42 U.S.C. § 1983

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when the alleged conduct does not violate a constitutional right.

Medical Society of New Jersey v. Herr · filed 2002-03-21

Based on the discussion in the preceding section, it is apparent that the alleged policy of Mr. Herr does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Thus, defendant Herr is entitled to qualified immunity from Count II of the Complaint.

An officer who obtains a warrant is immune from a § 1983 illegal search and seizure claim unless the warrant application so lacks indications of probable cause that believing probable cause existed was unreasonable.

McNutt v. Furches · filed 2002-03-21

Police officers are insulated from a § 1983 action for illegal search and seizure if a warrant has been obtained, unless the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that official belief in the existence of probable cause is unreasonable.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action may be denied on a motion to dismiss when the complaint’s allegations overcome the defense.

St. George v. Pinellas County · filed 2002-03-21

We conclude that Mitchell, in his individual and official capacity, is not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity at this stage of the case.

Officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when a jury could find that they relied on an uncorroborated tip understood to be anonymous and a reasonable officer should have known it did not justify an arrest.

Marinis v. Village of Irvington · filed 2002-03-22

Even assuming the accuracy of defendants’ transcript, the record in this case would permit a reasonable jury to find that that is exactly what occurred here: that even though the informant in fact mentioned her name at one point, the officer didn’t catch it, the informant knew that he didn’t, and both agreed that the informant would not have to repeat it. On those facts, the case could not meaningfully be distinguished from J.L.: the tip would have to be treated as fully anonymous, probable cause was therefore lacking, and a reasonable officer should have known that there was insufficient evidence to arrest Marinis. Accordingly, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false-arrest claim when the officer had arguable probable cause.

Anthony Coons, Sr. v. Casabella · filed 2002-03-25

Because Casabella had arguable probable cause and thus was entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, we need not reach his claim that he had actual probable cause to issue the appearance ticket.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim should be addressed early; the court may allow discovery on that defense before dispositive motions.

Raimondo v. Village of Armada · filed 2002-03-26

Because there are numerous Defendants in this case, the qualified immunity defense in a Section 1983 claim should be addressed first. ... However, because not all Defendants are related to governmental entities, the Court will issue a Scheduling Order as to discovery for all parties. The parties raising qualified immunity may file dispositive motions based on that defense at the first instance after they have taken discovery on the qualified immunity defense.

Individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 due process claim when the plaintiff fails to present a cognizable due process violation against them.

Munafo v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2002-03-26

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court should have granted the individual appellants’ motions to dismiss the due process claims on qualified immunity grounds because Munafo failed to present a cognizable claim against those defendants for violation of due process.

Officials who commit no constitutional violation are protected by qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims.

Jim v. County of Hawaii · filed 2002-03-26

Because Defendants committed no constitutional violation, they are protected by qualified immunity.

Individual defendants may obtain qualified immunity from a Section 1983 due process claim when the plaintiff fails to show a cognizable due process violation.

Docket No. 01-7161 · filed 2002-03-26

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court should have granted the individual appellants' motions to dismiss the due process claims on qualified immunity grounds because Munafo failed to present a cognizable claim against those defendants for violation of due process.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when it was objectively reasonable to believe her actions did not violate clearly established constitutional law.

Sacay v. Research Foundation of the City University of New York · filed 2002-03-27

It was objectively reasonable for Pérsico to believe that her actions did not violate clearly established constitutional law.

Defendants in a § 1983 suit are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish the violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Nelson v. Stalder · filed 2002-03-29

Nelson has failed to establish the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, and, therefore, the defendants are entitled to the qualified-immunity defense.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when a genuine factual dispute remains about whether they violated clearly established rights.

Hager v. Pike County Board of Education · filed 2002-03-29

There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants have violated plaintiffs clearly established rights in this matter. Therefore, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment is inappropriate.

Section 1983 officers are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established, even if the court does not decide whether a violation occurred.

Koch v. Town of Brattleboro, Vermont, Sherwood D. Lake, Jr., and John Doe, Unidentified Brattleboro Police O · filed 2002-03-29

Therefore, Koch cannot point to a “clearly established right” that was violated. As such, we find it unnecessary to decide, as the district court did, whether the officers violated Koch’s Fourth Amendment rights. Instead, we explain both arguments only to show the ambiguity in the law and affirm the grant of summary judgment because the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity for defendants sued individually does not dispose of a § 1983 suit seeking injunctive relief against them in their official capacities.

Fenner v. Suthers · filed 2002-04-02

Initially, I note that plaintiffs complaint here seeks injunctive relief and is thus readily construed as a suit against defendants in their official capacities. ... Thus, even if defendants, in their individual capacities, were entitled to qualified immunity, that would not justify dismissal of the entire lawsuit.

A § 1983 plaintiff must raise a genuine factual issue that an official should have known the conduct violated a clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity.

Omni Behavioral v. Miller · filed 2002-04-02

Even if a constitutional violation has been established, Omni also fails the final obstacle to overcoming a motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Omni must raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether Miller should have known that his conduct violated plaintiff's clearly established rights. Habiger, 80 F.3d at 295.

A government official performing discretionary functions is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim unless the official violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Baca v. Bennett · filed 2002-04-03

Appellant Stephen Baca challenges the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to appellee Thomas Bennett on grounds of qualified immunity. We affirm. ... “[G]overnment officials will not be liable for their conduct when performing discretionary functions unless their conduct violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Bruning v. Pixler, 949 F.2d 352, 356 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

Individual defendants in a § 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when the claimed constitutional liberty interest does not exist.

Kitchen v. Upshaw · filed 2002-04-09

That being true, the order of the district court grant- ing qualified immunity to the individual defendants as individuals is likewise correct.

State employees sued for damages in their individual capacities under § 1983 may be entitled to qualified immunity.

Hamilton v. Gary T. Myers, Executive Director of the Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency · filed 2002-04-10

For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the defendant-appellee employees of the TWRA sued in their individual capacities under the doctrine of qualified immunity, but REVERSE the district court’s holdings that the plaintiffs-appellants’ claims against the defendants sued in their official capacities were barred under Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, and that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs-appellants had constitutionally protected property interests in Reelfoot Lake or its submerged lands.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law would make the alleged conduct’s unlawfulness clear to a reasonable officer.

Glenn W. Phelps, Jr. v. Robert M. Coy, Jr., Christin Stutes · filed 2002-04-10

We conclude that it was clearly established in 1997 that Phelps enjoyed the protection of the Fourth Amendment during the incident. ... No reasonable officer could have thought the alleged actions were lawful.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their interpretation of warrant restrictions was objectively reasonable and no relevant facts are disputed.

Hall v. Tudbury · filed 2002-04-19

Thus, because the officers’ interpretation of the warrants was objectively reasonable, and no disputed factual issues exist, the officers are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields a public official from a § 1983 suit when the official’s conduct violates no clearly established constitutional or statutory right.

Wolf v. Winlock · filed 2002-04-23

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity, and thus shielded from suit under § 1983, for his actions if his conduct does not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable official would have known.

Qualified immunity may be denied at summary judgment in a § 1983 claim when key facts about the officers’ conduct and circumstances remain disputed.

Threlkeld v. White Castle Systems, Inc. · filed 2002-04-24

Where “[k]ey facts [and circumstances] are unknown and disputed,” denial of summary judgment on the question of qualified immunity is proper.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for entering a paying guest’s motel room on a clerk’s consent when a reasonable officer would know the guest’s right was clearly established.

Finsel v. Hartshorn · filed 2002-04-25

This court concludes that a reasonable police officer would have known that Plaintiff had a clearly established right to be free from a search of his motel room based upon the consent of a motel clerk or manager. This court further concludes that a reasonable police officer would not have believed that the circumstances of this case warranted an unconsented entry into Plaintiffs motel room. ... Accordingly, this court concludes that Cruppenink is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can bar individual-capacity damages under § 1983 on a claim that state conduct was preempted by the NLRA.

New England Health Care Employees Union, District 1199 v. Rowland · filed 2002-05-07

Therefore, the court concludes that Rowland is entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity as to any damages arising out of District 1199’s preemption claim based on the use of Medicaid funds.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim at summary judgment when disputed facts prevent the court from finding the officer’s conduct objectively reasonable.

Shevlin v. Cheatham · filed 2002-05-07

Defendant Officer Cheatham claims that he is entitled to qualified immunity from Mr. Shevlin’s claim, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the Defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights by effectuating an arrest without probable cause. ... The key facts upon which the reasonableness determination turns, therefore, remain in dispute. Thus, a grant of qualified immunity would be improper.

An officer lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when any reasonable officer would have known that the use of deadly force was excessive under the facts assumed for summary judgment.

Lewis v. Boucher · filed 2002-05-09

On these facts any reasonable officer would have known that the use of deadly force was excessive. Accordingly, we conclude that to the extent we have jurisdiction over this appeal, the district court’s order denying Boucher’s summary judgment motion on grounds of qualified immunity must be affirmed.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Pike v. Osborne · filed 2002-05-09

Because the law in this area was not clearly established at the time the plaintiffs were not reappointed, Sheriff Osborne is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from damages when the asserted right was not sufficiently clear for a reasonable official to understand that the conduct violated it.

Murphy v. Carroll · filed 2002-05-10

The right was not sufficiently clear that a reasonable prison official would understand that a policy such as that implemented by Maryland violated that right. ... Consequently, I find that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Individual officials sued under § 1983 for retaliation over employee speech are not entitled to qualified immunity when the speech concerns a matter of public concern and the Pickering balance favors the employee.

Weast v. Pierce County · filed 2002-05-13

Weast has shown that (1) his speech involved a matter of public concern and (2) the Pickering balancing test weighs in his favor. We affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment on defendants’ qualified immunity claim.

Qualified immunity protects a police officer from a § 1983 claim when the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Elkins v. McKenzie · filed 2002-05-13

This Court finds that the trial court erred by denying Elkins summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity pursuant to the § 1983 claim. Elkins's actions were objectively reasonable under the facts of this case.

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 claim against a government official when the plaintiff has not shown that the official violated a clearly established right.

Ande v. Rock · filed 2002-05-16

Qualified immunity may preclude claims against a government official for the performance of discretionary functions if the official's conduct does not violate a clearly established federal statutory or constitutional right. ... Therefore, we conclude that qualified immunity bars all their federal claims.

Qualified immunity protects an official from a § 1983 suit when the law governing the official’s conduct was not clearly established.

Humphrey v. Lane County · filed 2002-05-16

If it was not clearly established, the official is entitled to immunity from suit.

Section 1983 officials are entitled to qualified immunity from damages when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Sorrels v. Ronald McKee David Buss Cly Evans Archie Grant Loreli, Cruthers Kay Walter Jim Blodgett Joseph Lehman · filed 2002-05-17

In sum, we conclude that defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Sorrels’s First Amendment claim. There is no published caselaw on point, and the policy was not so far-fetched that its illegality was necessarily obvious to a reasonable prison official.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would not have known the conduct violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Omni Behavioral Health v. Miller · filed 2002-05-21

In sum, we can find no authority that allows us to conclude that a reasonable officer would have known he was violating Omni's constitutional rights by conducting an extensive child abuse investigation at the Woodlawn facility.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from liability under Section 1983 when the asserted right was not clearly established such that a reasonable officer would understand the conduct violated it.

Grix v. Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation Commission · filed 2002-05-22

Since the contours of appellant’s right to use the large cast nets had not been clearly established so that a reasonable officer would understand that what he or she is doing violated that right, the officer could not be held liable under section 1983. Therefore, the officer was protected by qualified immunity.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when a clearly established right is alleged and factual disputes remain about whether reasonable officers would have known their conduct violated it.

Smith v. Heimer · filed 2002-05-23

Further, we believe that Mr. Smith alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether reasonable officials would have known that the alleged actions indeed violated that right.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 wrongful-arrest claim when a reasonable officer would not have known the arrest violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Jaramillo v. Curry · filed 2002-05-23

The Jaramillos bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from wrongful arrest. We affirm the district court’s denial of the Jaramillos’ motion for summary judgment and grant of summary judgment to defendants Curry and the City of Hanford because Curry is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct is objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Harris v. Mississippi Valley State University · filed 2002-05-23

The defendant's acts are held to be objectively reasonable unless all reasonable officials in the defendant's circumstances would have known that their conduct violated the United States Constitution or the federal statute as alleged by the plaintiff. ... The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because Harris' termination was reasonable.

Public officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law did not make their alleged conduct apparently unlawful.

Fannon v. Shewell · filed 2002-05-28

Based on our review of the parties’ briefing of this appeal and on our research of these issues, we conclude that Fannon has not identified any binding precedent from the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit, the district court, or case law from other circuits that is directly on point, that demonstrate the apparent unlawfulness of Shewell’s alleged conduct.

Section 1983 provides qualified immunity against a false arrest claim when reasonable officers could disagree about whether probable cause existed.

Micalizzi v. Ciamarra · filed 2002-05-29

At the very least, reasonable officers could have differed on the question, which provides Detective Suarez with the shelter of qualified immunity on the Federal false arrest claim.

A § 1983 defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity for conditioning a public employee’s job on contributions to an ideological cause when the prohibition was clearly established.

Acevedo-Delgado v. Rivera · filed 2002-06-04

The bar against coerced contributions to ideological activities was well established at the time of the acts in question, and appellant is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 retaliation claim, qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment when the plaintiff offers particularized circumstantial evidence of an improper motive.

Aquavia v. Goggin · filed 2002-06-05

This is sufficient “particularized evidence of ... circumstantial facts ... supporting the claim of an improper motive,” Blue, 72 F.3d at 1084, and summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is thus inappropriate.

Government officials have qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability when the constitutional violation would not have been clear to a reasonably diligent official.

Redwood v. Lierman · filed 2002-06-07

We hold, however, that the individual defendants have qualified immunity for their violation of the fourteenth amendment. To understand the necessity for another hearing, the governmental official would have had to perform a factual analysis and to apply his judgment or discretion to those facts. The due process violation would not necessarily have been clear to a reasonably diligent official.

Section 1983 officers are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when disputed facts prevent a determination that their actions or beliefs were reasonable.

City of Des Moines v. Wilson · filed 2002-06-07

The current record does not conclusively establish the reasonableness of the officers’ actions or beliefs. Therefore, we agree with the District Court that summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is inappropriate.

In a § 1983 excessive-force suit, qualified immunity must be evaluated for each officer using all admissible evidence relevant to that officer.

Wilson v. City Of Des Moines · filed 2002-06-07

All of the facts in the summary-judgment record that will be admissible at trial need to be considered with respect to each officer's claim of qualified immunity. This does not mean, however, as appellants seem to think, that in considering the position of Officer Mitchell, for example, only his version of events is to be looked to.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Milstein v. Cooley · filed 2002-06-12

Qualified immunity, however, shields § 1983 defendants “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court grants the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can shield an officer from damages in a § 1983 action.

Jones v. Robinson · filed 2002-06-17

Moreover, the district court correctly concluded that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from suit for damages in any event.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when prison medical staff allegedly withheld prescribed pain medication in violation of a clearly established right.

Walker, John v. Benjamin, Ivy · filed 2002-06-18

Nor are the defendants entitled to a finding of qualified immunity on this claim.

Qualified immunity does not shield prison medical staff from a Section 1983 claim for deliberately refusing prescribed pain medication when the unlawfulness of that conduct was clearly established.

Walker v. Dr. Ivy Benjamin, Dr. Adrian Feinerman, Dr. Ansar Ansari, Dr. Virgilio Pilapil, Pamela Dunbar and Vickie · filed 2002-06-18

Nor are the defendants entitled to a finding of qualified immunity on this claim. The general standard for liability under the Eighth Amendment for refusal to treat a serious medical condition was well-established at the time of these events.

Qualified immunity protects defendants from a Section 1983 claim when their alleged conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Spittal v. Browne · filed 2002-06-19

The district court properly determined that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the conduct alleged does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

In a § 1983 qualified immunity analysis, the court first decides whether the officer violated a constitutional right.

Billington v. Smith · filed 2002-06-21

Thus we will not assume without deciding that Detective Smith violated Hennessey's constitutional rights and move on to the qualified immunity question. Instead, we will first decide whether Detective Smith did in fact violate Hennessey's rights.

Section 1983 does not shield individual officials through qualified immunity from a retaliation claim when the right to testify truthfully was clearly established.

Catletti v. County of Orange · filed 2002-06-24

To the extent the individual defendants seek dismissal based on qualified immunity that branch of the motion is also denied. The right to testify was clearly established as long ago as 1920, and the Benedict decision was widely reported in Orange County prior to the actions taken.

Qualified immunity may be denied in a § 1983 action when material factual disputes bear on the defense.

El Ranchito, Inc. v. City of Harvey · filed 2002-06-26

I also Deny the defendant’s claim to qualified immunity on those counts as depending in part on material issues of fact.

Section 1983 does not grant prison officials qualified immunity from a failure-to-protect claim if they acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of inmate harm.

Williams-El v. McLemore · filed 2002-06-27

In the Eighth Amendment failure to protect context, to the extent -that Plaintiff can demonstrate that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm, those Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a Section 1983 illegal-arrest claim when clearly established law would have shown a reasonable officer that the arrest lacked probable cause.

Sorrell v. McGuigan · filed 2002-06-28

Because the legality of Sorrell’s penknife was clearly estab- lished, Sergeant McGuigan was not in a gray area. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying him qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 claim when the officer’s mistaken belief that an arrest was lawful was unreasonable.

Resek v. City of Huntington Beach · filed 2002-07-01

We conclude that it was not, and thus that Wersching is not protected by qualified immunity. No officer would reasonably believe that a person could lawfully be arrested for shouting criticism at the police and answering police questions with sarcasm.

In a § 1983 suit, qualified immunity can shield an officer who reasonably relies on a trusted fellow officer’s report when entering a home without a warrant.

Smith v. Stone · filed 2002-07-09

We now reverse in part. The facts material to Kynard’s claim of qualified immunity with respect to the warrantless search are (1) the identity of the officer who stated that an armed suspect had entered the plaintiffs’ residence and (2) the reliability of that officer as known to Kynard at the time of the search. ... These undisputed facts support the reasonableness of Kynard’s reliance on Lyles’s information and her belief that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of the plaintiffs’ residence.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment in a § 1983 suit when a rational factfinder could find the officials’ conduct objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.

Searles v. Van Bebber · filed 1998-01-07

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a rational factfinder could find that defendants’ conduct was not objectively reasonable. ... Summary judgment is therefore inappropriate.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim when an officer could reasonably believe a limited search during a reported domestic dispute was lawful.

Maureen Tierney, for Herself and as Mother of Philip T. Newton, Patrick J. Newton v. Joel R. Davidson Thomas E. Williams · filed 1998-01-07

It was objectively reasonable for Davidson to believe that a limited search of the premises to locate the other person involved in the dispute was necessary to ensure the safety of the people on the premises (including Tier-ney’s two young children), and therefore lawful under the circumstances. Accordingly, Davidson is immune from suit for his continued presence in, and search of, the premises.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted procedural due process right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Henry E. Parrish Yvonne L. Parrish v. Donald Mallinger Richard Larkin Crispus Nix · filed 1998-01-07

In our view, the subsequent actions of the Iowa Supreme Court and the Iowa Legislature to clarify state law, and our subsequent decision in Mahers v. Halford, make it clear that the extent to which Parrish was entitled to predeprivation notice and hearing was far from clearly established in April 1991. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Nix and Mallinger are entitled to qualified immunity from Henry Parrish’s damage claims.

A § 1983 plaintiff facing a qualified immunity defense must plead the claim with factual detail and particularity.

Sloan v. Sharp · filed 1998-01-08

The record cites that Sloan refers to do not show that Wiley’s qualified immunity defense was denied, and thus he has not waived his defense. Therefore, under Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir.1995), Sloan has not pled her claim with factual detail and particularity.

Government officials are protected from § 1983 damages by qualified immunity if their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which reasonable persons would have known.

Smith v. Spain · filed 1998-01-08

In line with Anderson, supra, in Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir.1991) we held that the doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which reasonable persons would have known. Our study of the record leads us to conclude that the facts and circumstances of the case support the district court's conclusion that Spain was entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action may raise qualified immunity by answer, motion to dismiss, or motion for summary judgment.

Smith v. Spain · filed 1998-01-08

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense and a defendant may raise it by a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment or by answer.

A public official has qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the official’s conduct does not violate clearly established law.

Thornton v. City of Macon · filed 1998-01-13

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages action if his actions did not violate clearly established law.

In a Section 1983 excessive force claim, officers may receive qualified immunity on summary judgment if a reasonable officer could have believed the force was lawful on the plaintiff’s version of the facts.

Ekanem v. City of Chino · filed 1998-01-15

In the context of an excessive force claim, defendants can win on summary judgment if the court, after resolving all facts in favor of the plaintiff, concludes that a reasonable officer could have believed his use of force was reasonable. ... Therefore, the court properly denied summary judgment and the cross-appeal is without merit.

In a § 1983 action, a court may defer discovery while it decides qualified immunity at summary judgment.

Cartwright v. Carl Sparks Harris Sullivan Cook Isaac Sgt. Sneed Henderson, Detention Officer · filed 1998-01-15

However, since the summary judgment concerned the threshold issue of immunity, the district court appropriately determined that discovery should not proceed.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for an official who reasonably could believe her conduct lawful under clearly established law and the facts known to her.

Aitken v. Reed · filed 1998-01-16

We hold that measured against the standard of what was “clearly established law” and the circumstances known to Reed, a reasonable official in her position could have believed she was acting lawfully towards Aitken. She is, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity on Aitken’s due process claim.

For conduct in January 1990, a police officer had qualified immunity from a § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim based only on psychological harm because the asserted right was not clearly established.

Petta ex rel. Petta v. Rivera · filed 1998-01-16

We must therefore hold that in January, 1990, the Petta children had no “clearly established” constitutional right under the due process clause to be free from a police officer’s use of excessive force where the only injuries allegedly suffered were psychological. We therefore find that the district court erred in denying Officer Rivera’s motion for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity.

Prison officials may obtain summary judgment on a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim when they could reasonably believe their conduct complied with the Eighth Amendment.

Jirovec v. Tana Wood, Hal Snively, Larry Sutton, James Blodgett · filed 1998-01-16

Because prison officials could reasonably have believed that their conduct was within the parameters of the Eighth Amendment, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment for defendants.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim when the evidence could let a jury find that officers unreasonably believed probable cause existed.

Hansel v. Sheridan · filed 1998-01-20

That same evidence could lead to the conclusion that it was objectively unreasonable for the troopers to believe that probable cause was present. Because factual issues exist as to defendants entitlement to qualified immunity, summary judgment is denied in this respect.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their individual capacities have qualified immunity when a reasonable official could regard their conduct as lawful, even if the plaintiff alleges a violation of a clearly established right.

Bessman v. Powell · filed 1998-01-20

Thus, even if the clearly established law protects Plaintiffs speech as he alleges, a reasonable person could not possibly believe Defendants were violating the law by taking action.

Qualified immunity shields a state actor from personal liability under § 1983 when the actor’s conduct is objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.

Rogers v. Carter · filed 1998-01-20

The qualified immunity doctrine shields state actors from personal liability where their actions, though unlawful, are nevertheless objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time of the events in question. ... Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in concluding, in the alternative, that Bobby Carter and the City are entitled to qualified immunity on David Rogers’ Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claim.

A defendant may have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for denial of an amended site plan.

Reed's of Armonk Building Supply, Inc. v. Curry · filed 1998-01-20

Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, the defendant enjoys qualified immunity (see, Natale v Town of Ridgefield, 927 F2d 101, 104).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer for malicious prosecution when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the officer’s conduct.

Osborne v. Rose · filed 1998-01-20

However, Rose is entitled to qualified immunity on the Osbornes' malicious prosecution claims because a constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution was not clearly established in November 1994.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim when he reasonably believes he has arguable probable cause to arrest.

Ortega v. Reyna · filed 1998-01-22

Therefore, the trooper had arguable probable cause to arrest appellant under NRS 484.793. Accordingly, we conclude that the trooper is entitled to qualified immunity, and that the district court properly entered summary judgment in his favor with respect to this claim.

Qualified immunity does not shield defendants from a § 1983 political discharge claim on the ground that the law prohibiting political discharge was unclear when they acted in 1996.

Aleman v. Melecio · filed 1998-01-22

Defendants in this case are clearly not protected by qualified immunity based on any notion that the law of political discharge was not clear at the time of their actions.

An officer is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged violation of clearly established rights is supported by sufficient evidence and the court cannot find his conduct objectively reasonable as a matter of law.

Harris v. Kirby · filed 1998-01-23

Furthermore, we cannot say on these facts, as a matter of law, that Officer Kirby acted in an objectively reasonable manner. Therefore, the district court did not err by refusing summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity, and we affirm and remand this matter for trial on the merits.

Officials sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that employees’ confidential duties permitted their dismissal under the political affiliation exception.

Danahy v. Buscaglia · filed 1998-01-27

Because of plaintiffs’ access to confidential information, the defendants, acting as they did under the governing legal rules at the time, were entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects officials from a § 1983 claim for discretionary acts unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Nash v. Fields · filed 1998-01-29

Government officials are immune from suit respecting discretionary functions they perform, unless their actions violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 failure-to-protect claim when material facts remain disputed about the officer’s objective reasonableness.

Dowling v. Hannigan · filed 1998-01-30

The question in this case is whether defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the deliberate indifference standard used to evaluate failure to protect claims under the Eighth Amendment. That question is the central dispute in this case, and genuine issues of material fact prevent the Court from making such a decision on summary judgment. Summary judgment on the question of qualified immunity is therefore inappropriate.

Qualified immunity shields an official from a § 1983 First Amendment claim when the speech’s protected status was not clearly established.

Badia v. City of Miami · filed 1998-01-30

Lee's alleged actions did not violate clearly established First Amendment rights, and qualified immunity protects Lee from Badia's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First Amendment claim.

Qualified immunity shields an individual defendant from a § 1983 First Amendment claim when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Badia v. City of Miami · filed 1998-01-30

Because qualified immunity shields Lee from Badia's § 1983 First Amendment claim but not from Badia's discrimination claims, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability if the official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Jones v. Collins · filed 1998-02-02

A determination of whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 potentially involves a two-step analysis. First, if the official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, the official is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from § 1983 liability for an arrest a reasonable officer could have believed lawful under clearly established law and the information available.

Tangwall v. Stuckey · filed 1998-02-02

To reiterate, qualified immunity will shield a law enforcement officer (i.e., Detective Stuckey) from § 1983 liability if “a reasonable officer could have believed [the arrest] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed.” Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227, 112 S.Ct. at 536 (emphasis added) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3040, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)).

State officials sued for damages in their individual capacities under Section 1983 may assert qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would not have known that the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Rousselo v. Starling · filed 1998-02-03

When state government officials are sued in their individual capacities for damages under section 1983, they may assert the defense of qualified immunity. ... And, in the context in which the parties have presented this issue, we hold that as a result, a reasonable person in Trooper Starling’s position would not have known that his actions violated a clearly established right. Therefore, he is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity and the trial court erred in not granting his motion for summary judgment on this point.

Section 1983 provides qualified immunity from damages to a public official whose conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Thomas v. Anthony Ramos, Margaret Thompson, Leona Gregory, David Essenpreis, and Yolande Williams · filed 1998-02-03

Thus, we are convinced that the district court’s finding that Ramos was entitled to qualified immunity was correct and, thus its granting of summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim was proper.

A state official sued in an official capacity for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief cannot assert qualified immunity against a § 1983 claim.

Angeline v. Mahoning County Agricultural Society · filed 1998-02-05

Accordingly, because Dailey is sued only in his official capacity, as Director of the Ohio Department of Agriculture, and because Plaintiff seeks only prospective injunctive and declaratory relief and an award of attorney’s fees against him, said defendant is not entitled to assert herein the defense of qualified immunity, as a matter of law.

For qualified immunity in a § 1983 equal protection claim, the court must assess discriminatory intent as part of its initial inquiry.

Mencer v. Bd. of Ed./Birmingham, AL · filed 1998-02-05

Thus, even though intent is not “conduct” per se, a district court must make a determination regarding intent as part of the first prong of its qualified immunity inquiry.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim when an objectively reasonable officer would have had probable cause to arrest.

Hazelton v. City of Grand Prairie, Tex. · filed 1998-02-09

The Court finds that these facts would have given an objectively reasonable officer probable cause to arrest Hazelton for public intoxication. Thus, Wynne is entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity to Plaintiffs § 1983 claim and Wynne’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

A defendant in a Section 1983 equal protection suit may receive qualified immunity when the evidence would not allow a reasonable jury to find discriminatory intent.

Mencer v. Bd. of Ed./Birmingham, AL · filed 1998-02-05

In moving for summary judgment, Hammonds claimed qualified immunity in defense to a section 1983 claim that is based on an equal protection violation. ... In this case, Mencer, in order to defeat Hammonds' defense of qualified immunity, had to present the district court with enough evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that Hammonds intended to discriminate against her. She did not do so.

Defendants seeking qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim bear the burden of establishing it; failure to do so warrants denial of summary judgment.

Draper v. Astoria School District No. 1C · filed 1998-02-12

Since defendants bear the burden of establishing their entitlement to qualified immunity, Collins v. Jordan, 102 F.3d 406, 412 (9th Cir.1996), and have not done so, this court recommends denial of their motion for partial summary judgment on the § 1983 claim.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability if the official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Jones v. Gary Collins, Superintendent of Texarkana Independent School District · filed 1998-02-12

A determination of whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 potentially involves a two-step analysis. First, if the official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional'right, the official is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct was objectively reasonable under the clearly established law at the time.

Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss. · filed 1998-02-12

Instead, we hold that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, do not constitute objectively unreasonable conduct when applied against the deliberate indifference standard. ... In sum, as a matter of law, the district court should have granted summary judgment to Appellants on qualified immunity grounds.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when reasonable officials could differ about whether their conduct was constitutionally lawful.

Alton v. Hopgood · filed 1998-02-18

After a careful and exhaustive review of the summary judgment evidence submitted, this Court concludes that because reasonable public officials could differ on the constitutional lawfulness of the nonstudent Defendants’ behavior, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Public officials sued for damages under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity when their conduct does not clearly violate established constitutional rights.

Demilo-Fytros v. City of Mount Vernon · filed 1998-02-18

Defendant Blackwood, in contrast, was not directly involved in the events of which plaintiff complains. As mayor of the City of Mount Vernon, Blackwood took no actions that clearly violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Therefore, the defense of qualified immunity is available at this time to Black-wood, but not to Fatígate, Craparo, or Duncan.

In a § 1983 excessive-force suit, officers cannot obtain qualified immunity on summary judgment when material disputes about their conduct prevent resolution of that defense.

Taft v. Vines · filed 1996-01-04

By contrast, the Appellees' entitlement to qualified immunity as to the Appellants' excessive force claims was incorrectly granted by the district court at the summary judgment stage. Indeed, in light of the genuine disputes of material fact concerning the actual conduct of the police officers in executing the seizure and search, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment on this issue, and remand the case for trial on the Sec. 1983 excessive force claims.

A private person performing a government function at a government request may claim qualified immunity from § 1983 damages if a state official performing that function would be immune.

Eagon v. City Of Elk City · filed 1996-01-03

Thus, the rule in this circuit is "that a private individual who performs a government function pursuant to a state order or request is entitled to qualified immunity if a state official would have been entitled to such immunity had he performed the function himself."

Prison officials defending a § 1983 damages claim on qualified immunity grounds must show their actions were objectively reasonable.

Tyler v. Ashcroft · filed 1996-01-08

Likewise, the prison officials failed to support their qualified immunity defense by showing their actions were objectively reasonable. Thus, the district court committed error in holding the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the tuberculosis damages claims.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal.

Anthony W. Gantt and Cecily Gantt v. Akron Corrections Facility, William Meier and Paul Crow · filed 1996-01-08

Because application of the doctrine of qualified immunity to a particular defendant is a question of law, Garvie v. Jackson, 845 F.2d 647, 649 (6th Cir.1988), this court reviews de novo the district court's determination.

Qualified immunity can bar a § 1983 claim for damages.

Weber v. Pung · filed 1996-01-10

Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Weber's damage claims under the doctrine of qualified immunity and properly ... dismissed his equitable claims because Weber was no longer being incarcerated in a Minnesota facility.

Section 1983 can expose an officer to personal liability without qualified immunity for enforcing a statute after a ruling clearly establishes that the statute violates civil rights.

Blair v. Shanahan · filed 1996-01-31

An officer attempting to enforce the statute would likely lose qualified immunity and be subject to personal liability, because Blair I clearly establishes that the law violates the civil rights of those punished under it.

A defendant’s qualified immunity in a § 1983 action may present a factual issue for the jury when special circumstances bear on whether a reasonable person would have known the relevant legal standard.

Walker v. Arthur Elbert, Jerry Farley, Don Flegal, Earl Whitman, Royce Clark, Caralyn Bullock, and Pat McAlister · filed 1996-01-31

While we do recognize that the ultimate question of a defendant’s good faith immunity is frequently determined as a matter of law, a defendant may rely on special circumstances to raise an issue of fact to be determined by a jury.

Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from civil liability under § 1983 for allegedly unlawful conduct.

Ventura v. Mitchell Krugielki, Michigan State Trooper · filed 1996-02-13

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, available to government officials performing discretionary functions, which shields them from civil liability under § 1983 for allegedly unlawful conduct.

An officer is not entitled to a directed verdict on qualified immunity in a § 1983 action when the evidence permits a jury to find his belief that detention was lawful unreasonable.

Pierce v. Multnomah County · filed 1996-02-14

We conclude that because Pierce presented evidence from which the jury could conclude that any such beliefs were unreasonable, Duncan was not entitled to a directed verdict on his claim of qualified immunity.

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct does not violate rights a reasonable person would have known.

Rippett v. Bemis · filed 1996-02-16

Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages pursuant to section 1983, but only insofar as their conduct does not violate statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their personal capacities have qualified immunity when their conduct was objectively reasonable under the law at the time of their actions.

Ganther v. Ingle · filed 1996-02-16

Therefore, applying the law at time of their actions, the defendants' conduct towards Ganther on this request was "objectively reasonable" under the second part of the qualified immunity test.

In a § 1983 action, denial of qualified immunity may be affirmed without prejudice to renewed presentation when unclear pleadings prevent the court from deciding the defense.

Anderson v. District Board Of Trustees Of Central Florida Community College · filed 1996-02-20

The consequence of our being unable to determine whether the district court should have granted appellants immunity is that we affirm the district court's denial of immunity. We do so, of course, without prejudice to appellants' right to resubmit the issue to the district court once the parties appropriately join issue on their claims and defenses.

Qualified immunity does not support dismissal of a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the alleged facts support a finding that officers acted unreasonably under then-current constitutional law.

Ramos v. Desmarais · filed 1996-02-27

Assuming the facts alleged to be true, as the court must do at this juncture, there is a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that defendants LeBlanc and Lemieux acted unreasonably in light of the constitutional understandings then current and used excessive force when they attempted to subdue the plaintiff. Accordingly, defendants' attempt to interpose the shield of qualified immunity via a motion to dismiss must, at this early stage of the proceedings, be rejected.

Qualified immunity shields officials from damages under § 1983 when a reasonable state officer could believe the challenged conduct was constitutional.

Volberg v. Pataki · filed 1996-02-28

Qualified immunity is a creature of Section 1983 jurisprudence, and only plaintiffs First Amendment claims were brought pursuant to Section 1983. ... The Court has already determined that defendants’ action in firing plaintiff did in fact comport with the First Amendment, so it follows that a reasonable state officer could have believed that the firing did not violate plaintiffs First Amendment rights. ... Either way, therefore, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from liability in regard to plaintiffs First Amendment claims.

A § 1983 defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on a failure-to-protect claim when his response to a known inmate threat was reasonable as a matter of law.

Erickson v. Holloway · filed 1996-02-28

Johnle's shift ended more than two hours before Flying Horse attacked Erickson, however, and Johnle told Birdsall about Flying Horse's threat when Birdsall came on duty. Because this response was reasonable as a matter of law, the district court should have granted summary judgment to Johnle.

Public officials seeking qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim must prove they acted within the scope of their discretionary authority; disputed facts on that issue can preclude summary judgment.

Taylor v. Florida State Fair Authority · filed 1996-03-01

Therefore, in light of the disputed facts, Carlton and Rigdon have not met their burden of proof in showing that they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred. Accordingly, Carlton and Rigdon’s motion for summary judgment as it pertains to Count X is hereby denied.

A § 1983 complaint alleging unprovoked, racially motivated threats, harassment, and injury by police officers can overcome qualified immunity at the pleading stage.

Cyiark v. The City of Houston · filed 1996-03-11

The amended complaint, however, alleges numerous instances of unprovoked and racially-motivated threats, harassment, and injury at the hands of Houston police officers. This suffices to state a cause of action under section 1983 sufficient to overcome defendants’ claim of qualified immunity at this stage of the litigation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a police officer who properly enforces a presumptively valid law.

Nagol v. State of NM · filed 1996-03-12

A police officer cannot be held liable under § 1983 for properly enforcing the laws the officer is sworn to uphold.

When facts bearing on the objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct are disputed, a court must develop those facts before deciding qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit.

Clash v. Beatty · filed 1996-03-12

On the other hand, if the facts draw into question the objective reasonableness of the police action under the alleged circumstances, they must be developed in the district court before a definitive ruling on the defense can be made.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 equal protection claim when they could reasonably believe that male and female inmates were not similarly situated and that different policies served legitimate security interests.

Prince v. Endell · filed 1996-03-13

We agree that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. ... Thus, it was objectively reasonable for a prison official to believe that female and male inmates were not similarly situated for purposes of package call and cassette player use. In addition, a reasonable prison official could have found the difference in policies to be rationally related to legitimate security interests.

Qualified immunity protects a state actor from a § 1983 suit if it was objectively reasonable to believe the challenged conduct was lawful at the time.

Doe v. Marsh · filed 1996-03-19

The qualified immunity defense will protect a state actor from suit if it was objectively reasonable for that actor to believe that his actions were lawful at the time of the challenged act. ... Accordingly, the court grants the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

A government official cannot establish qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim merely by showing official status.

Shechter v. Comptroller of New York · filed 1996-03-21

It is not enough that defendants-appellants were “government officials” to establish qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, government officials seeking qualified immunity must show that the challenged acts fell within the scope of their official duties.

Shechter v. Comptroller of City of New York · filed 1996-03-21

It is not enough that defendants-appellants were "government officials" to establish qualified immunity. They must further demonstrate that the specific acts at issue were performed within the scope of their official duties.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a constitutional right.

Brennan v. Township of Northville, Lawrence Demeter and Fred Yankee, Individually and in Their Official Capaci · filed 1996-03-26

Without a showing of a constitutional violation, the denial of qualified immunity to defendants Yankee and Demeter must be reversed.

Section 1983 personal-capacity claims against government officers are barred by qualified immunity when reasonable officers could disagree about whether the challenged conduct was lawful.

Ramirez v. Holmes · filed 1996-03-31

Moreover, even if there were any such rights, which I have found there were not, officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether Holmes’s conduct as alleged by Ramirez was legal. Therefore, qualified immunity bars a suit against Holmes in his personal capacity and is an alternative and independent basis upon which the Amended Complaint is dismissed.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could believe the use of force was objectively reasonable in the circumstances.

McQueen v. Bedsole · filed 1996-04-03

Further, the evidence at trial, which was undisputed as to any material fact, established that Robertson and Clark were entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer in their position could have believed that the use of deadly force was objectively rea- sonable in light of the circumstances.

Qualified immunity can support summary judgment against a § 1983 claim.

Nathaniel Ellerbe, Jr. v. Robert Anderson Clarence Hall, and Willis Griffin Alvia Sutton · filed 1996-04-04

Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

Section 1983 claims may be resolved by summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

Ellerbe v. Anderson · filed 1996-04-04

Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action turns on whether officials would know their conduct violated established rights, not on whether prior cases had established civil liability for that conduct.

California Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts · filed 1996-04-10

This argument, however, misses the point of qualified immunity. As stated in Harlow, the test for qualified immunity is whether the government official realizes that his actions violate a constitutional or statutory right, not whether his actions subject him to civil liability. ... However, the Court denies the motion to dismiss the claims by Plaintiffs Bey and McNally, and further holds that qualified immunity is not available to Defendants Cooper, Talbot, Bennett, and Crosby.

Public officials may have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim based on asserted statutory rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

Scorpio v. Foster-Woodson · filed 1996-04-04

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his motion to alter or amend the judgment denying relief in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint. ... To the extent that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (West 1994), might apply to Appellant's action, Appellees are entitled to immunity.

Section 1983 defendants may obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity even if they did not raise the defense in their answer.

Rodriguez v. City of Simi Valley · filed 1996-04-12

As an initial matter, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment for defendants based on qualified immunity even though defendants did not raise the issue of qualified immunity in their answer to Rodriguez's complaint.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against officers when the plaintiff raises no factual issue that their conduct was unreasonable under existing law.

Dickerson v. Mertz · filed 1996-04-17

We agree with the district court that plaintiff has not shown a factual issue concerning unreasonableness of defendants’ actions based on the existing law, and therefore we conclude the district court did not err in finding defendants immune from plaintiffs § 1983 claim.

Qualified immunity can bar damages against public officials in a § 1983 action even if the Religious Freedom Restoration Act applies.

Scorpio v. Foster-Woodson · filed 1996-04-17

To the extent that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (West 1994), might apply to Appellant's action, Appellees are entitled to immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an official who reasonably believed under existing precedent that she could discharge an employee whose candidacy for her office threatened disruption and political loyalty.

Brinston v. Dunn · filed 1996-04-22

In the present case, defendant submits that she fired plaintiff because she believed that his candidacy would disrupt the operations of the office and because she believed that plaintiff was a confidential employee from whom she could legitimately demand political allegiance as a condition of his continued employment. The court finds that both conclusions were objectively reasonable in light of the existing Fifth Circuit precedent, and accordingly, defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

A § 1983 defendant preserves qualified immunity by asserting § 1983 defenses in the answer and promptly raising qualified immunity after the court recognizes an individual-capacity claim.

Sisinia Pro v. Ronald Donatucci. Ronald Donatucci, Register of Wills · filed 1996-04-26

In this case, Donatucci made the general statement in his answer that he was asserting "all defenses available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” and then explicitly raised the qualified immunity defense in his motion for summary judgment, which he filed just one day after the district court held for the first time that Pro had sued Donatucci in his individual capacity. In these circumstances, we believe that Donatucci adequately met the standard that we have followed. We therefore hold that he has not waived the defense of qualified immunity.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when a reasonable official could have believed the challenged conduct was lawful.

Kondrosky v. Dan Pierce, Sergeant, and Carl R. Peed, Sheriff · filed 1996-04-29

In this unusual factual context, a reasonable person in Pierce's position could have thought that refusal to credit Kondrosky's one-day sentence for time spent in a holding cell was not illegal. ... For the foregoing reasons Pierce acted reasonably and he is entitled to qualified immunity.

A public official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official could have believed the challenged conduct was lawful.

Kondrosky v. Pierce · filed 1996-04-29

For the foregoing reasons Pierce acted reasonably and he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law based on an animal control officer’s belief that he could enter a home without a warrant to seize a dog.

Conway v. Pasadena Humane Society · filed 1996-05-08

Alternatively, defendants contend that, as a matter of law, they were entitled to qualified immunity based on Jurman’s objectively reasonable belief that he could enter the Conway residence without a warrant. We disagree with both contentions and reverse.

Officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful detention claim when their conduct was reasonable and violated no right a reasonable officer should have known.

Thomas v. Holt · filed 1996-05-09

In this case, we hold that on the basis of the officers’ observations of the employee in the locked room in the downstairs area of the MARTA station and thereafter, they did not act unreasonably by requiring him to accompany them from the MARTA platform back to a staff room in the downstairs area so that the status quo could be maintained pending his questioning by his supervisor. Therefore, they did not violate a right of his of which a reasonable police officer should have known.

Officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Polanco v. Lt. K. Pierce, Donald Selsky, and Comm. Thomas A. Coughlin, III · filed 1996-05-22

In view of the unsettled status of the law concerning whether the defendants' exclusion of a witness from the disciplinary hearing violated Polanco's right to due process, it cannot be said that the defendants' conduct violated one of Polanco's clearly established rights. ... Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Polanco's Fourteenth Amendment claim.

An officer’s qualified immunity from § 1983 liability cannot be decided until a jury resolves material factual disputes about the officer’s conduct.

Glover v. Crawford · filed 1996-05-24

Accordingly, before this court can determine whether Sergeant Crawford is entitled to qualified immunity, a jury must first resolve the significant disputes between the parties as to the material facts.

Section 1983 defendants cannot obtain qualified immunity on summary judgment when factual disputes must be resolved before the objective reasonableness of their conduct can be determined.

Tobing v. City of New York · filed 1996-06-03

Second, numerous factual questions must be resolved by a jury before the objective reasonableness of defendants’ conduct can be determined.

A defendant sued personally under § 1983 has qualified immunity when prior law did not clearly establish that the challenged conduct violated federal law.

Beauregard v. Olson · filed 1996-06-12

This case is not the exceptional case where the individual defendant is unentitled to qualified immunity: it was not clearly established at the time Olson acted that firing Plaintiffs was unlawful.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity when her conduct is objectively reasonable.

Crow Tribe of Indians v. Racicot · filed 1996-06-14

Her conduct was objectively reasonable and she is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims may be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds.

Hershey v. California State Humane Soc. · filed 1996-06-14

Our de novo review of the entire record reveals that the district court properly granted summary judgment of Hershey's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the defendants based upon qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 qualified immunity dispute, the jury must decide disputed historical facts underlying the immunity determination.

Rudi Acosta Alma Acosta v. City and County of San Francisco Daniel Yawczak · filed 1996-06-18

Regardless of who makes the ultimate determination as to qualified immunity, the jury, not the judge, must decide the disputed “foundational” or “historical” facts that underlie the determination.

A denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim is immediately appealable when based on a question of law, but not when based on a triable question of fact.

City of Lakewood v. Brace · filed 1996-06-24

Thus, the appealability of a motion for summary judgment on section 1983 claims premised on the doctrine of qualified immunity hinges on the trial court’s basis for denying the motion. The trial court’s order is immediately appealable if its denial was based on a question of law, ie., the trial court found that there were sufficient facts pled to support a violation of a clearly established law. Alternatively, if the trial court found a triable question of fact, that determination is not immediately appealable.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 in their individual capacities have qualified immunity when a reasonable official in their position would not have known that the alleged conduct violated the law.

Christianson v. Clarke · filed 1996-06-26

This being true the motion to dismiss must be granted on qualified immunity grounds because a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the defendants would not have known that the conduct alleged in the complaint violated the law.

A professional acting under color of state law who exercises professional judgment in treating a disabled person under state care has qualified immunity from a § 1983 bodily restraint claim if the treatment is within the scope of professionally acceptable choices.

Heidemann v. Rother · filed 1996-07-01

Accordingly, we hold that, when an authorized professional acting under color of state law exercises professional judgment in treating a disabled individual under the state's care, and that exercise of judgment would otherwise cause unconstitutional bodily restraint, he or she is entitled to qualified immunity if such treatment is within the scope of professionally acceptable choices, which, for purposes of judicial review, is broadly defined to include any choice that is not a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards.

A court need not decide qualified immunity when a § 1983 claim fails to state a claim.

Bumstead v. Jasper County · filed 1996-07-03

The analysis in the preceding section disposes of the need to address defendant Davis’ qualified immunity defense. When an attempted claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a defendant’s assertion of the qualified immunity defense becomes moot.

Section 1983 defendants cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when factual disputes remain over whether their conduct was objectively reasonable.

Cruz v. Root · filed 1996-07-09

Defendants further contend they are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. To the extent they rely on the Court of Claims findings of fact, for the reasons set forth above, their contention lacks merit. To the extent that they argue their actions were "objectively reasonable” as a matter of law, thus entitling them to qualified immunity, their contention necessarily raises questions of fact that preclude summary judgment.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to correctional officers employed by a private corporation under contract to operate state prisons.

McKnight v. John Rees, Daryll Richardson and John Walker · filed 1996-07-10

We therefore refuse to grant qualified immunity to correctional officers employed by a private corporation to maintain prison facilities for the state.

Officials are entitled to summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim before discovery when the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of a constitutional or statutory right.

Yowell v. Jerry P. Combs, etc. · filed 1996-07-17

Because Yowell failed to allege a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, the officials were entitled to summary judgment before discovery commenced.

Qualified immunity cannot support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts prevent determining whether the officers acted in good faith.

Billado v. Parry · filed 1996-07-18

Because there is a factual dispute relating to whether or not the deputies had increased Billado’s vulnerability to harm or taken him into custody and then failed to protect him, it is impossible to determine whether or not they were acting in good faith under the laws surrounding § 1983. Because there is a factual dispute, the issue is not suitable for summary judgment.

Government officials sued under Section 1983 are protected by qualified immunity from claims that fail to establish a constitutional deprivation.

Spacek v. Charles · filed 1996-07-18

Because Charles failed to assert constitutional claims under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, Spacek successfully defeated the threshold issue in asserting his qualified immunity defense. Therefore, Spacek, in his individual and supervisory capacities, is protected from liability by the defense of qualified immunity as to these claims.