arise as the proceedings develop.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the alleged facts show that the official violated clearly established rights.

Velez v. Levy · filed 2005-03-11

That leaves us only with Chancellor Levy’s claim of qualified immunity with regard to his asserted violations of the plaintiffs First Amendment and “stigma-plus” procedural due process rights. We conclude that qualified immunity does not, at this time, shield him from these causes of action.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would not have known that the specific conduct was prohibited.

Demster v. City of Lenexa, Kan. · filed 2005-03-16

Because defendants did not have reason to know that the specific act of arresting plaintiffs was prohibited under the circumstances, defendants are shielded by qualified immunity, and the court properly dismissed this claim.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from a § 1983 procedural due process claim when reasonable officials would know that their conduct violates a clearly established right.

Keefer v. Durkos · filed 2005-03-17

Therefore, the Plaintiff possessed a clearly established right to procedural due process in her termination by virtue of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law. Qualified immunity is denied as to Count II.

Qualified immunity protects a defendant from liability under Section 1983 unless the defendant violated a clearly established constitutional right that a reasonable official would have known.

Blair v. City of Evansville, Ind. · filed 2005-03-17

The defense of qualified immunity protects an individual defendant from liability under § 1983 unless his conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable government official in his position would have known. ... For this reason, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on their qualified immunity defense to Blaú’s Fust Amendment claim is GRANTED.

Qualified immunity protects officials from a § 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Calef v. Budden · filed 2005-03-18

For the same reasons, even if Calef could establish a violation of the First Amendment via § 1983, Defendants Batchelder and Bud-den are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

A denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 action is reviewed de novo on appeal.

Leaf, Larry J. v. Shelnutt, Ronald · filed 2005-03-18

This court reviews de novo a district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

In a § 1983 qualified immunity appeal, the court accepts the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and decides whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Greenlee v. Allread · filed 2005-03-10

We have jurisdiction to determine, as a matter of law, whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, after accepting all of the plaintiff’s factual ... allegations as true, by determining whether those facts show, inter alia, that the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law at the time of the conduct.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against an official for violating a right that was not established law.

Crowley, Daniel v. McKinney, Donald · filed 2005-03-11

As should be apparent from our discussion, the existence of the right that Crowley asserts is not established law, and McKinney is therefore immune from having to pay damages for violating that right.

Section 1983 affords an officer immunity from damages only when the officer reasonably believes the conduct complies with constitutional requirements.

Robert Bevier and Annette Bevier v. Hucal · filed 1986-11-18

Law enforcement officers are entitled to immunity from damages if their actions are taken with a reasonable belief that they comport with constitutional requirements. ... For those reasons, we conclude that Hucal is not entitled to good faith immunity.

Qualified immunity shields officials from § 1983 damages when they could not reasonably have known their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Matney v. City of North Adams · filed 2005-03-21

Here, the defendants could not have reasonably known that their actions violated plaintiffs constitutional right to the use and enjoyment of his land. No authority would have alerted them to the possibility of such a violation on their part.

When an officer sued under § 1983 was performing a discretionary function, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that qualified immunity is inappropriate.

Burdeshaw v. Snell · filed 2005-03-25

Burdeshaw does not dispute the fact that Snell was performing a discretionary function, therefore the burden is on Burdeshaw to demonstrate that Snell is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to allege facts showing a violation of constitutional rights.

Rutland v. Pepper · filed 2005-03-28

Because Rutland has not alleged facts showing that Pepper violated her constitutional rights, Pepper is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Rutland’s § 1983 claims.

A crime lab technician cannot claim qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit based on uncertainty about a duty to disclose evidence directly to the defense when the alleged breach is failure to disclose it to prosecutors.

Charles v. City of Boston · filed 2005-03-29

Bogdan’s related qualified immunity argument must also fail because it turns on the absence of a clearly established duty for him to disclose directly to a defendant, which is not the constitutional breach that Charles is alleging. Bogdan’s duty to disclose Brady information to the prosecutor was clearly established at the time of his investigation into the 1980 rapes (not to mention his duty — unquestionably well-established — to testify truthfully on the stand).

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect an official who would reasonably know that initiating criminal investigations in retaliation for protected speech violates a clearly established right.

Heller v. Fulare · filed 2005-03-30

More specifically, accepting the Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, a reasonable person in the Defendant’s position would have known that retaliation by means of initiating criminal investigations against the Plaintiffs for the exercise of their rights to free speech in the reporting of Chiefs Moss and Valle would be a violation of the First Amendment. Therefore, on this issue, qualified immunity is denied.

Section 1983 does not shield a prison physician with qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage when the alleged facts show that a reasonable physician would have known that withholding recommended treatment for excruciating pain violated the prisoner’s rights.

Carter v. Fagin · filed 2005-03-31

I am hard pressed to imagine that there exists a reasonable physician who would not have known that it would violate plaintiffs well settled Eighth Amendment rights to leave him without any treatment, in excruciating pain, in the face of medical recommendations for a therapy that would alleviate the pain.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects officers from liability for violating an asserted right to refuse identification during a lawful investigative stop when that right was not clearly established at the time.

Marrs v. Tuckey · filed 2005-03-31

Within days after Plaintiff was arrested, the Sixth Circuit held that any such right was not “clearly established” for purposes of a court’s qualified immunity analysis. As a result, Defendants here are entitled to qualified immunity against any possible liability arising from their abridgment of Plaintiffs purported right to refuse a request for identification during the course of Defendants’ limited investigative detention of her.

A government official has qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Willson v. Buss · filed 2005-03-31

Even if the rule in this case were unconstitutional, Buss would be protected by qualified immunity because the right at issue here is not clearly established.

A grand jury indictment supplies a presumption of probable cause that can support qualified immunity from a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim when the plaintiff does not rebut it.

Matheis v. Fritton · filed 2005-03-31

Regardless of how the district court answers these questions, we find that Fritton is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to that part of Matheis’s section 1983 claim based on his prosecution for possession of a gambling device. Because Matheis did not allege that Fritton lied during his grand jury testimony concerning the gambling device, the presumption of probable cause to prosecute raised by the grand jury indictment was not rebutted by Matheis.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Beard v. Whitmore Lake School District · filed 2005-04-04

The law, at the time the searches were conducted, did not clearly establish that the searches were unreasonable under the particular circumstances present in this case. Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers may be denied qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their unreasonable execution of a search warrant violated clearly established law.

San Jose Charter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose · filed 2005-04-04

We affirm the district court’s order denying the SJPOs and Linderman qualified immunity. We hold that Linderman’s instruction to seize “truckloads” of personal property, including numerous motorcycles and a piece of concrete, for the sole purpose of proving that the Hells Angels was a gang was an unreasonable execution of the search warrants in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We further hold that at the time the searches were carried out the law was sufficiently clear to put a reasonable officer on fair notice that this conduct was unlawful.

Section 1983 defendants may receive qualified immunity when they reasonably rely on a licensed veterinarian’s opinion while executing a warrant.

McClendon v. Story County Sheriff's Office · filed 2005-04-04

We will not bar McCaskey and Rogers from the benefits of qualified immunity because they followed the law of their jurisdiction and obtained a veterinarian’s opinion, as any reasonable Animal Control Officer would.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action based on a facially valid arrest warrant when the complaint alleges they obtained it unlawfully.

Henshaw v. Daugherty · filed 2005-04-04

Thus, even if the warrant appeared valid on its face, it would not entitle the officers to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, an individual defendant is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows both a violation of a constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established.

Moore v. Hernandez · filed 2005-04-05

First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant “violated a constitutional or statutory right.” Id. (quotation omitted). Second, he must show “that the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s unlawful conduct.” Id. at 1156. If the plaintiff cannot make both showings, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. ... We find no reversible error relative to Mr. Moore’s constructive-discharge and qualified-immunity challenges.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim cannot be granted on summary judgment when material factual disputes prevent the court from assessing the defense.

Rivera v. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority · filed 2005-04-05

Therefore, due to the factual disputes regarding a possible political discriminatory motivation and the circumstances surrounding Defendants’ decision to assign or reassign the particular duties and working conditions which Plaintiff had at the PREPA, all of which are vital to this case as a whole and the Court’s assessment of the qualified immunity defense in particular, the Court is not in a position to grant Defendants’ motion for qualified immunity at this time.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the alleged facts fail to show that they disregarded a known risk.

Crow v. Montgomery · filed 2005-04-12

However, we reverse the district court's denial of qualified immunity because, as a matter of law, the facts alleged by Crow do not establish that the FCDC officials disregarded any known risk alleged by Crow.

An official sued under Section 1983 has qualified immunity unless the right was clearly established and a reasonable official would have known the conduct violated it.

Wagner v. City of Holyoke · filed 2005-04-13

Such immunity can be overcome only if the constitutional right at issue is clearly established and a reasonable official would have known that his actions violated that right.