42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Delaney, Glen v. DeTella, George · filed 2001-07-09

Having found that Delaney has alleged a constitutional violation, we consider whether the right he asserts was clearly established prior to the spring of 1996. ... On this record, Judge Coar was right to deny the qualified immunity plea of all defendants.

Qualified immunity bars an individual-capacity § 1983 failure-to-train claim when the asserted duty was not clearly established.

District Council 20, American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. District of Columbia · filed 2001-07-10

Accordingly, the Court holds that all plaintiffs, including Escobar, fail to state a claim against Williams in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to train, because Williams is entitled to qualified immunity as to these claims which have not been clearly established in this or any other circuit.

Section 1983 does not shield police officers with qualified immunity when they withhold exculpatory evidence from prosecutors in violation of a clearly established right.

Newsome, James v. McCabe, John · filed 2001-07-11

If Newsome can prove what he alleges, then under the approach of Brady and Jones v. Chicago he will establish a violation of the due process clause, a kind of violation for which officers McCabe and McNally do not have immunity.

Section 1983 claims against state officials in their individual capacities are barred by qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Mukaida v. Hawaii · filed 2001-07-12

To the extent Mukaida’s claims are asserted against Okamura in his individual capacity, he has qualified immunity from those claims. Qualified immunity bars claims against state officials in their individual capacities if their conduct did not “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 excessive force claim cannot be resolved on summary judgment when material facts about the officer’s perceptions and their reasonableness remain disputed.

Clem v. COUNTY OF FAIRFAX, VA · filed 2001-07-17

A close review of the current record compels the conclusion that neither summary judgment nor qualified immunity can be determined at this time because there remain disputes regarding what Officer Corbeau actually perceived and the reasonableness of his conclusion either that plaintiff was armed or that he posed a threat of death or serious physical injury.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the right they allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Doe v. Delie · filed 2001-07-19

Although we ultimately agree that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, we do not agree with the District Court’s reasoning. We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment protects an inmate’s right to medical privacy, subject to legitimate penological interests. However, because this right was not clearly established at the time of defendants’ conduct, we will affirm the dismissal of Doe’s complaint.

A defendant in a Section 1983 claim is not entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would understand that penalizing an employee for requesting religious accommodation is unlawful.

Phillips v. Collings · filed 2001-07-19

This Court finds that an objectively reasonable official would understand that it is unlawful to recommend the termination of a subordinate in the first instance, and then author an exceedingly negative and voluminous performance evaluation of the employee in the second instance, based on that employee’s request for accommodation of his religious beliefs. Collings is not entitled to qualified immunity for her actions.

In a Section 1983 suit, an official cannot rely on counsel’s advice to support qualified immunity if the official failed to give counsel complete information.

York v. Purkey · filed 2001-07-20

And, second, Purkey could not rely on Cantwell’s advice because he failed to provide Cantwell with complete information.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 retaliation claim when prosecutors independently review the case and the officers supply no materially false information or omissions.

Petersen v. Cazemier · filed 2001-07-23

Neither Cazemier nor McDonald furnished any material false information to the prosecutors, or omitted any material information in their reports. The prosecutors’ independent review entitles the defendants to qualified immunity on plaintiffs retaliation claim.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action protects an official from the burdens of trial as well as liability.

Chavez v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2001-07-23

Qualified immunity is not only a defense to liability but also “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.”

A government actor performing a discretionary task is immune from a § 1983 suit if the action did not violate clearly established law.

New York State National Organization for Women v. Pataki · filed 2001-07-23

A government actor performing a discretionary task is entitled to immunity from § 1983 suits if his or her “action did not violate clearly established law.”

In a § 1983 qualified immunity analysis, a defendant is entitled to judgment if no constitutional violation occurred; if a violation occurred or may have occurred, the court proceeds with the immunity inquiry.

Wayne v. Shadowen · filed 2001-07-23

If the alleged violation of the plaintiffs constitutional right did not occur, the defendant is entitled to immediate judgment; whereas if the alleged constitutional violation did occur, or may have occurred, the court should proceed with the qualified immunity inquiry.

An officer’s belief that a person posed a threat after an unlawful seizure began cannot provide qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for that seizure.

Jacobs v. Village of Ottawa Hills · filed 2001-07-24

Officer Miller’s subjective belief that plaintiff was going to strike her, after she had already commenced an illegal seizure, cannot serve as a basis to hold her immune for her actions.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for removing children from parental custody when the removal is objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Pace v. Montalvo · filed 2001-07-24

Thus, under the second and third prongs of the Robison analysis, the 96-hour hold on custody and removal of the Pace children was objectively reasonable as Defendant Lopez personally observed and recorded the situation and reviewed the police and EMS personnel statements. She, as well as the other three Defendants, is to be granted qualified immunity as to'that act.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the alleged conduct would violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Williams v. Belknap · filed 2001-07-24

In fact, it is clear that Defendants’ alleged conduct would have violated rights that were clearly established on May 17,1998. ... Accordingly, qualified immunity does not shield Defendants from suit.

Qualified immunity can entitle an individual school official to summary judgment on a § 1983 claim.

Chiu v. Plano Independent School District · filed 2001-07-24

For the following reasons, we dismiss Defendants Davis, Wohlgehagen, Burleson, Criswell, and Sellers’s appeal from the denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity for want of jurisdiction; however, we reverse the district court’s denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to Defendant Brooks.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Doe v. Delie · filed 2001-07-24

However , because this right was not clearly established at the time of defendants' conduct, we will affirm the dismissal of Doe's complaint.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from § 1983 liability when the jury’s supported findings establish that the officer acted unreasonably.

Corcoran v. Fletcher · filed 2001-07-26

Therefore, because the jury instructions demonstrate that the jury must have determined that Officer Fletcher not only lacked probable cause to arrest Corcoran but did so unreasonably, and because this Court holds that the jury’s determination was sufficiently supported by the record, this Court hereby denies Fletcher’s assertion of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against officers when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct was unlawful at the time.

Kerman v. City of New York · filed 2001-07-26

We find that at the time of the officers’ conduct in this case no clearly established law prohibited a warrantless entry into an apartment on the ground of exigent circumstances based solely on an anonymous 911 call. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to all nine defendant police officers with regard to defendants’ entry into Kerman’s apartment.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts material to the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct remain.

Kerman v. City of New York · filed 2001-07-26

However, the parties' versions of the facts differ markedly and "[s]ummary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not appropriate when there are facts in dispute that are material to a determination of reasonableness." Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d at 143. Therefore, we remand to the district court the issues of whether Crossan employed excessive force following the initial seizure and handcuffing of Kerman and whether qualified immunity attaches.

Defendants in a Section 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when plaintiffs fail to show that their actions violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Veile v. Martinson · filed 2001-07-30

For these reasons, we also hold defendants are entitled to qualified immunity based on plaintiffs’ failure to meet their summary judgment burden of showing defendants’ actions violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim if a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause for the arrest.

Merrick v. Sattle Police Department · filed 2001-07-30

If a reasonable officer could have believed that there was probable cause for the arrest, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. ... After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Merrieks, the record supports the conclusion that the officers could have reasonably believed they had probable cause to arrest the Merricks.

Qualified immunity protects officials from § 1983 damages for discretionary acts that do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Ayres v. City of Beaumont · filed 2001-07-31

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from liability of civil damages as long as their actions do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... As such, Chief Bertrand was acting within his discretion as a city official and enjoys qualified immunity from a federal claim.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when their reasonable conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Cantrell v. DeKalb County · filed 2001-08-03

Based on the undisputed facts, the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity because they acted reasonably and did not violate any of Mr. Cantrell’s clearly established rights when they asked him to talk with them in the parking lot of the church and then suggested that he pursue his disagreements with the pastor on another day.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action does not protect officials whose conduct patently violates clearly established fundamental constitutional rights, even if they relied on statutes authorizing it.

Gorromeo v. Zachares · filed 2001-08-07

Because Plaintiff alleges conduct that is patently violative of clearly established, fundamental constitutional rights, the district court did not err in denying qualified immunity, regardless of whether Defendants relied upon statutes that purportedly authorized their conduct.

A government official is immune from a § 1983 claim based on issuing a ticket when the complaint alleges neither knowledge that the act would violate the plaintiff’s rights nor malice.

Smith v. Herbert, No. Cv99-0266709-S (Aug. 10, 2001) · filed 2001-08-10

In the absence of an allegation of scienter or malice, Herbert's issuance of the ticket was protected by an immunity from suit, and summary judgment is entered for the defendants on the first count.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when, on the facts viewed in the plaintiff's favor, no reasonable officer could think their coercive interrogation was lawful.

Wilson v. Lawrence Cty. · filed 2001-08-15

Against this background case law, in light of Wilson's limited intelligence and mental capacities, no officer could have reasonably thought this conduct consistent with Wilson's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 generally shields officials sued in their individual capacities through qualified immunity unless controlling law clearly established that their conduct was impermissible.

Thomas v. Clayton County Bd. of Education · filed 2001-08-15

As noted supra, officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 are generally entitled to qualified immunity unless a factually similar and controlling case has clearly established that the conduct is impermissible.

In a § 1983 claim, school officials are not entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage when the alleged retaliation concerns classroom speech germane to the subject and advancing an academic message.

Hardy v. Jefferson Community College and Kentucky Community and Technical College System, Mary Pamela Besser · filed 2001-08-15

Given this court’s indepth analysis of the protections available to one using the “N” word in an academic context, reasonable school officials should have known that such speech, when it is germane to the classroom subject matter and advances an academic message, is protected by the First Amendment.

Officers lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have known that their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Wilson v. Lawrence County · filed 2001-08-15

In determining if appellants are entitled to qualified immunity we must ask whether Wilson states a violation of a constitutional right, and whether that right was clearly established at the time, such that a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct violated the law. ... Against this background case law, in light of Wilson's limited intelligence and mental capacities, no officer could have reasonably thought this conduct consistent with Wilson's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to a prison officer for malicious and sadistic force causing actual injury when clearly established law prohibited that conduct.

Foulk v. Charrier · filed 2001-08-17

Moreover, the district court did not err in declining to grant judgment as a matter of law based upon Charrier’s qualified immunity defense. By June of 1994, the law was well established that a malicious and sadistic use of force by a prison official against a prisoner, done with the intent to injure and causing actual injury, is enough to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause.

Officers may receive qualified immunity from § 1983 claims for an arrest supported by probable cause and reasonable force, while a disputed later use of force remains for the jury.

Smith v. City of New Haven · filed 2001-08-20

Thus, the Court holds that the four police officers are worthy of qualified immunity from Smith’s claim of false arrest, lack of probable cause and excessive force in removing Smith from the vehicle. Wexler, Papa and Muller are not granted qualified immunity on the charge of excessive force in escorting Smith to the patrol car.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when factual questions remain about whether the officers acted objectively reasonably.

LaLonde v. Bates · filed 2001-08-20

Viewing the facts most favorable to the plaintiff, questions exist as to whether the defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable. ... Defendants’ request for summary judgment based on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity must be denied.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have known that the challenged conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Armstrong v. District of Columbia Public Library · filed 2001-08-21

Here, the Court cannot conclude that a reasonable person would have known that the regulation at issue violated a clearly established constitutional right. ... Thus, the Court concludes that summary judgment should be granted in favor of the Director and Trustees of the Library, as well as the three unnamed Library employees, on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 individual-capacity claims against state officials cannot rest on conclusory allegations that fail to overcome qualified immunity.

Fennell v. TX Education Agency · filed 2001-08-23

Fennell and Rameses offer only conclusory allegations and fail to show why the state officials are not entitled to qualified immunity; accordingly, their claims under §§ 1981 and 1983 were properly dismissed.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Carroll v. Pfeffer · filed 2001-08-23

Because Carroll has not established a violation of her constitutional rights, she has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Officer Pfeffer was entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity is available for § 1983 claims but does not apply to Title VII claims.

Cutts v. Peed · filed 2001-08-24

Although this claim is similar to the § 1983 claims, contrary to the parties' apparent belief, the Sheriff is entitled to qualified immunity only with respect to the claims brought under § 1983; there is no qualified immunity from liability under Title VII.

A prison director who knows officers are applying an unlawful obscenity standard and allows the practice to continue can be personally liable under § 1983 without qualified immunity.

Broulette v. Starns · filed 2001-08-27

Once Director Stewart knew that deputy wardens were not applying the standard set forth in A.R.S. § 13-3501 required by his own policy and the Hook Decree, a reasonable officer in the position of Director Stewart could not have reasonably believed that allowing review of publications for depiction of specific sexual acts only to continue for another two years was lawful. Therefore the Court has determined that Director Stewart has personal liability along with Defendant Schiavo for the con-trabanding of Plaintiffs magazines.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit shields officials from the burdens of discovery and trial as well as liability.

Locurto v. Safir · filed 2001-08-27

Because qualified immunity is a shield not only from liability, but also from the burdens of discovery and trial, a denial of immunity is effectively unreviewable if appeal is delayed until after a final judgment has been entered.

Public officials performing discretionary functions are generally immune from Section 1983 suits if their conduct does not violate clearly established federal rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Williams v. Franklin County Board of Commissioners · filed 2001-08-28

Summary judgment in favor of the FCCS employees was warranted for the additional reason that these defendants were entitled to immunity from the Section 1983 claim. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, public officials who perform discretionary functions are generally entitled to immunity from suit in a Section 1983 action as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established federal statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

A plaintiff facing a qualified immunity defense in a § 1983 action bears the burden of showing that the defendant violated a federal right that was clearly established at the time.

Snyder v. Cache County · filed 2001-08-29

Because Defendants raised a qualified immunity defense, Snyder bears the burden of showing that Defendants’ actions violated a federal constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established at the time of Snyder’s arrest.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the evidence does not show that it was unreasonable for the defendant to believe the challenged conduct complied with constitutional rights.

Rider v. Town of Farmington · filed 2001-08-29

But in this case, the plaintiff has presented no evidence that Bangham’s actions were discriminatory, nor that it was unreasonable for Bangham to believe that yelling at employees during a heated dispute, and investigating employees who had been accused by a superior officer of insubordination, would not violate those employees’ constitutional rights. Bangham is therefore entitled to qualified immunity on the Second Count, and summary judgment will enter in his favor as to the § 1983 claim.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when plaintiffs cannot show that their conduct violated a clearly established right.

McGee v. Snyder See also Supplemental Opinion Upon Denial of Rehearing - filed Nov. 7, 2001 · filed 2001-08-29

Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that defendants' conduct violated any clearly established right; therefore, we hold that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in the present case.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim against jail officials when detention beyond a prisoner’s lawful term is objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

Jones v. Lopez · filed 2001-08-31

Again, based on the authorities discussed, this Court finds the holding of Mr. Jones 253 days beyond his term of confinement was not objectively reasonable in light of the case law on this issue and the nondelegable duty .imposed upon these defendants. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Motion to Dismiss (docket # 3) and Defendants’ Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment (docket # 15) are DENIED.

Section 1983 qualified immunity applies when an officer reasonably could have believed that probable cause existed to use deadly force.

Jerry Charges Vaughn v. Cox · filed 2001-08-31

For qualified immunity purposes, therefore, we ask whether officers had “arguable probable cause” – that is, whether the officer reasonably could have believed that probable cause existed. ... In our prior opinion, we concluded that Deputy Cox had arguable probable cause, see Vaughan, 264 F.3d at 1036, and we reaffirm that decision today.

An officer sued individually under Section 1983 for using deadly force is entitled to qualified immunity if the officer had arguable probable cause to believe the suspect committed a violent crime or posed a threat of serious harm.

Jerry Charges Vaughn v. Cox · filed 2001-08-31

Under that standard, an officer will be entitled to qualified immunity if he had “‘arguable probable cause’” that the suspect either had committed a violent crime or presented a threat of serious harm.

An officer sued under § 1983 may be denied qualified immunity even without a prior case involving the same type of force in precisely the same circumstances, if the law was clearly established.

Deorle v. Greg Rutherford, Butte County Deputy Sheriff Mick Grey, Butte County Sheriff County of Butte · filed 2001-08-31

Although there is no prior case prohibiting the use of this specific type of force in precisely the circumstances here involved, that is insufficient to entitle Rutherford to qualified immunity: notwithstanding the absence of direct precedent, the law may be, as it was here, clearly established.

Qualified immunity does not shield an official from a § 1983 retaliation claim when the alleged conduct violates a clearly established right and is not objectively reasonable.

Breeden v. University of Mississippi Medical Center · filed 2001-09-05

Therefore, this court finds that Dr. Galli is not entitled to claim benefit of qualified immunity from the plaintiffs § 1983 claim of retaliation.

Qualified immunity shields § 1983 defendants from damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established federal rights.

Devereaux v. Abbey · filed 2001-09-05

Qualified immunity, however, shields § 1983 defendants “[f]rom liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

In a Section 1983 qualified-immunity analysis, the court must first determine whether the facts, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, show a constitutional violation.

Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified School District · filed 2001-09-10

In this case, Saucier requires the district court to first determine whether the facts urged by plaintiffs, viewed in the light most favorable to them, show intentional discrimination on account of their actual or perceived sexual orientation. ... We therefore conclude that this case must be remanded for reconsideration in light of Saucier.

Qualified immunity may protect an officer from a § 1983 excessive force claim when the plaintiff’s cited precedent does not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct was unlawful.

Hendon v. City of Piedmont · filed 2001-09-11

Sheth does not “clearly establish” the law pertinent to this case for two reasons.

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the alleged facts do not establish a substantive due process violation.

Martinez v. Uphoff · filed 2001-09-18

Since plaintiffs failed to state a claim for denial of substantive due process under the danger creation theory, we further agree with the conclusion of the district court that defendants are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars damages under § 1983 when the constitutional right violated was not clearly established at the time.

Sparing, Eugene v. Village Olympia · filed 2001-09-19

Although Sparing has demonstrated a constitutional violation, he cannot show that the violation was clearly established under the second part of the standard for qualified immunity.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the constitutional right allegedly violated was not clearly established.

Garcia v. Davis · filed 2001-09-20

The district court correctly found that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Garcia’s remaining claims because the constitutional rights allegedly violated are not clearly established.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to foster care officials whose deliberate indifference to known risks violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Roes v. FLORIDA DEPT OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES · filed 2001-09-24

Defendants McCarthy, Reale, Andrews, and Williams failed to protect the Roes from the abuse they suffered at the hands of the Lynches to the degree of rising to the level of deliberate indifference. Therefore, they are not protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

A prison official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the law in effect at the time required specific knowledge of a risk to the plaintiffs and the official lacked that knowledge.

Hedrick v. Roberts · filed 2001-09-27

As such, pre-Farmer law governs the issue of qualified immunity. ... Under Ruefly, defendant would be liable only if he had a specific knowledge that plaintiffs’ assailants would have assaulted them in 2F4. ... As such, the Court finds that defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer from a false arrest claim when the officer had arguable probable cause to make the arrest.

Lea v. Kirby · filed 2001-09-27

Although an officer must show probable cause to make a warrantless arrest, in determining whether or not an officer is entitled to qualified immunity under Section 1983, the issue is whether arguable probable cause exists. ... The Defendants’ decision to arrest Saul E. Lea was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances and the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not defeat a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff alleges deprivation of a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

Alvarado, Chad J. v. Litscher, Jon E. · filed 2001-09-28

Given the decision in Helling, the right of a prisoner to not be subjected to a serious risk of his future health resulting from ETS was clearly established in 1998-99. Both prongs of the Wilson test have been met to defeat defendants’ qualified immunity defense at this time.

A § 1983 plaintiff need not plead facts anticipating and overcoming a qualified immunity defense; that defense ordinarily does not justify dismissal at the pleading stage.

Alvarado v. Jon E. Litscher, Secretary, Jane Gamble, B. McCreedy · filed 2001-09-28

Because an immunity defense usually depends on the facts of the case, dismissal at the pleading stage is inappropriate: “[T]he plaintiff is not required initially to plead factual allegations that anticipate and overcome a defense of qualified immunity.”

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when a reasonable officer could believe there was probable cause for an arrest and a legal basis for the challenged searches.

Diehl v. Munro · filed 2001-10-02

Given the facts found herein, a reasonable police officer in these circumstances could have believed that probable cause existed for the arrest, detention and prosecution of Diehl and that there were legal bases to conduct the searches of the van! Accordingly, in the alternative, the defendants are entitled to judgment on this ground on the claims asserted in the first cause of action under section 1983.

A genuine factual dispute over whether officials acted objectively reasonably can preclude qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

LeBeau v. Town of Spencer · filed 2001-10-02

A genuine issue of material fact therefore exists as to the defendants’ reasonableness and they are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued individually under § 1983 lack qualified immunity when they violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Doan v. Watson · filed 2001-10-10

Because Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to establish a constitutional violation, and because the rights at issue were clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, Defendants are not shielded by qualified immunity in this matter.

Qualified immunity protects an officer against a § 1983 false-arrest claim when the plaintiff does not show a genuine dispute that the officer knowingly or recklessly gave false information to obtain the arrest warrant.

Marchbanks v. Franklin · filed 2001-10-11

The issue is not whether Deputy Franklin’s affidavit showed that he had probable cause to arrest Marchbanks but whether there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Franklin knowingly provided false information to secure the arrest warrant or gave false information in reckless disregard of the truth. ... Because Franklin was entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983, he also is entitled to qualified immunity against Marchbanks’ state claim for false arrest.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when a genuine factual dispute remains over whether they used excessive force in violation of a clearly established right.

Santiago v. Fields · filed 2001-10-17

In the case at bar, plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for an Eighth Amendment excessive force violation. Also, at the time of the events at issue, plaintiffs Eighth Amendment right against excessive force was clearly established. Because the court finds that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants used excessive force against plaintiff, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at this time.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields an official from liability when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the official’s conduct.

Jenkins v. Tyler · filed 2001-10-18

Accordingly, this Court concludes that it was not clear at the time of Tyler’s actions that federal law or the federal Constitution protected the relationship interests Jenkins asserts, and thus that Tyler’s actions would violate the contours of the First Amendment right to freedom of intimate association. On this basis, the Court concludes that Tyler is qualifiedly immune from liability under this claim.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts bear on the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct.

Arizmendi-Corales v. Rivera · filed 2001-10-19

Lastly, having determined that plaintiffs have established a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to their First Amendment claim, the Court must analyze the two latter prongs of the three-part test to determine whether qualified immunity is available as a defense to a state officer sued under § 1983. ... The granting of summary judgment based on objective reasonableness grounds of the qualified immunity defense is not appropriate where, as here, there is a factual issue as to an essential element of plaintiffs claim that bears on the determination of the objective reasonableness of the defendants’ actions.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct did not violate a constitutional right clearly established at the time.

Taylor v. Russell · filed 2001-10-24

Therefore, since the conduct Plaintiff complains of took place in 1999, Plaintiff has not alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Hence, Defendants enjoy qualified immunity and are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs § 1983 claims.

For qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit, the right must be established, but the civil remedy need not have been previously established.

Martinez v. City of Oxnard Oxnard Police Department Art Lopez, Chief Maria Pena Andrew Salinas Ron Zavala, and · filed 2001-10-30

Section 1983 requires only that the right, not the remedy, be established. Indeed, Congress’s purpose in enacting § 1983 was to create a novel civil remedy for violation of established constitutional rights.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have known that increasing a person’s vulnerability to harm from third parties could violate substantive due process.

Neuens v. City of Columbus · filed 2001-11-01

Based on the state of the case law in December 1998, the Court finds that a reasonable person in Defendant Bridges’s position would have known that a state actor could be liable under § 1983 for taking actions that increase an individual’s vulnerability to harm from third parties. Therefore, Defendant Bridges is not entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.

Public officials cannot obtain qualified immunity from a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim when they fail to show enough actual or potential workplace disruption to trigger Pickering balancing.

Washington v. Normandy Fire Protection District · filed 2001-11-05

Because the directors’ showing of actual or potential disruption is insufficient to trigger the Pickering balancing test, their claim of qualified immunity fails.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim is a legal issue reviewed de novo on appeal.

Cozart v. Collins · filed 2001-11-06

We affirm the district court’s judgment for essentially the same reasons stated in that court’s December 20, 2000, memorandum opinion and order. Because the doctrine of qualified immunity is a legal issue, its application by the district court is reviewed de novo.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 damages claims against officials when plaintiffs fail to show that their conduct violated a clearly established right.

McGee v. Snyder · filed 2001-11-07

Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that defendants’ conduct violated any clearly established right; therefore, we hold that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in the present case.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Peterson v. Hardwell · filed 2001-11-08

Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding appellees were entitled to qualified immunity against the First Amendment claim.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when plaintiffs cannot show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

McKnight v. Alford · filed 2001-11-09

Taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, which we must do when reviewing the denial of qualified immunity in the context of summary judgment ruling, see Wagner v. Bay City, Texas, 227 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2000), we conclude that Plaintiffs have not alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Correctional officials sued under Section 1983 may receive qualified immunity when a reasonable official could believe the challenged use of force was lawful.

Amero v. Merrell · filed 2001-11-15

The district court properly granted defendants summary judgment because a reasonable correctional counselor could have believed that defendant Bennett’s order in response to Amero’s disturbance did not represent unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.

Qualified immunity protects a defendant from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff presents no material fact showing that the defendant’s examination or prescribed treatment was unreasonable.

Holton v. Oral Surgeon Sing Sing Corr. Fac. · filed 2001-11-15

The district court granted summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that Dr. Fraitellone was qualifiedly immune from suit since Holton had failed to present any material fact that would support the conclusion that Dr. Fraitellone did not perform a reasonable examination in conformity with professional norms and prescribe a treatment that he thought was objectively reasonable. We review the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mazzola, 175 F.3d 255, 258 (2d Cir.1999), and affirm its decision on this ground.

Qualified immunity protects a defendant from a § 1983 claim when the alleged duty was not clearly established at the time.

Deyver v. Wilson · filed 2001-11-16

The district court also concluded that Wilson was entitled to qualified immunity, because “even if the applicable statutes ... and regulations could somehow be interpreted to have required defendant Wilson to release plaintiff on February 4, 1995, such an interpretation was not clearly established at the time.” ... We therefore affirm for substantially the same reasons described in the district court’s order.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Dixon v. Sullivan · filed 2001-11-19

Qualified immunity shields public officials from civil damages liability if their actions “did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 1467 (10th Cir. 1996). Because Dixon had not asserted facts to support a showing of the defendants’ deliberate indifference, which was required to establish a violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, he did not show that the defendants violated any of his clearly established rights. Thus, the district court properly granted these defendants qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 wrongful arrest claim when it was objectively reasonable to believe probable cause existed.

Crouch v. Sanchez · filed 2001-11-19

Therefore, Sanchez is entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity on this issue as well.

An officer may be denied qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim even without a prior case involving the precise type of force used, if the unlawfulness was clearly established.

Deorle v. Greg Rutherford, Butte County Deputy Sheriff Mick Grey, Butte County Sheriff County of Butte · filed 2001-11-19

Although there is no prior case prohibiting the use of this specific type of force in precisely the circumstances here involved, that is insufficient to entitle Rutherford to qualified immunity: notwithstanding the absence of direct precedent, the law may be, as it was here, clearly established.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their actions were lawful.

Webster v. Moquin · filed 2001-11-20

Thus, assuming the plaintiff did have a clearly established federal right, it was reasonable for Moquin and Sherman to believe that such right was not violated by the quarantine order and subsequent destruction of the birds. Accordingly, the plaintiffs claims are barred by qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Officers who fail to show probable cause for an arrest are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim arising from that arrest.

Prewett v. City of Palestine · filed 2001-11-21

Our review of the briefs, pertinent record excerpts, and controlling jurisprudence persuades that the officers have failed to show that they had probable cause to arrest the Prewetts for disorderly conduct; therefore, they are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants may receive qualified immunity from damages when they reasonably but mistakenly believe their conduct is lawful.

Nelson v. Heiss · filed 2001-11-21

On the other hand, making that error was neither anserine nor intentionally wrong. Thus, they were entitled to qualified immunity from being subjected to damages.

An official sued for damages under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Anobile v. Pelligrino · filed 2001-11-26

We therefore hold that Joel Leveson is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonably well-trained officer would have believed the search warrant was valid.

Pelster Ex Rel. Boyer v. Walker · filed 2001-11-27

Based on the undisputed evidence, this Court finds a reasonably well-trained officer would have believed the warrant was valid. The individual Defendants, therefore, are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity before trial when the facts, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, defeat the officers’ immunity defense.

Egebergh, Kathleen F v. Nicholson, David · filed 2001-11-27

A trial may of course cast the facts in a different light. But construed as they must be for purposes of this appeal, they defeat the motion for qualified immunity.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim before trial when the facts, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, support a finding that they knowingly exposed a detainee to a substantial health danger without good reason.

Kathleen F. Egebergh, Individually and as Special Administrator of the Estate of Edward J. Fitzgibbons v. Nicholso · filed 2001-11-27

A trial may of course cast the facts in a different light. But construed as they must be for purposes of this appeal, they defeat the motion for quajified immunity.

Government officials sued for damages under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have understood that the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Vega v. Floyd H. Miller, James C. Desimone, Howard L. English, Carolyn D. Jones, and G. Peter Cooney · filed 2001-11-29

The qualified immunity defense requires consideration of the clarity of the law establishing the right allegedly violated and whether a reasonable person, acting under the circumstances then confronting a defendant, would have understood that the applicable law was being violated.

Government officials sued under § 1983 may be entitled to qualified immunity when the complaint fails to allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Fitzgerald v. Bureau of Workers Compensation · filed 2001-11-30

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Bureau defendants, as they are entitled to qualified immunity. ... Fitzgerald’s complaint, as amended by his attorney, failed to allege that the Bureau defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 damages against prison officials when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Virgili v. Michelle Gilbert, John Morrison, and Joseph Masi · filed 2001-11-30

We need not, and do not, opine on the Fourth Amendment standard to be applied to strip-searches of prison employees. We conclude merely that the standard to be applied to such searches was not clearly established in this circuit in 1999. ... For all of the above reasons, we hold that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Virgili’s claimed violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 claims against officials are barred by qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Gaston v. HOUSTON COUNTY, TEXAS · filed 2001-12-04

Thus, Horn and Reed have qualified immunity from the Gastons’ § 1983 claims and Horn and Reed’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings should be granted with regard to the § 1983 claims.

Qualified immunity protects a public official from § 1983 liability when, in light of the information she possessed, her conduct was lawful.

Miller-Wagenknecht v. City of Munroe Falls, Unpublished Decision (12-5-2001) · filed 2001-12-05

In light of the information that Lyons possessed, her conduct was within the bounds of the law when she referred the matter for prosecution. Being a tax collector may not be a popular job, but the state of the record is that Lyons was doing her job and nothing more. Miller-Wagenknecht has failed to adequately rebut the assertion of qualified immunity by Lyons.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials are subject to qualified immunity unless their conduct violated clearly established federal law.

Xiques v. Knight · filed 2001-12-05

This is basically a defamation case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and cast as a cause of action for the violation of federal due process. We conclude that the defendant, a state prosecutor, is entitled to qualified immunity because her statements did not violate “clearly established” federal law, a requirement for recovering damages.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 damages against an officer when existing law did not clearly establish that his failure to disclose newly acquired, potentially exculpatory information before arrest was unlawful.

Glidewell v. Town of Gantt · filed 2001-12-10

Hayse is, therefore, entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity as to the claim for damages for federal malicious prosecution.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer could have believed the challenged conduct was lawful.

Bordelon v. Franklin Township, Unpublished Decision (12-13-2001) · filed 2001-12-13

Given these basic principles, the essential question is whether, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to appellant, no reasonable police officer would conclude that charging appellant with obstructing official business was authorized under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellant has failed to meet this burden.

A state official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not sufficiently clear to overcome that defense.

Adoption Services of Connecticut, Inc. v. Ragaglia · filed 2001-12-17

Thus, this Court concludes that this right is not sufficiently clear to overcome the defendant’s qualified immunity defense, and the defendant is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Section 1983’s qualified immunity shields a case worker from damages for taking temporary custody of a child on a reasonable suspicion of abuse, even if that suspicion later proves unfounded.

Richard H. Hatch, Jr. v. Department for Children, Youth and Their Families (State of Rhode Island), Steven Brown and Mar · filed 2001-12-17

The record shows that Brown had a reasonable basis both for suspecting child abuse and for believing John to be in danger (and, therefore, that he acted justifiably in taking the boy into temporary custody). The fact that this suspicion proved, in the long run, to be unfounded does not strip Brown of his entitlement to qualified immunity in regard to a claim for damages.

Section 1983 excessive-force claims against officers are subject to qualified immunity when the officers’ actions are reasonable under the circumstances.

Dokman v. County of Hennepin · filed 2001-12-18

The use of excessive force by officers constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure and is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Viewed from their perspective that they were dealing with a suicidal person, the officers’ actions were reasonable and therefore not excessive, thus supporting their claim of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects officers from a § 1983 claim when their conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; the court need not then decide whether a right was clearly established.

Klein v. Paul Long, Blackman Township Police Officer Phillip Rogers, Blackman Township Police Sergeant · filed 2001-12-21

In sum, we conclude that Long and Rogers had probable cause to arrest Klein and that they therefore did not violate Klein’s constitutional rights. We need not reach, then, the second part of the qualified immunity analysis delineated in Saucier — whether the constitutional right violated was clearly established.

Qualified immunity does not protect officers from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when their belief that the force was lawful was unreasonable.

Rosales v. City of Phoenix · filed 2001-12-26

Again, the officers’ own statements belie any reasonableness in their mistaken belief that shooting Rosales in the back was justified. Thus, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Section 1983 officials are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct is reasonable under the circumstances known to them and in light of clearly established law.

Duncan v. Weatherford · filed 2001-12-28

The school district officials are entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct toward Duncan was reasonable under the circumstances known to officials at the time, and in light of clearly established law.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 damages claims against officials in their individual capacities when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Page v. Torrey · filed 2001-12-28

Because there is no clearly established law on grooming regulations for persons civilly committed to state hospitals, the district court properly dismissed Page’s claims against hospital officials, in their individual capacities, on qualified immunity grounds.

Officials who intentionally violate constitutional rights are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim.

Brewster v. Shasta County · filed 2001-12-28

Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity for intentional constitutional violations.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would know that issuing a citation in retaliation for a citizen’s complaint violates a clearly established right.

Harless v. City of Columbus · filed 2002-01-04

Furthermore, a reasonable officer in Defendant Bahgat’s position would have known that the issuance of a citation based in part on a desire to retaliate against Harless for his filing a complaint violates § 1983. Therefore, the Court DENIES Officer Bahgat’s request for qualified immunity.

Officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Risbridger v. Connelly · filed 2002-01-04

Accordingly, the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Connelly and Fadly with respect to plaintiffs Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim over an arrest for refusing to identify oneself during a valid Terry stop when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time.

Risbridger v. East Lansing · filed 2002-01-04

Given the Supreme Court's express reservation of the question of whether a Fourth Amendment right to refuse to provide identification during a valid Terry stop renders invalid an arrest that is based on probable cause to believe the individual has violated a presumptively valid state or local law, as well as the lack of clear precedent from our circuit, we join the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits and find that the contours of such a right were not sufficiently clear that the unlawfulness of plaintiff's arrest must have been apparent at the time. Accordingly, Officer Fadly and Chief Connelly are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action depends on whether the plaintiff alleges a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and whether the official’s conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

Lacey v. Tejeda · filed 2002-01-09

Constable Tejeda is entitled to qualified immunity unless: Lacey has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right; and the Constable’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in the light of clearly established law.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when no reasonable officer could have believed the force used was lawful under the circumstances.

Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt · filed 2002-01-11

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the protestors, we conclude that Philip and Lewis are not entitled to qualified immunity because the use of pepper spray on the protestors’ eyes and faces was plainly in excess of the force necessary under the circumstances, and no reasonable officer could have concluded otherwise.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit when the alleged facts would not establish a constitutional violation.

Gurik v. Mitchell · filed 2002-01-15

In sum, we conclude that Gurik has not alleged facts on the pleadings that, if true, would demonstrate that Defendants-Appellees’ conduct in terminating his employment constituted unconstitutionally arbitrary action, and, therefore, we conclude that DefendantsAppellees are immune from Gurik’s suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity from the underlying Section 1983 claims also protects defendants from a related Section 1983 conspiracy claim.

Hill v. City of Seven Points · filed 2002-01-18

Under the holding in Hale, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 conspiracy claim if they are entitled to qualified immunity from the underlying § 1983 claims.

Qualified immunity can shield officers from a Section 1983 claim arising from a search and seizure.

Hart v. Myers · filed 2002-01-23

Even if the area constituted curtilage, however, the officers’ conduct is protected by qualified immunity. Therefore, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. # 36) is granted.

Section 1983 qualified immunity is unavailable at the pleading stage when the alleged retaliation for a public employee’s protected speech would be objectively unreasonable.

DePace v. Flaherty · filed 2002-01-28

It would have been objectively unreasonable for Flaherty to believe that adverse employment action against and unequal treatment of an employee who exercised his First Amendment rights was permissible. Qualified immunity therefore is not available to Flaherty at this time.

Officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the law did not clearly establish their responsibility for an uncommanded police dog attack.

Neeley v. Samis · filed 2002-01-28

The court finds no persuasive case law to support the notion that police officers should be responsible under § 1983 for an uncommanded attack by a police dog or that an officer, such as Officer Bratz, who is not the handler should be responsible for controlling a police dog. Because the contours of the law are not clearly established, a reasonable officer in Officer Samis’ or Officer Bratz’ position could not know that his specific actions violated any law and, as a result, they are entitled to qualified immunity from liability.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to government officials when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Hunter v. Heath · filed 2002-01-28

Government officials performing discretionary functions receive qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 so long as their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... An inmate legal assistant does not have a clearly established right to assert the claim of another inmate for the confiscation of that inmate’s legal materials.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit does not protect officials found to have intentionally violated a clearly established right against political discrimination.

Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig · filed 2002-01-30

This finding of intent renders Defendants’ argument of “reasonable mistake” moot. ... Therefore, Defendants’ motion for new trial based on the argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity is hereby DENIED.

Officers sued in their personal capacities under § 1983 may be entitled to qualified immunity.

Rodriguez v. City of Winter Park · filed 2002-01-30

Joe John Rodriguez sued Sergeant Wayne Farrell (“Sgt. Farrell”) and Officer Lorri Szczepanski (“Officer Szczepanski”), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the police officers violated the Constitution when they mistakenly arrested him pursuant to a valid arrest warrant for another person. Sgt. Farrell and Officer Szczepanski, in their personal capacities, appeal the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. We reverse.

Section 1983 does not shield officers through qualified immunity when no reasonable officer could believe their use of force was lawful under the circumstances.

Headwaters Forest Defense v. The County Of Humboldt · filed 2002-01-30

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the protestors, we conclude that Philip and Lewis are not entitled to qualified immunity because the use of pepper spray on the protestors' eyes and faces was plainly in excess of the force necessary under the circumstances, and no reasonable officer could have concluded otherwise.

Government officials lack qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when a reasonable official would have known their conduct violated clearly established rights.

Mansoor v. County of Albemarle · filed 2002-02-05

“Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil damages in a § 1983 action ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” ... As such, the court finds that the defendants reasonably should have known that the broad language of the prior restraint imposed unconstitutional limitations on the plaintiffs protected speech. To put it another way, the court finds that the defendants’ belief that the plan of assistance was not an unconstitutional prior restraint was objectively unreasonable. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is denied.

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from individual liability under § 1983 unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Khan v. Lucas · filed 2002-02-06

Even if we were to accept that Mr. Khan sued the state defendants in their individual capacities, they would still be entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

When an official raises qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit, the court must first determine whether the plaintiff alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right.

Donahue v. Gavin · filed 2002-02-07

Although we agree that the defendants are entitled to judgment, we conclude that the district court should not have reached the issue of the defendants' qualified immunity without first addressing whether Donahue even alleged a civil rights claim. The Supreme Court has held that courts must "determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all" when a government official raises qualified immunity as a defense to an action under § 1983.

A government official sued for damages under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the complaint fails to allege a constitutional violation.

Tuchman v. Connecticut · filed 2002-02-08

In order to prevail on an action for damages under § 1983 against a government official, the plaintiffs must show that the official violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... The court has concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a claim for violation of constitutional rights. Accordingly, the court finds that Nash is entitled to qualified immunity on all federal claims against him in his individual capacity.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from § 1983 liability for an arrest when the officer reasonably believes probable cause exists.

Menebhi v. Mattos · filed 2002-02-11

In this case, the Court concludes that Det. Lt. Higgins acted reasonably both in conducting his criminal investigation of plaintiff and in his preparation of the affidavit in support of the application for the arrest warrant. Accordingly, defendants have satisfied the requirements of qualified immunity, and therefore, are shielded from liability against plaintiffs § 1983, false arrest, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution claims.

Officers lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when they ignore an obvious need for medical attention after a beating they committed or observed.

El-Uri v. City of Chicago · filed 2002-02-11

If the officer, or his partner who observed the beating and its aftermath, then fails to provide the attention even after the victim screams in pain for an extended period, spits up fluids, and hobbles painfully, he shows deliberate indifference. The individual officers have no qualified immunity defense here.

Qualified immunity does not bar an official-capacity claim for injunctive relief under § 1983.

Millennium Restaurants Group, Inc. v. City of Dallas · filed 2002-02-21

In actions against public officials in their official capacities, the doctrine of qualified immunity plays no part, prohibiting neither the grant of injunctive relief, nor the award of attorney’s fees.

Qualified immunity cannot be granted on summary judgment in a § 1983 suit when material factual disputes prevent the court from assessing the defense.

Candelaria v. Rivera Rodríguez · filed 2002-02-25

Due to the factual disputes regarding a possible political discriminatory motivation and the circumstances surrounding the Mayor’s decision not to renew Plaintiffs’ contracts, all of which are vital to this case as a whole and the Court’s assessment of the qualified immunity defense in particular, the Court is not in a position to grant Defendants’ motion for qualified immunity at this time.

Qualified immunity can shield a police officer from liability on a § 1983 claim for discretionary conduct when the plaintiff fails to establish a violation of a clearly established right.

Hebert v. City of Canton, Unpublished Decision (2-25-2002) · filed 2002-02-25

The next level of inquiry is whether appellant has established that any official in appellee's position "would have clearly understood that he was under an affirmative duty to refrain from such conduct." ... Therefore, on appellant's 1983 claim based upon probable cause to arrest, we find qualified immunity shields appellee from responsibility for discretionary acts.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the officer had probable cause to issue a citation.

Menon v. Frinton · filed 2002-02-25

Frinton is entitled to qualified immunity because his investigation of the 1996 accident provided probable cause to issue the citation and find Menon at fault: Menon’s admission, the other driver’s account, and the damage to the ears furnished Frinton with sufficient information to make such a determination.

Officers are qualifiedly immune from a § 1983 false arrest claim when it was objectively reasonable to believe probable cause existed or reasonable officers could disagree about it.

Rodriguez v. City of New York · filed 2002-02-25

Additionally, the police officers were qualifiedly immune. An officer has qualified immunity to make an arrest “if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.”

In a § 1983 judicial-deception claim, a finding that an officer recklessly or deceitfully prepared a warrant affidavit defeats qualified immunity.

Butler v. Elle · filed 2002-02-26

In this regard, because the two issues merge, there need be no separate inquiry at trial, and no discrete instructions, on whether Elle is entitled to qualified immunity. If he was reckless or deceitful in preparing the warrant affidavit, then he both violated Butler’s rights and is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when preexisting law did not give fair warning that their conduct was unlawful.

Pace v. Capobianco · filed 2002-03-01

Because the preexisting law did not warn defendants fairly that shooting the decedent in these circumstances would clearly violate federal law, defendants — if they violated federal law (which we strongly doubt) — are entitled to immunity.

Government officials sued individually under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when preexisting law did not fairly warn that their conduct clearly violated federal law.

Grech v. Clayton County, Georgia · filed 2002-03-01

Qualified immunity protects government officials, in their individual capacities, from suit unless the law preexisting the defendant official’s supposedly wrongful act was already established to such a high degree that every objectively reasonable official standing in the defendant’s place would be on notice that what the defendant official was doing would be clearly unlawful given the circumstances. ... Because the preexisting law did not warn defendants fairly that shooting the decedent in these circumstances would clearly violate federal law, defendants -- if they violated federal law (which we strongly doubt) -- are entitled to immunity.

Qualified immunity shields an official from a § 1983 claim when the governing law was not clearly established or a reasonable official could have believed the conduct lawful.

O'Connor v. Terhune · filed 2002-03-04

The test for determining whether an official can be shielded by qualified immunity is two-fold. The court must consider whether (1) “the law governing the conduct was clearly established,” and if so, whether (2) “under that law, a reasonable official could have believed his conduct was lawful.”

Government officials sued individually under § 1983 have qualified immunity if the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Anobile v. Pelligrino · filed 2002-03-06

The doctrine of qualified immunity provides immunity to government officials sued in their individual capacity in any of three situations: (1) if the conduct at issue is not prohibited by federal law; (2) even if the conduct was prohibited, if the plaintiffs right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct; or (3) if the defendant’s conduct was objectively legally reasonable in light of clearly established law. ... We therefore hold that Joel Leveson is entitled to qualified immunity.

A government official sued for damages under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the right violated was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Anobile v. Pelligrino · filed 2002-03-06

We therefore agree with the district court that the law governing the searches of dormitories on racetrack grounds was not clearly established at the time of this search. ... We therefore hold that Joel Leveson is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields state actors from personal liability under § 1983 unless they violate a well-established constitutional or federal right.

Donnelly v. Peters · filed 2002-03-07

Qualified immunity shields state actors from personal liability in § 1983 claims, unless the state actor has violated a well-established constitutional or federal right.

In a § 1983 suit, limited discovery may proceed to address qualified immunity before the defense is resolved.

Moore v. Taylor · filed 2002-03-07

Discovery is appropriate for the limited purpose of addressing the issue of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity may be denied on a § 1983 First Amendment claim at summary judgment when the evidence sufficiently shows that the employee was neither a policymaker nor a confidential employee.

Fletcher v. Szostkiewicz · filed 2002-03-08

In summary, there are sufficient summary judgment facts to conclude that Plaintiff was neither a policymaker nor a confidential employee and that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity, as a matter of law, with respect to Count One.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when, accepting the plaintiff’s account, clearly established law would have made the force unlawful to a reasonable officer.

Jones v. Marcum · filed 2002-03-11

The Kettering Defendants argue that Officers Wabler and Marcum are entitled to qualified immunity insofar as they are implicated by Jones’ § 1983 cause of action. The Court disagrees. ... Suffice it to say that the body of law is considerable, and leaves no doubt in the mind of this Court that if Jones’ version of the facts is to be believed, he had a clearly established right not to be treated in such away. Accordingly, the Kettering Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of qualified immunity is OVERRULED.

Qualified immunity is available in a § 1983 suit only to officials sued in their personal capacity, not their official capacity.

Cestero v. Pagan Rosa · filed 2002-03-11

However, the qualified immunity defense can only be raised by persons sued in their personal capacity, not in their official capacity.

Factual disputes about an officer’s conduct can preclude qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim at summary judgment.

Thompson v. Sweet · filed 2002-03-11

These disputed questions of fact also preclude a determination that Officer Sweet is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right.

Bates v. Bigger · filed 2002-03-12

We therefore hold that Denehy’s conduct did not violate any clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known, and he is thus entitled to a defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows qualified immunity for line officers who reasonably rely on their superiors’ assurance that a search warrant is valid without reading it themselves.

Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County · filed 2002-03-13

Line officers, on the other hand, are required to do much less. They do not have to actually read or even see the warrant; they may accept the word of their superiors that they have a warrant and that it is valid.

Officers are qualifiedly immune from § 1983 false arrest liability when they had arguable probable cause to arrest.

Tobias v. County of Putnam · filed 2002-03-14

In short, the officer defendants clearly had arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. Tobias for any one of these three crimes from the moment they arrived at the cottage on July 7, 1999. Accordingly, they are immune from suit on this claim, and we grant summary judgment in their favor.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages action cannot be resolved on summary judgment when disputed facts material to an officer’s objective reasonableness remain.

Bloom v. Luis · filed 2002-03-14

Therefore, the court finds that summary judgment is not appropriate on qualified immunity grounds and that the question of whether Officer Luis acted reasonably is an issue for trial, to be decided on the basis of the jury’s findings regarding the factual issues in dispute.

In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the asserted right was clearly established when the defendant raises qualified immunity.

Ivey v. Hamlin · filed 2002-03-18

When a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the rights he or she is asserting have been clearly established.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim for assaulting an arrestee after he is handcuffed and subdued.

Lee v. City of Portsmouth · filed 2002-03-19

But, the right of a person in custody to be free from assault on his person after being handcuffed and subdued is "clearly established." ... Defendants Russo, Maloney, and John and Jane Doe are not entitled to qualified immunity from Lee's excessive force claim.

Qualified immunity defeats a § 1983 damages claim when the plaintiff fails to demonstrate a constitutional violation.

Alexander v. Carrick · filed 2002-03-19

We need not proceed any further than the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis as Alexander has not demonstrated a constitutional violation.

A defendant entitled to qualified immunity cannot be held liable on a § 1983 claim.

Bucknor-Smartt v. University & Community College System · filed 2002-03-19

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Bucknor-Smartt’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against defendant Nielsen because Nielsen was entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 may be entitled to qualified immunity for claims about strip and pat searches.

Young v. Seling · filed 2002-03-20

The district court properly concluded that the SCC officials were entitled to qualified immunity on Young’s claim that SCC officials conducted unconstitutional strip and pat searches.

An official sued under Section 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when existing precedent clearly established that the challenged conduct was unconstitutional.

Heggen v. Gary Lee, Hopkins County Sheriff, in Both His Individual and Official Capacities, Hopkins County, Ke · filed 2002-03-20

Further, Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity inasmuch as this Court’s opinion in Hall v. Tollett should have alerted Defendant that refusing to rehire Plaintiffs for political reasons was impermissible.